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INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EMERGING AND MATURE CASES

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Abstract

The notion of institutional entrepreneurship emerged to explain how actors change the institutions in which they are embedded. However, the introduction of institutional entrepreneurship into institutions creates a promising tension between actors as strategic agents – institutional entrepreneurs – and the powerful influence of institutional forces on actors. For the notion of institutional entrepreneurship to hold, it is necessary to address how institutionally embedded actors bring about institutional change. This thesis examines how institutional entrepreneurs bring about institutional change and explains success in entrepreneurial efforts.

Drawing on two in-depth case studies, the researcher examined which combinations of contextual elements constitute institutional entrepreneurship – in terms of deviation from existing institutional arrangements and institutionalisation of innovation – and which factors explain success or failure in institutional entrepreneurship. The cases provide comparative and contrasting perspectives on the process of institutional entrepreneurship. The first case focused on the entrepreneurial process in the emerging organisational field of positive psychology in Kuwait and led by actors outside the target institution for change. In contrast, the second case represented the mature organisational field of business incubation in Kuwait and led by actors inside the target institution. The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators in each case and collected documents to augment and validate the data in the interviews.

The research shows that the differences in the characteristics of emerging and mature fields and positions of institutional entrepreneurs shape the entrepreneurial process and the form of change in fields. The findings suggest that outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields requires multiple forces from within and outside the field working for the institutional change. As outsiders who lack centrality in the target institution, the institutional entrepreneurs connect with macro-level forces and draw on related mature fields and their associated institutions to bring about their innovation. The situation is rather different in insider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields. The evidence shows that the institutional entrepreneurs target field-level forces. As insiders to the target institution, the institutional entrepreneurs leverage their social position and draw strategically on the established institutional logic and its associated set of practices to realise their innovation.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my loving mother and father;

Fouz and Faisal Abumuamar

Who support, love, and pray for me every day to get this work done.

I also dedicate this thesis to my brothers and sisters who have supported me throughout the process.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSC	Civil Service Commission
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
EDIP	Enterprise Development & Investment Promotion
EEKW	Economic Empowerment of Kuwaiti Women
FED	Follow-up and Enterprise Development
FOMLP	Fruit of My Labour Project
FWD	Family Welfare Directorate
ICD	International Cooperation Department
ILO	International Labour Organisation
KAPF	Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation
KFIB	Kuwait Foreign Investment Bureau
LPAC	Local Project Appraisal Committee
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoP	Ministry of Planning
MOSAL	Ministry Of Social Affairs and Labour
NCP	National Cooperation Project
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSDP	National Strategic Development Plans

SCPD	Supreme Council for Planning and Development
SDC	Social Development Centre
SVI	Shuwaikh Vocational Incubator
TPAD	Training and Production Awareness Division
TPP	Training and Programmes Preparation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Background

There is a broad agreement among organisation members and citizens the world over that institutional change is fundamental to development. With most countries facing developmental issues, the question of how to change existing institutions has assumed greater urgency. Efforts to change institutions, however, face institutions' strong power of inertia (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009). In essence, institutions are "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North, 1990, p. 3). They provide structure to everyday life in the sense that they guide human interaction, so that when we drive a car, form a business, or borrow money, we know how to perform these tasks (or can learn easily how to do so). In this way, the institutional constraints not only determine what institutional inhabitants are prohibited from doing, but also under what conditions some are permitted to undertake specific activities. Such conception of institutions implicitly assumed that actors often have a limited degree of agency. Thus, institutions are frameworks that include written formal rules as well as unwritten codes of conduct within which human behaviour takes place (Jepperson, 1991), and thereby constraining the options that individuals and collectives are likely to choose to bring about institutional change. From this perspective, institutional change appears to be a complex process because the change can be a result of changes in the formal or informal constraints in which different forces and actors interact with each other. In this interaction process, not only institutions influence actors' behaviour, but also actors might, in turn, influence, and possibly change institutions (Battilana et al., 2009).

