SYSTEMIC ANTAGONISM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

by

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Abstract:

Systemic Antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union was based on functional opposition and irreconcilability because American-style Capitalism was not convergent with Soviet Socialism. They occupied different ends of a systemic spectrum and their inseparably intertwined ideological, political, economic, cultural and legal elements were systemically not adaptable to the other. Each systemic whole exceeded the sum of its elements, so altering one affected the others: amending ideology to include other parties, representative of class interests, inherently compromised the Communist Party's single party proletarian status; assimilation of private enterprise would vitiate the state's planned economy, embodying workers' rather than private/ class control of productive means.

Pre-war Soviet-American co-existence was possible because Systemic Antagonism remained latent, while joint involvement in the anti-Nazi alliance subordinated their differences. Peace made Systemic Antagonism actively real as irreconcilable reconstructive templates associated with conflicting political agendas projected systemic divisions onto a weakened Europe which had forfeited the management of its destiny to the dominant European-based super states. Importantly Soviet-American war-time respective advances from the East and West largely configured the geography of the Cold War. This conflict proved a stress test ultimately exposing Soviet systemic weaknesses. The U.S. emerged the victorious survivor by unwitting default.

Dedicated to my son
Ashley Ponsonby

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INTRODUCTION

American forces advancing across Europe from the West and Soviet forces from the East met on the River Elbe in April 1945. This approach from different directions was symbolic. These soldiers were from very different types of states and so were protagonists of divergent political, ideological and economic values. The encounter marked the near fulfillment of the objective of defeating Nazi Germany, yet without guarantees for future co-operation. Hitler's death a few days later removed the cement from an unlikely alliance and effectively transformed Soviet-American agendas. Within months the images and photo calls that had reflected soldierly bonhomie would be superseded by Soviet-American disagreements and a burgeoning conflict. During the war the need for an alliance of mutual benefit to defeat Nazi Germany produced unity. Now the need to rebuild Europe but based on different world visions would produce irreconcilable templates. Co-operation in destruction was easier than in reconstruction because there was no consensus about the kind of Europe each wanted. This was emblematic of *systemic antagonism*. Such conflicting Soviet and American post-war objectives arose from their antithetical natures and the consequence was the projection of their systemic fault lines onto Europe.

The Soviet Union and United States differed from preceding great powers since each represented a new category of super state. Firstly, these were states based on ideologies which were reflected in their political, economic, legal, cultural and social forms. Secondly these ideologically-based forms reflected opposed core precepts so that the United States and Soviet Union occupied different ends of a systemic spectrum. Thirdly, and as a consequence, they were competitively expansionist global powers whose aim was to convert and absorb other states into their respective systemic folds which promoted a

schismatic world. Fourthly their antagonism would become associated with the mutual possession of new weapons of mass destruction which meant they held the world's survival in their hands so that any crisis between them could be potentially threatening to all. Fifthly, their dominance was facilitated by a world war which saw the exhaustion or defeat of all European and Asian great powers. In this sense the encounter on the Elbe marked a new epoch of aspirant superpower domination. The focus of this thesis is on how their competing systemic agendas developed, then on how these conspired with the circumstances of a devastated Europe to create bi-lateral strains that transformed Soviet-American *systemic antagonism* from latent into actual in the form of the Cold War conflict.

The 1947 pronouncements of President Harry Truman to Congress in March, then of Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin's then heir apparent, to the Cominform in September, highlighted clearly different world outlooks but also contrasts between systems rooted in conflictual premises. Each contended theirs was superior. The rhetoric of "alternative ways of life" and "two major camps" implied the potential for conflict due to mutual antagonism. Their words contain an insightful contemporary perception which is historically useful because they retrospectively identified the mainsprings of systemic conflict. Their notion of a global struggle presaged a clash between the United States and the Soviet Union both of which began exhibiting the attributes of systemic archetypes even before the start of the war in 1939. However, a clear recognition of underlying Soviet-American differences became subordinated to prioritizing their war-time alliance. Later, Truman referred to supporting free peoples and that a global perspective underpinned containment (1956, p.105-6). Zhdanov's speech aligned the Soviet Union with the aspirations of progressive mankind and his reference to her foreign policy's

enlarged international scope also reflected a universalism but of a different, Socialist-oriented form (1947). Both therefore drew heavily on their respective politics, ideologies, and economics. Although *systemic antagonism* was in neither's lexicon this concept was implied in their assumption of a protracted conflict between antagonistic and competitive entities. Their perspectives, but without their partisanship, inform the parameters of this analytical systemic overview.

The historiography of the Cold War has moved through phases of blame allocation which invite accusations of being simplistic and partisan. Furthermore emphasis on the primary causal role of personality, ideology, economics, political system or policy is restrictive by ignoring a wider view. While each element is contributory such a view is limited by assigning too much importance to just one; yet none on its own is sufficient. Thus a preoccupation with such specifics has blinkered historians to an essentially holistic approach. Various elements are best contextualized within the remit of *systemic antagonism* which adopts a broader and more inclusive perspective. An examination of key ideas and approaches is therefore important now to determine how other commentators have sometimes approached but then failed to identify *systemic antagonism* in explaining the Cold War's origins. The criterion is how the existence of two distinct and opposed systemic entities created a predisposition to conflict. Thus the proposition is that since each whole is greater than the sum of its constituent elements, the proper perspective should be from the two wholes, not any one of these elements.

Ralph Harrington noted that historians became the victims of their own historical circumstances since for fifty years they wrote about the Cold War within the conflict itself (2005, p.1). Strong contemporary loyalties militated against objectivity as certain writers fought the Cold War with their robust criticism or defence of respective sides. Distinct schools of thought developed, the first of which is referred to as either "Orthodox" or "Traditional", reflecting the assumption that Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world caused the Cold War. This view was essentially pro-American and pro-Western by positing that containment was defensively inspired by Communist hostility and expansionism. This broad consensus endured until the mid 1960s. However, subsequent cynicism about U.S. foreign policy objectives associated with her involvement in the Vietnam war helped to generate a "Revisionist" school. This incorporated the view that America was an imperialist and militarist nation sustaining the Cold War for selfish economic and strategic reasons. Arguably the Soviet Union did nothing more in Eastern Europe than other great power would have done in preserving national interests and reacting to an assertive United States (Thomas T. Hammond, 1982, pp. 3 – 26; Harrington, 2005, p.2).

Such opposite views were the swings of an historiographical pendulum and showed partiality. A synthesis then emerged with the "Post Revisionists". They broadly argued that each side had faults, pursued their own interests and were both guilty of misunderstanding, miscalculation and mutual incomprehension. This was a more equable allocation of responsibility compared with previous views: culpability now was portrayed in shades of grey. However there was still neither a coherent framework nor focus that could explain the conflict's origins without assigning unilateral or mutual blame.

Cutting across such different schools of thought were those who emphasized one principal causal factor for the Cold War. Harrington cites both Linda Kielen and Hugh Thomas as stressing the role of ideological confrontations in producing an irresolvable hostility between East and West (2005, p.5). Thomas maintained that it was the Soviet leaders' restrictive ideological mindset that prohibited permanent relationships with Capitalist leaders (1986, p.759). Others in the 1990s including Powalski, Ball and Davis endorsed this causal role of Communist ideology. John Lewis Gaddis argued that Stalin's personality conspired with an authoritarian government to create a prescriptive ideology (1997, pp. 285-9). However Bastian has criticised him for selectively using Soviet archives in interpreting the Cold War to assign responsibility to the Soviets (2001, pp. 1-2). While ideology contributed, these historians' collective failure to consider the nature and influence of American ideology renders their critiques partisan; they also self-restrictively did not consider other factors. These all typify a quest for an appreciation of the Cold War's origins but maintain a mono causal view instead of a more encompassing and integrated perspective.

Melvyn Leffler argued against the restrictive nature of existing views. He suggested that historians should consider both Washington's and Moscow's perspectives because examining just one country's policy was insufficient. He also denied that ideology alone determined policy. Leffler then went further by advocating the abandonment of customary binary categories for new theoretical approaches uniting an understanding of political processes, institutions as well as material and strategic interests (1999, pp 503, 522-3)**.** This was a call for an broad and inclusive perspective. Although Gregory Mitrovich shifted the

focus from blame allocation and ideologically inspired conflict towards a more neutral overview, he failed to integrate different approaches as Leffler suggested (2000, p. 181).

Diane Kirby (2002) rightly points out how accessing new American, European and Russian archives has enriched Cold War history. However Richard Aldrich warned that the movement or not of files into the public domain occurs because of governmental decisions, denoting censorship. Openness, he argues, is more apparent than real due to this selectivity which allows enticing morsels to spice a diverting trail which might go elsewhere if other material was forthcoming (2001, pp.5-7). Moreover, the use of archives should recognize how much remains concealed; secondly that officially sanctioned destruction removes much; thirdly that what is released can reflect a hidden manipulative agenda. These caveats impel caution in using archives which remain only as good as how far related questions reveal underlying assumptions and perspectives.

Some historians having accessed such archives claim to pursue a more inclusive position but still relapse into mono-causation. It is illustrative to examine some examples of these approaches to a bigger picture before self- imposed limits recurred. Gaddis, for example, concluded that:

"The new sources … seem to suggest that ideology often *determined* the behaviour or Marxist-Leninist regimes….Why except for ideology would Kremlin leaders retain a system of collectivised agriculture that had repeatedly shown itself not to work? Why, for that matter, insist on a command economy in the first place , since the evidence of its failures was almost as compelling? Foreign policy too reflected ideology, in ways that resist alternative explanations." (1997, p.290).

Irrespective of the eventual Soviet implosion, its system to supporters seemed to be successful and within it collectivisation and the planned economy were means of creating a

distinct Socialist state. The planned economy sought to organise both agriculture and industry to facilitate the systemic objective of creating an alternative to Capitalist forms which were considered divisive, bellicose and exploitative. Gaddis perceived ideology as the principal motivator without appreciating it was only one strand commingled with others in the total systemic package wherein, for example, political, economic and ideological dimensions were each part of the whole, with each reflecting the others. Similarly Soviet foreign policy manifested the systemic totality not just one constituent element.

By contrast Gaddis had suggested that:

"There was nothing …that made the Cold War inevitable…but a situation such as existed in Europe in 1945, with two great powers separated only by a power vacuum, seemed almost predestined to produce hostility, whether either side willed it or not." (1990, p.181).

Despite references to "will" and a degree of predestination he then failed to examine the underpinning conflictual impetus. He grasped neither the innate systemic hostility nor that the Soviet Union and United States were unlike former great powers. The power vacuum was less important than the systemic impediments to mutual agreement on Europe's future that highlighted opposed world views rendering post-war aims irreconcilable despite potential mutual benefits from co-operation. The American war-time industrial plant was convertible to mass peace-time production of non-military goods, thus could have fulfilled the Soviet need for extensive industrial equipment to rebuild its ravaged economy. Indeed there were unrealistically optimistic American assumptions about integrating the Soviet Union into the world economy. Thus Gaddis ignored systemic fundamentals by asserting political factors' primacy by asserting how Roosevelt antagonistically but in vain withheld aid to extract political gains in Eastern Europe (1972, pp.174-175). Gaddis essentially

overlooked the Soviet-American systemic mismatch, and had he adopted a systemic overview he could thereby have avoided the difficulties of positing contrary mono-causal explanations on different occasions.

Adam Ulam at first tantalizingly maintained how the reasons for Cold War conflict should be sought in the character of the globally dominant state systems. He then abandons this broader overview and asserts, in a vein similar to Gaddis, how the Soviets were alienated by post-Roosevelt changes to American policy producing less cooperation. Having acknowledged that Soviet suspicion was endemic he fails to explore the reasons for this. He then argues that Soviet concerns about a future war required rebuilding the ravaged Soviet economy behind safe ramparts in order to compete with the United States (1973, pp.399-401). Once again, the lack of co-operations remains un-explored. His reasons emerge as separate instead of unified aspects. This characterises his failure to expand on his original causal notion of the state systems' antagonism after Hitler's defeat created a critical hiatus in Soviet-American systemic agendas.

Robert Service moved beyond political causality by arguing how Stalin's personality fostered a Cold War environment:

"Politics in the Soviet Union in any generally accepted sense had ceased. An administrative behemoth ran the U.S.S.R. whose master was the pock marked little psychopath…Stalin was totalitarianism in human form."

He suggested how the exchange of ideas which fuels the dynamic of change had ceased and that Soviet political stasis resulted. Furthermore that Stalin's despotic leadership meant that he would not share power with others. " Stalin's was not a cooperative personality ." (2005,

p.538). This is an important feature but yet again lacks a broader explanatory context, especially since Stalin had co-operated during the war with the West, then far less later on. Service fails to explain this difference.

Certain American diplomats and commentators have helped to chart a direction that others followed. C.E. Bohlen argued that a fundamental impediment lay in the Soviet leadership's opposition to everything that democratic governments stood for and that it acted accordingly (1973, p.125-126). Although he begins to imply deeper reasons for the regimes' mutual political incompatibility he then failed to develop them, instead emphasising the paramount Soviet lack of co-operation. Harriman described the Bolshevik Revolution as essentially reactionary because it denied the basic beliefs "we value so deeply - the rights and dignity of the individual, the idea that government should express the will of the people." Bolshevism, he contended, was premised on the few claiming to know what was good for the many (1971, p.7). Once again there is the proposition of incompatibility but then an assertion of greater unilateral Soviet blame that yoked mono-causation with Soviet culpability.

J.R. Deane said that "in Russia authority is centralised in one man. In America we decentralise to many." (1947, p.300). It was an important point but its broader systemic significance was neither contextualised nor explored. While the line between personalising the origins of the Cold War to Stalin or ascribing them to the Soviet state might seem narrow, in effect no separation existed. By 1945 the Soviet state had been comprehensively Stalinised. With the ending of war-time co-operation, the Soviet lines of demarcation from Western forms were accentuated as Stalin aimed to reassert a Socialist agenda to ensure

systemic integrity. This also included the objective of outperforming the West thus demonstrating Socialist superiority which was always a Marxist-Leninist tenet. Stalin all along was committed to independent, systemic integrity.

Historians have followed this lead, as shown by how the composite view is repeatedly overlooked in favour of a focus on the mono-causal origins of conflict at the expense of examining the deeper question why two adversarial and competitive systems were predisposed to collide. Thereby so many for too long mistook symptoms for causes in pursuing a direction set down by earlier contemporary commentators. Moreover, since the fall of the Soviet Union the proverbial *victors* have written the histories. Whereas the Capitalist-Socialist views of Marxist historians has been rightly criticised as overtly prescriptive and predictive, a casualty has been downplaying their essentially systemically oriented critiques that at least signposted a more holistic interpretation.

Therefore in response to Leffler's challenging question, this thesis attempts to integrate varied approaches into the paradigm of *systemic antagonism*. The Cold War's origins stem from the tectonic collision between two entities for which the war set the stage and which conspired with their systemic polarity to shape respective agendas. Although the Soviet Union took great credit for victory having undertaken the preponderant share of anti-Nazi fighting, the projected power of the United States was based on its great economic strength which encouraged it to be systemically expansive and to seek to shape the peace. The American economy by 1946 was the workshop, the bakery and the banker of the post-war world. Such strength encompassed an aspiration to manage the world system in ways

American leaders thought would negate self-destructive tendencies (McCormick,1995, pp.47-48). They sought to redefine the world broadly in the American image and presumed that when other states adopted Americanism as a package, benefits would accrue to them. The United States also needed the world's trade and resources to maintain its own expansion to avoid a return to depression. Kolko concluded that, "The United States was incomparably the greatest single nation in the world with sharply articulated global, political and … economic aspirations." (1990, pp.618-619). Bretton Woods was the cornerstone of a new economic world order and indicated an aspiration for a global Americanism consistent with its developing hegemony and founded on Open Door free trade. W.A. Williams - (whose work along with Wallerstein's and Bobbitt's will be examined later to determine their respective contributions to *systemic antagonism*) - commented that the pattern of international trade, which is conducive to the freedom of enterprise, is one where major decisions are made by private organisations rather than by governments (1972, p. 269). While this was a specific difference between the United States and the Soviet Union it also connoted a profound systemic demarcation.

The systemic collision began to occur as the American super state confronted a battered but redoubtable Soviet rival. This engendered a situation of systemic mutual exclusiveness. However in 1945 the Soviet Union was militarily strong but economically weakened and could not compete on equal terms with American economic power, thus it needed to manage its systemic agenda under constraints inherited from the war. While its vision remained clear it was restricted. Crucially it had survived and so could now consolidate its autarkic bloc, which had been greatly expanded by war, in order to retain a defensive and

independent systemic integrity. It would resist Americanisation which entailed modification and concomitant compromise of its core principles and practices. Stalin's state was no candidate for cooption. Its planned economy and vaunted rapid industrialisation created a different but seemingly viable economic model with a strong contemporary appeal. Therefore it embodied an alternative to American economic power, which having identified this obstacle, would seek in time to contain then circumvent it. The emerging Soviet-American conflict was triggered by the systemic competition for the strategically and economically vital European heartland. Yet while Europe was the primary stage, the world would become the bigger arena.

Behind this gathering conflict lay perspectives which helped define how each side saw the world. Certain words such as *democracy*, *equality*, *independence* and *freedom* were used by both but invested with semantic differences that rested on divergent precepts and mindsets. American multi-party democracy differed from Soviet single party democracy which was supposedly the voice of the classless proletariat. Soviet equality envisaged an equal allocation of resources while Americans valued the right to compete equally. Soviet independence meant freedom from Capitalist exploitation within a classless, overarching state which required subordination of the individual to its higher Socialist goals. This compared with an American independence of expression which when combined with the personal pursuit of property and wealth acquisition, viewed the state best serving the individual when it did least. Therefore although a crucial marker lay in different Soviet-American attitudes towards individual and state, this was only one facet within the totality of antithetical systems

The United States and the Soviet Union, brought together by the Second World War in Europe, were structural and operational opposites. Some historians in arguing that certain unique or combined factors precipitated the Cold War have missed the implications of this key point. Their fundamentally mismatched and opposed natures moulded their aims. The intentions to rebuild and re-align a war torn continent transposed Soviet-American systemic parameters onto Europe, which thereby transformed their *systemic antagonism* from dormant to active. War-time unity produced co-operation to destroy a common enemy. Peace produced adversity as irreconcilable reconstructive templates, that were reflected in disparate political forms, signalled profound systemic dissonance.

The United States and Soviet Union had so little in common because they occupied opposed ends of a systemic spectrum. The concept of *systemic antagonism* therefore proposes that these diametrically opposed entities - consisting of their precepts, ideologies, moralities, legal systems, politics, social values and economics – created a potential threat to the other that remained dormant until actualized by specific circumstances. Such entities were greater than the sum of the interconnected elements rather than discrete, separable parts. For example ideological, political and economic aspects were reciprocally manifest in the others: alter one and you could affect the whole. This helps explain why each side was wary of changes that implied a systemic dilution rendering it more like its adversary. Innate *systemic antagonism* was clearly articulated in the Marxist-Leninist proposition of an on-going struggle between Socialism and Capitalism. The Bolshevik state from its inception was avowedly anti-Capitalist, while the United States soon afterwards reciprocated by

making its moral and political opposition to it clear. Such were the early manifestations of *systemic antagonism*, though it was only from 1945 that peace created the catalyst for conflict.

CHAPTER ONE

CONTRASTS AND COEXISTENCE

The development of opposed ideologie**s** characterised the Twentieth Century, prescribing differing historical interpretations of the past, present and future according to competing precepts. Fascist and Communist regimes emerged in particular states while a liberal democratic Capitalism had developed in the United States and certain parts of Western Europe. The principal ideologies included key features such as the Nazi pursuit of racial dominance, the Soviet commitment to a classless society, and the Western adherence to liberal democratic practices and Capitalist market economics. Manifest in their politico-economic forms these ideologies could generate contention and perhaps conflict due to innate self-propagation aimed at the persuasion or coercion of others into adopting beliefs enshrining core principles presumed to create universal progress along differing paths. Such prescription and potential political, military or economic self-assertion contributed to a century of volatility, especially when the interests of systemically divergent states conflicted.

The irreconcilability of Twentieth Century's ideologies rested on tripartite systemic antagonism until the end of the Second World War. The Nazis' push to dominance originated in the conviction that racial conflict determined historical development thus impelling the so called Aryan master race's drive for supremacy. Races were categorised hierarchically with some destined to lead, others to serve while supposed human detritus should be obliterated. The notions of Nazi race and Communist class wars were innately confrontational.

Marxist-Leninism posited the historical determinant of class conflict manifest in interstate conflicts and reflective of the broader irreconcilable struggle between an inevitably triumphant Socialism and a global Capitalism riven by its own internal contradictions. Initially, before subsequent Marxist revisions, it was presumed that after the Revolution in Russia, Germany was the state most likely to follow suit because of its advanced industrial nature. Notions of a racially- free egalitarianism were anathema to National Socialists, whose vision encompassed expansion of the racial elite into the vast territories of Slavic *inferiors* exemplifying how a specific political aim developed directly from its ideological origins.

Liberal democratic forms included parliamentary procedures, the extension of voting rights, constitutions based on vaunted legal impartiality and the elevation of citizens through ownership of property, political rights and wealth. Such views were more evolutionary in origin. An example was the gradual expansion of citizens' rights in the British extension of the vote throughout the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Nazis and Communists, whose pre-existing ideologies provided greater prescription for ensuing political forms, considered parliamentarianism moribund. Since neither Russia nor Germany emerged successfully from the Great War both viewed the subsequent peace as alienating and incompatible with their differing socio-historical dynamics enshrined in their respective single party dominated states. Parliamentarians considered totalitarian regimes despotic, destabilising and assertive by concentrating power in dictatorial leaderships at the expense of greater constitutional balance and individual rights. The spread of liberal Western ideas was generally perceived as encouraging associated democratic practices. Moreover European imperial powers paternalistically considered their empires, based on vested economic self-

interests, inducted less developed colonial peoples into superior civilisations by graduated participation in higher political forms. This conflicted with both Fascist precepts of subordinating lesser races, also Communist aspirations to liberate the victims of colonial oppression.

Therefore irreconcilable systems promoted instability by framing political disputes within the ideological lexicons of opposed principles while drawing on the considerable resources of national conscript armies supported by industrialised states. The messianic element of ideology was anchored in a presumed superiority reminiscent of earlier religiously antagonistic states. This could justify disseminating ideas through state propaganda including specific institutions such as the Soviet Comintern.

In each ideological system there was an inherent fear of dominance by others. Post 1919 Germany was fettered by a punitive Versailles settlement imposed by Western liberal powers whose ideals it reflected. Bolsheviks saw their revolution from the outset surrounded by hostile Capitalist states. Liberal democracies had meanwhile reacted to perceived German militarism and imposed a war guilt clause and a punitive peace for initiating war. They also conferred pariah status on the Bolsheviks after their acquisition of power because they promulgated world proletarian revolution and economic principles opposed to the Capitalist mainstream.

Despite ideological differences the will for conflict or coexistence was politically determined. Pragmatic opportunism created unlikely alliances, for instance the Nazi-Soviet

Pact of 1939, and the Soviet alliance with Western allies during the Second World War. Such agreements did not prelude the Nazi-Soviet war or the Soviet-American Cold War once systemic irreconcilability conspired with specific events to override pragmatism. The Spanish Civil War can be seen as a proxy conflict which involved politically and ideologically opposed great powers in a localised theatre but indicating the predisposition for broader systemic conflicts.

Geographical factors were important in both restraining and promoting systemic antagonism. Despite their differences the Soviet Union and the United States coexisted during most of the interwar years despite earlier American anti-Bolshevik intervention in the Russian Civil War. Thereafter distance between the two inhibited further conflict. Although the U.S. played a bigger part internationally and economically, its direct involvement with Europe was minimal so no political trigger for Soviet-American conflict occurred and economic contacts proved mutually beneficial. This contrasted with the relative proximity of Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union which permitted the ideologically based Nazi policy of Lebensraum to be implemented in June 1941. This was Hitler's attempt, following military successes across Europe, to destroy Bolshevism by exploiting supposed Slavic inferiority and Soviet military weakness to acquire vast spaces for colonisation after the partition and defeat of Poland removed the impediment to eastward expansion of Germany's Greater Reich.

Referencing others' models helps to define the concept of systemic antagonism by clarifying both what it is and is not. The ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein, William Appleman

Williams and Philip Bobbitt are relevant because they used parameters with systemic attributes. Philip Bobbitt argued that competition between different state-based constitutional forms produced conflicts and changes to the world order through *epochal wars*. Wallerstein has posited a developmental global Capitalist world system from the Sixteenth Century within the operational milieu of an economically interlinked Core and its Periphery. Williams has developed a revisionist view of the United States' paramountcy through its assertive exercise of power originating from the end of the Nineteenth Century in its enforcement of an Open Door world economic order. Within the context of these three approaches Henry Luce needs to be recognised as expressing the assertively ideological voice of an aspirant and missionary hegemonic power. His advocacy of an Americanised world system reflected Bobbit's constitutional approach, Wallerstein's hegemony based on accrued power through the state-based concentration of Core production processes, also Williams' critique of an assertive America that believed the world's interests were best served by following its practices.

