

ENACTING THE UNTRANSLATABLE:

THE SOCIO-LINGUISTIC SITUATEDNESS OF SHAKESPEAREAN EMOTIONS

by

MICHAEL JOEL BARTELLE

A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

The Shakespeare Institute
School of English, Drama and Creative Studies
College of Arts and Law
University of Birmingham
September 2021

UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

University of Birmingham Research Archive

e-theses repository

This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation.

Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the phenomenon of emotion in different cultural contexts, through the lens of Shakespearean performance. In particular, it investigates how differences in language may reflect, or even shape, how feelings in the playhouse are experienced, expressed, and emphasised. This involves the comparison of emotion concepts in early modern English to twenty-first-century English, as well as to untranslatable concepts in Russian, French, and German. The INTRODUCTION serves as an overview of the importance of both translation scholarship and emotion studies as they relate to Shakespeare and early modern England. CHAPTER ONE introduces the philosophical, scientific, and linguistic groundwork that will permit a confident exploration of the situated nature of emotions on the Shakespearean stage. In particular, this chapter presents a theoretical paradigm known as enaction, as well as the methodological tools of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage. CHAPTER TWO focuses on the experience of lovesickness as it pertains to the character of Mariana in *Measure for Measure*. The chapter begins with a study of the idea of love melancholy and the many ways it was considered a serious illness in Renaissance England, and then examines how twenty-first-century productions of the play navigate the dramaturgical implications of Mariana's emotive improvisation. CHAPTER TWO then compares current English-language notions of lovesickness with the Russian

untranslatable concept *тоска* (toska), and looks at how Russian productions of the play have embodied this emotion. CHAPTER THREE looks at *Othello*, through the lens of an emotion we tend to think of as positive: joy. However, in exploring the early modern English attitudes toward this particular feeling, this chapter uncovers the interrelatedness of Renaissance England's concepts of joy and death. CHAPTER THREE then turns to an examination of joy's French-language analogue: *joie*. An analysis of French translations and productions of *Othello* will show how *joie* carries surprisingly different connotations from the "joy" that native English speakers know. CHAPTER FOUR explores the concept of fear in *Hamlet*. The first half of the chapter examines the neuroscience behind the claim that fear is a universal human emotion, before demonstrating how fear in Renaissance England was bound up with concepts of the afterlife. The second half explores the German-language concept of *Angst*, and analyses how this emotion has coloured German theatre-makers' relationship with *Hamlet*. The CODA looks more closely at the practical, theatrical implications of the disparity between the emotion concepts that emerged from Shakespeare's specific time and those of today. In particular, the CODA outlines a means by which actors can use the Natural Semantic Metalanguage to deconstruct some of Shakespeare's emotions, which may be considered "untranslatable" today, and synthesise them into a culturally relevant mode of expression.

To my family

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my primary supervisor, Dr Erin Sullivan. Thank you for being willing to take on an unconventional student with an unconventional project. Thank you for your endlessly wonderful reading recommendations and your honest and encouraging feedback. Thank you for working so tirelessly on my behalf in order to make what has been a very challenging time go as smoothly as possible for me. Your brilliant blend of intelligence, wisdom, professionalism, and kindness is such an inspiration. I count myself the luckiest PhD student in the world to have had your guidance throughout this process.

Many thanks as well to my secondary supervisor, Professor Michael Dobson. Your encyclopaedic knowledge of and enthusiasm for Shakespearean performance—especially in non-English languages—has guided and inspired me just as much as have your wit and charm.

Thank you Juliet Creese, Rebecca White, and all of the staff at the Shakespeare Institute. Many thanks to all of my fellow students as well, for helping make this time a lot less lonely. And extra-special thanks to Karen Thompson, Kate Welch and the entire SI Library staff for putting up with my presence every day.

My studies would not have been possible without generous support from the Sir Barry Jackson Trust and the Richard Stapley Trust. Many thanks to both of these wonderful organisations.

At various times before and during my work on this thesis, I received invaluable help in various forms from a few special individuals, without which I would have maintained neither my focus nor my sanity. Thank you very much to Dorothy Field & Commander Owen Thomas, Meaghan & Brett Barakett, Annie Lennox & Dr Mitch Besser, Sue & Chris Hamer, and Bill Earner & Dr Bianca D'Souza.

Additionally, a substantial portion of my fees were paid by the scores of generous contributors to my crowdfunding campaign. I am grateful to and humbled by everyone who chipped in to help make this thesis possible. In addition to the many anonymous donors, I wish to extend my thanks to the following individuals: Anna Åhlgren, Lisa Åkesson Stryker, Danna Aliano, Elizabeth Barnett, James Bartelle, Jennifer Billot, Nancy Breton, Ben Broadribb, Dr Thea Buckley, Josh Caldicott, Hattie Chamberlin, Kristian Comer, Shona Cowley, Andy Crane, Kate Croft, Roderick Cromar, Dr Mary Davies, Claire Deroy, Chris Devine, Julie Dietz, LaRaisha Dionne, Will Dorman, Kelly Downes, Maureen Downes, Sam Dudley, Casie Duplechain, Heather Evans, Rosa Falconer, Prof Ewan Fernie, Amanda Finch, Alex Forster, Ann Gavaghan, Lorna Giltrow-Shaw, Anita Goa, Billy Griffin, Sophie

Guerin, Emily Gummer, Saraya Haddad, Beth Hagen, Abi Halden, Lizzie Hardy, Monica Harris, Melissa Harrison, Susan Hart, Dr Ella Hawkins, Megan Heeney, Dr Martin Higgins, Sarah Hodgson, Lucy Holehouse, Vivian Holmes, Jess Horn, Gina Howie, Dr Elizabeth Jeffery, George Johnson, Alexandra Juckno, Monica Kaminska, Daliya Karnofsky, Michael Kohn, Jo Kreft, Kerry Lambeth, John D. Langdon, Andrew Larimer, Irene D. Ledesma, Diane Lowman, Georgina Lucas, Cristiana Marsella, Dr Emer McHugh, Grace McLean, Neela Miller, Kelsey Moore, Emma Müller, Liz Nealon, Dr Rachael Nicholas, Dr Richard O'Brien, Dr Maria O'Connor, Dr Mary Odbert, Aoife O'Rourke, Gillian M. Othen, Nikki Pearson, Tova Perlmutter, Andy Pickering, Alyssa Ramirez, Sheena Ramirez, Jini Reddy, Elizabeth Ricardo, Ian Riddoch, John Robinson, Mark Routhier, Kathy Sanchez, Laryssa Schoeck, Molly Schreiber, Dr Kirsty Sedgman, Héloïse Sénéchal, Dr Will Sharpe, Dr Beth Sharrock, Eleanor Smith, Jodie Smith, Alexa Spiegel, Arianna Spiros, Tresa Stephens, Dr Joseph Stephenson, Prof Tiffany Stern, Stephen Stout, Amelia Strohsnitter, Dr Erin Sullivan, Jeremy Summer, Dr Alexander Thom, Joan Thomas, Barbara Thompson, Alexander Wallace, Tonia Wang, Kate Welch, Prof Sir Stanley Wells, Jon White, Nora Williams, Gillian and Teddy Wiggin-Alvaro, Carrie Wofford, Elissa Wolf, Prof Ramona Wray, and Michael Zuffoletti.

Just as importantly, all of my wonderful friends around the world have done so much to keep my spirits up during this time. In particular, thank you to my *University Challenge* teammates Rachel Humphreys, Mark McParlan, John Robinson, and Jaimy Sajit for the incredibly fun source of distraction that only buzzer-quizzing with you four can provide.

Finally, much love and many heartfelt thanks to my family, to whom this thesis is dedicated. Grandma. Papa Bear & Pameloo. James & Jamie. Eryck & Rachel. Jada, Jérôme, Arizona, Dahlia, & Tygen. Fiasco & Maura. I'm nothing without y'all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: Shakespeare, Translation, Emotion	1
Shakespeare's Translational Relevance	3
Shakespeare and the Cultural History of Emotions	10
Emotions in Shakespearean Performance	23
Vocabulary of the Passions	29
Overview	32
Author's Notes	38
One: Theory and Methodology	39
Enaction	41
Languaging Emotions	55
Affects, Emotions, and Moods	61
The Untranslatable	68
The Natural Semantic Metalanguage	75
Anticipating the Actor	84
Two: Love Melancholy and Russian <i>Tocka</i> in <i>Measure for Measure</i>	95
Lovesickness in Renaissance England	97
Mariana's Music	105
Mariana on the Contemporary Stage	116
Emotional Heat	122
<i>Tocka</i>	131
Mariana on the Russian Stage	138
Three: Joy and French <i>Joie</i> in <i>Othello</i>	149
What is Joy?	153
Troilus, Pericles, and Cymbeline	158
<i>Othello</i>	167
Mixed Emotions and the Paradox of Tragedy	177
<i>Othello's</i> Joy on the Modern English Stage	180
<i>Othello en Français</i>	184
<i>Joie</i> as <i>Émotion</i>	192
<i>Les Othellos Français à l'Écran et sur Scène</i>	202
Four: Fear and German <i>Angst</i> in <i>Hamlet</i>	213
What is Fear?	215
King Hamlet's Ghost	224
Fear and the Enactive Imagination in the Playhouse	235

"All that is I see"	239
"Fear and wonder"	247
<i>Unser Shakespeare</i>	255
<i>Die Deutsche Angst</i>	258
<i>"Aber Höre mit Angst"</i>	267
Hamlet's <i>Angsttraum</i>	273
Coda: Performing the Untranslatable	289
Translation and Transference	291
Shame and Dishonour	296
Microbeats and Performative Pointillism	308
Conclusion	321
Bibliography	325

To unlock a society, look at its untranslatable words.

Salman Rushdie, *Shame*, 1983

INTRODUCTION

SHAKESPEARE, TRANSLATION, AND EMOTION

“To many theatergoers,” asserts the *New York Times* theatre critic Ben Brantley, “the idea of hearing Shakespeare in anything other than its original tongue is akin to watching ballet performed by inanimate statues” (2006). These words appear in a review of the Chekhov International Theatre Festival’s Russian-language production of *Twelfth Night*, directed by Declan Donnellan. Yet despite acknowledging these misgivings, Brantley’s piece asserts that the emotional potency of this staging’s storytelling was of a quality that he had “rarely seen matched in productions of Shakespeare” (ibid.). Among spectators who are willing to give translated Shakespeare a chance, Brantley is not alone in expressing such reflections about the powerful feelings that can transpire when attending one of the plays in a language other than English. In her research of the 2012 Globe to Globe Festival, which saw 37 Shakespearean productions in 37 different languages, Amy Kenny heard similar comments from the playgoers she interviewed. Even amongst audience members who spoke only English, there seemed to be a consensus that watching Shakespeare’s plays in translation “allowed for more focus on performance and emotion” than they

usually experienced while watching stagings in the original English (2014: 32). Why might this be?

Brantley's review offers a hypothesis that likely resonates with what many people believe about these plays: that there is "an alchemical substance in Shakespeare that transcends the verbal" (2006). As he sees it, this is because "the essence of Shakespeare isn't exclusively linguistic. The words, it seems, are but steppingstones to a universal pattern of images and insights about human behavior" (ibid.). But then, something truly fascinating happens. Brantley offers particularly high praise for the way in which this Russian production "reminds us that the line between pleasure and pain, between happiness and despair, is also flexible" (ibid.). The reason this insight is so intriguing is that, while his assessment of the play's success emphasises the transcendence of words, the Russian language has a very common and culturally important word—*тоска* (toska)—that encompasses all the emotional qualities to which Brantley refers. Crucially, as we shall see in CHAPTER TWO, this word has no suitable equivalent in the English language. Is it possible, then, that the ostensibly ineffable emotional experiences that Brantley and others have described when attending translated Shakespeare manifest themselves *because* of the languages in which they are performed, rather than *despite* them?

This thesis explores the phenomenon of emotion in different cultural contexts, through the lens of Shakespearean performance. In particular, it investigates how differences in language, across both temporal and geographical bounds, may reflect—or even shape—how feelings in the playhouse are experienced, expressed, and emphasised. This will involve the comparison of emotion concepts in early modern English to twenty-first-century English, as well as to untranslatable concepts in Russian, French, and German. Thus, although what follows is rooted in the literary, historical, and performance-oriented field of Shakespeare studies, it necessarily borrows methodologies from other disciplines, such as psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and—perhaps most importantly—translation studies.

Shakespeare's Translational Relevance.

Some native English-speaking performers and scholars of Shakespeare—along with the “many theatregoers” to which the opening Brantley quote refers—may find it difficult to fathom the relevance of translation studies to the world's most famous English author. In my view, among the many reasons such reluctance needs to be challenged, three points in particular stand out as especially salient.

The first, and perhaps most obvious, relates to the undeniable fact that these plays and their stories carry a powerful emotional impact that extends well beyond

traditional anglophone borders. “Shakespeare,” according to Peter Holbrook, “made the emotional life of human beings the essence of art” (2015: 264). While I agree with Holbrook’s statement, it is today’s global community of readers, interpreters, and audiences who continue to give relevance to the emotional fire Shakespeare ignited. And it is important to understand that, in the third decade of the twenty-first century, most people around the world encounter these plays primarily in their own native (non-English) languages. As Shakespearean translation scholar Ton Hoenslaars notes, “[i]n many educational contexts Shakespeare may indeed be taught in English, but beyond the privileged space of the classroom, in the theatre for example, his words are generally conveyed in translation” (2012: 1). For this reason, Alexa Alice Joubin goes so far as to assert that translation “is the core of the Shakespeare industry” (2011: 71). Consequently, in order for anglophone Shakespearians to continue taking part in a well-informed global conversation, it is vital that we understand the frameworks in which these textual and performative encounters take place—as well as the sociolinguistic processes that inform such interactions. In fact, we need only consider Shakespeare’s creative enterprise in its own historical context in order to appreciate the importance of this kind of discourse. Joubin offers this reminder:

As products of an age of exploration, Shakespeare’s plays demonstrate influences from a rich treasure trove of multilingual sources in Latin, Italian, Spanish, and French. ... Shakespeare was a great translator in the sense of

transforming multiple sources, and he was a talented synthesiser of different threads of narratives (ibid.: 74).

Due to the abundance and accessibility of information, we ourselves live in a historical moment that is in many ways analogous to the Renaissance “age of exploration.” As such, investigating the artistic alchemy of translation can offer us front-row seats in the global theatre of cultural exchange.

Second, integrating methodological principles from the field of translation studies offers benefits that accrue even if we are working entirely within the anglophone realm. Much of the present study will indeed focus on analysing the affective upshots of contemporary performances of Shakespeare in other tongues and cultures. Nevertheless, I find it helpful to begin my case studies with instances of how transtemporal semantic shifts within English have their own emotional implications—especially in terms of how (and whether) modern-day theatre artists realise these disparities and ambiguities in their work onstage. This point is far from trifling. Cultural historian Robert Darnton puts it this way: “We constantly need to be shaken out of a false sense of familiarity with the past to be administered doses of culture shock” (1984: 4). As we shall see, many of the discrepancies between how passions were understood in Shakespeare’s time and how we understand our own emotions now can be attributed to the fundamental problem of the “untranslatable.” We shall look more closely at the concept of untranslatability in CHAPTER ONE, but for now it

shall suffice to say that the term applies to any word for which a translator's target language lacks a word that can be said to equate precisely with the source-language word (Large et al., 2018: paragraph 7.8). As Hoenslaars notes,

Shakespeare's early modern work is really a fixed product in a "foreign" language that no one speaks any more, except on the stage and other performance platforms, or in inverted commas. Seen in this way, one could argue that Shakespearean translation may hold its own alongside the original. One could go one step further even and argue that, given its purpose of communication, the translation may have the edge over the original Shakespearean text. For if there is a language barrier anywhere, it does not operate between Shakespeare and non-native readers or audiences of his work in translation, but rather separates native speakers of English from their own early modern writer (2012: 12).

It is in this spirit that my research investigates the idea of "untranslatable" emotion concepts as having intra-linguistic consequences as well as inter-linguistic ones. As the translation scholar Susan Bassnett has argued, "Shakespeare's world is a different world and any rendering of Shakespeare's plays, whether in some written form of translation or in terms of staging, involves the negotiation of difference" (2012: 55). Much of that difference emerges in numerous lexical shifts in affective terminology over the centuries. "If naming emotions makes them available to experience," argues the historical and cultural anthropologist Monique Scheer, "then charting changes in naming means writing a history of feeling in the fullest sense" (2012: 214). Bridget Escolme has noted, for example, that while "grief, woe, sorrow, and tears are often used in association or even indeterminably in Shakespeare," the word "grief" could

also “connote distress at an offence” (2014: 177). And in an illustration that is even further removed from present-day usage, Richard Meek has demonstrated how “the words rue and ruth could both denote sorrow and compassion” (2015: 139). By understanding the scope of such differences and their performative implications, I hope to illuminate what enables these plays to sustain such a high degree of emotional relevance across the shores of time and place alike.

Third, viewing works and words with which native English-speakers are so intimately familiar sometimes comes at a cost. We may, in fact, be so inured to Shakespeare’s language that certain elements of it escape our attention. As I have already noted, it is certainly true that understanding the implications of historical slippage is part of what makes scholars and actors of early modern plays scrutinise the text in a way that we might not otherwise find necessary. Yet a good translator requires an even keener sensitivity to the nuances of Shakespeare’s text. Thus, the level of sharpness needed in order to successfully render these famous works into another tongue enables translators to glean insights that can bring a remarkable level of clarity to the plays. This is precisely the point that Séverine Hubscher-Davidson makes in *Translation and Emotion*:

Translators undertake very close readings of source texts and become involved with source authors and their texts to a greater extent than do “regular” target readers. It can be said that the translation process binds them to source authors, providing them with intimate knowledge of how they

work, how they construct meanings, impart knowledge and express themselves (2018: 3–4).

And when it comes to translating Shakespeare in particular, Michael Billington has similarly noted that “aspects of a play we [as an English audience] would overlook shine out more clearly when transmitted through the prism of another language, culture, and history. ... [T]he plays acquire a different resonance and richness—a new patina of meaning—when seen through foreign eyes” (qtd. in Hoenslaars 2012: 21). In other words, we native English-speaking Shakespearians stand to learn things about these plays from the translators and artists who are able to divine relatively unexpected elements of semantic, dramaturgical, and emotional import from the works that we have so long considered “our own.” This is a discovery that the translator Alfredo Michel Modenessi has made in his own work: “Ironically, while Shakespeare’s texts grow increasingly less accessible to English users, translation and performance not only enable those texts to operate effectively within less constraining conditions but also provide immediate, manifold, and mutually cancelling/enriching interpretations” (2012: 245). The case studies of this thesis will explore many examples of this very phenomenon.

As such, I wish to make one crucial point perfectly explicit from the outset: while it is tempting to think of translated material as somehow inferior, to do so

would constitute a grievous error. As a corrective for this line of thinking, Joubin suggests the following:

It is useful to think of translation as a love affair involving two equal partners, because it allows us an unimpaired view of the event, and eschews such hierarchical constructs as a superior original and a necessarily lesser derivative. The production and reception of translated works—either literal translation of words into another language (e.g., the Hebrew Bible to the Geneva Bible) or the transformation of meanings into a new form of expression (stage play to film noir)—imply double perspectives and have a significance that goes beyond the simple transfer of semantic meanings. A translator is an interpreter of the literary text and its cultural contexts, and a reader of the translation is no less a mediator between many possible worlds and meanings (2011: 86).

The present study concerns itself chiefly with how situating Shakespeare in these “many possible worlds” can demonstrate a staggering variety among the ways we experience and express the things we feel. The primary point of focus for this exploration is the concept of “untranslatable” emotions—feelings that are codified into specific words in one language but not in another. The overarching idea this thesis examines is that, because “different languages carve up and map experiential state-space in different ways,” as Lomas puts it, “one is more likely to encounter, recognize, and cultivate such values within a culture that has expressly identified them” (2018: 12, 16). Another way of looking at this, according to the social psychologists Batja Mesquita and Michael Boiger’s “sociodynamic” model of emotions, is that “[e]motions and emotional responses that are valued in a particular sociocultural context, tend to be more prevalent and more intense” (2014: 299–300; see also Lyon

2009). And as the following section will show, the emotional artistry of Shakespeare and his interpreters—along with the author’s international *bona fides*—makes his work a superb proving ground for this idea.

Shakespeare and the Cultural History of Emotions.

“Feelings,” according to the biologist Charles Birch, “are what matter most in life” (qtd. in Wierzbicka 1999: 1). Whether or not we can all agree with this assessment, it certainly does not seem possible to discount the importance of emotions, nor their immense capacity to affect our experiences throughout our lives.¹ As the philosopher Achim Stephan puts it, without emotions,

much would leave us indifferent; even our own future would seem uninteresting and trivial. Without emotions, we would be unable to make the decisions that guide our actions; we would have no evaluative basis for more long-term rational judgments and decisions. Without emotions, we would be incapable of a social and cultural life in a close community with many other persons (2009: 18).

Our fascination with feelings has such a broad scope that the study of them takes up increasingly significant space in a range of disciplines across the humanities and sciences—so much so that the theorist Eugenie Brinkema has dubbed the present scholarly moment the “Episteme of the Affect” (2014: xi). Katharine Craik has noted that the study of emotions “is emerging as one way in which the humanities in

1. For an overview of differences between feeling terms such as “affect” and “emotion,” see CHAPTER ONE, especially pp. 61–67.

general—and literary criticism in particular—can reflect on lived life” (2020: 2). The historical study of emotions has, in recent decades, captured heretofore underappreciated aspects of the past, adding new layers of richness to our understanding of the narratives that led us to where we are now (Matt and Stearns 2014: 9).

Within the specific context of drama, the performance scholar Erin Hurley has made the bold claim that “doing things with feeling is the primary reason for theatre’s existence” (2010: 4). Kathryn Prince concurs. “Drama is,” she says, “unlike any other genre, acutely interested, perhaps even chiefly interested, in the communication of emotional states” (2017: 92). Again, one need not fully subscribe to these claims. However, it is fairly uncontroversial to argue that the realm of theatrical performance is a decidedly fruitful locus for exploring human feeling. In large part, as Peta Tait argues, this is because “[d]ramatic scripts present narratives that frame the emotions in a context,” and theatrical performances of these texts offer “an engagement in which emotions are distilled” (2021: 1, 76). As such, examining these often ephemeral phenomena within a theatrical space offers a kind of scholarly facility: spectators know that, when watching a performance, they are likely to witness more intensely expressive displays of feeling than they might expect to encounter regularly in their day-to-day lives.

In many ways, Shakespeare's dramatic works—both on the page and on the stage—can claim a particularly noteworthy relationship with the world of emotions.

Borrowing a phrase from *Measure for Measure*, Craik contends that

[Shakespeare's works are "motion generative" in our own world, not only capturing emotional experiences that belong to the past but also reimagining and reinscribing, in new ways, the interconnected actions, events and encounters, which make up affective life now (2020: 3).

Craik's argument, in other words, is that Shakespearean drama is such a worthwhile field of study for emotion scholars precisely because his plays still influence how we conceive of and experience our own emotions today. The strength of this claim may be debatable; however, because they have been translated for performance in all of the world's major languages (and many of its minor ones), Shakespeare's plays do indeed offer a great deal of affective richness as well as a significant degree of global ubiquity—at least as far as dramatic literature is concerned. These works can, therefore, provide a particularly rewarding field of investigation when it comes to a comparative study of emotional conception, experience, and expression.

It is unsurprising, then, that several scholars have already explored many facets of the intersection of Shakespeare and emotion. Indeed, Shakespearean scholarship as a whole has always attended to the author's particularly powerful treatment of human feeling. That being said, scholarly criticism's focus on Shakespeare's passions as a specific field of study properly began in 1930 with Lily

Bess Campbell's *Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes: Slaves of Passion*. Dissatisfied with the tendency of her contemporaries to study Shakespeare's dramatic art as driven principally by action, Campbell "became convinced that Shakespeare in all his tragedies was primarily concerned with passion" (1930: vi). She described the aims of her work in these terms:

I have tried to show how the passions were understood and why the passions were the pivotal point for discussion by physicians and philosophers of the [early modern] period; and ... I have discussed the embodiment of passion in the four great tragic heroes of Shakespeare, in each of whom a dominating passion is analysed in accordance with the medical and philosophical teaching of the period (ibid. vii).

The majority of the emotion-based scholarship that flowered in the mid-twentieth century was of the character-based variety that Campbell's second point describes—from John Dover Wilson's *What Happens in Hamlet* (1935) to John Bayley's *The Characters of Love* (1960). While vestigial traces of this approach remain in current research—a point to which we will return in CHAPTER ONE—character criticism fell mostly out of favour as a primary means of exploring emotion in Shakespeare in the century's later decades.

However, the first part of the task that Campbell began—that of situating early modern passions in their historical context—is a project that is very much still alive. The past thirty years have witnessed an immense expansion of this discussion. Much of twenty-first-century scholarship's interest in early modern emotions

emerged from the research into the era's relationship to humoral theory. This is the idea, advanced by the Graeco-Roman medical philosopher Galen in the second century CE, that an individual's bodily and affective life was governed by the four humours of blood, choler (yellow bile), melancholy (black bile), and phlegm (see Kambaskovic 2017 for a concise overview). The most prominent scholars who discussed this theory as it pertained to early modern England were Gail Kern Paster (1993, 2004) and Michael Schoenfeldt (1999). The academic sea change instigated by this paradigm was significant for a number of reasons—not least of which being that it encouraged a characterisation of emotions as embodied, physical processes rather than discrete conceptual states. Schoenfeldt cites this as humoral theory's primary strength: that it “possesses a remarkable capacity to relate the body to its environment, and to explain the literal influences that flow into it from a universe composed of analogous elements” (1999: 3). Through this lens, then, the world of early modern affect can be seen as far more dynamic and unstable than many scholars previously thought. “[T]he humoral body,” according to Paster, “should be characterised not only by its physical openness but also by its emotional instability and volatility, by an internal microclimate knowable, like climates in the outer world, more for changeability than for stasis” (2004: 19). This idea of affective changeability and volatility is one that I have kept in mind for the present study. Even as I examine

what are ostensibly individual emotion concepts, I understand them to be points along a dynamic continuum—both in the context of specific scenes onstage and on the grander historical scale.

Yet while humoral theory has enjoyed enduring popularity, many emotion historians now argue that viewing the period's understanding of affect primarily in Galenic terms carries considerable limitations. One notable claim that has been scrutinised is the insistence that our understanding of affective differences between Renaissance England and our own time has been "obscured ... by the post-Enlightenment dematerialisation of embodied emotion" (Paster 2004: 118). According to Paster, this philosophical paradigm shift carries important linguistic implications when it comes to analysing emotion within Shakespeare's dramatic works. Our "residual tendency toward mind-body dualism," she argues, renders us likely to "find abstraction and bodily metaphor where the early moderns found materiality and literal reference" (2004: 24, 26). In many ways, Paster's argument is an important one to acknowledge, as the evolution of language has indeed created some significant gaps in affective terminology over the last four hundred years—a phenomenon that we shall explore throughout the following pages. However, as Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan have posited, the vast variety of emotional metaphors Shakespeare

employs makes it difficult to maintain that we should always interpret his humoral references literally (2015: 12).

Furthermore, the idea that early modern English conceptualisations of affect were thoroughly non-dualistic seems to stem from misunderstandings about one particularly influential book. As Sullivan (2015) notes, one cannot make much progress in reading about the history of emotions without contending with Thomas Wright's *The Passions of the Mind in General* (originally published in 1601). Sullivan argues convincingly that many recent scholars have not only depended too heavily on *The Passions* as fully representative of the era's relationship with its own affective ecology, but also misunderstood the substance of Wright's arguments as far more materialist than the text actually indicates. Scholars like Schoenfeldt and Paster foreground the importance of the idea that Wright's presentation of the early modern conceptualisation of emotion—which is indeed rooted in Galenic humoralism—pre-figures the Cartesian dualism of body and mind. Their contention, therefore, is that *The Passions* presents affective experience in a thoroughly materialist manner. Yet Sullivan demonstrates that Wright's book is in fact “more representative” of contemporaneous dualist thinking than is generally presented, in that it “explicitly acknowledges the possibility of ‘reasonable’ or at least disembodied affective experience, offering a subtle but important adjustment to our understanding of the historical

phenomenology and concomitant emotionology of Renaissance England” (2015: 39–40). As a result, the enthusiasm that Paster and Schoenfeldt instigated for the humoral paradigm of early modern emotion scholarship at the beginning of the twenty-first century had a tendency to occlude, as Sullivan puts it, “the extent to which contemporary natural philosophy and theology accommodated different varieties of embodied and disembodied experience” (ibid.: 36).

In more general terms, according to Meek and Sullivan, the emphasis on the humours’ relationship to emotion

has to some extent obscured the way in which other intellectual and creative frameworks, such as religious and philosophical belief, political performance, or rhetorical and dramaturgical style also shaped cultural beliefs about emotional experience. Such frameworks complicate the humoral paradigm and point to more *active and wilful* experiences of emotion in the period, in which writers drew on multiple emotional discourses in order to construct their own particularised models of feeling (2015: 5).

The idea that a historical understanding of human affective dynamics needs to include “*active and wilful* experiences of emotion” will be crucial to this thesis when considering the concept of emotional practice in general and theatrical performance in particular. The same is true, in fact, of all of the cultural traditions and phenomena Meek and Sullivan have enumerated.

However, many critics have reacted so strongly against the humoral paradigm that their work has effectively constituted a hypercorrection, leading them to discount its relevance altogether. Richard Strier, for example, lambasts Schoenfeldt’s

work as treating “a framework ... that is filled with contradictions, crudities, and crippling ambiguities as a subtle and coherent system” (2011: 18). But Strier’s assessment is overly simplistic for two reasons. The first is that the human experience itself is, almost by definition, “filled with contradictions, crudities, and crippling ambiguities.” In fact, this understanding is part of what makes Shakespeare and other great writers so emotionally powerful and effective. As a result of his multi-valent imagination of the realm of human feeling, Elizabeth D. Harvey claims, Shakespeare himself “fashioned an idiom of affective experience made up of shards and fragments of competing accounts of affect” which “formed the eclectic matrix upon which he drew his representation of the passions” (2020: 35). And as Craik argues,

Shakespeare’s grasp of emotional life was not anchored in any one system. ... Instead the capaciousness of his imagination allowed him to move flexibly within, between and outside these systems, sketching an eclectic and improvisatory version of somaticism which does justice to the unsystematised business of living (2020: 4–5).

Secondly, Paster and Schoenfeldt themselves do not actually present the humoral theory as something they see as all-encompassing. In her introduction to *Humoring the Body*, for example, Paster acknowledges that early modern emotions occurred “almost inevitably within a dense cultural and social context,” leaving plenty of room for other affective influences (2004: 8). And Schoenfeldt states even more unambiguously: “I am not arguing that Galenic physiology provides the only

or even the predominant vocabulary of inwardness in the period"; rather, in investigating the system, he seeks "the amplification of knowledge to awaken its resonances" (1999: 38). As I have mentioned, one of the theory's resonances with the present study's understanding of affectivity is the way in which it situates the body in its environment. This notion has some particularly striking parallels with enactive ideas of emotion and experience, which I shall explain more fully in CHAPTER ONE.

It is also important to remember that, although we have no way of knowing whether or how fully Shakespeare himself subscribed to Galenic theory, the affective language he assigns to his characters is often undeniably influenced by such thinking. As Paul Menzer has noted, "[t]he humoral hegemony in early England may be overstated, but both learned and lay medical practitioners continued to consider health care a matter of balancing hot and cold, dry and moist, even if they did not subscribe to humoral theory per se" (2006: 96). And, as Bridget Escolme contends, the relatively intuitive nature of the humoral paradigm has meant that such ideas often hold sway over our thinking even today:

We are all aware that science has proven that irrational fury is not controlled by too much yellow bile circulating in the body, nor low mood by an excess of the black variety. But hot, dry, fiery cholera still seems to go beyond the metaphorical as a description of intemperate feelings and behaviour, whilst damp, cold, earthy melancholy, with its concomitant thoughts of nihilism and worthlessness, still feels like a good way of describing something along a spectrum between introversion and depression (2020: 122).

Furthermore, the wisdom gleaned from Paster's method is both commendable and, it would seem, nearly unavoidable for the historical aspects of the present study. Thus, while my own discussion of emotions and their early modern histories will by no means be dominated by the humours, I will not be entirely ignoring them either. Paster's "exercise in historical phenomenology" has awakened a world of questions and possibilities when it comes to attempting to understand what it would have felt like to be a human being in early modern England (2004: 11).

The question of what it would have felt like to be an actor or an audience member in that time period is a decidedly more specific one. However, in attempting to shed light on how Shakespeare and his players not only experienced but also performed their emotions onstage, it remains important to take a panoply of contemporaneous factors into account. These factors may include what Paster refers to as "the specifically bodily character of an early modern emotion" (2004: 244–45), but have just as much to do with differences in education and training (both general and actor-specific), societal power dynamics, and various transformations within the very language of affect itself. In fact, in recent decades, the scholars who have investigated the affective capacities of early modern players and spectators have found it essential to consider the multiple forces at play, rather than relying too heavily on any one framework. Frederika Bain, for example, cautions that exploring Renaissance

playhouse emotions exclusively via the lens of humoral theory “might lead to a perceived inability to completely school the passions: the greater their physiological basis, the less under conscious control they could be” (2015: 222). Such a presumption is at odds with the evidence “that there was an implicit understanding in the early modern period of the possibility of control, as in *ars moriendi* texts and *specula principis*” (ibid.).

One strain of scholarship that has focused on the question of conscious control over the passions is the research into the influence of religion on affective life in Shakespeare’s England (e.g., Williamson 2020; Bagchi 2015; Sullivan 2016). Particularly salient for our purposes is the fact that religious services were the early modern Christian’s most ubiquitous context for experiencing performance—far more so than in the playhouses themselves. As William Fraser Mitchell remarks about the period, “[f]or one person who witnessed a play or ten who happened to read it, thousands may, without exaggeration, be said to have attended sermons” (1932: 3–4). Such experiences would undoubtedly have helped to shape the emotional tendencies and preoccupations of the parishioners. As David Bagchi demonstrates, recent research has shown how the affective performativity of early modern sermons helped to “create or at least to reinforce ... different ‘communities of emotion’” (2015: 47, qtg. Karant-Nunn 2010). In fact, the emotional impact of the clergy’s performances could

sometimes even manifest in methods that we might consider overtly theatrical.

Consider, for example, Wright's observation that he had

seene some preachers bring a dead mans scull into the pulpit, therewith the better to move their auditors to contemne the transsitorie pleasures of this world, to beat into them a terrour of death, to the intent that for the rest of their dayes, they might lead a better life (1604: 158).

This traces a rather neat line from the performative practices of this type of sermon to what is arguably anglophone theatre's most enduring image.

Indeed, the societal importance of religion in Shakespeare's day is difficult to overstate. This may be particularly true with regard to the culture's emotional discourse; John Corrigan contends that the individual's concept of soteriological "meaning" was "inseparable from their sense of belonging to an emotional community" (2014: 146).² As such, the case studies I undertake in the chapters that follow all examine the religious influences on a given emotion's cultural history, alongside linguistic, biological, and dramaturgical considerations. Remembering that many aspects of religious observance can be just as performative as theatrical practices will help to foreground the relevance of those sections of the discussion.

2. Corrigan is careful to add the following caveat: "Emotions in religion are sometimes understandable as part of a broader system of meaning and sometimes not" (2014: 159).

Emotions in Shakespearean Performance.

Recent decades have also seen several fascinating enquiries into the skilful application of what Hurley calls the “feeling-labour” of commercial theatre-makers in the Renaissance (2010: 9; see also Hochschild 2012 [1983]). Hurley uses this term “to capture the work theatre does in making, managing, and moving feeling in all its types (affect, emotions, moods, sensations) in a publicly observable display that is sold to an audience for a wage” (ibid.). Joseph Roach was one of the first scholars to look at early modern actors’ engagement with the feeling-labour of the playhouse through a multidisciplinary lens. Roach’s study places a significant emphasis on “the nature of the body, its structure, its inner and outer dynamics, and its relationship to the larger world that it inhabits” (1993: 11). Yet importantly, while the concept of the humours informs aspects of his discussion, Roach takes care to emphasise that playhouse emotions are not purely material phenomena:

When an actor takes his place on a stage, even in the most apparently trivial vehicle, and his audience begins to respond to his performance, together they concentrate the complex values of a culture with an intensity that less immediate transactions cannot rival. They embody its shared language of spoken words and expressive gestures, its social expectations and psychological commonplaces, its conventions of truth and beauty, its nuances of prejudice and fear, its erotic fascinations, and frequently its sense of humor (ibid.: 11–12).

One of the benefits of situating performance in this way is that it helps mitigate our potential prejudices about the authenticity of the actors’ modes of affective expres-

sion. “Before we label an acting style artificial,” Roach argues, “we should have at least made an effort to understand what its practitioners meant by natural” (ibid.: 15). This argument has been advanced notably by Paul Menzer, who asserts that “to talk about early modern acting in terms of ‘artifice’ and ‘naturalism’ is to pursue an infinite regression—the explanation of one phenomenon by contrast with an earlier phenomenon that will in turn require the same type of explanation” (2004: 29). Although a presentist bias makes it easy for us to assume that actorly skill grows more sophisticated over time, Menzer contends that “acting does not get better; it gets different. The best acting is ‘natural.’ Bad acting is not. It has always been thus” (ibid.: 28). Yet even Menzer’s argument leaves little room for the fact that, depending on the specific cultural context, “natural” acting is not always what is called for. As Melissa Croteau notes, for example, “Shakespeare’s injunction, through Hamlet, that actors should avoid bombastic performing and, instead, ‘hold a mirror up to nature’ is certainly not embraced by Bollywood” (2020: 137). The same can be said about Japanese Noh theatre or British pantomime. Such aesthetic differences are important to keep in mind as we compare early modern English approaches to the conceptualisation and performance of emotion to those in the present day—and indeed, as we compare anglophone performances to those in other languages. The exploration of these differences does not entail value judgements about their legitimacy. As Peter

Stearns puts it, “[c]hange need not be complicated by glib implications of progress” (2014: 36). In fact, it is via the “productive tension” in which Shakespeare holds “the difference between emotion as natural or artificial, improvised or systematised, spontaneous or predetermined, synthesised or piecemeal” that his works are able to “constantly reflect upon, and reimagine, the ways art can revitalise the way we experience the world” (Craik 2020: 7). Shakespeare is certainly not the only author who provides us with such opportunities; nevertheless, the many interfaces between his works and various cultures around the world provide a useful lens through which to examine affective similarities and differences.

From a contemporary perspective, this word of caution applies perhaps most significantly when discussing early modern players’ use of the tools of rhetoric. While we tend to use this word today to signify manipulative language that is devoid of any sincere feeling, Shakespeare and his contemporaries had a profoundly different relationship with rhetoric. As Roach explains, an early modern understanding of rhetorical tools constituted the most effective means for an early modern actor to convey the vivid spirit of his passions onstage:

Far from denying natural inspiration in acting by substituting disembodied hieroglyphs for truthful gestures, the rhetoric of the passions proposed a means of harnessing inspiration’s inexorable synergistic effects. Rhetors saw the body of the actor “fallen into a passion” as brimming over with emotions in need of channeling into properly regulated conduits—hence the rules for gesture, posture, deportment, voice, physiognomy, and expression that fill so many pages in our earliest acting textbooks. A passion, once unleashed,

cannot be suppressed, but it can be shaped into outwardly expressive forms. An oratorical gesture, a prescribed pattern of action, serves as a pre-existing mold into which this molten passion can be poured (1993: 55).

It is precisely in this spirit that Lynn Enterline has argued that Shakespeare—along with his fellow actors and dramatists—learned their greatest artistic lessons about emotion as schoolboys. In *Shakespeare's Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion*, Enterline asserts that one of the chief modes of teaching and learning in the early modern humanist classroom engrained what she terms “habits of alterity” in the students, via the rhetorical platform of *imitatio*. This process demanded “that boys imitate the schoolmaster’s facial movements, vocal modulation, and bodily gestures as much as his Latin words and texts” (2012: 9). Far from being an exercise in rote learning, this method of study actually “required students to mimic—indeed, to embody—a host of passions that were not their own” (*ibid.*: 13). Enterline goes on to contend that this form of education, in which “imitating someone else’s passion” was so central, is what allowed Shakespeare the playwright “to produce the effect of inwardness, of intense personal feeling, long recognized as characteristic of his texts” (*ibid.*: 130). And Neil Rhodes similarly argues that “the relationship between rhetoric and the emotions was crucial to Shakespeare’s agenda as a dramatist” (2020: 20).

Evelyn Tribble frames the players’ tools of rhetoric as a facet of what she calls a “kinesic intelligence that undergirded their entire practice” (2017: 11). Tribble’s study investigates actorly skill—including the affective aspects thereof—within the

context of “distributed cognitive ecologies” that include not only the actors’ minds and bodies, but also the physical playing space of the theatre, as well as the audience (ibid.: 5). Along these lines, Steven Mullaney has demonstrated the specific ways in which the innovative architecture of Elizabethan theatres produced “a complex cognitive space for playwrights, players, and audiences to occupy and experience an inhabited affective technology” (2007: 74). The affective relationship between players and spectators has also been the locus of historically situated investigations such as Matthew Steggle’s *Laughing and Weeping in Early Modern Theatre*, which details the ways in which a chain of emotional feeling “runs from inspiration through the writer and on into the actor, who by a process of almost sympathetic resonance induces that same passion in the audience” (2007: 86–87). Reciprocally, Allison Hobgood’s *Passionate Playgoing in Early Modern England* primarily examines how the flow of feeling often moved in the opposite direction—from audience to actor.

Early modern drama, as I conceive of it, relied for its emotive force on the spectators in which it conjured affectivity, and in that reliance became enmeshed in transactions in which spectators had the power to augment, deny, and alter its force. Drama not only depended on the emotionality of audience members for its effect, that is, but was reciprocally reshaped and mutually constituted, sometimes in surprising and unintended ways, by those affected, and affecting, spectators (2014: 10).

These strands of research have been keenly informative for the present study. They have served as clear reminders that, even in Shakespeare’s time, theatrical feeling was seen as a series of multidirectional processes that had numerous points of

origin. As Hurley notes, “[i]f emotion is made in the relationship between stage and audience (the stimulus and receiver, if you will), it cannot simply be projected by actors and caught as the same emotion by the audience. The theatre’s emotional labour, then, is, in part, a negotiation” (2010: 20). Therefore, when we discuss “fear” (for example), we need to remember that the fear written into the script by Shakespeare combined with the fear crafted and expressed by the actor, the fear brought to the playhouse by the spectators (due to the political mood or religious concerns), and the fear generated by the play’s design elements—all contained within and shaped by the physical architecture of the theatre (Barclay 2017B; Randles 2017). These various forces were—and still are—involved in a constantly shifting dynamic, and it is important to remain conscious of these processes as we work to find ways of understanding the overall “life” of an emotion in cross-cultural and cross-historical contexts (Barclay 2017A: 14).

The performance theorist Peggy Phelan captures what animates students of history and performance with her observation that “[t]he moving body is always fading from our eyes. Historical bodies and bodies moving on stage fascinate because they fade” (1995: 200). This evanescence is all the more striking when we speak of the affective processes—phenomena that are often more transient than thought itself—of those perpetually fading historical and performing bodies. Yet it is

precisely because they are so fleeting that they fascinate. Actors have, throughout the ages, focused obsessively on how best to enact the passions because they are aware that human emotion is the thing that makes life feel alive. Theatre artists, in fine-tuning the skill with which they make their affective lives so vivid and so public, make us aware of the presence and the power of what we ourselves are capable of feeling.

Vocabulary of the Passions.

The work of this thesis can be divided into roughly two halves. Examining the cognitive ecologies of theatrical feelings in Shakespeare's time accounts for one half of that work. This aspect of my study is part of the larger academic project of "squaring up to our differences from the past—the recent past, as well as more distant ones—rather than settling complacently into what looks like affective sameness" (Craik 2020: 10). Much of this endeavour is particularly complicated by lexical shifts in terms for individual emotions—and for the terminology of affective life in general. As Aleksandra Hultquist remarks, in the early modern world,

the vocabulary of the passions was vast. Ideas about emotion in the early modern period were encompassed in words as diverse as affect, appetites, emotion, feelings, passions, perturbations and sentiments. The use of specific terms often indicated allegiances of thought. ... These terms, while related, were never interchangeable: to speak of "affects" or "sentiments" often connoted calm, useful feelings, while terms like "passions" and "appetites"

typically referred to raw, unregulated feelings. One must pay attention to specific authors and their use to be sure (2017: 71; see also Simons 2017).

The semantic variety in the vocabulary of human feeling remains just as critical today as it was in Shakespeare's time—a point that will become clear in the work of the other half of this study. This second half concerns itself with the investigation of the cultural differences that emerge when these instances of performed emotion are situated on the twenty-first-century stage. In recent years, performance scholars such as Hurley (2010) and Tait (2021) have turned their attention to the analysis of feeling-labour in contemporary theatre. Perhaps the most notable works to compare early modern conceptions of emotions to modern-day Shakespearean performance are Escolme's *Talking to the Audience* (2005) and *Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage* (2014). Escolme's manner of employing a historical lens in order to construct rich analyses of theatrical feelings in twenty-first-century performance has been so useful to my own research that it has inevitably influenced the approach of this thesis. Like Escolme, I am particularly interested in "how early modern audiences judged or valued the emotions they heard and saw performed and whether we judge or value differently" (2014: xix). My work will continue this exploration; it will also expand it into different sociolinguistic communities in the present day.

The three main chapters of this thesis examine individual emotion concepts from various critical angles. In addition to Escolme's research, the work of these

chapters draws inspiration from the diverse methodologies implemented in a number of studies that have explored Shakespearean and early modern English conceptions of specific emotion categories in remarkable depth. Paster's *The Body Embarrassed* (1993), for example, analyses early modern ideas of shame in both humoralist and feminist contexts; Ewan Fernie's monograph *Shame in Shakespeare* (2002) investigates the same phenomenon using the tools of comparative literature. Peter Kishore Saval's *Shakespeare in Hate* looks at feelings of enmity under the presupposition, originally espoused in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, that emotions are evaluative phenomena in that they constitute "those things about which people differ according to their judgements" (2015: 7). And Sullivan's *Beyond Melancholy* (2016) surveys medical records, religious treatises, and contemporaneous cultural norms in order to show that notions of sadness in Renaissance England were far richer than humoral theorisations alone can illustrate. In my own studies of lovesickness, joy, and fear—as well as their Russian, French, and German siblings—I have endeavoured to take a few bold steps further along the trails that these critics have blazed.

In many ways—whether or not they have been aware of it—these authors have been serving as translators between the emotional past and the present. Consider, for instance, the manner in which Hubscher-Davidson characterises the feeling-labour of translation:

When perceiving, regulating and transferring emotions in writing, the translator shapes a text that takes into account vast amounts of emotional information including the potential reactions of target readers, as the reception and understanding of translated emotions will necessarily differ from one culture to another. They are responsible for carrying over specific, personal, affective, identity-related otherness. They drive the creation of a text that will expose and give scope to new significances and intertextualities (2018: 4).

In addition to serving as a helpful reminder of the affective aspects of the translation process, Hubscher-Davidson's words are an accurate summation of the work of all scholars of emotion. In a similar vein, Mark Steinberg argues that "the best recent work on emotion history tries to see and think about these ubiquitous acts of translation" (2014: 77). Thus, while I am certainly not a translator in the classical sense of the word, it is my hope that this project will contribute to some of these "new significances and intertextualities."

Overview.

In the introduction to the edited volume *Shakespeare and Emotion*, Craik flagged a specific challenge that faces scholars who work at the intersection of these two fields: namely,

to push back against the truism that the affective intensity of the poems and plays echoes unproblematically in and for everyone. Attending thoughtfully to emotion involves disturbing some long-cherished ideas about our natural, sympathetic affinity to Shakespeare, and acknowledging instead the different and challenging affinities made possible through affective difference (2020: 9).

The various disciplinary threads I shall intertwine in **CHAPTER ONE** are the tools I have found most useful in order to move beyond frameworks that reinforce the

“truisim” Craik mentions. In CHAPTER ONE, I shall introduce the philosophical, scientific, and linguistic groundwork that will permit a confident exploration of the cultural and theatrical implications of Mesquita and Boiger’s claim that “[e]motions are situated: They are dynamically changing in conjunction with changes in the social context” (2014: 299). This chapter will focus explicitly on a theory of embodied cognition known as *enaction*, as well as on the linguistic methodologies that explore the intersection between translation and emotion. As these theoretical and methodological ideas may be less than familiar in the realm of Shakespeare scholarship, it will be helpful to outline their salient points and situate their relevance. The chapter will also address terminological questions that pertain to concepts such as affect, emotion, mood, untranslatability, emotive utterances, and Anna Wierzbicka’s (1999) Natural Semantic Metalanguage.

Following CHAPTER ONE, the case study chapters will focus on the occurrence of a specific emotion in a specific play. The first halves of CHAPTERS TWO, THREE, and FOUR are examinations of how theatrical treatment of the given emotion concept has shifted between Shakespeare’s time and now. In doing so, we shall see how today’s theatre-makers are required to engage in a kind of translation process—even for emotions that are ostensibly native concepts. Often, as these sections will show, the consequences of working with affective terms for which there has been some degree

of semantic drift can illustrate Katherine Rowe's contention that "we may tend to self-select for emotion scripts we recognize, in ways that are hard to see" (2004: 175).

The second halves of these chapters each discuss a similar but untranslatable emotion from another language, as well as how productions of the given play in that language relate to that untranslatable concept. As I mentioned at the beginning, the languages I explore are Russian, French, and German. I have chosen these languages because I have a level of proficiency in them, and because there are numerous translations of Shakespeare's works into each of them. Furthermore, I have found it helpful that there are video recordings of productions of the plays in these languages—a particularly salient requirement as the vast majority of my study has taken place under the 2020/2021 coronavirus lockdowns, during which attending live theatre has not been possible.

It is worth noting that each of these languages is spoken in multiple countries—and even among the speakers of these languages within these individual countries, there are numerous dialectical variants that reflect the existence of many unique cultural communities. The same is true, of course, of early modern English. It may thus be helpful to keep in mind Barbara Rosenwein's concept of "emotional communities":

Imagine, then, a large circle within which are smaller circles, none entirely concentric but rather distributed unevenly within the given space. The large circle is the overarching emotional community, tied together by fundamental

assumptions, values, goals, feeling rules, and accepted modes of expression. The smaller circles represent subordinate emotional communities, partaking in the larger one and revealing its possibilities and its limitations. They too may be subdivided. At the same time other large circles may exist, either entirely isolated from or intersecting with the first at one or more points (2006: 24).

In practice, I will be discussing each of these languages as essentially coterminous with a “large circle,”—an “overarching emotional community.” This means that it will be impossible to ascribe all of the connotations of a given emotion concept in any language to its use among all of that language’s speakers. Similarly, I have attempted to maintain an awareness of Mark Steinberg’s caution that it is “unwise, even harmful, to approach a regional history of emotions looking for essential patterns of national or ethnic character” (2014: 74). Instead, he argues, “it is most useful to view regions not as stable or homogeneous places but as spaces constituted by social relationships and thus marked by difference, conflict, and change interacting with common and stable features” (ibid. 74–75). As such, the cultural qualities and affective constructs I describe should be taken to apply in a general sense—and one that is always in flux—rather than in an absolute or fixed one.

CHAPTER TWO focuses on the experience of lovesickness in the frame of what Sullivan terms “emotive improvisation” (2016: 4)—particularly as it pertains to the character of Mariana in *Measure for Measure*. The chapter begins with a study of the idea of love melancholy and the many ways it was considered a serious illness in Renaissance England. We then compare current English-language notions of love-

sickness with the Russian untranslatable concept *тоска* (toska)—at which we already glanced above—and look at how Russian productions of the play have embodied this important Russian emotion.

CHAPTER THREE looks at *Othello*, through the lens of an emotion we tend to think of as positive: joy. However, in exploring the early modern English attitudes toward this particular feeling—and to emotional extremes in general—this chapter shall uncover the fascinating interrelatedness of Renaissance England’s concepts of joy and death. Then, via a shared etymological root, we turn to an examination of joy’s French-language analogue: *joie*. Through a historical and contemporary analysis of French translations and productions of *Othello*, I will show how this French *émotion* carries some surprisingly and significantly different connotations from the “joy” that native English speakers know.

CHAPTER FOUR explores the concept of fear in *Hamlet*—particularly as it relates to the characters’ encounters with King Hamlet’s ghost. In the first half of the chapter, I shall examine the neuroscience behind the claim that fear is a universal human emotion, before turning to the remarkable degree to which fear in Renaissance England was bound up with religion and concepts of the afterlife. In the second half, I explore the German-language concept of *Angst*, and analyse how this

culturally central emotion has coloured German theatre-makers' relationship with the Prince of Denmark and his father's spirit.

The CODA will take a closer look at the practical, theatrical implications of the disparity between the emotion concepts that emerged from Shakespeare's specific sociolinguistic milieu and those held by anglophone theatre artists of today. In particular, I will outline a means by which actors can deconstruct some of Shakespeare's emotions, which may well be considered "untranslatable" today, and synthesise them into a theatrically viable and culturally relevant mode of expression.

The common thread throughout this thesis is the idea that we need not view the untranslatable as an impediment. Rather, we can see it as an opportunity to explore our many similarities and our many differences. I endeavour to heed Rowe's call to "see gulfs of time and cultural context not as permanent obstacles to understanding early modern affects, but as features of emotion as such. Emotions, understood this way, are historically composite phenomena, anchored in the biology and social practices of different periods" (2004: 178). In following Rowe's advice, not only can we remain hopeful that we have something to learn about the emotion scripts of the early modern era, but we will also keep ourselves open to the idea that doing so will teach us new ways to think about how we experience our own feelings—and those of the people around us as well. Just as when we watch Shakespeare's works

themselves, the magic sometimes lives in our ability to know precisely how someone else is feeling; at other times, the magic is in feeling like we have absolutely no idea at all.

Author's Notes.

Unless otherwise specified:

- All lineation of Shakespeare plays is from *The Complete Oxford Shakespeare*, ed. by Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
- All translations from Russian, German, and French are my own. In order to distinguish from the original, quotes within {curly brackets} indicate my own back-translation into English.
- All emphases in quotations are as printed in the original.
- All quotations from early modern texts retain their original spellings, with the exceptions of i/j and u/v.

ONE

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Thus far, we have looked at both translation and emotion as they relate to Shakespearean scholarship, but we have considered them as more or less separate phenomena. However, according to Séverine Hubscher-Davidson, “[l]anguage and emotions are inextricably linked” (2018: 9). This is because, she continues, “emotional factors are embedded in the dynamics of multilingual discourses and, in turn, languages shape individuals’ emotional landscape” (ibid.). In many ways, Hubscher-Davidson’s claim captures the central idea upon which the work of this thesis is based. Yet because the discussion of emotions and performance occurs at the crossroads of so many disciplines—including history, literature, biology, psychology, phenomenology, and linguistics—it is necessary to fortify this assertion with a rigorous theoretical foundation that is capable of integrating these various strands of research. Furthermore, as the task ahead entails attempting to comprehend what Clifford Geertz (1976) has termed “experience-distant” concepts from various cultures, we will require a methodology that allows us to render such untranslatable terms into a semantic system that is intelligible to people who live outside of the given cultural contexts.