Initiatives to change institutions despite pressures towards conformity to institutional arrangements represent the acts of institutional entrepreneurship (Andrews, 2013; Hardy and Maguire, 2018). It provides considerable promise for understanding how and why certain novel organising solutions appear and become well established over time (Garud, Hardy and Maguire, 2007). Actors who command resources necessary to influence institutionalised arrangements, either by mobilising those resources to create new institutions or transform the existing ones, have been termed institutional entrepreneurs by DiMaggio, who introduced the notion in 1988 (cited in Hardy and Maguire, 2008). The focus of this new avenue of research has been primarily on the strategies used by institutional

entrepreneurs to change institutional arrangements rather than following them, thereby introducing the issue of human agency and interest into institutional analysis (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2009). Subsequently, the research on institutional entrepreneurs grew exponentially to build a theory of action that could provide explanations for institutional changes in fields. This work provides mapping for the field of institutional entrepreneurship. In essence, studies of institutional entrepreneurship focused on the levels of maturity in fields where entrepreneurial acts take place (emerging versus mature fields), who the institutional entrepreneurs are (individuals versus organisations), and their position in the field (insiders versus outsiders).

While research on institutional entrepreneurship has provided valuable insights to address the role of interest and agency in institutional change, it creates a promising tension that opens up avenues for how institutional change occurs in light of processes associated with change and continuity (Garud et al., 2007). The controversy revolves around the ability of actors who are embedded in the institutional context to provide explanations for institutional change and act entrepreneurially. Institutionally embedded actors are not supposed to realise alternative ways of doing things because institutional constraints define their interests and, in the limit, produce their identities (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). This paradox between institutional determinism and agency is often referred to as the 'paradox of embedded agency' (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Garud et al., 2007; Seo and Creed, 2002). Research in this field shows that the determinist orientation does not focus on action, but on the "structural properties of the context within which action unfolds," and on institutional constraints that shape organisational behaviour and provide organisational life with overall control and stability (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009, p. 33). This perspective suggests that actors' environment and the broader cultural and social processes shape organisational action (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). In this view, the acts of institutional entrepreneurs to bring about institutional change are most likely to be context-specific. This is because each institutional environment poses different contextual elements that determine actors' responses to situations they encounter (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

The study of institutional change has received considerable attention from scholars. These scholars have increasingly attended to institutional entrepreneurs as instigators and leaders of change. Consequently, much knowledge has accumulated about how actors promote

changes in mature fields (e.g. Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury, 2002). Scholars have also studied how institutional entrepreneurs instigate changes in emerging fields (e.g. David, Sine and Haveman, 2013; Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004; Purdy and Gray, 2009). Despite this progress, however, most studies of institutional entrepreneurship are based on single, in-depth case studies. These studies tend to focus on the early phases of implementation process without providing a full account of the entrepreneurial process nor explaining which combinations of factors correlate with success or failure in institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy and Maguire, 2018). However, multi-case comparative research that examines the whole process of institutional entrepreneurship in different contexts remains rare (Battilana et al., 2009). Moreover, studies of institutional change in a given field have largely focused on changes initiated by actors inside the field (Maguire and Hardy, 2009), so we know far less about how institutional entrepreneurs located outside the field bring about field-wide change (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). In addition, prior research tended to ignore the viewpoints of actors other than the institutional entrepreneurs. Even when they are not ignored, their views are not taken more seriously (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). From this perspective, for the notion of institutional entrepreneurship to hold, it is necessary to call for more attention and finder-grained analysis that addresses these gaps in understanding.

1.2 Research Objectives and Questions

This research aims to strengthen the theoretical understanding of institutional entrepreneurship and develop a theory of action that provides explanations for how institutionally embedded actors bring about institutional change. To the extent that institutional entrepreneurship involves deviation from prevailing institutionalised arrangements *and* institutionalisation of innovation (Battilana, 2006), it is necessary to examine which combinations of activities constitute institutional entrepreneurship, and explain success in the entrepreneurial efforts. Accordingly, this research was motivated by the following research questions:

1. How do institutional entrepreneurs deviate from existing institutional arrangements?
2. How is innovation institutionalised?
3. What explains the success or failure of institutional entrepreneurs' efforts?