Bobbitt argued that epochal wars occurred between states whose constitutional bases differed and that the outcomes produced new international constitutional orders such as those incorporated in the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), Utrecht (1713) and Vienna (1815). In the Twentieth Century he contends there was prolonged conflict between Fascist, Parliamentary and Communist states as each sought to replace the Nineteenth Century's imperial order with a new one based on their own. Importantly he conflates different wars fought over perceived single constitutional issues into the same long conflict and argues for an epochal conflict from 1914 to 1990 because interstate constitutional issues remained

unresolved until the success of the *Parliamentary* U.S. over the Soviet Union ushered in a new international order (2003, pp. xvi-xxviii).

Bobbitt said that the Versailles Settlement, in contrast to earlier centuries' constitutional settlements, failed to resolve fundamental peace issues. This then resulted in the effective ostracism of Germany and the Soviet Union which were not reconciled to the world order imposed by the liberal democratic victors. Both were thus encouraged to circumvent and unpick these terms which fostered discontent and succoured Nazi and Communist movements. Bobbitt also contends that despite Fascism's defeat, "Yalta did not resolve the systemic issue and whether the order amongst nations would be the rule of Parliamentary law or Communism." (2003, p.43).

It is however spurious to assert a continuous epochal war beginning in 1914. Despite a flawed peace the post war German Weimar Republic was a parliamentary liberal democracy which created an hiatus with the Kaiser's German state, which Bobbitt asserts to have been a proto-fascist precursor to Nazism. However, Weimar was not pre-ordained to fail any more than Hitler was to succeed. It is more reasonable to contend that the differences between three competing ideologies continued and that a period of unstable peace prevailed until the next world war. However Bobbitt deems this only a further phase followed by yet another one called the Cold War until the epochal war's end occurred with the Soviet collapse, then followed by a Parliamentary constitutional order. He also presupposes a constitutional British-American homogeneity without contrasting the differences between a republican, avowedly non-colonial state and an imperial monarchy.

The notion of a constitutional world order can neither rest on the notion of the last man standing in 1991**,** nor be squared with the short- lived, debatable peace dividend, the continued existence of Communist China or the development of other global challenges to Western liberal democratic values. In effect the Soviet implosion did not herald a triumphant parliamentary international world order since despite only one superpower, the world remained riven in different ways.

Bobbitt framed his concept too much in terms of conflicts between three state-based constitutional forms, which he sought to extrapolate into a seamless *epochal war* which at best is notional and at worst unrealistic. However he rightly identified political/constitutional differences contributing to protracted inter-state tensions and potential for conflict, but overstated them by underrating interlinked ideological and economic perspectives. He sought to conflate too much and his thesis emerges as imbalanced and incoherent. He also ignores how the war waged by disparate allies against Nazi Germany became from 1945 the catalyst for a new kind of conflict between the victors which differed in form from the preceding total war and which possessed its own systemic roots.

By contrast Wallerstein has outlined an economic model that prescriptively explained the contemporary world using terms of reference relevant to the Soviet-American Cold War conflict. He postulated a Capitalist world economy originating in the Sixteenth Century

which was founded on the constant accumulation of Capital by means of an inextricably linked unity of Core and Periphery. He contended that a concentration of efficiently productive and profitable economic systems – rather than nation states - constituted the Core which was a trans-national entity enabling it to appropriate the surplus-value of the whole world economy. Wallerstein postulated the Core's primacy, thus states needed to act as benevolent hosts to benefit from the wealth generated by the producer systems. Those states with a concentration of Core-like systems were often among the richest and sometimes most politically powerful.

The Periphery consisted of weaker, but aspirant economic systems essential to the Core in their supply of materials and consumption of Core-produced goods and services (2000, p.86; 2004, pp.91, 93). Crucially, there was an innate instability due to Capitalist cycles wherein relative alterations in productive efficiency led to realignments between Core and Periphery. Peripheral systems sought by greater wealth-producing efficiency to appropriate extra value to become Core-like. Wallerstein asserted that quasi-monopolism characterised profitable Core-like systems because they generated greater value than less profitable, more competitive Periphery systems (2004, p. 18). This had implications for the rise as well as fall of powerful states and has relevance for the rise of American economic power during the Second World War.

Wallerstein said his world-system was more perspective than theory (2000, p.129). Nevertheless it often contains generalised, prescriptive assertions at the expense of being evidence-based. He has acknowledged several criticisms. One is the lack of rigorous testing;

a second is the Marxist critique of neglecting the determining centrality of the mode of production as the dynamic of change; thirdly that world-systems analysis subordinates the political sphere to the economic and that state events are not explicable in response just to the Capitalist world economy; fourthly that economism is assigned priority over other spheres of human activity such as the cultural (2004, pp.19-21). Disentangling the merits of such perspectives, criticisms and counter-justifications exceeds the present brief but certain critics clearly regard Wallersetin's world-system as less perspective and more a coherent theory replete with the imperfections of a grand design. He also assigned particular meanings to certain terms, such as the *division of labour*, described as an invisible axis binding Core-like with Peripheral-like processes (2004, p. 91). Yet his thesis approximates to the notion of exploiter and exploited while his underpinning assertion of economic primacy means Wallerstein's ideas have a strong Marxist orientation. Moreover his thesis originally contained the belief that Capitalism would be superseded by something better. After 1990-1 this was hardly sustainable so like other neo-Marxists he succumbed to the perils of prediction.

Wallerstein's concept of the single indivisible Core-Periphery is central to his world-system theory. Deconstructing this paradigm's prescribed terms of reference within the context of Soviet-American systemic antagonism offers an important insight. Wallerstein wrote that:

"Property rights are of course the centrepiece of the Capitalist system. There is no way to accumulate capital endlessly unless one can hold on to the capital one has accumulated. Property rights are all those laws which limit the ways in which the state can confiscate the money (and) extended kin can lay claim to a share in the money…But of course the key actor in this protection of property rights is the state which has the legitimate right to set the rules…Entrepreneurs have long acted as if the arena in which they are most anxious the state abstains from setting the rules is the workplace…" (2004, p.47)

Such were some of his model's prescriptions. However, the Bolshevik premise of an on-going Capitalist-Socialist conflict contained a commitment to destroy the world's Capitalist system. Therefore they sought to dismantle what Wallerstein asserted was the centrepiece: private accumulation of capital and associated protection of property rights in favour of the proletarian control of the means of production. The regime was ideologically anti Capitalist, thus hostile to the prevailing world order which reciprocated because of its incitement to their own workers and the challenge to Capitalists' preferred regulation of the workplace. What Wallerstein's theory fails to clarify were the results of a state rejecting fundamentals inherent in his Core-Periphery paradigm. The Bolshevik Revolution incurred political and economic consequences. Using Wallersetin's logic but not his processes meant the new state achieved systemic self-ostracism from the world's economic engine caused by its alienation of Capitalist institutions and entrepreneurs. The Bolsheviks were not benevolent hosts providing a safe, politically underpinned state haven for Capitalist operations. Thereby such agencies, who in Wallerstein's framework might have fostered the development of Core-like industrial processes in Russia, were eliminated or excluded. They could only have survived had Marxist-Leninist precepts been overturned, but this was ideologically impossible without undermining the nature of the revolutionary state.

Wallerstein's thesis therefore supports the concept of systemic antagonism but at the expense of his postulate of a single indivisible Core-Periphery, further highlighted by his failure to reconcile it with the ideological precepts and economic operations of the Bolshevik-Soviet state. The closest he gets is in describing how the Soviet Union sought to catch up with the West by its rapid industrialisation while compelling satellite allies to

pursue the same path (2000, p.382). He gives scant attention to what constituted that path and how Soviet-American systemic directions were opposed from the outset.

The Bolsheviks initially sought the collapse of the Capitalist world system through domino revolutions. With their failure emerged the need to maintain revolutionary integrity by establishing a Core based initially in the new state. This was extended militarily by Westward progress during the anti-Nazi war. What began in 1917 was a schism which Wallerstein seemingly overlooks and which critically vitiates an indivisible Core-Periphery. He therefore cannot explain what the Cold War was and the underlying reasons for the deal that he described in which the Soviet Union remained inside its designated zone (2000, p. 382). This lacuna arose from his description of Ideology as a strategy from which "one can draw quite specific political conclusions", which he then defined as consisting of conservatism, liberalism and radicalism. However these are better deemed to be broad schools of political thought. He perceives change in the interaction between them and postulated the triumph of liberalism in defining the geo-culture of the world-system of the Nineteenth Century (2004, pp. 60-69). However this view cannot explain how those Twentieth Century ideological states mentioned earlier became the engines for antagonism and confrontation. His redefinition fails to factor in the morally charged commitments and certainties powering such entities in their promulgation of single minded political programmes.

The origins of Soviet-American systemic antagonism which then developed into conflict are inextricably linked to two processes. Firstly the American hegemony's strategic development

of containment and economic circumvention of the Soviet bloc after 1945. Secondly, the Soviet endeavour from the Revolution onwards to establish a countervailing rival to the global Capitalist Core based on an anti-Capitalist autarky operating a planned, state-owned industrial base. Systemically the Soviet state sought from the outset to secede –employing Wallerstein's terms – from the primary Capitalist Core-Periphery. There was subsequent Soviet development of a strategically vital systemic East European *Periphery* which also served as barrier and buffer to the expanding post-war world American hegemony. No Marxist-Leninist state could permit itself to be assimilated into this while retaining its systemic integrity. It therefore remained dissociated from the institutions created at Bretton Woods in 1944 which underpinned the expanding American economic order. Nor could it willingly nurture private sector institutions inside its Socialist framework. Both would have violated its ideological precepts and entailed compromises amounting to systemic transformation by steering Communism towards Western forms. The Soviet Union had pragmatically permitted restricted Western interwar institutional operations within its borders, but only to assist its autarkic programme of centrally directed industrial development. Such concessions were the means not the ends.

Importantly Wallerstein argued how the combination of powerful political systems allied with a concentration of Core production systems in specific geo-spheres could lead to hegemonies and he identified three: that of the Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, the British in the Nineteen Century and the American in the middle part of the Twentieth Century (2000, p.255). Crucially the transitional period from the British to the American hegemonies coincided with the Twentieth Century's development of ideologically based

states so that systemic antagonism evolved within the milieu of changes in the relationship between the primary Core-Periphery. This coincided with development of Marxist-Leninism that caused the successful revolutionaries to set up a rival anti-Capitalist Core-Periphery zone. As the economic power of the U.S. grew, Britain began to lose its position as "Workshop of the World" while also facing German political self assertion, naval development and advancing industrialisation. In effect economic and political changes conspired to generate political stresses during the process of economic and political shift which entailed relocating the centre of world power from Europe to North America during an era of revolutionary ideas. Significantly Wallerstein identified how hegemonies advocated global liberalism in various ways: the free flow of production including goods, capital and labour throughout the world economy; an opposition to trade restrictions; the general endorsement of liberal political institutions including the restriction of bureaucracy and support for civil liberties (2000, p257). This indicates how the self-interested use by the hegemonic power of its strength and influence fostered political and economic practices most beneficial to itself. This view is congruent with Williams' notion of the Open Door to be examined in due course.

However Wallerstein's model is seriously flawed regarding Communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. Since the Bolshevik- Soviet state was based on anti-Capitalist premises it could not fit within his paradigm of one Capitalist-based Core-Periphery from which it sought to separate. This was because its objective was the provision of an alternative and superior Socialist economics in contrast to Capitalism, over which it eventually expected to triumph. Wallerstein failed to assimilate the implications of such

distinctiveness as well as the consequent Soviet creation of a separate autarkic hegemony behind an Iron Curtain. The only effective way of accommodating the Communist Soviet Union within Walerstein's paradigm is to amend it by positing two Core-Peripheries, one Capitalist and one anti-Capitalist. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were committed to developing their separate hegemonies in a schismatic world of competitively opposed economic models within the broader context of systemic antagonism. Their respective Cores and Peripheries might be able to co-exist but economically were irreconcilable.

Therefore the natures of the two states from the Bolshevik Revolution onwards led to a schismatic world of systemic opposites whose expansions eventually led to direct conflict. Politically the Soviet Union was founded on a highly centralised, rigid single party system and similarly centralised economic control. Significantly this contrasted with Wallerstein's liberal characterisation of hegemonies which further impeded assimilating the new system within the mainstream. Bolshevik economic centralism was non-Capitalist and non-liberal. Soviet single-party *democracy* contrasted with an American plural democracy conferring voting rights to most adults while considerable autonomy was delegated to constituent states. Whereas the American electorate could exercise limited real choice at specific times, Soviet citizens were largely disenfranchised as an elite came to dominate political institutions. Neither political nor economic liberalism characterised the revolutionaries and within the Soviet Union the dictatorship ***over*** rather than ***of*** the proletariat was established.

The Marxist-Leninist principles of the Soviet Union required, as a pre-requisite for a world Socialist society, the elimination of Capitalist practises that supposedly created class divisions, while the individual was subordinated to party and state which were the means of the proletariat's progress to egalitarian freedom. This contrasted with the pursuit of personal advancement and wealth in the U.S. which was rooted in the ideology of elevating individualism as the state's principal objective. American freedoms were enshrined in a Constitution and Bill of Rights with a balance sought between Executive, Legislature and Judiciary to forestall the primacy of one. However in the Soviet system the political executive came to predominate reflecting an inherent trend towards centrism as well as both Stalin's personality and his long tenure of control.

In his influential article in the February 1941 edition of "Life" Henry Luce coined the term "The American Century". Here he argued for the world leadership of the United States because of the superiority of its system and that it was in the process of transition from isolationism to internationalism. He had thereby identified her developing hegemony and how her ideals differed from those of other states. His ideas came to be reflected in what the Roosevelt Administration envisaged for the post-war world, although neither Luce nor Roosevelt anticipated the challenge arising from the powerful Soviet countervailing system whose global vision differed.

The missionary influences in Luce's background permeated his vision of his country's dominant role and its dissemination of Americanism. This entailed the prevalence of free economic enterprise to support its notions of freedom. His message contained a need for

moral and systemic leadership which he considered unfulfilled after 1919 because of President Wilson's failure to promulgate Americanism vigorously:

"Freedom requires and will require far greater living space than Tyranny. Peace cannot endure unless it prevails over a very large part of the world. Justice will come near to losing all meaning in the minds of men unless Justice can have approximately the same fundamental meanings in many lands and among many peoples. We must insist that the abundant life is predicated on Freedom… (We must share) with all peoples our Bill of Rights, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent industrial products, our technical skills…an internationalism of the people, by the people and for the people."

Luce's expansive message envisaged the U.S. as a powerhouse from which her idealism, politics, constitutional and economic practices should permeate and thus improve the world. This vaunted exceptionalism drew on a certainty that the American way had divine sanction. Her role lay in elevating the "life of mankind from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmists called a little lower than the angels." It would thus be morally wrong to deny the rest of humanity such blessings and this systemic message underpinned his concept of "The American Century":

"We must accept whole-heartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit."

Luce also recognised the contemporary clash of high principles between different states and acknowledged competitor ideologies that he deemed to be detrimental in contrast with the benefits of the American way. Luce's notion of "Tyranny" contemporaneously focused on Nazism, but after its defeat the eventual outcome of the post war systemic competition with the Soviet Union justified America's claim to the Century. During the Cold War it was the assertion that American values were morally superior to Soviet tyranny which reiterated his opposition to totalitarianism. In this respect there is consistency with Bobbitt's concept of

ideologically-based parliamentary democratic values confronting first one then another totalitarian regime. This is reflected in Luce's systemic distinction between Americanism and forms of totalitarianism. This sanctioned his advocacy of challenging their opposition to the American way. Although Luce's message was simplistically partisan its appealing coherence resonated with America's growing hegemony. It justified American abandonment of isolationism and the proactive fulfilment of its morally based outward bound role that apparently reflected its manifest destiny to confer her systemic benefits globally.

By contrast William Appleman Williams took a different perspective and drew on F.J. Turner's "Frontier Thesis" as well as the works of A.T. Mahan and Brooks Adams. He chronicled and criticised American foreign policy which he contended reflected selfish American Capitalist interests that exploited the world without necessarily benefiting it. This revisionist critique contained salient systemic characteristics.

Williams argued that American prosperity and its political structures derived from the pursuit of secure markets for American productivity, initially through westward continental expansion and later by exploiting economic frontiers beyond distant oceans: moreover without such expansion America would stagnate. From the 1890s he suggested the American individual entrepreneur was replaced by globally-oriented corporations as the impetus for expansion arose from inadequate domestic markets for American products. He thus saw a link between wealth acquisition, the growth of corporations, the maintenance of plural democracy and an expansionist foreign policy. He cited the aggregated views of

Herbert Hoover, H.L. Stimson and C. Hughes that the American economy was an interrelated system rather than a random conglomeration of individual operations. Moreover its overseas expansion established a secure and peaceful foundation that facilitated the successful function of the American political economy (1972, pp. 22, 28-29, 32-33, 119,136). In this respect there is congruence between his views and Wallerstein's notion of the Core/Periphery's interrelation. However Williams sees this as an essentially American construct rather than Wallerstein's thesis of realignments of production within broader Capitalist cycles in both Core and Periphery which generated shifts in political power, thus fostering an American hegemony. Essentially Wallerstein perceives a process at work, while Williams adopts a morally critical anti-American perspective.

Williams asserted that from the end of the Nineteenth until the middle of the Twentieth Centuries the American Open Door policy , which was reinforced as necessary by coercion, established "the conditions under which America's preponderant economic power would extend throughout the world without the embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonialism." Williams defined "imperial" in terms of a highly industrialised country behaving one-sidedly by exploiting weaker economies. This therefore created an informal empire determined by the strongest economy. After 1918 President Wilson's efforts to make the world safe for democracy were predicated on assumptions that American expansion improved the world, a proposition echoed by Luce. This economic aspect of democracy rested on the liberal proposition that a society should consist of free people acting as independent producers and consumers with a profit motive that was benevolent when bestowing collective benefits for individuals and community. Williams contended that by

1939 America's economic expansion encompassed the globe and she "assumed a posture of moral and ideological authority." (Williams, 1972, pp.52-55, 59, 92-94).

Andrew Bacevich summarised Williams' thesis:

> "Sustaining American freedom required ever-increasing prosperity. Enhancing American prosperity required territory, resources, markets and influence. The resulting American imperium – continental during the nineteenth century, global during the twentieth – derived its moral justification from the conviction that the United States had erected a uniquely righteous Empire of Liberty that expressed history's (or God's) intentions." (2009)

Williams questioned whether such an institutionally based economic model which underpinned American foreign policy benefited any state other than itself. His conclusion was that a self-confident and self-interested United States regarded the world as its economic oyster to be prised open to suit its needs. This however contrasted with ideas articulated by Luce about current institutional American perceptions of an intrinsically virtuous system enshrining America's wealth-oriented ideology and democratic political forms that made her model suitable for emulation. Williams however argued this represented a global hegemonic aspiration based on enforcing an Open Door. Indeed in his First Open Door Note in September 1899 Secretary of State John Hay sought formal recognition that the United States should receive "the benefits of equality of treatment of all foreign trade" within China. Similar notes followed. Despite vaunted benevolence, Williams suggested that America's economic toolkit contained coercion.

Williams' thesis of an expansionist American global system commingled political, economic and ideological elements. It perceived the whole to be greater than the sum of the parts but with economic self interest primary. Significantly Luce's and Williams' attitudes towards

American policy are similar but fundamentally different. Luce argued that what was good for American also benefited others; Williams contended that what benefited America principally benefited America and her imperial stance sought to subordinate world markets and other states' interests to the international needs of American institutions. In essence the contrast was between benevolent and selfish motives.

Some critics of Williams , like Robert W. Tucker queried Williams' assumptions and lack of clarity about whether America's institutions required constant expansion or "whether America has been expansionist out of the mistaken conviction that the continued well-being, if not the very existence of these institutions, required constant expansion." Whether *mistaken* or not, the expansionist impetus existed. Tucker also suggests that American expansion might owe less to the "structural needs of American Capitalism" than to "the dynamics of state competition or the search for security"; hence the quest for "a congenial international environment" was not driven by economic factors alone. He pointed out that the United States behaved like other great powers whereas the use of such methods was, according to Williams, uniquely central to American commercial development. Tucker described as parochial the view that the Open Door was a distinctively American contribution for a nation possessing an economic preponderance; moreover that the method of indirect and informal empire was neither an American nor a Capitalist invention (1971, pp.57, 81-2). Other criticisms of Williams focus on his failure to define precisely terms such as "Open Door", "expansion" and "empire" thus engendering a false sense of continuity (B. Perkins, 1984, p. 331).

Nevertheless expansion was clearly systemically endemic, irrespective of causal institutional links and this was consistent with its developing hegemony. Expansion beyond American boundaries was also associated, as Luce outlined, with a missionary drive to export democracy for universal benefit. It is more helpful to consider an interlinked systemic perspective comprising balanced political, economic and ideological motives than one where the economic factor predominates, as inheres within Williams' and Wallerstein's critiques, both of which contain neo-Marxist generalisations buttressing a didactic thesis. Other motives supporting the systemic paradigm include inter-state competition, strategic necessities and security concerns in a world of competitive ideologies and economic models. American expansion came as a total package originating from its inherent nature to propagate itself in the varied manifestations comprising Americanism.

By practising an Open Door foreign policy American behaviour was no different from earlier dominant powers who developed their reach in response to self interests, vision, capability and domestic mores. The Second World War was the catalyst for further American internationalism. This superseded her phase of isolationism when European volatility and conflict resulted in a greatly enhanced American international presence: indeed circumstances conspired to pull America out of her shell. Luce's term "The American Century" was a mission statement adopted as she abandoned isolationism. Removing Williams' crypto ideological wrapper allows examining systemic criteria for American-Soviet antagonisms. Tucker acknowledged that Williams demonstrated how American diplomatic self-interest rested on a discrepancy between ideals and behaviour (1971, p. 148). Interrogating this veneer's underlay remains Williams' strong point but his weakness

remains his ideologically oriented critique displaying bias and a lack of realism. While American self-serving motives were concealed behind the rhetoric, this was also the case with the Soviet Union, as well as other states. Self-interest remains the most powerful motivator for any state in contending with the matrix of change within international affairs.

However 1917 was a year of hiatus. The Russian Revolutionaries explicitly sought to challenge world Capitalism by creating a movement that repudiated prevailing political and economic systems as its new egalitarian society aimed to control all Russian wealth generation. The leaders assumed their example would soon sweep through the world thus superseding state structures as a new international harmony between workers spontaneously consolidated. It also created a systemic alternative and therefore a challenge to the idea of an "American Century" which sought to export the American Capitalism to the rest of the world. However interwar Soviet-American co-existence was possible as both countries started to look inward with the development of Soviet Socialism in One Country and American Isolationism, which when combined with the intervening distances inhibited conflict despite their opposed natures. World war from 1939 would end this physical separation by drawing both into Europe.

However the Great War had seen the Bolshevik regime trying to disentangle itself from a European conflict that it conceived was fought between avaricious state-based Capitalist interests. This meant that while Western powers must adjust to a state repudiating their core principles, their initial preoccupation was with the Revolutionaries' resolve to take

Russia out of the war. This greatly focused allied minds during the German-Bolshevik Brest-Litovsk negotiations.

In January 1918 President Wilson's speech promulgating his Fourteen Points was delivered within a few months of the Revolution and outlined a vision for a post-war world within which the new Bolshevik state might be accommodated. He wanted a world safe for "every peace-loving nation" and emphasised each country's autonomous development. While accepting Russian independence he stipulated that this should be within the "society of free nations", implying an underlying consensus. However he laid down an "acid test" for Russia's "sister nations " in how they treated her, urging the "principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities" and avoiding separate interests. Importantly he wanted the removal of economic barriers to facilitate the equality of trade conditions between all consenting nations and described his principles as "the program for the world's peace…the only possible program." The prescription was evident because such principles for world peace, while broadly reflecting Western liberalism, were explicitly American. He created distance between the U.S. and her Anglo-French allies whose colonialism he amalgamated with that of the Central Powers. He specified the necessary "adjustment of all colonial claims" to reflect the sovereign interests of populations concerned.

Wilson wished to mould the post-war world in ways favourable to Western democratic nations in general but the U.S. in particular and reflecting the American moral, ideological and political lead as well as its hegemonic aspirations. At this time he hoped to draw in the

Bolshevik state whose infancy might make it amenable to inclusion within the fold of other nations. Significantly he used nationalist terms associating the Russian people with his principled purposes by referring to,

"the voice of the Russian people….They are prostrate and all but hopeless…before the grim power of Germany…Their power apparently is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right and honourable for them to accept has been stated with a frankness , a largesse of view, a generosity of spirit and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind…Whether their present leaders believe it or not , it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace"

He aimed his appeal to Russian nationalism over the heads of the regime's leaders, tacitly acknowledging their scepticism about American goodwill. He also offered American help to offset Russian war losses and revolutionary disruption but recognised that a regime so recently established might not survive, thus justifying the appeal to nation not state which proved significant given subsequent American support for the Whites during the Russian Civil War.