This chapter will serve as an introduction to frameworks that fulfil both of those requirements. I shall begin with a theoretical overview of *enaction*—a multidisciplinary paradigm of situated cognition. The ideas of enaction will allow us to adopt a conception of emotions that is both biologically grounded and culturally flexible. I shall then outline the linguistic methodology of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage, which will permit us to decompose unfamiliar affective concepts into “experience-near” terms. While the philosophical thrust of this chapter will sometimes entail brief departures from the Shakespearean centre of the overall thesis, a firm grasp of the ideas that drive my investigation will ultimately polish the lens through which we can more clearly view the ubiquitous interfaces of biology, culture, performance, and language. We will also see the ways in which this theory and this methodology mutually reinforce one another, and how they demonstrate both the striking commonalities and countless capacities for variation amongst the emotional lives of human beings. Ultimately, this work will make it possible for us to understand the processes and products of Shakespearean translation in a new and fascinating light.

Enaction: Situating the Lived Body in its Environment.

As I showed in the INTRODUCTION, much of what scholarship privileges about Shakespeare is his ability to give verbal form, timbre, and power to the passions. Aside from his poetry, his characters' utterances are, after all, the only means by which we are able to understand the feelings he was trying to elicit and convey. His deftness in this particular arena is a significant reason actors have taken on these roles with particular relish for the last four centuries. Shakespeare's affective language offers English-speakers an opportunity to engage with human feelings in an especially rich way. Yet translators also have an acute understanding that dramatic dialogue is intended to be embodied. Playtexts are "first and foremost written for mouths that speak, for lungs that breathe," asserts Jean-Michel Déprats, a leading contemporary translator of Shakespeare into French (2012: 137). And the nuance with which Déprats is able to see this so clearly also helps him to recognise drama's scope for individual and cultural variations on the precise forms that embodiment can take; plays "imply gesture without dictating one type of gesture; they do not determine the movement of the body or the inflexions of the voice. They do not solve everything" (ibid.: 146). This insight is important to keep in mind when we explore the affective upshots of Shakespeare's dramas, and all playtexts, in translation. For if the language carries certain bodily implications in the original

English, then it follows that the implications of a new linguistic topography will have different effects on body-minds that are culturally distinct. As Alfredo Michel Modenessi argues, “[t]ranslating generates otherness” (2012: 245).

Katherine Rowe alludes to the affective implications of cultural alterity when she invokes Arnold Davidson and Lorraine Daston’s concept of “historical epistemology.” Though Rowe’s interest (inherent in the phrase itself) lies more in temporal disparities than in differences among contemporary cultures, the basic components of the concept carry a high degree of relevance for the present-day aspects of my exploration as well: “the study of changing categories of knowledge; of the cultural preconditions that make thinking in a certain way possible; of the material conditions and practices in which such categories emerge, change, disappear” (2014: 192). Similarly, Monique Scheer contends that affective experience and exchange are situated phenomena that both emerge from and constitute aspects of cultural practices. As she argues:

Reading emotion in faces, gestures, vocal patterns, bodily postures, or manifestations such as tears, changing skin color, or heavy breathing is a complex process that functions on a multi sensory level and involves different modes of knowledge. It includes judgements about the situational context, the actors involved, and social expectations. ... [T]he accomplishment of sincere communication (or its discernment by an observer) depends heavily on bodily performances—tone of voice, facial expression, movements and gestures—that have been culturally transmitted (2012: 214–15).

Thus, while many of the physical signs of emotional experience can indeed be found across cultures, what those signs signify is necessarily variable depending on the culture in which they occur—even for ostensibly universal emotions such as joy and fear (Engelen et al. 2009: 28).

Scheer goes on to explain that “[e]motions change over time not only because norms, expectations, words, and concepts that shape experience are modified, but also because the practices in which they are embodied, and bodies themselves, undergo transformation” (2012: 220; see also Martín-Munro and Pichel 2019: 6). Although the last part of Scheer’s assertion may strike some as a bold claim, we can understand how different times, places, and practices might literally engender different bodies with the help of recent findings within the natural sciences. Although my own research is primarily humanities-driven, conversations about emotions in the twenty-first century prove most fruitful when including the fascinating work that the cognitive sciences bring to the table. Yet even as academia has taken tentative steps toward exploring a discourse in which science and the humanities can enrich one another, resistance in some quarters reflects a legacy of the influence of what C.P. Snow (1959) famously described as the dichotomy between these “Two Cultures.”

There have, however, been many scholars of Shakespeare and performance who recognise the richness of possibility within such interdisciplinary loci. Mary Thomas Crane explored this crossover potential in *Shakespeare's Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory* (2001). And Philip Davis has even teamed up with laboratory scientists to measure the effects of Shakespeare's words on the human brain (2009, 2020). Yet others retain some degree of wariness about the prospect of bringing too much hard science into the humanities (Pandit and Hogan 2006: 2). They argue that, when compared to a humanities-centred approach to the study of emotions, "experimental cognitive and neurosciences lack depth" (Frevert 2014: 2). Evelyn Tribble illustrates this tension thus:

Students of early modern literature and culture are generally willing to accept the profound importance of social and environmental shaping, but they may be less happy to concede the role of internal cognitive mechanisms, perhaps fearing that attention to such matters will result in false universalizing and essentialism. Yet an understanding of human neuro-biological capacities and constraints is essential to any informed understanding of memory and attention in the early modern playing system. ... [I]t is impossible to approach the question sensibly without an understanding of the biological and psychological constraints (2011: 8).

Lalita Pandit and Patrick Hogan concur with Tribble's premise. As they argue, the sciences (which study the universal) and the humanities (which study the particular)

not only may, but must be reconciled. We cannot understand universals without understanding the particulars in which they are instantiated. Conversely, we cannot understand particulars, at least the particulars from another era or culture, without understanding universals. It is universals that provide the common ground against which we define and make sense of differences (2006: 2–3).

This distinction may be more of a generalisation than Pandit and Hogan's claims imply; nevertheless, it a useful way to understand the perceived divide between the sciences and the humanities.

From a performance studies perspective, Bruce McConachie recognises that there are potentially "a fair number of biocultural universals for performance that are shared by all peoples" (2015: 13). This suggests an evolutionary thirst for the kind of meaning we can glean only through engaging with the process of enacting and being touched by stories and emotions that—biographically speaking—may not be our own. And Susan Matt and Peter Stearns have observed that, in the realm of emotions scholarship, "there is an emerging consensus that emotions have both biological and cultural components and that societies influence the expression, repression, and meaning of feelings by giving them names and assigning values to some and not others" (2014: 2; see also Stearns 2014: 17). The new epistemologies that are emerging as a result of the increased dialogue between the sciences and humanities have the benefit of a certain hybrid vigour—a robustness that has come about as the strengths of the various disciplines reinforce one another.

When embarking on multimodal study such as this one, it is important to remain aware of a tendency to view the benefit of the interdisciplinary conversation as unidirectional. Tribble addresses this potential problem in her own work:

...lest it seems as though I am suggesting only that cognitive psychology can be used as a means of correcting what the humanities get wrong, let me also make the point that ignoring the material and social factors governing a cognitive enterprise such as theatre is equally problematic. This is indeed a failing of much work in psychology, which tends to have a very attenuated sense of the past and often attempts to “control for” the very elements that seem to humanists as constitutive of the practice under study (2011: 9).

I agree with Tribble’s argument, which is why I have endeavoured to integrate the scientific elements of my exploration of emotion in Shakespearean performance in a manner that can be mutually beneficial for the various disciplines involved. Indeed, it is my hope that this project and others like it might spark a greater awareness of social and experiential factors within the scientific inquiry into the interplay of language, culture, and performance.

...

The questions I explore call for an approach that is capable of understanding the plasticity of the human body-mind *in situ*, while also allowing for the fact that certain dynamics have strong tendencies to manifest regardless of individual circumstances. A paradigm that recognises such areas of stability on the level of human life enables us to understand where to look for forms of behavioural and experiential alterity with a much keener sense of awareness. Moreover, such a framework will itself respond and adjust to advances and insights that come from more traditionally humanist spheres, as its understanding of how the mind can shape the brain and body necessitates a comprehension of the influence of culture on

biology. Along with both Tribble and McConachie, I believe that these requirements are met by a burgeoning paradigm of embodied cognition known as *enaction*. While much of the remainder of this section will take up some fairly technical points, a rough outline of enaction and its relationship to emotion and language is necessary to understand why I believe concepts and words have the affective power I ascribe to them throughout this study.

First articulated by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in their 1991 monograph *The Embodied Mind*, enaction is a program that combines philosophy of mind, cognitive science, linguistics, and phenomenology. Its bases are that “the living body is a self-producing and self-maintaining system that enacts or brings forth relevance, and that cognitive processes belong to the relational domain of the living body coupled to its environment” (Thompson 2016: xxv). The coupling Thompson describes necessitates that physical, cognitive, and experiential realities are constantly shifting in tandem with the reality that is “brought forth”—or “enacted”—in the exchange between body and environment. Understanding the significance of this paradigm entails recognising that the body is

an adaptively autonomous and sense-making system. An adaptively autonomous system is one that generates and maintains itself through constant structural and functional change (like a living cell), and in so doing brings forth or enacts relevance. In being a self-individuating system, it is also a sense-making one, and in being a sense-making system, it is also a self-individuating one. Cognition and world are interdependently originated via

the living body. ... [C]ognition as sense-making is the exercise of skillful know-how in situated and embodied action (ibid.: xxvi).

Thompson's explication of the enactivist framework responds to many of the core challenges that emerge when the humanities attempt to engage with the sciences. The recognition of the body as an "adaptively autonomous system" entails that certain aspects of any organism's functions—be they psychological or physical—are instigated and coordinated by certain natural drives and processes that we all share. Consequently, viewing such phenomena as emotions in strictly relativist terms begins from untenable premises. Yet the fact that the body's sense-making process comes about as a result of the interdependence of the mind and its environment also precludes the possibility of viewing human psychology in expressly universalist terms. Differences in the world around us must be both the causes and the effects of the various psychophysiological differences amongst individuals and populations.

Another way of stating this idea, as Rosch puts it, is that "[t]he lived body, lived mind, and lived environment are all ... part of the same process, the process by which one enacts one's world" (2016: xxxviii). The field in which this process occurs is what we call *experience*, and it is something enaction takes seriously. While many schools of cognitive science consider conscious experience an "epiphenomenon"—the inconsequential byproduct (or "froth") of other cognitive processes that have true importance in the universal chain of cause-and-effect (Searle 2002: 26)—enaction

scientists and philosophers take a very different stance. Experience, according to Thompson,

is central to any understanding of the mind, and accordingly needs to be investigated in a careful phenomenological manner. Hence, in the enactive approach, cognitive scientific and phenomenological investigations of human experience are pursued in a complementary and mutually informing way (Thompson 2016: xxvii).

As McConachie succinctly states it, “[e]nactivists emphasize that experiences transform our bodies and brains over time” (2015: 30). This experience-centred pursuit not only provides fertile ground for research that attempts to bridge the gap between essentialist and relativist ways of thinking about humanity and culture, but also has fascinating implications for the study of both performance and emotion.

McConachie’s articulation of the virtues of the enactivist lens highlights its relevance to performance studies:

By understanding action in the brain, the body, and the social and the material surround as the motive power of cognition, the Enactivists extend the arena of cognition from learning, memory, language, and behavior to include historical as well as psychological phenomena. In general, Enaction provides a broader basis for investigating the range and significance of all kinds of performances than does conventional cognitive science (2015: 21).

McConachie also recognises some ways in which the enaction paradigm can apply to a deeper understanding of emotion in performance (2015: ch. 3). My study will build upon his beginning by recruiting the observations and ideas of Giovanna Colombetti, a philosopher who has borne the standard for the exploration of human affect within the enactivist framework. Enaction, according to Colombetti,

entails that there is no difference in kind between cognition and emotion. Rather, both cognition and emotion turn out to be instances of the relentless *sense-making* activity of the precarious living organism as it maintains itself via continuous processes of self-regulation and exchange with the environment (2014: xvii).¹

Within the realm of emotion studies, Colombetti's claim is more radical than it may sound. The most prevalent theories of emotion throughout Western history (Engelen et al. 2009; Lomas 2018: 38–40; Pavlenko 2012: 408–9) have held that:

- a) Emotions are a special class of feelings that can be distinguished from other sensations that are not affective as such—e.g. the visual experience of the colour green, or the proprioceptive experience of knowing where one's arm is in space;
- b) Emotions come about as the result of a separate cognitive faculty—an “evaluation” or “appraisal,” for example, that one had been treated unfairly would cause one to be angry (Pandit 2006 reads *The Comedy of Errors* within this framework);

or

- c) “Basic” emotions are adaptive responses that have distinct physiological signatures (i.e., there is a specific area of the brain that correlates to the experience of fear, one that correlates to joy, etc.).

1. Tim Lomas notes that many Asian languages “do not divide thought and emotion as English does” (2018: 44). I look forward to the possibility of studies like this one that investigate these phenomena outside the Indo-European language family.

While the differences among these theories can be profound, what they all have in common is the idea that affective experience can be separated from other aspects of the body-mind. According to the enactive approach, on the other hand,

[a]ffectivity ... permeates the mind, necessarily and not even contingently. The mind, as embodied, is intrinsically or constitutively affective; you cannot take affectivity away from it and still have a mind. Affectivity ... refers broadly to a *lack of indifference*, and rather a *sensibility* or *interest* for one's existence (Colombetti 2014: 1).

As we have seen, one of enaction's central tenets is the fact that—even at the level of a single cell—life is defined by the autopoietic processes of individuation and sense-making. As Colombetti puts it, “all living systems are cognitive in the sense that, in virtue of their adaptive autonomous organization, they behave according to meaning and norms that they themselves bring forth (generate) in interaction with the world” (2014: 18). Understanding both biology and psychology from such a vantage point obviates the perceived divisions amongst affectivity, physiology, and cognition. When we understand that all of these processes are simply facets of the same sense-making and individuating functions, we are forced to recognise that they all entail one another. This perspective resonates with Gail Kern Paster's understanding of the dynamic as well: “cognition and emotion are conjoined activities of the mind: there is no thinking without feeling, no feeling without thinking” (2020: 96). And we think and feel things because of the way our bodies and the world move in relation to one another. The French philosopher Renaud Barbaras explains it thus:

Life as conservation of self by renewal of its own matter implies something like a concern for self, which manifests itself in minimal fashion by the discriminating and oriented nature of the response to external stimuli: the organism “knows” what suits it and what does not suit it. This vital consciousness thus has a meaning which is inseparably intentional and affective: it experiences itself through the recognition of what does or does not suit it in the world; it engenders itself passively in its affectivity by virtue of the responses that it gives to what affects it (2010: 96–97).

In other words, what we feel is inextricably bound up with what we “know” about the way our selves and our environments “affect” one another through action.

Adopting such a standpoint constitutes a radical act because it precipitates seeing everything we do and perceive—and, crucially, every piece of information we process—as inherently affective. Yet it remains vital to remember that this fact does not predetermine the precise forms these affective experiences will take; on the contrary, it means that we must look more carefully at the dynamics among biology, psychology, and environment in order to understand the kinds of emotions that manifest for certain individuals in certain situations. This set of dynamics forms the core of the present study, as it provides us with a way of sharpening our awareness of the mutual influences of emotion, language, and culture in order to understand how these factors are enacted in the playhouse. As the cognitive scientist Edwin Hutchins notes, “although the enaction of cultural meanings is something that our bodies and brains *do* in the world, it is not something that our bodies and brains do by themselves. The skills that enact the apprehension of patterns as representations

are learned cultural skills" (2010: 446). Hutchins's distinction is an important one, as it requires us to view the relationship between the body-mind and its culture as a two-way street.

This perspective acknowledges culture's influential role on human psychophysiology, while also obliging us to reconsider the post-structuralist ideas generally favoured by the humanities. The largely unidirectional Derridean assumption "that social-linguistic conditioning beyond human control determines what 'subjects' will find meaningful in their lives," cannot work within the framework of enaction (McConachie 2015: 72; see also Oatley 2006: 16). This is because, as the enactivist linguist Didier Bottineau recognises:

...linguistic cognition involves cortical, muscular, and environmental dynamic events shared by individual beings in a continuous experiential shell forming a *social body*. In this process, vocal interplays synchronizing mental dynamics amount to forming *complex transitional synapses between conscious selves at the intercortical level using acoustic signals as transmitters across the atmospheric medium* (2010: 272).

In other words, what we find meaningful in the world is very much a product of what we create within and amongst ourselves, in ways that both emerge from and affect us on the biological level. The enaction paradigm enables Bottineau to base his understanding of language on an integration of the physiological, the psychological, and the social, rather than depending too heavily on any one of these elements. His invocation of the role of the bodily and environmental dynamics we all share

acknowledges that linguistic processes are rooted in structures that can claim some degree of universality. This is not only because the act of speaking depends upon the same set of physiological activities for all of us, but also because language is so thoroughly embodied that “in the languaging experience in all its forms, even the innermost intimate pondering, the elaboration of meaning can never be envisaged out of the realm of bodily action” (ibid.: 277). The idea that language’s vocal expression depends upon a common “experiential shell forming a *social body*” also recognises the extent to which mutual understanding depends upon lived bodies in a lived culture. Yet, through his emphasis on the agency inherent in the relationship between language and “conscious selves,” Bottineau also understands the limit to which the linguistic fabric of this “social body” is determinative of individual experience. “[I]f consciousness is devoted to action in the world rather than computation,” as enaction posits, “languaging is used to launch or relaunch action in the face of an enactive stalling or obstacle in natural experience, which includes the social encounter with other selves” (ibid.: 281). Thus—far from being a disembodied, determinative set of “symbols,”—enaction can help us see that languaging constitutes one of the primary means by which humans assert their own sense of agency.

Languaging Emotions.

The confluence of language, experience, and agency serves as a vital focal point in the exploration of the situatedness of emotion in Shakespearean performance. Even within a single language, the tension between what a person feels and what they can say about it—what Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2009) terms the problem of “languaging experience”—is at the heart of what makes emotions so fascinating. One of the clearest ways of understanding this interplay comes via the recognition of the spoken word’s effects on both the speaker and their surrounding world. There is something inherently creative about verbalising our feelings. In doing so, we generate something new—what William Reddy terms a “peculiar, dynamic relation” between what is felt and what is said (2001: 64). “Speaking does not *refer* to the world,” according to Bottineau; “it *causes an experience* that happens to coincide or not with the narrow situation or the larger reality such as it is enacted, and has to be mapped against the environmental medium, including the psychological environment” (2010: 277). Bottineau’s statement shares some obvious parallels with J.L. Austin’s (1962) concept of the “performative utterance”—the kind of statement that, rather than simply describing the current state of affairs in a manner that can be deemed either “true” or “false,” actually brings about a new reality. Examples of performatives include speech acts such as a minister’s saying “I now pronounce you man and wife,” or a parent’s telling their child “you’re grounded.”

Perhaps even more pertinent to the present study is Reddy's notion of "emotive utterances," which are emotion statements that "are influenced directly by and alter what they 'refer' to," and thus "are themselves instruments for directly changing, building, hiding, and intensifying emotions" (1997: 331). In the context of Shakespearean performance, this occurs when the playtext's language gives meaningful shape to the actor/character's affective processes via specific emotion words. Consider Malvolio's proclamation "I am happy" (*TN* 2.5.170), Polixenes's intimation to Camillo when he says "[f]ear o'ershades me" (*WT* 1.2.457), or Antonio's famous opening line "In sooth I know not why I am so sad" (*MV* 1.1.1): these moments all instantiate the concept of the emotive utterance.² Emotives differ from J.L. Austin's concepts of "constatives" (which are simply descriptive statements, and thus can be either true or false) and "performatives" (which, as we have just seen, are pronouncements that "do things to the world") (Reddy 1997: 331). Because "the statement's referent changes by virtue of the statement," emotives combine elements of both constatives and performatives in that they can both describe a pre-existing state of affairs and create a new one (*ibid.*). Thus, they are "influenced directly by and alter what they 'refer' to. ... Emotives are themselves instruments for directly changing,

2. Malvolio's "I am happy" is slightly problematic because, as I discuss in pages 152–53, the Shakespearean use of the word denoted "fortunate" as often as it did the emotion that current English-speakers mean when they use the word today. Nevertheless, twenty-first-century actors often play the moment in a way that implies the latter, so the argument obtains for these purposes.

building, hiding, intensifying emotions. There is an ‘inner’ dimension to emotion, but it is never merely ‘represented’ by statements or actions” (ibid.).

In expounding her theory of emotions-as-practice, Monique Scheer invokes the concept of emotives as well:

Putting a name on our feelings is part and parcel of experiencing them. Expression organises the experience—or to use Reddy’s terminology from cognitive psychology, an emotive such as “I am angry” brings into attention thought material hitherto activated but outside awareness. It is amorphous and unintelligible until it has been shaped by mental attention. Reddy notes that emotives have unexpected outcomes, but that they very often succeed and that people generally use them (based on their practical experience with their effectiveness) to achieve certain emotional states. The use of emotive is emotional practice (2012: 212).

As cultural and historical anthropologists, it is unlikely that Reddy and Scheer intend for their ideas to pertain so clearly to the realm of theatrical performance. Nevertheless, as Peter Burke (2005)—another historian—has noted, emotionologists habitually recruit the language and metaphors of the theatre when discussing their subject matter in linguistic, historical, and cultural contexts.³

Crucially, Reddy’s characterisation of emotives assumes neither that the speaker’s words accurately describe the feeling they are naming, nor that they successfully manifest that feeling. “[L]ike a performative,” he says, an emotive

is neither true nor false. Emotives constitute a kind of pledge that alters, a kind of getting-through of something nonverbal into the verbal domain that could never be called an equivalence or a representation. The very failure of

3. See, e.g., Wierzbicka’s (1999) use of the term “emotional scripts”; Ronald de Sousa’s (1987) “paradigm scenarios”; Rom Harré’s (1986) “emotional repertoire.”

representation is recognized and brings an emotional response itself; this response is part of the emotive effect. This is true whether one's "intention" is to speak the "truth" about one's feelings or not (1997: 332).

It is fascinating to note that Reddy's work involves a significant amount of translation, as it centres on writing in English about French history. His use of words such as "equivalence" and "representation" when discussing emotives echoes the similarity between the process of translation and the act of putting the emotions we experience into words. Both tasks necessitate an exchange—a negotiation between what will be lost and what will be gained; an awareness of how the very act of transference from source to target entails consequences that are both deliberate and unintended. Furthermore, Reddy acknowledges that even culturally-learned gestures or physiological behaviours can serve as emotives (2001: 107, 331)—an idea that brings an additional layer of complexity to their transformative (and translational) potential when the language is embodied by actors on the stage.

Thus, when actor/Malvolio speaks the words "I am happy," the utterance, and any accompanying physicality, may or may not serve as an accurate representation of the speaker's experience. Alternatively, the actor/character may intend for the line to function as a catalyst for generating happiness within himself—an intention that, again, may or may not achieve its desideratum. These variables determine whether the emotive turns out to be, in Reddy's terminology, "'successful' or 'unsuccessful,' depending on whether the emotions expressed, to a greater or lesser degree, come

into being (or continue), intensify, gain sufficient focus to generate further action, or slip into the background" (1997: 346). In actor/Malvolio's case, it is often the effects of the very process of the emotive utterance that determine the audience's response. If "I am happy" is successful in that it serves, in that moment, as a surprised realisation that he is experiencing such an emotion at all, the audience may (among other possibilities) experience a sense of pathos toward him. If the words are successful in that he deliberately uses them to bring himself out of his wonted dourness and into happiness, the audience may share in his delight. If, on the other hand, such an attempt proves ultimately unsuccessful—i.e., he is still decidedly *unhappy* after the emotive utterance—the audience may laugh in contempt at the irascible Puritan's failure. These various theatrical possibilities illustrate Simon Palfrey's assertion that

language is not primarily there to describe what is already known and observed. Instead, it is itself finding out what might be present; it is its own barometer of possibility. It is at once tangible and speculative, rooted in the body's immediacy but committed to an almost magical apprehension of what might be (2011: 37).

It is worth remembering, however, that this process remains straightforward only to the degree that the emotion concept maintains a sense of currency in the interactional spaces between player and playtext, between playtext and audience, and between audience and player. At the same time, emotive utterances play a large part in establishing a sense of agency for actors within those affective relationships. Tania Colwell notes that "[a]n individual's capacity to shape their emotions using

emotives provides the opportunity to situate the feeling subject within social collectives” (2017: 7). And while such a moment may ostensibly begin as an individual act, the resulting transformation of the affective landscape of the situation inevitably ripples outward, becoming another step in the ongoing evolution of the emotional community. After all, according to Bottineau,

[l]anguage is, all in one, an enactive all-selves-encompassing way of organizing knowledge and controlling action through direct intervention in the world. Linguaging alters the environment and accretes the selves into a cultural body that self-defines itself as one of the living species—mankind (2010: 298).

Bottineau’s enactivist understanding of language’s capacity to create experience helps us to understand what enables emotive speech acts to have such transformative power: namely, the irreducible interdependence amongst language’s physical (acoustic/physiological/neurobiological), cognitive (semantic/affective/experiential), and environmental (temporal/geographic/social) elements (see also Martín-Moruno and Pichel 2019: 9).

Enaction’s recognition of this ongoing, dynamic interplay provides us with the capacity to survey the different elements of our study from a series of mutually enriching perspectives. Thus, at various points throughout this study, we shall be able to explore the semantic variability of emotion words by investigating how they are shaped by preexisting societal norms, as well as how this variability creates new cultural realities. Similarly, we will look at the reciprocal relationship between the

value of emotional expression in different cultures and how emotion is embodied in those cultures' performance traditions. As we investigate the various forces at play, it is helpful to keep in mind the degree to which emotions, performance, and identity—both individual and cultural—are already inextricably intertwined. As Dolores Martín-Moruno and Beatriz Pichel frame it, “emotions are always a *doing* that transforms the subject in myriad ways” (2019: 3; emphasis mine). They even go so far as to contend that human bodies are “defined by the result of the performative work of emotions” (ibid.: 7). Similarly, Katie Barclay reminds us, “[e]motions are performed because they ‘do something’; they both communicate the self and create it. Moreover, as emotions are performed they become implicated in wider communicative strategies, able to shape the world and not just reflect feeling” (2017: 15). Grounding this discussion in the neurobiological and phenomenological realities of the lived body will provide us with a focal lens for viewing the ways in which emotion is experienced, expressed, and understood—or, crucially, *not* understood.

Affects, Emotions, and Moods.

In the broadest terms—both historically and currently—it is safe to say that there is little agreement on what even constitutes an “emotion” (as opposed, say, to

“affect” or “passion”). For the purposes of this study, then, it will be helpful to clarify the features that distinguish a few related terms from one another.

Affect: Erin Hurley describes affect as the “immediate, uncontrollable, skin-level registration of a change to our environment” (2010: 13). Her definition is inspired by leading affect theorist Brian Massumi, who equates affect with “intensity” of feeling, something that is inherently at odds with the “linear” quality of language (1995: 87–88). In his formulation, therefore, affects are pre-noetic feelings that necessarily become “dampened” when they are “qualified” by language (ibid.). As such, according to Stephanie Trigg, they are “often granted a form of ontological priority” (2017: 11). This is how Massumi distinguishes “affect” from “emotion,” which he sees as intensity that is “qualified” by sociolinguistic labels (1995: 88). Yet this differentiation between the kinds of “logic” that drive feeling and those that inform cognition depends on the notion that “intensities are necessarily and utterly divorced from all that signifies” (Brinkema 2014: 28). As we have seen, the advances of the enaction paradigm have rendered the separation between affective experience and semantic forms of cognition progressively less tenable. For our purposes, then, I will use the term “affect” in the way that Colombetti describes it: as a set of moment-to-moment experiences that demonstrate “a *lack of indifference*, and rather a *sensibility or interest* for one’s existence” (2014: 1). In her formulation, remember, all forms of

cognition and sensation are inherently affective. It is on this basis that I will use affect-related terms to describe concepts, words, and thoughts in ways that might be less common for those who are more familiar with Massumi and other theorists in his tradition.

Emotion: With the above formulation of affect in mind, we can view emotion as a variety of affect, rather than as a contrasting category. Massumi's understanding of emotion is a helpful jumping-off point:

An emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized (1995: 88).

Hurley frames the concept similarly: "emotion names our sensate, bodily experience in a way that at once organises it and makes it legible to ourselves and consonant with others' experiences" (2010: 23). The idea of emotion as an "organising," "socio-linguistic" phenomenon that is "semantically and semiotically formed"—*semantic affect*, if you will—represents a central aspect of my thesis. However, my understanding of emotion diverges from Massumi's in that I consider language and the other semantic aspects of cognition as inherently embodied, affective processes as well, rather than as an entirely distinct set of functions occurring only in the brain or mind. As Colombetti argues,

emotion should be conceptualized as a faculty of the whole embodied and situated organism. Evaluations arise in this organism in virtue of its embodied and situated character, and the whole situated organism carries meaning *as such*—not by way of some separate cognitive-evaluative faculty (2010: 146).

The cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder takes a similar view, framing emotions as situated complexes. An emotion, he says,

is not something separable from the conditions that justify it, from the somatic and affective experiences that are ways of being touched by it, from the actions it demands, and so on. The emotion is the whole story. It is a kind of somatic event (fatigue, chest pain) and affective event (panic, emptiness, expansiveness). It is caused by the perception of some antecedent condition (e.g., the death of a friend) and by the recognition of the personal implications of the event for the self (e.g., loss, gain, threat, goal blockage, degradation, or elevation of status). This motivates a plan for action (e.g., attack, withdraw, hide, confess, celebrate) to preserve or enhance one's sense of identity and purpose in life. The idea of an "emotion" is about the entire mental, moral, and social episode. It is about the unitary experience of the whole package deal or the simultaneous experience of all the components of meaning (2004: 91).

Shweder's understanding of the concept of "emotion" offers a rich manner of conveying what I mean when I use the word in this thesis—particularly as it relates to how native English speakers understand it today.

Yet it is certainly worth remembering that the word "emotion" remains problematic in certain contexts—not least of which being the discussion of translation. Linguist and emotion scholar Anna Wierzbicka notes, for example, that other languages such as French, German, and Russian—all of which we will be examining in the present study—do not have words that equate directly to what English-speakers mean when they use the word "emotion." In ordinary German, for

example, “[t]he word usually used as the translation of the English *emotion*, *Gefühl* (from *fühlen* ‘to feel’) makes no distinction between mental and physical feelings” (Wierzbicka 1999: 3). That being said, what is decidedly less problematic is that the natural languages of the world—and certainly the ones we are focusing on in this study—do indeed appear to have words that equate directly to what we mean in English when we use the words “think” or “feel” (ibid.: 8). When I use the word “emotion,” then, I intend it in the sense that Wierzbicka employs it: as a shorthand for the concept of “feelings based on thoughts” (ibid.: 12), or what I have called semantic affect. It is also worth emphasising that, when I employ some of Wierzbicka’s methods, I intend for the “thoughts” upon which these “feelings” are based to be understood as inherently affective. As we shall see in future chapters, such inherent affectivity—in a potentially limitless number of semantic and experiential combinations—is precisely what constitutes “a broader conception of emotion, according to which fear, anger, happiness, guilt, anguish, and so on are only *some* of the many ways in which sense-making manifests itself in experience and in the body” (Colombetti 2010: 150).

Mood: During Shakespeare’s lifetime, according to R.S. White, “mood” often connoted “a form of courage ... demonstrating an extreme ferocity and vigour” (2017B: 51). This level of emotional specificity is, of course, no longer the case when

the word is used today. As I employ it, “mood” connotes another classification of feeling. Whereas “emotions” are “feelings based on thoughts,” we might say that the feeling-quality of a mood is a (typically) long-lasting affective atmosphere that can create suitable conditions for many of the thoughts on which emotional episodes are based. This is how Dylan Evans refers to them: as “background states that raise or lower our susceptibility to emotional stimuli” (2001: 68). As such, we might say that moods are analogous to climate zones, while emotions correspond to weather events (thunderstorms, tornadoes), and affects are like the more granular components of those events (lightning flashes, gusts of wind). Just as thunderstorms are more likely to occur in warm, humid climates, the likeliness of an angry outburst increases when one is in a cranky mood. Invoking the language of Dynamic Systems Theory—in which the concept of “attractors and repellers” describe elements within a given system that make certain patterns more or less likely—this is the analogy Colombetti employs in her discussion of the relationship between emotions and moods:

Dynamically speaking, we can say that moods make some emotional episodes more likely than others by affecting the topology of the organism’s state space. Changes in moods shift the landscape of attractors and repellers, pulling or “enslaving” brain and bodily processes more toward certain emotion forms than others. Conversely, the reiteration of certain emotion forms can carve a topology that leads to the relative stabilization of certain mood forms (ibid.: 2014: 78).

Generally speaking, then, we can say that moods tend to be relatively “stable” and longer-lasting when compared to emotional episodes; however, as Colombetti describes, a frequent recurrence of certain emotions can often shift a person’s mood.

In the specific context of theatre, the concept of “mood” carries a separate but related meaning. Tait defines this as “the overall emotional tone or sequence of emotional impressions generated by the combined aesthetic effects of performance” (2021: 17). This is a useful distinction to keep in mind because it allows us to understand how the overarching feeling-tone of a production can sometimes differ from some of the individual emotional episodes that occur within the action of a play. While moods are not connected to language as directly as emotions are, we shall see in later chapters how linguistic influences do indeed both contribute to and reflect cultural mood-tendencies—in drama and beyond (ibid.: 121). As Matt contends, “[w]ords shape the emotions of those who lived in the past, marking the limits of the possible and the recognized. Likewise, our own vocabularies limit how we in the present understand the emotions of other eras” (2014: 43). The same can easily be said about other cultures in the present era. In order to understand these influences and limitations, however, we must first grapple with the problem of untranslatability.

The Untranslatable.

When I use the term “untranslatability,” I shall follow the definition offered by Duncan Large and colleagues: that a target language lacks “a single-word equivalent which can be agreed to cover all the senses of the source-language word” (2018: para. 7.8, citing Jakobson 2000: 113–18). Yet, as they go on to note, “no translation can be expected to achieve that level of comprehensiveness” (ibid.). This is because of the fact that, even within the bounds of a single language, no two synonyms can truly claim an exact equivalence. Consider, for example, the words “nice” and “kind.” Any thesaurus will list these words as synonymous with each other. But for thoroughly competent English speakers, the two words carry mildly divergent denotations, as well as sometimes wildly divergent connotations; a person can be said to have a “kind heart” without necessarily behaving in a way that is superficially “nice,” and vice versa. Furthermore, as Batja Mesquita and Michael Boiger point out, emotions

emerge in interplay with and derive their specific function from the social context. This means that emotional experience and behavior will be differently constructed across various contexts. Being angry with your boss may be a different emotion than being angry with your child; anger in a soured relationship may be different than anger in a flourishing one; and the modal construction of anger in Japan may be different than that in Belgium (2014: 299).

The point here is that we learn to distinguish between such subtle differences by living them, and by sharing them with those around us. As Tim Lomas notes, “[t]he subjective state-spaces represented by these words are not self-evidently demarcated but rather are determined by convention” (2018: 7). This phenomenon of conceptual inequivalence becomes even more pronounced when we compare verbal concepts between two different languages—or even, as we shall see in further chapters with terms such as “honour”—between two different time periods or cultures with a “common” language.

Yet it is worth clarifying that the lack of “a single-word equivalent” does not generally render any given verbal concept completely meaningless as a result of the translation process. As Jakobson highlights, for both gramatical and cultural reasons “[l]anguages differ in what they must convey, and not in what they may convey” (2000: 116). In fact, as Barbara Cassin notes in the introduction to her *Dictionary of Untranslatables*, that which is “untranslatable” is “not what one does not translate, but what one never ceases to (not) translate”—“*ce qu’on ne cesse pas de (ne pas) traduire*” (2014: xvii). Similarly, Emily Apter notes the significance of the untranslatable as “an ordinary speech-act or term of common usage whose signification is supposedly unambiguous but which is anything but. ... The Untranslatable comes into focus as that x-factor that disqualifies presumptive knowability in matters of

linguistic definition" (2013: 121). But it is important to remember that this disqualification of "presumptive knowability" does not entail absolute *unknowability*. While we must indeed leave room for the "logical possibility that autonomic arousal (an objective state of the body) does not produce the same sensations, feelings, or subjective experiences everywhere you go" (Shweder 2004: 85), this does not mean that such differences in subjective feeling are ultimately incommunicable. Hubscher-Davidson asserts, in fact, "that emotions that are supposedly 'culturally unique' are actually not totally incomprehensible in other cultures, as people have the ability to experience all kinds of emotions, even if some of them are less emphasised in their own culture" (2018: 16). And there are many who believe that engaging with such words from other cultures can be personally enriching for one's own emotional palette. Lomas, for example, contends that developing a relationship with new affective concepts from other languages can help us to articulate feelings with which we may have been vaguely familiar, but for which we lacked the appropriate vocabulary to crystallise the experience (2018: xiii–iv). Considering untranslatable words in such a light allows us to see that they are not merely insignificant curiosities; on the contrary, they may have much to teach us about both ourselves and cultures that may be less familiar to us.

From a lexical perspective, however, the lack of equivalence that characterises the untranslatable does present translators and interpreters with some undeniable challenges. Wierzbicka has devoted several decades of research to the question of the untranslatability of emotions. She has noted that every language has emotion words that cannot be found in other cultures—a conclusion that will not come as a surprise to anyone who speaks more than one language. However, Wierzbicka's assertion is an even stronger claim: namely, that *all* words for “thought-related feelings ... are language-specific and, generally speaking, do not match across languages and cultures” (1999: 15). Remarkably, then, it is not just that *certain* emotion words in other languages do not have English equivalents—it is that emotion words as a rule have no true equivalents in other languages whatsoever. At first blush, this claim appears rather counter-intuitive—particularly because it seems obvious that at least the so-called “basic” emotions like “sadness” or “anger” would have reliable equivalents in all languages. Yet Wierzbicka insists that this supposition is incorrect (ibid.). In fact, these ubiquitous lexical lacunae have piqued the curiosity of several other researchers. As James Russell, for example, has opined, “it is puzzling why a language would fail to provide a single word for an important, salient, discrete, and possibly innate category of experience—if such exists” (1991: 440). Yet soon thereafter, he acknowledges that “one must recognize that the existence of basic

emotions does not entail nor is entailed by the existence of universal categories for understanding emotion. There is no guarantee that human beings have got the matter right” (ibid.: 441; see also Shweder 2004: 83). Even if humans do have certain “basic emotions”—a point that is far from settled—the fact that the world’s cultures are not in agreement about what they might be has its own remarkable implications.

A recent data analysis of emotion concepts, exploring 2474 languages across 20 language families, has served to strengthen Wierzbicka’s claims. The researchers’ computer-driven study focused on the idea of “colexification”—which denotes “instances in which multiple concepts are co-expressed by the same word form within a language” (Jackson et al. 2019: 1518)—determined that

[e]motion concepts had different patterns of association in different language families. For example, “anxiety” was closely related to “fear” among Tai-Kadai languages, but was more related to “grief” and “regret” amongst Austroasiatic languages. By contrast, “anger” was related to “envy” among Nakh-Daghestanian languages, but was more related to “hate,” “bad,” and “proud” among Austronesian languages (ibid.: 1522).

Other, more localised studies have frequently demonstrated similar phenomena, such as how the Ifaluk people of Micronesia “make no conceptual distinction between sorrow and love. They are both described with the same term, *fago*” (Engelen et al. 2009: 42). Thus, even those emotion concepts that have heretofore been considered “universal”—and even those that are considered to be in the same

affective “categories”—are conceptualised quite differently from culture to culture.⁴

We shall consider several illustrations of this point through the remaining chapters of the present study.

It must be said, however, that not everyone agrees with Wierzbicka’s work. While ultimately concurring with her conclusion, Colombetti takes issue with Wierzbicka’s linguistic methodology. From the enactive perspective, according to Colombetti,

arguments from cross-cultural linguistic differences do not undermine the claim (supported by empirical evidence) that some organismic features recur reliably across cultures and languages in comparable situations. There appear to be similarities in emotional manifestations across populations that are resistant to linguistic practices (2014: 31).

This argument resonates with many of Wierzbicka’s hard-science critics, in that many scientists believe that she denies the biological and psychological possibilities of any kind of universal experience amongst human beings. Yet Colombetti’s claim mischaracterises Wierzbicka’s approach. Wierzbicka makes it clear that her argument is not a blanket rejection of the idea of universals; on the contrary, the thrust of her linguistic study is actually about discovering what those universals actually are. In her own words:

The idea that there may be an infinite variety of “emotion” categories operating across cultures is not incompatible with the view that there may also be

4. See Barsalou 2008 (esp. p. 239) for a detailed analysis of how distributed neural patterns serve as “simulators” that construct conceptual categories by “providing inferences based on previous members.”

some universal patterns of emotional organization. The crucial point is that if there are universal patterns they cannot be captured by means of English folk categories such as *anger*, *sadness*, or *disgust*, but only in terms of *universal* human concepts (1999: 28).

Thus, Wierzbicka's claim is that all emotions comprise features that are both intrinsic (universal) and acquired (cultural). This actually squares well with Colombetti's enactivist understanding, which "does not draw a clear-cut division between basic and nonbasic emotions. ... [A]ll emotions come in complex organismic patterns subject to both evolutionary and developmental pressures" (Colombetti 2014: 71–72). From a neurophysiological perspective, the crucial point is that concepts coalesce around "any component of experience that attention selects repeatedly" (Baraslou 2008: 240). This is true whether that repeated selection occurs during the evolution of the species as a whole (e.g., fight-or-flight response in the face of danger), the development of a given culture (valuing emotional expressivity versus restraint), or the course of an individual's lifetime (Casimir 2009). Studies suggest, for example, that "early and repetitive emotional responses can result in structural changes that become consolidated in personality" (Hubscher-Davidson 2018: 13). In such cases, it is easy to imagine that language may have a causal role to play. As Bottineau argues, "[t]he forming of personal languaging is part and parcel of the forming of the person. ... In the same way, but at a different scale, the forming of a community's social languaging is part and parcel of the cultural forming of the tribe" (2010: 295–96). Such formative variations—even on a purely lexical level—are

bound to lead to corresponding disparities in the varieties of affective experience that are conceptually salient for an individual person or a distinct culture. We shall see examples of this in the following chapters—particularly with Russian *тоска* (toska) and German *Angst*.

The Natural Semantic Metalanguage: Decomposing Concepts.

Yet does the prevalence of affective untranslatability necessitate that there is ultimately nothing on which to base a shared vocabulary of feelings across cultures? Fortunately not. Willard Quine addresses the fundamental ambiguity of the untranslatable by proposing a process he terms the translator's "analytical hypothesis." Here, various words, phrases, and parts of speech in the source language are correlated as granularly as possible to analogues in the target language (Quine 2000 [1959]: 107). Quine employs the term "hypothesis" here because of the very recognition that linguistic and cultural differences preclude the certainty of equivalence between languages.

Such uncertainty is, of course, magnified when we speak about the things we feel. Nonetheless, Wierzbicka has devised an ingenious method of translating emotion concepts that is very much in the vein of Quine's analytical hypothesis. Yet rather than decomposing source language emotion concepts into granular semantic

units available *only* in the target language, Wierzbicka's research has recognised that there are indeed certain core concepts that are translatable among all of the world's natural languages. "The crucial point," she contends, "is that while most concepts ... are complex (decomposable) and culture-specific, others are simple (non-decomposable) and universal (e.g., FEEL, WANT, KNOW, THINK, SAY, DO, HAPPEN, IF); and that the former can be explained in terms of the latter" (1999: 8). She calls this vocabulary of non-decomposable, universal concepts the "Natural Semantic Metalanguage" (NSM). I reproduce the components of NSM in full here, as they will inform the discussion throughout this thesis.⁵

Substantives	I, YOU, SOMEONE(PERSON), SOMETHING(THING), PEOPLE, BODY
Determiners	THIS, THE SAME, OTHER
Quantifiers	ONE, TWO, SOME, MANY/MUCH, ALL
Attributes	GOOD, BAD, BIG, SMALL
Mental predicates	THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR
Speech	SAY, WORD, TRUE
Actions, events, move- ments	DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
Existence and possession	THERE IS, HAVE
Life and death	LIVE, DIE
Logical concepts	NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF
Time	WHEN(TIME), NOW, AFTER, BEFORE, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME TIME
Space	WHERE(PLACE), HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR; SIDE, INSIDE
Intensifier, augmentor	VERY, MORE

5. NSM table: Wierzbicka 1999: 36–37.

Taxonomy, partonomy	KIND OF, PART OF
Similarity	LIKE

Unlike an ostensibly basic term like “happy,” the words found in the NSM vocabulary are so basic that they are difficult to define to a child. One might say to a toddler, for example: “You are happy when something good has happened to you, and you feel good because of this.” But how would one define the word “if”? We all learn such concepts via our experience of the world, in relation to ourselves and others, and over the course of time. What’s more, a “normal” ability to understand our experiences in life depends directly on such concepts, irrespective of culture. Thus, the words of the NSM constitute the essential elements necessary for describing thought-related feelings—what the English language terms “emotions.”

Let us look at an example of one of Wierzbicka’s explications: the English-language concept of “joy” (which CHAPTER THREE will discuss more fully).

Joy (X felt joy)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “something very good is happening
- (d) I want this to be happening”
- (e) when this person thinks this this person feels something very good
- (f) X felt something like this
- (g) because X thought something like this (1999: 50–51)

The composition of Wierzbicka’s cognitive scenarios may strike some readers as slightly silly; this is due to the necessarily simplistic nature of the constituent thoughts. This almost childlike simplicity is what allows the elements of complex

concepts like emotions to be understood across language and cultures. With a few exceptions, elements (a), (b), (f), and (g) tend to be typical of the explications of most emotion concepts, underscoring the fact that the affective processes we are describing all have cognitive components; this is what distinguishes thought-based feelings from other physical feelings. We can also see that the concept of “joy” involves a particularly positive occurrence in the present moment (“something very good is happening”), a sense of positive volition (“I want this to be happening”), and an intensely positive valence (“this person feels something very good”). Such variables as the assessment of the occurrence and its intensity; the degree of volition; and the intensity, duration, and valence of the feeling itself can be present or absent in differing degrees. The distinctions amongst these variables are what determine various “emotion” concepts throughout the world. Moreover, the nearly infinite number of semantically viable combinations is precisely what makes it statistically unlikely that any two languages will have exact matches in the lexical terms they commonly use to describe such experiences.

Colombetti’s critique of Wierzbicka’s methodology has already demonstrated the scientific reservations toward a framework that disputes the notion of basic emotions as transcultural entities. It should be mentioned, however, that criticisms of Wierzbicka are not limited to those who believe her work to be dismissive of

universals. Scholars from the humanities have taken issue with her arguments for precisely the opposite reason—they believe that her attempts to identify a set of concepts that are common to all humanity is excessively essentialist. The historian Rob Boddice's thoughts on this matter are worth quoting at length, as they are more or less representative of this line of criticism.

Wierzbicka's culturally specific account is persuasive until it contradicts itself. Social neuroscientists would, I think, prevent this slippage into culture-independent concepts, since all concepts are formed and learned after being born, once the brain is in the world. Since that brain is bound by the conceptual framework of a specific culture or cultures, even the most fundamental concepts, which Wierzbicka argues are universal, such as "want" or "feel," come laced with layers of meaning that do not transcend cultural boundaries. The concept of "want," for example, from an anglophone perspective, has changed in recent times from being a recognition of being without something—as in I want *for* bread, or conversely, I want *for* nothing ... to being a statement of desire akin to "I would like to have." ... If those words represent a particular language at a particular time in a particular cultural setting, then it remains a mystery why or how her own "universal" concepts have come by this status (2018: 50–51).

Boddice is, of course, correct in his assertion that the meaning of the English word "want" has shifted over time—and this is a particularly relevant shift within the field of Shakespeare studies. When Prospero says, at the end of *The Tempest*, "Now I want / Spirits to enforce, art to enchant" (Epilogue.13–14), he means it in Boddice's invoked sense of "being without something." This is indeed the sense in which Shakespeare and his contemporaries employed the word, and understanding this distinction is undoubtedly essential to understanding these plays.

However, Boddice's recognition that the meaning of the word has changed does nothing to undermine Wierzbicka's claim. Nowhere does she say that the meanings of individual words—even the ones she has identified for NSM—have stayed the same throughout each language's history. Rather, her assertion is that there is always a word that is attached to the universal signified. Thus, what we currently signify by the verb "want" was signified by the early modern verb "will" (as in *What You Will*). As such, despite what Boddice contends, a word's shift in meaning does not preclude the possibility that its current definition can define a universal concept. The fact that the actual words differ between temporal and cultural settings is fully acknowledged within Wierzbicka's framework. The point is that the words exist, regardless of what their precise form is.

Yet Boddice's criticism does not stop there. He continues:

While it may be true that all cultures have had some concept of bad and good, want and know, and feel too, they are not reducible to a conceptual rule that works equally for all. For such concepts cannot exist outside of the place where they are formulated and practised. To strive to be good, at one point in time, might have meant paying fair prices for slaves. A few years later, in the same place, the purchase of slaves at any price might be re-cast as bad. I posit that to feel good about something is indissociably bound with that something and carries a quality related to that practice. To feel good about paying fair prices for slaves and to feel good about banning slavery cannot be qualitatively the same. Such apparently basic concepts are bound up in the cosmological worlds of those who use them. Because of that, they are not actually basic at all, but as rich and complex and distinctive as more obviously culturally specific labels such as *Angst* (2018: 51).

Boddice's concession that all cultures may "have had some concept of bad and good," and so forth, is the fundamental point that Wierzbicka's NSM system was created to make. And while he follows this concession with the contention that these concepts "are not reducible to a conceptual rule that works equally for all," the argument that follows does not convincingly tell us why. In maintaining, for example, that "to feel good about something is indissociably bound with that something," Boddice makes a logical leap. The concept of "good" does not necessarily have to relate to *feeling* good, and it certainly does not necessitate feeling good *about* anything. In connecting the basic concept "good" to feeling or intentionality (i.e., "aboutness," relating to the NSM component "because"), Boddice is doing precisely thing that NSM was created to explain—how basic concepts combine to create complex ones. It is certainly true that there is a qualitative difference between feeling good because of slave prices and feeling good because of the abolition of slavery. Yet it is also essential to remember that it is possible to feel good for no reason at all. And perhaps even more importantly, it is possible to have a sense that something is good without actually feeling good about it. "For example," Wierzbicka notes, "*envy* implies that 'something good happened,' but alas, it happened to someone else, and the experiencer feels 'something bad,' not 'something good'" (1999: 50). Thus, the concept "good" can, like the other components of NSM, be

isolated out of more complex concepts in which it is involved. This is why, *pace* Boddice, these non-decomposable concepts are not “as rich and complex and distinctive as more obviously culturally specific labels such as *Angst*.”

Where I agree with Boddice, however, is in the idea that the more complex experiences of feeling are not in themselves universal. Crucially, this kind of observation is no longer unique to the humanities, or to social sciences like linguistics and anthropology. According to scientists like Lisa Feldman Barrett, the fields of neuroscience and psychology are increasingly finding that—contrary to the “classical view” of emotions—there are no neurological “fingerprints” for even what used to be considered “basic” emotions such as “fear” and “anger” (2017: 3; see also Daum et al. 2009). This is due to “degeneracy,” which, according to Barrett, denotes “the capacity for dissimilar representations (e.g. different sets of neurons) to give rise to instances of the same category (e.g. anger) in the same context” (ibid.). As Barrett explains, degeneracy is the reason that the brain is capable of its astonishing degree of complexity—a fact that has direct implications for how we experience and categorise the things we feel:

In emotion research, degeneracy means that instances of an emotion (e.g. fear) are created by multiple spatiotemporal patterns in varying populations of neurons. Therefore, it is unlikely that all instances of an emotion category share a set of core features (i.e. a single facial expression, autonomic pattern or set of neurons). ... [F]ear (or any other emotion) is a “category” that is populated with highly variable instances. ... The summary representation of any emotion category is an abstraction that need not exist in nature (ibid.).

Colombetti's enactivist account offers a similar conjecture: "an individual emotional episode is thus underpinned by a neural pattern whose shape is influenced by the local context, as well as having been molded by evolutionary and developmental forces" (2014: 66). While the core sets of affect may be bound by the parameters of human biology, "the specific emotion one processes this as depends on one's linguistic-conceptual schemas" (Lomas 2018: 39). As a result, the limited number of words available in any given language necessitates a certain amount of linguistic stereotyping. Wierzbicka's various conceptual explications—notwithstanding their remarkable degree of semantic specificity—account for such inevitable variations by employing the component "X felt *something like this*" (emphasis added), rather than stating simply that "X felt *this*." The individual's unique constitution, history, and cultural situatedness all have roles to play in the wide array of varieties of semantic affect that are available on any specific occasion (Mesquita and Boiger 2014: 301). After all, Matt reminds us, "even within a single society, at a given moment, the meaning of those words and the feelings they describe may be understood differently by different individuals" (2014: 44). Thus, Wierzbicka's formulae are not merely cognitive recipes; however, they cannot be said to be simply descriptive, either. As Lawrence Barsalou notes, "representing a concept does not just activate an abstract semantic representation but instead induces preparation for a

situated action” (2008: 250). This brings us back to Reddy’s emotive utterances; recruiting a concept with which to label an emotion invariably transforms both the experience and the consequence of the feeling. It is vital to maintain awareness of this point as we begin to analyse the ways in which language and emotion intersect on the Shakespearean stage.

The utility of adopting Wierzbicka’s methodology for the purposes of this study is that, in Shweder’s words, it “begins with the documentation of how particular wants, feelings, beliefs, and values get linked or co-occur during actual mental events or mental episodes in particular populations” (2004: 94). This provides us with a constructive means of understanding emotion concepts with which we might not be initially familiar. Theoretically, investigating the particular cultural values that motivate people can lead to a greater understanding of why some categories of feeling are crystallised and expressed with greater frequency and clarity in those cultures than they are in others.

Anticipating the Actor.

Employing enaction’s embodied framework in our discussion of emotion, translation, and performance allows us to avoid some of the most beguiling pitfalls of Shakespeare criticism. Chief among these temptations is the tendency to definit-

ively pin down the emotional lives of a play's characters as though they were actually living agents capable of experience. John Dover Wilson initiated the popularity of this analytic approach nearly a century ago, when he insisted that, in order to have any chance at successfully interpreting a scene in one of Shakespeare's plays, "there is one question which it is well to deal with first: in what mood are the principal characters when it begins?" (1935: 174). The problem with such a question stems from the fact that, as we have seen, affect is a thoroughly embodied phenomenon that is inherent in the autopoietic, sense-making processes that define living beings. And while it may seem as though criticism has moved beyond this issue, some prominent scholars still discuss the characters in such terms. As recently as 2018, for example, David Schalkwyk argued that Antony and Cleopatra have a "shared sense of insecurity vis-à-vis each other [that] stems from the fact that they know that each is merely the latest in a series of substitutes" (2018: 223).

Admittedly, when we think about these characters, we do indeed imagine them as embodied entities. This is an example of what the enaction theorist Edwin Hutchins terms "creative acts of perception" (2010: 447). Even as readers of the playtexts, we may indeed have the capacity to detect certain impressions in ways that can escape our conscious awareness. Invoking the cognitive sciences' concept of verbal "priming," Emma Firestone demonstrates why readers of Shakespeare so

frequently imbue his characters with social and affective significance. Even though the characters are mere “linguistic objects,” she argues, they nevertheless “present themselves to readers and audiences with the conviction and credibility of real human beings” (2014: 50). This occurs due to the fact that, as social creatures, the language we associate with others tends to influence the personal valence we ascribe to them. Firestone uses the example of the prevalence of language that connotes or denotes “coldness” in speeches by and about Prince Hal in *1 Henry IV*, in contrast with the linguistic “warmth” with which we associate Henry Percy (whose sobriquet is, of course, Hotspur). Firestone elaborates:

Play-texts are made of language, and this language includes words and ideas the meanings of which resonate in both physical and psychological-conceptual dimensions. ... These concepts, in turn, exert a profound influence on the level or limits of affection these characters might hope to earn from audiences. In other words, language pertaining to “warmth” functions as a linguistic behavioural prime. It therefore both reflects the affection these characters reliably earn from audiences and bears real responsibility for engendering it (ibid.: 57).