To address these questions, the researcher conducted a multi-case comparative research to examine which combinations of contextual elements lead to specific outcomes – in terms of deviation from institutional determinism, the institutionalisation of innovation, and success or failure of institutional entrepreneurship. The use of strategies by institutional entrepreneurs "depends very much on whether or not an organisational field is forming, stable or in crisis" (Fligstein, 1997, p. 398), and that "actors' environments determine their responses to situations they encounter" (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009, p. 33). Therefore, it is necessary to examine and compare the activities that constitute institutional entrepreneurship in different fields and contexts, considering the different positions actors may occupy in the field. Each case of the two cases studied in this research represents an institutional project that produced institutional change, and each case represents different context and organisational fields. The first case investigates institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields, while the second case examines the entrepreneurial process in mature fields, both of which took place in the State of Kuwait. The institutional entrepreneurs in each case are different regarding the positions they occupy in the field. For example, the first case was led by actors outside the institution in question, whereas actors inside the target institution led the second case. On the methodological approach, the research takes the viewpoints of institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators in both cases because "institutional entrepreneurship evokes a complex political process" (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 95).

The emphasis on comparative research of institutional entrepreneurship within different field contexts helps make a number of contributions to scholarship. First, it contributes to the theoretical understanding of the dynamics of institutional entrepreneurship by providing more contextualised views of the strategies of institutional entrepreneurs in different organisational fields and contexts. Such contextualised views provide a full account of the process of institutional entrepreneurship that considers the enabling conditions of institutional entrepreneurship, deviation from institutional arrangements, and institutionalisation of change in emerging and mature fields. Second, it ascertains in more details a set of critical activities associated with outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields as well as insider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields to bring about field-wide change. Third, it provides an explanation for which combinations of factors determine the success in entrepreneurial efforts in mature and emerging fields.

Fourth, it addresses a call in the literature to “document the actions of institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators” (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 95) and “take the viewpoints of actors other than institutional entrepreneurs more seriously” (Hardy and Maguire, 2018, p. 275). In doing so, the researcher is able to develop a finer-grained analysis that accounts for actions of actors affected by the process of shaping institutions, thereby enhancing the methodological approach to study institutional entrepreneurship. Finally, it introduces the concept of “normalisation”, which is particularly relevant to outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields as the institutional entrepreneurs make a case for their innovation.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

The chapters which follows this introduction are organised as follows:

Chapter two reviews the existing research to explore the theoretical foundations of the notion of institutional entrepreneurship. Prior work shows that institutional entrepreneurship provides considerable promise for understanding how and why actors shape institutions. The research also shows that the introduction of institutional entrepreneurship into institutions creates a promising tension that opens up avenues for how institutional change occurs in light of processes associated with change and stability. The controversy revolves around the ability of institutionally embedded actors to provide explanations for institutional change. The chapter explains that institutional entrepreneurs can be individuals or groups of individuals. Their intervention strategies are likely to take different forms and have different targets in mature and emerging fields due to the contextual challenges each field poses, and thereby shaping the type of change one can expect. It also explains that the entrepreneurial process evokes a complex political process that incorporates highly diverse perspectives, interests, and forces.

Chapter three explains in detail the methodological concepts followed in this research and methods for data collection and analysis employed. To the extent that institutional entrepreneurship is context-specific, the chapter shows that multi-case comparative study is a well-suited research design to study institutional entrepreneurship across different organisational fields and contexts. The chapter shows that the main methods of data collection are interviews and documentation. It contributes to the methodological approach for studying institutional entrepreneurship by taking the viewpoints of institutional

entrepreneurs and their collaborators. In doing so, it develops a finer-grained analysis that accounts for actions of actors affected by the process of shaping institutions, thus offering a vantage point to look at institutional entrepreneurship. The chapter goes on to discuss how the fieldwork was planned and carried out to clarify the research journey involved.

Chapter four studies the process of institutional entrepreneurship in the emerging field of positive psychology initiated by actors outside the established institution in question. Drawing on the case of the institutionalisation of Bareec – the first educational programme for positive psychology – within the Ministry of Education (MoE) in the State of Kuwait, the chapter challenges the dominant view of agency in institutional entrepreneurship. It shifts focus away from centrally positioned actors in an institution to those located outside the institution. It concentrates instead on how actors located outside the established institution of MoE bring about field-wide change. The chapter contributes to the advance of research on institutional entrepreneurship in three regards. First, it explains how outsiders who are less embedded in the institutional taken-for-granted assumptions engage in institutional entrepreneurship and enable actors inside the institution to deviate from the constraining conditions of prevailing institutional arrangements. It introduces the concept of "normalisation", which is particularly relevant to outsider-driven institutional change where institutional entrepreneurs produce claims to make a case for their innovation. It adds that connecting the claims with macro-cultural discourse and broader social values and mobilising allies (particularly insiders) and resources to confer legitimacy and induce implementation by outsiders enable insiders to deviate from institutional arrangements. Second, it contributes to our understanding of how outsiders-institutional entrepreneurs institutionalise their innovation in emerging fields. It shows that they draw on related mature fields and their associated institutions to legitimise their innovation by aligning it with the values and interests of key stakeholders, as well as attaching their innovation to existing arrangements associated with related institutionalised fields. Finally, it also contributes to our understanding of the determinants of success in outsider-driven institutional change. It suggests that the mobilisation of a large number of legitimate insiders behind the change project along with constant support and legitimacy, as well as a good understanding of the contextual forces are the key to success.