Wilson had outlined a global programme of Western democratic values, liberated nationalisms (excluding German), anti-colonialism and Open Door economics. This was tantamount to an Americanised global future, but predated the political will to assert an American hegemony. Wilson anticipated Luce by advocating Americanism in all but name. He had led the United States into the Great War to make the world a better place by defeating those like Germany who behaved otherwise, thereby defining both what America was for and against. Luce's vision for peace after the Second World War would reflect Wilson's after the First. Both envisaged the American way to foster humanity's

improvement. Wilson's Fourteen Points had outlined a framework for America's engagement with the world:

"We entered the war because of violations of right which touched us to the quick and made the life of our people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war therefore is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression…The program of the world's peace therefore is our program"

Wilson thereby advocated exporting the American way. Open agreements, freedom of navigation, removing economic barriers, the equality of trade and ideologically based principled interventionism all amounted to an early draft of Americanism. There was also the implication that America might be ready to lead a needy but reluctant world. Subsequently America's non-participation in the League of Nations militated against her global involvement, presaging an isolationist trend. Thus Wilson's Americanism was notional, in direct contrast with Luce's case for a proactive approach over a quarter of a century later when the ascendant American hegemony conspired with the growing Soviet conflict to increase America's global engagement. While Wilson's and Luce's Americanism was rooted in home-grown American ideological principles the timescale for implementation would be delayed. Wilson however laid much of the systemic groundwork upon Luce later drew but he urged that the chance for world leadership should not again be wasted as it had been after 1918.

Wilson had invited the new Russian regime to participate effectively on American terms as expressed in the Points. In January 1918, while he tacitly acknowledged differences

between the American and Bolshevik systems, he perhaps either underrated how different their respective precepts were or else hoped for the end of an anti-Western regime lacking universal support in Russia. Thus his attitudes at this point may have reflected hopes rather than reality about future Russian attitudes. This changed. An open dislike came to influence the actions of Wilson and the Allies towards a regime whose reiterated revolutionary message created concerns about Bolshevism's spread across a volatile post-war Europe. Official recognition denoting approval was withheld which reflected systemic antagonism. After the failures of the Western supported anti-Bolshevik Whites an ensuing grudging toleration permitted Bolshevik consolidation. This was matched by the Bolsheviks' wary readjustment to the encircling Capitalist world after other revolutions failed. Both sides thus showed mutual pragmatism.

However strong latent hostility remained. The Colby Note of 1920 described the Bolsheviks as forcefully gaining power, being untrustworthy in negotiations and overtly hostile to other governments (Gaddis, 1990, pp. 77, 85, 94). Germany's defeat left Bolshevik Russia as the main destabilising influence, thus beyond any Western notion of a society of free nations. Yet the Note omitted prohibitions on trade and other economic contacts while still justifying non-recognition (Joan Hoff Wilson, 1974, p.18).

American administrations continued to view the Bolshevik state as dangerously different in form and behaviour and this revulsion had an ideological base. Herbert Hoover who was variously Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of State and President made the case in

American Individualism. He depicted Bolshevism as stifling individualism and democracy. He promulgated countervailing American ideological values of individualism, materialism, private property, frontier neighbourliness, equality of opportunity, competition, democracy and economic expansion abroad. Thereby he explained how Bolshevism contravened the fundamental American tenets. This clearly implied opposed societies and systems.

He described the Bolshevik tyranny as based on theories inimical to the individual's primary self interest to produce, and he highlighted the regime's bloody characteristics. However, his critique exceeded the ideological by incorporating political and economic dimensions. He emphasised how American society rested on individual achievement spurred by "the emery wheel of competition" which was as central for the individual as for the country; moreover, that property ownership and self expression were essential motivators (1922, pp.9-10, 18, 34, 36, 38). He contended how American individualism encouraged national attainment and what worked for America was applicable elsewhere. However this conflicted with Communism's subordination of the individual to the state and its opposition to private ownership. Thus how the individual was perceived in relation to the broader society was a key Soviet-American differentiator. Hoover went far towards identifying the antithetical natures of the two societies and implied systemic antagonism. Nevertheless, the world then was big enough to insulate each from the other so these systemic differences did not create conflictual flash-points. Hoover did however make a case for American moral and political superiority, later underpinning Luce's concept of an "American Century".

To prevent revolutions proliferating throughout a hungry Europe while also having regard to American economic self-interest, Hoover advocated a “bread and butter” programme which included relief for Bolshevik Russia during its great famine of 1921-2. Yet this showed a contradiction in American foreign policy because while assistance for starving Russians was humane it helped an alien regime (Hoff Wilson, 1974, pp. 6-7, 23, 26). American political and ethical motives might thus seem in contention although Hoover may have deemed such international “frontier neighbourliness” as superseding the competing interests of opposed states. If so it echoed Wilson’s reference to the people rather than the regime of Russia. Yet American help contributed to Bolshevik survival.

There was also another contradiction. Hoover’s anti-Bolshevik ideology contended with his goal of a controlled expansion of American trade reflected in The Colby Note’s ambivalent refusal to recognise the Soviet state without prohibiting commercial relations. While ideology and commerce were central to the American system, there remained opposed motives towards the Soviet Union. The issue was whether the United States should apply economic pressure against the Soviet state or exploit Russian markets in an Open Door style (Hoff Wilson, pp. 29). The outcome was to continue withholding recognition but not preventing trade. By the end of the fiscal year 1924-5 the United States was exporting goods worth more than $68 million to the Soviet Union which benefited American producers. Ensuing years saw highs and lows in the Soviet-American commercial relationship but never its extinction. During the Soviet First Five Year Plan and Depression trade increased between the two yet did not exceed 1% of American overseas commerce which was disproportionately significant for the Soviet Union since the success of the Plan was crucial.

This underlined Soviet reliance on Western but especially American credit facilities, heavy equipment and technology. Moreover certain American companies helped Soviet development: in 1929 Henry Ford signed a major contract with the state run Amtorg, despite his earlier hostility to the Bolshevik regime (Hoff Wilson. 1974, pp. 82-3, 92, 96).

American assistance in the early and late 1920s promoted both Soviet survival, then later the development of its centralised Socialist industrial infrastructure: the United States thereby facilitated the consolidation of an antithetical systemic competitor. Establishing normal economic and political relations with the Soviet Union during 1917-33 has been described as complicated by institutionalised ideological considerations. Despite administrations' opposition to the Communist regime, a significant minority within the business community continued trading with the Soviets (Hoff Wilson, p 131). Whereas the American Government said one thing, certain commercial interests did another. This simultaneously reflected ambivalent ideological disapproval and commercial Open Door thinking which denoted a lack of American political will to end such links. However, although official and corporate motives did not coincide, such contacts might be future bridgeheads for subsequent regime change, which could thus justify governmental toleration.

American support at critical times begs the tantalising question whether an earlier, co-ordinated policy prohibiting these contacts which helped Soviet industries could have prevented the later Cold War. However such efforts against a systemic competitor would have required strong central government resolve to end trade. Yet the will had evaporated

after earlier unsuccessful allied interventions to support the anti-Bolshevik Whites. Such a policy would have contravened the notion of small government while also contending with corporate interests. This revealed an American systemic dichotomy between competing ideological and economic motives reflecting differences between American politicians and commercial interests. Corporatism combined with constitutionally embedded states' rights represented systemic centrifugal tendencies at the expense of central power and underpinned by suspicions of big government. This duality was absent in Soviet totalitarianism where systemic coherence united ideologically based economics and politics through the state's central grip on all structures. No Soviet counterparts existed to powerful and independent American corporations.

The Bolshevik-Soviet state now requires closer examination because it constituted a systemic departure in its commitment to building world Socialism which was intrinsically anti-Capitalist. The potential for systemic antagonism and even conflict now existed unless the similar transformation of other states facilitated political convergence. Bolshevism schismatically sought initially to create a world revolution based on the Marxist-Leninist precept of the classless ownership of production, completely at variance with practices elsewhere. Therefore Bolshevism rejected all Capitalist practices especially those in the prototypically Capitalist United States and Imperialist Britain. Its economic model refuted the accumulation of privately owned capital which it contended created exploiter and exploited, owner and worker, oppressor and oppressed, coloniser and colonised. Its message was challenging, experimental and dangerously different.

Therefore it is important to examine how it worked, why it was different and the problems it met. It had to adapt its political philosophy to meet the challenge of a transition to revolutionary power, while surviving in the face of encircling hostile states. Bolsheviks were convinced their form of Socialism could out-perform Capitalism on its own terms, especially in productive capacity, so developing industrial power along Marxist principles was central both to survive and to demonstrate Socialist superiority.

Almost at once theory and practice failed to combine. The Bolsheviks had expected a speedy end to their isolation with spontaneous and successful revolutions elsewhere in line with the Russian catalyst, so heralding a universal chain reaction that would mark Capitalism's end as the trans-national working classes overturned global exploitative structures. However, although revolutions broke out, none survived. The result was a single revolutionary regime that justifiably feared other countries' hostile intentions. It now sought the subordination of other revolutionary movements to itself and this process enhanced Bolshevik centralism which thereby manifest a defining systemic feature. Now the new state became the sole embodiment of the world revolution which marked a dramatic political and ideological shift from the international to the national. It must now survive in an alien world.

Mid-Nineteenth Century Marxism had posited revolutions in West European industrially advanced nations, particularly Germany. *The Communist Manifesto* contended these would

occur as countries attained higher stages of industrialisation which would precipitate a world revolutionary process as workers' natural common interests transcended national frontiers. One of Lenin's major contributions however was to revise Marxism. A key example was how effective leadership could produce a revolution in a less industrialised country such as Russia where circumstances did not conform with classical Marxist revolutionary preconditions. Lenin readily altered the ideological mould if it did not fit the circumstances. This begged the question whether such opportunist updating of theory in line with events was legitimate, or else revealed that Marxism was a flawed and incoherent predictive system. Lenin however identified himself as the principal mover in redefining the conditions for revolutionary change.

In *What Is To Be Done* in 1902 Lenin argued how successful revolutions required efficiently led and highly organised political parties, thereby questioning Marx's contention about the spontaneity of revolutions without a disciplined and elite leadership for the masses. In *State and Revolution* in 1917 he urged organising the national economy under the control of the armed proletariat but then "made the transition from the concept of the 'proletariat' to that of the 'party' without seeing the enormity of the questions begged." Such leadership by dedicated revolutionaries would result in the central role of the party to both revolution and the resulting state: henceforth party and state became indissoluble. This was consolidated in 1919 by the establishment of the Politburo which concentrated power in a small but dominant organisation at the apex of the party (G. Hoskins, 1990, pp.73, 88). On this foundation developed the dictatorship *over* rather than *of* the proletariat.

In *Imperialism* in 1916 Lenin argued that the late Nineteenth Century development of Monopoly Capitalism was marked by internecine conflict between states which presaged the destruction of international Capitalism. He concluded that inter-Capitalist wars gave scope for the proletariat's revolutionary acquisition of power without a state's prior advanced industrialisation. Thus a revolution in industrially backward Russia was facilitated by the propitious circumstances of the European war's disruption, but only if exploited properly. Intermediate revolutionary stages could now be bypassed through effective organisation, thus the party could enable revolution:

> "Only the political party of the working class, i.e. the Communist Party, is capable of uniting, training and organising a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people that alone will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois vacillation of the mass…Without this the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible." (Lenin, 1975, 3, p.523).

Thus the Bolshevik leadership could exploit the turmoil of war by adapting events. At the Brest-Litovsk Treaty negotiations in 1918 with Germany, the Bolsheviks entered as world revolutionaries but emerged as men seeking state power which propelled them towards Socialism in One Country because of the peace terms' constraints (Ulam, 1968, pp. 74-5). The treaty while ignominious for the Bolsheviks involved regime recognition by the Germans and permitted the creation of the fundamentals of statehood. The failure of other Communist uprisings - especially in Germany in January 1919 - dashed immediate hopes of revolutions elsewhere, while animosity between Capitalist powers and Revolutionary Russia increased. The founding of the Communist International in March however both reaffirmed Bolshevism's broader international aspirations and solidified Western enmity. Yet its Twenty One Conditions imposed a centralism requiring foreign parties to emulate the Bolshevik

revolutionary template that inhibited the initiative of indigenous Communists. Although Comintern kept for some years its supranational character it effectively became the buttress of the new state. Therefore although the world revolution immediately post-1917 was a constant expectation, this became during the Civil War a distant albeit sustaining vision, then in the 1920s degenerated into a slogan lacking the earlier urgent enthusiasm (Ulam, 1968, pp. 112-118, 129).

Dwindling hopes of exporting revolution made Communism centripetal and inward-looking with greater emphasis on the Soviet Socialist state than world revolution. This trend was accentuated after Lenin's death in 1924 with Stalin's ascendancy and his determination to become the successor to Lenin the theorist. He accomplished this by adroitly using the ideological legacy to mould the cult of Lenin. In *The Foundations of Leninism* (1924) he distilled Lenin's miscellaneous writings into a doctrine of universal significance. The Marx-Engels Institute and the Lenin Institute were institutions established to accumulate the heritage of the revolutionary founding fathers. Stalin proclaimed Leninism as the "Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution" and Lenin the heir of Marx and Engels. However in his *Problems of Leninism* (1926) Stalin promulgated Socialism in a Single Country that was contrary to Lenin's views which he successfully doctored. Although he made Lenin the high priest of the Revolution, he identified himself as the true heir (Hoskins, 1990, 133; R. Service, 2005, pp. 221-222).

The interrelationship between politics and ideology was a systemic characteristic. Marxism postulated Dialectical Materialism based on immutable laws that historical progress occurs in stages whose determining criterion was the class struggle for the ownership of the means of production. This conflict had created conflictual stages: Feudalism had replaced a slave owning society, Capitalism replaced Feudalism, then Socialism would replace Capitalism when the workers controlled production (R.N. Carew Hunt, 1962, pp. 37-40).

Stalin was an arch practitioner of adapting to survive by employing revisions to Marxist-Leninism. However he believed History was deterministically on the side of Socialism while modifying Marxist-Leninism to legitimise his actions. His increasing powers permitted the implementation of his political programme, which he justified by referring to the modifiable ideological canon. While capable of pragmatic realism, Stalin remained a committed ideologue. He considered that ruthless leadership was needed to protect the new Socialist order because of continued Capitalist hostility while his doubts about the spontaneous spread of revolution were realistic. Although this contradicted Lenin it maintained the revisionist tradition practised by Lenin himself. Both adapted ideology to circumstances and their pursuits of power. Under Stalin eliminating rivals and stifling debate accompanied the concentration of power in fewer hands. While Lenin was the intellectual autocrat who framed the revolutionary debate, Stalin exercised his autocracy by control of the party. Opponents were portrayed as "deviationists" and although this characterised Communism it became a particular feature of Stalinism. Stalin's Marxist-Leninism was both predictive but increasingly prescriptive. It was differentiated from Western liberalism by its totalitarianism, introspection and intolerance. By ruthless concentration of power and manipulation of the Leninist legacy to redefine Socialism when deemed necessary, the Soviet state became

Stalinised with his personal autocracy supplanting any real proletarian democracy. Stalin effectively directed this power against political opponents, notably Trotsky. Orthodoxy as well as Stalin's personal jealousy demanded acquiescence. Challenges were treated as threats. Malleable Marxist-Leninism ideology, construed as orthodoxy, was adaptable to sustain Stalin's power. Such flexibility enabled Stalin to any plans he deemed necessary, even the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939.

Mistakes inevitably occurred when ideology conspired with poor judgements. The start of the 1930s saw rapid Soviet industrialisation and encompassed the conviction that the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and ensuing Depression heralded the final crisis of Capitalism, epitomising the erroneously predictive nature of Marxist-Leninism. Furthermore Stalin initially considered European Social Democrats, not Hitler, as his main enemy. A systemic feature was the leadership's inability to accept critical advice yet Stalin, like Lenin, was committed to the state's survival which was essential for the Socialist experiment to succeed.

In May 1918 Lenin's speech had described the Bolshevik Revolution as "a lone island in the stormy seas of imperialist robbery." (Gaddis, 1990, p. 88). He anticipated antagonism between imperialist states, but he recognised the Bolshevik Republic was in an extremely unstable and critical international position which required taking advantage of the respite afforded by the treaty with Germany to recover from the country's very serious wounds.

Lenin anticipated future attacks while survival relied on enemy disunity and Bolshevik organisation (Lenin, 1936, 7, pp. 313-314).

Combining Socialist economic development with a modus vivendi with Capitalist powers was a pre-requisite. During the Paris Peace Conference the Russian Foreign Minister Chicherin offered Western powers economic gains in return for ending hostile intervention. Bolshevik Russia needed such links, especially with the United States since accessing capital, expertise and products facilitated Socialist development while exploiting Capitalism's profit motive, so nurturing its nemesis. The policy was centrally conceived, pragmatic yet ideologically consistent and dictated by the survival of the Socialist "lone island". Moreover Bolshevik Russia could learn from the West despite eschewing Capitalism and this strategic political-economic coherence contrasted with the American dichotomy between government and commercial interests.

Survival however incurred a heavy price with the cession of extensive territories to Germany at Brest Litovsk. During 1918-21 the Bolshevik regime implemented drastic internal measures known as War Communism to sustain state and economy during the Civil War while also contending with domestic enemies, epidemics, famine and great dislocation. Temporary compromises became necessary. In 1921 Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy to restore balance after chaotic times. The centrepiece was the toleration of limited economic liberalisation such as limited personal wealth creation and property ownership (Ulam, 1968, pp. 77-78). Despite contravening ideology, this like Brest-Litovsk was

considered a necessary price to pay. Molotov, a long standing Bolshevik and Stalin's foreign minister, commented:

"As regards N.E.P., according to Lenin, it was our strategic retreat from Socialism….They accused us of jettisoning our line, of renouncing Socialism, of renouncing leadership of the working class, of drifting with the current towards Capitalism." (1993, 246-247).

Crucially for Soviet ideologues the N.E.P. only delayed progress to Socialism. Although reversing the priority of industry over agriculture which entailed concessions to the peasantry, the leadership never relinquished the objective of Socialist industrialisation as the lynchpin of a classless state.

Stalin would not be deflected from key political objectives which meant reasserting priorities. Accordingly he described 1929 as the year of "The Great Break" when he sought the destruction of the old society in order to build the new. The concessionary expedients of the N.E.P. were dismantled so as to redirect the Soviet Union back to its correct ideological path. Identifying specific groups as ideological obstructions was helpful and the so called NEPmen were vilified as bourgeois and favouring a Capitalist economy. Industry would now again be paramount and perceived opponents became class enemies. Agricultural collectivisation to underpin industrialisation meant a war against the kulaks, the rich peasantry, who were castigated as the reactionary forces of the old society. However it has been well argued that the "kulak class" was a fantasy while the loss of such enterprising peasants was an economic catastrophe (Orlando Figes, 2008, pp. 6, 73-74, 84-86). The Socialist experiment made great mistakes which however occurred for systemic reasons. Personal accumulation of wealth meant tolerating Capitalist practices hence were an

unacceptable dilution. Purging all such elements was seen as the pre-condition to progressing the Socialist future, which required acquiescence. However the basic contrast with other Capitalist economies and especially the U.S., was marked. Here small scale private enterprise was deemed the route to national progress. As Stalinism strengthened, prospects of systemic convergence with the world beyond receded.

Subordination was required of individual will to the Party which ideologically embodied the collective wisdom of the proletariat which logically could not be wrong, despite increased autocratic control. The practice of self-criticism and purging that had originated in early revolutionary days continued, when important questions were subject to the Party's jurisdiction. Thus if accused of crimes by the Party, repentance alone was acceptable because self-defence was considered an anti Party crime. Such self subjection to this superior wisdom reinforced the leadership's authority and this helps explain why so many accused before and during the purges abjectly acquiesced to their fate. (Figes, 2008, pp. 32-34). Consequently any edicts of the leadership were in effect ideologically infallible and were forcefully applied. Free thinking individualism and self expression which characterised American attitudes were anathema in the Stalinist state and were deemed obstructive to its citizenry's correct mindset.

Therefore discontent caused by collectivisation's deleterious effects on rural living standards evoked vigorous state repression. Indeed Stalin found "terror on a grand scale deeply congenial". Terms including "anti-Soviet elements" and "enemies of the people" were commonly used from the Civil War onwards reflecting a prevalent official view that

whole social categories deserved harsh persecution (Service, 2005, pp.339, 345). The basic Soviet tenet of class warfare justified repressing internal and external class enemies because external hostile forces had infiltrated the state. In order to avoid party divisions Molotov justified repressing deviations associated with certain supposedly renegade Bolsheviks, which also usefully removed potential leadership rivals. "It would have been one against the other. Then what?" (1993, 258). This reflected how a conformist unity had the highest priority to obviate a descent into factionalism. Official orthodoxy was paramount revealing how the leadership's paranoia emanated throughout the Party. This exercise of power showed how an inflexible system reacted to the challenge of open political institutions. The rigid Stalinist mould became an enduring feature of Soviet Socialism.

The N.K.V,D. or secret police was the state's principal instrument for maintaining orthodoxy and practising repression. By the 1930s it had built up a network of informers in every factory, office, school and institution. The readiness to inform was valued, denoting a higher regard for political loyalty than bourgeois ties of family or friendship. The system successfully relied on the citizenry's collaboration and proved effective in a vast country where ordinary policing was difficult. The Great Terror of the late 1930s marked the apotheosis of terror when half of those arrested were eliminated. During 1937-8 alone probably in excess of 680,000 were executed for alleged anti-state crimes. Arguably fears of an approaching war within the milieu of a threatened Soviet state strengthened the case for repressing a supposed fifth column of "tsarist spies and enemies". Indeed paranoia was integral to Stalin's character (Figes, 2008, pp.180, 234-235). The loyal Molotov later admitted that "great mistakes were made" which included the repression of women and

children. Yet he justified such excesses “for the sake of the main objective – keeping state power”, even contending that without it,

> “things would have been worse…but Stalin insisted on making doubly sure…spare no one but guarantee absolute stability in the country for a long period of time…it was difficult to draw a precise line where to stop.”

However he admitted that “ the best people are purged first.” (1993, pp. 255-256, 277-278). The widespread and indiscriminate Great Terror represented a self-harming level of overkill and a huge public relations blunder by highlighting to observers the regime’s apparent paranoia. It also probably deterred the French and British from closer links with the Soviet Union at a critical time as it underwent such traumas for dubious reasons, thus putting the regime’s survival in doubt which encouraged Hitler’s belligerence. If the conspicuous Soviet treason trials were justified then treason was rampant; but if not why perpetrate such a bloody fantasy? (Ulam, 1968, pp.241-243). Therefore there was the double cost of wasted lives, skills and talents, as well as a degraded perception of Soviet rationality. This reflected Western concerns about the leadership’s personality and judgement while raising broader questions about totalitarianism’s effectiveness.

Contemporary Western observers identified specific Soviet totalitarian features. These included central direction, a single mass party mobilised against internal and external enemies, the official monopoly of mass communications, supervision of the population by the security police, the adulation of an infallible leader and adherence to an ideology prescribing mankind’s advance by implementation of Socialism (Hoskins, 1990, p.204).

Such attributes underlined Soviet-American systemic differences while enhancing initial American reluctance to give support in the face of Hitler's aggression.

Indeed such systemic masochism seemed tragically and ironically irrational to outsiders given the Soviet aspiration to become strong quickly. The Great Terror apparently subverted the objective of rapidly industrialising a rural and backward country. Yet perceptions differed and Stalin never recanted. Economic progress remained the leadership's highest priority reflecting the conviction that irrespective of cost a Socialist state practising true (Stalinist) Marxist-Leninist principles could deliver modernisation to prove its innate superiority.

From the outset it was acknowledged a high price must be paid by someone for transformational achievements. Lenin had identified a major problem as "the peasants, the most numerous and the most sluggish section of the population" despite toleration of concessions during the New Economic Policy (1975, 1, p.572). However such temporary expedients might involve a fundamental shift in economic direction. Bukharin's call to the more affluent peasants to "enrich themselves" acquired heretical status by institutionalising personal wealth within a re-moulded orthodoxy. Lenin had never endorsed the profit motive for Soviet agriculture's regeneration and planned to propel the peasantry towards farming co-operatives (Service, 2004, 240). However initially he expected the expediencies of the N.E.P. to last "a decade and probably more" yet the longer it endured, the more irreversible ingrained practices might become which vitiated systemic anti-Capitalist precepts.

Bourgeois behaviours must be extirpated in order to foster a Socialist personality. After 1928 Stalin advocated resorting to Civil War style requisitioning practices to support the First Five Year Plan. He depicted this as an "heroic period" in eliminating the last Capitalist vestiges such as petty trade and peasant farming which impeded Socialist industrialisation (Figes, 2008, pp.6-8, 72-73).

During 1927-8 Stalin sought transformation through collectivisation and industrialisation, the two sides of the same coin and intended to change fast and fundamentally the socio-economic structure of the Soviet Union. Compulsion was liberally applied as Soviet Communism acquired more totalitarian attributes. By 1930 Stalin had vanquished the former allies, now characterised as the "Right Opposition", comprising Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov and portrayed as enemies of Socialism. Thereafter any effective opposition to Stalin within the Party ended , so that being a Communist meant being a Stalinist as the cult of personality consolidated (Ulam, 1968, p.183-184).

Thus economic and political transformation combined during a phase of centrally directed accelerated development as Soviet agriculture and the peasantry became the elements that paid the price. Molotov explained that:

"To survive the state needed grain. Otherwise it would crack up – it would be unable to maintain the army, the schools, construction, the elements most vital to the state…only the overwhelming authority of the centre, with Stalin at the head, enabled us to fulfil our plans." (1993, p.243)

In the first two months of 1930 half of all Soviet peasantry representing 60 million people in 100,000 villages were relocated to collective farms (Figes, 2008, p. 85). By 1932 62% of all households belonged to collective farms which was achieved by targeting re-organisation of farm tenure, employment and grain seizures. This last measure in the Ukraine eliminated the stock for planting in subsequent years and the ensuing famine caused six million deaths. However the state needed grain both for export and the expanding industrial workforce in mining and manufacturing. The First Five Year Plan scheduled for completion by 1933 was achieved a year early with gross industrial output up by 137%. Huge showpiece projects including the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the new city of Magnitogorsk confirmed the Soviet transformation to an industrial and urban society. This was achieved only with many rural deaths, but while success was publicised, its cost was not. Nothing could detract from the premise of Socialist superiority (Service, 2004, pp. 271-4, 312).