Firestone’s insight helps us understand why it is only natural that readers and critics speak about these characters as though they were human. Similarly, Keith Oatley argues that audiences tend to experience characters and their emotions as “literary simulations” (2006: 17).

When we conceive of reading or theater-going as a type of simulation, we can see that we insert ourselves into the goal-plan-action-event-emotion structures of fictional characters and by so doing we bring these characters into being in our minds. We perform the feat of breathing life into fiction, in an emotional

way, by empathy with protagonists, and also by sympathy for other characters (ibid.: 18).

On an individual level, there is a great degree of truth to arguments like these. What becomes problematic, however, is when critics proceed as though there were a transcendently “correct” way of determining a character’s feelings. The trouble with this kind of analysis is that it overlooks the fact that emotional experience is necessarily situated in a physical, social, and cultural context. This situatedness precludes the possibility that all readers—or, at least as importantly, all actors—will interpret a scene’s affective content in an identical manner.

Some critics may, however, qualify their discussions of the characters’ affective lives by framing them in terms of what they take to be the author’s intentions for how the roles should be read. Yet there is plenty of skepticism around this idea as well; as Nicholas Moschovakis cautions, “[w]e might doubt ... whether authorial intentions are ever univocal, or fully coordinated; probably they never are” (2006: 130). There is, in fact, only one thing we can say with any degree of confidence about Shakespeare’s intentions for the affective lives of his characters: that he wrote them knowing that their emotions would be brought to life by his fellow actors. As Simon Palfrey astutely notes:

...authorial intention requires a kind of letting go, a passing of meaningful responsibility to the very agents that the author has composed. The most obvious of these agents is the actor. The part is written for him, and so in lots of ways he has already been anticipated in it, has had a directing hand in its composition. And then, when he gets the part, there are myriad decisions he

must make, opportunities he must identify or respond to, which are constantly making the text something more than words written and defined by a playwright. He reads, analyses, discusses, rehearses, amends, performs; he thinks, speaks, responds, moves, gestures, and so on and on, each of these actions both his own and in dialogue, potentially or actually, with other players undergoing the same process. This is authorial intention in action: but the author-function is multiply collaborative (2011: 26).

Palfrey's well-informed reasoning exemplifies why I believe that theatrical characters' full sense of agency or interiority is fulfilled only when they are embodied by actors. Throughout this process, therefore, I endeavour to resist the temptation to presume knowledge about any character's "true" emotion, motivation, or intention. We can certainly make guesses, and our own emotional responses will necessarily inform our creative acts of perception as we read the plays. Yet it remains critical to leave room for the fact that our own ideas of what these characters are feeling may be very different from how other people understand the affective content of Shakespeare's drama.

This is not to say that the language of the plays is entirely devoid of any cues for passion. Shakespeare's texts certainly provided his fellow actors with many suggestions (via dialogue, stage directions, verse structure, etc.). In these cases, it is valuable—as Palfrey argues—"to let Shakespeare's words mean what they say" (ibid.). If a character's text says in so many words that they are angry, I shall err on the side of accepting such a statement as a necessary element of the story. Yet in the absence of such explicit emotive utterances, a reader's attempt to definitively

determine “what mood” the characters are in serves only to delimit and to prejudge what would otherwise be a vast number of options that should be available to any actor.

From an affective perspective, what makes these plays truly universal is not some prefabricated emotional architecture that we can furnish with external design elements of our choosing. In fact, the opposite is the case. Presuming to know what a given character should or must be feeling is to rob the plays of their transcendent potential: allowing theatre artists across the borders of time and culture to bring their own emotional creativity to stories that can be told in any number of ways. As such, I agree with W.B. Worthen’s assessment of the matter: “The relationship between embodiment, orality, writing and print—in dramatic literature and elsewhere—is not static or essential. It is given a specific shape as performative practice” (qtd. in Strier and Mazzio 2005: 22). It is our work, therefore, to try to understand the emotional vocabulary, dynamics, and expectations available within (a) a given culture’s affective ecology, (b) the way a play’s social structure might affect those emotions, and (c) the author’s textual and theatrical cues. This will, I believe, lead both actors and critics to a range of viable options for how a living, breathing human body might be likely to feel in any given moment—all the while maintaining the dynamic nature

of what Bridget Escolme terms the “passionate irrationality” of Shakespeare’s characters as he wrote them (2014: 132).

In practice, the actor’s emotional state will also be at play with the emotions of the other actors on stage, the responses of the audience, and any number of other factors one must account for in the precarious world of a live theatrical performance. As Andy Kesson has demonstrated, Renaissance dramatists asked “the audience members to be actively creative and collaborative in both the fictional story and its affective context,” with the knowledge that the life of the play was “not quite the responsibility of the actors or the audience, but a complex fusion of the two” (2015: 190). Such affective synergy makes itself not only possible but also necessary in the playhouse in part because, as Palfrey puts it,

Shakespeare’s words are all about the speaker feeling or expressing barely articulate emotions, often more than one at a time; or about mental processes that cannot reach clear volition or decision; or about the speaker *not* possessing all of his/her meanings, such that we can conceive things that the speaker does not (2011: 31).

Thus, what auditors contribute to a dynamically interactive environment plays an important role in the emotional collaboration of the performance.

A.R. Braunmuller and Robert N. Watson have prefaced their own character analyses by drafting the following caveat:

Speculation that “character X does Y because she is thinking Z” should be understood as useful shorthand for, “drawing on our tendency to suspend disbelief and interpret the human bodies on the stage as human beings, and to

deduce their motives and personalities from fragmentary evidence by mapping them intuitively on to our experience of actual human beings, the text or production plausibly suggests to readers or audiences that character X does Y because she is thinking Z" (2020: 57).

In other words, while dramatic figures may not always be "thinking," or "doing" things as a result of their thoughts, it is only natural that readers, critics, or spectators might make such assumptions. In the pages that follow, I intend all discussions of dramatic characters' internal or emotional life to be taken within this context. Furthermore, when I engage with other scholars' interpretations of the affective dynamics of the plays, this is the predicate upon which I shall assume their claims are based.

Along similar lines, the points discussed in this section have persuaded me to adopt a convention from McConachie's work: the idea of "actor/character" as a process of "conceptual blending." In brief, McConachie describes that process as follows:

Performing *Hamlet* requires actors who can mentally project themselves into a blend of self and character; the actor playing Hamlet will unconsciously blend a concept of himself (or herself, if a woman is cast) with a concept of the Prince of Denmark. ... When spectators perceive the blend of an actor and Hamlet, they perform a similar operation. Like the actors, they do not mix all of the information from each of the concepts into the final actor/character blend; they temporarily put aside their knowledge that the actors have other lives outside of their immediate role-playing and that the characters began initially as words on a page. If the spectator perceives the actor as a star, however, she or he may include the star's public persona in the final actor/character blend (2015: 60).

In other words, the knowledge of both character-as-written and actor-as-person combine—in varying ratios depending on how much knowledge there is about each—to create a unique blend, with a unique meaning for both artist and spectator. The “blending” that occurs may not be seamless; in fact, spectators may be very much aware of actor-as-actor in some moments, and not aware at all in others. However, I have chosen to follow McConachie’s lead in my own performance analyses: when I mention an actor-as-character on stage in a production, I refer to them as Essiedu/Hamlet, Rylance/Olivia, or Walters/Brutus. Inelegant though this may be, it feels essential in this study in order to avoid slipping into the claim that any given affective process is that of either the character or the actor alone. This convention also serves as a reminder that the emotions with which we shall engage in these various productions are the results of a combination of the realities and the imaginations of the various cultures we are about to explore.

In many ways, the idea of the actor/character blend serves as an artistic instantiation of many of the ideas of conceptual negotiation this chapter has explored. Enaction, for example, provides a hybrid theory of self and cognition that shows us that experience is brought forth in an active collaboration of mind, body, and environment. Wierzbicka’s methodology offers a functional means of understanding emotions as processes that are necessarily contingent on both universals

and specifics. Together, this theory and methodology will allow us to understand how bodies, minds, words, spaces, histories, and cultures affect each other through the things we feel in the Shakespearean playhouse.

TWO

LOVE MELANCHOLY AND RUSSIAN *TOCKA* IN *MEASURE FOR MEASURE*

Shakespeare's dramatic material explores many different types of grief. Hamlet, Olivia, and Lady Anne serve as quintessential examples of the kind of grief brought about by deaths of close family members; Lear displays the suffering that can ensue for a father whose daughters have demonstrated filial defiance; Romeo and Falstaff grieve their own banishments. Yet the specific variety of grief we will explore in this chapter—namely, lovesickness—has a particularly complex relationship with the ways in which both early modern English and contemporary anglophone cultures expect its sufferers to conduct themselves. This is because, as Carol Thomas Neely argues, English-speakers have long viewed love both as “a romantic fantasy and a somatic disease”; thus, she continues, “[f]alling in love is both normal and pathological” (2016: 294). Consequently, the phenomenon of lovesickness (often referred to in Renaissance texts as “love melancholy”) has often carried a certain transgressive potential that can be both societally and dramaturgically volatile. “Although the condition subjects humans to painful desires and strange fantasies,” Neely contends, “it also catalyzes passionate agendas. These can resist or disrupt status roles, rigid gender hierarchies, and binary constructions of sexuality” (ibid.:

296). As this chapter will argue, Shakespeare composes his lovesick characters in a way that lends particular power to this emotion's disruptive potential.

Can the same claim be made, however, when Shakespearean love melancholy is translated—be it on the page or on the stage? The present chapter will explore this very question in the unique context of the Russian language—one which, according to the Russian literature scholar Valeria Sobol (2009), has its own rich linguistic, sociological, and medical histories of both love itself and what English-speakers term “lovesickness.” Via a close reading of the initial appearance of the “dejected Mariana” in act 4, scene 1 of *Measure for Measure*, this chapter will explore lovesickness in the context of anglophone and russophone employments of what Erin Sullivan has termed “emotive improvisation” (2016: 4). Sullivan defines this idea as “the process by which actors (both in the sociological and the theatrical sense) find new pathways through and sometimes beyond existing emotional standards and scripts” (ibid.). Viewing Mariana through this lens will provide a sharper contrast between the cultural scripts of these two languages in general, and their treatments of the phenomenon of lovesickness in particular. Furthermore, I will argue that the emotional expectations engendered by the two cultures necessitate opposing dramaturgical considerations for English Marianas and their Russian counterparts—

and even their translators—in order to render the bed-trick satisfactorily plausible for their respective audiences.

Lovesickness in Renaissance England.

In 1594, André du Laurens—who served as physician to King Henry IV of France—published his *Discourse of the Preservation of Sight*, which Richard Surphlet translated into English in 1599. In this influential text, which enjoyed eight reprints in French and two in Italian by 1930 (Dannenfeldt 1987: 240), du Laurens relates the effects of what he calls “amorous melancholie”:

the man is quite undone and cast away, the senses are wandring to and fro, up and downe, reason is confounded, the imagination corrupted, the talk fond and senceless; the sillie loving worme cannot any more look upon any thing but his idol: all the functions of the bodie are likewise perverted, he becommeth pale, leane, swouning, without any stomacke to his meate, hollow and sunke eyed. ... You shall finde him weeping, sobbing, sighing, and redoubling his sighs, and in continuall restlessness, avoyding company, loving solitariness, the better to feed and follow his foolish imaginations (trans. Surphlet 1599: 118).

Du Laurens's illustration is representative of numerous treatises on the subject from medieval and early modern Europe (Wells 2007: 1). Most notably, the above passage conveys the degree to which the early modern imagination held this particular affliction as a potent locus of dialogue between the cognitive and physical aspects of the human experience. In fact, Marion A. Wells argues that early writing on lovesickness is “strikingly important in the history of medicine” specifically because of its

investigation into how mental states related to bodily processes (*ibid.*: 6). Yet this sense of importance may surprise many present-day English speakers. As the psychologist Frank Tallis points out, it is common today to view lovesickness as “a disconcerting but harmless state of mind associated primarily with adolescent infatuations” (2005: 31)—an attitude that is perhaps best exemplified in phrases such as “puppy love.” However, as Tallis continues, such terms—“evoking comfortable images of innocent, loyal attachment—fail almost entirely to capture the confused, anxious and frankly miserable state” that the emotion’s sufferers actually experience (*ibid.*: 41).

As this chapter will show, there were certainly people in Renaissance England—and even characters in Shakespeare’s plays—who were dismissive of those who pined for an unobtainable love. Nevertheless, several of Shakespeare’s contemporaries, including many medical authorities, saw the condition as a potentially grave affliction. In order to understand the consequences of this historical difference, we must first recognise that the modern-day word “lovesickness,” which currently carries benign and often silly connotations, is in fact a reliquary term for a condition that many in Shakespeare’s time considered an actual illness. “Rather than dismiss lovesickness as a literary trope and decode its symptoms as an artificial display of

exaggerated despair,” observes Lesel Dawson, “early modern medical authors held erotic obsession to be a real and virulent disease” (2008: 2).

Admittedly, early modern drama does indeed frequently include depictions of individuals whose fulsome love symptoms subject them to ridicule. Consider, for example, Speed’s sending up of Valentine in act 2, scene 1 of *The Two Gentlemen of*

Verona :

Valentine.

Why, how know you that I am in love?

Speed.

Marry, by these special marks: first, you have learned, like sir Proteus, to wreath your arms, like a malcontent; to relish a love-song, like a robin red-breast; to walk alone, like one that had the pestilence; to sigh, like a schoolboy that had lost his ABC; to weep, like a young wench that had buried her grandam; to fast, like one that takes diet; to watch, like one that fears robbing; to speak puling, like a beggar at Hallowmas. You were wont, when you laughed, to crow like a cock; when you walked, to walk like one of the lions. When you fasted, it was presently after dinner; when you looked sadly, it was for want of money. And now you are metamorphosed with a mistress, that when I look on you I can hardly think you my master (2.1.16–30).

While Speed’s words recall much of the language in the du Laurens passage above, the dialogue’s position in the context of the play makes it fairly clear that Shakespeare has created this exchange for comic purposes, rather than as a depiction of a serious psychological and medical malady. Indeed, the melancholy Renaissance man was a fairly easy satirical target. In fact, it was not uncommon for certain individuals to put on an outward show of love melancholy in order to attract admiration from their peers. “The association of melancholy with intelligence,

alienation, depression, and ecstatic rapture” amongst higher-class men in particular, according to Dawson, “made such posturing both fashionable and culturally resonant” (2008: 27). Because performative melancholy was a significant aspect of normative court life amongst men, Shakespeare and others were often able to capitalise on this behaviour for comedic value.

That being said, in the analyses that follow, it is important to remember that performance does not necessarily entail falsehood. As Dawson continues, the idea of melancholic “posturing” can actually “testify to the interaction of social codes and personal experience: whilst being constructed socially and medically, lovesickness was also an emotion individuals genuinely felt” (ibid.: 27–28). Moreover, maintaining an awareness of the paradigm of enaction highlights the fact that physical, physiological, and mental activity are so intrinsically bound up with affect and emotion that these phenomena are impossible to separate. Remembering that “there is no difference in kind between cognition and emotion,” it is more or less inevitable that the activity and mentation associated with a certain feeling will correspond—to some degree—with the experience of that feeling (Colombetti 2014: xvii). Consequently, the “performance” of a given emotion cannot occur entirely in isolation from the feeling *per se*. In the context of this thesis as a whole, this serves as an

important reminder that such performative correspondence obtains for both sociological and theatrical actors.

It is also helpful to understand that many contemporaneous accounts made an effort to distinguish between the state of being in love and that of lovesickness proper—an affliction that was considered no laughing matter. As Wells puts it, “[i]t is only when the desire for a particular object continues over time without satisfaction that the *actio* of love results in an imbalanced complexion and becomes a *passio*, a disease” (2007: 2). The dangers of this disease were well-documented in the era, as Robert Burton attests in his *Anatomy of Melancholy*: “Goe to *Bedlam* for examples. It is so well knowne in every village, how many have either died for love or voluntary made away themselves, that I not need such labor to prove it. ... Death is the common *Catastrophe* to such persons” (1621: 625). It is worth noting, of course, that Burton’s work slightly post-dates Shakespeare’s lifetime. This timeline certainly entails a degree of caution when evaluating how applicable his writings might be to the plays themselves. However, Burton’s observations and musings do indeed represent the beliefs and ideas to which many people in Elizabethan and Jacobean England were exposed. Furthermore, his work was in many ways an expansion of ideas set out in Timothy Bright’s 1586 *Treatise of Melancholy*, which many scholars believe had a direct influence on Shakespeare’s work (Wilkinson 2018).

On the other hand, it is always vital to remember that English culture in the Renaissance—just like any culture in any given time period—was by no means monolithic. This diversity pertained to beliefs about physical and affective processes as much as it did to things like religion and politics. Shakespeare himself alludes to this difference of opinion in *As You Like It*, when Orlando insists to “Ganymede” that he will die if Rosalind will not have him. He/she responds:

The poor world is almost six thousand years old, and in all this time there was not any man died in his own person, videlicet, in a love-cause. Troilus had his brains dashed out with a Grecian club, yet he did what he could to die before, and he is one of the patterns of love. Leander, he would have lived many a fair year though Hero had turned nun if it had not been for a hot midsummer night, for, good youth, he went but forth to wash him in the Hellespont and, being taken with the cramp, was drowned; and the foolish chroniclers of that age found it was Hero of Sestos. But these are all lies. Men have died from time to time, and worms have eaten them, but not for love (4.1.88–101).

Rosalind’s speech can easily be interpreted in the framework of someone deliberately assuming the mantle of cynicism as a pedagogical tool—particularly because later on in the scene she herself insists that she “cannot be out of the sight of Orlando” (4.1.205–6). Yet Shakespeare’s employment of this point of view on stage likely indicates that it had some level of currency in his time (Sullivan 2016: 53–59; see also Sullivan 2020: 213).

It is also rather telling that Rosalind’s assertions specifically address men, rather than women. This could well reflect the degree to which enacting love melancholy carried divergently gendered sets of meaning. As we have already seen,

male melancholy constituted a fashionable behavioural model for men of a certain class. Lovesick women, on the other hand, were far more likely to be viewed as experiencing serious bodily ailments when displaying the same symptoms (Dawson 2008: 4). Such gendered distinctions will emerge fairly clearly later in this chapter, as we cross-reference our discussion of Mariana with that of the similarly-disposed yet differently-gendered Orsino in *Twelfth Night*. These comparisons will elucidate the many ways in which Mariana's enactment of lovesickness can be read as societally aberrant, while the latitude permitted to Orsino's emotions constitutes a much broader range of culturally acceptable boundaries.

Nevertheless, the notion of love melancholy as a serious illness held an undoubtedly conspicuous place in the medical discourse of the era, for both women and men. The widely-circulated works of authors such as du Laurens and Burton—in addition to those of Bright and Thomas Wright—contributed to a philosophical current that highlighted this view of lovesickness as a disease to be cured. Conversely, the twenty-first-century anglophone world tends to regard the same symptoms as normal, rather than pathological. As Tallis puts it:

Love sickness is no longer recognised as a medical condition. It does not feature in either the ICD [International Classification of Diseases] or DSM [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders] systems, but, given the controversy surrounding psychiatric diagnosis, its absence doesn't really mean very much. It still looks like, feels like, and behaves like a mental illness. ... When people fall in love, they reliably describe four core symptoms: preoccupation (with the loved one), episodes of melancholy, episodes of

rapture, and general instability of mood. Symptoms such as these correspond closely with the conventional diagnoses of obsessionality, depression, mania (or hypomania), and manic depression (2005: 52–53).

These symptoms are so conspicuous and clear-cut that Tallis deems the diagnosis of lovesickness “more coherent and reliable than many of the diagnoses that appear in ICD and DSM” (ibid.: 53). This assessment will prove illuminating for our own contemporary context, in which many theatre-makers and audience members may consider the state less worthy of serious concern than our early modern counterparts may have done.

It is thus important to understand Mariana’s state of dejection in *Measure for Measure* in the context of what Shakespeare’s society would have seen as an alarming health concern. Seen through this lens, a woman like Mariana could potentially be seen as wielding her own lovesickness as a powerful political tool in defiance of the era’s emotional regime. As Dawson argues, love melancholy was a state that could sometimes “operate as a complex strategy for self-assertion” (2008: 118). The following section will demonstrate how Shakespeare crafted the part of Mariana in a way that allowed his audiences to understand, and perhaps even support, this character’s deviations from their culture’s normative emotional scripts.

Mariana's Music and her Melancholy.

While Mariana's romantic predicament is outlined slightly earlier, she first appears onstage in act 4, scene 1. Set outside of the tensions of central Vienna, this scene marks a palpable shift in tone from the three acts that have preceded it, in large part because it begins with an elegiac air of lost love, sung by "a Boy."

Take, O, take those lips away,
That so sweetly were forsworn;
And those eyes, the break of day,
Lights that do mislead the morn:
But my kisses bring again, bring again;
Seals of love, but sealed in vain, sealed in vain (4.1.1–6).

The performance of this song coincides with the first appearance of Mariana, who—after five years—is still grieving the breakdown of her betrothal to the "foresworn," "mislead[ing]" Angelo. The audience has learned about the existence of this character just two scenes prior to this, and the dramaturgical implications of this first encounter are, from an affective standpoint, rather remarkable. As such, it is worth noting that some recent scholars have posited that the boy's song was a post-Shakespearean addition (perhaps by Middleton) for a revival of the play at the indoor Blackfriars theatre in the early 1620s. According to A.R. Braunmuller and Robert N. Watson, who argue that the play contains a number of Middletonian adaptations for an indoor revival,

[t]he way Mariana is introduced would also fit the shift to indoor theatres, where soft music would be audible; that would help explain the song that accompanies her first appearance. Furthermore, the song itself seems most likely to have been imported from a play called *Rollo, Duke of Normandy* (1617–20). This makes more sense than assuming *Rollo* borrowed it from Shakespeare, since what appears in *Measure for Measure* is only part of *Rollo*'s two-stanza song, which appears to be coherently drawn from the Latin lyric *Ad Lydiam*, and which fits much better in *Rollo* than in *Measure* (where the lyrics seem inapt for a character who apparently has not seen her faithless beloved in five years) (2020: 121–22).

On the surface, it does indeed seem as though the words are not entirely appropriate to Mariana's situation. However, Middleton may well have imported the song precisely because its lyrics amplify the affective intensity of the character's suffering. In the intimate setting of the Blackfriars, the melancholy song may also have had the potential to elicit a greater degree of pity due to the closer proximity of the audience (Woods 2014). Yet whether the scene is played indoors or outdoors, Mariana's ability to generate theatrical empathy carries a high degree of dramaturgical significance—and the way her love melancholy is portrayed in the story is critical to the creation of this effect.

We begin to understand the emotional import of Mariana's situation in her first words to the Duke (disguised as her newly-acquainted confidant Friar Lodowick), after she dismisses the singing boy:

I cry you mercy, sir; and well could wish
 You had not found me here so musical:
 Let me excuse me, and believe me so,
 My mirth it much displeas'd, but pleas'd my woe (4.1.10–13).

Here, it becomes clear that Mariana has been deliberately employing the boy's song as what Monique Scheer has termed a kind of "emotional practice" (see CHAPTER ONE). Indeed, Scheer has noted, people often "seek out" certain types of music or other media in order to "modulate [their] feelings to a greater or lesser degree" (2012: 209–10). Many of us can certainly recognise the apparent truth of Scheer's words as they apply to our own time, but the practice was also acknowledged in Renaissance England. In *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, Burton refers specifically to the mood-altering powers of music in a section entitled "The Cure of Love-Melancholy" (1621: 626–31). He notes that it "doth augment the passion in some Lovers, as *Avicenna* notes, so it expelleth it in others, and doth very much good. These things must bee warily applied, as the parties symptomes vary, and as they shall stand diversly affected" (ibid.: 630).

What can Burton's insight tell us about how we should read the playwright's depiction of Mariana in this scene? The last line of her speech carries the potential for a fair amount of ambiguity. "My mirth it much displeased" clearly indicates that the song has not made her particularly happy, but does the fact that the song has "pleased" her woe mean that it has effectively alleviated or aggravated her grief? In *Treatise of Melancholy*, Bright invokes music in his discussion of the means of "restoring the melancholicke braine and heart, to a better state of conceit, and cheere" (1586:

242). Yet Bright takes care to be specific about the type of music necessary to elicit such a palliative effect:

not onely cheerefull musicke in a generalitie, but such of that kinde as most rejoyceth is to be sounded in the melancholicke eare. ... That contrarilie, which is solemne, and still: as dumpes, and fancies, and sette musicke, are hurtfull in this case, and serve rather for a disordered rage, and intemperate mirth, to reclaime within mediocritie, then to allowe the spirites, to stirre the bloud, and to attenuate the humours, which is (if the harmony be wisely applied) effectuallie wrought by musicke (247–48).

Thus, if we follow Bright's logic, the melancholy music to which Mariana is listening is likely to do more harm than good; it has "pleased" her woe in that it has succeeded in reifying her dejected state.

In contrast, Louise Schleiner claims that the boy's song has actually had a curative effect. She supports this conjecture by appealing to Burton's descriptions of the beneficial properties that music effects in those suffering specifically from lovesickness:

...though it makes them melancholy, "it is a pleasing melancholy that it causeth; and therefore to such as are discontent, in woe, fear, sorrow, or dejected, it is a most present remedy; it ... easeth in an instant." Such a one is Mariana, feeding and nursing her melancholic love, beyond the time when it would naturally have died, with sad music that pleases and eases her woe, with isolation, and with religious exercises, thereby maintaining her obsession (1982: 232, qtg. Burton 1621: 375).

Schleiner's claim that the boy's sad song both "pleases and eases" Mariana's woe provides a nuanced yet somewhat problematic assessment of the dramaturgical import of what the text suggests about the character's emotional situation. The idea

that such a practice could “please” the grief itself is recognisable to many unrequited lovers who understand the deceptive pleasure of persisting in such painful feelings. Yet Schleiner’s assertion that the boy’s melancholy song equally “eases” Mariana’s lovesickness is ultimately more dubious. Indeed, Burton’s remark that in such cases, music “easeth in an instant” might be more accurately interpreted as “easeth *for* an instant”—much as scratching at the site of a mosquito bite might provide “instant” relief, while ultimately perpetuating the itch. Robert Tofte provides further contemporaneous evidence for this attitude in the dedication of his sonnet sequence *Laura, The Toyes of a Traveller: Or, The Feast of Fancie* to one Lucy Percy, admonishing her to employ his poems “(as a mean[s] at ydle times) to drive away that selfe-pleasing, yet ill easing humour of never glad melancholie” (1597: A2r–v). C.O. Gardner makes a similar point about Orsino in *Twelfth Night*: he too requests “a sentimental song to relieve (but really to titillate) his ‘passion’” both in 1.1 and in 2.4 (1962: 26). Understanding Mariana’s employment of music as an emotional practice in precisely this manner clarifies Schleiner’s observation that the character does so as a deliberate means of “maintaining her obsession.”

Mariana’s choice to nurture her pining for so long—as Schleiner notes above, “beyond the time when it would naturally have died”—serves as an instance of what Sullivan terms “emotive improvisation.” Mariana is depicted in a manner commen-

surate with Sullivan's observations of Ophelia in *Hamlet*, Anne in Thomas Middleton's *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, and Penthea in John Ford's *The Broken Heart*: "they invoke a form of impassioned reason that subverts social and emotional confines by emphatically persisting in one's sorrow" (Sullivan 2016: 78). Shakespeare thus appeals to the audience's sensitivity to the fact that this character is acting in deliberate defiance of what her society might expect of her—especially considering the years that have passed in the story between the breakdown of her relationship and the moment she first appears onstage. As Susan Matt and Peter Stearns contend, this is part of what makes emotions so powerful. "Choosing to express or repress a feeling," they argue, "choosing to obey or ignore social conventions about feelings, can be an explicitly political act" (2014: 4). Similarly, Mark Steinberg suggests that emotions reach their greatest intensity when a society obstructs an individual's sense of agency (2014: 76). And while Mariana does not ultimately encounter the same tragic fate as the characters Sullivan cites, it still holds true that Mariana's emotional practice, as depicted in the playtext, appears to demonstrate how "grief allows its victims to maintain some sense of ownership and control over themselves" (Sullivan 2016: 84).

This impression of affective determination struck Alfred, Lord Tennyson as such a compelling phenomenon that he published a poem called "Mariana," about

the character's pining away at the moated grange. All of the first six stanzas end with the lines "She only said, 'My life is dreary, / He cometh not,' she said; / She said, 'I am aweary, aweary, / I would that I were dead!'" The seventh and final stanza ends similarly, yet with more conviction: "O God, that I were dead!" (1830). Braunmuller and Watson cite Tennyson's poem as evidence of "how well Shakespeare evoked [Mariana's] entrapment in a play where death-wishing and erotic desire feed each other's sickly appetites" (2020: 87). The sense of "entrapment" Braunmuller and Watson characterise as pertaining to the play-world could just as well describe the situation of any contemporaneous individual whose intense distress exceeded their society's affective conventions.

The use of emotion as a means of self-scripting proves a crucial aspect of the audience's felt response to the role of Mariana. Societal expectations may indeed prescribe that such grief be overcome after an extended period of time. Note, for example, King Claudius's admonition of his nephew/stepson Hamlet:

...to persever
 In obstinate condolement is a course
 Of impious stubbornness, 'tis unmanly grief,
 It shows a will most incorrect to heaven,
 A heart unfortified, a mind impatient,
 An understanding simple and unschooled (*Ham.* 1.2.92–97).

The king's reasoning is, of course, generated at least as much by his own ulterior motives as it is by his true sense of affective propriety (Sullivan 2020: 129). However,

this does not change the fact that such counsel was commonplace at the time the play was written. As Bridget Escolme notes, his words are

commonsensical wisdoms of the period, which anyone may have recognized as healthful advice and proper religious duty 400 years ago. Claudius is all the more wicked for hypocritically giving sober, religious council about a death that he has violently caused but this would not necessarily have undermined his advice about moderation in mourning itself (2014: 174).

Nor does Claudius's gendered employment of the word "unmanly" necessarily imply that such prolonged sorrow might have been more acceptable for a woman than for a man. Shakespeare gives us evidence to the contrary in *Romeo and Juliet*, for example, in Paris's words to Friar Laurence after Romeo's departure into banishment—just one day after her cousin Tybalt's death.

Immoderately she weeps for Tybalt's death,
And therefore have I little talked of love,
For Venus smiles not in a house of tears.
Now, sir, her father counts it dangerous
That she do give her sorrow so much sway,
And in his wisdom hastes our marriage
To stop the inundation of her tears,
Which, too much minded by herself alone,
May be put from her by society (4.1.6–14).

It may be tempting to argue that Juliet's grief is considered "immoderate" because the kinship of a cousin is too far removed to merit such a passion. Yet in the early modern English mentality, Sullivan notes, even "a woman grieving at length for the death of a child might be deemed foolish or even irresponsible" (2016: 48; cf. Röttger-Rössler 2009).

Moreover, Paris's use of the word "dangerous" to describe Capulet's opinion of his daughter's affective state may be indicative of a contemporaneous association of behaviour such as Juliet's with the condition of "green sickness." This potentially deadly condition of the womb was thought to befall girls who had maintained their virginity for too long (Dawson 2008: 25). Such a diagnosis would have served as what Dawson terms a "physiological imperative" for her to marry, since only marriage and copulation could help her avoid the potential death sentence her virginity ostensibly entails (ibid.: 31). Thus, even in situations where grief might seem to our sensibilities as a perfectly reasonable response, it was normal in early modern England for a woman's woe to be ascribed to a physiological pathology—and, typically, one of which a man could easily cure her.

What can all this tell us about Mariana's melancholy? Although we are told that the shipwreck that drowned Mariana's dowry also killed her brother, we are given every reason to believe that Angelo's abandonment is the chief cause of her woe. Moreover, unlike the relatively short time periods associated with Hamlet's and Juliet's sorrows over the loss of their family members, Mariana has held onto her pain for five whole years (*MM* 5.1.215). Seen in this context, Bright's assertion that the grief that emerges due to "love not answered" is a "vaine and foolish sorowe" may indeed have typified what many of Shakespeare's contemporaries believed

about this kind of prolonged lovesickness (1586: 125). Unsurprisingly, the culture's affective expectations penalised women more harshly than men. Dawson explains the gendered differences in Renaissance conceptions of the condition:

Whereas male lovesickness is classified as a form of melancholy—a malady associated with creativity, interiority, and intellect—the female version is considered a disorder of the womb. ... Far from being the hallmark of a noble mind, a woman's erotic melancholy bespeaks her lack of reason and her subjugation to her body's sexual demands: women's illnesses are constructed as bodily and passionate rather than intellectual and creative (2008: 4).

Dawson's use of the word "constructed" in this passage serves as a potent reminder of the degree to which the affective and bodily realities of an individual or class of individuals organise themselves around the wider culture's emotional scripts. It is not a new phenomenon; perhaps more remarkably, neither is the human capacity to recognise these differences and the imbalances they entail. We can, in fact, witness signs of this analytical capacity in the English playhouse during Shakespeare's lifetime. For example, in Thomas Tomkis's 1615 play *Albumazar*, sixteen-year-old Flavia complains about this affective double-standard:

Alas, our Sex is most wretched, nurst up from infancie in continuall slavery. No sooner able to pray for our selves, but they brayle and hudde us so with owre awe of Parents, that wee dare not offer to bate at our owne desires. And whereas it becomes men to vent their amorous passions at their pleasure; wee poore soules must take up our affections in the ashes of a burnt heart, not daring to sigh without excuse of the spleene, or fit of the mother (2.9.33–41).

Such gendered distinctions within the culture's emotional scripts would seem to put Mariana at a significant dramaturgical disadvantage in terms of eliciting an empath-

etic response from the audience. Unlike the Jailer's Daughter in *The Two Noble Kinsman*, whom the Doctor diagnoses with "a most thick and profound melancholy" (4.3.46–47)—the pathos-inducing effects of which are presented prominently in the action of the play—Mariana does not exhibit or invoke the kinds of corporeal symptoms to which Flavia alludes.

Why, then, might spectators feel inclined to emotionally support such a character? To understand this, it is helpful to view the playtext's depiction of Mariana as an instance of what Escolme has termed "the subversive power of grief" (2014: 172). As it transpired earlier, Angelo's pretence for calling off his betrothal to her was that she had been sexually promiscuous (3.1.228–29). For Mariana—indeed, for any woman in the English Renaissance whose reputation had been defiled in such a manner—to simply accept her fate and move on would essentially have served as a confirmation of these allegations in the eyes of her society. Instead, as the Duke tells Isabella, Angelo's "unjust unkindness, that in all reasons should have quenched her love, hath, like an impediment in the current, made it more violent and unruly" (3.1.241–45). Thus, it is more important that the audience experience her as an unjust victim than it is that they see her as a reasonable individual who can conform to her culture's affective expectations. The obsessive emotive improvisation in her introductory scene effects this perspective. "[W]e must recognize," Schleiner

observes, “that Shakespeare goes out of his way to show Mariana as a lady of depth and honor, certainly no whore. ... [T]he scene gives her the moral weight she needs to play so major and so unforeseen a role in resolving the plot” (1982: 232). Her ostensibly excessive grief functions in a similar manner to that of Anne in *A Woman Killed With Kindness*—a character who, by contrast, actually *was* unfaithful to her partner. “Through persistent grief,” Sullivan points out, “she does not lose but rather enhances her higher, angelic faculties” (2016: 77). We can say the same about Mariana. “Lovesickness can thus articulate the sufferer’s own emotional and sexual preferences in the face of opposition,” according to Dawson, providing a passionate rationale for the “sufferer to be united with the beloved” (2008: 31–32). Indeed, it is essential that the audience understand both the all-consuming nature of her longing for Angelo and the profundity of her virtue, if we are to comprehend why she would agree to participate in the bed-trick. The societally aberrant yet ultimately sympathetic nature of her grief is precisely what fulfils this requirement.

Mariana on the Contemporary Stage.

To what degree does the historical context we have explored tend to inform twenty-first-century stagings of this scene’s love melancholy? And, being at so great a remove from this context, are these performances able to convey the dramaturgical

significance of Mariana's emotional process? For a small sampling of how this might be managed, I shall now turn to a pair of productions—both from the last twenty years—by one of London's premier Shakespearean playhouses. Informed by the contexts this chapter has explored thus far, the following performance analyses will examine a key emotional moment within a pair of English-language productions of *Measure for Measure*. The remainder of the chapter will then offer comparative contexts as we explore russophone emotional scripts, as well as two Russian-language stagings of the play.

In 2004, John Dove directed a Jacobean-dress production of *Measure for Measure* at Shakespeare's Globe, featuring former Artistic Director Mark Rylance as Duke Vincentio.¹ In this staging, the moated grange scene with Mariana re-opened the play after the interval. A band of musicians with Renaissance instruments such as the viola da gamba entered the stage and began to play a melancholy tune in a minor key. After a few minutes, having created this solemn atmosphere, Mariana (played by Hilary Tones) entered holding a collection of papers that were perhaps intended to represent letters from her former love. As she made her way onto the stage, she gestured in acknowledgement to the musicians and their song—momentarily looking as though she was striving to prevent the music from causing her to weep.

1. *Measure for Measure: Live from the Globe*, (dir. by John Dove), 19:30 04/09/2004, BBC4, 180 mins. <https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/004EDF0B?bcast=4201876> [Accessed 22 Sep 2020].

Over the course of several bars of the instrumental music, she listened with seeming sadness, while occasionally looking down longingly at the papers in her hand. Eventually, she herself began to sing the song that the Folio text assigns to the boy (“Take, O take those lips away...”). For part of the verse, Tones/Mariana sat on the bench just beside the viola player, carefully connecting the words of her song to the movement of the musician’s bow. This had the effect of strengthening her connection with the instrumentalists, as well as indicating that she was deliberately using the song as a form of emotional practice. Her deliberate attention on the musicians, as well as her own physical gestures and posture, created the sense that the emotion in her body was actually conducting the music. As a result of this engagement, she became increasingly, markedly distraught—her body grew more tense and her singing voice sounded progressively more strained. Upon the final words of the verse (“sealed in vain”), Tones/Mariana let out a loud sob, broke off her song, and began to sprint off the stage. Before she could leave the scene entirely, however, she caught sight of the entering Rylance/Duke, which caused her to stop herself.

Dove and company’s interpretation of the scene underscored the idea that when Mariana speaks of the song pleasing her woe, she has intended to employ the music as a means of intentionally increasing the painful state of her lovesickness. In fact, when Tones/Mariana spoke these words (“My mirth it much displeased, but

pleased my woe”) to Rylance/Duke, she hung her head—in this instance a gesture connoting a sense of shame, despair, or defeat. The effect of this staging’s power was particularly notable in that Tones/Mariana’s moments in the scene were some of the only ones in the whole show that did not elicit any audience laughter—at least in the one production video that is currently available. Indeed, in a production that many critics lambasted for its “jolly japes and jokes instead of moral complexities” (Gardner 2004), this sequence appears to have evoked a certain degree of solemnity. The serious nature of the scene gained further emphasis during the brief exchange between Isabella (Sophie Thompson) and Tones/Mariana, and the latter’s decision to assent to the bed-trick. After the entreaties from both Thompson/Isabella and Rylance/Duke, Tones/Mariana glanced warily at each of her scene partners. She then looked directly toward the centre of the audience for a full five seconds before announcing her agreement with the line “Fear me not.” Admittedly, five seconds may not seem like a particularly long time; however, in this fast-paced production that contained almost no pauses at all, the silence was striking. To my mind, it signalled the culmination of a difficult decision that was borne out of a desperate degree of pain.

...

Eleven years later, Dominic Dromgoole's 2015 production of *Measure for Measure* for Shakespeare's Globe was also in Jacobean dress—and also dispensed with the character of the singing boy.² Instead, the production's musicians came onto the stage after the interval, joined by Pompey (Trevor Fox), and began playing a sentimental waltz. Mariana (Rosie Hilal) soon entered, stood centre stage, and snapped her fingers in Fox/Pompey's direction, indicating her desire to hear singing. Seemingly reluctantly, he began to perform the song's lyrics, while she began a solo sway, holding one arm partially out as though dancing with an invisible partner. Gazing longingly into the middle-distance, Mariana/Hilal's gentle movements expressed a degree of bittersweetness; she was enjoying herself, in spite of the pain conveyed in both her situation and the song. At the end of the first verse, the music stopped. She stood still and released a wistful sigh. She then turned and snapped her fingers again at Fox/Pompey, who—even more noticeably grudgingly—began to sing the second verse of the song as the musicians resumed their tune.

While this scene played a touch more comically than in Dove's production, it also demonstrated the desperate degree of obsession to which a lovesick person can actively commit themselves. "Like a salamander," says Dawson, "with its mythical delight in scorching flames, those suffering from erotic melancholy appear careless of

2. *Measure for Measure*, dir. by Dominic Dromgoole (Shakespeare's Globe 2015) *Drama Online Library* [Accessed 21 August, 2020].

their own well-being, fanning and embracing the fiery passions that consume them” (2008: 12). In a manner reminiscent of frequent portrayals of Orsino at the beginning of *Twelfth Night*, Dromgoole and company chose to underscore this delight-in-suffering in order to prepare the audience for the upcoming dramaturgical turn. Unlike Tones’s Mariana, when the Duke (Dominic Rowan) and Isabella (Mariah Gale) entered the scene with their proposal of the bed-trick, Hilal/Mariana needed no time at all to assent—an acceptable (if somewhat odd) upshot for a person with a backstory of taking pleasure in pining over the same lost lover for the last five years.

While the approach of two productions differed somewhat in their portrayals of Mariana’s lovesickness, they nevertheless shared a common thread. In line with what the above investigation suggests about the dramaturgical necessities of the scene’s emotional content, both versions portrayed Mariana’s grief as something she was consciously and deliberately engaging with and nurturing. What the remainder of this chapter will demonstrate, however, is that different cultural contexts may encourage rather divergent stagings of Mariana’s relationship with her emotions—particularly in a language like Russian.

Emotional Heat.

The Russians' relationship with Shakespeare began in the middle of the eighteenth century, which saw the first Russian-language translations of his plays (Samarin 1966: 7). His works very quickly became celebrated even in the highest echelons of society; in fact, Empress Catherine II's own 1786 adaptation of *The Merry Wives of Windsor* "was the first production on the Russian stage to bear the name of Shakespeare" (Kizima 2021: 171). In the decades that followed, for many of Russia's literary luminaries, "the immortal heritage of Shakespeare served as a great example of realistic art" (Samarin 1966: 7–8). For Russia's national poet, Alexander Pushkin, Shakespeare's artistic realism was explicitly equated to emotional authenticity. As he wrote in 1830, "[t]he truth of passions and the verisimilitude of feelings in the imagined circumstances—this is what our mind demands of a dr[amatic] writer" (qtd. in Kizima 2021: 180). Pushkin himself was chief among Shakespeare's Russian champions. It was he, according to Marina Kizima, "who embraced and embedded him in Russian literature and culture, paving the way to national acceptance and appropriation" (2021: 167). Pushkin's engagement with the work of the English dramatist proved instrumental in the development of his own art—and, by extension, the Russian artistic imagination on the whole (ibid.: 175).

In what ways might Russian "appropriation" of Shakespeare's drama and its "truth of passions" be able to teach us something new about the emotional dynamic

of *Measure for Measure*? In the context of the historical and theatrical implications of emotion in general—and of lovesickness in particular—what might native anglophones be taking for granted? One place to start is with a peculiarity about the English language: even when compared to the other European languages this study will explore, English differs significantly in its conceptualisation of what it means to be “emotional.” As Anna Wierzbicka has astutely noted,

there is a certain unconscious “ideology” written in to the English word *emotional*—an “ideology” which assumes that showing feelings over which one has no control is a departure from “normal” behaviour. The word has pejorative overtones, and even when it is used in a “tolerant” tone it still implies that there is something there, in the “emotional outburst,” which needs to be excused (the loss of “control” over one’s feelings and over their display). There are no words analogous to *emotional* in German, French, Italian, or Russian (1999: 19).

This insight can serve as a helpful guide in the exploration of the way artists enact emotions in the playhouse when Shakespeare’s plays are translated into other languages. It may be particularly useful in the case of Russian. While the anglophone world often sees emotionality as something that “poses an affront to settled cognition” (Craik 2020: 4), russophone culture is notable for such phenomena as “the tremendous stress on emotions and on their free expression, the high emotional temperature of Russian discourse,” and “the wealth of linguistic devices for signalling emotions and shades of emotions” (Wierzbicka 1992: 395). English-speaking scholars have recognised these patterns for decades. The anthropologist Geoffrey

Gorer wrote in 1949 of the Russian cultural tendency to “take much pleasure in expressing aloud the emotions which are momentarily possessing them” (qtd. in Wierzbicka 1999: 218). He noted specifically that

[t]here is a considerable Russian vocabulary for the expressing of the emotions, “pouring out one’s soul” being one of the most common. For many Russians this is the most valued aspect of living. Indeed, feeling and expressing the emotions you feel is the sign that you are alive; if you don’t feel, you are to all intents and purposes dead (ibid.).

This conceptualisation recalls Colombetti’s enactive understanding of affect in general, which “entails that there is no difference in kind between cognition and emotion” (2014: xvii). While traditional cognitive science treats emotional episodes as breaks from a neutral “norm” (as English speakers tend to do), the sociolinguistic conventions of russophone culture indicate the opposite viewpoint. In anglophone culture, Wierzbicka notes, “it’s good to be cool, bad to be cold; it’s good to be warm, bad to be hot and bothered” (1999: 238). In contrast, russophone culture operates on a script more along the lines of: “it is good to be ‘hot’ [горячий], and it is *not* good to be just ‘warm’ [тёплый]” (ibid.). This contrast, as embodied by the Russian cultural character, can go a long way toward illuminating what distinguishes Russian-language performances of Shakespearean drama from their English-language counterparts. Even from the earliest translations, such as Alexander Sumarokov’s 1748 version of *Hamlet*, Russian translators of Shakespeare have taken deliberate efforts to achieve “emotional intensity and stylistic beauty” (Kizima 2021: 169). Thus,

while English-speaking actors may be guided more by the anglophone culture's greater value on emotional restraint, it may be possible—and even expected—that Russian artists find opportunities for vivid emotional expression far more frequently in the text.

Consider, for example, this exchange in *Twelfth Night* between Viola (disguised as Cesario) and Orsino:

Viola.

Say that some lady, as perhaps there is,
Hath for your love as great a pang of heart
As you have for Olivia. You cannot love her.
You tell her so. Must she not then be answered?

Orsino.

There is no woman's sides
Can bide the beating of so strong a passion
As love doth give my heart. No woman's heart
So big, to hold so much. They lack retention.
Alas, their love may be called appetite,
No motion of the liver, but the palate,
That suffer surfeit, cloyment, and revolt.
But mine is all as hungry as the sea,
And can digest as much. Make no compare
Between that love a woman can bear me,
And that I owe Olivia (2.4.82–96).

In English-language productions, the actor/Orsino typically imbues his response with beats of what read as frustration, indignation, and wistfulness. This held true for Liam Brennan's Orsino in Tim Carroll's 2012 "original practices" staging for Shakespeare's Globe,³ as well as for Oliver Chris when he played the count in Simon

3. *Twelfth Night*, dir. by Tim Carroll (Shakespeare's Globe 2012) *Drama Online Library* [Accessed 24 April, 2020].

Godwin's 2017 modern-dress production for the National Theatre.⁴ In the available recordings of both of these productions, Orsino's speech elicited laughter from the audience—likely in response to the dramatic irony of his refuting the possibility that a woman could experience the very feelings that Viola's text has already expressed about the count himself.

In the English-speaking world, actors are not alone in interpreting the speech this way; scholars, too, tend to perceive similar emotions from the page. Thomas Kelly reads the count's affective experience in this scene as one of "delicious melancholy" (1973: 13). C.O. Gardner has cited this passage as demonstrating Orsino as "somewhat blustering" and "at his most ludicrous and his most impertinent" (1962: 28). Elias Schwartz insists that "in the performance ... while he is protesting his pain and eternal love for Olivia, it ought to be apparent that he is falling in love with Cesario-Viola. This will give the proper ironic touch" when he launches into the speech in question (1967: 511–12). Schwartz also maintains that Orsino—along with Olivia and Sir Toby—"are each foolish in their own way. Yet they are all lovable because they never take themselves too seriously; they are redeemed by an awareness of their own affectation" (ibid.: 509).

4. *Twelfth Night*, dir. by Simon Godwin (National Theatre 2017) *YouTube* [accessed 23 April, 2020].

In contrast, the moment was certainly not an appeal to humour in Donnellan's Russian-language production of the play—nor did the count's affect come across as mere affectation.⁵ Vladimir Vdovichenkov/Orsino responded to Andrei Kuzitchev/Viola's protestations with an explosive fury that would be difficult to read as anything but earnestness. With the first line of his speech, "Грудь женщины не вынесет биенья,"⁶ Vdovichenkov/Orsino shouted down his questioner in an eruption that appeared, momentarily, as though it might turn violent. He approached the seated, diminutive Kuzitchev/Viola with arms and hands outstretched as though he were about to grab him/her by the throat. When Vdovichenkov/Orsino's fingertips had nearly (or perhaps barely) come into contact with his scene partner's body by the end of this first line, he backed away again as though needing to force himself to refrain from such physical abuse. With the second line, "Такой могучей страсти, как моя," he tore open the front of his robe to reveal where the "могучей страсти" {mighty passion} was beating. E.L. Linetskaia's translation of this phrase can actually be rendered back into English as something near Shakespeare's original "so strong a passion." However, the Russian word *страсть* (*strast'*) carries a number of additional meanings that are difficult to capture with any one English word. It can denote powerful love or lust, just as our own "passion" does, and is

5. *Twelfth Night*, dir. by Declan Donnellan (Chekhov International Theatre Festival/Cheek By Jowl 2003) Chekhov International Theatre Festival page on Facebook [Accessed 20 April, 2020].

6. Trans. E.L. Linetskaia (1990).

etymologically connected to the Russian root *strad-*, which indicates “suffering” (Karimova and Vasylchenko 2014: 1064). Yet while the English version of the word “suffering” indicates a passive process that happens *to* the experiencer, “Slavonic *stradati* [страдати] (to suffer) is derived from *strada*, which first meant effort, then painful labor, before taking on the sense of torment” (ibid.). For this reason, the Russian concept *страсть* is a far more active form of suffering that also carries elements of the anglophone notion of “rage” (cf. Wierzbicka 1999: 92). These connotations illuminate why a Russian actor might find a degree of validity in the aggressive type of response Vdovichenkov/Orsino displayed, even though such a reaction might not occur as a possibility for the average English-speaking actor.

Vdovichenkov/Orsino continued the next several lines of the speech in a restless pacing to and fro across the stage. As his dialogue moved toward speaking directly about what a “woman’s heart” was incapable of holding (“Нет, в женском сердце слишком мало места”), it is possible that the Russian idiomatic associations with this particular organ continued to fuel the decidedly intense and graphic nature of his passion. In an analysis of the affective implications of *The Russian-English Collocational Dictionary of the Human Body (RECDHB)*, Wierzbicka points out the sheer quantity and the semantic intensity of Russian expressions relating to the heart (*сердце*) as compared to English. She notes that the expressive wealth associated with

this one bodily organ illustrates the russophone tendency to give emotions “full sway without any attempt to control them” (1999: 233). Wierzbicka cites the example “у него сердце бьется” (“N’s heart is pounding [connotations of loud, desperate and violent movements]”) (ibid.: 234), which lexically correlates to the word *биенье* (*beating* or *throbbing*)—that which Orsino says women’s chests are specifically incapable of withstanding in Linetskaia’s rendition of the first line of the speech. Yet Wierzbicka also notes two related terms, which she suggests are also “clearly more hyperbolic” than the English counterpart “N’s heart is pounding”: “у него сердце колотится” (“N’s heart is pounding [connotations of battering, smashing, thrashing]”), and “у него сердце готово выскочить из груди” (“N’s heart is ready to jump out of N’s breast”) (ibid.). The variety of these phrases—which, according to *RECDHB*, “describe symptoms of fear, excitement, or joy”—indicates the semantic intensity with which Russians are capable of describing the turbulent characters of their own hearts (*RECDHB* entry: “сърдце heart”).

Wierzbicka also notes the prevalence of a vast number of other heart-related phrases that Russian-speakers use to express emotions. Among these are phrases that translate roughly into English as “N’s heart is (seems to be) dying,” “N’s heart squeezed,” “N’s heart fell,” “N’s heart snapped (and fell),” and “N’s heart escaped into N’s heels” (1999: 233). It may, of course, be tempting to dismiss these metaphors

as lacking true relevance to what a person is apt to (or capable of) experiencing.

However, as Paul H. Thibodeau and Lera Boroditsky have argued,

metaphors in language appear to instantiate frame-consistent knowledge structures and invite structurally consistent inferences. Far from being mere rhetorical flourishes, metaphors have profound influences on how we conceptualize and act with respect to important societal issues (2011: 1).

The prevalence of such heart-related expressions in the Russian lexicon suggests that russophone actors have a lexically-driven tendency to entertain a richer and fiercer collocation of affective possibilities—whether consciously or subliminally—than anglophone actors may have when encountering similar concepts in their own language.⁷ In enactive terms, the intensity and violence with which Vdovichenkov/Orsino expressed himself in this episode instantiated the embodied enaction of neural, physical, and conceptual connections that derive at least in part from their situated evolution in a Russian-speaking environment.

While Vdovichenkov/Orsino used the majority of the rest of the speech to fuel his tortured pacing, he did find one more telling example to turn on the emotional “heat” of which Russians are so fond. Where the last few lines of the speech in Shakespeare’s text read “Make no compare / Between that love a woman can bear

7. See Barsalou 2008: 239: “The properties of a category’s members tend to be correlated. ... As a result, interacting with different instances of the same category should activate similar neural patterns in features systems. ... In turn, similar populations of conjunctive neurons in association areas tuned to these particular conjunctions of features should tend to capture these similar patterns. ... Across different category members, a multi-modal representation of the category results, distributed across relevant features systems and the association areas that integrate them.”

me / And that I owe Olivia,” Linetskaia’s version has “Нет, мой мальчик” {“No, my boy”} in place of the first half-line. The actors in Donnellan’s production took this moment as an opportunity to increase the emotional conflict: just before Vdovichenkov/Orsino spoke this line, Kuzitchev/Viola opened his/her mouth as though to interject. “Нет, мой мальчик” came in as a fiery, impassioned shutting-down of this attempted interruption. This moment serves as just one possibility of how translator and performers can—perhaps unwittingly—collaborate in showcasing the ways in which a target language’s means of expressing emotions differs from that of the source language.

Тоска.