Chapter five investigates the process of institutional entrepreneurship in the mature field of business incubation initiated by actors inside the institution. Drawing on the case of the

establishment of the first handicraft business incubator in Kuwait and the Middle East, the chapter usefully challenges the taken-for-granted assumptions about institutional change. It sensitises researchers to the importance of context and *constant* support in fully understanding how institutions are changed. The chapter makes several important contributions. First, it offers detailed explanations for how institutionally embedded actors engage in entrepreneurial efforts and deviate from the prevailing institutional arrangements. It shows that actors' social position, field conditions and individual characteristics enable engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. It adds that novel specification of existing organisational problems and justification of proposed solution as superior to dominant arrangements, as well as mobilising legitimate allies to authorise change enable institutional entrepreneurs to deviate from constraining conditions of institution. Second, it contributes to our understanding of how insiders-institutional entrepreneurs institutionalise their innovation. The chapter shows that actors draw on existing institutional logics and practices to develop new organising methods, and then replace them with the pre-existing ones. It also shows that ongoing legitimisation of the innovation, and resource mobilisation to induce implementation significantly contribute to the innovation being institutionalised. Last, the chapter provides explanations for the determinants of success in the entrepreneurial efforts. It argues that constant support and legitimacy, along with a rich understanding of the contextual constraints and opportunities, paved the way for success.

Chapter six concludes the thesis with a comparison of entrepreneurial processes across the two cases studied. It shows that while institutional entrepreneurship in both cases has one purpose – that is to challenge the prevailing arrangements and institutionalise the innovation –, it takes different forms and has different targets in emerging fields than in mature fields. The chapter demonstrates that outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields requires multiple forces from within and outside the field working for the institutional change. It also shows that the insider-driven entrepreneurial process in mature fields targets field-level forces. It also directs attention to contextual differences in institutional entrepreneurship to explain entrepreneurial success. The chapter then presents the conclusion for the thesis, followed by the directions for future research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

One way to understand the term of institutional entrepreneurship is to review the underlying literature that underpins it – institutions and entrepreneurship. Research on institutions has tended to focus on how organisational process are formed by institutional forces that emphasise reward conformity and continuity (Garud et al., 2007). In contrast, the research on entrepreneurship tends to stress on how institutions and organisational processes are shaped by entrepreneurial activities that bring about change (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002). This chapter reviews the literature on the term institutional entrepreneurship and its underlying research as well as other theoretical streams associated with the notion of institutional entrepreneurship.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses the work on institutions. In the following section, the researcher reviews the research on entrepreneurship. Next, the researcher presents the notion of institutional entrepreneurship and discusses its intervention strategies. The research then discusses the collective dimension of institutional entrepreneurship. The subsequent section explores the location of institutional entrepreneurs and discusses their different positions in the field. Next, the researcher investigates the paradox of embedded agency – the principal obstacle for institutional entrepreneurship. The following section explains the different forms of institutional change one can expect and type of change actors who lead different forms of change. The penultimate section highlights the characteristics of institutional entrepreneurs. Finally, the conclusion section presents the focus of this research.

2.2 Institutions

An organisation's action is shaped by a narrowly defined group of legitimate options identified by the group of individuals composing the organisation's organisational field (Scott, 1991). This form of influence is manifested in institutions, which connotes the presence of binding organisation or authoritative rules (Jepperson, 1991). This perspective suggests that actors within organisations have a constrained ability to make strategic choices (Lawrence, 1999). The central issue has become how organisational environments are formed and transformed through organisational relationships and actions (Lawrence, 1999). Institutional

theory contributed to this discussion by providing explanations of the processes through which organising forms become legitimate and dominant within an organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Central to institutional theory is the way in which organisations adopt procedures, structures, or ideas based on the external definitions of legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