Famine and urban unrest affecting industrial output caused Stalin to make some concessions. He knew when to bend tactically. Peasants were allowed to trade their agricultural surplus and there was a reduction in state grain quotas from the collective farms. Yet by 1935 Stalin again raised the industrial tempo, agricultural liberalisation was curbed and predictable political repression followed. By 1937 gross output at the end of the Second Five Year Plan had increased by 60% over 1932 output levels (Service, 2004, pp. 310-318). In effect the Soviet state was at war with its backward and conservative rural past in its ruthlessly rapid bid to modernise.

Collectivisation, purges and political repression increased the number of prisoners who were placed in prison camps called Gulags. The penal system was expected to make good economic use of these inmates through implementation of "perekovka", the re-moulding of prisoners through penal labour to fulfil their contribution to Socialism. Inevitably many died during vast projects such as The White Sea-Baltic Canal and building the city of Magnitogorsk. During 1932-1936 those in labour camps, colonies and special settlements reached 2.4 million. Such slave labour was vital for important Arctic industries like timber, construction and mining industries which deterred free labour but enabled inhospitable but economically valuable regions to be exploited. Unlike the American frontier hopes for a better life through individual initiative and personal aspiration were lacking. The Gulag system employed many specialists including victims of purges. A minority enjoyed some benefits but the majority had few and little chance of reprieve or a long life. Conservative N.K.V.D. statistics for 1932-6 show 150,000 deaths in Soviet labour camps (Figes, 2008, pp.112-113, 193-194, 208-218).

Stalinism created a large pool of labour that needed to be self-justifying on successful showpiece projects that enhanced the success story of the Soviet Union where slavery in all but name was a politically acceptable way to accelerate modernisation. However, there was a sharp contrast with Western views of liberty, exemplified by the American abolition of slavery in the Nineteenth Century.

Throughout the later interwar years an overt commitment to spreading Communism remained but progress impelled introspection and developing autarkic structures that permitted self-interested economic contacts with Capitalist states but not convergence. An Iron Curtain was effectively being constructed The Soviet *door* would open only when links proved of self interest. For Stalin most Western states were coterminous with globally hostile Capitalism and Soviet divergence with such political and economic models enhanced systemic schism.

Both the differing roles of the individual and the degrees of central control were systemically delineating factors. Even before 1917 centralism was inherent within the Bolshevik Party so its accession to power produced a regime committed to single party politics, central management and a disciplined, classless society. The leadership's increased dominance facilitated a grip that impacted ideology, politics, economics and legislative functions.

Stalin's personal influence was systemically significant. He used Marxist-Leninist theory to fashion his Communist state while his long tenure of central control and cult of personality conspired to confer political deification. Paraphrasing Louis XIV's famous remark, the Soviet state was Stalin. While he manipulated theory pragmatically he had single-minded ideas about the path to his conception of Socialism which entailed outperforming then defeating Capitalism because systemic reconciliation was impossible. His paranoia meant the prominence of others incurred his jealous retribution therefore suspicion permeated an informer-riddled system which edified loyalty to Stalin and party. He also demonstrated

xenophobia sustained by notions of the alien, contaminating and hostile nature of the surrounding Capitalist world. He indelibly shaped the Soviet state which remained Stalinist long after his death.

By the start of the Second World War the Stalinist Soviet Union was completely different from the U.S, and indeed from most other states. Although its image was more appealing than its reality, it would prove an obstruction to Luce's hopes for a world amenable to betterment by Americanism. Its revised Marxist mould enhanced its systemic distinctiveness and it propounded an alternative path for world development. However up until 1941 it remained a "lone island" but the war compelled changes, compromises, realignments and the beginning of the end for Socialism in a Single Country.

The contrast with the American model was fundamental. American political philosophy was equally ideological but less prescriptive, even when articulated by Luce. It had relied on personal and institutional initiative to assimilate its vast new western lands while central authority remained relatively restricted. Corporations possessing economic independence pursued large scale private enterprise projects central to American continental and global development. Devolved powers to the constituent states meant they enjoyed significant autonomy within a federal structure. A constitutionally enshrined balance was sought between Executive, Legislature and Judiciary to restrain each. This contrasted sharply with the Soviet system where the executive's paramount role over all other functions realistically prohibited a similar balance.

American values encouraged the virtuously perceived pursuit of corporate and personal wealth based on the stimulus of competition whose parameters were framed by the equality to compete. Such views would come head to head with Soviet values that required subordination of individuals to the party and state, the elimination of private ownership as the main buttress of a tyrannous Capitalism that prevented progress to equality. The American system regarded the state as doing best when it did least which promoted a social diversity reflected in differentiated degrees of wealth, conflicting opinions and competing political parties. The Soviet system required the state, representing the proletariat's democratic voice as exercised through the Communist Party, to provide leadership consistent with Marxist-Leninist historical determinism. The ideological ends justified the sometimes cruel means. However the American system self-righteously prided itself on avoiding excesses of rapid Soviet industrial progress which, despite vaunted higher goals, exhibited institutionalised and dehumanising brutality.

Such contrasting world views were carried forward into the American-Soviet encounter on the Elbe at the war's end. Mutual animosity would become unavoidable within the milieu of wartime European devastation which nevertheless also witnessed the growing economic ascendancy of the U.S. whose unscathed industries uniquely thrived on war's stimulus. How the war set the stage for systemic conflict comprises the next chapter as an aspirant hegemonic power with a global programme encountered an implacable systemic rival. Notably the Soviet Union and Western democracies would become more assertive and

potentially confrontational because of the fervent ferocity with which the war was prosecuted.

CHAPTER TWO

MY ENEMY'S ENEMY

During the Yalta Conference of February 1945 James Byrnes quoted Stalin as saying that:

"The danger in the future is the possibility of conflicts between ourselves… It is not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there is the joint aim to defeat the common enemy, which is clear to everyone. The difficult task will come after the war when diverse interests tend to divide the Allies."

This view reflected that of Franklin Roosevelt a month earlier:

"The nearer we get to come to vanquishing our enemies the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors."
(J.F. Byrnes, 1947, pp. 37, 44, 60)

The war-time Soviet-American aim was the destruction of Nazi Germany but to achieve this Soviet survival was important. After this seemed likely insufficient consideration was given to the consequences of the allies' irreconcilable systemic natures on the ensuing political landscape. *My enemy's enemy* remained a friend only while that common foe existed.

The Second World War proved transformational although this was imperfectly understood at the time. Firstly, it terminated the distance between the Unites States and the Soviet Union as both became major European political entities having abandoned their isolationism. Secondly , the U.S. developed views for the Americanised economic and political restructuring of the post-war world. Thirdly, the independence of Europe was diminished relative to the power of the U.S. and Soviet Union and it became the contested interface between their competing systems. Fourthly, as the war was ending American and Soviet views increasingly diverged as Stalin sought enhanced security for his battered state while the U.S. sought to internationalise its economic template. His conviction about a continuing

Capitalist-Socialist struggle enabled him to comprehend better than the Americans that their systemic antagonism portended conflict (Levering et al., 2001, pp. 160 -164).

The Cold War therefore developed from fundamental "differences among the victors" due to an intensification of allied "diverse interests" (Byrnes, 1947, pp. 37, 44, 60). Furthermore technology increased their antagonism after American atomic bombs caused the surrender of Japan which removed the need for Soviet help against her, hitherto an American priority. The Soviet Union's subsequent exclusion from American control of Japan confirmed Stalin's belief that the American atomic monopoly conferred leverage enabling her to expand in Europe and beyond at Soviet expense(Levering et al., 2001, p. 105; Zubok and Pleshakov, 1996, p.45). This exacerbated existing suspicions fuelled by Soviet exclusion from the Anglo-American atomic collaboration which Stalin's spies had revealed before Truman's disclosure of the bomb at Postdam in July 1945 l. The August blasts demonstrated that the bombs were in a new league of devastation. Moreover Stalin appreciated that Soviet success against Germany cloaked a weaknesses caused by war, now enhanced by the awesome display of new American technology. Much of what Stalin subsequently did was responding to his perception of Soviet weakness in relation to the more economically and technically advanced American systemic competitor that war left relatively unscathed.

The United States came to oppose the potential Communising of the human and physical resources of a geopolitically vital Europe as it transposed the mantle of totalitarian aggressor from the Nazis to the Soviet Union (M.J. Selverstone, 2008, p. 38). Promulgating Americanism developed from a benevolent ideal of presumed universal appeal into a

systemic necessity as the U.S. re-evaluated Soviet motives. The U.S. suffered from a perceptual deficit and could not read situations through Stalin's lens. It thus considered Communist obstruction and aggression to be the source of problems without appreciating Soviet strategic weakness relative to American strength and expansionism within the broader context of systemic competition (Leffler, 1992, p.5)

After fighting initially to survive the Soviet Union sought to forestall future threats from hostile Capitalist powers by strengthening its countervailing systemic bloc whose principles and practices were inconsistent with America's (Levering et al., 2001, pp. 89-91). A vital touchstone was Germany because of its position, resources and abject defeat. Allied unity, sustained by war, was eroded by a peace which evoked difficult questions about whether Europe and specifically Germany would look East or West for systemic orientation (Gaddis, 1997, pp. 115-118).

The two powers' mutual perceptions were thus critical and rooted in polarities reflecting their economic, political, ideological and cultural differences. The initial American expectation of Soviet co-operation continuing from war time into peace was abandoned as specific differences emerged (Levering et al., 2001, pp. 14,42,119; Leffler, 1992, pp124 - 126). Although Soviet ideology posited an on-going conflict with Capitalism there were no ideologically-rooted American certainties about conflict, so a Soviet-American perceptual mis-match initially existed because American high hopes for co-operation meant overlooking underlying systemic inconsistencies.

The first systemic conflict occurred between Germany and the Soviet Union after the collapse of the short-lived mutually expedient Nazi-Soviet Pact signed in August 1939. This had done nothing to soften a Nazi doctrine which asserted that the dynamic of racial conflict meant a war to take lands from the inferior Slavs (Adolf Hitler, 1999, pp. 654, 660 – 667). This combined with German rearmament fed Soviet fears which reinforced the conviction of historical determinism's prescription of conflict with Capitalist states whether fascist or democratic (Franklin, ed., 1972, pp. 85- 88, 300- 333). Significantly Nazi-Soviet systemic antagonism was not inhibited by a similar distance as existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. The end of Soviet hopes for an alliance with France and Britain and the unlikelihood of American help left Stalin little alternative but to deal with Hitler because the survival of the Soviet Union, inadequately prepared for war, was at stake. The Nazi idea of expansion through conflict at the Soviet Union's expense meant Germany was the immediate threat which other Capitalist states were not.

Stalin appreciated the Pact only bought time but just how much proved critical. Its temporary suspension of Nazi-Soviet differences meant that Hitler could turn his attention elsewhere (Liddell Hart, 1970, pp 13 -14; Overy, 1998, pp. 54 – 56). The chance for a Soviet-Western alliance to confront Hitler in a two-front war had passed. Europe moved closer to totalitarian domination while isolationism prevented the U.S. from mitigating a deleterious shift in the European balance of power. This was significantly compounded throughout 1939-40 with the swift and successful invasions of Poland and France which strengthened Hitler's positions in both East and the West by creating springboards for further military moves in either direction Britain emerged as Europe's solitary source of resistance

while transatlantic affinities were insufficient to overcome American reluctance to be militarily involved despite the worsening European power imbalance. Hitler's rapid political and military manoeuvring had outrun Western options for alliance building while Germany's domination of Europe brought increased scope for her to utilise the continent's considerable industrial and manpower resources (Martin Gilbert, 2002, pp. 264-274). This situation was detrimental to the U.S. by making her position less secure through forfeiture of influence over European events. Isolationism came with a price.

The Pact ceded Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and a section of Eastern Poland to the Soviet Union (Hoskins, 1990, pp. 251-252). An inverted *cordon sanitaire* against a postponed but inevitable Nazi attack was under construction which offered prospects of a barrier defence, while systemic conformity was required of those within, which was accomplished by the N.K.V.D.'s purges of anti-Soviet elements (Overy, 1998, pp. 51- 53). This denoted the beginning of a Sovietised zone beyond her immediate borders based on a defensive strategic expansion which marked the start of the end for Socialism in One Country. This buffer could later be interpreted by American analysts as the ideologically-rooted systemic propagation of Communism (Deane, 1947, pp.289- 290). Indeed while initially oriented against Hitler it also accommodated the Capitalist world's hostility to the Soviet Union apparently embodied in Western refusal of a defensive alliance. Thus the buffer illustrated efforts at defence without a Western alliance.

The speed of Hitler's progress wrong-footed the Soviet Union and the West. "We are not opposed to war if they have a good fight and weaken each other," Stalin had told the

Comintern. This reflected both his assumptions about inter-Capitalist wars and his underestimate of the success of Hitler's Blitzkrieg attack on France. Afterwards Stalin acknowledged Soviet vulnerability and doubted the Red Army could withstand a German attack until 1943 especially in view of its poor showing in the Winter War against Finland during 1939-40 (Service, 2005, pp. 399-406; Figes, 2008, p.372). He had miscalculated both the timescale for the war in the West and the Pact's capacity to buy him sufficient time. The Baltic states conceded by Germany to the Soviet Union were now forcibly annexed and Sovietised as Stalin realised that Hitler's aggressive agenda in the East was accelerated as the Pact's life-span shortened.

The territories gained by the Pact for the Soviet Union were both a buffer and an incipient bloc which – employing Wallerstein's amended concept – would evolve into another Core-Periphery to rival the pre-existing Capitalist one. This had profound long-term implications as its subsequent extension represented the Soviet strategic priority of combing defence in depth with systemic expansion. Where the Red Army went Sovietisation usually followed. This created a potential stumbling block to Americanism.

Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union was a watershed in the war and affected the post-war world. It drew in the great powers from West and East and enabled a political realignment as the nullified Nazi-Soviet Pact helped rehabilitate the Soviet Union thereby creating scope for a Western-Soviet alliance. This also shaped the war's parameters by producing predominant Soviet military power in the East and Anglo-American power in the West, increasing the predisposition towards a future systemic divide. Moreover Soviet extension

of its bloc along non-Western lines concomitantly increased the likelihood of subsequent Soviet-American antagonisms, as well as splitting a weakened Europe.

Soviet survival from mid 1941 however seemed problematic after Stalin's miscalculation over the timing of a German attack. The ruthless purging of a suspected internal military opposition had entailed liquidating 30,000 senior officers in 1938. This loss was starkly reflected in the Finnish Winter War of 1939-40 and the earlier stages of the Nazi-Soviet war. Khruschev later strongly criticised the removal of experienced military officers which had followed the elimination of intellectuals, Party members, scientific and executive personnel in 1937 (1971, pp.86-89). During a period of national vulnerability, Stalin had weakened his state and reduced the odds of surviving Hitler's attack.

Both Hitler and Stalin could make serious errors reflecting the systemic weakness of over-reliance on dictators' sometimes questionable judgements. A victorious Hitler now dismissed the Soviet Union thus: "The whole structure is rotten; one kick and we can bring the building down." (S. Badsey, ed., 2000, p.89). Charles E. Bohlen, a State Department Soviet expert, considered that a Nazis attack in 1939 instead of 1941 might have removed the Soviet Union from the war and destroyed its system. (1973. p.85). W. Averell Harriman, the wartime ambassador to Moscow, said Stalin admitted that,

"If Hitler had concentrated on Moscow …he could have taken the city and if Moscow had fallen the nerve centre of the nation would have been destroyed." (1971, p.23).

However Hitler opted for neutralisation of France because a German priority from the Great War was avoiding a war on two fronts by gaining victory in the West before turning

Eastwards. However in the face of his generals' opposition, his failure to concentrate on Moscow was arguably decisive. Moreover the inability to eliminate Britain also proved crucial by leaving an undefeated and defiant adversary in the West. On June 22nd 1941 following news of the start of Barbarossa, Churchill ended British isolation by saying:

"Any man or state who fights on against Nazi-dom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe….It follows therefore that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and to the Russian people." (1952, p. 301).

Hitler's invasion had significant strategic implications for Britain and the U.S.. It not only facilitated an Anglo-Soviet alliance, but created the prospect of a disadvantageous two front war for Germany (B.H. Liddell Hart, 1970, p.711).

Roosevelt had compromised American isolationism by providing vital Lend-Lease aid to Britain, convinced that her survival was essential to that of Western civilisation. After the fall of France in 1940 until Barbarossa in June 1941 Britain remained the solitary protagonist against Hitler. Whereas common democratic beliefs were shared between the United States and Britain, no such commonality existed with the Soviet Union, to whom Roosevelt extended Lend Lease that same year. Thus began an ambivalent Soviet-American relationship. Initial American material support for those fighting the Nazis increased with her own military involvement at the end of 1941 (Koenker, D.P. and Bachman, R.D. eds., 1997, pp. 650 – 651).

However the delegation of anti-Nazi fighting on Eastern European fronts to the Red Army produced major political and strategic results as Soviet power gradually consolidated there. This undermined American strategic cohesion concerning present and future aims because the Soviet-American alliance downplayed a basic systemic incompatibility which later

emerged forcefully. However in a remark to Joseph E. Davies, the former American ambassador to Moscow, Roosevelt admitted that while he couldn't "take communism…to cross this bridge I would hold hands with the devil." (Gaddis, 1990, pp. 146-147). Events after that bridge was crossed were deeply influence by the course of the war and especially Soviet consolidation of its East European buffer. Therefore war-time strategic necessities shaped the outline of the Cold War. (Levering, et al., 2001, p. 90).

An important visionary element of American thinking had originated in Wilson's Fourteen Points in 1918 with his ambition of spreading American values. This was revived and repackaged in February 1941 when Luce not only urged the U.S. to join the war against Nazi tyranny but referred to the "The American Century", advocating interventionism and the world's future based on free trade and democracy. This took hold within American foreign policy making circles but overlooked the systemic challenge of a strengthening Soviet autarkic system organised on anti-Capitalist precepts. Wilson's and Luce's ideas were reflected in the Atlantic Charter signed in August 1941. It expressed principles for a better post-war world including a lack of aggression, no territorial changes without popular support and the promulgation of Western-style democratic processes with popular choice being central to all forms of government. Its reference to the right of people to "live out their lives in freedom" wrongly presupposed a universally accepted concept. Whereas it laid down a marker, linguistic and conceptual ambiguities arose from the signatories' opposed ideologies. American freedom to pursue wealth and property contradicted Soviet freedom from Capitalism's exploitation. In September 24th the Soviet Ambassador Maisky signed it but noted that "the practical application …will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances,

needs and historic peculiarities of particular countries." (Herbert Feis, 1967, pp. 23-24). Despite this Soviet disclaimed concerning the Charter's principled vision, its ambiguities could be overlooked while fighting the Axis remained the priority. Stalin appreciated the tactical value of an apparently common ideological plank with his Western allies but pointedly commented, "We can deal with it in our own way later." (Miscamble, 2008, p.66). The Charter's Western democratic principles played no fundamental part in his agenda.

While containing no tactical steps towards its implementation, the Charter was overtly systemic. Its framework for peace contained global objectives concerning forms of government, how people should live and emphasised improved conditions of labour and social progress. It reflected a Western economic ideology, presaging Bretton Woods in 1944, by advocating freeing up markets and equalising access to the world's raw materials which contradicted prevalent interwar economic nationalism. Luce's populism complemented the Charter's elevated expression of American post-war ideals. He reflected a domestic culture now assimilating interventionism while his predicted American Century presumed an exceptionalism that made Americanism the desirable path for a needy world.

While Maisky's reference to " practical applications" had been a deliberate tactical disclaimer, it also implied postponing difficulties that constituted potential divisions. However Roosevelt overlooked them because from 1941 to 1945 he optimistically conflated the Soviet-American war-time alliance with subsequent co-operation in implementing an American post-war vision. He had mistakenly presumed the Soviet signature on the Charter ensured future Soviet compliance, thus ignored possibilities of a

fundamentally different Soviet vision. However this anomaly in American policy was structurally reinforced by his restriction of important decision making over the war's conduct to the White House which entailed marginalising the State Department. His deaf ear complemented a blind eye. He strongly believed that his emollience towards Stalin could resolve problems and that personal chemistry could obviate systemic inconsistencies. He overemphasised American-Soviet convergence over global imperialism but could not see the relationship through the ideological lens of Stalin, to whom the Charter was a necessary but temporary expedient. Until his death Roosevelt sought a special personal relationship with the Soviet dictator, even courting Russian approval by sometimes belittling Anglo-American ties (Gaddis Smith, 1965, pp.65, 81).

Two different American strategic levels developed, replacing a single unity of two parts, the first melding sequentially with the second. The premise was that the war would lead to peace and a better post-war world if the right template was universally adopted. The first developed through American engagement with the Soviet Union in the anti-Nazi war. It was precipitated by Barbarossa and later confirmed by Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war, generating a Soviet –American alliance. To these ends the allies' objective was defeating fascist enemies but the speed of events precipitated rapid reactions which downplayed differences and derailed American strategic integration. Later an impending victory brought forward this global strategic tier as embodied in the Atlantic Charter and the concept of the "American Century". Mistakenly extrapolating from the war-time alliance, the Americans had not foreseen how a systemically divergent Soviet Union's

agenda could alter with peace from co-operation to apparent obstruction. This revealed a flaw in assumptions underpinning American strategic thinking.

The Charter's advocacy of Western values was intrinsically anti-totalitarian and therefore portended Soviet-American difficulties. Although this inconsistency remained largely sublimated during most of the war years it inevitably emerged later. The Declaration on Liberated Europe updated the Charter and included direct reference to Eastern Europe's democratization. Therefore whereas it aimed to resolve inter-allied problems it instead ironically highlighted the disjunction between Western and Soviet notions of democracy.

It was also ironic that American war time assistance had helped the Soviet system not just to survive, then to advance, but thereafter to expand and consolidate in Eastern Europe. Lend Lease aid to the Soviet Union was estimated at $5,357,300,000 for the period from October 1941 to May 1944 alone (Koenker, D.P. and Bachman, R.D. eds., 1997, pp. 650 – 651). Thus while U.S. had quickly exploited the demise of the Nazi-Soviet Pact to construct a war-time alliance with the Soviet Union, it then not only gave economic help but also acceded militarily to Soviet power in the East. This revealed the political and strategic anomaly of an antagonistic Soviet entity to which the United States had given extensive help: nor was this the first instance of American aid for this atavistically different regime. From the outset the Western-Soviet alliance was more certain about what it was against rather than for. Deep-rooted antagonisms would generate mutually exclusive political forms in the post-war landscape as suppressed differences emerged.

Wrong assumptions and poor perception caused the American strategy to fracture into two disconnected parts: the defeat of fascist enemies had entailed helping the very entity that would oppose its post-war goal of spreading Americanism. This chasmic systemic fault-line remained underrated by American policy-makers for most of the war. Consequently the United States helped to win the war but compromised the type of peace she wanted as her sequential strategy fell apart with the Red Army's progress Westwards that brought with it Sovietisation.

Roosevelt revealed how much he overlooked major differences not just by placating Stalin but also heeding those who were starry optimists about the Soviet Union. Despite witnessing the infamous show trials, Joseph E. Davies wrote:

> "In my opinion there is no danger from Communism here...To maintain its existence this government has to apply Capitalistic principles...I expect to see (it) while professing devotion to Communism, move constantly to the right, in practice just as it has for the past eight years. If it maintains itself it may evolve into a type of Fabian socialism with large industry in the hands of the state, with however, the smaller businesses and traders working under Capitalistic, property and profit principles…(there has been) a marked departure from Communistic principle in practice. The profit motive had to be resorted to in order to make the system work." (1944, p. 267).

Supportive evidence however was available. In 1943 the Comintern was abolished. Disclaiming international revolution ostensibly removed an impediment to collaboration with the United States. The American media emphasised Soviet abandonment of doctrinal rigidities and promoted a benign image of "Uncle Joe" Stalin. *Life* in March 1943 even proclaimed that Lenin was "perhaps the greatest man of modern times" and that Russians "look like Americans, dress like Americans and think like Americans." (Gaddis, 1972, pp.

33-63). War-time exigencies blurred realities which Stalin did little to dispel. To win the war he must consolidate his regime's security through Sovietisation because unlike Roosevelt, his ideological certainties depicted a conflictual future because of innate Capitalist-Socialist antagonism. Soviet amenability to liberal modifications including Americanism was a well developed war-time fiction that some like Davies promulgated, fed by optimistic propaganda emphasising similarities not differences. Although Stalin certainly did not think like an American, he had some understanding of how Americans thought but he grasped the core systemic differences. Crucially he needed Western allies' military and material support to sustain his war effort, regime and system. For, like Roosevelt, he too would hold hands with the devil to cross the bridge of war.