The affective “heat” exemplified in this exchange warrants closer examination. As we have seen from Wierzbicka’s linguistic analysis, heat is a quality that features prominently in the conceptualisation of Russian feelings. Even so, it holds an especially strong relationship with the Russians’ notions of desperate love—a connection reflected in the title Valeria Sobol chose for her book on lovesickness in Russian literature: *Febris Erotica*. In it, she argues that the foundation of the way in which Russians understand their affective lives, as evidenced in both its literary and scientific discourse over the last few centuries, is the idea that “[t]he physical and the

spiritual, the heart as an anatomical organ and the heart as a metaphysical ‘soul,’ are not discriminated” (2009: 35). In particular, Sobol notes the degree to which the connection between lovesickness and medical fever are historically intertwined in the Russian cultural imagination. She quotes the following, for example, from a 1794 article from the oldest Russian-language medical journal, the *St. Petersburg Medical News*:

Feverish attacks consist in: increasingly elevated temperature [*zhar*], accelerated pulse, food aversion, great general weakness, headache and the strained fulfillment of all the vital functions; other attacks typically occurring in fevers are: nausea, thirst, dejection [*toska*], delirium, heaviness of the limbs, weight loss, insomnia or restless and light sleep.⁸

Comparing this list of symptoms to the prevalent Russian literature of the same era, Sobol finds it fairly obvious that most of them “overlap with the traditional signs of passionate love: irregular pulse, fever, insomnia, lack of appetite, emaciation, elements of insanity (delirium), and, characteristically, dejection” (2009: 45). As this equivalence has such deep historical roots in the russophone tradition, it is easy to see why Vdovichenkov/Orsino’s intense longing manifested the way it did. From the perspective of embodied cognition, the concepts of lovesickness and physical heat are so closely related in the same dynamic system that the enaction of the former will very easily elicit the latter. As Lawrence Barsalou puts it, “representing a

8. “O likhoradkakh voobschche (Sochinenie Aglinskogo vracha),” *Sanktpeterburgskie vrachebnye vedomosti* 2.41 (1794), p. 118, trans. Sobol, p. 45.

concept does not just activate an abstract semantic representation but instead induces preparation for situated action" (2008: 250).

In the above medical explication of this feverish quality, Sobol uses the word "dejection" as her translation of the Russian word *тоска* (*toska*). *Tocka* is an untranslatable concept that has received a fair amount of attention from scholars of both translation and emotions, due to the powerful place it holds in the russophone imagination. "This term," Sobol says, covers "a whole range of emotional states, among them sadness, anxiety, fear, boredom, sorrow, and, in Northern Russian dialects, even physical illness" (2009: 220, fn 107). As Sobol's allusions to the word in the contexts of both physiological pathology and affective intensity indicate, the Russian conception of love melancholy is often strongly associated with this culturally salient emotion word. Vladimir Nabokov—a Russian author whose preternatural mastery of English as a second language makes him supremely qualified to analyse linguistic distinctions—invokes the English notion of "lovesickness" in his characterisation of *тоска*:

No single word in English renders all the shades of "toska." At its deepest and most painful, it is a sensation of great spiritual anguish, often without any specific cause. At less morbid levels it is a dull ache of the soul, a longing with nothing to long for, a sick pining, a vague restlessness, mental throes, yearning. In particular cases it may be the desire for somebody or something specific, nostalgia, lovesickness. At the lowest level it grades into ennui, boredom (in Pushkin 1964: 141).

Wierzbicka glosses the concept along similar lines:

The nature of *toska* is such that elements of something similar to melancholy, something similar to boredom, and something similar to yearning are blended together and are all present at the same time, even though different contexts may highlight different components of this complex but unitary concept (1992: 171).

However, she appears to qualify Nabokov's discussion of the emotion's capacity for "specific" intentionality. "*Toska*," she claims, "is always indefinite, even if it does have a specific crystallising point, because it always hints at an unappeasable heartache, at an insatiate longing which seems to reach out beyond the boundaries of 'this world,' of the accessible reality" (ibid.: 172). Her NSM explication of this term captures this "indefinite" nature:

toska
 X thinks something like this:
 I want something good to happen
 I don't know what
 I know: it cannot happen
 because of this, X feels something (ibid.).

Tiffany Watt Smith writes that this "distinctly Russian emotion" is believed "to blow in from Europe's Great Plains, which sweep from the Pyrenees to the Ural mountains, and brings a maddening 'unsatisfiedness,' an insatiable searching" (2015: "*Toska*," para. 1). Its scope is broad, its shades are many, and its importance to Russians is difficult to overstate. Wierzbicka considers it "one of the key words in Russian culture," and even "a word that can be seen as a key to the 'Russian soul'" (1992: 169). In fact, according to lexical analyses of everyday usage, Wierzbicka points out, "Russians seem to refer to their *toska* more often than speakers of English

refer to any emotion whatsoever” (ibid.: 170). This emotion concept is indeed linked to “grand metaphysical anguish,” Watt Smith notes, “but the word is also part of everyday spoken Russian too, capturing the distracted fog of the daily commute, or the yearning of a broken heart” (2015: “Toska,” paragraph 1). This final manifestation of the concept is precisely the feeling to which Mariana refers in her opening speech about the boy’s music in Osiya Soroka’s 1990 translation of *Measure for Measure*.⁹

Here are the lines, side-by-side with the original English text:

Мне стыдно, отче, - вы меня застали	I cry you mercy, sir; and well could wish
За песней. В оправдание свое	You had not found me here so musical:
Скажу, что сладкой музыке внимала	Let me excuse me, and believe me so,
Не веселясь, а лишь тоску смягчала.	My mirth it much displeased, but pleased my woe.

Mariana’s meaning in this translation differs from Shakespeare’s. In Soroka’s version, she defends her music-listening by saying that she {“wasn’t enjoying herself”}; rather, she uses the boy’s song as means of attempting to {“soften”} (смягчать) her *тоска*. In the original, as we have seen, the music has “pleased [her] woe,” indicating that the boy’s song has actually increased her love melancholy, rather than diminishing it. This suggests that the Russian Mariana has chosen to utilise the music as an emotional practice for mitigating her despair, rather than indulging in it.

At first blush, the comparison between Mariana’s affective tactics in the original and in translation appears to conflict with the cultural differences we have

9. Osiya Soroka, *Measure for Measure* (1990).

surveyed. If anglophone emotional culture leads toward self-control while Russian speakers value expressivity, why is it that English Mariana feeds her “woe,” whilst Russian Mariana works to soften her *мочка*? The answer, I suggest, lies in the way the author and the translator have attempted to convey to their own target audiences the degree to which the character’s emotional life is at odds with the culture’s emotional norms. The philosopher Jan Slaby captures the crux of this dynamic as follows:

Emotions are not just shaped as a matter of fact, but also constituted as a *normative* reality—as matters that are subject to assessments of appropriateness. ... Once expressed and then reflected back and acknowledged by relevant others, I am *committed* to an emotion of a certain type and to rationally appropriate follow-up emotions—and the others are expected to hold me to my commitments by normative sanctioning. For example, it is normatively inappropriate *not* to feel happy or relieved after the danger that gave rise to one’s fear has been avoided. Our emotional lives are in this way situated in a normative social practice that provides an encompassing socio-normative scaffolding for our individual emotional episodes (2014: 40).

Necessarily, of course, the “appropriate” expectations, commitments, and sanctioning Slaby invokes vary from culture to culture. For English-speaking cultures, as we have already seen, there is an implicit tendency to prize affective “neutrality” over “emotionality.” Thus, while it may be expected that a woman would grieve after having gone through a heartbreaking and potentially humiliating ordeal like Mariana’s, English culture might tend toward holding her to an expectation that she should eventually exercise self-control in order to mitigate her own

sadness. This mindset was prevalent in Renaissance England as well, as is lexically evident in the seventeenth-century preacher Edward Reynolds's advice to help his fellows from the temptation to "overgrieve" (Sullivan 2016: 24). By depicting a scene in which a character is wallowing in her romantic woe, I have argued, Shakespeare is illustrating the depth and desperation of Mariana's state. If, after all this time, she is not only unable to move on from her grief but is also actively indulging in it, the situation must be incredibly serious.

Yet this expectation may not resonate in the same way in Russian culture, which values the aliveness it associates with feeling deeply and expressing those feelings. In fact, Wierzbicka notes, the high degree of cultural currency that *mocka* holds for Russian speakers means that it has developed "positive connotations (poetic and metaphysical)" alongside its "negative ones (connotations of despair and hopelessness)" (1992: 172). The ambiguity of the emotion's specific valence is even apparent in Wierzbicka's NSM script: while most of her emotion scripts include a component such as "X feels something good," or "X feels something very bad," the final component for *mocka* is simply "because of this, X feels *something*" (emphasis mine). Even though the experiencer is cognisant of the fact that what they want to happen "cannot happen," it would not be fully accurate to label this emotion as imparting a "bad" feeling. It is, as Wierzbicka has suggested, a feeling that people in

russophone cultures are rather likely to prize for its poignant beauty (ibid.). In the case of Russian Mariana, then, dramaturgical pathos is elicited by conveying the idea that her *моща* has become so overwhelming that she must take active steps to ameliorate it. For a Russian audience, the very fact that this transpires as a necessary action—that the emotion has become so problematic that the experiencer would no longer wish to feel it—may be enough to convey Mariana’s desperation in an analogically appropriate manner. In either case, the author or translator seizes upon this character’s first appearance onstage as a way of depicting someone whom their culture’s audience would perceive as being at her wit’s end. It is dramaturgically vital that the audience comprehend the gravity of her state; otherwise, as we have seen, it is difficult to see how they would accept the plausibility of Mariana’s agreement to the bed-trick.

Mariana on the Russian Stage.

Moscow’s Vakhtangov Theatre’s staging of the play depicted the progression from Mariana’s introduction to her assent to the Duke’s plot via a remarkably swift and powerful emotional journey. The production, which employed Soroka’s translation, was originally directed by Yury Butusov in 2010 and brought to London for the

2012 Globe to Globe Festival.¹⁰ The “moated grange” scene did not begin with the boy’s song (which was cut entirely), but with Mariana (Alexandra Streltsina) sneaking across the stage with a pair of large bags. It seemed as though she was attempting to flee the city, and had reached someplace on the outskirts of town. She then removed a number of potted plants from her bags—perhaps indicating a decision to settle down in a new location, more removed from her old life. She began to set down the plants, and as she reached the midpoint of the stage, the Duke (Sergey Epishev) emerged from a hiding place behind a large movable frame. He proceeded to chase the startled Streltsina/Mariana, who managed to evade his advances for only a couple of moments before he apprehended her. As he stood behind her, grasping her hands to hold her in place, Streltsina/Mariana began to speak her first speech—her head bowed with her hands pressed to either side of it—about feeling ashamed that he had found her listening to the song, but that it was helping her to “soften” her *мокка*. The moment read as fairly odd, as this was one of the few instances in the production that did not contain some form of diegetic or even incidental music. However, Streltsina/Mariana’s gesture of her hands on her head as she spoke—along with Epishev/the Duke’s calming tone of voice as he attempted to reassure her that he was there to help—may have served as an indica-

10. *Measure for Measure*, dir. by Yury Butusov (Vakhtangov Theatre 2012) Globe Player online [Accessed 14 August, 2020].

tion that the “music” was actually some form of internal obsession she was implementing to manage her emotional state.

By the time Isabella (Evgeniya Kregzhde) arrived on stage, Streltsina/Mariana’s initial fear and wariness gave way to enough trust for her to entertain the proposition she was about to receive. When it was time to explain the plan, the two women kneeled down centre stage, facing one another, and Kregzhde/Isabella whispered into Streltsina/Mariana’s ear—immediately prompting about twenty seconds of raucous laughter from the latter. This response apparently reflected the sense of ridiculousness she felt about the scheme—a healthy reminder that, although Shakespeare’s saturation of our dramatic culture has inured us to the concept of a bed-trick, it is not a particularly normal occurrence in life. During this time, Kregzhde/Isabella joined in on the laughter briefly, albeit seemingly more from something like nervousness than anything else, until at last she extended an arm to offer the garden house keys that would be needed to make the trick possible. Streltsina/Mariana immediately stopped laughing and stoically accepted the keys, pocketed them in a signal of her agreement to the ploy, and maintained an air of quiet curiosity as her scene partners continued to impress the desperate nature of the situation upon her. As Epishev/the Duke and Kregzhde/Isabella began to leave the stage, Streltsina/Mariana’s actions became more frenetic; her hands began aggress-

ively and repeatedly pressing and smoothing her own hair down, rubbing intensely against one another at first and then against her face. It read as though she were attempting to calm her nerves and simultaneously muster up the necessary courage to perform such a bold undertaking. She then stood up, paced quickly for a brief moment, and eventually gathered the plants and bags from the floor before running offstage in the same direction from which she originally entered.

This three-minute journey—from evasion to apprehension, through curiosity and laughter, to eventual acceptance, agitation, and resolve—contained far more affective variety than we often see in this scene. Butusov's stagecraft underscored the idea, suggested in Soroka's translation of the play, that a russophone Mariana who is attempting to move away from her prior feelings can open up the dramatic space to the possibility of a more dynamic emotional narrative. Streltsina/Mariana entered the scene looking as though she had resolved to run away, notwithstanding the fact that she was still carrying a fair amount of baggage. This movement away from the *моска* she had decided to leave behind allowed the other actors/characters to help her move into the experience of a wide variety of feelings, rather than simply remaining immutably mired in her own sense of dejection. Her exit from the scene—back in the exact direction from which she came—seemed to constitute a willingness to reclaim the life she had been promised. She had her baggage again, yet the ardour with

which she rushed off indicated that the various emotions she had encountered within herself during the scene would imbue her with a greater sense of purpose than her former woe alone could afford.

...

Cheek By Jowl's Russian-language production of *Measure for Measure*, directed by Declan Donnellan in 2013, also used Soroka's translation.¹¹ In this staging, Peter Kirwan astutely notes, Donnellan and company explore "how a play so concerned with manipulation (legal and physical) can engage empathetic connections" (2019: 169). For our purposes, one salient upshot of this particular dramatic enquiry was that the emotional impact of the "moated grange" scene took an altogether novel form. The company elected to stage Alexander Arsenyev/the Duke's explication of the bed-trick plot to Anna Vardevanian/Isabella in the form of what Kirwan describes as "a dance of death" (ibid.: 173). This staging entailed a full-company circular waltz around the centre point of Petr Rykov/Claudio aggressively plucking out the rhythm on an upright double bass. The scene's musicality served as a framework within which the actors/characters could perform a miniature dumb show of aspects of the relationship—both past and present, as narrated by Arsenyev/the Duke—between

11. *Measure for Measure*, dir. by Declan Donnellan (Cheek By Jowl 2013) *YouTube* [Accessed 23 May 2020].

Andrei Kuzichev/Angelo and Elmira Mirel/Mariana. Kirwan helpfully describes the sequence:

A recorded waltz soundtrack joined the notes of the bass, and the Duke took Isabella's hand at the start of a human chain as he explained the bed trick. Projected subjects emerged to present Mariana (Elmira Mirel) drinking and Angelo presenting her with a ring. Isabella was deposited with Mariana, then the grinning Angelo, whom she blindfolded. He held out his hand in expectation, until Mariana, clapping her hands, summoned him to her. Angelo and Mariana waltzed centre stage as the human chain encircled them; the two danced out of sight (*ibid.*).

My own close assessment of the archival video of the production has revealed a pair of additional elements that further illuminate our present discussion.

The first is that Mirel/Mariana's initial moment of drinking, which Kirwan notes, appears to serve as a portal through which we can view her subsequent interaction with Kuzichev/Angelo (in which he presents her with the ring) as a flashback. After this portion of the sequence, she returns to her initial spot on stage and resumes her drinking. This serves as a clear demonstration of the use of a mind-altering substance as a means of managing the character's *mocka*—in other words, as an emotional practice. As Scheer mentions, "consumption of mood-altering substances intervenes in the materiality of emotional processes" (2012: 211). While she notes that many would argue that "drug ingestion requires no practice or accomplishment, as it is a completely mechanical chemical process," she goes on to contend that

managing and shaping such effects is indeed a learned skill, and a given culture may cultivate it or neglect it, leading to different effects. Getting "high" is not explainable solely as a chemical reaction alone. It is deeply embedded in codes, norms, and social functions, and its ubiquity as a cultural practice—as well as the ubiquity of strong prohibitions against it—is indicative of its effectiveness (ibid.).

Thus, it is important to view this moment not simply in terms of a generalised understanding of alcohol's effects, but rather with the recognition that the relationship between alcohol and emotion can and does carry diverse meanings in various cultures. Here, Lev S. Sverdlov describes the Russian culture's "mythology" of alcohol—what Russians term "the green snake":

Alcohol "warms the soul," provides strength, eliminates fatigue, is a remedy to cure all disorders ("we do not drink, but only cure ourselves") and has many other benign properties. Mythological thinking readily ignores the inconvenient and easily reconciles the incompatible. Thus, alcohol is seen as "the bitterness" (*gor'kaja*), "the poison" (*otrava*) and "the cruel enemy" (*zlodejka*). ... At the same time, it is the only salvation; the only reliable shelter ("the sorrow and the rescue"); and can release a person from any concern or worry ("drink wine and everything will be okay"). ... People praise the idol and blame it; they create poems, sing songs, tell terrifying stories about, and worship it (2001: 14).

Sverdlov's broad outline of attitudes toward alcohol in Russian society is helpful in understanding its import both for Mirel/Mariana and for russophone audiences of the play. The idea that the onstage presence of alcohol carries with it the weight of such a prominent cultural character—an "idol," as Sverdlov terms it—is just one example of how much affective significance can be present in a theatrical element that can be easily overlooked.

The second feature worth noting about Cheek by Jowl's staging of this sequence is that Mirel/Mariana sang the lyrics of the song during her waltz with the blindfolded Kuzichev/Angelo—who himself gleefully joined in on the final line:

Дай забыть уста твои,	{Let forgotten be your lips
Что клялися мне в любви.	That swore themselves to me in love
Дай забыть лучи очей,	Let forgotten be the eye's rays
Утренней зари ярчей.	Brighter than the morning dawn}

Soroka's translation of the song itself merits closer attention. Her emphasis on the lover's lips and eyes being "forgotten" ("*забыть*") underscores the desire for selective amnesia to take Mariana's romantic suffering away entirely. The original play's English-language singer, on the other hand, pleads "Take, O, take those lips away"—a request that is sure to deepen the pain of lovesickness, rather than ease it.

Yet Donnellan and company's staging of the song—including the decision to have Mirel/Mariana sing the lyrics herself, while again actively in her beloved's embrace—made the dynamic even more fascinating on an affective level. In embodying the lyrics in both song and dance with her partner, Mirel/Mariana captured the various elements of her *толка*: the desperation (in participating in the bed-trick), the "unappeasable heartache" and "insatiate longing" of which Wierzbicka speaks (in that she was wishing for him to be forgotten even as she finally had him in her arms again)—even the boredom (as Mirel/Mariana's body language through the repetitive motions of the waltz was far less engaged than that of Kuzichev/Angelo). Thus, this

staging managed to demonstrate the tenacity and the indefinite nature of the Russian Mariana's *mocka*. Even after having achieved her ostensible goal, something like these thoughts persisted: "I want something good to happen," "I don't know what," "I know: it cannot happen." The grandness and cyclical nature of this staging of the scene, which served as the production's dramatic centrepiece, generated a theatrical mood that touched every aspect of the production and "refused to allow" the play's characters "any easy solutions" (Kirwan 2012: 173–74). As a result, the beautiful "unsatisfiedness" of *mocka* essentially defined the production as a whole.

...

In both of the Russian productions we have examined, the minor role of Mariana received an introduction with a high degree of emotional richness and nuance. The untranslatable concept of *mocka*—in all its complexity, vastness, and cultural import—appears to have lent a considerable amount of affective texture to not only her particular slice of the story, but to both of the productions overall as well. On the whole, the two English productions we analysed emphasised the comedic elements of the play far more than did their Russian counterparts; both Russian stagings, on the other hand, explored the emotional complexities of their characters and scenes in a much more direct way. It strikes me as possible that the

pervasive ambivalence of *mocka* within the russophone cultural imagination may well have something to do with these affective differences.

It is important to remember, however, that comparing two productions in one language with two productions in another does not represent a particularly substantial sample size. The variation we have noted in the emotional tone of the stagings of any given play will always be due to differences in artistic interpretation and approach, as well as to any other factors we might choose to consider. Yet it is also true that, on an affective level, there is something that simply *feels* different when watching the same story in Russian instead of English. Tellingly, Donnellan himself has expressed a belief that Russian actors have “uncensored connectivity to their feelings without sentimentality” (qtd. in Dow 2017). Coming from a director with decades of experience creating shows in multiple languages, these words go a long way toward endorsing the ideas this chapter has investigated.

In both languages, viewing Mariana’s words, decisions, and actions via the lens of emotive improvisation frames her story as an individual who is acting in defiance of an emotional regime. It is important to remember, as Matt and Stearns remind us, that “emotional rules” cannot “tell the whole history of an emotion” (2014: 4). Nevertheless, in historical terms, such rules can and do “point to important social conventions and make clear how individuals conformed or deviated from

these mores" (ibid.; see also Matt 2014: 45). The fact that Mariana's affective deviance is handled in such dramaturgically divergent manners in each language suggests remarkable differences in how emotionality is valued in English and Russian playhouses, as well as in their respective societies.

THREE

JOY AND FRENCH *JOIE* IN *OTHELLO*

Emotion historians, according to Darrin McMahon, have long been guilty of a “negative bias” (2014: 103). The field has devoted a disproportionate amount of time and energy, he argues, to the exploration of painful feelings rather than pleasurable ones. There are clear reasons for this phenomenon. “Painful events stay with us longer in memory and are recalled more often,” McMahon concedes, and “negative emotions like fear, anger, guilt, anxiety, shame and regret seem to have played such a crucial evolutionary role in ensuring our survival that they are simply more powerful than their positive counterparts” (ibid.: 104). Yet many scholars have recently begun to redress this imbalance. In *The Unrepentant Renaissance* Richard Strier challenges emotion historians to join him “in seeing the period as one in which it was possible to regard enjoyment of the things of this world as something not clearly negative and even, at times, as praiseworthy” (2011: 5). In the decade that has followed, the broadening influence of positive psychology on both popular culture and academia has instigated a cross-disciplinary boom in the investigation of emotions that feel “good” (Fox et al. 2021: 2). In addition to Strier, this turn toward positive emotions has found champions in early modern scholars such as James S.

Lambert, who has explored joy in the poetry of Edmund Spenser (2014), and Cora Fox, Bradley J. Irish, and Cassie M. Miura, whose edited collection *Positive Emotions in Early Modern Literature and Culture* (2021) heralds an even greater expansion into the feel-good territory of the era. It is in that spirit that the present study will now turn specifically toward the investigation of Shakespearean instances of joy.

Yet one should not assume that Strier's favoured concept of "unabashed enjoyment" (2011: 5) in the English Renaissance is as straightforward as it may seem. "The expression of joy," McMahon reminds us, "may be universal, but like every emotion, it is also culturally specific and culturally distinct" (2014: 110). And in some instances, it may not even be seen as an unambiguously positive thing. Thus, when it comes to the emotional culture of early modern England, we must come to terms with the importance placed on stories like this one from Thomas Wright's *The Passions of the Mind in General*:

Plutarch recounteth also, howe the Romanes, leeing to Hannibal, newes was brought to Rome, and specially to two women, that their sonnes were slaine: afterwards, a remnant of the souldiers returning, these two afflicted, ranne with many more, to know the manner of their sonnes deaths, and amongst the rest, found them both alive, who for joy, gave up their ghosts. And universally, after much pleasure and laughter, men feele themselves both to languish, and to be melancholy (1604: 61).

Or this, from Richard Brathwait in 1630:

Sure I am, there is nothing that tasteth more of true wisdome, than to temper our desires in effects of joy: so as I cannot sufficiently wonder, how *Chylo* being accounted one of the seven Sages of *Greece*, should bee so overtaken with joy, as to die with excesse thereof. The like we reade of *Argia* the proph-

ettesse, who being carried in a chariot of gold to the Temple by her two sonnes, whereat shee conceived no lesse joy than if her two sonnes had beene invested with the title of *Emperours*, through excessive joy immediately died (1630: 222).

Unsurprisingly, there are a few rather illustrative examples of this phenomenon within the action of early modern drama as well. Rolf Soellner very briefly noted the habit of Renaissance commentators—as well as Shakespeare himself—to warn “about the danger of inordinate joy to a man’s life” (1958: 557). And there has certainly been a growing acknowledgement that positive feelings are not as straightforward as they seem. Lambert shows, for example, that “the joy with which Spenser was dealing was as full of sorrow and anxiety as it was delight” (2014: 81). Fox and colleagues note as well that positive emotions regularly interact with “their non-positive counterparts” (2021: 8), and Patrick Colm Hogan observes that “the study of literary joy will inevitably lead us to instances of literary grief, often as part of that joy” (2021: 212). Nevertheless, the especially ambivalent and potentially lethal semantics of Shakespearean joy have not yet been parsed comprehensively. This is precisely what I aim to do presently.

The first part of this chapter will explore this beguiling aspect of the Renaissance imagination through a few specific joyous moments expressed by the title men in *Troilus and Cressida*, *Cymbeline*, *Pericles*, and—with particularly close readings—*Othello*. In doing so, we will examine how Shakespeare’s dramatic language negotiates the boundaries between “the greatest joy” and “life’s proper limits” (Potkay

2007: 25). With that information in mind, we shall then analyse the ways in which some contemporary productions of *Othello* have grappled with the mixed valence of this passion's early modern form.

In this chapter's second half, we shall explore the divergent evolutionary course the French concept *joie* has taken since the time of Languedoc *joi*—a medieval French concept that is an ancestor of English *joy* as well. Seen in the context of classical francophone conceptions of affect and playhouse propriety, the fascinating theatrical history of *joie* will demonstrate that the word's conspicuous absence from the tragic stage may be able to tell us at least as much as its presence. The remainder of the chapter will then examine *joie*'s unique impact on contemporary translations and performances of Othello's joyful reunion with Desdemona in Cyprus (2.1.182–95) on the French page, stage, and screen. These analyses will show the degree to which this French *émotion* still carries many of the affective ambiguities that anglophone conceptions of “joy” no longer tend to connote. Along the way, it will become clear that there are many ways in which the inarguably intense experiences of both English joy and French *joie* can create room for far more affective nuance than we might normally imagine. In fact, as Darren Hudson Hick and Craig Derksen have argued, the mixed emotions that transpire underneath and around such seemingly positive feelings can reveal a great deal about the “paradox of tragedy” (2017).

What is Joy?

The Story of Joy author Adam Potkay defines joy as “the mind’s delight in a good thing that comes to pass or seems sure to happen soon” (2007: vii). He was undoubtedly influenced by John Locke’s definition in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*: “Joy is a delight of the Mind, from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a Good” (1690: 114). Potkay/Locke’s definition is helpful for our purposes because, while the word “delight” suggests a positive feeling, such an understanding does not limit the experience in terms of either its degree or its consequences. Following Potkay, I find it helpful to distinguish joy from “happiness” by underscoring the suddenness and irrationality represented by the former, versus the “secular ideal of rational contentment through ethical conduct” that defines the latter (Potkay 2007: 21).¹ “Joy” connotes a surprising moment, while “happiness” suggests a guiding principle with an ostensibly homeostatic end result (Watt Smith 2015: “Joy,” para. 1). And McMahon argues that “joy” is “an emotion and flood of feeling more concentrated and intense than happiness, and hence generally of shorter duration” (2014: 109). These glosses are compatible with Anna Wierzbicka’s cognitive scenarios for the two concepts as well:

1. Potkay further notes here that Shakespeare refers to happiness in this way as well: “Lucentio, en route to the university in Padua, invokes the term pedantically: to ‘that part of philosophy / Will I apply that treats of happiness / By virtue specially to be achieved’ (*The Taming of the Shrew*, 1.1.18–20)” (2007: 21).

Joy (X felt joy)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "something very good is happening
- (d) I want this to be happening"
- (e) when this person thinks this this person feels something very good
- (f) X felt something like this
- (g) because X thought something like this (1999: 50–51)

Happiness (X felt happiness)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) "some very good things happened to me
- (d) I wanted things like this to happen
- (e) I can't want anything else"
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something very good
- (g) X felt something like this (because X thought something like this) (1999: 53)²

"Joy" is more immediate ("something very good is happening" whereas with "happiness" it has already happened). "Happiness," on the other hand, is the result of good things accumulating. In discussing the semantic drift of the term, which was in active flux during Shakespeare's day, Richard Chamberlain alludes to the historical roots of this idea of "happiness" as the result of an accumulation of good fortune.

The role of language is essential to Shakespearean artworks in their negative-dialectical dislocation of actual happiness from its concept. Moreover, in this connection, a particular coincidence or conjunction of like-sounding words in the English of his time, much used in the plays, seems especially important. These words include "hap," "haply," "perhaps," "hapless," "mishap," which are all to do with fortune, luck, chance, accident or event, and also "happiness," "happy," "happily," which are used both of fortunate happenings and of an early modern emotion which some people suppose they still

2. Note that Wierzbicka (1999: 51–54) distinguishes between "x was happy" and "x felt happiness"; the former lacks the intensity of the latter (e.g. "I was happy *with* this arrangement," does not actually indicate that the experiencer *feels* happiness per se).

experience today. In short, Shakespeare's texts play across the strong family ties between these words deliberately and creatively (2015: 160).

R.S. White adds that the earlier conceptions of happiness "may reflect a fundamentally different world view in times when life itself was more contingent on uncontrollable, outer circumstances such as epidemics, making the state of 'happiness' more like a lucky accident than a goal" (2017: 33).³ Additionally, the good fortune of "happiness"—in which "some very good things happened *to me*"—suggests a more personal nature than does "joy." And with the "happiness" element (e), "I can't want anything else," there is a sense in which the experiencer achieves some degree of affective homeostasis. This element also resonates with what Strier considers a "distinctively Shakespearean" variety of "happiness"—exemplified by such figures as Aaron the Moor, Richard III, Falstaff, and Rosalind— which "has to do with pleasure in being exactly who and what you are, and in actively manifesting, indeed performing, that identity" (2020: 276, 280).

Conversely, "joy" remains open to further external desires and fears. And as I shall argue, this open-ended intensity of "joy"—particularly as demonstrated by several of Shakespeare's leading men—can carry the risk of not only destabilisation but also real danger. James Burgh recommended that the aspiring actor or orator

3. One cannot help pondering the degree to which the 2020–21 pandemic has begun to shift our own worldview, and the ways in which this might affect our emotion concepts.

capture this particular aspect of joy in his instructive eighteenth-century treatise *The Art of Speaking*:

Joy, when sudden and violent, expresses itself by *clapping* of *hands*, and *exultation*, or leaping. The *eyes* are *opened* wide; perhaps filled with *tears*; often raised to *heaven*, especially by devout persons. The countenance is smiling, not composedly, but with features *aggravated*. The voice rises, from time to time, to very *high* notes (1761: 15).

While Burgh wrote his instructions on the performance of joy over a century after our primary historical focus, his work nonetheless serves as an illuminating window into the way in which early modern England conceived of the passion's physical manifestation. Particularly salient is the clear conception of joy as a decidedly fitful phenomenon. It can be "violent"; one smiles "not composedly, but with features *aggravated*." Joy corresponds, in other words, to both an exalted experience and a frenetic set of behaviours. Tiffany Watt Smith has noted, too, that "joy can be a kind of violence" (2015: "Joy," para. 1). This recognition, along with what Wierzbicka has termed an anglophone "trend against emotional intensity," may be among the key factors of a significant reduction of "joy" in the English language since Shakespeare's time (1999: 54). As Potkay points out:

Some may still self-consciously pursue *happiness* or the good life. But *joy* is a word we don't use much anymore, at least not in secular contexts. Shakespeare uses the words "happy" and "joy" with the same frequency, but by the early twentieth century the latter was less often sounded on the stage: George Bernard Shaw, for example, uses "happy" seven times more often than "joy." And while joy has grown less common, still less do we now "rejoice" (2007: 1).

Granted, there is certainly evidence that popular culture has been kinder to joy as a concept and, in particular, as a life goal. In addition to titles such as *The Joy of Cooking*, and all of the *Joy of...*s that have followed in its footsteps, a whole host of self-help books, magazines, and blogs have capitalised on twenty-first-century culture's desire to have "[m]ore joy, right now!"⁴ While the idea that one can have "too much of a good thing" may serve as a truism in our culture, the idea that we might be able to experience "too much of joy," as Othello terms it (2.1.195), feels counterintuitive to us at first blush.

However, we must recognise that today's concept of "joy" has apparently evolved into something more straightforwardly positive. Conversely, Shakespeare's treatment of the passion—as with most of the affective processes he invokes—invariably involves a fairly sophisticated degree of conceptual blending. As R.S. White and Ciara Rawnsley have noted, "[e]motions-based commentary on early modern literature, and Shakespeare in particular, may suffer from a reductiveness due to reluctance to reflect multiple emotional states present simultaneously" (2015: 241). Hogan argues that this is often particularly true when examining positive emotions, with which "there is often an underlying ambivalence, even in cases where the overall experience has an apparently clear valence" (2021: 201). Yet this potential

4. O: *The Oprah Magazine*, review excerpt on book cover, *The Power of Now*, by Eckhart Tolle (Novato: New World Library, 1999).

reductiveness does not confine itself to literary criticism; such oversimplification has consequences on the contemporary stage as well. It is essential “to understand how Shakespeare makes mixed emotions function on the stage,” White and Rawnsley note, “since this aspect of his drama is so characteristic as to be ‘the dyer’s hand’ in his work” (2015: 242). And as Katharine Craik puts it, “[e]motion is never singular in Shakespearean drama where the messy nature of feelings fleetingly ‘blent together’ colours life as it is lived” (2020: 16). In the case of “joy,” we will see that this conceptual reductiveness can sometimes lead to a tempering of the multiplicity of valences available for exploration in these moments in the Shakespearean playhouse. Situating the passion in its early modern context will provide us with a much richer understanding of theatre-makers’ possibilities when engaging with these instances.

Troilus, Pericles, and Cymbeline.

In order to see just how frequently the mixed nature of joy occurs in Shakespeare’s drama, we shall briefly examine such moments in *Troilus and Cressida*, *Pericles*, and *Cymbeline*. We shall then turn our attention to a multivalent moment of joy in *Othello*, looking more closely at the emotion both on the page and on the stage.

In the immediate moments before his long-anticipated sexual encounter with Cressida, Troilus provides a paradigmatic instantiation of the mixed nature of joy.

I am giddy; expectation whirls me round.
 Th'imaginary relish is so sweet
 That it enchants my sense. What will it be,
 When that the wat'ry palates taste indeed
 Love's thrice-repured nectar? Death, I fear me,
 Swooning destruction, or some joy too fine,
 Too subtle-potent, tuned too sharp in sweetness,
 For the capacity of my ruder powers.
 I fear it much; and I do fear besides
 That I shall lose distinction in my joys,
 As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps
 The enemy flying (*Tro.* 3.2.16–27).

It is perhaps possible to contend that Shakespeare depicts the Trojan prince as a man who is simply overthinking what should easily be an unambiguously positive moment; this is, after all, what critics such as Harold Goddard consider “the most intellectual play [Shakespeare] ever wrote” (1951: 4). And many critics argue that the overwhelming nature of Troilus's passion stems in large part from what they see as his seeming sexual inexperience (Bevington 1998: 39, fn 1). Yet, rather than displaying sheer naïveté, the language of this speech consistently underscores the emotional complexity of the moment. Not only are both mentions of “joy” immediately problematised (“some joy too fine”; “I shall lose distinction in my joys”), but the word “fear” also appears thrice within the span of just five verse lines. What’s more, one of the first things he mentions fearing upon his joy’s fulfilment, of course, is death. These complexities become particularly fascinating when we consider another important distinction between “joy” and “happiness.” According to Potkay, happiness is “a technology of the self ... that elevates inner integrity, constancy and

wisdom over external mutability, loss, and death." Joy, on the other hand, involves "at least partial loss of self" (2007: 3).

It is also worth considering the idea that the intensity of "joy" as a category may have resonated in early modern English with dark and rich over- and undertones that would strike us as unusual today. According to Małgorzata Fabiszak's *The Concept of Joy in Old and Middle English*, an analysis of the earliest uses of the word

provides a clear picture of a dichotomy between "earthly joy" (*idel ioies*) and that resulting from religious experience (*ioie of þe hali gast, joye of heaven*). The former leads to pain, and it is *wykkid men* [who] *habounded in joy and gladnesse* ... The transitoriness and worthlessness of earthly joy is often stressed as in: *þe ioie of þis wrecchid world is a schort feeste* ... and *This warldly Ioy is onely fantasy* (2001: 78).

This sentiment certainly survived into and beyond Shakespeare's day. The *OED* cites, for example, an early version of a "common proverb" from 1591 that claims there is "no joy without annoy."⁵ Nearly thirty years later, John Donne proclaimed in a sermon that "true sorrow and true joy, are things not only contiguous, but continual; they doe not onely touch and follow one another in a certaine succession, Joy assuredly after sorrow, but they consist together, they are all one, Joy and Sorrow" (1956 [1622]: 4.343).

In fact, the more closely one looks at the conceptualisation of "joy" within the Shakespearean context, the more apparent it becomes that the passion was consist-

5. "joy, n." *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, June 2021, www.oed.com/view/Entry/101795. Accessed 22 June 2021.

ently intertwined not only with pain, but also with death. For example, upon the realisation that his daughter Marina is still alive, Pericles exclaims

O Helicanus, strike me, honour'd sir;
 Give me a gash, put me to present pain;
 Lest this great sea of joys rushing upon me
 O'erbear the shores of my mortality,
 And drown me with their sweetness (*Per.* 21.178–82).

Here, the Prince of Tyre expresses a desire to have his joy tempered with physical pain as a means to prevent that joy from killing him outright. In a very similar moment, Cymbeline's surprise reunion with his own daughter, Innogen (also presumed dead), leads him to cry out: "If this be so the gods do mean to strike me / To death with mortal joy" (*Cym.* 5.4.234–35). Both Pericles and Cymbeline appear to see this fatal excess of joy as a sudden and violent act of a natural or divine authority; however, in this late stage of Shakespeare's career, death's associations with joy carry a far greater potential for redemption. For example, Cymbeline's joy does not, in the end, kill him. In fact, although he does invoke the word "death" in association with his joyful realisation that he has not outlived all three of his children, the reunion ultimately recalls a moment of birth. "O what am I?" Cymbeline exclaims, "A mother to the birth of three? Ne'er mother / Rejoiced deliverance more" (5.5.367–69). According to Valerie Wayne, "Cymbeline's claim to maternity at the moment his family has been reassembled—posed first as a bewildered question, then claiming affiliation only with a mother's joy—signals the reunion as a form of rebirth and himself as its

unwitting agent" (2017: 136). Potkay characterises this nexus of death, birth, and joy in the following terms:

Understanding joy's primacy among the passions is, finally, to understand joy as the passion for primacy, for recurrence. Freud would label this homeostatic mechanism the death drive, an orientation towards the quiescence of of inorganic matter, but we could as easily label it the neo-natal or pre-birth drive, an orientation towards blissful totality and un-demarcated awareness (2007: 16).

Yet Shakespeare had not yet begun to explore the full potential of the themes of rebirth and redemption when he was writing *Troilus* and *Othello*. In these comparatively earlier years, his characters' "joys" and their associations with death tended to be darker and, often, eroticised.

In fact, it is impossible to begin any conversation about death in the context of Renaissance England without recognising the era's implicit and explicit associations between dying and sexual fulfilment (Bevington 1998: 29). Various forms of the verb "to die," as well as the noun "death" (especially in the diminutive phrase "little death") frequently served as euphemisms for orgasm. While this association is particularly obvious in *Troilus's* case, it is prevalent in *Othello* as well, where, as Marjorie Garber notes, "sexual consummation is deferred in the interest of war and civic duty, and where the lovers will ultimately die together on a bed fitted with their wedding sheets" (2004: 600; see also A. Thompson 2016: 44–54; Hallstead 1968: 112). We will examine the connections between joy, sex, and death in *Othello* shortly; first,

we shall look more closely at the implications for Troilus, as the language in his instance of joy reads as particularly charged with sexual desire (Wells 2010: 187).

This link between sexuality and death, particularly in Troilus's instance of joy, also evokes some rather fascinatingly relevant medieval etymology. While Shakespeare's play was neither written nor set in the time of the troubadours, it is certainly worth remembering that his main source—Chaucer's late-fourteenth-century epic poem *Troilus and Criseyde*—is often seen as a quintessential celebration of chivalric ideals. Thus, inasmuch as he has chosen to depict his own Troilus as the literary inheritor of Chaucer's version of the character, Shakespeare may indeed use the character to serve as an expression of joy as *joi*—a Languedoc (medieval Occitan) concept that connotes “a technical term of erotic service” that was a product of medieval Europe's cultural construction of “courtly love” (Potkay 2007: 3). For the troubadours, *joi* was a spiritualised state of sexual desire whose object was ostensibly a beloved “Lady,” but which in reality was more fixated on the state of desire itself. According to Jennifer Crone, “the lyrical jouissance with which the troubadours expressed their fervor for their ladies was a song of *Joi*, a celebration of being, that was very similar to the Christian beatitude experienced by the amorous mystic Bernard” (2013: 2). Yet, she continues, while the mystic's bliss is centred “on the certainty of possessing the loved object ... the troubadours did not possess their

Lady, as she was always unobtainable” (ibid.). As Potkay explains, this state of affairs created “a fundamental ambiguity between carnal and sacred rhetoric in many of the troubadour lyrics—and, indeed, in the troubadour tradition as it extends into the Renaissance and European Romanticism” (2007: 51). Insofar as the concept of *joi* may have left a lasting mark on Renaissance “joy,” Shakespeare may well have crafted this moment as a demonstration of Troilus's affective ambivalence, a manifestation of what Potkay recognises as a further ambiguity

about the proper duration of the unsatisfied desire that comprises *joi*. Ought it to be a temporary deferral that makes fulfilment all the more joyous, or an interminable deferral? Is *joi*, in other words, the sustained prelude to climax (*jouissance*), or is it rather a fetishism of the unattainable or irreplaceable? (ibid.)

Through this lens, we can begin to see some evidence of the complex nature of *joi* in Troilus's “joy.” “Equating desire and love,” Potkay continues, “the troubadours suggested that the satisfaction that ended desire would also put an end to love” (2007: 56).

While not referring specifically to *joi*, David Kaula invokes the notion when he notes

the self-obsessive nature of Troilus' passion, of its tendency to prolong and intensify the process of yearning rather than to seek consummation in active experience and the responsive love of another. Caught between desire and revulsion, his will remains focused on itself alone. It has no thought for the other, for Cressida as a real person (1961: 275; see also Davis-Brown 1988: 22).

Troilus's joy may thus become too “fine”—a word perhaps evoking the sense of “finitude” or “thinness”—if the ostensible object of his desire was something he never truly intended to attain in the first place (Földvary 2019: 43). Examining the play’s relationship to the concept of the “infinite will,” Bruce Haley argues that “[w]hen the individual moves past pure will (desire and anticipatory idea) to execution, the idea is corrupted, thence becoming a slave to ‘envious and calumniating time’” (1972: 22). Thus, moving out of the idealised domain of the infinite and into the temporal realm is, paradoxically, what brings Troilus to the brink of oblivion. As Crone contends, “[w]ith the loss of the Lady’s divinity ... the *Joi* of courtly love poetry is transformed into the anguished awareness of desire’s lack” (2013: 5).

The complexity we have explored in Shakespeare’s depiction of Troilus's joy is undoubtedly challenging to capture in contemporary performance. In a 2018 RSC production of the play with artistic director Gregory Doran at the helm, Gavin Fowler/Troilus approached the whole soliloquy in a manner that was markedly quiet and contained.⁶ In the available recording, his sheepish elocution of the words “I am giddy” elicited giggles from the audience. However, all of the speech’s references to death and fear were cut. Streamlining performance times by removing lines is, of

6. *Troilus and Cressida*, dir. by Gregory Doran (Royal Shakespeare Company 2018) *Drama Online Library* [Accessed 3 February, 2020].

course, standard practice when staging Shakespeare. However, the creative team's decision to choose these complicating affective moments as the targets of such cuts instantiates how the untranslatability of emotions can affect performance not only across languages and national borders, but also across the gulf of centuries. This particular choice typifies what White and Rawnsley term the "tendency to compartmentalise clearly defined emotional states for the sake of analysis ... rather than noticing that many states of feeling are transitional or inseparably multiple" (2015: 241). It is important to recognise what is lost in this kind of affective redaction: as White and Rawnsley continue, "Shakespeare pre-eminently works at a more complex and multiply integrated level when dealing with 'mixed emotions.' This is an important aspect to the cultural transportability and temporal longevity of his plays" (ibid.: 241–42).

Thus, recognising and honouring the darker aspects of *joy* may bring us closer to maintaining this moment's relevance and power—as well as that of the play as a whole. Such a reading makes what many critics consider an uncomfortably cynical dramatic work—which Mark van Doren called "Shakespeare's revenge upon mankind" (1939: 203)—even more cynical. Yet the "joy" we encounter in Shakespeare's rendition of the story is inescapably influenced by its etymological ancestor *joi*, whose eventual satisfaction—like "appetite," that "universal wolf," eats

up itself (*Tro.* 1.3.124,127). Haley concurs with this assessment, noting that the play demonstrates “that the source of unhappiness is joy itself” (1972: 23). As Troilus himself says at the play’s beginning, “sorrow, that is couched in seeming gladness, / Is like that mirth fate turns to sudden sadness” (1.1.37–38).

Othello.

The relationship between joy and death in *Othello* can be summed up rather neatly by Emma Smith’s recent comment on the play: “This is a comedy that goes horribly wrong” (2019: 222). Smith’s pithy commentary echoes a generic opinion that many critics have endorsed over the past several decades, outlined neatly by Susan Snyder: “The motives are sexual love and jealousy; intrigue and deception propel the plot; the outcome is engineered by a clever manipulator; the impact is personal, ‘domestic,’ rather than political and cosmic” (1972: 123). Snyder also notes that a driving force in most of Shakespeare’s romantic comedies is that of characters pairing up in order to achieve a fullness of identity that is unavailable to those who are single. In fact, she isolates Othello’s joyful instant, which “underlines this sense of a movement accomplished, a still point of happiness like the final scene of a comedy” (ibid.: 128).

Othello.

It gives me wonder great as my content
To see you here before me. O my soul's joy!

If after every tempest come such calms,
 May the winds blow till they have waken'd death!
 And let the labouring bark climb hills of seas
 Olympus-high and duck again as low
 As hell's from heaven! If it were now to die,
 'Twere now to be most happy; for, I fear,
 My soul hath her content so absolute
 That not another comfort like to this
 Succeeds in unknown fate.

Desdemona.

The heavens forbid
 But that our loves and comforts should increase,
 Even as our days do grow!

Othello.

Amen to that, sweet powers!
 I cannot speak enough of this content;
 It stops me here; it is too much of joy (*Oth.* 2.1.182–95)

What makes this moment painful for the spectator, however, is the fact that we all know that this play is very much a tragedy; that Desdemona's prayer that their "loves and comforts should increase" will not be answered. Knowing the story as we do, it is obviously difficult to ignore the uncanny irony of these words. As Goddard puts it:

At a first reading we enter into Othello's wonder and joy, a content so absolute that we, like him, cannot imagine it augmented; and we feel that undertow of sadness that accompanies all supreme felicity and beauty—enhanced in this instance by our knowledge of the plot against them. When, however, having finished the play, we reread these lines, we suddenly realise that Othello has prayed in them for exactly what the future was to bring him: a storm ... much more terrific than the tumult of wind and wave through which he has just passed as the ocean of human emotion is more treacherous than any Mediterranean—a storm whose crest and trough should literally touch heaven and hell (1951: 82).

Even for those audience members who attended one of the initial performances of the play, who did not necessarily know how it would end, the exchange is loaded with foreboding language that may in and of itself have served as unpropitious foreshadowing. Garber invokes this moment between Othello and Desdemona for its “faintly ominous ring ... for, ironically, this will be the last truly happy moment either of them will ever enjoy” (2004: 600).

Note that, as with Troilus, the word “fear” appears prominently in this speech, as do direct references to death. “He speaks in part,” notes Gail Kern Paster, “of the rhetorical inexpressibility of great joy, but mostly of joy’s physiological effects” (2004: 64). She goes on to connect this moment to the following passage from Thomas Wright, about the potential for a seemingly positive emotion like joy to have an unhealthy effect on the body:

if the passion of pleasure be too vehement, questionles it causeth great infirmitie: for the heart being continually invuironed with great abundance of spirit, becomes too hot and inflamed, and consequently engendreth much cholericke and burned blood: Besides, it dilateth and resolveth the substance of the heart too much, I[n] such sort, that the vertue and force thereof is greatly weakned (1604: 60).

As a humoral conception of emotions held sway for many at the time of *Othello*’s writing—incidentally, right around the same time as Wright’s *The Passions of the Mind*—such an account may well have been plausible to many of the play’s initial spectators (see INTRODUCTION, pp. 13–20).

Yet let us return for a moment to what Paster referred to as “the rhetorical inexpressibility of great joy.” As Othello’s line “I cannot speak enough of this content” suggests, joy’s place in the shadow of death may derive from the fact that it is a singularly challenging passion to express linguistically. Potkay has observed that the word “joy” often serves as a signifier for “the limit of language as it gestures towards the undifferentiated unity before words were or after they shall cease to function as they familiarly do” (2007: 2; see also Lambert 2014: 96). While many extreme emotions affect our ability to express ourselves verbally, Potkay singles joy out in particular: “no other passion,” he says, “is so closely connected as joy with what’s unsayable—indeed, with making apparent the limitations of language conceived as a representational system that allows for the sharing of experience between minds” (2007: 17). Thus, by taking us to the boundary of what is sayable, joy makes us supremely aware of the limits of our ability to feel truly understood (Ryrie 2013: 88). As such, joy’s destabilisation of linguistic ability can even jeopardise one’s very sense of agency. Othello’s reunion with Desdemona serves as a rather well-known example of his elocutionary prowess—the musical articulacy with which he charmed both his wife and the Venetian senators. Yet notably, his joy here pushes him to a limit beyond which the power of words lose their connection with the realm of the living. This marks the beginning of the deterioration of Othello’s language,

which slowly devolves, over the course of the next three acts, into locutions like “Pish! Noses, ears, and lips! Is’t possible? Confess? Handkerchief? O devil!” (4.1.40–41). This devolution peaks most markedly when he loses speech entirely in his “ecstasy” — the word Iago uses to describe Othello’s fit (4.1.80).

It is worth noting at this point that our current concept of “ecstasy” has also transformed considerably when compared to Shakespeare’s usage of the word. While we are at least as likely to ascribe a positive valence to it as a negative one (*OED*’s first two definitions: “an overwhelming feeling of great happiness or joyful excitement” and “an emotional or religious frenzy, a trance-like state”), this was certainly not the case four hundred years ago. David Crystal and Ben Crystal gloss Shakespeare’s uses of “ecstasy” variously as “1. fit, bout of madness, frenzied behaviour,” as in Othello’s aforementioned fit; “2. madness, lunacy”; “3. emotion, state of mind” (2002: 144). Jennifer Edwards adds that, in Shakespeare’s work, “ecstatic tremulousness” denotes “a fit brought about by a lack of (self-) possession” (2020: 126). Thus, while the twenty-first-century boundary between joy and ecstasy is a desirable place, the equivalent boundary in the seventeenth century ran through the heart of terrifying emotional badlands. As Potkay contends, “[t]he surprise of joy always signals some loss of agency, but ecstasy is more clearly a type of death” (2007: 25). Iago’s use of this word, then, resonates with Othello’s “disintegration of self,”

which, according to Snyder “is the dark side of comedy’s insistence on interdependence, on completing oneself with another” (1972: 135). Thus, inexpressible, unsurpassable joy becomes the generic looking-glass through which one ought not to go. As Garber notes, “it is only when Othello loses language, loses this capacity to enchant through speech ... that his tragedy begins” (2004: 597). This moment of joy-bordering-on-ecstasy may well serve as the beginning of the process of Othello’s tragic self-disintegration.

What Potkay terms “the paradox of joy”—the seeming lack of distinction “between the desire to lose oneself in some greater whole or narcissistically sense everything as one’s (non-) self” (2007: 16)—can illuminate the understanding we have of each of our title characters’ precarious balancing acts between exaltation and oblivion. As we have seen, critics have had no trouble identifying the narcissistic impulse within Troilus’s soliloquy. Othello’s joy, though perhaps more ostensibly loving and less obviously narcissistic, nonetheless reveals the way in which the extremity of the passion can push someone to a blindness of anyone else’s perspective:

If it were now to die
 ’Twere now to be most happy, for I fear
 My soul hath her content so absolute
 That not another comfort like to this
 Succeeds in unknown fate (*Oth.* 2.1.187–91).

Many critics perceive a strong current of selfishness in the sentiments Othello expresses in this moment. Elias Schwartz alludes to this quality when he notes that "Othello's wonder at his own joy, his hyperboles and the general grandeur of his rhetoric suggest the latent egotism, the engrossment in passion, and the underlying sensuality which is involved in his love for Desdemona" (1970: 306). He goes on to note, in fact, the similarity between these speeches and "the utterances of Troilus (another self-deluding lover) while he anticipates the consummation of his passion" (ibid.). Yet I disagree with Schwartz's assessment that the source of these words' selfishness is necessarily lust. Rather, a careful consideration of Othello's sentiments reveals a passion so powerful that it renders the experiencer incapable of recognising his responsibility for the well-being of the other. Fleeting though it may be, the idea that a man's delight should push him toward a wish for his own death—leaving his new bride a tragically young widow simply because of his "fear" that he may never be this happy again—undermines the "nobility" critics have ascribed to Othello in the first half of the play. Without calling explicit attention to the self-centred nature of these remarks, Harry Berger does note that, in response to the "ominous prospect" underlying the "intensity of expression" in her groom's speech, Desdemona offers "a mild rebuke: She sensibly redirects him toward a future of lovemaking, affection, and family life. Is this the anticlimax he fears?" (2004: 21). Paster argues that the

intensity of the moment prompts Othello toward a kind of abdication of emotional responsibility. “The joy, being immoderate,” she says, “feels dangerous enough to make Othello almost prefer leaving the calm of reunion and returning to the violence —of weather, Turks, and before that the angry father—that had separated them”

(2004: 64–65). The danger manifests from the idea, as Paster puts it, that Othello

imagines a marital weather of gusts and calms only, being blown about by passion and stopped by an ecstatic but deadly increase of joy. ... [T]o figure strong emotion as a surge coming from *somewhere else*, somewhere external to the self, not only disclaims any sense of possession of one’s own feelings, but it also portrays the self as passively victimized by them. The meteorology of love here is just the kind of extreme weather in which there can be no safe passage between countries, no comfortable intercourse between husband and wife, no ongoing traffic of ordinary, domestic life. Othello’s implication [is] that great passion is as humanly uncontrollable, unpredictable, and potentially devastating as violent weather, and causally as external to the self (65–66).

Paster’s analysis of Othello’s anxieties and ambivalences speak to the heart of Potkay’s “paradox of joy.”

For both Troilus and Othello, joy serves as a terminus of other passions experienced in their stories up until that point. In Shakespeare’s sophisticated and complex handling of such a seemingly simple passion, he chooses to highlight precisely how momentary such a moment can be. Troilus explicitly expresses his mortal “fear” that “the capacity of [his] ruder powers” are no match for joy’s potentially lethal sharpness. According to Willard Farnham, Troilus experiences in this moment “a refinement beyond bearing” (1964: 259); his joy is thus unsustainable.

Othello's own consciousness of joy's fleeting nature—"That not another comfort like to this / Succeeds in unknown fate"—is precisely what precipitates the death wish he expresses then and there. Some part of him has taken to heart the Aquinean idea that "[o]nly in heaven is there absolute repose of the will, endless joy without sorrow" (Potkay 2007: 46).