Reviews of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995) differentiate between old and new streams of institutional theory. The old stream of institutional theory (often referred to old institutionalism) accounted for the conflicting values and interests, power and influence in the institutional building at the local community level in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. Selznick, 1949, 1957 cited in Lawrence, 1999; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). In contrast, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the new stream of institutional theory (often referred to neo-institutionalism) focused on the scripts, routines and schemas through which institutions constrain organisational behaviour and structures (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013), and thereby clarified the convergence of organisational practices within the institutional environment (Lawrence, 1999; Lawrence et al., 2009). Both the old and new streams emphasise the relationship between organisations and their surrounding environments, and both view the institutionalisation of new practices as a state-dependent process that limits the options actors are likely to pursue and make organisations less instrumentally rational (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).

The similarities between the old and the new institutionalism evinces much continuity between both streams. Yet, the old stream departs from the newer in significant ways. The old stream was straightforwardly political in its analysis of organisational strategy and group conflict (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). It emphasised the vesting of interests within organisations in response to the political trade-offs and alliances (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). The stress was on the “shadowland of informal interaction” (Selznick, 1949, p. 216) – coalitions, informal structure, competing values, and influence patterns – to demonstrate how the informal structures can diverge from and constrain aspects of formal structure, and to illustrate the “subversion of organisation’s intended, rational mission by parochial interests.” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 13). In their conceptualisation of the environment, old institutionalists maintain that organisations are embedded in local communities, to which inter-organisational treaties tie them, and the multiple loyalties of personnel hammered out in face-to-face interaction (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). They pay attention to the actions

and beliefs of those who have the power to define interests and directions (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).

Neo-institutionalism traces its roots to the old stream of institutional theory yet departs from that tradition significantly. The newer stream emphasised the cultural processes through which institutions constrain organisational activities and structures (Lawrence et al., 2009). This stream draws attention to the normative and cognitive aspects of social action (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Thelen, 2003), and concentrated primarily on explaining organisational homogeneity within organisational field (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009). Within this literature, the institutionalists stressed on the taken-for-granted quality of knowledge and action that maintains stability and makes organisations resistant to change, once their members conform to institutionalised organisational forms (Lawrence et al., 2009). They suggest that organisational forms do not reflect the distribution of power in the society, but they reflect the shared cultural understanding of what is moral or legitimate (Thelen, 2003). They proposed that organisations must become legitimate entities in the eyes of the larger publics to receive the worthy of support required for survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). To do so, they must adopt – at least in appearance – to the institutional norms in the environment in which organisations operate. This is because organisations in the institutional environments are rewarded for conforming to the acceptable practices or structures, not the quality, quantity and efficiency of their output (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009; Meyer, 1982). Therefore, legitimacy is central to the neo-institutional theory as a force that pressures organisations to act alike and constrain change (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009).

The neo-institutionalism came under increasing criticism for its emphasis on continuity and conformity, and the neglect of agency, interest and change in their studies (Battilana, 2006; Garud et al., 2007; Lawrence et al., 2009; Mutch, 2007). DiMaggio (1988) called for clear incorporation of human agency into institutional theory, and the study of how institutional actors pursue their interest, and criticised the institutional research as “frequently laden with metaphysical pathos-specifically, a rhetorical devocalization of interest and agency” (cited in Lawrence et al., 2009). Perrow (1985) points out that institutional authors had gone ‘overboard’ with their emphasis on symbols and myths. Similarly, other scholars have joined the above critics, calling for the injection of human agency into institutions (Beckert, 1999; Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Maguire et al., 2004).

In response to these calls, a body of neo-institutional literature has emerged and emphasised the role that individuals play in institutional change. In doing so, many of them (e.g. DiMaggio, 1988 cited in Beckert, 1999; Fligstein, 1997; Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Maguire et al., 2004) highlighted the notion of institutional entrepreneurship, which emphasises the role of agency and interest in neo-institutional theory (Battilana, 2006), thus reviving a dimension that early neo-institutional studies had de-emphasised (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009). This notion examines institutional actors who attempt to shape institutions (Maguire et al., 2004). The main focus of the research on institutional entrepreneurship has been on the strategies that institutional actors use to change institutional arrangements rather than just following them (Lawrence et al., 2009). While institutional entrepreneurship has been presented as a promising way to address the role of interest and agency in institutional change, it is still a source of controversy among neo-institutional theorists (Battilana, 2006). The controversy revolves around the ability of actors who are embedded in the institutional context to provide explanations for institutional change under the tenet of institutional theory (Battilana, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009).