Sanguine United States' optimism about the alliance's post-war survival helped her to be reconciled to the consolidation of Soviet military power in the East. Stalin's war-time relaxation of hard line attitudes seemed reassuring. There was an underlying reciprocity: Soviet reliance on material Western aid; Western reliance on the Red Army tying down many German divisions in the East. After the Soviet victory in early 1943 at Stalingrad Ilya Ehrenburg wrote that until then belief in victory was an act of faith "but now there was no shadow of doubt: victory was assured." The Soviet loss of a half a million men underpinned the Soviet commitment (Richard Overy, 1998, p.185). In July the Soviet victory at Kursk confirmed the tide was turning which made the Soviet state's survival more assured. The Western allies' failure to open a second front in 1942 justified Stalin's strategy of security through occupying and Sovietising *liberated* territories; thereby military success engendered growing political control. Stalin also reasserted claims in the Baltic states, Eastern Poland,

Romania and parts of Finland while significantly ending diplomatic relations with the non-Communist Polish Government exiled in London (Gaddis, 1972, p.135). Stalin, considering both present and future, required subordinate systemically congruent regimes in friendly states. It was a self-protective pattern which however predisposed towards post-war conflict with the West.

At Casablanca in January 1943 Western leaders realised the need both to sustain the Soviet Union and allay fears about a separate peace between any ally and Germany. The resulting strategy of unconditional surrender meant depriving the Nazis of negotiating options, thus raised the moral ante by positing complete Nazi defeat. Among contemporary critics William Leahy, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1942, averred that the allies would need to fight harder to destroy an enemy without such options (1950,p.145). Bohlen too was critical, believing the invasion of France, coupled with easier surrender terms, could strengthen opposition to Hitler (1973, p.153). Gaddis Smith argued that unconditional surrender had merit but implied postponing problems associated with defeating the Axis which victory itself could then somehow presumably resolve. Miscamble contended Casablanca ignored the consequences for Europe of the defeat of so great a power as Germany (1965, p.57;. 2007, p.56).

Indeed Casablanca meant that victory on such terms must avoid a destabilising political vacuum where once Europe's most powerful state had been. Post-war structures in central Europe therefore presumed an allied-controlled administration reliant on continued post-war great power co-operation. This overlooked latent but significant allied systemic

incompatibilities while insightful American perspicacity was conspicuously lacking at this point. Thereby Casablanca generated a hostage to fortune. However the immediate need was to ensure the Soviet Union stayed on side without risking a separate peace with Germany, also as a placatory gesture which acknowledged the delayed Western invasion in the face of the Soviet Union undertaking a disproportionately large share of the fighting. Casablanca directly strengthened the Soviet hand as a major European political and military player, particularly given France's diminished status following defeat.

In November 1943 the U.S.-U.K.-Soviet summit at Teheran proved to be the last chance for Western allies to influence events in the East. John Deane, the American military adviser in Moscow acknowledged the sound military reasons underpinning American support for a second front in the West and a cross channel invasion to liberate France and access the heart of German industrial strength in the Saar and the Ruhr. He contrasted this with Churchill's suggestion of Anglo-American and Russian participation in the Balkans which could have arguably improved the Western post war position there. Deane concluded that:

"From the political point of view hindsight on our part points to the foresight on Churchill's part. It will always be debatable whether Churchill might not have been right even though the action he proposed put an additional burden on our resources and probably would have prolonged the war." (1947, pp. 43-44).

Churchill pressed for Turkey's involvement which offered prospects of allied progress from the Aegean into the Black Sea and applying direct pressure on Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. Significantly this entailed accessing part of the Soviet coastline. Churchill also aired concerns about Poland and Germany but his comment to Stalin that any current discussion about Germany involved only a "preliminary survey" drew the retort that "it was certainly very preliminary." (Churchill, 1954, pp 316-320). Stalin intended to avoid giving

premature commitments, preferring a free hand over both Germany and Poland by exploiting the fluidity of war and the Red Army's advances. He also wished to forestall any Western presence on Soviet soil while preserving his monopoly of the advance from the East which Churchill's ideas would have compromised. Roosevelt's agreement to a Western second front effectively ended prospects of Anglo-American involvement in Eastern Europe, which also presupposed an allied advance from the West without the Red Army. Roosevelt also pointedly said that American troops would be withdrawn from Europe two years after the war. This was of immense significance to Stalin who realised the implications for the potential growth of Soviet influence over Europe by exploiting the positions of Red Army troops as well as large existing indigenous Western Communist parties.

1943 therefore emerged as the pivotal year both for the current war and future conflict. Teheran portended the delineation of Europe along lines determined by converging armies representing systemically divergent regimes united only by a commitment to destroy a common foe. It also raised Soviet expectations that America's considerable presence would be withdrawn from a weakened and politically volatile Europe as Communist forces brought with them an alternative to Capitalism. Soviet victory in the East founded on her advancing armies meant much depended on hitherto unspecified settlement terms for Germany after her impending defeat. She would thus remain a principal and contentious focus after the war.

Western allies' non participation in an East European military strategy as well as their failure

to open a second front until 1944 were exploited by Stalin's consolidation of a burgeoning bloc critically impacting on future Cold War geographical and systemic divisions. The war saw the effective ending of Socialism in a Single Country as the Red Army moved Communism Westwards while its successes enhanced Communism's leverage and profile as European independence waned. The United States ignored prospects of Soviet post-war non-compliance for too long because of Roosevelt's overly sanguine perception of Stalin based on presuming a paramount need for the Soviet alliance.

Soviet-American visions about the future were irreconcilable. The American was at first primarily economic by presuming the clear benefits to others of imitating her own model which included plural democracies complementing progression towards global free trade. The Soviet vision was mainly political founded on a bloc requiring internal homogeneity via single party Communist politics to maintain security against a hostile Capitalist world and complemented by centralised economic planning. American espousal of the personal and corporate profit motive contrasted with its rejection by the Soviet Union which promulgated state control of industrial production in establishing a classless society.

During the war such differences did not impede co-operation: indeed American economic power and mass production assisted the Soviet war effort. The Harriman-Beaverbrook Agreement which provided $1,015,000,000 of supplies to the Soviet Union in 1942 was followed by an agreement giving $1,000,000,000 of interest free credit. Soviet claims about moving their divisions rapidly were, according to John Deane, possible only because of "American trucks to ride in, American shoes to march in and American food to sustain

them." (1947, pp.87-89). At the Teheran Conference Stalin openly admitted that, "Without the United States as a source of motors, the war would have been lost." (Harriman, 1971, p23). This both acknowledged how much the Soviet war effort required American technology and materials, also how much the U.S. relied on the Soviet Union doing the brunt of the anti-Nazi fighting. For Stalin the necessary dependence on Capitalism was tolerable only temporarily.

Importantly Secretary of State Cordell Hull's economic ideas permeated Roosevelt's Administration and contributed to framing the post war American plans to extend her Capitalist practices. In Williams' terms this meant pushing the Open Door wider. Hull believed various interwar Economic Nationalisms had produced trade restrictions through economic blocs which denied raw materials to other nations and undermined freedoms by contributing to wars. Those that he deemed at the root of the Twentieth Century's problems included Japan's Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, Germany's New Order in Europe, Britain's "Ottawa System" of imperial preferences, the Soviet Union's "Socialism In One Country" and "Fortress America's" isolationism. Towards the war's end all, except the Soviet model, were gone or waning. The war left the United States unscathed and economically dominant in contrast to Britain, the Soviet Union , Germany and Japan where infrastructural damage and economic weakness were prevalent. The highly productive American model signalled an apparently distinctive systemic superiority over all forms of Economic Nationalism while universal application of her template indicated to believers that Americanism was the world's salvation. Moreover support for the United Nations signalled

the U.S. would not repeat the former error of disengagement through its then non-participation in the League of Nations.

Hull was convinced that American-style private enterprise combined with free international trade would raise the world's living standards, reduce the prospects of war and increase employment. By using its influence the United States should ensure "that no one nation should feel compelled… to seek by force of arms what it can gain by peaceful conference." The vision reflected Wilson's Fourteen Points while extending free trade was promulgated in the interim report of State Department's Special Committee on the Relaxation of Trade Barriers in December 1943:

"A great expansion in the volume of international trade after the war will be essential to the attainment of full and effective employment in the United States and elsewhere, to the preservation of private enterprise and the success of an international security system to prevent future wars."

Perpetuating the Grand Alliance was therefore for the U.S. the means for both present military and future economic success (Gaddis, 1972, pp.22-24).

However, this strategy presupposed other states' agreement. Williams suggested that the American Open Door policy became an ideology before the end of the war and Miscamble argued America aimed to reshape the international system and its economy in its own likeness (1972, p.229; 2008, p.39). Post-war economic coherence to tackle widespread problems was necessary so imitating the successful American model seemed logical. The U.S. initially gave primacy to an economic rather than a political vision which the Americans never conceived as threatening anyone but Stalin did. For Cordell Hull his

blueprint was rational in unpicking the restrictions inherent in economic nationalism. While his motives were lofty both he and Roosevelt displayed some political naivety.

By contrast the Soviet Socialism in One Country had meant preserving economic nationalism through the state's central control of all aspects of life. Whereas pre-war the Soviet Union was a peripheral economic player, its Five Year Plans facilitated rapid industrialisation and presented an alternative economics to Capitalism. From 1943 the Red Army's victories ensured the Soviet Union would be a major post war player. Importantly Communism defined both what it was and was not, despite some tactical modifications. Stalin had ended Lenin's New Economic Policy and silenced Bukharin's call to the wealthy peasants to enrich themselves. Soviet war-time compromises were pragmatic and temporary. Communism was as innately anti-Capitalist as Americanism was Capitalist, yet the United States still expected Soviet compliance with divergent systemic practices. The assumption that the second half of the Century would be American was however fundamentally inconsistent with the Soviet world view and agenda.

The Bretton Woods Agreement of July 1944 was the cornerstone of the American economic vision. It sought to interlink all currencies at a fixed exchange rate with the American dollar as the hub and to tie all to gold at a stable price. The International Monetary Fund was established to develop monetary policy and assist countries with balance of payments problems to access short term loans to balance their books. For larger developments countries could apply to the World Bank for capital sums over longer periods. Bretton Woods helped self serving American interests because a stable monetary system let foreign

countries buy her goods. Furthermore, sustaining American exports at wartime levels would avoid a decline into another possible Depression so this necessitated exporting the concept of consumerism. The world could thus assist in forestalling the return of American economic problems. The I.M.F and World Bank would offset through conditions attached to their loans any discriminatory mechanisms other countries might use against American goods (George A Fossedal, 1993, pp. 111-112, 141-142). The formula involved American enlightened self-interest in encouraging the expansion of other nations' prosperity by adopting the American way. This assumed a degree of systemic convergence.

Therefore the American remedy for past problems associated with protectionism was to promote American-style Open Door Capitalism. However for the Soviet Union this would compromise its systemic premise that private wealth perpetuated class conflict. There were also hard edged reasons for a centralised economy. It was the economic foundation for the anti-Capitalist buffer. Moreover, the classless proletariat supposedly embodied in the Communist Party was Stalin's principal power base which he buttressed with ideological justifications, as during his Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party in 1939, when he said:

"The feature that distinguishes Soviet society today from any Capitalist society is that it no longer contains antagonistic, hostile classes; the exploiting classes have been eliminated , while the workers, peasants and intellectuals live and work in friendly collaboration. Whereas Capitalist society is torn by irreconcilable antagonisms between workers and Capitalists and between peasants and landlords – resulting in internal instability – Soviet society, liberated from the yoke of exploitation , knows no such antagonisms, is free of class conflicts and presents a picture of friendly collaboration.." (Bruce Franklin, ed., 1972, p. 367)

A central theme of Marxist-Leninism was that Capitalist practices and agencies generated divisive conflicts at every level. Accordingly in 1951 he dismissed Bretton Woods:

"The disintegration of the single, all-embracing world market must be regarded as the most important economic sequel of the Second World War. It has had the effect of further deepening the general crisis of the world Capitalist system…China and other European peoples' democracies broke away from the Capitalist system and, together with the Soviet Union formed a united and powerful socialist camp confronting the camp of Capitalism. The economic consequences of the existence of two opposite camps was that the single all-embracing world market disintegrated, so that now we have two parallel world markets, also confronting each other." (Bruce Franklin, ed., 1972, pp. 467-468).

The American policy of extending its economic practices helped to promote the countervailing Soviet system's consolidation, rather than achieve any reconciliation. Even partial Soviet acquiescence to Bretton Woods entailed qualified systemic compromise, carrying potential dangers for the regime and Stalin's control over it. The Iron Curtain was a necessary defensive device for an autarkic regime because Soviet Communism needed a closed internal market to survive the expansion of American-driven free market competition. Moreover absorption and economic convergence of other Sovietised states would increase security by extending the insulating buffer. The Soviet bloc's protectionist economy was anathema to Cordell Hull's views. Although autarkic and free market practices based on clear geo-systemic demarcations could co-exist, they could not converge. Such differences were at the heart of systemic antagonism. Conflict however could develop from the mutual systemic need to compete for, then absorb, vital European areas within opposed ambits. Such a situation developed from 1945.

Whereas the United States expected convergence arising from global adoption of its practices Stalin always believed in two ideologically opposed world systems reflecting the Capitalist-Socialist schism. He had outlined this as far back as 1927:

"Two world centres will be formed: the Socialist centre …and the Capitalist centre… The struggle between these two camps will decide the fate of Capitalism and Socialism throughout the world" (Stalin, 1954, 10, p. 140-141).

This was a precept of Marxist-Leninism. Although Soviet wartime propaganda accentuated fascist aggressors rather than Capitalist exploiters Stalin expected the Socialist-Capitalist struggle would continue but end with Socialism's triumph. The American administration fundamentally failed to appreciate the Soviet leadership's perception of its own economic plans that centred on Bretton Woods because it did not interpret its own institutions from a Marxist-Leninist perspective.

Soviet victories provided scope for imposing a political order by removing Capitalist practices, while American leaders sought a peaceful post war world on their terms through two principal mechanisms: preventing the recurrence of a 1930s Depression and enabling peoples of the world to determine their futures, thus harnessing political and economic forms. Roosevelt expressed these goals in January 1941 in an address to Congress which enumerated the freedoms of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from fear and freedom from want. These were variants on the Wilsonian concept of self-determination and reflected Hoover's emphasis on individuality, goal setting and attainment (Gaddis, 1972, p.11). However such principles was no substitute for creating concrete political forms which increasingly revealed American economic-political inconsistency.

These freedoms were important constituents of global Americanism and became anchored as war aims in the Atlantic Charter. John Deane noted how the Russians and the Americans:

"…differ in our beliefs concerning the four freedoms and each of us is amazed at those of the other. We lay stress on the spirit of agreements; the Russians recognise only the written word....In English the same word not only has different meanings but inflections on words and their relations to other words in the context connote different thoughts. Thus a Russian translation into English often appears blunt and unnecessarily offensive, while an English translation into Russian is likely to result in an interpretation not intended." (1947, p.301).

Deane identified ideological effects on linguistics and thus how semantics reflected such differences, while translations could enhance misrepresentations. Differing ideologies assigned words like "freedom", "democracy" , "independence" and "equality" with contradictory meanings. Western *freedom* included exercise of free expression and pursuit of personal objectives such as property and wealth. This conflicted with a Communist precept that Capitalism involved not gaining but losing freedom since it engendered the exploitation and inequality of a class-based society: property entailed theft. Furthermore while Western democracy meant political pluralism and electoral choice, Communist *democracy* envisaged the exercise of power by the proletariat via a single party to promote a classless society since Western pluralism reflected the class divisions of Capitalist societies. For Western democracy single parties were undemocratic by denying choice and characterising dictatorships. Therefore the use of the same words contained different meanings underpinning contrasting world visions. Such differences also embodied systemic contrasts between state and individual. Typically an American wanted minimal state interference in the pursuit of personal goals. A Soviet Socialist however saw the state as transcendent and embodying a higher entity requiring individuals' subordination. Such

divergent expectations of respective citizenries in relation to the state rested on contradictory notions of independence, freedom, democracy, possessions and politics.

C. E. Bohlen was one of the few contemporary Soviet experts in the State Department. He maintained that Roosevelt failed to grasp the ideological Soviet-American difference regarding world views, arguing that he should have put,

"…less belief in the American conviction that the other fellow is a 'good guy' who will respond properly if you treat him right…I do not think Roosevelt had any real comprehension of great gulf that separated the thinking of a Bolshevik from a non-Bolshevik and particularly from an American. He felt that Stalin viewed the world somewhat in the same way as he did and that Stalin's hostility and distrust, which were evident in the wartime conferences, were due to the neglect that Soviet Russia had suffered at the hands of other countries for years after the Revolution. What he did not understand was that Stalin's enmity was based on profound ideological convictions. The existence of a gap between the Soviet Union and the United States, a gap that could not be bridged, was never fully perceived by Franklin Roosevelt." (1973, pp. 210-211).

This laid an implicit charge of naivety against a president who either could or would not address fundamental Soviet-American differences. Roosevelt relied on personal chemistry to gain Stalin's cooperation as a vital present and future player. He considered that Stalin, "doesn't want anything but security for his country and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for democracy and peace." (Lloyd C. Gardner, 1970, p.227).

Roosevelt neither understood how far Stalin's quest for security was ideologically based nor how he sought the development of a separate systemic bloc by exploiting the Soviet role in the Grand Alliance's military strategy. Bohlen believed that Roosevelt's perceived reluctance to stand up to the Russians was mistaken and historically unjustified: "It was in my mind, a basic error, stemming from Roosevelt's lack of understanding of the Bolsheviks." He illustrated this by Roosevelt's reference to the reform process in India as "from the

bottom, somewhat on the Soviet line." Bohlen considered the Bolsheviks were a minority who seized power during anarchical times and implemented their ideas of Revolution (1973, pp. 140-141, 146). He thought Roosevelt misinterpreted the nature of Bolshevism by assuming its origins were democratic and popular which supported the misconception that Communism could be modified. Such assumptions had strategic implications.

This can be seen in Roosevelt's renunciation of Churchill's Balkans strategy at Teheran which compromised the Western allies' capacity to mitigate the results of Soviet victories producing increased domination of Eastern Europe. Soviet hegemony grew with its bloc. Thereafter American foreign policy relied on friendly persuasion and principled statements in framing a settlement in Eastern Europe where it expected free elections would return governments friendly to the Soviet Union. This neither factored in Stalin's lack of commitment to Western electoral freedoms nor these states' antipathy to Soviet domination. The Sovietologist George Kennan summed up Soviet attitudes:

"The jealous and intolerant eye of the Kremlin can distinguish, in the end, only vassals and enemies; and the neighbours of Russia, if they do not wish to be the one, must reconcile themselves to being the other." (1967, p.209).

Therefore significant differences about the Soviet Union existed between the White House and certain State Department Sovietologists. Roosevelt relied heavily upon confidants like Harry Hopkins and Davies for foreign policy advice. However, Cordell Hull, the State Department's war time head, shared Roosevelt's optimism. At the end of 1943 after returning from the Foreign Ministers' Moscow Conference he described the representatives of such peace-loving nations as supporting certain mutual interests:

"There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests… (Such) international cooperation … was revitalised and given practical expression..." (Cordell Hull, 1948, 2, pp.1313-1315).

This optimism conflicted with Bohlen's assessment that the aims of the Soviet Union were incompatible with those of the United States and that relevant State Department expertise was marginalised:

"What we were worried about was the future. Roosevelt and his chief assistant Harry Hopkins, were mostly concerned with the present. That means they focused on military decisions…the White House thought that the State Department's worry about political problems smacked of foot dragging." (1973, p.121).

Bohlen argued that Roosevelt's over-emphasis on present policy ignored future consequences. Others like Ambassador Averell Harriman also advocated less emollience and more realism: when American assistance did not contribute directly to the winning of the war "we should insist on a quid pro quo…" and thereafter if proposals remained unanswered by the Soviet Union after a reasonable time "we should act as we think best and inform them of our action." (Smith, 1965, p.128). The Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal complained that,

"Whenever any American suggests that we act in accordance with our own security, he is apt to be called a god-damned fascist or imperialist, while if Uncle Joe suggests that he needs the Baltic Provinces, half of Poland, all of Bessarabia and access to the Mediterranean, all hands agree that he is a fine, frank, candid and generally delightful fellow who is easy to deal with." (Walter Millis, ed., 1951, p. 14).

The issue was how the United States got on with a sometimes difficult but always necessary ally. Roosevelt's conciliatory approach prevailed but he miscalculated by presuming future Soviet co-operation which showed poor judgement and demonstrated an American tendency

to see others in American terms (Smith, 1965, p. 178). This supports Bohlen's contention that Roosevelt did not appreciate American-Soviet ideological differences. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes commented that Roosevelt had a first class temperament but only a second class intellect. Elsewhere it has been argued that an "increasingly utopian quality affected American policy making and public expectations regarding the post war world" and that Roosevelt's belief in partnership with the Soviet Union relied on his capacity to "domesticate and to civilise the Soviet 'devil' to adopt the American way." Roosevelt's faith in his and confidants' judgement led to "one of the most remarkable exercises in denial in the annals of diplomacy." (Miscamble, 2008, pp.25, 36, 50-51).

Roosevelt's greatest self-deception was believing he understood Stalin's mindset. He failed to anticipate Stalin's use of military force to create a systemic bloc for his own Communist brand and how much this would later obstruct American aims. He also overlooked how Stalin's thinking was essentially conflictual and in accordance with Mao-Tse-Tung's proposition that, "Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed." (1967, 2, p.152). Roosevelt ignored how this aspect of Communism transcended personal relationships and that the nature of both the regime and bloc was irreversibly autarkic.

American foreign policy thinking was divided between the White House's emollience and Sovietologists' critique of an ideologically motivated Soviet expansion. Secondly, it was incoherent in not reconciling its overarching economic vision with Soviet political and economic developments in Eastern Europe where American influence was weak and overly reliant on hopes that Western style policies would one day be implemented.

Stalin however had always pursued personally concentrated and centralised power having given himself ideologically-based political latitude through the *Short Course of the History of the CPSU(b)* published in 1939. He had determined its contents which reinforced his role as interpreter of Marxist-Leninism and it became required reading by all party officials. Hosking described it as the "canonical text of Stalinism." (1990, p.218). Stalin wrote:

"The Marxist – Leninist theory is the science of the development of society, the science of the working-class movement, the science of the proletarian revolution, the science of the building of the Communist society. And as a science it does not and cannot stand still, but develops and perfects itself . Clearly in its development it is bound to become enriched by new experience and new knowledge and some of its propositions and conclusions are bound to change in the course of time, are bound to be replaced by conclusions and propositions corresponding to new historical circumstances…Mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory means assimilating the *substance* of the theory and learning to use it in the solution of the practical problems of the revolutionary movement under the varying conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat. " (1939, p.355).

By affirming his "mastering" of the "science" of "theory" in support of his interpretations of "historical circumstances" and the "conditions of the class struggle" Stalin licensed himself do what he wanted which included suppressing both opposition and potential critics. Despite tactical war-time concessions his political control over the party, the mainstay of the Soviet system, remained undisputed because of this underpinning ideological manipulation. He planned to project this system into territories *liberated* by the Red Army. .

Soviet experiences before and during the war strengthened Stalin's resolve for defensive expansion to consolidate an autarkic bloc conferring insulation and isolation, in which only compatible political forms were acceptable. George Kennan rightly argued that because of the pre-war Nazi threat Stalin grew frustrated with Western powers' lack of support which

promoted the Soviet drive for long-term self-reliance. From the ensuing Nazi-Soviet Pact he developed the notion of a buffer which by the war's end included most of these original territories as well as Finland, the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bukovina and Bessarabia. Kennan also noted that while preferring collaboration Stalin also deployed military power, thereby using different means to gain his ends:

> "The course of military operations gave good grounds to suppose that the Kremlin would have it within its power, at the conclusion of hostilities, to achieve most of these objectives, whether the Western powers liked it or not. Soviet troops would, after all, be in occupation of nearly all these regions when the war came to an end. In these circumstances Stalin had little to lose by talking agreeably about 'collaboration'. What dangers could collaboration bring to a country which already held in its hand the tangible guarantees of its own security? (1967, p.228).

The stronger Stalin's hold became over Eastern Europe the less he needed Western support or approval. "The concept of territorial security was the cornerstone of his regime." (Zubok and Pleshakov,1996, p.17). Sovietisation required in buffer states a level of control which stifled civil liberties and imposed policies that promoted one party Soviet-style states (Ulam, 1973, p.360). This facilitated countries' easier absorption into an increasingly homogeneous post-war bloc. Collaboration with the West, which included signing the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration on Liberated Europe, was tactically expedient but became less valuable as Stalin enhanced his bloc's strength at the expense of compliance with Western democratic precepts which were increasingly inconsistent with Soviet self-defensive requirements concerning strategically vital East European areas. Djilas wrote that Stalin "regarded as sure only what he held in his fist and everyone beyond the control of his police was a potential enemy." (1962, p.82). Political conflict therefore grew with Soviet defensive systemic differentiation from Western values, and especially burgeoning Americanism which Stalin deemed to be hostile, expansive and insidious.