Yet we might also interpret Aquinas (following Augustine) as holding the belief that the one form of human joy that is uniquely sustainable is the joy found in the conscious experience of God's eternal presence (ibid.: 47). Shakespeare's tenacity in problematising his characters' (and thereby, his audiences') experience of worldly joy becomes all the more fascinating when we consider the fact that contemporaneous Protestant orthodoxy seemed almost to require believers to participate in the act of spiritual rejoicing (ibid.: 73; see also McMahon 2014: 113; cf. Frevert 2014: 4). In Martin Luther's 1535 commentary on Paul's epistles to the Galatians—translated into English in 1575, with seven reprintings through 1644—he characterises joy as "sweete cogitations of Christ, holesom exhortations, plesant songs or Psalmes, praises and thanks giving, wherby the godly do instruct, stirre up and refresh themselves" (1575: F.261). And according to Fabiszak, the earliest recorded occurrences of the concept of religious joy in the English language denoted an experience that was described variously, in contemporaneous terms, as "*perdurable, everlasting, without*

end, endless, perpetual, eternal, and sweet" (2001: 78). And yet, as Alec Ryrie points out, "while Protestants of all stripes wanted to insist that they could be joyful, they also wanted to make it very clear that they did not mean worldly joy" (2013: 78). As such, it may indeed be instructive that three of the characters whose complicated instances of joy this chapter has examined are personages of the pre-Christian era (Troilus, Pericles, and Cymbeline); the fourth (Othello) is one whose relationship with his own (ostensibly adopted) Christianity has exercised critics for the better part of the last four centuries. Is it possible that Protestant spectators in Shakespeare's England—for whom "theology and devotion played a central role in the experience of a wide variety of emotions" (Meek and Sullivan 2015: 7)—would therefore have read more into these moments than do current audiences, whose concepts of joy are largely divorced from such soteriological significance?

In a 1625 sermon at St Paul's cathedral, Donne indicted joylessness as the significant "spiritual disease" of his era:

There may be a just feare, that men doe not grieve enough for their sinnes; but there may bee a just jealousie, and suspition too, that they may fall into inordinate grieffe, and diffidence of God's mercy. ... God hath accompanied, and complicated almost all our bodily diseases of these times, with an extraordinary sadnesse, a predominant melancholy, a faintnesse of heart, a chearlesnesse, a joylessnesse of spirit, and therefore I return to this endeavour of raising your hearts, dilating your hearts with a holy Joy, Joy in the holy Ghost, for *Under the shadow of his wings*, you may, you should, *rejoyce* (1959 [1625]: 68–69).

Note that this “holy joy” stands in sharp contrast to the variety that Donne had earlier explicitly equated with sorrow (cf. Ryrie 2013: 78–80). In a sense, Shakespeare may be using these non-Christian characters as representative of what many cultural forces would have considered the depravity inherent even in joy, when it is of the unholy variety. Paradoxically, the Protestant Christian relationship with joy is one that finds its deepest fulfilment in the anticipation of the afterlife, at the expense of worldly happiness as a neo-classical ideal (Potkay 2007: 30; Ryrie 2013: 86). As the sixteenth-century Book of Common Prayer attests: “truely our waye to eternall joy is to suffre here with Christe, and our doore to entre into eternal life: is gladly to dye with Christe, that we may ryse againe from death, and dwell with him in everlasting life” (1549: 88; see also Ryrie 2013: 94). And as Donne later insists, “joy, true joy, is truley, properly, onely belonging to a Christian” (1649: 131; see also Lambert 2014: 84).

Mixed Emotions and the Paradox of Tragedy.

This early modern ambivalence toward joy manifests in the mixed nature of the emotion in *Othello*, and—in this regard—the joyful moment in question is certainly not unique in Shakespeare. White and Rawnsley put it this way:

A range of feeling states and experiences are aroused in different personages, leading to complexities of “mixed emotions” not only in individual characters but also the ensemble, and the audience, so that the whole emotional impact

is both a sum of, and greater than, each individual's limited but strongly felt, affective perspective (2015: 244; cf. Colombetti 2014: 72).

The complexity of Othello's joyful moment presents a significant emotional challenge for the actor. In fact, the difficulty in fully enacting such passionate extremes may indeed reach something of a pinnacle for those who dare take on the role of Othello.

E.A.J. Honigmann illuminates the challenge:

Of all Shakespeare's major roles Othello is the most exhausting (with one possible exception: King Lear). ... [H]e has to switch on extremes of passion repeatedly, and to oscillate between different extremes. ... Edmund Kean, one of the greatest Othellos, whose performance was "a series of explosions," was once found in his dressing-room "stretched out on a sofa, retching violently and throwing up blood" (1997: 65; qtg. Rosenberg 1961: 62, 68).

In a role with multiple peaks, the reunion with Desdemona is undoubtedly one of them. An actor who commits fully to the violent joy the title character experiences here will be far more likely to be effective as his circumstances progress toward the more thoroughly malign. This is in large part due to the fact that extreme emotions on the dramatic stage—even negative emotions—contribute to what Aristotle referred to as "the pleasure of tragedy" (Hick and Derksen 2017: 141). This idea has long been seen as a paradox: the fact that, "when done right, a tragedy fills its audience with fear and sorrow ... and enjoyment" (ibid.: 140). According to philosophers Derren Hudson Hick and Craig Derksen, the paradox can be explained by what Michael Apter and K.C.P. Smith have termed the "reversal theory."

Rather than treating emotional arousal as a continuum with pleasant affect in the middle and unpleasant at the extremes, reversal theory suggests that low arousal may be pleasant (relaxation) or unpleasant (boredom), and that high

arousal may likewise be pleasant (excitement) or unpleasant (anxiety). High arousal will be pleasant when one is in an excitement-seeking mode, and unpleasant when one is in an anxiety-avoiding mode. When one is seeking excitement but fails to find it, one will be bored; when one is seeking to avoid anxiety and succeeds, one will be relaxed. When we are focused on our goals, and in what is known as a telic state, we find arousal unpleasant because it stands between us and our goals: arousal becomes anxiety. Pleasure in the telic state corresponds with perceived progress towards one's goals. Conversely, when we are concerned with enjoying ourselves in the moment, rather than a goal, we are in a paratelic state—here, we find arousal pleasant (as excitement) and seek it out (ibid.: 143).

Hick and Derksen argue that it is within this framework that we, as spectators, are capable of actually enjoying the anguish that tragic characters undergo onstage. They liken the experience to being on a rollercoaster: we are able to feel these extreme feelings within a “protective frame, which deemphasizes our real-world concerns” (ibid.). Because the danger is not real, we are able to experience high arousal as pleasure—even if the emotions associated with that high arousal would be unpleasant in a context that felt less secure.

Within the context of the narrative, Othello may well be feeling his joy with an element of anxiety because, just before this moment, he very nearly experienced a shipwreck. He is thus experiencing this emotional high without yet feeling fully secure within a protective frame. From a dramaturgical perspective, and in line with Hick and Derksen's theory, the intensity and fear with which Shakespeare constructs Othello's nearly-fatal joy can be particularly pleasurable for the audience precisely because of its supercharged level of affective arousal. If this moment constitutes the

very height of the metaphorical rollercoaster, then the story's sudden drops, its tragic twists and turns, become all the more enjoyable as a result. Hence, the divalent conceptualisation of joy that is evident in Shakespeare's drama serves as a testament not only to the playwright's insight into the mixed nature of human emotions, but also to his ability to exploit their sometimes frightening dynamics in order to render tragic pain into playhouse pleasure.

Othello's Joy on the Modern English Stage.

How do contemporary productions navigate the early modern complexity of the playtext's joy? Nicholas Hytner's modern-dress production for the National Theatre in 2013 capitalised on the delight of what Arthur Kirsch describes as the playtext's "most ecstatic moment" (1978: 732).⁷ Upon Adrian Lester/Othello's entrance onto the stage, he and Olivia Vinall/Desdemona rushed toward each other and she leapt up to wrap her arms and legs around his torso. Their romantic enthusiasm was reminiscent of teenagers as they passionately kissed each other frequently throughout their lines. Lester/Othello's childlike euphoria upon reuniting with Vinall/Desdemona showed the audience a man all but stripped of the military gravitas he had convincingly displayed in the play's Venetian scenes. The unfettered

7. *Othello*, dir. by Nicholas Hytner (National Theatre 2013) National Theatre Archive [Accessed 11 February, 2020].

nature of the general's emotional display served as one of several instances in Lester's performance that lent a credible sense of three-dimensionality to the role. Moreover, the joyous excitement created a palpable feeling of passionate chemistry between the actors/characters. This quality was so strong that, in the available recording, Lester/Othello elicited laughter from the audience at the moment he suddenly reassumed his decorum after realising that his military subordinates had long been witnessing him in this emotionally vulnerable display of public affection.

Yet, as played, the scene sacrificed much of the language's affective nuance—principally, what Kirsch refers to as the “tremors of anxiety in what [Othello] says” (ibid.). The hedonically positive aspects of Lester/Othello's delight overpowered the text's invocations of fear and mortality, thus detracting from the moment's more foreboding overtones. The scene did, however, go a long way toward creating the emotional intensity that was dramaturgically required. This derived largely from the very intensity of the lovers' romantic chemistry as established by the scene. Furthermore, as we have already discussed, there is a high degree of dramatic irony inherent in the fact that most twenty-first-century spectators know how the play will end; as such, the storytellers did not deprive their audiences of any important narrative information by choosing to underplay or gloss over such instances of foreshadowing.

This missing element is indeed much more subtle—but arguably, it is no less important: the magnificent capacity of Shakespeare’s language to express affective variability and granularity via rhythm, phrasing, and line. As Palfrey contends,

Shakespeare’s words are all about the speaker feeling or expressing barely articulate emotions, often more than one at a time; or about mental processes that cannot reach clear volition or decision; or about the speaker *not* possessing all of his/her meanings, such that we can conceive things that the speaker does not (2011: 31).

If Hytner and company made any space for the complex nature of joy in this scene, it was in Palfrey’s latter sense of the audience noticing meanings in the language that the actors/characters did not consciously express. It is possible that, in the end, the creative team decided that attempting to play affective subtleties in this moment may not have read very well in the vastness of the Olivier Theatre (cf. Peterson 2020: 180).

...

In contrast, Iqbal Khan’s 2015 *Othello* at the RSC presented a fascinating solution to the text’s complex rendering of joy in the reunion scene.⁸ Before Hugh Quarshie/Othello’s arrival, Joanna Vanderham/Desdemona was gripped with tension and nervous concern about her husband’s fate. In contrast with some actors/Desdemonas in other productions, she was not at all shy about expressing her annoyance with Lucian Msamati/Iago’s attempts to engage in a verbal repartee with her.

8. *Othello*, dir. by Iqbal Khan (Royal Shakespeare Company 2015) *Drama Online Library* [Accessed 10 February, 2020].

However, upon Quarshie/Othello's triumphantly ebullient entrance, Vanderham/Desdemona's concern bubbled over into what played effectively as a tearful paroxysm of relief and ecstasy. She seemed, in fact, on the brink of hyperventilation. The effect of this dynamic was that Quarshie/Othello's more composed, gentlemanly joy gave him the capacity to comfort and reassure his overwhelmed young wife. It played, in fact, as though the violent, fearful joy his language was describing ("it is too much of joy") was that of Vanderham/Desdemona, rather than his own.

In the light of some of the critical analyses explored above, which characterised Othello's language as an indication of narcissism or abdication of responsibility, this choice very much played against the grain. I have argued elsewhere that this production's casting of Black actors in both the roles of Othello and Iago created a unique emotional dynamic between the two actors/characters, in that Quarshie/Othello did not need to live up to the racialised expectations of the title role. Instead, Msamati's Iago was often the more "emotional" of the two.

The distributed nature of Black actor/characters' emotionality in this production allowed Quarshie to explore affective textures within the role that are generally unavailable to actors who are the exception in an all (or mostly-) white company. With Msamati's Iago doing much of the emotional heavy lifting in the first half of the show, Quarshie's Othello was able to keep his own feathers fairly unruffled deeper into the play's timeline than is typically the case (Bartelle 2021: 85).

This affective redistribution inevitably altered the dynamics among other characters as well, as we have seen here with Quarshie/Othello's confident sense of calm and

Vanderham/Desdemona's emotional overflow. In this staging, the lines "The heavens forbid / But that our loves and comforts should increase, / Even as our days do grow!" came across more as Vanderham/Desdemona's attempt to calm herself emotionally, rather than as a rebuke of her husband's language. The scene provided many of the intense and complex feelings of fear and anxiety, as well as joy, that Shakespeare's text suggests—albeit in a different way than the scene is often interpreted. The emotional intensity of the moment emerged from the intricate combination of the passions of both actors/characters, establishing an "incandescent" chemistry—of which Kirsch would likely have approved (1978: 732)—and providing a fantastically ecstatic peak on which the production successfully built its tragic power.

Othello en Français.

Before we turn our attention to French interpretations of Othello's joy in this scene, it will be instructive to understand some of the history of Shakespeare's words on the francophone stage. Shakespeare, according to Voltaire, "had a genius of full strength and fecundity, natural and sublime, without the smallest particle of good taste, and without the least knowledge of the rules" (1879 [1730]: 149). Whether the great French thinker's sentiment constitutes a fair representation of the earliest

attitudes of his countrymen toward the English dramatist is an ongoing matter of scholarly debate. Nevertheless, notes John Pemble, “[i]t was from these two concepts—genius and taste—that the French constructed their first and most persistent verdict on Shakespeare. Shakespeare had the one—in abundance—but not the other” (2005: 24). And when it came to “the rules,” it was not simply Voltaire’s well-known remarks about the lack of adherence to Aristotle’s unities of time, place, and action that offended early modern French theatrical sensibilities. As we shall see, franco-phone theatre-makers and theatre-goers, grounded in Classical ideals, also took exception to many of Shakespeare’s verbal references to worldly things they considered to be beneath the dignity of the stage. In fact, *Othello* has long been a chief locus for this discussion, due to what English-speakers might consider a surprising controversy surrounding the play’s handkerchief. Perhaps even more pertinent for our purposes, these early French lexical sensitivities to “taste” and “the rules” have fascinating implications for the affective lives of theatrical characters in general, and for Othello’s joy in particular.

The historical record shows that the ambivalence in French opinions of Shakespeare’s work is evident in the earliest extant instance of their encounters with him. The remark in question comes from the catalogue of King Louis XIV’s library, in which “Nicolas Clément, the king’s librarian, commented in a jotted note that

Shakespeare was a fluent, imaginative poet, but that his merits were obscured by garbage ('ordures')" (Pemble 2005: xiii). The "garbage" to which Clément referred was generally taken as more of a theatrical problem than a literary one. In fact, Shakespeare's first French translator, Antoine de La Place, claimed in his 1745 book *le Théâtre anglois* "that study of the English dramatist's work would broaden the French intellect and help to perfect French literature" (ibid.: 22). Yet what was acceptable for reading on one's own was a very different matter than what was appropriate to put onstage in front of a French audience. Eliane Cuvelier sums up the French theatre establishment's demands as follows:

Apart from the overarching demand for verisimilitude (*vraisemblance*) the main rules of dramatic composition in the French neo-classical canon ... were decorum or propriety (*bienséance*), the three unities, the use of rhymed verse and an elevated style. Decorum meant a dignified language on all occasions and for all characters, no coarse words or puns, no crowds and no murders on the stage. In order to preserve the dignity of tragic language and behaviour, any blending of genres was banished (1995: 32).

Voltaire, of course, saw Shakespeare's "ignorance of the unities" as "a kind of intellectual crime, because it was an offence against both verisimilitude and logic" (ibid.: 33). Yet lest we underestimate the severity with which the French proscribed "the use of language unworthy of tragedy," Cuvelier offers the following exchange as evidence:

Though Voltaire admitted that the French were "over-scrupulous in the matter of propriety," he would reproach Shakespeare with having a soldier utter the phrase: "Not a mouse stirring"; he thus triggered off a controversy with Lord Kames, who considered the speech as "natural": "Yes, sir," Voltaire

replied, “in a guard house, but not on the stage,” for a select audience could not bear the mention of vermin. Likewise, he himself apologized for translating “my back” in *Julius Caesar*, 1.2 (ibid.).

It was not, in fact, just mice and backs that were too “low” to be mentioned on the tragic stage. The French theatrical community tended to generally shun many body parts—including thighs, for example, but not hands (Pemble 2005: 86)—as well as “the names of most lower forms of life—plants, animals, and insects—and what one eighteenth-century translator referred to as ‘expressions designed to signify actions or employments which [were] publicly unsuited to people of distinguished rank’” (ibid.: 76).

This brings us to the French public’s complicated relationship with *Othello*. The first successful rendition of the play into French was written by Jean-François Ducis, whose *Hamlet* was the first work of Shakespeare to be performed in France (Willems 2021: 123). His *Othello* premiered in 1792, and “was directly influenced by the 1789 *Déclaration des droits de l’homme* and by the ongoing debate about slavery, first denounced in 1788, in *L’Esclavage des noirs*, a play written by Olympe de Gouges, who was also the first French feminist” (ibid.: 137–38). As such, according to Michèle Willems, the problems Ducis encountered as he adapted the play did not stem so much from the main character’s skin colour; that he “solved,” in fact, “by opting for a ‘copper colour as befits an African’” (ibid.: 130). Rather, the difficulties emerged from matters of taste that French audiences found far more objectionable. One such

element was the “indecent language” and “devilish duplicity” of the character of Iago. Ducis confided to David Garrick that, “though the English could calmly watch the manoeuvres of such a monster on their stages, the French would never put up with his presence” (ibid.). Hence, the character was replaced wholesale by Pézare, “who appears to be nothing more than Othello’s confidant until, after the murder of Hédelmone [Desdemona], the Doge reveals that the schemes which this unsuspected villain exercised off stage have just been exposed, confessed and justified by his love for Hédelmone, all this in the wings” (ibid.).

Though Ducis may not have predicted it, the staging of Othello murdering his wife was to prove even less acceptable. Here is Willems’s account of the opening night of Ducis’s *Othello*, in which François-Joseph Talma played the title role:

...when Talma raised his dagger to stab Hédelmone, (smothering her under a pillow was out of the question), all the spectators rose and shrieked, and several women fainted. Four months later, Ducis supplied a happy ending which reunited the lovers after some improbable last-minute reversals and revelations (ibid.).

Ducis’s ultimate success with the play was thus due to his eventual adherence to Voltaire’s admonition to all translators of Shakespeare: to “correct” the author’s “errors” (Cuvelier 1995: 32). The result, according to Willems, was a production that “made theatrical history in a context when the public was prepared to accept a coloured hero, a bed scene, the heroine singing with a guitar, but not her murder on stage” (ibid: 138).

French theatres continued to shun Shakespeare's tragic dénouement until Alfred de Vigny's *Le More de Venise* premiered at the Comédie-Française nearly three decades later, in 1829. Perhaps just as remarkably, in some ways, de Vigny's rendition of the play also marked the first occasion in which the French word for "handkerchief" (*mouchoir*) was uttered in the professional theatres of France. As Pemble explains, while *mouchoir* had been uncontroversial in translations—such as that of Philippe le Bas in 1837 or François-Victor Hugo twenty years later—which were intended to be read in the silence and privacy of one's study, this was a word

which well-bred French people could not bring themselves to utter—or to hear—in public. It was emphatically "low." The poet Ponce-Denis Lebrun, when adapting Schiller's *Marie Stuart* for performance in France, had felt unable to use it even though the handkerchief in this play had been embroidered by a queen. He had substituted the word "tissu." Desdemona's handkerchief was even more problematic in that it was "spotted with strawberries," because "fraise" ranked even lower than "mouchoir" in the lexical hierarchy. Consequently for almost two hundred years no translator for the stage dared to ask actors to say—or audiences to hear—exactly what it was that Desdemona had lost and Iago had made atrocious use of (2005: 105).

Nevertheless, despite the objections of the actress playing Desdemona, the characters in *Le More de Venise* called their *mouchoir* a *mouchoir*. Yet even de Vigny was not bold enough to make his actors utter the word *fraise*, and the handkerchief remained without strawberries on the French stage for another one hundred years (*ibid.*: 106).

For their part, French translators viewed their attitude toward this issue as one of an almost patriotic sense of pride in their own language. When Yves Bonnefoy was

translating *Hamlet*, for example, his reflections included an inference “that the English expected less of language than did the French. ‘They require more direct observation of simple psychology ... than heroic reconstruction’” (ibid.: 75). Bonnefoy’s pointed invocation of the idea of “simple psychology” has some fascinating implications when we consider another word that took even longer than *mouchoir* to be translated for francophone stagings of the play, even though it may seem like it should occasion a straightforward swap: *joie*. Consider, for example, Ducis’s 1792 rendition of the speech we examined earlier in the chapter:

<p><i>Othello.</i> Que mon sang tout-à-coup s’arrête dans mon cœur.</p>	<p>{<i>Othello.</i> How my blood suddenly stops in my heart.</p>
<p><i>Hédelmone.</i> Ton cœur est donc heureux?</p>	<p><i>Hédelmone.</i> So your heart is happy?</p>
<p><i>Othello.</i> J’ai souvent sur ma tête Entendu les fureur, les cris de la tempête; J’ai vu le fond des mers, les flots audacieux S’y perdre avec l’éclair, s’élaner jusqu’aux cieux; Le calme étoit bien doux après ce bruit terrible: Mais qu’il n’approche point de ce bonheur pais- ible, De ce bonheur profond, sans bornes, inconnu, Où nul homme avant moi n’est jamais parvenu! Je crois à ces transports que mon ame ravie Consume en un instant le bonheur de ma vie. A peine tout mon cœur suffit à le sentir. Ah! c’est dans ce moment que je devrois mourir... (1.8.280–94)</p>	<p><i>Othello.</i> I have often on my head Heard the furies, the cries of the tempest; I’ve seen the depths of the seas, the audacious waves Lose themselves with the lightning, soar to the skies; The calm was very soft after this terrible noise: But it did not approach this peaceful happiness, This profound, boundless, unknown happiness, Where no man before me has ever reached! I believe these transports in which my soul de- lights Consume in an instant the happiness of my life. Barely all my heart is enough to feel it Ah! It is in this moment that I should die...}</p>

The speech carries on for several more lines, and the exchange ultimately contains the word *bonheur* (happiness) a total of five times, in addition to having the word

heureux (happy) a further two times. While Ducis's version clearly points directly to Shakespeare's in numerous ways—including the link between Othello's positive feelings and the idea of death—the word *joie* does not appear at all.

Now let us turn to de Vigny's 1829 translation of the speech:

<p>Ma femme ! ô ma jeune beauté! O délice et repos de mon cœur tourmenté! Que le son de ta voix est doux à mon oreille! Aux sifflements des airs que la mort se réveille, Que ma barque se livre encore aux flots puis- sants, Si mon jour doit venir, qu'il vienne, j'y consens; Car jamais, quel que soit ton cours, ô destinée! Une telle heure encore ne me sera donnée (40– 47).</p>	<p>{My wife! O my young beauty! O delight and repose of my tormented heart! How the sound of your voice is sweet to my ear! At the whistling of the airs that awakens death, May my ship still give way to the powerful waves, If my day must come, let it come, I consent; Because never—whatever your course, O des- tiny!— Will such an hour ever again be given to me.}</p>
--	--

As we can see, and as was the case with Ducis, de Vigny's translation of the speech retains much of the sense of the English original. De Vigny even derived his translation directly from the First Folio, and claimed: "I have attempted to work word for word, and after careful search found many astonishing analogies between the English language, implanted by William the Conqueror on the old Saxon, and our own" (qtd. in de Smet 1950: 120, trans. by Barry Jackson). Nevertheless, the absence of the word "joy"—which Shakespeare's Othello mentions repeatedly, and which has a seemingly obvious cognate in the French *joie*—is remarkably conspicuous, even allowing for individual translators' varying sensibilities and approaches. In the context of a culture and an era in which many words had associations that were simply too "low" to be spoken or heard in a theatre, might it be possible that this was

also true for some emotion words, such as *joie*? Although he was not discussing this scene specifically, de Vigny did state that he had made a conscious decision to make Othello's language generally "less prosaic" than it was in Shakespeare, so that it was "better conforming to the grandeur of the African warrior" (qtd. in Pemble 2005: 104). A brief examination of francophone conceptions of affective states may well support the idea that Othello's *joie* was a direct casualty of this endeavour.

Joie as Émotion.

French speakers, similarly to speakers of all romance languages, habitually classify what English speakers call "emotions" into two fairly distinct categories: *émotions* and *sentiments*. "Only *sentiments*," according to this dichotomy, "are typically human; *émotions* ... are common to humans and animals" (Leyens et al 2000: 188). French *émotions*, explain to Jacques-Philippe Leyens and colleagues, are akin to what many contemporary researchers term "primary emotions"; *sentiments*, on the other hand, most closely resemble "secondary emotions" (ibid.). The typical understanding of the affective capabilities of animals serves, for these researchers, as a heuristic for English speakers to recognise the fundamental difference between these two terms:

In our opinion, the best way to intuitively make the (lay) distinction between *sentiments* and *émotions*, or the (scientific) distinction between *secondary* and *primary emotions*, as we call them here, is to ask oneself, "Would I apply this

emotional term to an animal such as a rabbit or a fish?" An animal can show anger, sadness, elation, or surprise, but people will probably not say that the animal is in a state of disillusion, sorrow, felicity, or admiration (ibid.: 189).

While it is arguable, of course, that rabbits and fish cannot experience sorrow or felicity, the point remains that most people probably do have beliefs along these lines. *Émotions* are marked by their "quick onset, brief duration, and unbidden occurrence," and may appear earlier on in the developmental life of a child; by contrast, *sentiments* "involve cognition, morality, evolution, memory and an active, rather than reactive, role of the person," and appear later in age (ibid.; see also Holodynski 2009: 142; cf. McMahon 2014: 109). In a study titled "A Prototype Analysis of the French Category 'Émotion,'" Paula Niedenthal and colleagues concluded that, for French speakers, the "intensity" of a given experience "is the primary predictor of explicit beliefs about what constitutes an emotion in the French language" (2004: 299). "Intensity," they explain, "refers to the strength of the state, and is related to the degree to which the state becomes the focus of attention" (ibid.: 291). Their study involved tracking French speakers' quick assessments of a list of 237 words denoting affective states, and charting the degree to which the word was considered to be an *émotion*, on a scale of one ("I would not say that it is an emotion") to ten ("I would say that it is certainly an emotion") (ibid.: 312). The authors assigned each affective term a "Q-score," which they described as the "mean prototypicality rating" on this scale (ibid.). The data from this study are immensely fascinating. The

word *dédain* (“disdain”), for example, receives a fairly low Q-score of 3.92, suggesting that this term is most likely to be considered a *sentiment* (ibid.: 305). On the other hand, *colère* (“anger”) scores a relatively high 8.29, meaning that the vast majority of respondents perceive it as an *émotion* (ibid.: 304).

And what of *la joie*? Remarkably, of all the 237 words considered in this experiment, *joie* received the single highest Q-score of all: a whopping 9.26 points (ibid.: 309). What’s particularly interesting is that this score places *joie* over even the very word *émotion* itself, which received a score of 9.01 (ibid.: 306). This indicates that, for French speakers, the intensity associated with the concept of *joie* confers upon it an emotional primacy that is unmatched even by feelings such as *colère* and *peur* (“fear,” Q-score 8.51) (ibid.: 310). Now let us again consider the suggestion, put forth by Leyens and colleagues, that a feeling that the francophone community characterises as an *émotion* is likely to be viewed as a comparatively rudimentary affective experience that can be easily attributed to “lower” life forms. This context recalls the question posed earlier: is it possible that, as with *mouchoir*, French theatre makers deemed *joie* too unsophisticated to be named on their stages?

Unfortunately, the omission of “joy” from Othello’s onstage lexicon in French translation has not received the same kind of critical attention as handkerchiefs and strawberries—nor, for that matter, as mice, backs, and thighs. In large part, this is

indicative of the relative youth of the international project of historicising emotions in general, and positive emotions in particular. And admittedly, one substantial impediment to the prospect of determining a definitive answer to this question is the fact that there is no way of knowing how closely the results of an early twenty-first-century study may conform to the psycholinguistic sensibilities of early nineteenth-century French speakers. Nevertheless, considering the evidence more closely does paint a fascinating picture. I have already mentioned the oddity of the fact that these early stage renditions elected to circumvent the use of an unambiguous translation of a word with a morphologically obvious cognate. Yet equally intriguing are the comparatively low Q-scores that Niedenthal et al. have assigned to *bonheur* and *heureux*, which Ducis chose as his replacement words, as well as to *délice* (in the form of *délectation*), which is the only specific positive emotive utterance that de Vigny's Othello uses (2004: 304–07). This may well reflect a desire to bring Othello's affective vocabulary to the more sophisticated level of decidedly "human" *sentiments*, rather than the base *émotion* of *joie*.

There is something else. During the time of these translations, the word *joie* may have connoted sexually suggestive meanings that the French found inappropriate for the tragic stage. As Potkay notes, French *joie* has remained "tethered, in part, to the twelfth-century troubadours and their technical use of *joi* as a term of erotic

service,” with the result that the singular form of the word “tends to have a sexier cast in eighteenth-century (and contemporary) France than in Britain” (2007: x, 5). *Joie*’s connection with sexuality is perhaps even more clearly revealed in the etymological and conceptual space it shares with the noun *jouissance*. This word, according to Tim Lomas, is “derived from *jouissant*, meaning to enjoy or take pleasure in. It can denote enjoyment or, more strongly, joy and delight. However, more specifically, *jouissance* has come to be associated with sex, particularly orgasm” (2018: 54). Moreover, according to the French scholars Susan Harrow and Timothy Unwin, the common phrase *joie de vivre* relates “most obviously” to “physical and sexual appetite” (2009: 21). The broad difference between anglophone and francophone conceptualisations of joy and *joie* is further epitomised, according to Potkay, “by the fact that ‘Joy’ has for the past hundred years served as a fairly common woman’s name while in France a *fille de joie* remains a term, however quaint, for a prostitute” (Potkay: x).

This is not to say, however, that the history of modern English is totally free from such associations. Potkay continues:

Although *fille de joie* didn’t fly in England, English writers of the seventeenth century and earlier eighteenth century did have a habit ... of using “joys,” plural, to mean sexual pleasures (as in John Donne’s *Elegy 19*, “bodies unclothed must be, To taste whole joys”) or, more bluntly, sexual emissions. Thus in the second earl of Rochester’s poem “The imperfect Enjoyment,” a premature ejaculation becomes “the Clammy Joys.” This peculiar usage pays

homage to Ovid's *Amores* 3.7, a poem of fantasised sexual "joys" (*gaudia mente*) disappointed by an uncooperative penis (*ibid.*: 5).

The documented English usage of "joys" of this kind seems to have fallen away a few centuries ago. Nevertheless, this historical context makes it much easier to imagine—since such associations were still alive in the French language during the time of these translations—that this might have contributed to both Ducis's and de Vigny's hesitance to allow their tragic hero to reveal his *joie* onstage.

In many ways, it is not altogether surprising that French *émotions* were (and still are) conceived as being in a relationship of binary opposition with "higher" human faculties. After all, one of the most influential accounts of the affective lives of human beings came from France's most famous thinker, René Descartes. In fact, according to Paola Giacomoni, it was in his 1649 book *Les passions de l'âme* (*The Passions of the Soul*) "that the word *émotion* is employed for the first time in a definition of passion, a radical turning point that had very significant repercussions" (2018: 58–59). Among these repercussions was the fact that, because *émotions* were conceived in Cartesian dualistic terms as "an internal movement of the animal spirits and the consequent alteration of external parts of the body," they came to be considered natural urges that could not be trusted (*ibid.*: 63). "For those who consider the soul and the body as two distinct substances," Émile Chartier explained in 1899, this posed a specific difficulty for the experience of *joie*: the entailment of

...bodily joys and sadnesses, which depend entirely on nature, and joys and sadnesses of the soul, which depend on the disposition of our will. And, as there will consequently be some joys which will not relate to the proper perfection of the soul, there will never be space to rejoice at being joyful without more examination, but it is always considered a judgement that must decide if such a joy is good or bad (1899: 761).

In such a paradigm, a worldly joy—such as that expressed by Othello, for example—would necessarily be considered “bad.”

Yet Chartier himself was among a generation of philosophers who heralded a recalibration of the understanding of body and soul amongst the French-speaking literati. Influenced by the seventeenth-century work of Baruch Spinoza, Chartier argued that, rather than the mind and the body being two substances,

...there is only one sole substance; that the mind [*pensée*] and the physical [*étendue*; i.e., “extended”] are two attributes of this substance, that is to say two manners of considering it and nothing more; that, from the moment that one comes to exist, it is at the same time a body, if one considers it under the attribute of extension, and a soul if one considers it under the attribute of thought, and that this soul and this body are one and the same thing; that, similarly, it is only by abstraction that one can consider that the soul has faculties, and that the soul is one and indivisible; that it does not contain an inferior part, where joy and sadness live, nor a superior part, where one would find ideas and a will (ibid.: 761).

Chartier was certainly not alone in this new way of thinking; in general, as Ute Frevert notes, the “deep mistrust of the body and its relegation to a lower animalistic sphere became noticeably weaker towards the end of the nineteenth century” (2014: 22). This intellectual paradigm shift created an entirely new way of looking at *joie*. Chartier continues,

Peter's joy cannot be anything other than the whole soul of Peter, considered only in terms of the pleasant and the unpleasant; and, since there are no parts of the soul nor hierarchy, it is necessary that the pleasant and the unpleasant are identical with good and evil, and consequently that joy is the same thing as perfection. I say the same thing as perfection, and not at all the necessary consequence of perfection, for to understand it as such, it would be necessary to suppose a part of the soul that would be more or less perfect, while another part would be more or less joyous (1899: 761–62).

This conceptual upgrade for *joie*, from base passion to “the same thing as perfection,” did not, of course, mean that French speakers have ceased to categorise the experience as an *émotion* rather than a *sentiment*. Nevertheless, it is fascinating to note that this reassessment began to take shape toward the end of the nineteenth century—around the same time Othello was finally able to speak his *joie* on the French stage.

In fact, after just fourteen performances of de Vigny's 1829 translation, the Comédie-Française returned to producing Ducis's 1793 text for most of the remainder of the nineteenth century (Boquet 1995: 206). It was only in 1899 that a major French theatre mounted a full production of a new, more deliberately faithful version of *Othello* for the stage—this time by translator Jean Aicard (De Smet 1950: 103). A close look at the reunion scene reveals a greater level of semantic and affective fidelity than we have seen thus far:

Othello.

Je suis émerveillé, non moins qu'heureux! — O
joie
De mon âme ! Dieu veut qu'enfin je vous revoie!
— Ah! Si les ouragans laissent tous derrière eux
Un pareil calme, — alors, soufflent des vents af-
freux
A réveiller la mort de clameurs inconnues,
Et que ma frêle barque escalade les nues
Sur des montagnes d'eau, pour retomber après
Au plus profond de tous les enfers! — Je voudrais,
Desdemone, mourir là, dans cet instant même,
Car j'éprouve la joie infinie ; oui, suprême!
Et j'ai peur de ne plus retrouver, jamais plus,
Ce charme, cette paix, ce bonheur absolus!

Desdemone.

Qu'un aussi vaste amour, qu'une joie aussi
grande
Cessent de croître, oh! Dieu le défend!

Othello.

Qu'il t'entende!...
Dieu clément ! je ne puis parler de mon bonheur
Comme je le voudrais ! j'en ai trop plein le
cœur...
Il m'étouffe, là... (2.4.2–18)

{*Othello.*

I am amazed, no less than happy! Oh joy
Of my soul! God wills that finally I see you
again!
Ah! If all hurricanes leave behind them
Such a calm, — why, let the dreadful winds blow
To awaken death with unknown clamours,
And let my frail boat climb the clouds
On mountains of water, to fall again afterwards,
In the deepest of hells! — I would want,
Desdemona, to die here, in this very instant,
For I am feeling the infinite joy; yes, supreme!
And I fear not finding again, ever again,
This charm, this peace, this absolute happiness!

Desdemona.

That such a vast love, such a joy as great,
Should stop growing, oh! God defend it!

Othello.

Let him hear you!
Merciful god! I cannot speak of my happiness
As I would like! My heart is too full...
It chokes me, here...}

As we can see, Aicard's Othello still mentions feeling *heureux* ("happy") and experi-
encing *bonheur* ("happiness"). Yet both he and Desdemone speak of their shared *joie*
as well. Compared to the translations of both Ducis and de Vigny, Aicard's rendering
of this scene follows Shakespeare's remarkably closely—albeit with the French
classical theatre's requirement of rhyming alexandrines. Moreover, this new *Othello*
finally allowed French audiences to experience the tragic ending of the English
original; as such, Othello's *joie* was not the only beneficiary of French audiences'

readiness to realign the theatrical boundaries to which they had so long been accustomed.

Yet the tragic hero's speaking his *joie* onstage does feel significant in its own right. "Thinking about the popular practice of joy," argues French historian Pauline Valade, "can point us towards understanding the social imaginary" (2015: 184). Thus, while there is no way of knowing whether the shifts in the worlds of French theatre and French philosophy affected each other directly at the end of the nineteenth century, the fact that influential voices in the French-speaking world were reclaiming *joie* at the same time can potentially offer some fascinating insights into the affective dynamics of La Belle Époque. Harrow and Unwin note, for example, that *joie de vivre* only came into use as a substantival phrase around this time (2009: 21). Since then, French translations of *Othello* for the stage have invariably employed the word *joie* when translating this scene.⁹ The transition toward a higher degree of lexical fidelity throughout the play was certainly not without its controversies; audiences of Jean Sarment's 1937 translation of *Othello* in Monte Carlo were "astonished and not a little shocked by such frank expression" (de Smet 1950: 102). After it premiered, Robert de Smet reports, "critics even averred that the translator must have added crudities and unpleasant phrases of his own" (ibid: 104). As we examine a pair of French-language

9. e.g., Jean Sarment's translation, staged in Monte Carlo, 1937; Georges Neveux's staging in Brussels, 1944.

imaginings of the play—one early screen version and one recent stage production—we shall see examples of *la joie française* in the reunion scene and its continued evolution since that time. These analyses will show how francophone directors and actors interpret the scene in ways that highlight some fascinating differences between this *émotion* and anglophone conceptions of “joy.”

*Les Othellos Français à l'Écran et sur Scène.*¹⁰

The first *Othello* to reach a broad francophone audience was a television film directed by Claude Barma, using a translation by Georges Neveux.¹¹ The production was broadcast on the evening of 23 January, 1962, at a time when France had only one channel—thus making a captive audience of anyone who elected to watch television that evening (Hatchuel and Vienne-Guerrin 2014: para. 1). From a contemporary perspective, the most striking aspect of this production is the obvious use of blackface makeup on Daniel Sorano, who played the title role. However, as Sarah Hatchuel and Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin are careful to point out, this decision had layers of complexity that might not be immediately obvious (*ibid.*: para. 18). Sorano's

10. I acknowledge that the analysis of a 1962 film version of the play is not entirely congruent with the rest of my thesis. My original intention was to visit the archive of the Comédie-Française in order to view the recording of their 2014 production of *Othello*, which they are unable to make available online. However, for the vast majority of the time of writing—right through to the end—travel between Britain and France has proven sufficiently prohibitive for such purposes. It remains my intention to analyse the C-F production when I ready this material for publication.

11. *Othello*, dir. by Claude Barma (Radio Télévision Française 1962) *Ina - madelen* <<https://madelen.ina.fr/programme/othello/player/cpf86628574/othello>> [Accessed 3 September, 2021].

father was from Algeria, and Sorano himself had received racial abuse since the time of his youth; thus, for him, the racialised story of *Othello* and its central character held a place of significance—particularly as Barma’s film was televised in the final months of the French war with Algeria (ibid.). As such, Hatchuel and Vienne-Guerrin argue, “Sorano’s make-up turning him into a dark-skinned Othello only makes visible the difference and segregation that the actor felt throughout his life” (ibid.: para. 19). The fact that the broadcast occurred in black-and-white likely factored in to this decision to point up the difference in skin tone between Sorano/Othello and the rest of the onscreen personnel.

Yet the casting of Sorano and his use of blackface were not the only circumstances that imparted a sense of “in-betweenness” or hybridity to Barma’s *Othello*. In fact, only brief scenes of the production were taped in advance; the majority of the show was shot and broadcast live from Paris, in a manner reminiscent of elements of both theatre and film (ibid.: para. 4). The historical moment in which this television event occurred placed it at something of a crossroads between old and more familiarly modern concepts of the world—politically, theatrically, and emotionally.

Barma’s staging of the reunion scene in Cyprus stands out as the only unambiguously positive moment in the film. The preceding exchange between Desdémone (Francine Bergé) and Iago (Jean Topart) is treated with an atmosphere of playfulness;

it lacks any of the sense of concern that often permeates the anticipation of the general's arrival. Othello/Sorano then enters, stepping swiftly down a grand staircase in the centre of the set, his arms extended exuberantly outward. As he approaches Bergé/Desdémone, he exclaims "*Ma belle guerrière! Joie de mon âme!*" {"My beautiful warrior! Joy of my soul!"}, and she in turn approaches him for a warm embrace. They face the camera with their cheeks pressed against one another, and the shot quickly zooms in for a close-up of the couple, framing their necks and heads in a strikingly heart-shaped outline. Othello/Sorano and Bergé/Desdémone exchange the remainder of their dialogue, and then the two share a kiss. After then turning to the rest of the people onstage to announce the fortuitous sinking of the Turkish ships, the general returns to Bergé/Desdémone to embrace her, once again cheek-to-cheek. Before the two exit the scene, he admits to her that his "*bonheur*" is causing him to "*parle comme un enfant*" {"speak like a child"}—a significant diversion from the original text that seems intended to give expression to the giddiness of the scene without resorting to the potentially sexually charged connotations of *joie*.

In fact, in contrast to both Shakespeare's text and the 1899 Aicard translation, the word *joie* is only spoken on one occasion in this version of the scene—"*joie de mon âme*." Thus, this *joie* is explicitly associated with the soul, rather than the body. And while there is certainly warmth and enthusiasam between the two actors/characters,

there is little suggestion of any erotic energy at this point. Later in the film, however, it is worth noting that there is a fairly clear indication of the sexual relationship between the married couple; when Sorano/Othello complains that he has a headache, Bergé/Desdémone's sultry response is that it is probably because he did not have any sleep the night before. Thus, in this production at least, the age-old question of whether the couple ever had a chance to consummate their marriage is answered in the affirmative.

Nevertheless, this production's abstemious use of the word *joie*—along with the fairly tame treatment of the physical chemistry of the lovers—conveys some degree of emotional hesitation. At least in performance terms, this television broadcast was likely the first exposure to *Othello* for many across the French-speaking world. As the undisputed cultural centre of France, Paris's creative society may well have been willing to accept works that pushed artistic boundaries, while the rest of the country needed more time to acclimate to such changes. It is possible that a production with such a wide reach was intended to follow more conservative theatrical trends. As such, the emotional vocabulary and expression to which this production resorted may actually serve as a window into a deeper dramaturgical past than its 1962 date suggests. That being said, the casting of an actor of Algerian descent at such a geopolitically fraught time situates the film squarely in its own

historic moment. Furthermore, it seems likely that the inclusion of some references to *joie* and to the interracial couple's sexual life—and even their relatively chaste onscreen kiss—might have raised more than a few eyebrows at the time. As Hatchuel and Vienne-Guerrin see it,

[w]hat comes out of this film is mainly its hybrid dimension. “Hybridity” is linked to the notion of “bastardy,” of blood mixing—the progeny from two different species. This film is hybrid in its status, between the televisual production, the filming of a stage performance and the theatre without an audience. ... In 1962, French television reflected upon itself, upon what it produced and the way it produced it (2014: para. 24).

From an emotional perspective, this “hybridity” is evident as well in that it both embraces and mitigates Othello's *joie*, allowing it to be spiritual and childlike, but not too lustful. Thus, in reflecting “upon itself” and its own historical context, Barma's film also serves as a mirror to both the classical past and a more progressive future—a future we shall turn to next.

...

In 2019, Aurore Fattier directed *Othello* for Théâtre de Liège, in a new French translation by Sébastien Monfè.¹² According to the promotional materials for this production, the team aimed to display “the violent desire that perverts itself in the desire for violence” in a multimedia production that was “carried by free jazz, video, and love songs.”¹³ Notably, the actors in this staging all wore body microphones,

12. *Othello*, dir. by Aurore Fattier (Théâtre de Liège 2019) Théâtre de Liège *Vimeo* archive <<https://vimeo.com/365238658>> [Accessed 23 June, 2021].

13. “Othello,” *Théâtre de Liège* <<https://theatredeliège.be/evenement/othello/>> [Accessed 23 June, 2021].

which helped their voices carry over the frequently employed music, and which also played a surprisingly important role in the scene we are about to examine.

The transition between the worlds of Venice and Cyprus occurred initially via a video feed with the actors being projected onto a screen at the back of the stage. Here, in what read as a room within a lookout tower, Desdemona (Pauline Discry) appeared to be regaining consciousness after her passage through the storm, as she was carried onto the video scene by Iago (Koen de Sutter). Although she was at first rather subdued, she grew suddenly more anxious, with a notable start, as she questioned the lookouts about her husband's location. Over the course of the scene, Discry/Desdemona gradually regained her strength—even smiling during her joking exchange with de Sutter/Iago. Enlivened by the news of the arrival of her husband, Discry/Desdemona quickly exited the video scene, and soon emerged from the wings onto the darkened stage. Accompanied by the sounds of billowing wind and rain, she carefully searched the far side of the set. Othello (William Nadyllam) then emerged from the other side of a column in order to sneak up and embrace her from behind. As he did so, she let out an audible gasp before he proceeded to spin her around. The two actors/characters looked at each other for a few brief moments, until Discry/Desdemona leapt up onto Nadyllam/Othello, wrapping her arms around his neck and hooking her legs around his waist. As he held her there, he quickly

proceeded to remove her coat, and she embraced him with her arms again. She then slid down to her feet once more and eagerly took off his coat as well, throwing it to the ground. Still alone on stage, the two then stood gazing at each other for another moment.

When Nadylam/Othello finally began to speak, "*Ma belle guerrière*," it was in a whisper that was made audible only by the body microphone. The whisper continued throughout the speech, as he expressed and named his *joie*. The resulting sense of intimacy this delivery created was enhanced by the fact that the actors/characters' faces were remarkably close to one another during the exchange. This appeared to have the added effect of augmenting the volume of Nadylam/Othello's whispers into Discry/Desdemona's microphone as well, but also of amplifying her quickened breaths in response to his words. While Nadylam/Othello did speak of "*trop de joie*" ("Too much of joy") in this translation, there was no translated mention of the original text's line "It stops me, here." Instead, this Othello's *joie* led him to give his Desdemona two deeply passionate kisses—which soon looked as though they might lead to the removal of further layers of clothing. Yet before this could happen, the couple's amorous encounter was suddenly interrupted by the shout of "*Mon général!*" from one of a pair of soldiers who entered from the other side of the stage,

leading Nadylam/Othello to pull away from the embrace in order to attend to his business.

As is probably clear, the emotional dynamic of this scene was markedly different from that of the 1962 Barma film—a contrast that is at least partially due to the nearly six decades that elapsed between the productions. Some aspects of Fattier’s version of the scene echoed the Hytner staging we discussed earlier in the chapter—in particular, the passionate chemistry between the actors/characters. In most respects, however—even considering the much smaller temporal gap between the two—the interpretations of the scene could not be more different. Lester’s Othello and Vinall’s Desdemona demonstrated a level of excitement that was almost child-like in the uncontained exuberance of their public display of affection. In Fattier’s staging, by contrast, the chemistry emerged from a more dynamic sense of play between the bodies, voices, and even breath of the actors/characters. Rather than simply being all over each other, Nadylam/Othello and Discry/Desdemona’s moments of physical connection were interspersed with moments of brief separation in which they could look at each other and take one another in—a kind of theatrically physical expression of the audible breathing the body microphones allowed us to hear throughout the sequence. The fact that the reunion took place in private (rather than in public, as was the case with all of the other productions this chapter has

examined) made the scene far more intimate. This privacy also added to the potential for the scene to become more plainly sexual than it can be when there are onlookers onstage. In addition to all of this, of course, were the powerful effects of Nadyam/Othello's whispered delivery of the speech. This created not only a deeper sense of intimacy than we tend to see between these two characters, but also a fascinating point of friction for the scene's emotional life. The combination of the effects of emotional excess and the attention required under the subtle conditions of the emotions' expression created a scintillating mixture of tension, exhilaration, and sensuality.

The undeniably libidinous energy of Fattier's staging of this instance of *joie* recalls Potkay's comments about the "sexier cast" that distinguishes the word from its English counterpart (2007: 5). Considering *joie's* long journey on the French tragic stage—from apparent impropriety to being at the heart of one of this scene's most erotically charged interpretations—it is certainly worth entertaining the possibility that Potkay's contention is correct. Looking at *joie* through this historical and conceptual lens provides us with a rich means of understanding—and, I would argue, of appreciating—Fattier and company's decision to take the scene in a far more intimate direction than audiences are accustomed to seeing it played.

...

As viewed through the lens of this one moment in *Othello*, the story of joy is both complex and fascinating. Although this emotion might seem as though it is one of the most straightforward feelings in the human emotional repertoire, it is clear that joy's conception and expression are heavily influenced by the historical, linguistic, geographical, and religious milieus in which it is experienced. "Just as friends find joy in the same things," observes McMahon, "communities and societies share and impart notions of when to 'rejoice as one should'" (2014: 110, qtg. Aristotle). As long as we live in a time when theatre artists around the globe frequently turn to Shakespeare as a means of capturing what is of greatest value in their respective societies, the varieties of joy that manifest on the Shakespearean stage may serve as useful windows into the notions of what is both emotionally important and emotionally appropriate in a given cultural moment. This is one significant reason why the rich, multicultural histories of joy—in literature, onstage, and in life—deserve far more scholarly attention in the years to come.

FOUR

FEAR AND GERMAN *ANGST* IN *HAMLET*

Many prominent theorists across history have considered fear to be one of the fundamental emotions in the human experience. In a historical overview of various influential thinkers' categorisations of the "primary passions," Rolf Soellner cites Plato, Cicero, Virgil, and Thomas Aquinas—among several others—who all itemise a small number of emotions that should be seen as the bases on which all other feelings are built (1958: 47–52; see also Dixon 2003: 18). The lengths of these lists vary, as do the specific emotions enumerated, with one notable exception: "fear" is invariably present. Intuitively, this makes sense. As Margaret Bourke notes in her book *Fear: A Cultural History*, this emotion has been "a powerful driving force in the history of humanity. Its spectre cannot be ignored" (2005: xii).

What English-speakers refer to as fear tends to correlate to an experience that is not only unmistakably visceral from a subjective perspective—it may also be the emotion that many people feel is easiest to identify in the behaviour of other animals (Casimer 2009: 59). This was as true in Shakespeare's England as it is today. Thomas Wright, for example, employs a frequently recurring set piece about how a sheep fears a wolf—and how that same wolf fears the shepherd and his dogs—in order to

illustrate the primary passions of the mind (1604: 23–24). Perhaps more than any other affective concept, fear is possibly the emotion with the greatest claim of universality amongst human beings. As such, especially for those who assert that Shakespeare’s greatness lies in his ability to appeal to such affective universality, recognising instances of fear in his drama is generally a fairly straightforward task. It motivates the actions of many of the characters in *Macbeth*—a play in which the word “fear” appears forty-eight times (Hobgood 2005: 41). It drives the “rude mechanicals” away from the “translated” Bottom in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*—in addition to being what the weaver surmises his companions are attempting to induce in him with their flight (“This is a knavery to make me afeared” [MND 3.1.100]). And of course, as this chapter will examine more closely, it is what dominates the encounters with the Ghost in *Hamlet*.

Nevertheless, we need only venture into German—one of the English language’s closest relatives (Diewald et al. 2013: 1)—to begin to see how oversimplified our assumptions about fear’s affective primacy really are. This chapter will begin with an examination of the history of this important emotion from a scientific perspective, with the aim of exploring whether there is a biological basis for these assumptions of universality. This overview will provide a context for understanding the Shakespearean varieties of “fear” as what Robert Applebaum calls a “polyse-

mantic" concept (2018: para. 4). It will also underscore the differences between how the emotion was portrayed in the playhouses of Shakespeare's lifetime and how it manifests in the theatres of today. The second half of the chapter will then compare the English-language concept of fear with the German-language notion of *Angst*. We shall see the profound influences that both Christian beliefs and contemporaneous scientific paradigms have exerted on the English language's semantic construction of fear in the early modern and contemporary eras, as well as on that of its German analogue. Along the way, we will explore a number of productions of *Hamlet* in both languages, with the specific consideration of how English fear and German *Angst* influence theatre-makers' portrayal of the Ghost. Just as importantly, this chapter will investigate how a deep appreciation of the subtle differences between these emotions in their cultural contexts can provide a valuable lens through which to appraise the other characters' response to the play's supernatural elements, as well as the audience's experience of the play as a whole.

What is Fear?

To begin, let us examine the empirical rationale behind the notion of fear as a potentially intrinsic human emotion (Daum et al. 2009). The historical idea of fear as a universal experience has made it a frequent target for brain scientists who wish to

identify the neural signatures of emotional experiences . Thus—duly noting Applebaum’s injunction against letting “the cognitive scientists dictate what to talk about when you talk about fear in Shakespeare” (2018: para. 37)—a brief look at the neurophysiological arguments about this emotion seems worthwhile if we aim to scrutinise the idea that fear is the basis upon which other, more complex emotions are built. After all, if fear is something that is hard-wired into the living brain and body, the cultural context of the feeling will ultimately prove far less salient than the physiological mechanisms that govern it.

In his 1872 book *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals*, Charles Darwin explored the phenomenon of fear primarily in terms of the body’s anatomical actions and reactions. “The eyes and the mouth are widely opened,” he insisted, “and the eyebrows raised. The frightened man stands like a statue motionless and breathless, or crouches down as if instinctively to escape observation” (2013: 306). An increased heart rate, general muscular stiffness, and an intense “contraction of the platysma myoides muscle” (which stretches from the cheek to beneath the collarbone) were other bodily responses that Darwin considered inseparable from the experience of fear (ibid.: 297). Fascinatingly, for our particular purposes, Darwin gives specific emphasis to fear’s ability to cause “erection of the hair” (ibid.: 312)—a

response that David Garrick famously manufactured in a mechanised wig when his own Hamlet first beheld his father's Ghost (Roach 1993: 58–59).

By the 1930s, scientific inquiry into the experience of fear began to centre itself more specifically on the anatomy of the brain. At this point, scientists thought they had discovered the source of fear after removing the amygdala—a small, almond-shaped bundle of nerves in the deepest part of the temporal lobe—from a rhesus monkey. The researchers observed that the monkey's behaviour changed dramatically after the surgery; specifically, it no longer sought to retract from aspects of the world (such as snakes, and other, unknown monkeys) that it had tended to avoid before the operation. According to Lisa Feldman Barrett, the team attributed the monkey's post-operational behavioural shift to "the absence of fear" (2017b: 17). In the decades that followed, studies showed that many humans with Urbach-Wiethe disease—which progressively deteriorates the amygdala—exhibited similar changes in behaviour to that of the monkey. Such studies, along with neuroimaging evidence of an increased amygdala response during reported instances of fear in the laboratory, led to the scientific community's widespread acceptance of the idea that the amygdala was directly responsible for the experience of fear (ibid.: 20). These scientific assessments are often based on the understanding of "basic emotions" (including fear) as the results of conscious or instinctive appraisal. "Typically,"

explains Giovanna Colombetti, “appraisal is the process that evaluates and understands the environment, and that ultimately brings about specific emotions (e.g., to appraise something as dangerous brings about fear” (2010: 150). For many decades, the function of the amygdala was understood to be the appraisal of danger, and fear was said to be the organism’s direct response to this appraisal.

However, as further fMRI studies have emerged, it has transpired that an increase of activity in the amygdala does not necessarily equate to a danger response. Barrett’s own meta-analysis of hundreds of studies reveals a similarly increased amygdala activation during instances of “anger, disgust, sadness, and happiness,” which she says indicates that “whatever functions the amygdala was performing in some instances of fear, it was also performing those functions during some instances of those other emotions” (2017b: 21). The key link for occasions of increased amygdala activity, argues Barrett, does not appear to be that the person is experiencing fear, or even appraising an element of the environment or a situation as dangerous; it appears that the common thread among these instances of amygdala activity is that the person is encountering something *unknown*. She notes, for example, the evidence of amygdala activation during experiences that many people would consider non-emotional, “such as when you feel pain, learn something new, meet new people, or make decisions” (ibid.: 22). Thus, the general role of the amygdala may have more to

do with novelty or unknowability than it does specifically with fear (Daum et al. 2009: 114). This sense of unknowability will become particularly salient later in this chapter, when we explore the affective contours of different stagings of *Hamlet*.

Furthermore, there are other studies that have indicated that even some Urbach-Wiethe patients whose amygdalae have fully disappeared seem nevertheless to experience and exhibit fear, which, Barrett argues, indicates that “other brain networks are compensating” for their missing amygdalae (2017b: 18). Taken together, this evidence suggests that fear, as such, is not hard-wired into any specific part of the human brain. And on the other side of the coin, it is also important to remember that there is no one “typical” fear response. Chantal Schütz reminds us that “different types of fear lead to very diverse physical effects, ranging from paralysis and the impossibility of all action, to accelerated heartbeats, being short of breath or panting, irrepressible shaking or a complete loss of control over bodily functions” (2018: para. 2). One reason that these very different symptoms often seem to suggest the same overarching affective idea is that, as Applebaum argues, “*the languages and concepts of fear are not systematically coherent*” (2018: para. 4). As an emotion concept and as an experience that is associated with certain behaviours (whether in life or onstage), Applebaum continues, the ways in which we speak about fear are “polysemantic” — that is, they “are not systematically coherent in our own time and they weren’t in

Shakespeare's time either" (ibid.; see also Engelen et al. 2009: 29). If these concepts lack coherence even within languages and historical eras, it seems reasonable to expect an even greater variability across temporal, geographic, and linguistic cultures. This kind of reasoning has led to a greater scientific acceptance of the idea that "[e]ven emotions such as joy or fear, which are attributed with universality, are shaped by culture" (Engelen et al. 2009: 28).

Yet while such differences warrant recognition, it remains important to interrogate our intuitive understanding of what these "polysemantic" concepts have in common. Even if it is true, as Bourke tells us, that "the body refuses to surrender unambiguous signs of the emotion" (2005: 7), what can the way we conceptualise fear linguistically tell us about the experience itself? Why does it seem reasonable, for example, to suppose that "fear" has more in common with "dread" or *Angst* than it has with "love" or "happiness"—increased amygdala activity notwithstanding? Or that the "fear" that paralyses is more or less the same emotion as the "fear" that induces flight? Lexical evidence indicates that speakers of all languages make corresponding connections. The authors of a wide-reaching study of colexification determined that there are no natural languages in which a concept analogous to "fear" shares a conceptual space with emotions that correspond to a positive feeling (Jackson et al 2019: 1518). Most frequently, international emotions that most resemble

“fear” generally correlate to concepts like “anxiety” (ibid.)—though words corresponding to “anxiety” itself tend to relate more closely to the concepts of both “grief” and “regret” in many Austroasiatic languages (ibid.: 1522). The most apparent explanation for the fact that both our own intuitive grasp of such feelings and the more rigorous linguistic meta-analysis agree on the subjective negativity of these concepts is likely that, while various notions of “fear” and its relatives are indeed “polysemantic,” they nevertheless share a significant area of semantic overlap.

...

To explain this overlap, Anna Wierzbicka analyses the English-language concepts of “feeling fear” and “being afraid” among a broader category of cognitive scenarios in which “[b]ad things can happen” (1999: 72). It is worth noting that, although English-speakers often think of these terms as having a precise equivalence, closer consideration of each concept’s components reveals a number of important differences. Consider Wierzbicka’s script for “fear”:

Fear (X felt fear)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “I don’t know what will happen
- (d) some bad things can happen
- (e) I don’t want these things to happen
- (f) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (g) I don’t know if I can do anything”
- (h) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (i) X felt something like this
- (j) because X thought something like this (1999: 75)

Note the generalised nature of the components: “some bad things can happen,” “I don’t want these things to happen,” and “I don’t know if I can do anything.” In Wierzbicka’s outline of the experience of fear, it is particularly notable that this emotion does not necessarily need to be caused by or about anything—or anyone—in particular. As we shall see in a moment, this serves as a salient point of contrast with the way we use the word “afraid.” “Of course,” Wierzbicka concedes, “*fear* can also be (and typically is) used in situations when something bad can happen to the experiencer, but this is not necessarily the case” (ibid.: 73). “Fear” also tends to maintain a primary focus on the unknowability of what is yet to happen, rather than what is currently occurring (see also Casimir 2009: 60). As mentioned earlier, it is precisely this sense of unknowability, uncertainty, or lack of familiarity that appears to elicit heightened activity in the amygdala. The component “I don’t know what will happen” is also present in Wierzbicka’s cognitive scenarios for other emotions in the “bad things can happen” category, such as *anxiety*, *nervousness*, and *apprehension* (ibid.: 83–86). Yet it is also notable that this component occurs in other emotions as well, such as *rage* (in the slightly altered form of “I don’t know what I will do”) and even *hope* (ibid.: 59, 92). Thus, it is worth considering the idea that amygdala engagement should not be associated with any specific emotion—which is problematic due

to the fact that emotion concepts in general are culture-specific—but rather, with the more truly universal semantic pattern “I don’t know what will happen.”

Let us now contrast the script for *fear* with the cognitive scenario for *afraid*:

Afraid (X was afraid)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks about something:
- (c) “something bad can happen to me because of this
- (d) I don’t want this to happen
- (e) I don’t know if I can do anything now”
- (f) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (g) X felt something like this
- (h) because X thought something like this (ibid.: 75)

By invoking the phrases “a person thinks *about something*,” “something bad can happen to *me* because of *this*,” “I don’t want *this* to happen,” and “I don’t know if I can do anything *now*,” it becomes clear that the idea of “being afraid” captures an experience that is inherently more specific, personal, and immediate than the concept of “feeling fear.” Rather than reflecting about the future (“I don’t know what will happen”), being “afraid” tends to focus on the present threat (“something bad can happen to me”) (ibid.: 74).

The differences amongst the components in these scenarios offer an important insight into potential behavioural divergences the two concepts might engender. “Fear,” Wierzbicka argues, “is more likely to mobilize one to action, in particular, to make one run away from a potentially dangerous situation (although it could also have a paralysing effect), whereas being *afraid* is more likely to stop one from doing

something" (ibid.). If I feel "fear" when encountering a dog, I will likely run away; if I am generally "afraid" of dogs, I will tend to avoid them as a matter of course. If I do encounter one, I may be just as likely to freeze as I am to flee. This is how Shakespeare employs the word "afraid," for example, when Sir Nathaniel is unable to perform his part of Alexander the Great in the final scene of *Love's Labours Lost*; Costard chastises him with the words "A conqueror, and afraid to speak?" (5.2.574).¹ This distinction will prove instructive as we examine these emotions in the embodied actions (or, indeed, inactions) of onstage performers.

King Hamlet's Ghost: What are we afraid of? (And what do we fear?)

Unsurprisingly, "fear" and its semantic relatives play conspicuous roles in the first scene of *Hamlet*, in which Bernardo, Marcellus, and Horatio encounter the Ghost of the late King of Denmark. The affective power of this scene has been the subject of interest and commendation since the earliest days of Shakespearean criticism. In the anonymous work *Some Remarks on the Tragedy of Hamlet Prince of Denmark* (1736)—which is believed to have been written by Sir Thomas Hanmer (Lee 2016: 22)—the author praises the opening of the play for its impact on audiences' feelings.

...the Beginning of all Dramatick Performances ... should be with the greatest Simplicity, that so our Passions maybe work'd upon by Degrees. This Rule is very happily observ'd in this Play; and it has this Advantage over many

1. "Affraid" appears in the First Folio; the 1598 Quarto has "afeard."

others, that it has Majesty and Simplicity joined together. For this whole preparatory Discourse to the Ghost's coming in, at the same Time that it is necessary towards laying open the Scheme of the Play, creates an Awe and Attention in the Spectators, such as very well fits them to receive the Appearance of a Messenger from the other World, with all the Terror and Seriousness necessary on the Occasion. ... And tho' most Men are well enough arm'd against all Belief of the Appearances of Ghosts, yet they are forced, during the Representation of this Piece, entirely to suspend their most fixed Opinions, and believe that they do actually see a Phantom, and that the whole Plot of the Play is justly and naturally founded upon the Appearance of this Spectre (1736: 89).

Invoking a number of experiential states—including “Awe,” “Attention,” “Terror,” and “Seriousness”—the author emphasises the efficacy with which Shakespeare’s crafting of the scene is able to play so powerfully on the passions of actors and audiences alike. Especially noteworthy is this early critic’s recognition of the fact that the scene’s particular admixture of sentiments—as Horatio says upon beholding the apparition, “it harrows me with fear and wonder” (1.1.47)—entails that the audience is “forced” to suspend their disbelief in paranormal activity. An investigation of the relationship between the feeling of fear and the role of the Ghost in this play will elucidate the dramaturgical import of this emotion in its manifold manifestations.

In recounting their supernatural encounter to the titular prince, Horatio relates the initial meeting Marcellus and Bernardo had with the Ghost:

A figure like your father,
 Armed at point exactly, cap-a-pe,
 Appears before them, and with solemn march
 Goes slow and stately by them: thrice he walk'd
 By their oppress'd and fear-surprised eyes,
 Within his truncheon's length; whilst they, distilled
 Almost to jelly with the act of fear,

Stand dumb and speak not to him (1.2.198–205).

Although he is technically describing a moment that occurred before the timeline of the play, Horatio's attention to the details of the bodily form this fear takes is potentially instructive to the actors of the opening scene. And while the characters' response to seeing the apparition for a third time might be expected to differ when compared to the first or the second, Horatio's colourful words go a long way toward evoking the visceral impact of the event.

Yet, although it may seem obvious, it is worth asking: what, precisely, do they fear, and/or what are they afraid of? As Christy Desmet notes,

[w]e are not privy to the exact source of the soldiers' fear. Hints come throughout the play; the ghost may be a damned spirit, may drive men to suicide by luring them over a cliff, or simply brings with him the contagious, terrifying aura of the afterlife. The latter explanation seems most probable, at least according [to] the ghost's own interpretation, who predicts that the tale to Hamlet of his purgatorial sufferings, famously

Would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood,
 Make thy two eyes, like stars, start from their spheres,
 Thy knotted and combined locks to part,
 And each particular hair to stand on end,
 Like quills upon the fearful porpentine (Desmet 2018: para. 7).

Desmet's point about the relative obscurity of the specific source of the sentinels' sentiment is a fantastically insightful one. If, per Wierzbicka, fear correlates to the thoughts "some bad things can happen" and "I don't want these things to happen," the question Desmet puts forth is effectively this: what exactly are the bad things that the Ghost provokes Marcellus and Bernardo into wanting to avoid? Is the ghost itself

the bad thing? Do they believe it poses a physical threat to them? Do they think it will lead them to madness? This last option would certainly seem to be supported by Horatio's text—at least with regard to his fears for what might happen to Prince Hamlet if he were to pursue the apparition:

What if it tempt you toward the flood, my lord,
Or to the dreadful summit of the cliff
That beetles o'er his base into the sea,
And there assume some other horrible form
Which might deprive your sovereignty of reason? (1.4.69–73)

Since the text offers no indication that Horatio or the sentinels have any intention of following the Ghost themselves, we cannot reasonably conclude that this is the main personal concern of Bernardo and Marcellus. Later in the play, however, the possibility that the Ghost might actually be an evil spirit that intends to create deliberate psychological misdirection does indeed become an especial apprehension for Prince Hamlet:

The spirit I have seen
May be a devil, and the devil hath power
T'assume a pleasing shape. Yea, and perhaps
Out of my weakness and my melancholy,
As he is very potent with such spirits,
Abuses me to damn me! (2.2.533–38)

There is, of course, a fairly straightforward logic to the tendency to associate the visions of revenants with the possibility that one is not quite of sound mind. In a play famously full of questions about sanity and madness, it is unsurprising that this link should be evoked as often as it is—from when Marcellus tells Bernardo, “Horatio

says tis but our fantasy" (1.1.22), to the Queen's response to her son after the appearance of the Ghost in the "closet scene": "This is the very coinage of your brain. / This bodiless creation ecstasy / Is very cunning in" (3.4.135–37). Indeed, we shall examine some fascinating theatrical explorations of the concerns around madness in our performance analyses later in this chapter.

Yet what is notable about Hamlet's particular concerns in the above soliloquy is not that he expresses fear about being made to lose his mind as such. Rather, it is the explicit reference to the ultimate consequences of being misled that is the object of his fear: that of damnation. The spirit he has seen has, after all, enjoined him to commit premeditated murder (Greenblatt 2001: 220). The spiritual stakes of certainty on this point could hardly be greater, but the presence of the Ghost only serves to intensify, in soteriological terms, the uncertainty of the fear-script thoughts "I don't know what will happen" and "I don't know if I can do anything." In the play's original theatrical context, this uncertainty would have been compounded by early modern England's omnipresent religious ambivalence; as many critics have noted, "for a Catholic the Ghost might be the spirit of Old Hamlet returned; while for a Protestant it would have to be an agent of the Devil" (Lee 2016: 39). The fact that this play's characters vacillate between these considerations indicates that the Ghost may

well have provoked fears of both varieties for audiences at the Globe in the year 1600 (Lake 2020: 90).

As for potential physical dangers, Catherine Belsey notes that in the Renaissance imagination, “the walking dead traditionally carried infection” (2019: 66). This belief prompts Belsey to consider the idea that “the hellish ‘contagion’ Hamlet associates with yawning graveyards is more than metaphorical” and that this is what may prime him to refer to Denmark’s air as “a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours” (ibid.: 67). Carla Mazzio concurs: considering the play’s rather remarkable preoccupation with the corrupt potential of the element of air, she argues, King Hamlet’s Ghost “seems a striking embodiment of environmental blastments and the coming of plague” (2009: 178). Such effects, however, seem more likely to engender something closer to “disgust” or “revulsion” than the “fear and wonder” of which Horatio speaks (cf. Wierzbicka 1993: 127). From what specifically, then, does this fear emerge?

The complications of this question underscore a number of important cultural and dramaturgical considerations. Ghosts figure even more frequently than bed-tricks in Shakespeare’s drama, which explains a certain degree of the theatrical desensitisation we have toward them. Yet while we are cerebrally capable of equating the presence of a ghost with the experience of fear, Shakespeare’s contemporaries

would likely have conceived of the very existence of the Ghost as an immediate, visceral manifestation of the “bad things” that can happen to an impious soul in the afterlife. This thought seems to be the chief ground upon which the era’s paranormal fears are based. In traditional tales of supernatural activity, Belsey elegantly notes, “[t]he Dead admonish the Living, ‘As we are, so you shall be’” (2019: 62).

This spirit, however, says far more than that. In fact, one of the notable things about this particular ghost, when compared to those that are depicted in Shakespeare’s other plays, is the fact that he has so much to say. Strikingly, the first portion of the Ghost’s speech relates to the intensity and purpose of his current affliction:

My hour is almost come
 When I to sulphurous and tormenting flames
 Must render up myself.
 ...
 I am thy father’s spirit,
 Doomed for a certain time to walk the night
 And for the day confined to fast in fires
 Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature
 Are burnt and purged away. But that I am forbid
 To tell the secrets of my prison-house
 I could a tale unfold whose lightest word
 Would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood,
 Make thy two eyes like stars start from their spheres,
 Thy knotted and combined locks to part
 And each particular hair to stand on end
 Like quills upon the fearful porpentine ... (1.5.2–20)

Thus, while it might not seem altogether obvious that the mere appearance of the Ghost would immediately conjure up the thought of Purgatory in the world of the

play, the first twenty lines the author provides for the character make the association abundantly explicit. And though King Hamlet's spirit is "forbid" from divulging the secrets of his prison of purging, his vague allusions to the effects these secrets would have on the living certainly evoke—in terms Darwin himself would have recognised—the "fearful" experience that the concept of Purgatory was essentially intended to engender. In the twenty-first century, many of us are disinclined to buy into the experience of the fear of Purgatory; however, for many people in Renaissance England, the possibility of such a fate was a cause of genuine concern. "In visual as well as verbal representations," Belsey notes, "Purgatory looks a lot like hell, softened only by the promise of eventual rescue, and afflicts its inhabitants with severe pain" (2018: para. 8). According to Thomas Aquinas—in anticipation of the Ghost's remarks about the extreme reaction the "lightest word" about his "prison-house" would effect—Purgatory was a place where the slightest degree of pain "surpasses the greatest pain that one can endure in this world" (qtd. in Greenblatt 2001: 21).

Stephen Greenblatt argues that the concept of this harrowing midpoint between Heaven and Hell "is the invention of the terrorised imagination. Frightened humans create fables with marvellous poetic sublimity, sublimity so great that they believe in their own creations" (2001: 48). Religious authorities employed a kind of

emotional manipulation for centuries in order to maintain a few “general goals,” Greenblatt tells us: “to undermine psychological security, to prevent any serene contemplation of one’s own death or that of one’s loved ones, to make the stomach churn and the hair stand on end, to provoke fear” (ibid: 70). For the most part, of course, the notion of Purgatory was doctrinally central to Roman Catholicism, and was therefore deemed anathema to Protestant orthodoxy during Shakespeare’s day. Article twenty-two of *The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England*, finalised in 1571, states that

[t]he Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory, Pardons, Worshipping, and Adoration, as well of Images as of Reliques, and also invocation of Saints, is a fond thing, vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the word of God (1897: 537).

John Corrigan speaks directly to this shift in imagery and its emotional significance, arguing that Protestants deliberately eschewed the “depictions of agonized bodies in the image of the crucifixion or in the torture of martyrs, which aroused the emotions of fear and terror among late medieval Christians” (2014: 147). Yet central to Greenblatt’s thesis is the idea that, while Protestant polemicists of the era decried Purgatory as “a vast piece of poetry,” they understood that its power over the imaginations of the general population was too considerable to ignore.

They grasped clearly that the imagination was not exclusively the inspired work of a tiny number of renowned poets, though it included that work; it was, they thought, a quality diffused, for good or ill, throughout a very large mass of makers. They saw that it took a sustained collective effort to make

Purgatory central to the institutional, material, and spiritual practices of everyday life (2001: 50).

This imagination, as a spiritual–institutional entity, became the fertile field in which the Purgatorial idea could both sow and reap a variety of fear that held immense sway over the hearts of Christians long after they had nominally abandoned the notion of Church-sanctioned Purgatory *per se*. “The brilliance of the doctrine of Purgatory,” Greenblatt goes on to contend, “—whatever its topographical implausibility, its scriptural belatedness, and its proneness to cynical abuse—lay both in its institutional control over ineradicable folk beliefs and in its engagement with intimate, private feelings” (ibid: 102). Thus, while early English Protestants were officially banned from believing in Purgatory, the cultural imagination’s persistent struggle with such a terrifying prospect entailed the deliberate engagement with fear as what Monique Scheer would recognise as an emotional practice: “fear,” Greenblatt tells us, “was a gift to be assiduously cultivated” (ibid: 71). Alec Ryrie concurs:

It was a mainstay of conscience-literature, a genre whose argument can be summed up as follows: if you fear that you are not saved, that suggests that you are, whereas if you are blithely secure about your salvation then you are probably in trouble. The fearful should take comfort, and the confident should be afraid (2013: 92).

Thus, it would not be such a stretch to imagine that many of Shakespeare’s contemporaries would have spent significant time and attention essentially rehearsing the very feeling of fear that the Ghost’s appearance so vividly ignites for the characters in

Hamlet. Jane Owen, a recusant Catholic writing at the beginning of the seventeenth century, made an explicit case for the cultivation of fear in her posthumously-published treatise *An Antidote Against Purgatory*. “Among all the Passions of the mind,” she wrote, “there is not any, which hath so great a sovereignty, and command over man, as the Passion of Feare” (1634: A1r–v). Such deliberate emotional cultivation, for the sake of safeguarding one’s own immortal soul against a probable term of painful purgation “for a certain time” that is ultimately unquantifiable, shares a kind of self-consciousness with Hamlet’s determination to be vigilant about the possibility that his own wits are being deceived (cf. Lake 2020: 89–90). In other words, since the ambivalence about the trustworthiness of the senses in this life echoes the ultimate *unknowability* of the fate of one’s own soul in the hereafter, fear emerges as both an inevitable consequence and a precautionary necessity. The Ghost’s appearance may evoke fear, then, because it is a manifestation of these doubts on both the sensorial and the spiritual levels. “Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all,” Hamlet famously tells us (3.1.82); it is the ongoing awareness of the unknowability of it all that leads us to fear anything that makes this unknowability even more obvious.

Fear and the Enactive Imagination in the Playhouse.

The cultivation of fear as an emotional practice may well have made for a particularly evocative experience even for the actors and audiences for whom the play was written. “Just as Augustine found the joy and vexation provoked by a spiritual substance upon the mind to be real,” argues Michael D. Barbezat, “so too are the emotional effects of theatre upon its audience” (2019: 52). And Thomas Fienus made a similar claim during Shakespeare’s lifetime: “Since the imagination produces change by means of the emotions [Latin: *motus* = motion/movement] and the emotions produce change by means of the natural movement of the heart and by means of the movement of the humors and spirits, the imagination does also” (qtd. in Brown 1985: 48). In other words, from an affective standpoint, both spiritual practices and theatrical practices blur the lines between the imaginary and the real. In this theatrical instance—with this particular, religion-infused emotion—it appears as though the two types of practice formed something of a symbiotic relationship.

In a discussion about the potency of ostensibly “fictional” emotions, the philosopher José Medina argues that “the enactive imagination is a key component in our cognitive, affective, and moral learning” (2013: 333). This seems to have been at least as true four hundred years ago as it is today. An understanding of the powerful relationship between affect and imagination (whether religious or

theatrical) may, in fact, carry even more intense implications about fear in the Shakespearean theatre. Allison Hobgood has argued that early English drama “flaunted the possibility that emotions like fear could overrun [their] borders and seep out, sometimes even lethally, into the world beyond the stage” (2014: 37). In a fascinating way, this brings us back to the idea of contagion—albeit in an affective context, rather than the supernatural context we visited earlier. As Antony remarks in *Julius Caesar*, “Passion, I see, is catching” (3.1.285). Hobgood notes that early modern medical discourse relating to the passions trafficked heavily in the idea that not only was the experience of fear contagious—it could also lead to bodily disease (2014: 38). “[C]onversations about disease and emotion,” she notes, “shared certain tropes and vocabularies that, in their mutuality, distorted boundaries between affectivity and ailment, passion and disorder” (ibid.: 39). This characterisation evokes the ideas of Jacobean court physician Helkiah Crooke, for example, whose *Microcographia* described the body as “Transpirable and Trans-fluxible, that is, so open to the ayre as that it may passe and repasse through them” (1615: 175). According to Crooke and other Renaissance thinkers such as Wright, passions were considered “bodily states—psychophysiological responses to perceived changes in the environment” (Paster 2004: 154). As such, while we may habitually place emotional disturbances and physiological pathologies in different categories, such a categorical

separation may not even have occurred to many Elizabethan and Jacobean playgoers as a possibility.

This is, in effect, the thrust of Hobgood's argument. The minds of many Renaissance English people formulated the passions in general, and fear in particular, as dangerous and highly infectious phenomena—and, what's more, audiences attended the theatre knowing fully what they were potentially exposing themselves to. Moreover, the idea that fear was "in the air" may have been magnified by the fact that these plays were originally staged at a time when the air itself, as Mazziro puts it, "was a powerful object of fascination and terror for the diverse inhabitants of England" (2009: 169). Hobgood strikingly posits that

even the possibility of the translation of contagious fear into disease or death significantly alters the stakes of theatregoing such that ... playgoers risked more than their time, money, or pleasure. Early modern theatregoers instead ... literally hazarded their well-beings in the face of terrifying entertainments (2014: 57–58).

Hobgood's account hinges largely (although not entirely) on the conceptualisation of the passions in a humoral fashion, which, as we have already seen, was not necessarily a universal paradigm at the time these plays were written. Nevertheless, the material understanding of the passions was prevalent enough that we cannot dismiss the possibility that Hobgood's proposal held true for a significant number of attendees of a given performance of *Hamlet*. As such, the "affective exchange" entailed what Hobgood terms "corporeal generosity on the part of playgoers: in the

sheer act of attending the play and being present to its purposes, theatregoers might have hazarded their health for the sake of performance” (2014: 61). Casting the affective commitment of Shakespeare’s original spectators in such an active role resonates elegantly with Medina’s enactive explication of the general mechanism that renders this exchange possible. “Imagining,” he insists, “is not something that happens to us, as if we were mere passive spectators of the theater of the imagination. Rather, it is *something that we do*, something that requires *active participation*, a form of action and interaction” (2013: 319). Medina’s use of theatrical metaphor here—which, as we have seen, is fairly typical within the emotion studies discourse—is striking in that it provides a vivid cognitive analogy of the playhouse relationship Hobgood describes.

How might such an understanding of the actor-audience affective exchange cast our conception of fear in the early stagings of *Hamlet* in a new light? From a dramaturgical perspective, it helps us discern the stakes. It is certainly no mistake that the Ghost and the fear it generates arrive so very early on in the story of the play. In contrast to the appearances of the ghosts in *Richard III*, *Julius Caesar*, or *Macbeth*, the entirety of *Hamlet*’s tale is haunted by the apparition, from beginning to end. The fear that is felt by characters and audiences alike is surely intended to inform the affective lens through which we view the action of the rest of the play.

Keeping this idea in mind will help us to understand the role fear plays in the emotional palate of the productions we examine—as well as how the variant affective concept of *Angst* informs these productions' German counterparts. Yet because the fear response appears to have such a strong correlation with the dominant concerns within a given culture at a given time, might it actually be possible to learn more about the particular preoccupations of a society by investigating this emotion's onstage representation? The two English-language productions we shall now examine provide some fascinating responses to this question.

"All that is I see?": Hytner's *Hamlet*

In 2010, Nicholas Hytner mounted a modern-dress production of *Hamlet* for the National Theatre in London.² Hytner's staging, which starred Rory Kinnear in the title role, invoked and evoked a distinctly twenty-first-century emotional experience that Bourke discusses in the introduction to her book about modern fear—a fear marked most conspicuously by the “proliferation of surveillance systems” (2005: x). In this imagining of the play, as Jonathan Croall notes, Elsinore “was awash with CCTV cameras and dark-suited, armed security guards sporting earpieces, with microphones concealed by their cuffs” (2018: 108). The play-world was also rife with

2. *Hamlet*, dir. by Nicholas Hytner (National Theatre, 2010) *Drama Online Library* [Accessed 28 December, 2020].

instances of characters confronting one another with surveillance photos (as David Calder/Polonius did with Ruth Negga/Ophelia in Act 1, scene 3). Though the staging was modern, Hytner has said that he elected to underscore the surveillance motif in his production because of his belief that, in his words,

Hamlet was certainly conceived as a contemporary state-of-the-nation play about Elizabethan England: a surveillance state, a totalitarian monarchy with a highly developed spy network. That's how Elizabeth exerted power. Shakespeare's audience knew exactly what the play was talking about (qtd. in Croall 2018: 109).

As such, Hytner and company managed to create a remarkable emotional link between two time periods by highlighting a set of similar concerns shared by both contemporary London theatre-goers and their early modern forebears: namely, the unknowability of whom to trust, in both the political and the private spheres.

Yet while the lens of the “surveillance state” was arguably this production’s most memorable innovation, the supernatural elements of the story nonetheless played a powerful role too. In fact, the fearful manner in which various characters wielded their power, attempting to shed the insecure light of scrutiny onto every corner of their kingdom, may well have symbolised a reaction against the unsettling degree of uncertainty that lurked in the spirit realm—as well as in the unseen realms of each others’ minds. This tension found a subtle yet telling meta-theatrical expression at the end of act 2, scene 2. After the players exited the scene, Kinnear/Hamlet was left alone for his “O what a rogue and peasant slave am I” soliloquy (2.2.485)—

yet remaining with him on the stage was the players' theatrical lighting control board. As he opened his own mind to the audience, divulging his plan to stage the re-written version of *The Murder of Gonzago* in order to "catch the conscience of the king," he slowly began to increase the illumination of one of the players' onstage lighting instruments. Yet, ironically, this boost in illuminance in the affected area ultimately made other parts of the stage look slightly darker. So it was in Hytner's *Elsinore*: the more the characters attempted to suppress their concerns about the unknown via various means of surveillance, the more imposing the darkness became.

Hytner's opening scene saw the watchmen—Francisco, Marcellus, and Bernardo (respectively, Matthew Barker, Marcus Peavoy, and Michael Cunningham)—armed and in military uniform. In the lead-up to his exit, Barker/Francisco displayed a relaxed disposition compared to his onstage partners—an understandable state considering the text provides no evidence that Francisco knows anything about the apparition that the others claim to have seen. Giles Terera/Horatio also conveyed a mood of relaxation upon his entrance to the scene in civilian clothing—though his sense of ease ostensibly manifested more from skepticism than ignorance. There was, in contrast, a noticeable air of apprehension in Peavoy/Marcellus and Cunningham/Bernardo, whose relatively rigid bodies seemed ready to either freeze

entirely or explode into action at any moment. When King Hamlet's Ghost (James Laurensen) appeared briefly for the first time, in pale makeup and a faded military uniform, all three of the men did, in fact, appear frozen with "fear and wonder." After Laurensen/the Ghost's first exit, Terera/Horatio's erstwhile sense of projected skepticism had disappeared; he now struggled at times to find his breath as he searched for meaning in the apparition's presence. Upon Laurensen/the Ghost's second entrance, the three men scattered quickly away from centre stage in a collective shout. Thereafter, Terera/Horatio took a bit of time to begin speaking, seemingly in order to muster up the courage to address the spectre directly, but appeared to become more desperate and frustrated by the silence with which he was met each time he shouted the word "speak." After Laurensen/the Ghost exited the scene without answering, the men who remained onstage again drew nearer to one another—an apparent manifestation of their collective resolve to pull themselves together in order to relate what they had seen to the prince.

In act 1, scene 2, Hytner and company found a clever way to weave the emotion of the first scene into the sentinels' reappearance onstage. Upon his entrance to the scene, Cunningham/Bernardo caught sight of a large portrait of Laurensen/King Hamlet that was displayed behind the Danish thrones. He was noticeably distracted by it, transfixed with fear, and required Kinnear/Hamlet's sharply

delivered “Good even, sir” (1.2.166) to snap his attention back to the scene. Similarly, at the beginning of act 1, scene 4, the cast found another conspicuous moment to convey the supernatural fear they were holding: a blast of offstage horns indicating the start of the royal “wassail” (1.4.10) made all four men onstage start with fright, before briefly recovering with nervous laughter upon realising that the sound they had been afraid of did not indicate anything paranormal. These two brief instances—not dictated by the text but rather interpreted by the company—conveyed that the theatrical team behind this production intended to give a sense of centrality to the emotions associated with the disturbing activity of the play’s beginning.

Moments later, when Kinnear/Hamlet laid his own eyes on Laurensen/the Ghost, he fell to his knees at once, evoking the notion of turning “almost to jelly with the act of fear” (1.2.205). Yet throughout his “Angels and ministers of grace defend us” speech (1.4.20–38), Kinnear/Hamlet mustered up the courage to stand again, to follow the figure, and even to fight off his companions when they attempted to restrain him, eventually running offstage in pursuit of Laurensen/the Ghost. When he came back onstage at the top of act 1, scene 5, however, he suddenly began to run away from the apparition, as though the bravery he had managed to conjure up in the previous scene had been exhausted. This made for a fascinating affective tension, as these initial moments of fear of Laurensen/the Ghost gave way to a journey

through curiosity, pity, and anger as the scene played out, and the fratricidal plot was revealed. Kinnear/Hamlet's emotional transformation throughout the scene set up a dynamic with his other three stage partners when they returned, themselves still fairly harrowed "with fear and wonder"—now not only for the supernatural sighting itself, but also for its effects on the prince's affective state. Each time Kinnear/Hamlet asked the men for their oath of secrecy about what they had seen, seemingly driven more and more into a kind of delirium, the disembodied voice that enjoined them to "swear" caused the men to scatter in fright. All of these moments crystallised the emotional story that Hytner and company wished to tell: the actor/characters were not going to be inured to the presence of a ghost. If anything, the more they learned, the more intense their feelings about it seemed to become.

When Laurensen/the Ghost returned to the stage in act 3, scene 4 (the "closet scene"), Kinnear/Hamlet's fear emerged in a manner suggesting something like emotional exhaustion. As he pleaded "Save me and hover o'er me with your wings / You heavenly guards!" he sank to his knees again, recalling the initial encounter. This time, at least at first, he did not face Laurensen/the Ghost, but rather looked directly downstage toward the audience, his head cast downward toward those seated just before and below him. Meanwhile, Clare Higgins/Gertrude appeared arrested with horror at the sight of his actions, as though she now fully believed and understood

the import of the next words she cried: "Alas, he's mad!" (3.4.96). For Kinnear/Hamlet, fear seemed to give way to shame as he spoke the words "Do you not come your tardy son to chide / That, lapsed in time and passion, lets go by / Th'important acting of your dread command?" (97–99). Though he himself seemed unable to look toward Laurensen/the Ghost, he was ultimately successful in convincing Higgins/Gertrude to do so—and, remarkably, it became clear that she could indeed see what was there. Her jaw dropped open, she gasped quietly, and she began to walk in small, slow, fearful steps in the apparition's direction. Yet it soon also transpired that she was in denial of the sight she beheld when she asked Kinnear/Hamlet, "To whom do you speak this?" Upon his incredulous "Do you see nothing there?", she replied, with a strong sense of determination, "Nothing at all..." Yet this immediately cracked to a far more equivocal and incredulous "...yet all that is I see" (122–23). The scene continued with a sense of ambivalence about whether he believed her protestations—the upshot of which was an even greater degree of ambiguity about the actors/characters' understanding of each others' knowledge and feelings about one another.

Croall learned in his interviews with Hytner that the team decided to stage the scene this way, with Higgins/Gertrude seeing—but pretending not to see—Laurensen/the Ghost, "because of her guilt in knowing of Claudius's murder of her

husband, if not having been complicit in it” (2018: 109). This serves as yet another example of this production’s treatment of fear as an epistemological phenomenon that resided at the junction of what the actors/characters did and did not—or, indeed, could not—know about the afterlife, and about each other. There is obviously wisdom in the truism that we tend to fear that which we do not understand. Yet perhaps more significantly, Hytner’s staging of the play foregrounded the consequences of focusing on perceived external threats without acknowledging the sea of troubles within. Shining an insecure light outward further blackens the inward darkness, transforming fear into something closer to paranoia. Considering the political climate in which this production was mounted—as the Brexit debate was gathering steam and the threat of terrorism dominated much of the cultural discourse—the emotional tenor of this *Hamlet* is not at all surprising. Recalling Hytner’s earlier words about the original political context of Shakespeare’s tragedy, his own rendition was as much a “state-of-the-nation play” in 2010 as the Chamberlain’s Men’s staging was at the turn of the seventeenth century.

“Fear and Wonder”: Godwin’s *Hamlet*.

Simon Godwin’s 2016 modern-dress *Hamlet* for the RSC reimagined Denmark as a West African military state.³ The choice of setting emerged from the fact that the lead actor, Paapa Essiedu, was of Ghanaian heritage; this served as a starting point for the production’s overall concept (Croall 2018: 125–26). Act 1, scene 1 had Marcellus (Patrick Elue) and Bernardo (Kevin N. Golding) in military fatigues, seemingly subtly nervous, and carrying large rifles for their watch. They were soon joined onstage by Horatio (James Cooney) in civilian dress. In this first scene, the figure of the Ghost did not appear for the spectators to see, but rather announced its presence in a bright flash and beam of white light from an angle above the audience. After initially averting their gazes from this apparently blinding glare, all three men on stage began to stare with widened eyes at the source of the light as they slowly walked backward with stiffened frames. At first, Cooney/Horatio shielded himself slightly behind the two sentinels, and upon pronouncing “It harrows me with fear and wonder,” indeed conveyed an equal measure of both apprehension and admiration for this supernatural sight. Elue/Marcellus tempered the expression of his fear with something like reverence as well—particularly after having trained rifles in the

3. *Hamlet*, dir. by Simon Godwin (Royal Shakespeare Company, 2016) *Drama Online Library* [Accessed 7 December, 2020].

direction of the apparition during its return to the stage, when he uttered, "We do it wrong being so majestic / To offer it a show of violence" (1.1.142–43).

This sense of fear-dappled wonder continued in act 1, scene 4, when Essiedu/Hamlet saw the spirit for the first time, though the audience still did not. When the men were caught off guard once again by the light from above, the actors/sentinels and Essiedu/Hamlet fell to their knees in different ways. The actors/sentinels each took one knee to the floor and again aimed their rifles toward the light source, while Essiedu/Hamlet sank to both knees in a position that evoked a sense not only of alarm, but also of veneration. The directorial decision to keep the Ghost invisible to the audience's view for these initial appearances certainly seemed to have allowed the actors to express a more complex concoction of emotional responses than simply being afraid, or feeling fear. In fact, the production and design concept as a whole bolstered this potential for affective nuance regarding the actors/characters' relationships to the Ghost and the notion of death itself. This dynamic became particularly evident in the following scene (act 1, scene 5), when two figures in red coats made their way energetically onto the stage, beating large drums in an uptempo manner and intoning chants with the apparent intention of manifesting the spirit for the audience's eyes to behold at last. As Essiedu/Hamlet re-entered with what read as frantic determination, a shaft of light extended to the centre of the thrust stage's

floor, where a platform began to ascend from a trap door. Contained within the theatrical lift, enwrapped in a cloud of mist, was the silhouette of King Hamlet's Ghost (played by Ewart James Walters). As the mist began to clear, and as he began to emerge from his container, Walters/the Ghost's colourful, Ghanaian-print robes became more evident—a stark contrast to the drab dress or cold armour in which the character often appears onstage. Here again, Essiedu/Hamlet's response to the sight of this figure was tinged more with awe and amazement than outright fear.

Throughout this scene—and, in fact, throughout the production as a whole—the music (by Sola Akingbola) and the set design (by Paul Willis) created a more lively affective tone than we often find in *Hamlet*. The sound- and colour-scapes of this show created a vibrant alternative to the typically European Christian motifs that generally inspire the play's relationship with death and its imagery. There were certainly plenty of Christian references in this staging, such as the cross with which Claudius (Clarence Smith) attempted to pray in act 3, scene 3, as well as the one that hung above the grave of Ophelia (Mimi Ndiweni) in act 5, scene 1. Nor did this *Hamlet* shy away from the skull imagery with which the play is so heavily associated. Yet these memento mori—some of which were even painted on Essiedu/Hamlet's costume when he appeared in his “antic disposition” in act 2, scene 2—were far more

reminiscent of Jean-Michel Basquiat's polychromatic expressivity than Frans Hals's baroque earnestness. As Godwin himself has said of his preparatory visit to Ghana:

I had a very striking encounter with a country that is still extremely Christian. ... It also has a very rich relationship with the supernatural. So the notion of ghosts is present and welcome. The traditions of West Africa, which are to do with forms of story-telling, music and movement, began to create a much more coherent world for the play than I could find in my own country (qtd. in Croall 2018: 126).

The lens of these traditions coloured many of the actors/characters' responses to both the play's supernatural elements and to other moments where Death made its presence known. For example, in the encounter that followed Walters/the Ghost's exit in act 1, scene 5, the line "O day and night, but this is wondrous strange" (1.5.163) emerged from Cooney/Horatio's mouth almost as an expression of pure delight. And Hamlet's famous response "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your philosophy" (165–66) was delivered by Essiedu with a corresponding degree of enthusiasm. In addition to the overall aesthetic of the production, these acting instances (among several others) exhibited the affective landscape Godwin and company created for this show: one in which fear was not necessarily the characters' and audiences' chief response to death and the afterlife. Indeed, the team created a world in which there was room for wonder and awe as well.

None of this is to say, however, that the deaths in this production were handled with anything like a sense of glibness. The news of Ndiweni/Ophelia's death was met with solemnity and indignation by both Laertes (Buom Tihngang) and Essiedu/Hamlet. Perhaps even more memorable was the heart-rending howl that erupted from Cooney/Horatio after the titular prince went still in his arms in the play's final scene. Nor am I implying that fear factored little into this rendition of the tragedy. The fear the actors/characters displayed, however, was most often either *for* or *of* the title character himself. For example, in act 1, scene 4, the "fear and wonder" that the men onstage conveyed gave way to plain fear when Essiedu/Hamlet began to act on his intention to follow the figure of the revenant. This was the moment when their passion began to reach a frenzied peak. "Do not, my lord!" shouted Cooney/Horatio (1.4.64), as the two others assisted him in wrestling Essiedu/Hamlet to the ground in an attempt to block his pursuit. Finishing the verse line, Essiedu/Hamlet's response of "Why, what should be the fear?" took on a new layer of meaning: he seemed as though he genuinely did not understand why his companions should suddenly boil so fully over into an emotion that he still felt was disproportionate to the circumstances. Cooney/Horatio's impassioned response, that the figure "might deprive your sovereignty of reason / And drive you into madness"

(1.4.69–70) made it plain that their fervent fear was primarily for the mental health of their prince.

At other points during the play, Ndiweni/Ophelia and Smith/Claudius each conveyed their own fears of the implications of the central character's erratic behaviour. Yet this concern manifested perhaps most powerfully during the final appearance of Walters/the Ghost, during act 3, scene 4. When Walters/the Ghost emerged in an upstage corner, with Essiedu/Hamlet in the opposite, downstage corner, Gertrude (Lorna Brown) was centre stage, seated on the bed. As Walters/the Ghost began to speak, Brown/Gertrude turned her head, widened her eyes, and let out an audible gasp, indicating that she could indeed see the apparition and was momentarily frozen in fear. This apprehension was underscored when Walters/the Ghost spoke the words, "look, amazement on thy mother sits" (3.4.108). As in the previous production we examined, Brown/Gertrude seemed in her subsequent speeches to be in active denial of what she had just seen. Yet unlike in Hytner's staging, this response did not read as a symptom of Brown/Gertrude's guilt. Instead, in a moment that recalled Hobgood's formulation of the contagiousness of early modern emotional states, her fervour turned quickly to the idea that her son's madness might be so infectious that it had begun to affect those around him. "Upon the heat and flame of thy distemper / Sprinkle cool patience" (199–200) came across

as a plea for him to control his madness so that it would not continue to agitate her own mental state. This interpretation became even more clear with the lines “This is the very coinage of your brain. / This bodiless creation ecstasy / Is very cunning in” (135–37); in fact, she chose to place particular emphasis on the word *your*, despite its metrically unaccented place in the line, in a manner that made abundantly clear where she felt the source of these visions truly was. This actorly choice, along with the consistency with which the character of Hamlet became the locus of fear within the larger context of Godwin’s production, served as a fascinating theatrical illumination of this astute textual observation from Lianne Habinek:

A curious thing about *Hamlet* is that every instance of the word *brain* has to do with the organ being ill or shaken or emptied or mistaken. In other words, the brain is constantly seen to be fallible in the play, an entity forever malfunctioning and which no amount of thought or action seems to be able to set quite right. ... The human brain in *Hamlet*, then, is always apt to misfire—and it is crucial that the brain in question is invariably Hamlet’s (2014: 196).

Where the emotion of fear is concerned, Habinek’s observation held a remarkable degree of truth in Godwin’s staging of the play. In the world he and his team created—particularly compared to the historical context in which the play was written—fear was a much less prominent response to the concept of death or the supernatural. Instead, the personnel involved in this *Hamlet* enacted more wonder when engaging with the spirit world. Fear, in the microculture of this staging, was something far more personal and embodied, and was elicited most frequently as a response to the

ultimate unknowability of the central character. It manifested as a result of the keen sense that “bad things can happen” when a newly destabilised human being has “that within which passeth show” (1.2.85).

While fear has played a conspicuous role in both the productions we have examined, it is apparent that this emotion manifested in varying ways and in different moments. Because of the sheer multitude of factors that influence the affective outcome of any given performance (let alone production), it is impossible to claim any kind of certainty about the chief reasons behind the variations we have noted. However, even though both were in English, it seems reasonable to say that the mix of emotions in each production transpired due to the context of the specific culture each staging chose to evoke. Furthermore, the inverse also may be true: that, almost as though it were a design element itself, the affective palette of which each artistic team availed itself helped to situate and underscore the cultural context for the audience’s understanding. This has included instances of drawing affective parallels between Elizabethan and twenty-first-century British society, as well as storytelling elements that establish the uniqueness of the playhouse culture of each production.

As we shall see, the same processes are at work when the play is staged in translation, albeit with an additional layer of complexity. Thus, before we analyse

this dynamic in German-language productions of the play, it will first be helpful to have a general understanding of the evolution of germanophone attitudes toward Shakespeare and his drama. This overview will provide a firmer foundation on which to construct a conception of the relationship between language, emotion, culture, and the performance of this particular English playwright's works in a deceptively different sociolinguistic context.

Unser Shakespeare.

For German-speaking scholars and artists, Shakespeare has long held a place of momentous importance. Though many languages had translations of individual plays from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, German was the first language into which the complete works were rendered as an intact, definitive translation—a project begun by A.W. Schlegel in 1797 and completed by Ludwig Tieck in 1810 (Schmidt-Ihms 1964: 24). According to Maria Schmidt-Ihms, the appearance of this translation was “an event in the history of German writing” that gave “the Germans their very own Shakespeare” (ibid.). Schlegel, in fact, claimed that Shakespeare was “*ganz unser*” [wholly ours], and many Germans still refer to England's national playwright as *unser Shakespeare* (Schofield 2018). Indeed, by some measures at least,

there are often more productions of Shakespeare's plays in Germany than in England (ibid.).

Shakespeare's works have also wielded an immense influence on the imagination of Germany's own native authors. In a speech commemorating Shakespeare's birthday in 1771, a 22-year-old Johann Wolfgang von Goethe recounted the initial acquaintance he had made with the English playwright's work the previous year:

The first page of his I read put me in his debt for a lifetime, and once I had read an entire play, I stood there like a blind man, given the gift of sight by some miraculous healing touch. I sensed my own existence multiplied in a prism—everything was new to me, unfamiliar, and the unwonted light hurt my eyes (qtd. in Dickson 2015: 27–28).

This experience was certainly not unique to Goethe. Kristin Gjesdal argues, in fact, that the Germans' adoption of and ongoing dialogue with Shakespeare fundamentally changed the way they interacted with the arts in general.

[I]n addition to the widely shared sense that in the late eighteenth century Shakespeare becomes, as it were, an honorary German, I submit that in the years between 1770 and the early 1800s, German aesthetics becomes, in a significant way, Shakespearean. This is not only because the *content* of aesthetic thought was marked by Shakespeare's drama, but also ... that its *methodologies* were shaped in and through the encounter with Shakespeare (2018: 248).

The germanophone community's early and abiding academic interest in Shakespeare is further evidenced by the fact that the *Shakespeare Jahrbuch*, an annual journal first

published in 1865, is the world's longest-running academic periodical dedicated to the study of Shakespeare.⁴

Germany also has an important place in Shakespearean performance history —and *Hamlet*, in particular, plays a special role. The seventeenth century saw a German play known as *Der Bestrafte Brudermord* [*Fratricide Punished*], which is generally thought to have been an adaptation of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* (Roberts 2014: 128). It is supposed that the German adaptor encountered the original play when it was brought to German shores by touring English players in 1603–4 (ibid.). *Brudermord* may well have been staged as a puppet show —ironic, Lois Potter points out, “in view of Hamlet's joke about becoming an interpreter to puppets (3.2.239–40)” (2016: 59). A version of Shakespeare's play was performed again in Germany on 24 June 1626, in Dresden, by a travelling group of English players (Schmidt-Ihms 1964: 26). The first German-language version of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* in performance was in 1761, in Biberach, produced and translated by Christoph Martin Wieland (ibid.: 27).

Thus, both Shakespeare and his *Hamlet* share a German-language history that is nearly as deep as that in his own native tongue. Not only do the Germans see Shakespeare as their own; it might even be argued that they view Hamlet himself as something like a naturalised citizen (Schofield 2018: 95). So well-established is the

4. *Deutsche Shakespeare-Gesellschaft* <<https://shakespeare-gesellschaft.de/shakespeare-jahrbuch/?lang=en>> [accessed 27 November 2020].

stage tradition of this play in their language that germanophone artists may not acknowledge such a substantial cultural gap between the original English-language version and productions rendered into German. Nevertheless, from an emotional perspective, the germanophone cultural fingerprint presents itself rather boldly in these productions when we consider them through the lens of the language's affective traits.

Die Deutsche Angst.

In order to understand the affective differences between English and German —whether in Shakespearean performance or more broadly— we must first recognise a fundamental lexical disparity. As Wierzbicka explains:

...in ordinary German there is no word for “emotion” at all. The word usually used as the translation equivalent of the English *emotion*, *Gefühl* (from *fühlen* “to feel”) makes no distinction between mental and physical feelings, although contemporary scientific German uses increasingly the word *Emotion*, borrowed from scientific English, while in older academic German the compound *Gemütsbewegung*, roughly “movement of the mind,” was often used in a similar sense. ... At the same time, the plural form—*Gefühle*—is not restricted to thought-related feelings, although—unlike the English *emotion*—it doesn't imply any “bodily disturbances” or processes of any kind (1999: 3; see also Scheer 2014 and Wassmann 2017 for a history of these German terms).

The implication of this discrepancy between the conceptualisations of thought-related feelings in the two languages is subtle enough that, as we shall see, there are indeed affective germanophone concepts that bear striking resemblances to emotions

that are familiar in the anglophone world. However, the lack of a precise counterpart for the comparatively discrete English-language concept of “emotion” in German arguably creates the space for feeling states that are conceived as less “contained” — and thus, potentially more abiding and pervasive—than the words that are commonly available to native English-speakers. This is because German concepts that fall under the category of *Gefühle* can refer both to thought- and sensory-related feelings, thus amplifying their potential experiential resonances. Chief amongst these concepts is the distinctly German experience of *die Angst*.

Despite the consistent English-language tendency in the last century to describe the Danish prince as “angsty,” the word “angst” never occurs in Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*. According to the *OED*, in fact, it seems not to have appeared in writing in the English language at all until 1872, when the *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal* equated the term with “panic.”⁵ Over the ensuing century, the word —imported from the German as an untranslatable term in many English-language editions of Sigmund Freud and Martin Heidegger—evolved to mean a “feeling of anxiety, dread, or unease” (*ibid.*). However, this definition of English “angst” does not fully capture the contours of its German eponym. Tim Lomas explains that this is often the case when a language imports a word, because

5. “angst, n.” *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, September 2020, www.oed.com/view/Entry/7626. [Accessed 20 November 2020].

every word is embedded within networks of other terms that endow it with meaning. Thus, it is hard to understand a word in isolation from other terms in a system and the ways it is deployed in context. If words are taken out of their donor language, and inserted into a host language, this rich network of associations is not necessarily retained (2018: 25).

This lack of sociolinguistic associations does not, of course, entail that the imported word does not have a degree of semantic overlap with the original. As we have already seen, terms like “anxiety,” “dread,” and “unease” —the ideas by which the *OED* defines the English version of “angst” —are all, along with “fear,” semantically connected by the idea that “bad things can happen.” The same can be said, in fact, of the original German word *Angst*—which is the word German speakers often choose when asked to translate the English word “fear.” Furthermore, to “have” *Angst* translates most readily into the English phrase “to be afraid.” Thus, “*ich habe Angst vor dem Hund*” [“I have *Angst* of the dog”] is a common way a German speaker would convey the English expression “I am afraid of the dog.” Yet as we shall see, it is difficult to equate German *Angst* to “fear,” or to “being afraid” —or even to English “angst” —because, much like *mocka* for russophone culture, the emotion can be considered endemic to germanophone society (Kehoe and Pickering 2020: 1).

As is the case with the English “to feel fear” and “to be afraid,” German speakers have two common ways of expressing similar—though not identical—concepts. In addition to saying “*ich habe Angst vor dem Hund*,” one can express a comparable thought with the phrase “*ich fürchte mich vor dem Hund*” [“I fear me of

the dog”]. Distinguishing between these two terms will help illuminate the resulting differences between instances of *Angst* and *Furcht* in German stagings of *Hamlet*, as well as instances of “fear” in the anglophone counterparts we have already explored.

Wierzbicka contrasts the two concepts thus:

The main semantic difference between *Angst* and *Furcht* has undoubtedly to do with the basic “indeterminacy” of *Angst*, reflected in the fact that one can say *Ich habe Angst*, “I have *Angst*”, without having to specify the reasons for that *Angst*, whereas one cannot normally say *Ich fürchte mich* (roughly “I am afraid”) without specifying what one is afraid of. In English the sentence *I am afraid*, without a complement, is not unacceptable, but it sounds elliptical, and it invites the question “What are you afraid of?” But the German sentence *Ich habe Angst* does not sound elliptical at all, rather like the English sentence *I am depressed*. Of course a person’s depression has some reasons, but the sentence *I am depressed* is perfectly self-contained semantically, without any further expansion (1999: 124).

The experience of *Furcht*, then, is implicitly causal. *Angst*, in contrast, is not. Pascal David, following Heidegger, goes even further, claiming that if *Furcht* “has to do with something determinate or very precise,” we have *Angst* “for nothing” (2014: 38). This lack of causality—a sense of the emotion simply being “in the air,” so to speak—is one reason why the feeling of *Angst* may potentially be far more culturally and phenomenologically pervasive.

Yet another difference emerges when we look closely at Wierzbicka’s cognitive scenarios for the two German emotions. Here, she has helpfully set the main differences between the two in block capitals:

Angst (e.g. *X hatte Angst vor dem Hund/vor der Prüfung*)

- (a) X felt something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks FOR SOME TIME:
- (b') "I DON'T KNOW WHAT WILL HAPPEN
- (c) MANY BAD THINGS can happen to me
- (d) I don't want these things to happen
- (e) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (f) I don't know what I can do"
- (g) because of this this person feels something bad FOR SOME TIME
- (h) X felt something like this

Furcht (e.g. *X fürchtete sich vor dem Hund/*vor der Prüfung*⁶)

- (a) X felt something
- (a') BECAUSE X THOUGHT SOMETHING ABOUT SOMETHING
- (b) sometimes a person thinks ABOUT SOMETHING:
- (c) "SOMETHING BAD can happen to me BECAUSE OF THIS
- (d) I don't want this to happen
- (e) I want to do something because of this if I can
- (f) I don't know what I can do"
- (g) WHEN this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (h') BECAUSE X THOUGHT SOMETHING LIKE THIS (1999: 134)

As we can see from Wierzbicka's provided emphases, the second major difference between *Angst* and *Furcht* emerges when we consider the element of time. While the experience of *Furcht* is not temporally bound—one can feel it for the briefest of moments, for long periods of time, or anything in between—*Angst* is not something that can be felt just for a moment or two. This is, in some ways, a natural consequence of the stated "indeterminacy" that characterises *Angst*; without a specific, conscious cause, there is no obvious starting or ending point for the feeling. Thus,

6. As is generally the case in linguistics, setting an asterisk before a phrase indicates that the construction is not in use in natural language. It is helpful here to demonstrate that "*X fürchtete sich vor der Prüfung*" [X feared themselves of the exam] is not a usage one would hear a German speaker use, thus distinguishing it from the grammatically acceptable phrase "*ich habe Angst vor der Prüfung*."

both the thoughts and the feeling associated with this emotion are present “for some time.”