Stalin had used collaboration with Churchill in The "Percentages Agreement" of October 1944 in Moscow to consolidate his control over Eastern Europe while endorsing a concept of spheres of influence, which was compatible with the strategy of development his bloc. He also anticipated hegemony over Europe following American troop withdrawals as suggested by Roosevelt at Teheran. Churchill's immediate aim at the end was protecting Greece and British Mediterranean interests from the growing Soviet Balkan presence. The agreement represented Stalin's hard headed view of the likely post-war landscape, contrasting with the more general American framework of economic liberalism and democratic forms. However the Agreement contravened American opposition to such spheres and so was not endorsed by Roosevelt, although Stalin did not deviate from this strategic path.
Stalin, as demonstrated in Hungary, accepted heavy military losses to expand his buffer-come-bloc. Yet after grudging Western acceptance of Communist domination in Poland, he presumed the West would tolerate former Nazi allies such as Bulgaria and Romania being controlled by Communist coalitions after the Red Army moved in. His attitude towards Eastern Europe progressed sequentially from a sphere of influence to assimilation and Sovietisation, thereby exploiting Western abandonment at Teheran of military participation in Eastern Europe. Any vestigial Western democratic elements inside the bloc were unacceptable. Stalin believed that in the Twentieth Century,

"… war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own social system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise." (Djilas, 1962, p.114).

These words encapsulated his rationale for systemic homogeneity. However, the territorial buffer gained from the Nazi-Pact had failed to protect the Soviet Union during Operation

Barbarossa because it lacked sufficient depth, strength and cohesion in the face of the German Blitzkrieg attack. There was also the relative military weakness of the Soviet forces. Germany conquered much Soviet territory as a prelude to the planned partition and integration of a de-Communised Russian state into a Greater Germany which formed a vital part of Hitler's systemic plan (Gilbert, 1972, pp.118-119, 122). Stalin's buffer was necessarily shelved until the Soviet fight for survival enabled it to blunt then reverse the Nazi attack prior to a Soviet Westward offensive to establish a stronger strategic systemic entity representing a reverse *cordon sanitaire.* This was as much to keep in as to keep out, but it remained only achievable through effective leadership; and war tested both Stalin and Stalinism.

Stalin displayed leadership abilities including pragmatism and the ability to learn which entailed the tactical subordination of his political agenda to national survival: appeals to patriotic rather than political motives would evoke greater resistance. Earlier ideologically inspired industrial and agricultural transformations, then followed by the purges, caused widespread unforgotten resentment. On June 26th *Pravda* described the war for the first time as a "fatherland war". On July 3rd in his radio speech Stalin unusually addressed his listeners as both "brothers and sisters" and "friends". He described Germany's unprovoked attack as bringing the Soviet Union "to death grips with its most vicious and perfidious enemy." He invoked pre-Revolutionary heroes such as Alexander Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi and Mikhail Kutusov who combated earlier invaders. Using the theme of a national rather than a class war he exhorted "Death to the German invaders" which emphasised they were Germans rather than Nazis. He told his listeners this was no "ordinary war", but a total one involving

"the entire Soviet people". The Soviet war cry, "For the motherland! For Stalin", associated him with patriotism. He exploited Hitler's attack to confer increased legitimacy for the Communist regime that it had largely lost in the eyes of the masses (Richard Overy, 1998, pp. 77-78; Hosking, 1990, pp.221, 272-273). National cohesion in war therefore increased in contrast to the earlier peace.

Stalin also acted to reduce political influence in military affairs that had earlier damaged morale and combat effectiveness. Unlike Hitler he relinquished active control of the armed forces by making Georgi Zhukov Deputy Supreme Commander in August 1942. He had two advantages: a successful military record against the Japanese and he had survived the purges. The previous extensive influence of commissars and other political officers was now reduced. Strategic operational conduct of the war was transferred from the politicians to the General Staff under whose leadership the Party hierarchy was kept informed of developments:

"Released from the Party's tight control, the military command developed a new confidence; autonomy encouraged initiative and produced a stable corps of military professionals whose expertise was crucial to the victories of 1943-5…Changes in the industrial economy also contributed to the Soviet military revival…during 1942-3 dramatic improvements in the production of tanks, planes, cars, radars, radios, artillery, guns and ammunition enabled the formation of new tank and mechanised divisions which fought more effectively and at far less human cost. The rapid reorganisation of Soviet industry was where the planned economy (the foundation of the Stalinist system) really came into its own" (Figes, 2008, p.422- 423.).

The national will to resist was paramount but the legacy of the Bolshevik Revolution had also engendered a self-sacrificial readiness to die for a greater cause. This was notable in the first year of the struggle, and only 3% of soldiers born in 1923 survived until 1945. Soviet society had become fractured because of ethnic divisions exacerbated by previous

Soviet scapegoating of national minorities (Figes, 2008, pp.416-417). However, German excesses alienated potentially sympathetic populations in conquered regions such as the Ukraine, the Baltic regions and Byelorussia where collectivisation had caused widespread suffering during 1930-1933 in addition to vigorous suppression of the kulaks. However German ideologically-based views about Aryan superiority produced barbarous behaviour towards the Slavs that removed the danger of indigenous support for the Nazis. (Ulam, 1973, p.323). Racial intolerance was therefore not self-serving and the invaded opted for the lesser evil.

An incident soon after the start of the German assault highlighted the perception by others of Stalin's central in the war effort. After miscalculating the duration of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Hitler's success in the West and the timing of Barbarossa, Stalin withdrew to his dacha at Blizhnyaya. Here a delegation of the Politburo leadership visited him. Mikoyan commented that Stalin feared their purpose was his arrest but instead they requested that he should lead the newly formed State Committee of Defence and he accepted (Service, 2005, pp. 410-415). This demonstrated that despite great mistakes his subordinates recognised that survival prospects were greater with Stalin than without him. This temporary retreat from leadership made him stronger and reflected how the pinnacle of power had been created by and for him alone. He and the Stalinist state were considered inseparable, particularly when war required military as well as political leadership.

Such personal autocracy was a systemic differentiator from the modes of leadership

within Western allied states where accountability to democratic institutions was central. Soviet politics were subordinated to Stalin's will and his decisions were not subject to realistic approval or scrutiny by others which engendered a presumption of infallibility. The system was only as good as his judgement and leadership. The Soviet war-time framework remained intact and retained centralised planning and party primacy under his leadership. The state proved adaptive although tactical concessions were only tolerated as long as they were needed so could be withdrawn when their purposes were served.

The Soviet regime's totalitarian mechanisms efficiently mobilised national resources. In 1942 a policy of "Everything For the Front" was implemented and industrial output was prioritised for the armed forces. This effectively ended production of consumer goods and marked a trend which continued post-war. Soviet economic production in the second half of that year equalled German levels over the entire year. However, resources to collectives were denied and conditions here worsened because government quotas still had to be met, so the countryside became impoverished. By the start of 1944 the Soviet army was six million, twice the German armies on the Eastern front and indicating how the brunt of the anti-Nazi fighting was undertaken by the Red Army. Meanwhile a "labour army" of over a million conscripts was used for tasks not performed by free labour: the Gulag workforce produced 15% of Soviet ammunition, many uniforms and much of its food. Workers in wartime industries were subject to strict conditions and received harsh punishments for misdemeanours like lateness and negligence. There were 7.5 million convictions for such offences (Service, 2005, pp.421-422; 423).

The link between ruthlessness and efficiency typified the nature of the Soviet Union but was inconsistent with its signature of the Atlantic Charter , especially how "all men may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." Soviet labour practices rested on fear and deprivation; moreover slavery, rural impoverishment and harsh penalties showed ingrained indifference to life. Thus the Soviets like the Nazi practised widespread brutality, illustrating an aspect of Soviet incompatibility with Western values. Soviet totalitarianism deemed individuals were expendable according to the state's needs, and this contrasted with Western societies which emphasised the individual's greater worth. There was little prospect the Stalinised Soviet state could be morally Americanised.

War came to threaten the insulated Soviet mentality which had been fostered by the regime. Many Soviet soldiers having advanced into Europe witnessed stark contrasts with their own living standards. Even ruined German farms were superior to Soviet collectives. New cultures, ideas and ways of seeing the world confronted the Red Army's progress West until at last it encountered American forces on the Elbe, the outriders of the systemic polar opposite. The longer the Russian troops retained contact with Westerners, whether as friends or enemies, the more likely they were to be affected by associated influences. Reports of these encounters went back home, raised expectations and contributed to strikes on collective farms. Party leaders were anxious about the influx of reformist ideas. Therefore those released from captivity abroad or who had lived away for long periods were interrogated by the N.K.V.D. upon return: 2,775,700 former Red Army soldiers went through "filtration camps". Half went to labour camps; others were shot. The Soviet system feared those meeting ideas beyond its ideological mould. Furthermore, the Anglo-American

alliance had exposed Soviet citizens to Hollywood films, Western books and goods imported under Lend Lease (Figes, 2008, pp 422-426, 441-444; Hosking, 1990, p.304; Service, 2005, p.493; McCormick, 1995, p.63).

During the war the Soviet leadership tried often unsuccessfully to maintain the isolation of its citizens from insidious Western influences in case invidious comparisons produced questions about vaunted Socialist superiority:

> "Dropping an Iron Curtain between Russia and the West and imposing more conformist regimes in the East seemed a way of keeping the other world fearsome rather than fascinating and a way of buttressing the Stalinist regime inside Russia." (McCormick, 1995, p. 63).

Anything portraying the West favourably implied criticism of the Soviet system. For instance in 1942 any praise for American technology was criminalised as Stalin sought to re-insulate the Soviet mind (Service, 2005, p.446). The dissemination of different ideas challenged the inward-looking conformist nature of the state.

The war therefore made the Soviet state more repressive in its efforts to counteract undesirable influences and ideas. This trend characterised Stalinism's xenophobic conservatism. As the Red Army moved Soviet control Westwards, systemic divisions between the Soviet Union and the West widened as the exigencies of war increased rather than reduced their differences. War was forcing the Soviet Union out of its shell as various forms of exposure strengthened the case for better insulation against future systemic differences. This anticipated much of the moral and intellectual antagonism of the Cold War.

Lenin had considered the export of revolutionary ideas to be essential for the new Bolshevik state, and this became Comintern's function. When other revolutions failed to consolidate Stalin made it a mechanism for enhancing control over non-Soviet Communist parties and employed a degree of intellectual control which underpinned the political. Stalin's use of Comintern indicated both his tactical adaptation to circumstances but also his extension of political control throughout Eastern Europe. Its abolition in May 1943 ostensibly appeased Western allies for whom it was synonymous with Communist expansionism. Some have argued that the release of foreign Communist parties from Moscow's control permitted more effective competition for post-war positions of strength.(Ulam, 1973, pp. 345-346). However, such autonomy was more apparent than real because Soviet control of Comintern covertly remained. Local Communists could now associate more freely with non-Communist resistance, thus by enhancing this broader appeal "Communism…was seeking at Stalin's behest to acquire a diversity of national colours." (Service, 2005, pp.444-446). However The Red Army's Westward progress subordinated all anti-Nazi factions during *liberation* to the process of Sovietisation.

By the end of 1944 the balance of the war had altered fundamentally. The fight for Soviet survival was succeeded by an advance which brought both Soviet and American systems into a proximity that increased prospects of systemic conflict as Soviet political power increasingly obstructed an American strategy of utilising the war's end to establish a Pax Americana. This would in time lead to an American re-evaluation based on questioning previous assumptions about a consensus with the Soviet Union.

Some American officials considered that ideological-based differences produced allied disharmony. John Deane's work, published very soon after the end of the war, was based on considerable experience with Soviet opposite numbers. In Moscow, having witnessed Soviet dealings with the Western allies he credited the British and Americans with a more co-operative attitude leading to vital meetings such as Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. He noted grudging noted Soviet cooperation in ventures requiring "a closer association with Capitalist foreigners." There was,

"evidence of Russia's desire to avoid any entanglements from which she would have difficulty extricating herself in the post war world…Russia's position at the end of the war was to be that which she had won for herself – a position which Russia would control free of obligation to and interference from her allies."

The belief of Deane and others in the ideological origins for Soviet motives supported the premise that their dealings with the West were tactically oriented to post war advantage. A spur to Soviet success was preventing Western involvement undermining her prestige with those countries which she intended to dominate. One of Stalin's main aims at Teheran was denial of Western access to Soviet military operational theatres. Deane wrote that the Soviet leadership considered that "Russia will not be safe… until a dosage has immunized the rest of the world from the scourge of Capitalism." He judged that the Soviets feared the contaminating of her "own people by contact with representatives of effete Capitalism." He also differentiated between the types of consultations held by Stalin and those of the Western leaders. Stalin, he wrote,

"was the sole Soviet spokesman. There could be no doubt that he was the supreme Soviet authority as there was never the slightest indication that he would have to consult his Government on decisions being reached."

Deane believed that whereas Stalin's lack of accountability to a Congress, Parliament or popular was central to his autocracy, it made him isolated and dependent on close assistants who were generally reluctant to give frank advice (1947, pp. 43, 142, 160-161, 290, 295).

This broad critique from officials including Deane, Bohlen, Harriman and Kennan identified Soviet ideology as inhibiting present and future co-operation with the United States. However, while ideology played a role so did other factors which American analysts undervalued partly through an inability to perceive the situation as the Soviets did. This was explicable by lack of American detailed knowledge concerning Soviet losses in population, productivity and infrastructure. Nevertheless to the discerning, broad conclusions could reasonably have be drawn from the scale of the highly destructive Nazi advances, the ferocity of fighting , daily Soviet-American connections, as well as the strongly made Soviet case for extensive Lend Lease aid. However, these American interpreters of Soviet behaviour emphasised the Marxist-Leninist ideological roots of expansion rather than strategically defensive imperatives that derived not just from the current war but Soviet projections of future conflicts.

The Soviet Union had proved to be vulnerable to invasion and was concerned about this recurring. This engendered a strategy of an in-depth defensive buffer to mitigate incursions and losses as well as being an instrument of a wider Soviet hegemony. It employed systemic extension over Eastern Europe states while Poland was especially importance since more than once it had provided the conduit for invaders. The Soviet Union also sought to forestall Western support for a resuscitated Germany not least because the Nazis had caused

staggering Soviet losses: two thirds of the 26 million war dead were civilian while there were 18 million wounded soldiers. During 1941-5 three quarters of dead males were aged between 18 and 45. War made 20 million people homeless. Material devastation included 70, 000 villages, 1,700 towns, 32,000 factories and 40,000 miles of railway track. During two poor post-war harvests 100 million suffered malnutrition, yet military demands on national resources continued to suppress production of consumer goods as Soviet industry prioritised iron, steel, energy and armaments (Figes, 2008, pp. 457-458). At the end of the war the Soviet Union was victorious yet weaker economically than it chose to admit.

This contrasted with a similarly victorious, but strong and unscathed United States which saw peace as the opportunity for extending its global parameters without appreciating the Soviet perception of such its essentially Capitalistic world view. The U.S. assumed that its own was the broadly acceptable post-war world order, thus when Communist non-compliance became overt, this appeared obstructive and in time generated the widely held American belief in ideologically-driven Soviet behaviour, while the failure to consider possible reactive motives prevailed.

Soviet ideologists interpreted the Nazi attack of 1941 as an invasion by a Capitalist state indicating the on-going Capitalist-Socialist world conflict. Although by 1945 the situation had altered, the main antagonist had become the European-based U.S.. Stalin always believed in the hydra-headed enmity of Capitalism so that despite a constant challenge, adversaries may alter. Now he perceived an American economic threat to the bloc

he was creating since Americanism as articulated in Luce's "American Century" as well as in the Charter and Declaration apparently confronted the Soviet system.

Always a committed ideologue Stalin's response was to strengthen Socialism by purifying and reinvigoration it. This meant ending tactical concessions lest they undermined systemic integrity. This reprised his policy of the late 1920s when the N.E.P.'s measures were replaced with collectivisation, centralised industrialisation and the elimination of private enterprise. The regime must still aim to outperform Capitalism, which was only achievable through applying core Socialist principles. Therefore in 1945 Stalin started terminating war-time compromises which he feared paved the way for intrusive private ownership, cultivation for profit , markets and parliaments which were the counter-revolutionary "diseased products of the Capitalist order which had to be prevented from leaching into his country." The regime ended peasant profit-making by the compulsory return of all privately acquired land to the collectives, while state ownership and production plans began to be strictly implemented (Service, 2005, p.492; Hosking, 1990, 297-298). Stalin's war-time exploitation of patriotic language and images also stopped as he proceeded with the Sovietised sattelization of Eastern Europe. Political rather than nationalistic priorities were now reasserted.

By February 1945 the war's impending end in Europe was the backdrop to the Anglo-American-Soviet summit at Yalta where the predominant issue was the future peace. However divergent systemic priorities created conflicting agendas. Roosevelt wanted Soviet compliance with America's global agenda and democratic principles whereas Stalin

prioritised a Sovietised Eastern bloc which entailed reneging on commitments made in the Atlantic Charter. Despite signing the Declaration on Liberated Europe at Yalta he had reassured Molotov that, "We can implement it in our own way later. The heart of the matter is in the correlation of forces." In both agreements the form of words permitted Soviet room for manoeuvre.

Stalin's key objectives remained American troop withdrawals, keeping Japan and Germany weak, preventing an Anglo-American anti-Soviet bloc and thwarting democratisation in his bloc. The expected reduction in America's post-war European role led Stalin to anticipate Soviet hegemonic dominance over Europe and especially Germany. Moreover Red Army troops on East European ground meant a more favourable correlation of forces when the American military went home, thus facilitating greater Soviet leverage. His Marxist ideology also led him to expect inter-Capitalist struggles and especially Anglo-American rifts over competition for colonial markets (R.B. Levering et al., pp 98-101). Implementation of key Western principles enunciated in the Charter and Declaration would undermine East European Sovietisation. Yet having signed them Stalin now began openly reneging on the principled statements that Roosevelt had edified into a flimsy policy. Stalin appreciated the American policy's weaknesses, but his actions now incurred American charges of Soviet deception. This all conspired to subvert Stalin's aims of encouraging an American withdrawal, preventing an anti-Soviet alliance and progressing the Soviet hegemonic Westwards. This whereas Stalin secured his bloc's systemic integrity, he severely compromised other strategic goals.

Differences over Poland were a watershed and marked the start of the Cold War. The conflicting strategic and political interests arising from underlying Soviet-American systemic antagonism now gained clearer manifestation. The American economic vision had concomitant political principles originating in core American systemic convictions. Stalin's bloc at every level represented the very opposite, and its cohesion and security required a Sovietised Poland. This constituted a litmus test of whether Russia would organise the territorial gains into an autarkic bloc or enter America's internationalist system (McCormick, 1995, p.39). Poland provided the answer. The aspirations of both the Charter and the Declaration could no longer disguise intractable differences. Stalin's actions suggested his wider rejection of American hopes for spreading their democratic practices which complemented the broader American economic aims of the Bretton Woods agreement from which he now dissociated himself. The war-time consensus unravelled as peace-time issues were prioritised and American and Soviet visions proved divergent. If the U.S. had misunderstood how much Stalin felt threatened by its globalism, Stalin underrated the American reaction to his rebuttal of agreements. Whatever trust the war-time Soviet-American alliance once possessed would be increasingly eroded by different agendas.

Stalin's position in Poland rested on the Red Army. Kennan asserted that the West should have been ready for a "full-fledged political showdown with the Soviet leaders." (Kennan, 1967, p. 211). This view however ignored Roosevelt's reluctance for conflict, the West's lack of the military capacity in Eastern Europe to enforce democratisation and the West's need for Soviet co-operation against the Japanese. Semantic differences became

contentious as both sides used the same terms differently. Averell Harriman commented illustratively:

"To us a 'friendly neighbor' meant a country with which we do not have undue trouble, while to Stalin a 'friendly neighbor' meant a country which he dominated and controlled." (1971, p.33).

Sovietisation increasingly required systemic integration for strategic purposes and there was for Stalin no other way for Poland to be securely embedded in a bloc which sought to counteract European-based American power. For the Western allies Poland was the most difficult issue at Yalta. However this was an almost foreseeable consequence given an allied strategy of the Soviet advance from the East which was accomplished by extensive expansion of the its sphere. Stalin had refused recognition of the exiled non-Communist Polish Government in London and instead backed the pro-Communist Lublin Poles who were key to his political control. This followed removal of Polish anti-Communist elements in the clandestine Soviet liquidation of the Polish Officer corps in the Katyn Forest in 1943. Later, Stalin refused to interfere in the Wehrmacht's destruction of the Polish Home Guard during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Stalin over time had sought the removal of real or imagined dissent to ensure his control of Poland. A smokescreen of semantically equivocal terms only thinly disguised Stalin's contravention of tactical endorsement for Western values in the Charter and the Declaration. His need for security now overtook that for good relations with the West although a consolidated hand in Eastern Europe came at the cost of hegemony over the rest of Europe since American disenchantment increased and her European stance consolidated rather than diminished.

Poland became a pawn whose geography and politics were shaped by greater powers while her own interests were secondary. She posed few problems at the Teheran Conference when most issues related to the war (Leahy, 1950, p. 210). Stalin and Churchill then agreed that her borders should be based on the Curzon Line that gave certain Eastern provinces to the Soviet Union in exchange for compensation in the West at Germany's expense. Yet Roosevelt had stood aside from officially endorsing this to avoid offending his domestic Polish supporters during elections. American consent was not explicit, but lack of dissent signalled American non-interference to Stalin (Bohlen, 1973, pp.169, 187).

Therefore by Yalta the West's leverage concerning Poland was greatly weakened, but it belatedly sought mitigation through the words of the Declaration. Churchill had been insistent, since Germany's invasion of Poland triggered the British declaration of war. The abandonment of Poland to Soviet totalitarianism now would retrospectively invalidate this. The Declaration specified that the mainly Communist Polish Provisional Government should be broadened on "a democratic basis" to include "leaders from Poland itself and Poland abroad." Furthermore in ex-Nazi states interim governmental authorities "broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population" should be established through "free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people." This reaffirmation of earlier principles included "co-operation with other peace-loving nations to build world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind." Such intentions did not disguise how the time for effective Western action had gone. Poland's absorption into Stalin's bloc became emblematic of spreading Soviet control over Eastern Europe. Equivocal terms such as "freedom", "democratic", "sovereign

rights", "independence" and "will of the people" did not impede Red Army troops. Leahy wryly noted that the form of words in the Foreign Ministers' report about Poland was "so elastic that the Russians can stretch them all the way from Yalta to Washington without technically breaking it." (1950, p.316).

Expediently overlooked fault lines embedded in diplomatic agreements made Poland the symbolic litmus test of deteriorating American relations with the Soviets (Leahy,1950, p.367). By April 1st there remained a "discouraging lack of progress in the carrying out (of the Yalta decisions)...particularly those relating to Poland." (Harriman , 1971, pp.38-39). American accusations of Soviet violations reflected a Western semantic interpretation as differences conspired with divergent post-war intentions to make antagonists out of former allies. Poland's post-war fate was illustrative of Eastern Europe's and represented the political consequences of the Soviet war-time monopoly of Eastern military theatres.

Harry Hopkins, so long politically close to Roosevelt, was sent in May 1945 by Truman to visit Stalin to try to resolve the Polish problem. Stalin explained that any reconstructed Polish government must be composed of pro-Communist Lublin Poles and thus friendly to the Red Army. Stalin feared a Western anti-Soviet *cordon sanitaire* of which a Polish government containing major non-Communist elements might form a part, while insisting Poland must never again provide a German invasion route. For Stalin Poland's future was determined by his fears of the Germans:

"They will recover and very quickly. That is a highly developed industrial country with an extremely qualified and numerous working class and technical intelligentsia. Give them twelve to fifteen years and they'll be on their feet again." (R.E. Sherwood, pp. 878-890; M. Djilas, 1962, p.114).

His words to Hopkins emphasised the non-negotiability of a Poland that must be secure for the Soviet Union; moreover that this mattered more than negative American public opinion. Stalin insisted that Poland was not just pro-Soviet but Soviet-controlled, thereby precluding Western democratic influences, which were subversive and emblematic of systemic differences. This Sovietised structure confirmed Harriman's distinction between American and Soviet systemic concepts of a "friendly neighbor". It also confirmed just how weak the American policy over Eastern Europe was.

Germany's defeat greatly enhanced the Soviet Union's status in Europe and left her poised to exploit German lack of independence, possibly portending a political vacuum. This had followed confirmation by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at Yalta that "action… should be taken to destroy Germany as a military power." This meant ending her war making capacity, transferring German territories to Poland and imposing reparations. All this would reduce Germany "to the status of two or more agricultural states." German dominance over Europe was over but the levers controlling the balance of power were no longer in European hands. Leahy presciently warned this would make Russia the dominant power in Europe which he believed created "a certainty of future international disagreements." (1950, pp.322-323).

The legacy of Casablanca's commitment to unconditional surrender produced a weakened post-war Germany potentially susceptible to a Soviet domination. Moreover the expanded Sovietised Bloc could encourage pro-Soviet elements in West European states like France and Italy which possessed large indigenous Communist parties. Nazism's defeat by an allied

coalition so heavily reliant on a huge Soviet contribution enhanced Communism's appeal in Europe at a time when Soviet non-compliance with agreements highlighted her disowning of the American post-war agenda. The Percentages Agreement assisted Stalin's broader strategy of developing an Eastern bloc that vitiated Roosevelt's and Cordell Hull's post war hopes of ending spheres of influence and national economic blocs (Gaddis, 1990, p.176-177). There had thus been more idealism than realism in the American assumption of Soviet compliance with its global views, as it now encountered an intractable systemic obstacle.