In many respects, the *Angst* scenario resembles the experience of what English-speakers call “anxiety”—a word with which the German *Angst* is often equated. Wierzbicka’s scenario for “anxiety” contains many parallels with that for *Angst*, including the element “sometimes a person thinks for some time...” (ibid.: 83). There are, however, a couple of important differences here as well. While someone who is feeling “anxiety” thinks something like “maybe something bad will happen to me,” the prototypical scenario for *Angst* entails the thought “many bad things can happen to me” (ibid.). The implication, then, is that *Angst* tends to feel as though it is coming from multiple directions, whereas “anxiety” can actually (though not necessarily) feel more specific. Yet on a possibly even more basic level, *Angst* is even less causal than “anxiety.” While the latter may not manifest due to an *external* cause, it does tend to emerge as a result of the experiencer’s thought process. This is why Wierzbicka begins the scenario for “anxiety” with the element “X felt something because X thought something,” and ends it with “X felt something like this / because X thought something like this” (ibid.). On the other hand, Wierzbicka says, “*Angst* is defined only via a prototypical scenario, and no thoughts are attributed to the experiencer: when one has *Angst* one feels LIKE a person who thinks certain thoughts,

and one doesn't necessarily think these thoughts oneself" (1999: 135). The lack of both external and internal causality may render this emotion concept particularly capable of seeping into the collective and individual consciousness of German speakers. This is one possible reason why the feeling is potentially even more pervasive in the collective imaginations of germanophone cultures than "anxiety" is in anglophone ones.

Another reason for the endemic nature of *Angst* in the German-speaking world is that its prevalence is largely due to the most widely-read author in the history of the language: Martin Luther. In an acknowledgement of what was sure to be an abiding linguistic influence, his contemporary Erasmus Alberus called Luther "the father of the German language" (qtd. in Wierzbicka 1999: 139). In his version of the Bible, Luther employed the word *Angst* "to translate the Latin words *pressura*, *angustia* and *tribulation*, and the Greek words *stenoxoria*, *tlipsis*, and *synokhē*, all of which had meanings corresponding, roughly, to those of English words such as *affliction* or *distress*" (ibid.: 144). When one considers the wide dissemination of Luther's writings, Wierzbicka argues, along with "their great popularity, and their unquestioned impact on the German language, Luther's use of the key word *Angst* was likely to have an impact on the use of this word in German in general" (ibid.: 151). Thus, as with the historical context of early modern English "fear," we can

begin to see the heavy influence of religious ideology on both the lexicon and the affective culture of the German language and its *Angst*. Yet we need not strictly limit the influence of religion in Germany to the past. Even in the twenty-first century, it is not altogether unreasonable to surmise that a religious figure such as Luther might still hold sway over the culture and language of the German people. After all, the political party that has controlled the German government for the vast majority of the post-World War II era, the Christian Democratic Union, is defined at least as much by its association with religion as it is by its commitment to democracy.

And from an affective perspective, it may also be illuminating to consider the effects of the war itself on the German collective consciousness. This is precisely the story Sabine Bode tells throughout *Die deutsche Krankheit: German Angst*. In it, she describes the German war generation's understanding of what the end of the conflict stood for: "for a profound turning point, for liberation and a rude awakening, for shame and horror, for surrender and hope" (2006: 41). Yet, she argues, while these experiences certainly varied from person to person,

one feeling [*Gefühl*], about which barely anyone would speak and which most Germans in the struggle for survival perhaps could not even perceive, must have been widespread throughout the population: *Angst*.

Angst about hunger and poverty: Will my children have enough to eat? How will we have a secure roof over our heads? Coal? Medicine?

Angst about the knowledge of the death of relatives and friends: Will Father come home? Will he survive being a prisoner of war? Millions of people are still missing. Countless are still dying in prison camps.

Angst about the return of the Reign of Terror: Is the Third Reich actually over? Those who got away were deeply suspicious—and would remain so for a long time.

Angst about retaliation: Will the victims take revenge? The perpetrators and the beneficiaries of the tyranny sleep poorly.

And deep beneath it all lies the *Angst* about nothing, because nothing, absolutely nothing, was safe [*sicher*] anymore (ibid., see also Weber 2020).

For our purposes, it is fascinating to consider this *Angst* rooted in religion and war in the context of the more positive qualities to which the German culture is said to aspire. For many commentators, such as Bernard Nuss, the pervasive “uncertainty” of *Angst* is the characteristic that weighs most heavily on its experiencers.

Uncertainty generates *Angst*. The more Germans are confronted with uncertainties, the more reason they discover to be worried. In this way, the feeling of *Angst* spreads further and further and engenders in some people a permanent state of *Angst*. It is nourished by a thousand trifles which gradually swell to form a constant sense of threat, against which it is impossible to struggle. ... It is omni-present, because everything represents a danger, so that one is nowhere really safe. The German fears not so much physical danger (he is by nature brave), or the various vicissitudes of life ... as the unknown. Not to know what will happen, not to know clearly what problem one has to deal with, not to know one’s opponent, this evokes much more *Angst* in him than a real danger (1993: 188–89).

As a means of counteracting the uncomfortable experience of “not knowing,”

Wierzbicka suggests, the German culture has become keenly interested in striving toward its opposite: something like “certainty.” This ideal is most frequently represented by the German adjective *sicher* (which we encountered in the Bode passage above) and its noun form *Sicherheit*, which “are widely used in German in a sense which, roughly speaking, combines the ideas of ‘certainty,’ ‘safety,’ and ‘security’” (Wierzbicka 1999: 160). *Hamlet*’s challenge to this ideal may well be part of

what engenders such fascination with the play in the German imagination. After all, according to Thomas Kehoe and Michael Pickering, German *Angst* is often wrapped up in ideas such as “loss, abrogation, or extermination of a political, social, or cultural order” (2020A: 11)—all concepts that dominate the narrative of the play. As the German critic Ekkehart Krippendorff has written, “Everything is *unsicher* [uncertain] in the world of *Hamlet*. Who is who? Mistrust is the order of the day, even though externally the world is built solidly from rigid walls, which open as doors and hide eavesdroppers” (2014: 163). The two German-language productions we are about to explore both underscore this sense of mistrust and destabilise any sense of *Sicherheit*—though in very different ways.

“Aber Höre mit Angst”: Schrickel’s Hamlet.

One production in which the actors captured and capitalised on this sense of *Unsicherheit* was Kai Frederic Schrickel’s staging for the Neues Globe Theater of Potsdam. Schrickel’s *Hamlet*—in a new translation by Maik Hamburger and Adolf Dresen—opened in 2015 and featured a seven-member, all-male cast “in the tradition of the Elizabethan theater.”⁷ The production’s commitment to the traditional

7. *Hamlet*, dir. by Kai Frederic Schrickel (Neues Globe Theater, 2015) <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXI2uOd8fuo&t=2102s>> [Accessed 19 May 2021].

Quote from Neues Globe Theater website <<https://neuesglobetheater.de/stueck/hamlet/>> [Accessed 19 May 2021].

practices of the Renaissance English stage included the employment of a simple set, which was made up of three small platforms, at varying levels, in the middle of the playing area. While the costumes (designed by Hannah Hamburger) were in bold colours and patterns, they were simple as well, allowing the actors to shift from role to role with expedience. Though the touring company often played the show in outdoor venues, the performance in the available recording occurred indoors; nevertheless, the lighting remained constant, evoking the daylight experience of an open-air playhouse. These minimalist production elements left the actors nowhere to hide. They therefore relied on their bodies, their voices, and the combined imagination of the company and the audience to tell their story.

As a result, this was a very physical *Hamlet*. One conspicuous way in which this physicality manifested was in the ubiquity of Kai Fung Rieck's fight choreography. While Shakespeare's script saves the fencing until the very last scene, the first sword-fight in the Neues Globe's version occurred within the first few minutes. Schrickel elected to forego act 1, scene 1 of the play entirely, and instead opened the action with Saro Emirze/Hamlet encountering his friend Till Artur Priebe/Horatio. Instead of a simple greeting, Emirze/Hamlet rushed to the edge of the stage toward a rack with many weapons (which remained onstage throughout). He found a pair of Japanese wooden *bokken* swords and handed one to his scene partner, at which point

they began a playful fighting session that grew progressively more aggressive. The duel ended with Priebe/Horatio pinned under Emirze/Hamlet's hips. Thereafter, with laughter, the men released their weapons, helped each other to stand, and embraced one another.

The rough-and-tumble activity of this scene foreshadowed a world in which danger always threatened to erupt from within what might have started as a moment of play. This dynamic became even more apparent a few moments later when, in his first scene, Urs Stämpfli/Claudius attempted to ingratiate himself with Emirze/Hamlet with another *bokken* play-fight. After an initial refusal, Emirze/Hamlet eventually acceded, grabbing one of the weapons and engaging in a few moments of ostensibly innocent sparring—until Stämpfli/Claudius began to grow frustrated with his opponent's superior skill. Then, seemingly on the verge of defeat, Stämpfli/Claudius threw down his wooden swords and rushed over to the weapon rack at the side of the stage, drawing a far more deadly-looking metal broadsword. He grabbed Emirze/Hamlet by the shirt with his free hand and aimed the point of the sword directly at his opponent's chest. After a moment, Stämpfli/Claudius looked around at the onstage bystanders and appeared to realise that he had gone too far. He let the sword fall to his side as he let out a loud, awkward laugh before carrying on with his courtly speeches. Comparing these two sequences—alongside the fact that the

weapons were a constant presence on the stage—serves as a physical and embodied illustration of the idea that Krippendorff expressed above: that in this play, “[m]istrust is the order of the day.” This constant sense of potential danger created the *Angst* of uncertainty and mistrust not only for the actors/characters onstage, but also for the audience. Moreover, the rearrangement of Shakespeare’s script and the deletion of familiar scenes and characters contributed to the suspicion that our expectations could be undermined at any moment.

Schrickel’s staging of the Ghost scenes demonstrated how mistrust emerged in other ways as well. In contrast with Shakespeare’s script, Priebe/Horatio and Emirze/Hamlet were not specifically in search of a spectre at the beginning of the first Ghost scene; nor were they accompanied by any sentinels. Instead, the two men seemed to have left the confines of Elsinore in order to escape the pressures of the court and indulge in a playful bit of (theatrically mimed) skinny-dipping. Eventually they made their way to rest on the uppermost platform, where Priebe/Horatio fell asleep during one of Emirze/Hamlet’s long speeches, as the sound of chirping crickets played in the background. It was at this point that Dierk Prawdzik/the Ghost made his simple entrance. In a stark contrast to other productions, the entrance was not accompanied by any special visual or aural effects. He merely walked onto the stage in a long white nightgown and a crown and stood still against the tall platform as the

cricket sounds continued. Looking down from above, Emirze/Hamlet grew transfixed and remained silent for several seconds, until finally he said “*Vater?*” {“Father?”}. “*Höre*” {“Listen”}, Prawdzik/the Ghost replied. “*Ich tu es*” {“I am listening”}, responded Emirze/Hamlet. “*Aber höre mit Angst*” {“But listen with *Angst*”}, Prawdzik/the Ghost insisted. He then began to tell his tale, and seemed to relive each detail of the murder as he spoke it. As he made his exit, he walked backward across the stage and appeared to topple off the edge as he intoned the words “*Gedenke mein*” {“Remember mine”}.⁸ After Emirze/Hamlet’s passionate soliloquy in which he vowed to avenge his father’s death, Priebe/Horatio finally awoke. It was clear that Priebe/Horatio did not witness anything paranormal, and seemed understandably confused and concerned as Emirze/Hamlet made him swear not to divulge anything about what had happened or about his behaviour going forward. Now, Priebe/Horatio was the one listening with *Angst*.

As in Godwin’s production, the mind of Emirze/Hamlet himself served as a major source of that *Angst*. This was not, however, a staging that reflected Thomas Hamner’s 1736 insistence, quoted above, that “the whole Plot of the Play is justly and naturally founded upon the Appearance of this Spectre.” In this instance, according to Schrickel, the central character is actually driven to insanity by a figment of his

8. *Gedenkemein* is also the German word for the forget-me-not flower.

own imagination. "For me," he says, "the Ghost-apparition is a dream, because I do not believe in ghosts. Sometimes one dreams something so concretely that one thinks there is a certain meaning. But dreams are also thunderstorms of the unconscious, and Hamlet is overwhelmed by his past" (qtd. in Kugler 2015). And in case Schrickel's interpretation was unclear for the audience at the end of this scene, it became quite apparent in the "closet scene." Here, the Ghost did not reappear onstage; rather, at the point when the apparition would normally enter, Emirze/Hamlet turned his gaze upward, fell to his knees, and began speaking as though he were seeing the spirit of his father. The lines of the Ghost were entirely cut, but Hamlet's lines remained intact. As such, the concern around Emirze/Hamlet's state of mind became especially justified as his behaviour was, from the perspective of all onlookers, markedly disturbing and erratic.

One major consequence of the removal of a paranormal impetus for the action of the play was that the spectators were left with an even greater degree of ambiguity about whom they could trust. In productions that stage the Ghost scenes in a more literal manner, the character of the Ghost may indeed elicit fear. However, due to his supernatural status, he can often claim a sense of authority, leading the audience to have confidence in his version of the story. While Hamlet has spiritual and philosophical reasons to doubt the spectre's intentions, the audience generally tends to

take the Ghost's version of events at face value. In staging Prawdzik/the Ghost as a figment of Emirze/Hamlet's imagination, this confidence is undermined entirely; there is no real reason for the audience to believe that revenge is justified. Thus, rather than the play's uncertainty being confined to the narrative and the actors/characters within it, this production planted deep doubt into the minds of the spectators as well. There was always the potential that the sense of unknowability within the dramatic story itself could seep out as a mist of *Angst* that pervaded not only the onstage world, but the whole of the playhouse as well.

In many ways, this *Hamlet's* affective atmosphere exemplifies the key qualities of German *Angst*: its relative lack of containment, its indeterminacy, its lack of clear internal or external causality, and its temporal persistence. This is why—even more so than the feeling of fear in the two English productions this chapter explored—the *Angst* in Schrickel's *Hamlet* expanded far beyond the reaches of any individual moment or scene. The next case study, however, ratchets up this same dynamic to an entirely new plane.

***“Vielleicht (Angst)traumen”*: Ostermeier's *Hamlet*.**

Thomas Ostermeier's German-language staging of *Hamlet* for the Schaubühne in Berlin premiered in 2008 as a coproduction with the Hellenic Festival Athens and

the Festival d'Avignon.⁹ For a production that was unabashedly theatrical, the set itself was remarkably simple: it consisted of a cloth-covered banquet table that ran nearly the width of the stage; an upstage curtain of long, gold-coloured strings of beads; and a downstage area that was filled with dirt. "*Sein oder nicht sein*" ("To be or not to be") were the first words spoken as the show began, accompanied by a video of the face of Hamlet (Lars Eidinger) in a large projection on the curtain of beads. He continued to speak the displaced soliloquy, as translated by Marius von Mayenburg, as the distorted, spectre-like images of the play's other actors/characters appeared and disappeared from the projected video feed. Yet Eidinger/Hamlet's monologue stalled upon reaching the words "*Schlafen, vielleicht träumen*" ("To sleep, perchance to dream"), at which point he paused briefly before repeating the same phrase three more times. The speech ended there, portending the notion that, perchance, something dreamlike was imminent. And in fact, much like in a dream, what came next was not what anyone—even those who are very familiar with the play—would have predicted.

As with Schrickel's staging, Ostermeier chose to cut the first scene of Shakespeare's script entirely. Thus, rather than a Ghost scene in the battlements, what followed this unconventional opening was an even less conventional, wordless,

9. *Hamlet*, dir. by Thomas Ostermeier (Schaubühne, 2008), 22:45 19/07/2008, ARTE, 160 mins. vimeo.com (Password-protected access granted by Schaubühne) [Accessed 14 May 2021].

ten-minute long staging of a funeral, which devolved into Chaplinesque slapstick as the mourners proceeded to slip in the wet dirt and trip over one another. In the following scene, the actors/characters sat around the banquet table eating in a fairly nonchalant fashion, with one exception: Gertrude (Judith Rosmair), dressed in white and draped in a long veil, performed a twirling, awkwardly sensual solo dance behind the table. This lasted nearly two minutes and did not seem to attract any attention at all from the other people onstage. Both the music and the dancing came to an abrupt end when Laertes (Stefan Stern) fired an automatic weapon into the air. "*Danke schön, Laertes,*" responded Claudius (Urs Jucker), as he stood and held a microphone in order to begin his first speech of act 1, scene 2.

In many ways, Ostermeier's opening sequence both exemplified and catalysed the emotional trajectory of this *Hamlet*. Even for those who are deeply familiar with the play, nothing about this staging of it felt stable, safe, or secure. The handheld videocamera that Ostermeier/Hamlet employed for his soliloquies served as what was initially the most obvious means of transporting the spectators into the "dream" he repeatedly invoked as his initial monologue cut off. Yet, as Benjamin Fowler points out, it is probably more accurate to say that the camera, as "a technological supplement to his own vision ... wasn't capturing his dream so much as his nightmare" (2013: 739). And as in any dream or nightmare, the world of this *Hamlet* was

defined by its utter lack of predictability, consistency, or dependable familiarity. As we have already seen, much of the very ground on which the production was played was literally slippery and infirm. In fact, Ostermeier's version of the play went so far toward actively destabilising any sense of *Sicherheit* for both his company and their audiences that I would suggest that this show offered a vision of an *Angsttraum*—one of the many German words for “nightmare”—which means “*Angst* dream.”

One major way in which this vision manifested theatrically was through its use of double-casting. Five of the actors (Urs Jucker, Judith Rosmair, Robert Beyer, Sebastian Schwarz, and Stefan Stern) each played at least two of the play's major roles, and usually transformed from one into the other in a way that was conspicuous for the audience. For example, at the beginning of act 1, scene 3, Rosmair/Gertrude simply removed her blonde wig and her sunglasses in order to become Rosmair/Ophelia. According to Ostermeier himself, this was not simply a matter of convenience:

What Hamlet's mistake is, is that he doesn't see the difference between Ophelia and his mother. When we are here on earth, the first very important connection that we have is the connection to our mother. We need to trust in her or we cannot develop as human beings, and when this trust is taken away, we tend to be very much in danger. This is what happened with Hamlet. He cannot trust anybody anymore, especially—and this is his mistake—he cannot trust any woman any more. For what his mother did, he punishes Ophelia (qtd. in Banks 2010).

Ostermeier's double-casting precisely captures this ability for the people in dreams to metamorphose into others who are perhaps related in the dreamer's consciousness in some way. Moreover, what he says about Hamlet's lack of ability to feel a sense of stability or certainty within so primal a connection—and furthermore, that he “cannot trust anybody anymore” — speaks directly to the formulation of *Angst* we have been developing in this chapter. It is the persistent, indeterminate feeling, coming from all directions, that “many bad things can happen.”

It should be clarified, however, that there was one actor who did not have the duty of portraying multiple roles. “Whereas the five other actors morphed in and out of Shakespeare's cast of characters,” notes Fowler, “Lars Eidinger as Hamlet embodied a stable perspective, rooting this production in an individual reality” (2013: 739). Yet I would argue that while Eidinger/Hamlet may have been striving toward a feeling of stability throughout the show, it never appeared as though that stability was actually achieved. In fact, Ostermeier has said that he encouraged Eidinger to approach the role in a way that deliberately undermined stability, and even theatrical consistency, from performance to performance. When asked whether this Hamlet was actually in complete control, Ostermeier responded

He's not. ... But this is part of the agreement I have with [Eidinger]; that he has to be able to go over the top. Otherwise you cannot move your own borders. If I told him you can't do something because it's distasteful—which is a lot of times—then there wouldn't be a true meeting of madness and the danger of madness and the danger of the character and the danger of the actor

playing this character. This concept of directing *Hamlet* makes sense to me—even though sometimes I have to swallow my anger because he doesn't always hit the points he should—but it's part of the freedom he got (qtd. in Crawley 2014).

Thus, far from being able to claim any locus of stability, the multiple layers of danger from which this *Hamlet* is constructed have often been so unsettling that the man who created it can experience some performances as emotionally threatening on some level.

Aida Bahrami captures the affective dynamic of this particular *Hamlet*-world quite astutely in her investigation of this production's portrayal of what she calls Hamlet's "paranoia." This originates, she contends, "from his desire to predict, codify, and contain a narrative of alterity that enables him to slip on a vestige of autonomy" (2018: 476). Ostermeier attributes this loss of autonomy, which Eidingen/Hamlet tries so hard to maintain, to having "moved from the very centre of the family portrait to the margin," so that "his ties to the family as well as his central position in the political network of relations are severed" (qtd. in Bahrami 2018: 477). And these feelings of suspicion are underscored by sociopolitical dynamics. In fact, Ostermeier echoes Hytner's sentiments about the parallels between Shakespeare's time and today. "Considering how Ostermeier calls our time an era of 'terror and prosperity' akin to the atmosphere predominant in Elizabethan period," Bahrami argues, "this choice of burdening the audience with the capacity to engage with Hamlet's paranoia is an apt method for producing, as Artaud demands, a substantial

resonance with a contemporary anxiety" (2018: 477). In Hytner's *Hamlet*, surveillance cameras were everywhere, and all of the players exhibited instances of paranoia. And in Godwin's version, Essiedu/Hamlet himself became the primary locus for the other actors/characters' sense of fear and danger. In Ostermeier's staging, by contrast, the paranoia was embodied chiefly by the central actor/character himself, and the technical and design elements of the production amplified this feeling throughout the playhouse. The centring of this perspective, especially via the use of his handheld camera, created a distinct affective dynamic between Eidingen/Hamlet and his audience, transforming the stage into what Bahrami calls a "symptomatic space" in which the spectators share in his paranoia (2018: 481).

Yet it is rather telling that when discussing this emotion, Bahrami actually uses the words "paranoia" and "anxiety" fairly interchangeably. She says, for example, that the camera "forms an affective current between Hamlet and the audience who ... are compelled to share the surveyed sphere, and along with it Hamlet's anxiety" (ibid.: 482). Bahrami's argument is genuinely shrewd and well-crafted; however, in my estimation, the medium of the English language creates an epistemological challenge for her, in that she must vacillate between two different words in order to attempt to capture a feeling that German speakers can succinctly capture in one: *Angst*. So while there is truth to the idea that Eidingen/Hamlet often

operates from a place of paranoia throughout the play—particularly as he consistently exhibits what Bahrami terms paranoia’s “tendency towards antagonism” (ibid.: 478)—the resulting feeling amongst the rest of the company and the spectators is not necessarily an antagonistic one. And while “anxiety” certainly captures a slice of this affective exchange, it is a bit narrow; it tends to correlate to experiences in which, as Wierzbicka notes, a person feels that “maybe something bad will happen” (1999: 83). For the audience, then, the pervasive lack of *Sicherheit* in this production more precisely evokes *Angst*, which—much like Ostermeier’s *Hamlet*-world—makes the experiencer feel as though “many bad things can happen” (ibid.: 134). In other words, there are multiple destabilising factors coming from all directions. As one reviewer put it, this imagining of the play “seemed to rest on a razor edge of danger” (Crawley 2014).

The staging of the first Ghost scene serves as a powerful illustration of this idea. Because act 1, scene 1 was skipped over in this production, Eidinger/Hamlet’s first supernatural encounter was also the audience’s. The scene occurred at an untraditional moment in the storyline, at the end of what we know as act 1, scene 2. At this point, the wedding feast had grown much quieter; in fact, Jucker/Claudius had passed out from the revelling, and was now face-down in his food plate on the banquet table. Eidinger/Hamlet was in the midst of his first conversation with

Sebastian Schwarz/Horatio, and the German translation followed the original Shakespearean text fairly closely, through the point where Eidinger/Hamlet spoke the words "*Mein Vater...ich glaube ich sehe meinen Vater*" {"My father...I think I see my father"}, to which Schwarz/Horatio responded, "*Wo, mein Prinz?*" {"Where, my prince?"}. Eidinger/Hamlet responded, "*Vor meinem inneren Auge*" {"In my inner eye"}. Yet this famous exchange quickly took on a whole new significance. Rather than admitting at this moment that he had witnessed a spirit, Schwarz/Horatio began to speak von Mayenburg's translation of this Horatio speech from Shakespeare's act 1, scene 1, after the first sighting of the Ghost:

In the most high and palmy state of Rome,
A little ere the mightiest Julius fell,
The graves stood tenantless and the sheeted dead
Did squeak and gibber in the Roman streets:
As stars with trains of fire and dews of blood,
Disasters in the sun; and the moist star
Upon whose influence Neptune's empire stands
Was sick almost to doomsday with eclipse:
And even the like precursor of fierce events,
As harbingers preceding still the fates
And prologue to the omen coming on,
Have heaven and earth together demonstrated
Unto our climatures and countrymen (1.1.112–24).

As Schwarz/Horatio spoke these words, he approached Jucker/Claudius at the table and manually lifted the actor/King's head into an upright position. He then picked up the crown from beside one of the plates and placed it on Jucker/Claudius's head. During the course of this action, Eidinger/Hamlet trained his videocamera on

Schwartz/Horatio and Jucker/Claudius, whose images were thereby projected onto the screen of beads behind him. Transfixed, Eidinger/Hamlet exclaimed "*Hamlet! König, Vater!*" {"King, Father!"}, and Jucker was thus transformed into King Hamlet's Ghost. Jucker/the Ghost remained seated at the table, with a video feed of a distorted image of his face cast simultaneously behind him, and began to tell his anguished and horrific tale of Purgatory and murder. The text of the exchange closely followed that of Shakespeare's act 1, scene 5, up until Jucker/the Ghost's final words, "*Vergiss mich nicht*" {"Do not forget me"}, which he repeated thrice as the moving platform drew him and the banquet table upstage behind the curtain.

Eidinger/Hamlet himself repeated "*Vergiss mich nicht*" before launching into his soliloquy promising to avenge his father's murder. As he spoke with what read as a passionate sense of debt and duty, he knelt on both knees in the pit of dirt. When he finished the speech, he launched both his arms deep into the earth. Subsequently, one of his own hands emerged upward from the soil, grabbed his collar, and pulled him down to faceplant into the ground, all while Schwartz/Horatio looked on. After a few moments, Eidinger/Hamlet pulled himself up out of the soil, and Schwarz/Horatio remarked that he would not have believed what just happened if he had not seen it with his own eyes.

Virtually everything about this sequence of events had a destabilising effect, causing the spectators—both onstage and in the theatre seats—to question what they thought they knew, begetting a high level of the uncertainty and insecurity (*Unsicherheit*) that generates *Angst*. At the centre, of course, was the representation of a supernatural phenomenon. The conscious and conspicuous mapping of Claudius and the Ghost onto the same actor's body evoked a similar dream-like quality as did the double-casting of Gertrude and Ophelia, "rendering even more questionable," notes Bahrami, "the 'questionable shape' in which the ghost appears before Hamlet (1.4.43)" (2018: 484). From the audience's perspective, what became supremely questionable in this staging was the degree to which we were seeing something that was "really" happening—both with our own eyes and through Eidinger/Hamlet's. Was King Hamlet's spirit temporarily inhabiting the body of Jucker/Claudius? Conversely, was what we had seen thus far a usurpation of Jucker/King Hamlet's body by the malevolent spirit of Claudius? Or was this series of events something that had happened entirely in Eidinger/Hamlet's mind, which we were now all inhabiting and dreaming along with him? One might have attempted a shift of focus to Schwarz/Horatio in order to ascertain a greater level of certainty about these questions, but that would only cause a greater degree of unsurety. On the one hand, he had seemed to be directly complicit in this eerie occurrence; however, after Jucker/

the Ghost's exit, he had expressed a sense of astonishment about what had happened. Or was he simply voicing shock about Eidingen/Hamlet's strange behaviour in the dirt afterward—meaning that he had not actually borne witness to anything we all thought we saw?

Nearly every moment of the show lent itself to these kinds of questions. The space left behind by a lack of answers was filled only with more *Angst*. Nothing was clarified, for example, when Jucker/the Ghost returned to the stage in the “closet scene.” Flanked on either side by Schwarz/Guildenstern and Stern/Rosencrantz (or was it Schwarz/Horatio and Stern/Laertes?), who held the beaded curtain open for him, the spectral figure delivered his admonition to Eidingen/Hamlet into a microphone, with his face covered in blood. It was ambiguous whether Rosmair/Gertrude could see Jucker-as-Ghost, or if she perhaps saw Jucker-as-Claudius, or anything at all. As Bahrami argues, each version of reality we might entertain in this production is simply an association that reflects “an alternative reality among equally unstable realities” (2018: 484). And in a 140-minute-long show with no interval, there was simply no escape from the *Angst* this persistent instability engendered. In fact, because the central character remained alive at the end of this production, the audience could not even count on the Prince of Denmark's famous death to provide a

release valve. It is possible that many spectators left the theatre wondering, to some extent, whether they still remained in his *Angsttraum*.

...

Considering these four productions in the light of broader contexts for the concepts of “fear” and *Angst*, there are certainly some similarities to draw. Chief amongst these is, of course, the frequency with which the sense of unknowability seems to come up again and again in the story of *Hamlet*. Nevertheless, it is also evident that these emotions, and the cultures in which they emerge, provide varying lenses through which we can have vastly different experiences and interpretations of many aspects of this play we think we know so well. It is unnecessary, of course, for Hamlet’s hair to stand on end when he sees the Ghost—he may not even see the Ghost at all. Working with different shades or degrees of fear—or other, related emotions—may suggest changes to the story that make it more culturally or artistically relevant. Rather than offering theatrical moments that provide anything like a universal feeling of fear, these stagings show that mistrust, reverence, wonder, and *Angst* can bring out colours of experience that Shakespeare may never have intended or imagined.

However, it is worth considering why Ostermeier’s *Hamlet* in particular has been so successful around the world. It has had over 200 performances globally and

an audience of over 160,000 outside of Germany since 2009 (Schofield 2018: 107). Furthermore, it has been the primary force that has made Ostermeier an emblematic figure “for providing the idea of radical German theatre, and with that, the notion of transgressive German Shakespeare,” on the international stage (ibid.: 110). Yet while his *Hamlet* is seen as exemplary of the German aesthetic in some parts of the global theatre community, some critics have begun to interpret it as a product of global modernity instead (ibid.: 112). Affectively speaking, as we have seen, the *Angst* that permeates the production is very much rooted in the German cultural history and character. Nevertheless, it is possible that this particular blend of what English speakers would term “anxiety” and “paranoia” resonates with increasing power across the twenty-first-century international community (cf. Kehoe and Pickering 2020B: 278). The unwieldy power of the internet, the acute tension in the duelling forces of globalism and nationalism, the persistent threat of domestic and international terrorism, and, of course, the Covid-19 pandemic, have made it increasingly obvious that “many bad things can happen” in a world where the links between cause and effect are far too multifarious to be clearly understood. Kehoe and Pickering argue that the international community is currently living in a variety of fear that “hinges upon an awareness of our dependency upon the structures of civilization itself and of just how fragile these complex structures are” (2020A: 7). As

this chapter has shown, *Angst* is born of this sense of indeterminacy and uncertainty; as such, it is not at all surprising that a piece of art that can articulate this feeling so powerfully might have a significant emotional resonance in our particular age. By virtue of its own cultural specificity and currency—via the medium of the world’s most famous playwright’s most famous play—the thoroughly German concept of *Angst* has found a global audience in search of a word to describe the mood of late modernity.

CODA

PERFORMING THE UNTRANSLATABLE

In many ways, the case studies we have encountered all echo various shades of Hamlet's meaning when he says "I have that within which passeth show" (1.2.85). One of the fundamental problems with human emotions is that we can never be sure that anyone is truly capable of understanding what we are feeling in any given moment. Bridget Escolme sees this as one of the Prince of Denmark's fundamental challenges: "Hamlet begins the play by asserting that he feels more than he could ever express but struggles throughout it with the fact that his grief only produces meaning when it is externalised: interpreted or expressed" (2014: 175). Yet this is not just true of grief. In the general context of human relations—whether inside or outside of the playhouse—no emotion can, in fact, escape that fate. For example, William Reddy argues, "[t]ranslating love into action ... requires coordinating many simultaneous translation tasks—involving linguistic, visual, bodily, and social codes—in a single stream of strategic expression and behavior" (2001: 92). In fact, all emotions are necessarily both the sources and the products of an interpretative process—in other words, they are constantly involved in acts of translation. As Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan frame it, Shakespeare's explorations of human

emotions “emphasise the difficulties in turning one’s emotions into language, and suggest that all attempts to articulate inward feelings involve a certain degree of translation or metaphorical conceptualisation” (2015: 2). I hope the work of this thesis has demonstrated the degree to which linguistic differences—both temporal and geographic—further complicate translation work that is already inherent in emotional discourse. I have no doubt that Shakespearean drama in translation will continue to testify to the strength of the inextricable interplay between language, culture, and emotions.

This thesis has also shown several examples of how the process of bringing a playtext to life on the stage bears many resemblances to the process of translating a text from one language to another. In reflecting on these similarities, my own professional background as a Shakespearean actor has inevitably led me to wonder how the lessons of this study might be put to use in the rehearsal room and in performance. I recognise that the point is arguable, but it is my belief that the most useful forms of Shakespeare scholarship are those that offer something for theatre artists to incorporate into their craft. For this reason, I would now like to use this coda as an opportunity to deploy the methods and findings of the previous chapters as a means of looking more deeply at the deceptively difficult actorly task of assessing the affective processes suggested by a centuries-old playtext. Indeed, these tools

have much to offer when it comes to determining the most effective means of identifying with and embodying those feelings, as well as interpreting them in a way that will be readable for the audience—all within the context of a collaborative effort with the other theatre artists involved. In what follows I shall use a close reading of the concept of “shame” in the first scene of *Richard II* to argue that the language of Shakespeare’s playtexts offers actors a means of enacting instances of ostensibly “untranslatable” emotion with a high degree of legibility.

Translation and Transference.

Translation scholar Lawrence Venuti argues that his field serves as “a reminder that no act of interpretation can be definitive” (1998: 46). His contention—originally referring to the process of interlingual translation—applies equally well to the act of representing emotion in theatrical performance. Yet for the twenty-first-century theatre artist attempting to overcome the remarkable degree of conceptual obliqueness of early modern emotions, the challenges are innumerable. The playtext offers prescriptive emotional utterances only occasionally, and semantic drift often obscures the language’s meaning. Furthermore, the parts were written for specific actors who, according to Evelyn Tribble, “inhabit[ed] distinct ecologies of skill” (2015: 20). As Simon Palfrey notes, Shakespeare knew his actors “as readers, and

mime artists, and rhetoricians. He knew what they had said about the last play, their last part, how they spoke the words, responded to cues, what they enjoyed and what they did not” (2011: 5). Any actor approaching the role today does not have the luxury of having had these parts written for them, and tends therefore to approach the affective demands of the part in a manner commensurate with their own experience and ability—along with a twenty-first-century conceptual lens of the emotions a given character or scene might call for.

Fascinatingly, even the proponents of the “Original Practices” movement have had little to say about how today’s actors might explore early modern emotions.

Escolme has drawn attention to this particular lacuna as well, observing that

despite the [Shakespeare’s Globe] theatre’s early commitment to “Original Practices” (through experiments in historically researched costume, decor, dance and music) no discussions were had amongst Globe companies in the late 1990s and early 2000s around early modern psycho-physical theories of emotion. The fascinating *Globe Research Bulletin*, which includes accounts of rehearsals at the theatre in its early years, contains no speculations about what it might have been like to act if one believed in humoral types, predominances or illnesses (2020: 125).

Escolme goes on to advocate for ways that actors can understand and access early modern conceptions of emotional life “in order to realise its full potential for Shakespearean production” (ibid.: 132). I submit that, by using analytical tools such as those we have employed over the course of this study, theatre-makers can become aware of this immense potential. As Escolme has argued in a separate text, “by

understanding the differences pertaining to emotional expression and its cultural variation that exist between Then and Now, we might attempt to perform Then in a range of more exciting and challenging ways Now" (2014: xxx). In order to do this, we must first consider the possibility that, although many early modern emotion concepts are *untranslatable*, they are still *transferable*. The distinction between *translation* and *transference* as terms of art is technical, but it is well worth exploring as a way of demonstrating the scope of possibilities available to those who may wish to explore them.

When it comes to performing Shakespearean emotions, some may construe the interpretive function of the actor as J.C. Catford construes *translation*: "the substitution of TL [target language] meanings for SL [source language] meanings" (qtd. in Bassnett 2002: 16). If so, the performer's job is—conceptually, at least—quite straightforward. In such a context, one can simply ignore the complications involved in conveying early modern English's affective intricacies, instead choosing to work within the preexisting parameters of one's own emotional palette. In the playhouse, such a process relies on what Giovanna Colombetti terms *basic empathy*—"the phenomenological notion of directly perceiving the other's subjectivity" (2014: 176). She uses this term specifically in order "to distinguish it from other more elaborate and mediated ways of grasping how others feel," such as resorting to deduction or

imagination (ibid.). Bruce McConachie invokes Colombetti's sense of the word as the basis of performer-audience interaction: "Without our evolved ability to engage in empathy," he says, "role players could not coordinate their performances, and spectators would have little incentive to watch them, much less attempt to figure out what they were doing" (2015: 119). Ostensibly, one advantage of this approach is that actor and spectator alike can simply use broad emotion categories as heuristics for understanding the continued relevance of Shakespeare's stories and characters. The average English-speaking audience will understand, in general terms, what it is like to feel grief, joy, or fear; hence, when an actor/character expresses such emotions through the course of the story, the spectators will have a basic sense of whether the play's actors/characters are succeeding or failing in the quest to achieve their goals.

There are, however, some consequential disadvantages to this strategy. As McConachie has noted, "through visual cues, embodied interactions, and straightforward projections, our species can usually understand—or believe it understands—what conspecifics *in homogeneous social groups* are intending, doing and feeling" (2015: 103, emphasis added). On the other hand, when there are significant social differences between source culture and target culture, basic empathy often does not suffice for the conveyance of feelings and intentions (ibid.: 148–49). As is the case with all concepts, emotions are essential for guiding what people *do* from moment to

moment (Lyon 2009: 201). Therefore, having a clear understanding of them helps us “to anticipate what will happen next, so that optimal goals can be adopted and optimal actions taken” (Barsalou 2008: 246). As a result, many aspects of the story—as well as characters’ decision-making processes and their consequences—lose meaning without an understanding of culturally specific emotion concepts. This can occur whether translating transtemporally or inter-linguistically. Moreover, approaching large chunks of text with such generalised emotion concepts necessarily entails treating Shakespeare’s dramatic dialogue as poetry-for-poetry’s-sake, rather than as an affectively sophisticated set of story-driving units. This coda will examine each of these problems in turn. I will then propose a unified mechanism for actors to resolve both of these issues at once, allowing them to engage in the interpretive process that Catford terms *transference*: “implantation of SL meanings into the TL text” (qtd. in Bassnett 2002: 16). I acknowledge that this proposition may seem prescriptive; however, I shall argue that a recognition of the semantic value of early modern English emotions is often necessary in order to understand the action of the plays.

Shame and Dishonour.

In the first scene of *Richard II*, the feud between Thomas Mowbray and Henry Bolingbroke is fuelled principally by the adversaries' sense of "honour." This word is invoked no less than seven times in the scene (along with one instance of the word "dishonour," and three of the related word "disgrace"). Mowbray neatly encapsulates this conflict when he says

Mine honour is my life; both grow in one:
Take honour from me, and my life is done:
Then, dear my liege, mine honour let me try;
In that I live and for that will I die (1.1.182–85).

While there may be something vaguely recognisable about such a sentiment, the cultural currency of the concept of honour has diminished so greatly over time that it no longer holds emotional relevance for most middle-class Britons in the twenty-first century. Speaking in general terms, William Ian Miller defines the phenomenon thus:

Honor is above all the keen sensitivity to the experience of humiliation and shame, a sensitivity manifested by the desire to be envied by others and the propensity to envy the successes of others. To simplify greatly, honor is that disposition which makes one act to shame others who have shamed oneself, to humiliate others who have humiliated oneself. The honorable person is one whose self-esteem and social standing is intimately dependent on the esteem or envy he or she actually elicits in others (Miller 1993: 84).

We will explore the specifically Shakespearean implications of the term in due course. At the moment it is simply important to recognise that without such a "keen sensitivity," *Richard II*'s opening scene is unlikely to carry much emotional charge in the playhouse. This scene might, in fact, have audiences who are more predisposed

to find an emotional connection to it in parts of the American South or amongst street gang members—cultures where honour is indeed still viewed as a life-and-death notion (Nisbett 1996). Yet the average audience of, say, the National Theatre or the Royal Shakespeare Company will probably find that the genuine meaning of “dishonour” or “disgrace” as invoked in the playtext is ultimately *untranslatable*. The audiences for whom the play was originally composed, however, would have been better capable of following the action because of their own lived understanding of the concepts of honour and shame. How might an actor today apply Catford’s notion of *transference* to non-native emotion concepts—to feelings for which our culture does not have what Clifford Geertz calls an “experience-near” equivalent (1976: 227–28)—and thereby convey the affective immediacy of the scene?

As we examine the dialogue between Mowbray and Bolingbroke, we shall see that Shakespeare has supplied the characters (and, thereby, his actors) with several emotive utterances. In the cultural setting of Elizabethan England, these speech acts would have been remarkably useful tools by which the actors of the Chamberlain’s Men could convey the intended affective processes of the scene to their audiences. Yet because historical slippage has created significant semantic gaps between many of these early modern English emotion concepts and today’s, the provided utterances actually lose much of their inherent emotive power in a twenty-first-century anglo-

phone theatrical context. Returning to the first scene of *Richard II*, we can find a few such examples in one of Mowbray's speeches:

Myself I throw, dread sovereign, at thy foot.
 My life thou shalt command, but not my shame:
 The one my duty owes; but my fair name,
 Despite of death that lives upon my grave,
 To dark dishonour's use thou shalt not have.
 I am disgraced, impeach'd and baffled here,
 Pierced to the soul with slander's venom'd spear,
 The which no balm can cure but his heart-blood
 Which breathed this poison (1.1.165–73).

Of the emotions he invokes here—shame, dishonour, disgrace, bafflement (baffled)¹—we shall look in turn at the first two in greater detail.

As I mentioned in the INTRODUCTION, “Shame” is a subject about which much has been written as it pertains to Shakespeare's canon (e.g., Paster 1992; Fernie 2002). The anglophone world still uses and recognises the word; however, it may not be readily apparent to actors or audiences that the term has sustained a significant degree of semantic drift over the course of the last four centuries. Part of what has happened, according to Miller, is that “[i]n the English-speaking world we have moved from a culture of shame to a culture of embarrassment” (1993: 179). Anna Wierzbicka adds, “the concept of embarrassment is part and parcel of modern

1. Ewan Fernie defines “disgrace” as “shame imposed externally” (2002: 241). Charles R. Forker glosses “baffled” as “publicly disgraced for cowardice or perjury. To baffle was to degrade a knight ceremonially from his rank by stripping him of his armour and shield. ... Some commentators have regarded ‘disgraced, impeached, and baffled’ as chivalric terms arranged in ascending order of ignominy” (in Shakespeare 2002: 195, fn. 170).

anglophone culture. It was unknown to Shakespeare and it is unknown in most other cultures of the world, which of course have their own culturally constructed ‘social emotions’” (1999: 116). Wierzbicka’s paradigm scenario for “shame” entails the belief that other people can know something negative about the experiencer, leading to negative opinions on the part of both the other people and the experiencer themselves.

Shame (X was ashamed)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “people can know something bad about me
- (d) I don’t want people to know this
- (e) if people know this they can’t not think something bad about me
- (f) when I think about it, I can’t not think the same”
- (g) when this person thinks this this person feels something bad
- (h) X felt something like this
- (i) because X thought something like this (ibid.: 110).

Conversely, “embarrassment” occurs when something is happening in a given moment that is bringing unwanted attention to the experiencer. The motivation behind this attention need not necessarily be a bad thing per se (consider the embarrassment some people feel when their loved ones sing “Happy Birthday” to them), but the feeling itself is nevertheless a negative one (ibid.: 112–116).

According to Miller’s argument, the anglophone world today experiences and recognises embarrassment more readily than it does shame. However, this was not always the case. According to the *OED*, the word “embarrassment” entered the English language (via French) in the mid-seventeenth century; thus, as Wierzbicka

has noted, it was not in Shakespeare's lexicon.² "Shame," on the other hand, appears 346 times in his canon, with a further twenty-seven occurrences for "ashamed."³ Even so, Wierzbicka discerns a fairly significant degree of semantic drift for this word since Shakespeare's time:

The older meaning of *shame*, I would suggest, didn't include the knowledge component: "people can know something bad about me." The "blush of shame" did not indicate that people know something bad about the blusher but only that the blusher didn't want other people to know, and to think, anything bad about her. In fact, the older English *shame* was often "forward-thinking" and implied the thought "I don't want people to know bad things about me (and therefore I will not do certain things)" rather than a thought implying a *fait accompli*: "people can know bad things about me (because there is something bad to know)." ... [T]he older meaning of *shame* reflected a social climate in which other people's view of the individual was expected to act as a powerful means of control: it was expected that people wouldn't do certain things because they wouldn't want other people to know, and to think, bad things about them (1999: 111).

Wierzbicka's suggestion about the semantic divergence of "shame"—particularly its "forward-thinking" aspect—is bolstered by Thomas Wright's assessments in the forward to his second edition of *Passions of the Mind in General*. "[T]he shame of vice," he wrote, "is a good commencement of Vertue, because it proceedeth from a judgement disliking of evill, which is an apt beginning of good" (1604: F7). He later returns to the subject with even more specificity: "I take it, that shamefastnes in women restrayneth them from many shamefull offences, and feare of punishment

2. "embarrassment, n." *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, September 2021, www.oed.com/view/Entry/60798. [Accessed 22 September 2021].

3. opensourceshakespeare.org [accessed 9 March, 2020].

retaineth from theft, and the remorse of conscience calleth many sinners to the grace of God" (ibid.: 18). Wright's very use of the (now archaic) word "shamefastness" lends further testimony to the idea that shame was a concept that was highly valued in Shakespeare's England, and in many cultures where—as Tiffany Watt Smith explains—"those who fell short of expected behaviour were thought to bring dishonour not just on themselves, but on their whole family" (2015: "Shame" para. 2). Ewan Fernie notes that many cultures across Renaissance Europe were "concerned with the inner discipline and moral benefits of shame" (2002: 47). Similar concepts are still found today in places like Japan, where the reverberations of *Bushidō* samurai code (broadly analogous to medieval European chivalry) continue to act as moral tethers (ibid.: 16).

This background, then, reveals a more precise picture of what Mowbray finds so precious, valuing it over his monarch and his own life: "Myself I throw, dread sovereign, at thy foot. / My life thou shalt command, but not my shame." To modern anglophone audiences and actors—more familiar with embarrassment, and with a rather different understanding of shame—Mowbray's pronouncement is effectively untranslatable. This problem is further compounded by the additional semantic drift that the other emotion words in this speech have undergone.

“Dishonour” and “disgrace” are closely-related concepts that derive their Shakespearean meanings from the early modern culture of honour. As is the case with “shame,” we certainly recognise these words, along with their status as social emotions with a negative valence. However, as per Miller’s aforementioned assessment, English speakers today tend to use the terms “dishonour” and “disgrace” as more or less synonymous with “embarrassment.” Yet within the context of the scene, the extreme nature of Mowbray’s “dishonour” transpires with the words he employs to explicate the implications of his feelings. He is, as he says, “[p]ierced to the soul with slander’s venom’d spear,” invoking the feeling of being not only physically and spiritually wounded by the experience, but also infected with a deadly substance—a violent breach of the body-mind that is simultaneously acute and insidious. “With its suggestion of invasion by a foreign body,” writes Fernie, “it also conveys a consciousness of corruption and impurity” (2002: 215). Compare this, for example, to Sir Walter Raleigh’s letter to his wife, written from prison, after having been accused of treachery by Baron Cobham:

...that I can live to thinke how you shal be both left a spoiler to my enimies, and that my name shal be a dishonour to my child Oh God I cannot resiste theis thoughts, I cannot live to thinke how I am derided, to thinke of the expectation of my enemies, the scornes I shall receive, the crewell words of lawyers, the infamous taunts and dispights, to be made a wonder and a spectacle. O death hasten thee unto me, that thow maiste destroye my memorie which is my Tormentor, my thoughts and my life cannot dwell in one body (qtd. in Watson 1960: 158).

Raleigh's expression of his feeling indicates that he would find death preferable to having to endure the shame he has brought upon himself and his family. Yet Mowbray goes a step further. He follows his own self-diagnosis with not only a prognosis, but also a prescription: "no balm can cure" his condition except "his heart-blood / Which breathed this poison." In other words, Mowbray's dishonour will literally kill him unless the instigator of these passions, Bolingbroke, loses his life first. This pronouncement comports with many Renaissance Englishmen's conceptualisation of these passions; the experience of such a feeling was intrinsically bound up with the impulse to die or to kill. As Miller notes, "people acted as if the mechanics of honor had the structure of a zero-sum or less-than zero-sum game" (1993: 116). This also squares with Robert Ashley's observation in his 1596 treatise *Of Honour*, that "[o]ne body will fight another to death that he may not be compted a coward amongst his companions: Learned men do even kyll themselves with studie that they not be overdone in knowledge and understanding of things" (qtd. in Fernie 2002: 46).

This process of historically situating the Shakespearean conceptualisation of dishonour has the potential to help the actor understand the idea in more relatable terms. In fact, I would suggest that developing a working relationship with both emotion scholarship and Wierzbicka's NSM (or something like it) can be a boon to all actors who work with texts that do not emerge from their own culture. Such an

approach can help theatre artists to develop a sensitivity for the emotions of unfamiliar cultures in a way that can be legibly transferred into their own, through the creation of original cognitive scenarios. With the information explored above, for example, I propose my own NSM scenario for the courtly conception of “dishonour” as portrayed by Shakespeare in *Richard II*:

Dishonour (X felt dishonoured by Y)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “someone has done something to me
- (d) people can know about this
- (e) I don’t want people to know this
- (f) if people know this they can’t not think something very bad about me
- (g) when I think about it, I don’t know if I can live
- (h) because of this, I want to do something bad (to this person)
- (i) if I do this, people can’t not think something very good about me”
- (j) when this person thinks this this person feels something very bad
- (k) X felt something like this
- (l) because X thought something like this

The scenario shares some core elements with our own conception of “shame”: both emotions contain components referring to something that other people can know about oneself, a desire for others not to know this thing, and the acknowledgement that people will have a negative opinion about the experiencer if they do find out. The differences with the early modern conception of “dishonour,” however, are not only those of degree (“they can’t not think something *very* bad about me”; “this person feels something *very* bad”), but also of origin (“someone has done something

to me”) and consequence (“I want to do something bad [to this person]”).⁴ This component (h) is nearly identical to a constituent element in Wierzbicka’s explication of “fury”; furthermore, component (i) is very similar to an element in her scenario for “pride” (“if people know this they can’t not think good things about me”) (1999: 91, 117). As such, we can consider the Shakespearean “dishonour” as something like a conceptual blend of our own notions of shame, fury, and pride.

Thus, Mowbray’s emotive utterances do not of themselves carry the same meaning for twenty-first century, middle-class English actors and spectators as they did in the Elizabethan playhouse. It is therefore understandable that those who do not live within cultures of honour might simply see the words exchanged in this scene as symbolic, hyperbolic, or melodramatic. The temptation is particularly strong with *Richard II*, which—along with the contemporaneously composed *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* and *Romeo and Juliet*—is often regarded as one of Shakespeare’s most lyrical dramatic works. Such a view leads to the reading of much of the dialogue—and to the emotive utterances in particular—as being merely poetical for the sake of aesthetic pleasure. Yet this is misleadingly reductive, and such a misunderstanding

4. I have placed element (h), “to this person,” in brackets because it is actually not invariably necessary. In some cultures, a dishonoured person can reclaim honour by taking their own life. See, e.g., Brutus and Cassius in *Julius Caesar*, or Leonato’s “Hath no man’s dagger here a point for me?” (*Much Ado About Nothing*, 4.1.109) after his daughter’s public shaming. See also, e.g., Miller 1993: 40. In the medieval courts depicted in Shakespeare’s history plays, however, dishonour is far more likely to be quenched by violence toward another than toward oneself.

of the function of the language can lead to a lack of understanding of the opening scene as a whole. Emma Smith offers a prime example:

The theme of the scene here is divisive conflict and unspoken tension, but that's lacquered over with the formal quality of rhyme, which urges towards harmony and connection. If you find it difficult to work out what's actually happening as *Richard II* begins, your fog is absolutely spot-on: this is a scene about obscuring rather than communicating meaning. Basically, what can't be said here, for obvious reasons, is that the king himself may be implicated in the death of the Duke of Gloucester. ... It's one of the ways this history play is preoccupied with what can't be truly known about the past (2019: 62).

Smith's assertion that the play's first scene is challenging for modern audiences and readers to understand is, in itself, valid. It is certainly true that Bolingbroke does not explicitly indict the King in his suspected role in Gloucester's death; as Charles R. Forker explains in his commentary of the play, most of Shakespeare's contemporaries held this belief, due to a widespread familiarity with Holinshed's version of the story in his *Chronicle* (in Shakespeare 2002: 187, fn. 100). Yet while today's audiences are unlikely to be familiar enough with this historical background or with the play's source material to hold such a belief themselves, the ignorance of this detail does not in itself render the argument of the scene incomprehensible. Bolingbroke does make the direct accusation of Mowbray:

That he did plot the Duke of Gloucester's death
Suggest his soon-believing adversaries
And consequently, like a traitor coward,
Sluiced out his innocent soul through streams of blood (1.1.100–3).

The attentive listener may be able to discern Richard's implication in the plot as well, since, as Forker notes, "the King was chief among the *adversaries*" (Shakespeare 2002: 188, fn. 101). More importantly, however, Smith's assessment of the cause of this scene's confusion mischaracterises the function of Shakespeare's dramatic poetry. What so often obscures the scene's meaning is not that the conflict is "lacquered over with the formal quality" of the language. In fact, it is the very assumption that lyricism equals affective obfuscation that often occludes the vivid dramatic action that the text actually drives.

This complex affective context serves to highlight what the theorist Eugenie Brinkema views as a critical disconnect for scholars of affect—the idea that formal aspects of a text are necessarily at odds with the emotional. Yet such a perspective is actually the product of a deeper, essentialising habit. As Brinkema puts it,

[c]ritical positions that align affect with what generally and amorphously resists (structure, form, textuality, signification, legibility) hold on to the notion of a transcendental signified, hold fast to the fantasy of something that predates the linguistic turn and that evades the slow, hard tussle of reading texts closely (2014: xiv).

As an antidote to this assumption, Brinkema contends that "only reading specific affects as having and being bound up with specific forms gives us the vocabulary for articulating those differences" (ibid.: xv). This is why such pronouncements as Mowbray's "Mine honour is my life; both grow in one: / Take honour from me, and my life is done" (1.1.182–83) can easily fall into flowery declamations unless there is

an understanding of the full cultural significance of the emotion concepts that this scene evokes. As such, for both critics and actors, the “slow, hard tussle” of close reading that Brinkema prescribes is essential for comprehending and conveying the necessary affective differences of the scene.

Microbeats and Performative Pointillism.