American policy had been influenced by expectations of systemic Soviet changes. During the war many wanted to believe that Nazi aggression had "somehow reformed and purified Soviet behaviour." (Smith, 1965, p.40). No country fighting a common enemy so hard could surely be properly Communist; perhaps a mellower "Uncle Joe" had changed his beliefs; there had been no Comintern meeting since 1935; pre-revolutionary Russian heroes had been rehabilitated; the Russian Orthodox Church was again permitted; limited private enterprise was practised; moreover war-time American propaganda emphasised Soviet-American similarities rather than differences (Gaddis,1972, pp. 33-34). Moreover Joe Davies' book contended the Soviet Union was relinquishing Communism which gave substance to Roosevelt's assertion of being able to handle Stalin.

The American view slowly began to change as Stalin's war-time concessions came to be seen as tactical. Poland marked the first important step towards the Cold War by compelling an American adjustment to a divergent Soviet agenda, producing in turn a policy reappraisal as mutual mistrust burgeoned. Inevitably questions would arise about the

Grand Alliance, the implications of withdrawing American forces, Europe's importance to the United States and the super states' roles as European powers.

In this changing context suspicious grew. In April 1945 Stalin had objected to the refusal of the Western allies to allow Soviet participation in the German surrender in North Italy at Berne. Soviet accusations of secret deals included an alleged separate Anglo-American peace with Germany feeding Stalin's fears of allied domination of Germany at Soviet expense. Although lack of Soviet military involvement in this region undermined the case for inclusion, Stalin doubted assurances that the surrender was solely military and without political motives. Yet American attitudes were hardening too: "the Soviet officials were told just where they could 'get off'." (Miscamble, 2007, pp77-78; Deane, 1947, pp.165-166). The Berne Incident typified worsening relations as Soviet concerns about Western intentions grew along with Western disenchantment about Soviet failure to implement the Yalta agreements. Suspicions would colour mutual perceptions.

The Second World War unified for its duration the systemically opposed United States and Soviet Union. However inherent systemic antagonism awaited only predisposing events to increase the prospects of conflict. This was the last major war fought between European nation states whose diminished independence now meant they could not maintain a continental balance of power. The war left them dominated by the two disparate super states whose competing hegemonic tendencies created rifts which ended their war-time alliance. The consolidating Iron Curtain demarcated systems increasingly locked in attritional competition, reflecting antithetical politics, ideologies, economics and cultures.

Wars fought for supposedly high principles promote ideologically coloured aspirations for peace-time improvement to compensate for past errors and hardships. Both Americanism and Communism offered antithetical visionary paths. Americanism, articulated in Wilson's Fourteen Points was the foundation for the Atlantic Charter and Declaration on Liberated Europe and achieved a populist re-branding by Henry Luce who vigorously urged its export. Communism, whose origins lay in Marxist Nineteenth Century calls for economic and political redistribution, achieved political manifestation in Lenin's successful Bolshevik Revolution. Over two decades it acquired a Stalinist re-branding which also asserted its template was the world's best way forward. The promises were similar; the means however were radically different.

Both Americanism and Communism were accused by the other of seeking the global imposition of their own systems. This process developed as the two war-time allies shifted their focus from Nazi Germany to each other towards the war's end. Systemic differences engendered mutual accusations including aggression, greed, expansion, militarism, imperialism, domination, enslavement and untrustworthiness. Both contributed to the systemic stereotyping of the other and propaganda could manipulate what each proclaimed as virtues into vices.

The end of the Second World War engendered a collision between the Soviet Union and United States. The reasons for conflict originated in competitive systems seeking to impose their irreconcilable agendas incorporating their respective geo-strategic interests. This

process occurred against a backdrop of hardening perceptions about threats from the other which magnified the importance of any contentious issues. The Soviet case for self-defensive systemic insulation against the seductive corruption of American Capitalism was reinforced by fears of its support for a resurgent Germany. Whereas the United States feared the consolidating Soviet bloc could be the springboard for an ideologically driven Communist military expansion Westwards. The war had been fought for divergent post war world visions that now emerged and hardened with the intensification of systemic competition. From this divisive bedrock the Cold War evolved, sustained by a mutual quest for both security and systemic self-proliferation. No issue would remain more important and divisive than Germany which despite defeat remained intractably at the heart of Europe.

CHAPTER THREE

ACROSS THE BRIDGE

Roosevelt once said he would hold hands with the devil to cross the bridge of war (Gaddis, 1990, pp146-147). For both the Soviet Union and the United States the pragmatic alliance with *my enemy's enemy* represented the lesser evil when confronting an aggressive Nazi Germany. By 1945 both were established in a Europe which had become the interface between their two opposed systems and they promulgated opposed global visions which reflected themselves. The American view originated in a Wilsonian concept later developed by Henry Luce and which found a degree of expression in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration on Liberated Europe. The broad assertion was that the world's interests were best served by adopting the systemic features of the successful American model. Its economic cornerstone was The Bretton Woods Agreement for which the political concomitant was the extension of Western democratic practices (Gaddis, 1997, pp. 192 – 193). By contrast the Soviet Union pursued a self-defensive yet expansive systemic insulation through the development of its East European bloc founded on anti-Capitalist precepts, anathema to Americanism at every level. The Communist party alone supposedly represented the proletariat while a state-run planned economy sought to implement Socialist economic practices that excised Capitalism which supposedly created classes and associated exploitation. A core Marxist doctrine was an on-going Socialist-Capitalist conflict that manifest in systemic irreconcilability (Stalin, 1954, 10, pp. 140 - 141).

The Soviet Union and the United States were transcendent super states committed to self-proliferation to enhance their global self-interests. American economic and industrial power was enhanced by war and victory. By 1945 the United States had two thirds of the world's gold

reserves, three quarters of its invested capital, over half of the global manufacturing capacity, produced a third of the world's manufactured goods, owned half of the world's shipping and was the world's largest exporter of goods and services (Leffler, 1992, p.2). Such strength enabled it to pursue its mission of spreading its values which sought to shape the global environment to achieve a degree of systemic consistency of direct benefit to itself and other states.

Relative Soviet weakness due to huge war-time losses led it to seek consolidation of its buffer against such a powerful competitor (Leffler, 1992, p.5). This antagonistic backdrop predisposed both powers towards conflict, although this was not pre-ordained. However successful co-existence would have necessitated from the outset mutual realpolitik and commitment to agreed spheres of influence because such diametrically opposed systems required discrete operational zones. The basis for such an accord could have been laid in the Percentages Agreement between Churchill and Stalin in October 1944, but this lacked the essential American commitment in principle and practice to broaden it into a uniform allied policy (Sherwood, 1949, 2, p. 827; Feis, 1967, pp. 448- 451).

The United States' hopes of extending its practices globally precluded the concept of spheres of influence (Cordell Hull, 1948, 2, pp.1313-1315; Overy, 1998, p.253). This reflected American policy makers' lack of understanding about just how irredeemably divergent and antagonistic the Soviet systemic agenda really was.(Kimball, 1994, pp.188-191). This victory fulfilled a moral objective whose practical implementation compelled the Nazis to discuss only unconditional surrender (Ulam, 1973, p. 339; Feis, 1967, pp.109-117). There then

followed an ephemeral period of idealism extolling co-operation towards a better world and similar to that immediately after the Great War. Yet the issue of whether the American or Soviet template provided the superior and suitable reconstructive model proved problematic and divisive.

Therefore as the war ended mutually exclusive systemic irreconcilability intensified. Contentious issues included the ethos and nature of the state, its relationship to the individual, its political forms and economic operations as well as crucially divergent underpinning attitudes towards Capitalism. The ensuing conflict developed with each side learning to regard the other with suspicion as diminishing trust heightened mutual misperceptions. The initial commingling of opposed systemic and strategic interests occurred over Poland which marked the beginning of the Cold War by connoting the trend towards a divided Europe based upon two different visions for both Europe and the world (Leahy, 1950, pp. 315-316).

The war in Europe reinforced an American resolve to prevent another power ever again achieving a dominance allowing it to exploit the continent's considerable physical and human resources. After the United States became fully ensconced in Europe as a dominant political force itself, it began to move towards its own balance of power solution as its perspective of the Soviet Union deteriorated (Leffler, 1992, pp. 10-11).

Such a strategy had been facilitated by the Western allies' advance from mid 1944 which encompassed Europe's industrial powerhouse comprising Germany's Rhine and Ruhr as well as North East France and Belgium. This was part of an envisaged post-war world order

integrating Europe, the Pacific Rim, the Mediterranean Basin and Latin America into a global American-led market economy (McCormick, 1995, pp. 33-34). Because of the United States' vast war-time productive facilities it now required export markets in developed countries such as European nations.

However at the war's end the American wish to avoid large long term troop numbers in Europe led to reliance on economic levers to implement her systemic strategy of a world economy which permitted the free movement of goods, capital and technology. Roosevelt's speech in January 1945 referred to maintaining American security through the use of power "to achieve the principles in which we believe and for which we fought." (Levering et al., 2001, p.23). This formula for a Pax Americana required Soviet concurrence which was predicated on his assumption that it was in the Soviet and American common interest to avoid future conflict by forging common bonds.

However from 1945 there was a significant dwindling of hopes for a joint economic-led solution. The Soviet Union distanced itself from key American structures such as the World Bank and I.M.F. while strains arose from the Yalta Agreement focusing on difficulties over Poland and dissatisfaction with Soviet strategy in Eastern Europe. American expectations for a viable post-war Soviet partnership founded on overcoming political differences by means of shared economic interests, started to erode. This accelerating breakdown of important arrangements signalled the transition from potential to actual systemic antagonism.

The American re-orientation was not immediate but gathered pace after a change of President. Although Truman sought initially to continue Roosevelt's accommodation with Stalin, the parameters had altered with the new post-war agenda of conflicting systemic and strategic interests which emollience could not resolve. The chemistry which helped to sustain the alliance proved short-lived under the pressures of peace, particularly since changes to leadership undermined the strong personal foundation for the war-time partnership with the West. Roosevelt was the only president considered by Stalin as a partner. His death in April 1945 and Churchill's failure to be re-elected in July removed two people whom Stalin deemed equals. Their departures ended a common bond not replicated between Stalin and their successors (Zubok and Pleshakov, 1996, p. 39). Nor was a mistrustful Stalin confident about a President who terminated Lend Lease, took an increasingly tough line over Poland and rebuked Molotov for supposed Soviet misdemeanours in Eastern Europe.

Out of the war-time Big Three only Stalin remained and the Soviet position, unlike the two major Western powers, was strongly influenced by the personality of the leader which contributed to the continuity of policy. His tenure of power was by far the longest and the Soviet hierarchical system ensured that policy was personalised through a Stalinist commitment to Soviet preservation and expansion buttressed by territorial security (Zubok and Pleshakov, 1996, pp.17-22). Stalin's revolutionary convictions incorporated a sense of Russian history, strategy and statecraft while his xenophobia underpinned hostility to the technically more advanced West. He had imbibed a sense of Russia's spiritual superiority that gelled with his proselytising Bolshevism to proclaim a better way, while his personal autocracy was consistent with the Tsarist past. His views were supported by lieutenants whom he treated as

subordinates and disciples (Levering et al. 2001, p. 88). Stalin exhibited a unique blend in policy and personality of a conservative past and a revolutionary present. This mindset persevered into the post-war era and helped shape the Cold War.

Soviet post-war policy reflected two key aspects that increasingly merged: firstly a tendency to react against the American vision and secondly a specific sense of vulnerability to attack which manifest in a "Barbarossa Syndrome", the fear of another invasion perhaps by a revived Germany supported by other Western powers. This was fed by a long-term systemic appraisal of Western hostility inherent in the presumed Capitalist-Socialist conflict that seemed vindicated since the time of Western attacks on the Bolshevik state during the Civil War. The Nazi defeat led to a Soviet strategy of keeping Germany weak and building up a reverse *cordon sanitaire* which evolved into a tight systemic bloc. Any pragmatic collaboration with certain Western states was subordinated to establishing secure western Soviet borders. In 1942 Stalin pointedly told Molotov that only force would provide the necessary guarantee of border security. This was consistent with both war-time successes and weaknesses. The strategic and political influence of the Soviet Union was enhanced by the defeats of Japan and Germany which encouraged its hegemonic aspirations towards Eurasia. However penetrable borders, the lack of both a strategic air force and ocean-going navy as well as easy access to important seaways were among its principal post-war deficiencies. Moreover her victory over Germany only followed near defeat by this much smaller but technically superior state.

This conspired to increase suspicions of the West and an obsession with security. In 1944 addressing Yugoslav Communists Stalin, pointing to a map of the Soviet Union, proclaimed

that Capitalist states " will never accept the idea that so great a space should be red. Never ! Never!" Stalin believed the United States had emerged as the Soviet Union's main enemy. This seemed justified by an American commitment to revive the former enemies of Japan and Germany, the creation of an atomic monopoly and the encirclement of the Soviet Union with military bases. Stalin was aware of the role that he was expected to play in the post-war global American order. Hence the Soviet withdrawal from the I.M.F. and the World Bank early in 1946 was both pointed and significant (Levering et al., 2001, pp.37, 88- 93; 121). It showed that Communism would not be Americanised and thus conform to the all-embracing American vision. The Soviet Union's assertion of systemic opposition rather than convergence meant it would remain as much at bay post war as before, although both circumstances and the principal adversary had altered.

Therefore Soviet policy became increasingly reactive to the global vision of the relatively stronger United States. There was however a calculating opportunism inherent in Soviet strategy reflecting its systemic imperative to expand and absorb. Molotov pointedly acknowledged that "Our ideology stands for offensive operations, when possible, and if not we wait." (Resis, ed., 1993, p.29). This rested on the Marxist-Leninist precept that the ineluctable forces of historical determinism ordained the eventual triumph of Socialism.

On 9th 1946 February Stalin delivered his "Election speech". It contained references to Capitalism's inherent instability which generated an uneven development marked by crises and inter-Capitalist wars. His frequent mention of Soviet successes reinforced the victorious, superior and resilient nature of the Soviet social system which was rooted in popular support

while he enthused about how first class and modern the Red Army was. The Five Year Plans and Soviet economic system had produced unprecedented growth propelling the country from backwardness to the status of an advanced industrial country supported by the revolutionary collectivisation of Soviet agriculture.

The speech reflected both Soviet pride and fear. It was less combative than self-congratulatory but emphasised Soviet differences at a time when the U.S. was assimilating its former ally's growing non compliance and sharply differing global views. This constituted divergence from the American agenda and could be considered threatening. The Pax Americana was being obstructed and directly challenged by a systemic alternative that vaunted its superiority by basing future progress on its undiluted Socialist track record. The Election Speech helped to end residual American hopes that the Soviet Union would espouse Americanism and thus furthered the transition to a systemically divided world. Yet the speech also reflected Soviet concerns about its vulnerability to the West, hence the emphasis on the need for self-reliant strength. For Stalin understood the consequences of sustaining his brand of Socialist integrity which entailed resisting both the American embrace and the multi-faceted nature of American power. This occurred within increasingly antagonistic parameters which had followed the end of a war-time consensus.

Therefore by 1946 the previously embedded notion of a Soviet alliance was being superseded by mutual suspicion and enmity. This was elucidated in two telegrams comprising respective critiques of the Soviet Union and United States. The first was written by George Kennan in February while its reactive, mirror image came from Nikolai Novikov in September. Their

similar assessments concluded that the other's innate aggression was systemic and driven by world domination which could be contained only by superior force (Levering et al. 2001, p. 122). The telegrams were important because they represented consensus concerning the international situation's evolving bi-polarity and the need for mutual reliance on strength. Kennan's views presented a unified picture of a totalitarian, expansionist adversary whose interests lacked legitimacy but which could be successfully opposed only through the exercise of power (Leffler, 1992, 108-9). Yet Kennan injected an ominous warning:

"We have a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted,, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure." (1967, p. 557).

Kennan's assertion of a Soviet belief that the very existence of the United States compromised Soviet security helped to intensify the widening gulf and sense of a systemic conflict. This influential telegram's wide circulation in policy-making circles portrayed an implacable adversary committed to America's destruction and reinforced the notion of *us or them*. Moreover events in Iran and Turkey seemed to vindicate Kennan's recommended use of displays of strength in resisting Soviet encroachments.

The U.S. sought to develop its power base from a position of strength and the Soviet Union countered by trying to encroach from one of relative weakness. Manoeuvring for geo-strategic systemic assets affected the super states' relationship, but these areas of conflict amounted to more than individual cases because they denoted a systemic conflict that had moved from the latent to the actual with the withering of American hopes for a continued post-war Soviet co-operation. The former ally, once the enemy of America's enemy, started from 1946 to appear

as the emerging principal adversary with Soviet distancing from the global American grand design.

Iran became a highly contentious issue which led both sides to see the other as aggressive and expansionist. For the Soviet Union Iran was a potential source of both strength and weakness and was unignorable. While Iran could be a launch-point for an anti-Soviet invasion its Baku oil deposits made it economically important, and its potential for accessing the Persian Gulf was strategic. Soviet war-time shared occupation of Iran, combined with her use of the local Communist party, facilitated the organisation of a separatist, pro-Soviet movement in Southern Azerbaijan which could bring pressure on Teheran to establish a joint oil company with a predominantly Soviet interest (Levering et al.,2001, p.14). Delaying the agreed post-war withdrawal of Soviet troops as part of this objective was deemed provocative by the West, although consistent with Molotov's maxim of offensive operations if possible, otherwise to wait. This opportunistic gambit of trying to access the wealthy and strategically important Persian Gulf was an attempted counter to the American systemic agenda. For the United States the Soviet encroachments into Iran threatened not only a country with significant oil wealth but also the considerable fossil fuel reserves of the wider Gulf area which included Saudi Arabia. This region was also important for underpinning her systemic strategy which autarkic Soviet practices could nullify. Events in Eastern Europe showed that Sovietised regions became systemic losses. The assertion of American power and the Soviet retreat over Iran paved the way in due course for Iran and Saudi Arabia to become bulwarks of the American Middle Eastern power base.

Events concerning Turkey developed similarly. Soviet assertiveness followed traditional Russian claims in support of Armenian and Georgian nationalists combined with a push for joint Soviet-Turkish ownership of Straits bases, which if successful could pave the way for an eventual Soviet takeover. Soviet pressure in mid-August 1946 was then countered by the sending of a large American naval force to the Mediterranean resulting in a Soviet climb-down (Levering et al., 2001, pp. 42; 119). Soviet behaviour reflected the traditional Russian quest for access to the Mediterranean. Such a penetration, combined with Soviet ambitions regarding former Italian bases in Libya, would subvert an area of vital commercial and strategic importance to the West, while facilitating Soviet maritime expansion. Moreover Turkey was a buffer between areas vital to both the Soviet Union and United States. In the event of war Turkish bases could slow down a Soviet advance especially towards Cairo-Suez while allied control of the Dardanelles meant Soviet vessels were penned up in the Black Sea and could not interfere in vital Eastern Mediterranean sea lanes. Similarly there were strong Western interests in Greece while Communist political success could threaten Turkey's encirclement (Leffler, 1992, pp. 124-126). Undermining this regional Western dominance was thus an important Soviet objective, while a Western priority was sustaining and strengthening its position.

Strategic factors therefore impelled each to act and react during a duel for systemic dominance. Soviet progress would enhance her interests in rich, warm water regions which the U.S. regarded as vital to her expanding hegemony. This could be subverted by factors such as local Communist parties like those in Greece, France, Italy and Iran whose momentum would be strengthened by Soviet strategic advances. The gain or loss of economic and

political assets affected the antagonistic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such actions could be portrayed as either assertive Capitalism or Communism according to the needs of respective propagandists. Early post war idealism to create a better world had soon withered through a lack of consensus and was quickly followed by competing claims and counterclaims from two systemic camps as bi-polarity developed.

However the atomic explosions over Japan in August 1945 showed that the evolving super states' relationship which was based on a perceived equality had been destabilised. The new weapons created deep Soviet fears, subverting Stalin's aspiration for Soviet equality with the United States while intensifying concerns associated with the "Barbarossa Syndrome". The West's technical superiority had been clearly demonstrated which augmented a sense of weakness arising from extensive Soviet losses and devastation following the German invasion. Atomic weapons could now provide a way of attacking the Soviet heartland independently or as an adjunct to invasion. The bombs seemed to give a significant American advantage in the on-going systemic Capitalist-Socialist conflict that was a constant Soviet ideological theme. Furthermore American willingness to bomb an enemy unable to retaliate in kind had been demonstrated. Stalin's response was predictable:

"Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been broken. Build the Bomb - it will remove a great danger from us." (Levering et al., 2001, p.105).

These words reflected Soviet vulnerability and precipitated Soviet efforts to catch up in order to rebalance the situation and minimise danger for the Soviet Union by ensuring her systemic survival. The quest for an atomic capability was clearly emblematic of the reactive nature of Soviet policy to American military power.

This competition from such an early point became a defining characteristic of systemic antagonism, although the Bomb, whether atomic or nuclear, arguably produced a stabilising fear that helped prevent the Cold War becoming *hot*. Stalin believed that the explosions had removed his status of being second to none and thus compromised his position (Zubok and Pleshakov, 1996, p.45). The system was so personalised that Stalin and state were indivisible, and this sense of inferiority until the Soviet atomic explosion in 1949 engendered a sharpened sense of reality that helps to explain his adventurism over Turkey and Iran where probes were followed by retreats. Systemic-strategic manoeuvres therefore operated from August 1945 under the uncertainties imposed by American atomic power. Stalin behaved as if in overt denial of such leverage but rapidly channelled great resources into producing a Soviet equivalent. Meanwhile the U.S. sought to understand how to exploit whatever advantage, if any, her atomic monopoly conferred.

Turkey and Iran were areas of significant geo-strategic importance but remained secondary to Europe where Germany's role as the continental centre of balance derived from its ability both to assist Europe's recovery while signalling its future orientation. The securing by Western allied forces of Germany's principal economic and industrial regions proved crucial, especially given uncertainty about a post-war settlement. Yet this was explicable by American hopes for a consensus with the Soviet Union which endured only as long as the mutual intent of emasculating Germany's war-making potential irrespective of broader concerns about Europe.

In December 1944 Roosevelt's friend and adviser Harry Hopkins voiced prevalent Western indecision:

"Upon our full-out and final assault on the German citadel…there were no firm agreements as to what was to be done with Germany once she was defeated…it was quite possible to visualize the collapse of Germany without any plans or agreements having been made…the problem of dismemberment of the Reich was hanging fire; there was no agreement as to zones; nothing as to whether or not we were going to encourage or discourage central German Government." (1949, II, pp. 835-836).

Accordingly as the relationship with the Soviets worsened concerns about Europe's future systemic orientation grew. A war-weakened Europe required German industrial resources to help its revival. This would enable the continent to take its place within the Western fold and in due course to absorb American exports to sustain her highly productive, war-stimulated economy. Undersecretary of State Will Clayton, who would play a significant part in the formulation of the Marshall Plan, summarised the problem: "We simply can't afford after the war to let our trade drop off." (Fossedal, 1993, pp.111-112, 119,141). Europe thus had a key role to play and James Byrnes summarised Germany's constructive and destructive roles in this context:

"This area is at the heart of the European continent. Economically it has provided much of Europe's lifeblood through its mines, its industries, its agriculture and its transportation system. And politically it is the tinderbox that has ignited two world-wide conflicts within twenty-five years." (1947, pp. 159-161).

Ambivalence towards Germany was superseded by worrying aspects of the wider prevailing European situation which German resources could significantly mitigate. Germany therefore came to be seen by the Western allies less as the problem and more a major part of the solution. In April 1945 McCloy returned from a trip to Europe and gave an almost apocalyptic account of conditions there that made it exploitable by Communist parties. Truman realised

that the restoration of the economies of liberated countries was central to permanent peace in Europe because, "A chaotic and hungry Europe is not a fertile ground in which stable, friendly and democratic governments can be reared." This was an important systemic point and implicitly acknowledged that Communist autarky was in neither the American nor European interest. Truman wrote to Churchill that:

"Without immediate concentration on the production of German coal we will have turmoil and unrest in the very areas of Western Europe on which the whole stability of the continent depends."

The Potter and Hyndley Report reinforced the danger of a European coal famine and recommended mining more German coal for export to the rest of Europe. The Ruhr, the engine of Germany's war efforts, had now become essential for Europe's immediate survival. Equally important was denying access to this region to the Soviet Union which would use its resources for the benefit of itself and its buffer rather than Europe as a whole (Leffler, 1992, p.63-65). The Ruhr became Western Europe's best immediate hope of sustaining its industrial and political regeneration. As such its control and use by the Western allies became a factor in Soviet concerns for the Americanisation of Europe. This coincided with Stalin's agenda for Sovietising Eastern Europe which raised questions about possible Soviet adventurist plans to extend her domination further Westwards and absorb Germany's core industrial strength. Such concerns were also fed by apparent Soviet expansionism in Iran and Turkey.

Germany's importance for both systems made her the principal focus at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 and a vital factor in consolidating the division of Europe. A contentious issue was German reparations which the Soviet Union wanted as recompense for her own vast losses and a means of perpetuating German weakness through economic

subjugation. The Kremlin also hoped that British-American discord and a weak Germany would forestall the emergence of a hostile Western coalition (Levering et al., 2001, p.100). The Americans were determined to promote European stability but not to subsidise German reparations themselves, as had occurred after the Great War. The upshot was a deal in which occupying powers took reparations from their own German zones which reduced Soviet scope for interference in Western Europe while also putting the Ruhr's resources beyond its grasp. The strategic consequence was progress towards the permanent division of Germany which reflected both reduced co-operation with the Soviet Union and Western opposition to Soviet consolidation in Eastern Europe. The division of Germany and the broader division of Europe were now becoming closely linked. Significantly Truman at the time acknowledged "a line running from the Baltic to the Adriatic". Potsdam was convened to resolve major issues but failed to do so and instead revealed major differences over reparations, Germany' future and the wider issue of freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe. It thus marked a shift away from Roosevelt's earlier accommodating attitude towards the Soviet Union (Miscamble, 2008, pp. 211- 215; Fossedal, 1993, p.175).