In an important way, this reluctance to engage with form can also be attributed to a kind of translation loss between the theatre cultures of Renaissance England and today. The Chamberlain’s Men and their audiences lived in an aural culture—one in which the formal aspects of poetry lent a greater sense of active intensity to the expression of language (Wright 1988: 17–18).⁵ Palfrey contends that “[w]e will be much closer to the mark if we liken the way Shakespeare’s ‘auditors’ (probably a much more appropriate term than spectators) listened to his plays the way we read them” (2011: 12). Thus, Smith’s claim that “the theme of the scene” is “unspoken tension” misunderstands the degree to which there is an explosive level of conflict that is very much spoken. Actors may be better equipped to reveal this dynamic action if they can avoid the anachronistic tendency to treat both the language’s

5. Many theatre artists who translate Shakespeare into their own tongues discover organically that “the sounds and rhythm of language” are “integral to their understanding of what they [are] trying to represent on stage,” and that “the very building blocks of language can transmit emotions and themes” (Kenny 2014: 41).

formal qualities and the culture of honour's social emotions as antiquarian niceties.

Rather, they can recognise—as Palfrey argues—that

Shakespeare's dramatic verse is not best understood as poetry, which can be to detach the forms from action. Verse drama is not merely drama written in verse. It requires that the fact of verse is animate with the stuff of the drama—embodying it, moving with it, rather than merely a line-length container for articulating it (2011: 133).

By taking the language seriously, and by embodying the untranslatable in a way that is clear and legible, actors can help their audiences comprehend the action of even a scene that is as “difficult to work out” as Smith suggests. In fact, as the enaction theorist John Stewart has argued,

some of the most significant moments of communication occur when speakers identify a *misunderstanding*; paradoxical though it may seem ... what happens is that they then *realize* that up until that point, they had been misinterpreting each other (with the best of intentions, of course) (2010: 15).

This idea raises the possibility that performers can actually use the untranslatable as an opportunity to create moments of true theatrical salience.

The question, of course, is how? If the experiences of “shame” and “dishonour” carry such divergent meanings for us as compared to early modern England as to render them untranslatable, how can actors hope to impart the meaning and the active nature of these feelings to modern audiences? The key is to remember that “untranslatable” does not mean “indefinable” or “incomprehensible”—simply that a term lacks a single-word equivalent that captures all possible

meanings in another language or culture. By breaking down an individual concept into its most granular aspects—applying Willard Quine’s “analytical hypothesis” (see CHAPTER ONE, p. 75) to the emotion, via something like Wierzbicka’s NSM—it is possible to comprehend and convey the underlying volition, valence, and immediacy of any given moment. As such, I propose a means of employing the NSM vocabulary in order to support and augment Shakespeare’s built-in emotive utterances. This approach will have utility for emotion concepts that are both experience-near (culturally current) and experience-distant (untranslatable). Working in this way will entail that the actor carefully attend to the hierarchical aspects of Shakespeare’s formal structures, as they inherently offer the opportunity to achieve a high level of affective granularity that can vivify the nuances of the actor/character’s thought-related feelings.⁶

A common technique, popularised by Konstantin Stanislavski and his followers, involves the actor breaking down their text into small sections that are often called “beats.” Depending on the terminology of the specific acting school, each beat encapsulates a different action, objective, tactic, or emotion that the actor/character is effecting or undergoing during the action of the scene. Much like Wierzbicka’s NSM,

6. Admittedly, the process I describe here may not be effective in languages other than English, in which the formal structures of the language differ. As translation processes are typically carried out by native speakers of the target language, theorists and practitioners in each language will have to determine whether and how a similar approach might work for them.

these processes often derive from what the actor/character “wants” in that moment, and/or how they “feel” about whether or not they are meeting that particular goal. Tonal or informational shifts in the text serve as signals for a “beat change,” requiring a concomitant change of tack for the actor/character. Alternatively, beat changes can also arise from what is happening onstage, as the extratextual behaviour of the other people in the play can indicate that the current tactic or emotion employed needs to be refined, intensified, or abandoned in order to bring the actor/character closer to achieving the desired goal. This manner of working is common amongst actors because it is a fairly intuitive and effective means of capitalising on the interpersonal conflict inherent in most good pieces of dramatic writing; when different characters have different goals, the drama emerges from the emotional variety that ensues as a result of the challenges of navigating such charged circumstances. Thinking in terms of actions, desires, and goals is also supported by the way many cognitive theorists have come to understand how emotions function (e.g., Carver and Scheier 2009).⁷

Let’s return, for example, to Mowbray’s speech:

Myself I throw, dread sovereign, at thy foot.
My life thou shalt command, but not my shame:
The one my duty owes; but my fair name,

7. Yet note also Escolme 2020: 124: “...even actioning—which involves attaching verbs to actors’ lines to describe what each line is doing to another character, in order to give purpose, direction and focus to performance—can make assumptions around personal desires, drives and relationships” in a way that misses many emotional implications of the early modern context.

Despite of death that lives upon my grave,
 To dark dishonour's use thou shalt not have.
 I am disgraced, impeach'd and baffled here,
 Pierced to the soul with slander's venom'd spear,
 The which no balm can cure but his heart-blood
 Which breathed this poison.

Many actors would play the entirety of the eight-and-a-half lines of verse as a single beat, as the whole speech ostensibly centres around one general topic—that of the set of negative social emotions he names as “shame,” “dishonour,” etc. Alternatively, actors might divide the speech into two beats, noticing an attitudinal shift: the first five lines concern the things to which Mowbray feels Richard is and is not entitled (i.e., his “self” and his “life,” but not his “shame” or his “fair name”). The lines that follow involve the emotive utterances that capture Mowbray’s state, as well as the actions he intends to take in order to ameliorate his situation. Still other actors would choose to assign a new beat to each new sentence, thus implementing an additional beat division after the first line.

Yet in terms of their capacity to serve as vehicles for the *transference* of early modern emotion meanings into twenty-first-century performance contexts, the above beat divisions are insufficient. As Palfrey argues, Shakespeare’s speeches often “embody multiple actions. And any of the individual constituents of such speeches are liable to claim a life-force all of their own” (2011: 19). And as Wierzbicka’s work has shown, any given concept for an emotion—a “thought-related feeling” (1999: 3)—comprises several thoughts that operate on a more granular level. Attempting to treat

multiple, information-rich lines of verse as though they all convey the same thought or intention effectively misses much of the dramatic and affective nuance with which the author has imbued his language. As a result, rather than elucidating untranslatable concepts, such a generalised approach enhances their opacity.

In a sense, even treating the sentence as the basic semantic unit is an anachronistic approach that causes the actor to overlook the possibility of discovering new thoughts and opportunities with a far more dynamic and expressive level of frequency. While our own culture's familiarity with novels and contemporary drama has privileged the integrity of the sentence, according to George T. Wright, "Renaissance readers of verse (and even listeners in the theater) were expected to follow the twin authorities of meter and sentence, to feel the tension in their divergence and the harmony in their congruence" (1988: 16). Much of this tension emerges from the fact that each new line of verse provides the possibility for a new energy, a new sense of direction, and—I would argue—a brand new beat. According to Palfrey, "the line, for Shakespeare, is a living thing: it is measured by breathing; it is owned by a body. But even more than that, it is the foundational place in which the actor can discover ... his character's passions and motion" (2011: 164–65). As such, it feels apparent that the actor would benefit from employing a beat change—however great or slight the shift might be—with every new verse line (Tsur 2006: 170).

And yet, there is one more level of granularity that Shakespeare's verse encourages us to achieve. Almost every line includes a "caesura," or a mid-line break, which often constitutes a new thought without deranging the rhythm. Wright points out, for example, "when Othello says 'Put out the light, and then put out the light' (*Othello*, 5.2.7), the actor may make a pause of some length after the fourth syllable, but the iambic pattern of the line is not disturbed, only suspended" (1988: 3–4). Yet I do not believe that a "pause" of any length is absolutely necessary; an intentional shift/beat change (which is semantically apparent in the *Othello* example, and in most Shakespearean lines) can, in fact, be immediate. The shift itself will make the caesura felt without requiring any extra space between the two halves of the line. This is another way of capitalising on the opportunities produced by the tension between sentence and meter—particularly at times when a full stop occurs in the middle of the verse line, such as when Richard II says "I cannot do it. Yet I'll hammer it out" (5.5.5). As Palfrey contends, Shakespeare's language allows and encourages us to honour the life that is present in the individual thought of a "single image or clause" (2011: xii).

Narrowing the scope of the average beat into much smaller "microbeats" allows for an increased capacity to sharpen the focus of the affective components of the actor/character's thoughts. When it comes to enacting the untranslatable, it is

necessary to render the semantic content of an emotion into units of meaning that are readily accessible from culture to culture. As Miller observes, for example, “[h]onor is not our official ideology, but ... certain styles of honor and the heroic are recognizable if not exactly translatable across cultures” (1993: 9). Thus, while the ways in which other cultures conceptualise feelings like shame, disgrace, and dishonour “are not completely congruent with ours, they nonetheless bear sufficient points in common so that comparison, recognition, and rough mutual understanding are achievable” (ibid.: 12). Wierzbicka’s NSM provides us with those very points. As the individual thoughts contained within her paradigmatic scripts tend to be similar in lexical scope (quantitatively, at least) to the individual thoughts within a character’s text, actors can recruit components from the cognitive scenario of a given untranslatable emotion concept as a kind of metatext with which to charge each microbeat.⁸

For example, Wierzbicka’s research reveals that “[a]ll languages have words linking feelings with ... the thought that ‘people can think something bad about me’” (1999: 276; cf. Colombetti 2014: 74). This indicates that, regardless of culture, people will recognise an affective experience that contains this constitutive thought—even though the feeling will not be identical between cultures. If actor/Mowbray uses his

8. I have chosen the word “metatext” here as opposed to “subtext,” as the latter often indicates semantic subversion of the spoken word—or perhaps more precisely, it is the spoken text that obfuscates the subtext, which is the speaker’s “true” meaning. Metatext, on the other hand, are the semantic/affective fundamentals that can serve as a universally comprehensible basis for the spoken text. See also Escolme 2020: 132.

speech to express this thought in a playhouse full of middle-class Britons, it is probable that the audience will interpret his experience as a contemporary anglophone instantiation of something like “shame,” or perhaps “humiliation”—the two most readily available emotion concepts that contain this thought. Yet “humiliation” did not exist in the early modern English lexicon, and—as I noted earlier—“shame” has undergone a significant degree of semantic drift since Shakespeare’s time. In fact, both of these concepts are more “passive” in nature than the more “forward-thinking” Renaissance notions of “shame,” “dishonour,” or “disgrace” that Mowbray mentions. The early modern version of “shame” thus appears to constitute a “blend” of fairly passive insecurity and active resistance—just as the early modern notion of “dishonour” approximates a “blend” of our current notions of “shame,” “fury,” and “pride.”

We saw in CHAPTER THREE (pp. 155–56) that such affective blends, according to R.S. White and Ciara Rawnsley, are particularly characteristic of Shakespeare’s work. In fact, the authors view the idea of “mixed emotions” as “an important aspect to the cultural transportability and temporal longevity of his plays” (2015: 242). They go on to call for a “mode of analysis subtle and flexible enough to allow us to understand how Shakespeare makes mixed emotions function on the stage” (ibid.). Considering affective mixtures from a phenomenological perspective, Colombetti muses as to

whether it involves “alternations of pleasant and unpleasant feelings, depending on what the subject is attending to,” or, conversely, “a more intimate admixture, something more like the taste of a sweet-and-sour dish, which feels sweet and sour at the same time” (2014: 151). She leaves the question open to future research, but from a performance perspective it is difficult for an actor to communicate such semantic blends in a single moment—particularly with an experience-distant concept. However, by using the text in a way that enlists the individual semantic aspects of these emotions, one thought at a time, the actor can convey affective differences in a manner that renders a foreign concept ultimately intelligible. In other words, by abutting its more basic components against each other microbeat by microbeat—much like coloured dots in a pointillist painting—the affective “blend” transpires via moment-to-moment enactive perception, rather than *en bloc* conceptual representation.

In actor/Mowbray’s case, this integration is achieved by infusing each microbeat of the speech with expressions of the various cognitive components of (early modern) “shame,” “dishonour,” and “disgrace.” In order to accomplish this, the actor can resort to any of the various tools of expression within his toolkit. On a bodily level, this can include physical gesture, movement, or stillness. Such bodily states can be effective because, as Lawrence Barsalou notes, “[w]hen a particular

body state is adopted, it activates situated conceptualizations that contain it. As these patterns become active, they trigger related emotional states that can then influence a variety of cognitive processes” (2008: 253). There are many other available tools as well, such as vocal tone, volume, pacing, and pitch; facial expression; sense memory/emotional recall; psychological “actions” or “tactics” for goal attainment; etc.⁹

For example, the beat “Myself thou shalt command,” suggests a certain degree of passivity or even yielding. To this thought, the actor could tie the NSM component “people can know something bad about me,” which is common to the various social emotions actor/Mowbray is expressing here. He can do so by hanging his head, by lowering his volume, by playing the action “to capitulate,” or anything that would communicate this semantic metatext through the text he speaks in that moment (cf. Colombetti 2014: 73). The next thought, “but not my shame,” requires a definite shift. Conveniently, the next component in the paradigmatic *shame* scenario, “I don’t want people to know this,” can serve to charge the microbeat with a new energy. Thus, actor/Mowbray can (for example), lift his head if it had been lowered, make his voice steadier and perhaps louder, play the action “to defy,” or whatever the actor feels

9. This list of techniques is by no means extensive. Depending on training, experience, and preference, many actors will find some of them patently artificial (and therefore objectionable), while others will find the same techniques indispensable. My professional experience has left me feeling fairly agnostic on this particular topic, as different methods seem to work remarkably successfully for different people in different situations. At issue here is not how the actor goes about communicating these parcels of semantic information, but rather that they recognise the possibility of doing so at a granular level.

would make such a thought culturally legible. As a result, within one line of verse, we start to see the blend of resignation and resistance that distinguishes early modern shame from its twenty-first-century homologue. In fact, this can happen precisely *because* the single verse line contains two affective semantic units that are easily digestible together in one hierarchically predominant whole.

As actor/Mowbray makes his way through the rest of the speech, he can continue to assign elements from “shame” and “dishonour” to the beats that follow. It is not at all necessary that the order in which the affective metatexts are employed match the precise order of the cognitive scenarios as written. The actor can, for example, use the “shame” component “when I think about it, I can’t not think the same” (i.e. something bad about myself) to charge the microbeat “The one my duty owes.” He can then assign the component “I don’t want people to know this”—common to both “shame” and “dishonour”—to the following microbeat, “but my fair name.” He can subsequently use the “dishonour” element “when I think about it, I don’t know if I can live” to the next thought, “Despite of death that lives upon my grave,” and so forth. What is vital is that the actor combine each NSM element of the emotion(s) he is attempting to communicate to at least one microbeat of the speech, so that the concept’s full breadth of meaning is apparent. If he can do so in a way that allows the affective metatext to suit the semantic value of the written text as well, in

the manner I have attempted to demonstrate here, this can only support the clarity of both Shakespeare's words and the meaning of the untranslatable emotion.

This approach goes some way toward addressing what Paul Menzer has termed the "player's paradox" (2006: 86):

The crux for actors then as now is that bodily eloquence has to be both unique and conventional. ... Inevitably, players must rely on physical expression to register meaning; they must rely, that is, on Richard II's "external manner[s]" of "unseen grief" or joy or anger (4.1.285, 87). By virtue of their conventionality, however, these external manners can be aped, which erodes authenticity. Therefore, a truly authentic display must be unconventional but, by virtue of being so, risks incoherence (ibid.: 88–89).

By understanding emotional episodes as a series of granular units, rather than as unwieldy chunks of stereotyped affective behaviour, the actor can create a readable, unique tapestry of moments that is commensurate with the enactive understanding of how human emotions operate (e.g., Hutchins 2010: 447). Thus, while untranslatable emotions might not be conceptually obvious to the audience outside their original contexts, the artist's moment-to-moment enaction of universally comprehensible thoughts can serve as a matrix that provides manifold affective interfaces between spectator and performer. The potential for play enacted at these embodied, embedded, dynamic points of contact not only ensures that the story is both understood and driven forward—it also creates the necessary conditions for the kind of collective effervescence of which the multimodal nature of live theatre is so imminently capable.

Conclusion.

As Batja Mesquita and Michael Boiger argue, “emotions emerge from social interactions and relationships, which they in turn constitute, shape, and change” (2014: 298). In this “sociodynamic model,” they continue, “[t]he point is not that emotions occur in response to social events; rather, it is that social interaction and emotions form one system of which the parts cannot be separated” (ibid.). And while developing a greater degree of emotional granularity may not constitute the generation of “new” emotions per se, our exploration has certainly demonstrated the many ways in which the conceptual clarity of an emotion can effect a level of potency—on both the individual and societal levels—that is otherwise unlikely to occur. In this way, discovering and experiencing new affective concepts can have the remarkable ability to open new horizons for how we understand ourselves and relate to one another. Susan Bassnett argues that “different societies live in distinct worlds, not the same world with different labels attached” (2012: 54). This study has shown just how true these words can be. However, it has also shown how much we might learn about each other’s distinct worlds if we investigate the deeper meanings of those labels.

The theatre has always been a particularly noteworthy site for this kind of cultural-emotional exchange. “For much of history,” argues Peta Tait, “theatre has

had to conform to prevailing social values about emotional relationships and yet it often managed to surreptitiously challenge propriety” (2021: 25). As I see it, this is a fundamental structural tension of the feeling-labour of drama. There is an ongoing dynamic between, on the one hand, cultivating and maintaining the emotional ideas our society already holds dear; and on the other, inviting excitingly novel and potentially disruptive ways of feeling into the larger emotional community. All lovers of the dramatic arts—actors, directors, dramaturgs, designers, critics, scholars, theorists, teachers, and patrons—are, on some level, actively engaged in theatre’s emotional labour. Whether as theatre artists seeking to convey a certain degree of emotional granularity to the audience, or as spectators attempting to divine the significance of an as-yet-unfamiliar theatrical expression of feeling, all members of the theatrical community stand to reap significant rewards as a result of developing a sharper awareness of the sociolinguistic varieties of affective experience. As Ross Knecht argues, this emotional work

has lasting effects. It does more than simply produce transient states of mind: it instils in its audience embodied capacities and instructs them in modes of affective performance. In this way, it contributes to the configurations of expression, gesture and comportment that make up a distinctive emotional culture. Just as productive labour creates the material infrastructure that surrounds us, so does emotional labour shape the emotional landscape into which we are born, the specific configurations of emotional practice and performance in which we are acculturated (2020: 174–75).

In some instances, the ways in which this work shapes our lives might entail adopting new forms of experience and/or expression into our own emotional communities. Studies have shown, for example, that when schoolchildren have been trained to learn new words to describe specific emotions, their “greater emotional vocabulary has in turn been associated with improvements in behavior and academic performance” (Lomas 2018: 4). In other circumstances, diversifying our emotional fluency might simply mean having more sensitivity toward, or appreciation of, the experiences and expressions of individuals from societies that are not our own. As Tait notes, “theatrical emotion can be socially shared and provide an opportunity to subjectively imagine the experience of another” (2021: 162). As such, the practice of theatrical translation offers endless possibilities for helping to amplify the voices of individuals who have been ignored for too long due to poverty, illiteracy, or enslavement (Matt 2014: 50). Adapting or translating Shakespeare’s stories for the stage is, of course, only one way of facilitating a greater understanding of emotional communities that have received relatively little attention. Nevertheless, it is clear that the cultural cachet and sheer ubiquity of Shakespearean performances from so many corners of the globe will continue to offer significant opportunities for the kind of rich emotional exchange that playhouses so brilliantly afford.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aicard, Jean, *Othello: ou Le More de Venise*, ed. par (Paris: G. Charpentier, 1882)
- Apter, Emily, *Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability* (London and New York: Verso, 2013)
- Applebaum, Robert, "Shakespeare and the Concepts of Fear," *Actes Des Congrès de La Société Française Shakespeare* [En Ligne] 36 (2018)
- Austin, J.L., *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962)
- Bagchi, David, "'The Scripture moveth us in sundry places': framing biblical emotions in the *Book of Common Prayer* and the *Homilies*," in *The Renaissance of Emotion*, ed. by Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2015) 45–64
- Bahrami, Aida, "Paranoia and Narrative of Alterity in Thomas Ostermeier's *Hamlet*," *Contemporary Theatre Review*, 28.4 (2018) 476–87
- Bain, Frederika, "The affective scripts of early modern execution and murder," in *The Renaissance of Emotion*, ed. by Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2015) 221–40
- Banks, Summer, "A Chat with... Director Thomas Ostermeier," *ExBerliner* (31 December 2010) <<http://www.exberliner.com/culture/stage/five-questions-for-thomas-ostermeier>> [Accessed 17 May 2021]
- Barbaras, Renaud, "Life and Exteriority: The Problem of Metabolism," in *Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science*, ed. by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. DiPaolo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 90–122
- Barbezat, Michael D., "A Conjunction of Patrick: A Legacy of Doubt and Imagining in *Hamlet*," in *Hamlet and Emotions*, ed. by Paul Megna, Brid Phillips, and R.S. White (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019) 41–59
- Barclay, Katie, "Performance and performativity," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017A) 14–17
- Barclay, Katie, "Space and Place," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017B) 20–23
- Barrett, Lisa Feldman "The Theory of Constructed Emotion: An Active Inference Account of Interoception and Categorization," *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience*, 12.1 (2017a) 1–23
- Barrett, Lisa Feldman, *How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain* (London: Macmillan, 2017b)

- Barsalou, Lawrence W., "Situating Concepts," in *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, ed. by Murat Aydede and Philip Robbins, Cambridge Handbooks in Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 236–63
- Bartelle, Michael Joel, "Review of Shakespeare's *Othello* (Directed by Iqbal Khan for the Royal Shakespeare Company) at the Royal Shakespeare Theatre, Stratford-upon-Avon, June 2015. Shown as Part of 'Culture in Quarantine' on BBC iPlayer, 23 April to 22 August 2020," *Shakespeare*, 17.1 (2021) 83–87
- Bassnett, Susan, *Translation Studies*, 3rd edn (London and New York: Routledge, 2002)
- Bassnett, Susan, "Engendering Anew: Shakespeare, Gender, and Translation," in *Shakespeare and the Language of Translation*, ed. by Ton Hoenselaars, Revised (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2012), 53–67
- Bayley, John, *The Characters of Love: A Study in the Literature of Personality* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960)
- Belsey, Catherine, "Fear and Wonder: Shakespeare's Ghost in the Fireside Tradition," in *Hamlet and Emotions*, ed. by Paul Megna, Brid Phillips, and R.S. White (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019) 61–79
- Benjamin, Walter, "The Task of the Translator," in *The Translation Studies Reader*, ed. by Lawrence Venuti, trans. by Harry Zohn (London: Routledge, 2000) 15–25
- Berger, Harry, "Acts of Silence, Acts of Speech: How to Do Things with *Othello* and *Desdemona*," *Renaissance Drama*, 33 (2004) 3–35
- Bevington, David, "Introduction," in *Troilus and Cressida*, by William Shakespeare, ed. by David Bevington (London: Arden Shakespeare, 1998)
- Boddice, Rob, *The History of Emotions* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018)
- Bode, Sabine, *Die deutsche Krankheit — German Angst* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006)
- The booke of the common prayer and administracion of the Sacramentes, and other rites and ceremonies of the Churche: after the use of the Churche of England* (London: Edouardi Whitechurche, 1549)
- Boquet, Guy, "Shakespeare on the French Stage: A Historical Survey," in *Shakespeare Yearbook*, Vol. V, ed. by Holger Klein and Jean-Marie Maguin (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995) 191–218
- Bottineau, Didier, "Language and Enaction," in *Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science*, ed. by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. DiPaolo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010) 267–302
- Bourke, Joanna, *Fear: A Cultural History* (London: Virago, 2005)
- Brantley, Ben, "Shakespeare in That Universal Language: Theater," *The New York Times (Online)* (9 November 2006) <<https://www-proquest-com.ez->

- proxye.bham.ac.uk/docview/2225112942/F789AADD51B642FDPQ/1?account-id=8630> [accessed 22 July 2021]
- Brathwait, Richard, *The English Gentleman* (London: John Flaviland, 1630)
- Braunmuller, A.R., and Robert N. Watson, "Introduction," in *Measure for Measure*, by William Shakespeare, ed. by A.R. Braunmuller and Robert N. Watson (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2020) 1–148
- Bright, Timothy, *Treatise of Melancholy* (London: Thomas Vautrollier, 1586)
- Brown, Theodore M., "Descartes, Dualism and Psychosomatic Medicine," in *The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry*, vol. 1, *People and Ideas*, ed. by W.F. Bynum, R. Porter and M. Shepherd (London: Tavistock, 1985)
- Burgh, James, *The Art of Speaking* (London: 1761)
- Burke, Peter, "Is There a Cultural History of the Emotions?" in *Representing Emotions: New Connections in the Histories of Art, Music and Medicine*, ed. by Penelope Gouk and Helen Hills (London: Routledge 2005) 35–48
- Burton, Robert, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (London: 1621)
- Campbell, Lily Bess, *Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes: Slaves of Passion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930)
- Carver, Charles S., and Michael F. Scheier, "Action, Affect, and Two-Mode Models of Functioning" in *Oxford Handbook of Human Action*, ed. by Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh, and Peter M. Gollwitzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 298–327
- Casimir, Michael J., "On the Origin and Evolution of Affective Capacities in Lower Vertebrates," in *Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes*, ed. by Birgitt Röttger-Rössler and Hans J. Markowitsch (New York: Springer, 2009) 55–93
- Cassin, Barbara, et al., *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014)
- Chartier, (Alain) Émile, "Valeur morale de la joie d'après Spinoza," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, VIIe année (1899) 759–64
- Colombetti, Giovanna, "Enaction, Sense-Making, and Emotion," in *Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science*, ed. by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. DiPaolo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010) 146–64
- Colombetti, Giovanna, *The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014)
- Colombetti, Giovanna, "Enactive Affectivity, Extended" *Topoi*, 36.3 (2017) 445–55
- Corrigan, John, "Religion and Emotions," in *Doing Emotions History*, ed. by Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014) 143–62
- Craik, Katharine A., "Introduction," in *Shakespeare and Emotion*, ed. by Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 1–16

- Crane, Mary Thomas, *Shakespeare's Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001)
- Crawley, Peter, "Ostermeier's 'Hamlet': what did you expect?" *The Irish Times* (23 August 2014) <<https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/stage/ostermeier-s-hamlet-what-did-you-expect-1.1901339>> [accessed 18 May, 2021]
- Croall, Jonathan, *Performing Hamlet: Actors in the Modern Age* (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2018)
- Crone, Jennifer, "When the Divine Lady Becomes a Genius: The Journey from Joi to Lack in Courtly Love Poetry," *Sydney Studies in English*, 39 (2013) 1–24
- Crooke, Helkiah, *Microcomographia; or, A Description of the Body of Man* (London, 1615)
- Croteau, Melissa, "Bollywood," in *Shakespeare and Emotion*, ed. by Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 136–150
- Crystal, David, and Ben Crystal, *Shakespeare's Words: A Glossary and Language Companion* (London: Penguin, 2002)
- Cuvelier, Eliane, "Shakespeare, Voltaire and French Taste," in *Shakespeare Yearbook*, Vol. V, ed. by Holger Klein and Jean-Marie Maguin (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995) 25–48
- Dannenfeldt, Karl H., "André Du Laurens (1558–1609): An Early French Writer on the Aged," *The Gerontologist*, 27.2 (April 1987) 240–243
- Darnton, Robert, *The Great Cat Massacre: and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (New York: Basic Books, 1984)
- Darwin, Charles, *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013 [1872])
- Daum, Irene, Hans J. Markowitsch, and Marie Vandekerckhove, "Neurobiological Basis of Emotions," in *Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes*, ed. by Birgitt Röttger-Rössler and Hans J. Markowitsch (New York: Springer, 2009) 111–38
- David, Pascal, "ANXIETY," in Barbara Cassin et al., *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) 37–38
- Davis, Philip, *Shakespeare Thinking* (London: Bloomsbury, 2009)
- Davis, Philip, "Language," in *Shakespeare and Emotion*, ed. by Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 151–66
- Davis-Brown, Kris, "Shakespeare's Use of Chaucer in 'Troilus and Cressida': 'That the Will Is Infinite, and the Execution Confined,'" *South Central Review*, 5.2 (1988) 15–34
- Dawson, Lesel, *Lovesickness and Gender in Early Modern English Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)
- De Smet, Robert, "Othello in Paris and Brussels," in *Shakespeare Survey: Volume 3: The Man and the Writer*, ed. by Allardyce Nicoll, trans. by Barry Jackson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) 98–106

- De Sousa, Ronald, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 1987
- De Vigny, Alfred, *Le More de Venise, Othello. Tragédie, traduit de Shakespeare en vers français* (Paris: Chez Levasseur, 1830)
- Déprats, Jean-Michel "Translating Shakespeare's Stagecraft," in *Shakespeare and the Language of Translation*, ed. by Ton Hoenselaars, Revised (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2012) 133–47
- Desmet, Christy, "'The dread of something after death': Hamlet and the Emotional Afterlife of Shakespearean Revenants," *Actes Des Congrès de La Société Française Shakespeare* [En Ligne], 36 (2018)
- Dickson, Andrew, *Worlds Elsewhere: Journeys Around Shakespeare's Globe* (London: The Bodley Head, 2015)
- Diewald, Gabriele, Leena Kahlas-Tarkka and Ilse Wischer, "Introduction," in *Comparative Studies in Early Germanic Languages: With a focus on verbal categories*, ed. by Gabriele Diewald, Leena Kahlas-Tarkka, and Ilse Wischer, (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013) 1–16
- Dixon, Thomas, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2003)
- Donne, John, "Sermon XVI, at Lincolns Inne," in *Fifty sermons. preached by that learned and reverend divine, John Donne, Second Volume* (London, Ia. Fletcher, 1649)
- Donne, John, *The Sermons of John Donne*, ed. by George R. Potter and Evelyn M. Simpson, 10 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953–62)
- Dover Wilson, John, *What Happens in Hamlet* (New York: Macmillan, 1935)
- Dow, Steve, "Measure for Measure Review – Russians Add Layers to Shakespeare's Problem Play," *The Guardian*, 9 January 2017, Online edition, section Culture <<https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2017/jan/09/measure-for-measure-review-russians-add-layers-to-shakespeares-problem-play>> [accessed 22 April 2021]
- Du Laurens, André, *Discourse of the Preservation of Sight: Of Melancholike Diseases; of Rheums, and of Old Age*, trans. by Richard Surphlet (London: Felix Kingston, 1599)
- Ducis, Jean-François, *Othello*, ed. by Christopher Smith (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1991)
- Edwards, Jennifer J. "'Mark how He Trembles in His Ecstasy': Space, Place, and Self in the Comedy of Errors," *Shakespeare Studies*, 48 (2020) 125–31
- Engelen, Eva-Maria, et al., "Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes: Disciplinary Debates and an Interdisciplinary Outlook," in *Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes*, ed. by Birgitt Röttger-Rössler and Hans J. Markowitsch (New York: Springer, 2009) 23–53

- Enterline, Lynn, *Shakespeare's Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012)
- Escolme, Bridget, *Talking to the Audience: Shakespeare, Performance, Self* (London: Routledge, 2005)
- Escolme, Bridget, *Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage: Passion's Slaves* (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2014)
- Escolme, Bridget, "Acting," in *Shakespeare and Emotion*, ed. by Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 122–35
- Evans, Dylan, *Emotion: The Science of Sentiment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
- Farnham, Willard, "Troilus in Shapes of Infinite Desire," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 15.2 (1964) 257–64
- Fernie, Ewan, *Shame in Shakespeare* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002)
- Firestone, Emma, "Warmth and Affection in *1 Henry IV*: Why No One Likes Prince Hal," in *Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's Theatre: The Early Modern Body-Mind*, ed. by Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn Tribble (New York: Routledge, 2014) 47–65
- Földvary, Kinga, "The Critical Backstory: The Reception of *Troilus and Cressida* through the Ages," in *Troilus and Cressida: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Efterpi Mitsi (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2019) 13–51
- Fowler, Benjamin, "Hamlet: Presented at by the Schaubuhne am Lehniner Platz at the Barbican Theatre, London," *Shakespeare Bulletin*, 31.4 (Winter 2013) 737–45
- Fox, Cora, Bradley J. Irish, and Cassie M. Miura, "Introduction," in *Positive Emotions in Early Modern Literature and Culture*, ed. by Cora Fox, Bradley J. Irish, and Cassie M. Miura, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021) 1–17
- Frevert, Ute, "Defining Emotions: Concepts and Debates over Three Centuries," in Frevert et al., *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling 1700-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 1–31
- Garber, Marjorie, *Shakespeare After All* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004)
- Gardner, C.O., "Some Notes on the Comic Seriousness of 'Twelfth Night,'" *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, 19 (31 October, 1962) 24–31
- Gardner, Lyn, "Measure for Measure Review," *The Guardian*, 2 July 2004, section Theatre <<https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2004/jul/02/theatre1>>
- Geertz, Clifford, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976)
- Giacomoni, Paola, "The Light of the Emotions: Passions and Emotions in Seventeenth-Century French Culture," *Nuncius*, 33 (2018) 56–87
- Gibson, Edgar C. S., *The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England*, 2 vols. (London: Methuen & Co., 1897) vol. 2

- Gjesdal, Kristin, "Interpreting *Hamlet*: The Early German Reception," in *Shakespeare's Hamlet: Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. by Tzachi Zamir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 247–72
- Goddard, Harold C., *The Meaning of Shakespeare, Volume II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951)
- Greenblatt, Stephen, *Hamlet in Purgatory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001)
- Habinek, Lianne, "Altered States: Hamlet and Early Modern Head Trauma," in *Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's Theatre*, ed. by Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn Tribble (New York: Routledge, 2014) 195–215
- Haley, Bruce E., "The Infinite Will: Shakespeare's 'Troilus' and the 'Ode to a Nightingale'" *The Keats-Shelley Journal*, 22/23 (1972–1973) 18–23
- Hallstead, R.N., "Idoltrous Love: A New Approach to Othello," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 19.2 (1968) 107–24
- Harré, Rom, "An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint," in *The Social Construction of Emotions*, ed. by Rom Harré (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986)
- Harrow, Susan and Timothy Unwin, "Introduction," in *Joie de Vivre in French Literature and Culture*, ed. by Susan Harrow and Timothy Unwin (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009)
- Harvey, Elizabeth D., "Medicine," in *Shakespeare and Emotion*, ed. by Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 34–48
- Hatchuel, Sarah, and Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin, "'O monstrous': Claude Barma's French 1962 TV *Othello*," in *Shakespeare on Screen in Francophonía: The Shakscreen Collection 3*, ed. by Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin and Patricia Dorval, (Montpellier, France: IRCL, Université Paul-Valéry/Montpellier, 2014)
Online: <http://www.shakscreen.org/analysis/barma_othello/> [accessed 3 September, 2021]
- Hick, Darren Hudson, and Craig Derksen, "The Problem of Tragedy and the Protective Frame," *Emotion Review*, 9.2 (2017) 140–45
- Hobgood, Allison, *Passionate Playgoing in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)
- Hochschild, Arlie, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012 [1983])
- Hoenselaars, Ton, "Introduction," in *Shakespeare and the Language of Translation*, ed. by Ton Hoenselaars (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2012) 1–30
- Hogan, Patrick Colm, "All's Well That Ends Well? Happiness, ambivalence, and story genre," in *Positive Emotions in Early Modern Literature and Culture*, ed. by Cora Fox, Bradley J. Irish, and Cassie M. Miura (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021) 199–214

- Holbrook, Peter, "Afterword," in *The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries* (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 2015) 264–72
- Holodynski, Manfred, "Milestones and Mechanisms of Emotional Development," in *Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes*, ed. by Birgitt Röttger-Rössler and Hans J. Markowitsch (New York: Springer, 2009) 139–63
- Honigman, E.A.J., "Introduction," in *Othello* by William Shakespeare, ed. by E.A.J. Honigman, (Walton-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson & Sons/Arden Shakespeare, 1997) 1–111
- Hubscher-Davidson, Séverine, *Translation and Emotion: A Psychological Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2018)
- Hultquist, Aleksandra, "The Passions," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017) 71–73
- Hurley, Erin, *Theatre & Feeling* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)
- Hutchins, Edwin, "Enaction, Imagination, and Insight," in *Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science*, ed. by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. DiPaolo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010) 425–50
- Iordanskaja, Lidija, and Slava Paperno, *The Russian-English Collocational Dictionary of the Human Body* (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1996)
- Jackson, Joshua Conrad, et al, "Emotion Semantics Show Both Cultural Variation and Universal Structure," *Science*, 366.6472 (2019) 1517–22
- Jakobson, Roman, "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation," in *The Translation Studies Reader*, ed. by Lawrence Venuti (London: Routledge, 2000) 113–18
- Joubin, Alexa Alice, "Shakespeare and Translation," in *The Edinburgh Companion to Shakespeare and the Arts*, ed. by Mark Thornton Burnett, Adrian Streete, and Ramona Wray (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011) 68–87
- Kambaskovic, Danijela, "Humoral theory," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017) 39–42
- Karant-Nunn, Susan, *The Reformation of Feeling: Shaping Religious Emotions in Early Modern Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
- Karimova, Zulfia, and Andriy Vasylychenko, "STRADANIE," in Barbara Cassin et al., *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) 1064–1064
- Kaula, David, "Will and Reason in Troilus and Cressida," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 12.3 (1961) 271–83
- Kehoe, Thomas J., and Michael G. Pickering, "Introduction," in *Fear in the German-Speaking World, 1600-2000*, ed. by Thomas J. Kehoe and Michael G. Pickering (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020) 1-14

- Kelly, Thomas, "Shakespeare's Romantic Heroes: Orlando Reconsidered," *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 24.1 (Winter 1973) 12–24
- Kenny, Amy, "'A Feast of Languages': The Role of Language in the Globe to Globe Festival," *Multicultural Shakespeare*, 11.26 (2014) 31–44
- Kesson, Andy "'They that tread in a maze': movement as emotion in John Lyly" in *The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*, ed. by Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 2015) 177–99
- King, Ros, "Plays, Playing, and Make Believe," in *Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's Theatre: The Early Modern Body-Mind*, ed. by Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn Tribble (New York: Routledge, 2014) 27–45
- Kirsch, Arthur, "The Polarization of Erotic Love in 'Othello,'" *The Modern Language Review*, 73.4 (1978) 721–40
- Kirwan, Peter, *Shakespeare in the Theatre: Cheek by Jowl* (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2019)
- Kizima, Marina P., "From migration to naturalization: Shakespeare in Russia," in *Migrating Shakespeare: First European Encounters, Routes and Networks*, ed. by Janet Clare and Dominique Goy-Blanquet (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2021) 167–88
- Krippendorff, Ekkehart, "Mediale Verflüchtigung, historisierende Vergegenwärtigung—Shakespeare in Berlin und Meiningen," *Shakespeare Jahrbuch*, 150 (2014) 161–64
- Kugler, Sarah, "'Hamlet' auf dem Schirrhof in Potsdam: 'Im Kampf lernt man die Leute kennen,'" *Tagespiel Potsdamer* (27 Aug 2015) <<https://www.pnn.de/kultur/hamlet-auf-dem-schirrhof-in-potsdam-im-kampf-lernt-man-die-leute-kennen/21486894.html>> [accessed 19 May 2021]
- Lake, Peter, *Hamlet's Choice: Religion and Resistance in Shakespeare's Revenge Tragedies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020)
- Lambert, James S., "Spenser's 'Epithalamion' and the Protestant Expression of Joy," *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, 54.1 (Winter 2014) 81–103
- Large, Duncan, et al, "Introduction," in *Untranslatability*, ed. by Duncan Large, et al. (London: Routledge, 2018)
- Lee, John, "The Critical Backstory," in *Hamlet: a Critical Reader*, ed. by Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016) 15–52
- Leyens, Jacques-Philippe, et al., "The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of Secondary Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups," *Personality & Social Psychology Review* (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 4.2 (2000) 186–98
- Locke, John, *An essay concerning humane understanding* (London: Printed by Eliz. Holt, for Thomas Basset, 1690)

- Lomas, Tim, *Translating Happiness: A Cross-Cultural Lexicon of Well-Being* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018)
- Luther, Martin, *A commentarie of M. Doctor Martin Luther upon the Epistle of S. Paul to the Galathians...* (London: Thomas Vautroullier 1575)
- Lyon, Margot L., "Emotion, Embodiment, and Agency: The Place of a Social Emotions Perspective in the Cross-Disciplinary Understanding of Emotional Processes," in *Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes*, ed. by Birgitt Röttger-Rössler and Hans J. Markowitsch (New York: Springer, 2009) 199–213
- Martín-Moruno, Dolores, and Beatriz Pichel, "Introduction," in *Emotional Bodies: The Historical Performativity of Emotions* ed. by Dolores Martín-Moruno and Beatriz Pichel (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019) 1–14
- Massumi, Brian "The Autonomy of Affect," *Cultural Critique*, 31 (1995) 83–109
- Matt, Susan J., "Recovering the Invisible: Methods for the Historical Study of the Emotions," in *Doing Emotions History*, ed. Peter N. Stearns and Susan J. Matt (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014) 41–53
- Matt, Susan J., and Peter N. Stearns, "Introduction," in *Doing Emotions History*, ed. by Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014) 1–13
- Mazzio, Carla, "The History of Air: Hamlet and the Trouble with Instruments," *South Central Review*, 26.1/2 (2009) 153–96
- McConachie, Bruce, *Evolution, Cognition, and Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)
- McMahon, Darrin M., "Finding Joy in the History of Emotions," in *Doing Emotions History*, ed. by Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014) 103–19
- Medina, José, "An Enactivist Approach to the Imagination: Embodied Enactments and 'Fictional Emotions,'" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 50.3 (2013) 317–35
- Meek, Richard, "'Rue e'en for ruth': *Richard II* and the imitation of sympathy," in *The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*, ed. by Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 2015) 130–52
- Meek, Richard, and Erin Sullivan, "Introduction," in *The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*, ed. by Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 2015) 1–22
- Menzer, Paul, "That Old Saw: Early Modern Acting and the Infinite Regress," *Shakespeare Bulletin*, 22.2 (2004) 27–44
- Menzer, Paul, "The Actor's Inhibition: Early Modern Acting and the Rhetoric of Restraint," *Renaissance Drama*, 35 (2006) 83–111

- Mesquita, Batja, and Michael Boiger, "Emotions in Context: A Sociodynamic Model of Emotions," *Emotion Review*, 6.4 (October 2014) 298–302
- Miller, William Ian, *Humiliation: And other essays on honor, social discomfort, and violence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)
- Mitchell, W. Fraser, *English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tillotson* (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1932)
- Modenessi, Alfredo Michel, "'A Double Tongue within Your Mask': Translating Shakespeare in/to Spanish-Speaking Latin America," in *Shakespeare and the Language of Translation*, ed. by Ton Hoenselaars, Revised (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2012) 240–54
- Moschovakis, Nicholas R., "Topicality and Conceptual Blending: Titus Andronicus and the Case of William Hackett." *College Literature*, 33.1 (Winter 2006) 127–50
- Mullaney, Steven, "Affective Technologies: Toward an Emotional Logic of the Elizabethan Stage," in *Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England*, ed. by Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 71–89
- Neely, Carol Thomas, "Lovesickness, Gender, and Subjectivity: *Twelfth Night* and *As You Like It*," in *A Feminist Companion to Shakespeare*, ed. by Dymphna Callaghan (Hoboken, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2016) 294–317
- Nisbett, Richard, *Culture of Honor* (Boulder, CO and Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 1996)
- Niedenthal, Paula, et al., "A Prototype Analysis of the French Category 'Émotion'," *Cognition and Emotion*, 18.3 (2004) 289–312
- Nuss, Bernard, *Das Faust Syndrom: Ein Versuch über die Mentalität der Deutschen* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993)
- Oatley, Keith, "Simulation of Substance and Shadow: Inner Emotions and Outer Behavior in Shakespeare's Psychology of Character," *College Literature*, 33.1, (Winter 2006) 15–33
- Owen, Jane, *An Antidote Against Purgatory* (Saint-Omer: English College Press, 1634)
- Palfrey, Simon, *Doing Shakespeare* (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2011)
- Pandit, Lalita, "Emotion, Perception and Anagnorisis in *The Comedy of Errors*: A Cognitive Perspective," *College Literature*, 33.1 (Winter 2006) 94–126
- Pandit, Lalita, and Patrick C. Hogan, "Introduction: Morsels and Modules: On Embodying Cognition in Shakespeare's Plays," *College Literature*, 33.1 (Winter 2006) 1–13
- Paster, Gail Kern, *The Body Embarrassed: drama and the disciplines of shame in early modern England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993)
- Paster, Gail Kern, *Humoring the Body* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004)

- Paster, Gail Kern, "Community," in *Shakespeare and Emotion*, ed. By Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 94–108
- Paster, Gail Kern, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, "Introduction," in *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, ed. by Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2004) 1–20
- Pavlenko, Aneta, "Affective Processing in Bilingual Speakers: Disembodied Cognition?" *International Journal of Psychology*, 47.6 (2012) 405–28
- Pemble, John, *Shakespeare Goes to Paris: How the Bard Conquered France* (London: Hambledon and London, 2005)
- Peterson, Kaara L., "Macbeth, directed by Rufus Norris for the National Theatre, Olivier Theatre, London, UK, 26 February–23 June 2018. Filmed for NT Live (screen director: Tim van Someren), 2018. Viewed at National Theatre, London, 1 June 2018, circle, stage left. Accessed via NT Live in Boston, Massachusetts, USA, 6–7 May 2020," *Cahiers Élisabéthains*, 103.1 (November 2020) 178–81
- Phelan, Peggy, "Thirteen Ways of Looking at Choreographing Writing," in *Choreographing History*, ed. by Susan Foster (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995) 200–210
- Potkay, Adam, *The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
- Potter, Lois, "Performance History," in *Hamlet: a Critical Reader*, ed. by Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016) 53–81
- Prince, Kathryn, "Drama," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017) 92–95
- Pushkin, Alexander, *Eugene Onegin: A Novel in Verse*, trans. by Vladimir Nabokov (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1964)
- Quine, Willard V.O., "Meaning and Translation," in *The Translation Studies Reader*, ed. by Lawrence Venuti (London: Routledge, 2000 [1959]) 94–112
- Randles, Sarah, "Materiality," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017B) 17–20
- Reddy, William, "Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions," *Current Anthropology*, 38.3 (1997) 327–51
- Reddy, William, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
- Rhodes, Neil, "Rhetoric," in *Shakespeare and Emotion*, ed. by Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 19–33
- Roach, Joseph R., *The Player's Passion: Studies in the Science of Acting* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993)

- Roberts, David, "Hamlet in Performance: 1602–1709," in *Hamlet-Handbuch* ed. by P.W. Marx (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2014) 127–29
- Röttger-Rössler, Birgitt, "Gravestones for Butterflies: Social Feeling Rules and Individual Experiences of Loss," in *Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes*, ed. by Birgitt Röttger-Rössler and Hans J. Markowitsch (New York: Springer, 2009) 165–80
- Rosch, Eleanor, "Introduction," in *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016 [1991])
- Rosenberg, Marvin, *The Masks of Othello* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961)
- Rosenwein, Barbara, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006)
- Rowe, Katherine, "The Play of Time in Cognition", in *Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's Theatre*, ed. by Laurie Johnson, John Sutton, and Evelyn Tribble (New York: Routledge, 2014) 191–94
- Rowe, Katherine, "Humoral Knowledge and Liberal Cognition in Davenant," in *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, ed. by Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2004) 169–91
- Russell, J.A., "Culture and the categorisation of emotion," in *Psychological Bulletin* 110.3 (1991) 426–50
- Ryrie, Alec, *Being Protestant in Reformation England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)
- Samarin, Roman, "Preface," in *Shakespeare in the Soviet Union*, ed. by Roman Samarin and Alexander Nikolyukin (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966)
- Saval, Peter Kishore, *Shakespeare in Hate* (New York: Routledge, 2015)
- Schalkwyk, David, *Shakespeare, Love and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018)
- Scheer, Monique, "Are Emotions a Kind of Practice? (And is That What Makes Them Have a History?): A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion," *History and Theory*, 51.2 (2012) 193–220
- Scheer, Monique, "Topographies of Emotion," in Frevert et al., *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling 1700–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 32–61
- Schleiner, Louise, "Providential Improvisation in Measure for Measure," *PMLA*, 97.2 (1982) 227–36

- Schmidt-Ihms, M., "Shakespeare in the German Speaking World with Special Reference to 'Hamlet,'" *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, 23 (1964) 21–34
- Schoenfeldt, Michael, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
- Schofield, Benedict, "Shakespeare Beyond the Trenches: The German Myth of *unser Shakespeare* in Transnational Perspective," in *Local and Global Myths in Shakespearean Performance*, ed. by Aneta Mancewicz and Alexa Alice Joubin (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 93–120
- Schütz, Chantal, "Introduction," *Actes Des Congrès de La Société Française Shakespeare [En Ligne]*, 36 (2018)
- Schwartz, Elias, "Twelfth Night and the Meaning of Shakespearean Comedy," *College English* 28.77 (1967) 508–519
- Schwartz, Elias, "Stylistic 'Impurity' and the Meaning of Othello," *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, 10.2 (1970) 297–313
- Shweder, Richard A., "Deconstructing the Emotions for the Sake of Comparative Research," in *Feelings and emotions: The Amsterdam symposium*, ed. by A. S. R. Manstead, N. Frijda, and A. Fischer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 81–97
- Searle, John R., *Consciousness and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
- Shakespeare, William, *King Richard II*, ed. by Charles R. Forker (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2002)
- Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine, "On the Challenge of Languaging Experience," *The Corporeal Turn: An Interdisciplinary Reader* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2009) 363–81
- Simons, Patricia, "Emotion," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017) 36–39
- Slaby, Jan, "Emotions and the Extended Mind," in *Collective Emotions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 32–46
- Smith, Emma, *This is Shakespeare* (London: Pelican Books, 2019)
- Snow, C.P., *The Two Cultures* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1959)
- Snyder, Susan, "'Othello' and the Conventions of Romantic Comedy," *Renaissance Drama*, 5 (1972) 123–41
- Sobol, Valeria, *Febris Erotica: Lovesickness in the Russian Literary Imagination* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009)
- Soellner, Rolf, "The Four Primary Passions: A Renaissance Theory Reflected in the Works of Shakespeare," *Studies in Philology*, 55.4 (1958) 549–6
- Some Remarks on the Tragedy of Hamlet Prince of Denmark* (London: W. Wilkins, 1736)

- Stearns, Peter N., "Modern Patterns in Emotion History," in *Doing Emotions History*, ed. by Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014) 17–40
- Steggle, Matthew *Laughing and Weeping in Early Modern Theatres* (Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007)
- Steinberg, Mark D., "Emotions History in Eastern Europe," in *Doing Emotions History*, ed. by Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014) 74–99
- Stephan, Achim, "*Homo Sapiens* – The Emotional Animal," in *Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes*, ed. by Birgitt Röttger-Rössler and Hans J. Markowitsch (New York: Springer, 2009) 11–19
- Stewart, John, "Foundational Issues in Enaction as a Paradigm for Cognitive Science: From the Origin of Life to Consciousness and Writing," in *Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science*, ed. by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. DiPaolo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010) 1–31
- Strier, Richard, *The Unrepentant Renaissance: From Petrarch to Shakespeare to Milton* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2011)
- Strier, Richard, "Happiness," in *Shakespeare and Emotion*, ed. by Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 275–287
- Strier, Richard, and Carla Mazzio, "Two Responses to Shakespeare and Embodiment: an E-Conversation," *Literature Compass* 3.1 (2005) 15–31
- Sullivan, Erin, "The passions of Thomas Wright: Renaissance emotion across body and soul," in *The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*, ed. by Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 2015) 25–44
- Sullivan, Erin, *Beyond Melancholy: Sadness and Selfhood in Renaissance England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)
- Sullivan, Erin "Grief," in *Shakespeare and Emotion*, ed. by Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 211–223
- Sverdlov, Lev S., "Cultural Aspects of the Social Attitudes Toward Alcohol in Russia: The Mythology and Cult of Alcohol," *Common Health*, 2001, 14–18
- Tallis, Frank, *Love Sick* (London: Arrow Books, 2005)
- Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, "Mariana," in *Poems, Chiefly Lyrical* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966)
- Thibodeau, Paul H., and Lera Boroditsky, "Metaphors We Think With: The Role of Metaphor in Reasoning," *PLOS ONE*, 6.2 (2011) e16782 <<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0016782>>
- Thompson, Ayanna, "Introduction," in *Othello* by William Shakespeare, ed. by E.A.J. Honigman, (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016 [1997])

- Thompson, Evan, "Introduction," in *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016 [1991])
- Tofte, Robert, *Laura, The Toyes of a Traveller: Or, The Feast of Fancie* (London: Valentine Sims, 1597)
- Tribble, Evelyn, *Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare's Theatre* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)
- Tribble, Evelyn, "Introduction," *Shakespeare Studies*, 43 (2015) 17–26
- Tribble, Evelyn, *Early Modern Actors & Shakespeare's Theatre: Thinking with the Body* (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2017)
- Trigg, Stephanie "Affect theory," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017) 10–13
- Tsur, Reuven, "Delivery Style and Listener Response in the Rhythmical Performance of Shakespeare's Sonnets," *College Literature*, 33.1 (Winter 2006) 170–96
- Valade, Pauline, "Public Celebrations and Public Joy at the Beginning of the French Revolution (1788–91)," *French History*, 29.2 (2015) 182–203
- Van Doren, Mark, *Shakespeare* (New York: Holt & Co., 1939)
- Venuti, Lawrence, *The Scandals of Translation* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998)
- Voltaire, *Lettres philosophiques*, Nouvelle édition (Paris: Garnier, 1879 [1730])
- Wassmann, Claudia, "Forgotten Origins, Occluded Meanings: Translation of Emotion Terms," *Emotion Review*, 9.2 (April 2017) 163–71
- Watson, Curtis Brown *Shakespeare and the Renaissance Concept of Honor* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960)
- Watt Smith, Tiffany, *The Book of Human Emotions: An Encyclopedia of Feeling from Anger to Wanderlust* Kindle Edition (London: Profile Books, 2015)
- Wayne, Valerie, "Introduction," in *Cymbeline* by William Shakespeare, ed. by Valerie Wayne (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2017) 1–136
- Weber, Pierre-Frédéric, "German Angst after 1945 as Fear of the Fear," in *Fear in the German-Speaking World, 1600-2000*, ed. by Thomas J. Kehoe and Michael G. Pickering (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020) 253–73
- Wells, Marion A., *The Secret Wound: Love-Melancholy and Early Modern Romance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007)
- Wells, Stanley, *Shakespeare, Sex, & Love* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
- White, R.S., "Language of Emotions," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017A) 33–35
- White, R.S., "Mood," in *Early Modern Emotions: An introduction*, ed. by Susan Broomhall (London: Routledge, 2017B) 50–53

- White, R.S., and Ciara Rawnsley, "Discrepant emotional awareness in Shakespeare" in *The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries*, ed. by Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 2015) 241–63
- Wierzbicka, Anna, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal human concepts in culture-specific configurations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)
- Wierzbicka, Anna, *Emotions Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
- Wilkinson, Greg, "Timothie Bright: *Melancholie, Characterie*, Shakespeare and *Hamlet* – Psychiatry in History," *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 214.1 (2019) 51–51
- Williamson, Elizabeth, "Religion," in *Shakespeare and Emotion* ed. by Katharine A. Craik (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 49–63
- Woods, Penelope, "The audience of the indoor theatre," in *Moving Shakespeare Indoors: Performance and Repertoire in the Jacobean Playhouse*, ed. by Andrew Gurr and Farah Karim-Cooper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 152–67
- Wright, George T., *Shakespeare's Metrical Art* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)
- Wright, Thomas, *The passions of the minde in generall* (London, Valentine Simmes for Walter Burre, 1604)