Divisions in both Germany and Europe were indicative of broader divisions between two irreconcilably different global views as the world moved into a limbo that was neither peace nor war. Mistrust naturally arose from contentious issues originating from the competitive and irreconcilable Soviet and American systemic natures. Each appeared a threat to the other because divisions were both cause and consequence of systemic antagonism that promoted adversarial perspectives. Europe's pivotal industrial regions lay within Western control which fed Soviet concerns about a future attack were Western Capitalist allied powers to

encourage the revival of German nationalism. Yet a resuscitated Western-oriented Germany within a broader Western Europe framework seemed a vital structure for withstanding a Soviet-dominated Eastern autarky completely at variance with American post-war designs.

Events appeared to justify such Soviet fears as the development of Western Europe proceeded along Western lines. At Paris on July 11th 1946 Byrnes announced a "merger of the zones of occupation, with or without the Soviet Union." (1947, p.195). This marked a major step towards consolidating the position of the Western allies in Germany. At Stuttgart in September Byrnes said that American forces would be stationed in Germany indefinitely: "We are not withdrawing." The speech also clarified that Western notions of self-government in Germany precluded it becoming "the satellite of any power or to live under a dictatorship." (Levering et. al, 2001, pp. 74-75). This explicitly prohibited Soviet influence in Western-controlled German zones. Moreover the long cherished Soviet hopes of American troop withdrawals from Europe had now evaporated and therewith Soviet hegemonic aspirations over a wider area of Europe with clarified limits to any further Soviet progression Westwards. The U.S. had acquired the mantle of a major European power and exercised its strength accordingly. Furthermore by the time of the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow in April 1947 the Truman administration had decided to rebuild West Germany without Soviet approval and expressly against Stalin's will. The new state, founded explicitly on geo-systemic separation from East Germany, enshrined division at the heart of Europe and played a key role in the American vision for Europe and beyond. For the Soviet Union the

combination of German regeneration and American power amounted to a worrying scenario. Germany had thus become the focus of superpower divisions and the lynchpin for Europe's systemic future.

Whereas German issues were essentially European the catalyst for a major global reorientation in American policy occurred within the Anglo-American relationship which post-war witnessed American ascendancy and British decline. The war-time depletion of Britain's assets conspired with her imperial obligations to leave her over-extended and unable to fulfill her global commitments. The diminishing semblance of Anglo-American equality was starkly acknowledged by Britain in February 1947 in her inability to continue support for Greece and Turkey. American aid now made up the deficit which was the backdrop the following month to the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine. This provided for the continuity of support in an important region as well as outlining a wider, more American global role that asserted a Pax Americana. This accorded with America's multi-faceted strength which underpinned her systemic vision and growing hegemony. Britain was now the relationship's junior partner in terms of power and status and this denoted the shift from a bilateral Anglo-American partnership to an American led policy.

The Truman Doctrine of 12th March 1947 was a key marker in the progress of the Soviet – American relationship beyond the limbo of neither peace nor war and towards a more adversarial posture. The U.S. now reinforced earlier economic levers to promote her global view with a broader strategic repertoire including specific aid packages including military power. The former Soviet ally was now the identified opponent. The core message of

Truman's speech was of a differentiated world with active support forthcoming for those pursuing ideals consistent with American values. He proclaimed the intention of helping free peoples work out their own destinies and posited the choice that nations must make between "alternative ways of life". He distinguished between the broad values, type of representative government, way of life and democratic liberties enjoyed by Americans compared to what was endured under totalitarian regimes. His references to how misery and want stifled personal aspirations for "a better life" highlighted key systemic differences (Truman, 1956, pp. 105-6). It thereby emphasized deep contrasts between the Soviet Union and the United States but also acknowledged two types of societies. The American perception had now caught up with that of the Soviet Union for Truman's speech echoed the atavistic Soviet tenet that Capitalism and Socialism would always be in contention, which the U.S. had ignored because of Roosevelt's aspiration for a post war Soviet-American concordat. Both the Truman Doctrine and Zhdanov's reciprocal speech in September outlined antithetical and confrontational societies which underpinned the evolution of the Cold War. Moreover with Britain's relative decline the post-war "Big Two" superseded the war-time "Big Three" which accentuated development of a bipolar, systemically differentiated world.

The Truman Doctrine would soon be complemented by the Marshall Plan. Truman rightly insisted these were "two halves of the same walnut" (G.A. Fossedal, 1993, p.212). This was a crucial metaphor because their strategic and systemic components were not only mutually supportive but indissolubly connected since neither made sense without the other. After Secretary of State George Marshall failed to gain cooperation with the Soviet Union at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in April 1947 Truman concluded the reason lay in

the Soviet wish to exploit Europe's hapless condition to promote Communism (Truman, 1956, p112). This echoed a part of George Kennan's influential "Long Telegram" of February 1946 when he referred to world Communism as "a malignant parasite which feeds on diseased tissue." (1967, p.559).

The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan comprised a hegemonic strategy resting on American-led multilateralism which encompassed an agenda of help and support to specific states beneath the overarching bi-polarity of Soviet-American systemic antagonism. The Plan provided for the revival of Western Europe under an American aegis. While valuable economic resources were initially supplied to assist Western Europe by Germany it became, because of its intrinsic importance to both sides, a major source of political contention exacerbating Soviet-American antagonism. Then in 1948 economic moves and the creation of the Deutschmark as a separate currency precipitated the Berlin Blockade which provided the political pretext to develop the trappings of West German statehood. This was important for The Marshall Plan whose objective was to shore up Western Europe states so they could become functionally part of the wider Americanised vision that the U.S. fought the war to implement and which post-war the Soviet Union increasingly resisted. A solution of the German question was essential for this objective. Its geo- strategic position and industrial potential meant that neutrality was no option and its division proved to be emblematic of the systemic European conflict to which it was literally central..

Behrman asserts that the Marshall Plan was the animating policy of Containment and that the European Recovery Programme was intended to stop the spread of Communism (2007,

pp.102, 182). The Plan indeed was thus central to Containment which was defined by Truman as supporting free peoples "primarily through economic and financial aid" which gave this lever primacy over military assistance. He appreciated that while the huge Marshall Plan budget fitted this criterion it was still considerably less than the cost to the U.S. of the world war (Truman, 1956, pp. 105-6, 118). Thus the use by the Marshall Plan of cost effective financial help utilized economic means to support strategic objectives.

Both Doctrine and Plan not only underscored Britain's waning and marginalised position but denoted an American policy of moving towards ties with many states rather than relying principally on one relationship which the United States was fast outgrowing as her post-war global stance expanded. The Doctrine's principal strategic function was to provide a protective umbrella for the Marshall Plan's role of reviving Western states that were systemically similar. Yet The Plan had a strategic role of countering through its effective functioning the diametrically opposed Communist autarky. This entailed attrition which fused systemic and strategic dimensions. The Doctrine in relation to Europe could only work if the Plan successfully fostered viable European systemic practice. The halves of the walnut were also sides of the same coin by being indivisible yet facing different directions. Moreover helping people work out their destinies according to principles and practices resonated with Wilson' Fourteen Points and so reflected a long-term multilateral systemic tenet of global Americanism tantamount to a strategic objective at the cores of both the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine.

Their intentions of protecting and revitalising Western Europe were seen as threatening by the Soviet Union, which the events of July 1947 illustrated. Stalin reactively thwarted Czech involvement in the Marshall Plan at meetings held in Paris. He considered it would ensnare the Soviet Union and its allies via Western loans which were subversive Capitalist mechanisms. Moreover, the aim of signing up Soviet satellites for Marshall aid appeared aimed directly at the Soviet bloc's unity which "the Soviet Government could not tolerate." The Czechs were informed that other East European states would not take part and nor should they; this was couched as an ultimatum (Pogue, 1987, pp.226-227).

Stalin realised that if the Soviet Union or its allies received E.R.P. money they must open up their economies by providing information about their resources, assets and output levels. Such transparency formed no part of Stalin's state or personality and it appeared to him more about prying and spying. Furthermore such disclosures threatened the essence of independent internal Soviet control over the Soviet Central and Eastern Europe regions (Fossedal, 1993, p.242). In systemic terms it did entail more than openness, since there was the implication of change, dependence and structural accommodation to American practices. Thus Stalin perceived the Plan as a wedge to subvert his brand of Socialism. In 1948, Allen Dulles pointedly noted that the Soviet Union did not dare open its doors to Western influences which the Marshall Plan embodied. Such cooperation would not only entail trade and economic links but risked parts of the Soviet empire falling "politically and ideologically under the influence of the West." (1992, pp. 30-31, 34, 36). Dulles appreciated Stalin's conviction that the Plan directly threatened the systemic core of the Soviet bloc. However it was as much about what the Soviet Union wanted to protect as to hide, which indicated both Soviet suspicions and vulnerability.

To counterbalance both the threat and lure of the Marshall Plan, trade agreements were hastily entered into with a number of Soviet satellite states under the Molotov Plan. This reactive policy again revealed how much the Soviet Union had been pushed onto the back foot by the American deployment of its great economic power exemplified in The Marshall Plan . There were Soviet concerns about the extent of East European states' trade with the West. Significantly Soviet control was also tightened over the exports of potentially erring countries with the diversion of their products eastwards. The more Stalin felt systemically threatened the tighter his grip over the Soviet bloc became, making him appear even more dangerously intransigent to Western critics.

The Marshall Plan was a systemic manifestation of post-war Americanism and embodied altruism and self interest which were central to the overarching American economy that had become the lynchpin of the post war Capitalist system. Paul Hoffman, who became head of the Economic Cooperation Administration in April 1947, extolled the effectiveness of the E.R.P.'s "counterpart funding" scheme which enabled dollars to do "double duty" by permitting participant E.R.P countries to receive dollars which were then matched by an equivalent in their own currency. He contended that for the U.S. to sell goods abroad in return for dollars, it needed mechanisms enabling countries to earn those dollars. He saw this as a "contest between the American assembly line and the Communist party line" and to this end America needed to wage the peace (Hoffman, 1951, pp 35, 46, 49). This neatly distinguished between efficient productivity and ideologically prescribed centralized control of industries.

Altruism and self interest were powerfully fused in the Marshall Plan's operational mechanisms to anchor participating countries firmly within the American fold while reforming their industries. It therefore sought to create a new economic order in Europe by freeing up trade and using American methods to create wealth and promote revival. This served American interests by providing the United States with much needed access to European markets, also abundant material and manpower resources which a Communist dominated Europe would have denied (Hogan, 1989, pp.2, 19, 26). Indeed those states within the Soviet bloc represented a notable systemic loss to Americanism.

The Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine represented a broad policy of multilateralism which conspired to facilitate the economic revitalization of Western Europe and to make it both a strong interface with the competitor Soviet Union and a central part of the post-war American world order. The war-weakened Soviet Union had through its victories created its Eastern European buffer-bloc which it now sought to consolidate through Sovietisation into an hegemony of homogeneous states capable of withstanding the dynamic post war expansion of Americanism, any compromise with which would undermine Stalinist precepts. Soviet survival was the pre-requisite for demonstrating in time its systemic superiority. Indeed, such demonstrations became a crucial bilateral feature as Cold War divisions deepened.

As both sides squared up to each other, there was the question of how to measure success between global competitors whose rival systemic hegemonies were evolving into antagonistic systemic blocs. The pursuit of dominance occurred against the backdrop of accelerating development of formidable new weapons that imposed caution articulated in the

emerging concept of deterrence. The stalemate in some ways was reminiscent of the problems created by the Great War's Western front, which both sides sought to break out of in order to win. However the new post- 1945 context generated questions about the very nature of what became known as the Cold War, how it could be waged, and which strategic objectives would facilitate whatever definition of victory could be formulated Such parameters produced conundrums rather than solutions.

CONCLUSION

The *Cold War* is a term of convenience resting on an apparent oxymoron: if a war isn't *hot* is it really war? One of Clausewitz's key contentions was that war is an act of force to compel an enemy to do one's will. However in this context the descriptor of *War* may seem questionable (1989, p. 75). Yet the eventual implosion of the Soviet Union left the United States victor albeit by default, which suggests that decisive military engagement as the defining determinant of victory is less certain: the Nazi and Soviet states collapsed after different types of conflict and different time scales. During the Cold War there was no effective critique of differences between the protagonists' relative strengths and weaknesses in relation to the conflict. An important point was the broad acceptance of intrinsic Communist power and Soviet propaganda excelled at emphasising strengths and downplaying weakness. This in turn highlighted the contrast between closed societies where such assertions went unchallenged and more open ones where criticism could be expressed. Although the Soviet tenet that its Socialism would triumph over Capitalism was eventually shown as illusion, this was proclaimed loudly since 1917 and came to be widely believed, especially when America's foreign policy besmirched her core principles and global standing.

The Second World War justified the Clausewitzian premise about using force to compel an enemy's compliance: the allies successfully secured their objective of Nazi unconditional surrender. The war also exhibited attributes of totality as it acquired global dimensions, particularly from 1941 when the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States joined. Growing numbers of civilians and combatants became involved as participant states mobilised more and more national resources to sustain a maximum military effort. By contrast from 1945

no military engagements occurred between the two main Cold War protagonists despite subsequent proxy wars between superpower-supported affiliated states such as in Korea and Vietnam.

However the Cold War also possessed attributes of totality. It generated global bi-polarity, strong conflicting loyalties, punitively high bi-lateral expenditure on political warfare, military forces, conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as aid to allies. The ensuing space race also became a competitive and expensive arena for asserting systemic dominance. Such Cold War characteristics however became surrogates for strategic coherence during a conflict that defied the usually accepted parameters of war. This contrasted with the Second World War that had produced a clear victory. The conundrum was how this new conflict could be won. The threat of global devastation deterred a military conflict which might escalate to a nuclear exchange, after which neither protagonist could be sure of emerging as either a victor or even a politically viable state. The underpinning fear on which deterrence was based helped prevent war. However this only underscored how a conflict without military conflict was juxtaposed with an inherently uneasy peace as both sides vainly sought a strategy for victory without resorting to direct military engagement.

The conflict occurred against a backdrop of a reconfigured European systemic landscape following Germany's complete defeat. The American and Soviet victors were ensconced not just as dominant and embedded powers but as arbiters of its fate. The subsequent systemic contest evolved from rival templates for reconstruction which reflected their

opposed natures while the military strength that both once utilized against Germany became by degrees deployed against each other. With decreasing prospects of devising joint post-war objectives came mutual retrenchment denoting reciprocal appreciation of the vast forces both could muster. Europe's new divisions now reflected Soviet-American systemic divisions.

With Soviet acquisition of firstly atomic then nuclear bombs the concept of victory was undermined as the option for either side to use maximum force was undermined. This differentiated the Cold War from the Second World War by revealing how strides in weapons technology affected notions of war and winning. Bigger and more numerous stockpiles of weapons emphasized this conundrum which produced a dangerous and expensive standoff. The accelerating arms race and development of sophisticated weaponry only confirmed the denial to both of a clear cut strategic edge. Even the side with fewer and smaller bombs might possess enough overkill capacity to create disproportionate damage on well chosen strategic targets. The crux was making uncertainty less uncertain; yet the inability to do this produced an advantageous paradox by enhancing deterrence which discouraged the resort to war because the concept of victory was more in doubt.

Whether deterrence represented stabilized instability or unstable stability, it did reduce prospects of war. However it could not eliminate *the unthinkable* which might mean accidentally pulling the trigger then a rapidly escalating suicidal conflict. For instance, excessive brinkmanship might arise out of a crisis; one side could mis-read the other's intentions; a technologically-related accident was feasible; communications during a tense

situation might break down; other powers might develop nuclear capability. Since rogue events were possible this was an unreliable formula for peace.

The difficulties in formulating Cold War strategic objectives reflected unresolved questions about gaining victory without using total means. Yet if precarious survival was preferable to obliteration there remained problems associated with co-existence. What sustained mistrust was atavistic opposition to the other within the Soviet and American systems. Both shared a mutual sense of threat from the other, which weapons magnified but did not cause. Therefore for most of the Cold War notions of both winning and successful co-existence were elusive. The result was a mutual and costly slugging match with both demonstrating endurance. During this, a key preoccupation was undermining the other through political warfare including the extensive use of the hidden hand of espionage. There was also the need to assert a sometimes spurious dominance while seeking to neutralise the other's successes. A prime example was Stalin's determination to acquire atomic bombs to rectify his perception of an imbalance arising from America's atomic monopoly after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thereafter if one side devised a new bomb, the other needed to match it. However parity or superiority were more apparent than real because no outright advantage accrued. In the arena of space Soviet successes included Sputnik in 1957 then Yuri Gagarin's flight in 1961. These were later trumped by the American Apollo mission to the moon in 1969. Ostentatious exhibitions of strength were seldom done better than in the annual military displays in Moscow's Red Square to convey the image of an unshakably powerful edifice. Such posturing demonstrations were not proofs of superiority, but they did

reflect intense systemic competition. Yet identifying the strategic path towards winning the Cold War remained elusive.

Eventually the objective, while lacking a strategic plan, would emerge inadvertently in an unforeseen outcome. Clausewitz had suggested that in seeking to pinpoint a "single centre of gravity" it was necessary to trace an enemy's key weakness to the fewest possible sources and ideally to one, whether this was represented by armed forces, an individual, an alliance, an ally, a capital city, a piece of land or public opinion. Capturing or destroying this critical element was the objective of military activity (1989, pp. 595-596-617). This concept can be broadened and up-dated within the hypothesis of systemic antagonism and relative strengths and weakness. In terms of a *centre of gravity* the decades long competitive struggle was an endurance test of Soviet and American systems which ended with the sudden Soviet implosion. This was the result of a lengthy on-going but unacknowledged attritional process which produced a systemic collapse without prior design. The U.S. had all along done the right things but without realising it. This was a victory by unwitting default.

It has rightly been asserted that for the Soviet Union the Space Race was ruinous because it could not afford expensive technological adventures. The protracted Cold War bled the U.S.S.R. dry from before the Aswan Dam project in 1955 to Afghanistan in 1985 and beyond. The effect was a cumulative drain on Soviet economic resources produced by her less resilient and efficient industries. By contrast the United States, whose more robust

economy was diametrically configured, could better afford such a contest (J. Hughes-Wilson, 2006, p. 313)

In trying to further refine the centre of gravity concept it is tempting to identify the pre-eminent source of American survival and success as higher levels of G.D.P.. This indicated greater economic efficiency, capable of sustaining the varied costs of a long global struggle. However such economic power only derived from the total systemic mix within American Capitalism whose politics was based on an individually-based ideology that encouraged self expression and was exemplified in encouraging the pursuit and accumulation of personal and corporate private wealth. The consequence was that the competitively-oriented American system was more durable, versatile and adaptive, therefore better suited for a long struggle. This compared the Soviet Union whose state run industries, foundered on the Marxist prohibition of private wealth, were by American standards inefficient and uncompetitive.

Importantly the U.S., unlike the Soviet Union, started from a post-war position of strength which allowed it to invest $13 billion in Western Europe through Marshall aid. This was roughly equivalent to what the Soviet Union by contrast extracted from Eastern Europe during the same period to help offset its war-time loses and rebuild its industries (Behrman, 2007, p. 339). The significance lay in the American capacity to invest on this scale and thereby enhance its systemic position. This contrasted with the Soviet inability to do likewise, compounded initially by frustrated hopes for big German reparations, then over

time by the Soviet planned economy's failure to deliver the levels of growth and output that American Capitalism could sustain.

The inherent flexibility of entrepreneurialism and plural democratic practices enabled the American system to outlast by outperforming the more rigid, ideologically circumscribed political and economic Soviet institutions. Although the United States invented neither democracy nor Capitalism, Brand America's political-economic package contained a blend of consumerism and individually-based democracy which made the American Dream an attractive and exportable benchmark to which other states could aspire. In this respect Americanism truly sought to be global. Pechatnov and Edmondson commented:

"The American empire was generally pluralistic and open, while the Soviet one was totalitarian and closed. To put it more colourfully, a Soviet 'empire by rape' stood in contrast to an American 'empire by seduction'…" (Levering et al., 2001, p.149).

This seduction rested greatly on American production levels and consumerism. These were exemplified in Lend-Lease aid to an envious but needy Stalin who could counter such abundance with only renewed post war calls for austerity and sacrifice in anticipation of the constantly deferred better tomorrow. Thus the war's end brought little respite for the Soviet citizenry, so thwarting their expectations as military strength and industrial progress remained priorities throughout the Cold War. The paucity of Soviet consumerism undermined its broader systemic appeal because great resources were also siphoned off in military, economic and political support for Eastern Europe. Soviet economic nationalism defensively sought to insulate Socialist systemic structures from the transformational thrust of proactive Americanism which reflected relative post-war American strength and Soviet weakness. Crucially the war boosted the United States' economy which gave it a strong head

start advantage over a war-ravaged Soviet state and this served to enhance Soviet uncompetitiveness in relation to an intensely competitive Americanism.

Having initially been slow to react and re-orientate to the withering of the Soviet alliance, the United States grew more politically proactive while the Soviet Union became more reactive. For instance the American atomic and nuclear bombs preceded those of the Soviet Union; the Zhdanov Doctrine followed the Truman Doctrine; the Berlin Blockade came after Western initiatives to establish a West German state; Comecon emerged after the Marshall Plan, and the Warsaw Pact followed the creation of N.A.T.O.. The Soviet Union from the start of the Cold War often sought to both imitate and catch up by establishing its own versions of American initiatives. Moreover it was frequently motivated by weakness rather than strength though its posture suggested otherwise.

Greater political openness and resilience enabled the United States to accept defeat in Vietnam and then retreat from a contest where the media and hostile public opinion focussed on the moral mismatch between professed ideals and political and military practices. Core democratic values within Americanism as reflected in the Truman Doctrine's multilateralism were sometimes overlooked when assistance went to those regimes embodying anti-Communism at the expense of support for popular democracy. This also occurred in Central and South America but defeat in Vietnam, then withdrawal, greatly damaged Americanism's vaunted benevolence. However the American system, while shaken profoundly, could react to failure and criticism, then withdraw and move on battered but intact after underlying revulsion was openly demonstrated by American people and

institutions against Government policy-makers. It also retained its systemic integrity because culpable leaders were replaceable which permitted scope for regeneration as successors took over. The public acknowledgement of errors remains an essential American characteristic which strengthens its systemic mould and this inherent flexibility enables it to bend rather than break under pressure.

The Soviet predicament however was marked by the inability to modify key systemic precepts. From the outset these were prescriptive and unbending which made Soviet society institutionally closed and resistant to change. Gorbachev's initiatives from 1985 included efforts to introduce *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) but these proved destabilising by subjecting the Soviet Union to the types of pressures it was unused to and which contributed to the mounting pressures on its rigid mould.

Crucially the Soviet system lacked popular institutions permitting criticism to become a spur to political evolution because the all-knowing State took precedence over the subordinated individual who lacked a significant voice. The Cold War itself promoted rigidity. Concessions implied structural weakness and military over-reaction stifled reformist tendencies throughout the Soviet hegemony. If the edifice was required to bend it risked fracturing. This is traceable to Stalin and his long tenure of supreme power when rigidity and acquiescence were enshrined as virtuous. He so Stalinised the Soviet state that even after his death this personal legacy of intransigence could not be unravelled. The composition of the Politburo's ruling clique might alter but overall Party structures stayed immutable with very few conduits for democratic popular dissent to engender questions about the sterility of

the status quo. The dictatorship over rather than of the proletariat, promulgated by Lenin and the early revolutionaries then refined by Stalin, endured until threatened by an aspirational leadership unaware that reformist initiatives and Soviet politics had become mutually exclusive.

From early in Soviet history concessions to Western trends and especially Capitalist practices were considered only temporary expedients. Had Bukharin triumphed instead of Stalin in the 1920s then the dynamic of peasant self-enrichment as a permanent solution might have consolidated at an earlier stage, perhaps leading to a more adaptable brand of Communism. However collectivisation and the destruction of the kulak class proved to be self-inflicted national wounds indicating the extent that applied dogma weakened the Socialist systemic experiment. Soviet agriculture never recovered and the inefficiencies of centrally planned Soviet industrialisation rested on this damaged rural substructure set against a backdrop of widespread institutionalised repression and use of slave labour. The Marxist revolutionary experiment evolved into a brutal dictatorship that turned its back on what motivates ordinary people. Importantly it could not admit its mistakes to others or itself.

Marked Soviet-American differences led to the start of the Cold War within the catalytic crucible of post-war Europe. The unexpected Soviet systemic collapse represented the sudden outcome which embodied the elusive objective which Americans had prayed but not planned for. This only occurred after a contest that proved a prolonged and cumulative stress test of both systems. For decades the U.S. because of its systemic fundamentals had unwittingly been edging closer to victory by default. The painfully long attritional process

was the antithesis of a quick knock out blow. However a crucial perceptual and analytical contemporary failure lay in not developing an updated Clausewitzian paradigm that could relate the nature of the Cold War to the attributes of the two main players and how they individually coped with the toll it imposed.

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