Institutions are commonly defined as “rules, norms and beliefs that describe reality for the organisation, explaining what is and what is not, what can be acted upon and what cannot.” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 351). As culturally embedded understandings, they specify and justify behaviour and social arrangements (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2004), both formal and informal (Garud et al., 2007). Thus, institutions can be viewed as enabling structures or performance scripts that provide “stable designs for chronically repeated activity sequences”, departures from which are counteracted by sanctions or are costly in some manner (Jepperson, 1991, p. 145). Central to institutions is the taken-for-granted scripts that determine the constitutive expectations of actors (Beckert, 1999; Jepperson, 1991). Jepperson (1991) argues that all institutions are rules or frameworks of programmes establishing identities and activity scripts for such identities. Institutions thus embody “common responses to situations” or “programmed actions” (Jepperson, 1991, p. 147). Institutionalised programmes then create ‘reciprocal expectations of predictability’ or exceptional bonds (Jepperson, 1991). In other words, institutions function mainly by influencing actors’ perspectives about collective activity and the collaborative environment (Scott, 1995). Actors typically have ready access to some historical or functional accounts

of why the practice is there, although they may not actually comprehend institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). They also have an expectation that further clarification is accessible whenever needed. Institutions then effect on expectation and are taken for granted in the sense that they are regarded as “reflective fixtures in social environment and explicated as functional elements of that environment” (Jepperson, 1991, p. 147).

What it seems is that institutional theorists have tended to neglect the issue of human agency. Rather, they hold that organisations, and the actors who populate them, are suspended in a web of norms, values, beliefs, rules, and taken for granted assumptions (Barley and Tolbert, 1997), that are products of institutional actors themselves (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). They provide blueprints for organisations by identifying the procedures and forms an organisation should adopt (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Therefore, institutions set bounds on rationality by constraining the options that individuals and collectives are likely to choose (Barley and Tolbert, 1997).

Organisations operate in an environment of institutions that exert some degree of influence over them (Garud et al., 2007). Institutional environments are characterised by a set of rules to which individual organisations must comply with if they are to receive legitimacy and support (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 1995). In this context, Scott (1995, p. 35) argues that institutions regularise and constrain the behaviour of organisational actors as a result of the regulative aspects of institutions, or what he calls the ‘three pillars of institutions’: the regulative, the normative and the cognitive. The key interest of the framework is to understand the relationship between institutions and individuals through the manifest rules and sanctions, legitimacy and socio-cognitive mechanisms that influence what is taken to be relevant and real (Abdelnour, Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2017). *Regulative* pillar involves establishing rules and regulations that guide organisational perspectives and action through rewards or the threat of legal sanction in an attempt to influence future behaviour (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 1995). Organisations or actors within organisations comply with them for the sake of expedience and not to suffer from the noncompliance penalty (Jepperson, 1991).

The normative pillar of institutions takes the form of a normative framework, rules-of-thumb, norms of acceptability and occupational standards (Garud et al., 2007; Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 1995). Their constraints on social behaviour and organisational action stem from

professionalisation and social obligation (Hoffman, 1999). Actors conform because it is expected from them, not because it serves individual interests; they are obliged to do so (Scott, 1995). More to the point, social action is always based on the social context that determines the suitable means to specific ends; actions acquire its rationality from these social guidelines and rules for behaviour (Scott, 1995). Hence, choices are structured by normative frameworks and socially mediated values (Scott, 1995). Organisations then comply with them out of ethical/moral obligation or in conformance to norms established by professional training institutions and universities (Hoffman, 1999).

The *cognitive* pillar of institutions embodies symbols – words, signs, and gestures – as well as cultural frameworks and rules that constitute the frame through which meaning is developed and, the nature of reality (Garud et al., 2007; Scott, 1995). The cognitive view focuses on the significance of social identities: our understanding of who we are and what means of action makes sense for us in a specific situation (Scott, 1995). And points to the importance of scripts: guidelines for choosing meaningful actions and sensemaking (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 1995). Organisations will then abide by cognitive aspects as they form a conceptually correct and culturally supported basis of legitimacy that becomes unquestioned (Hoffman, 1999). For Scott (2008, p. 222) the three pillars of institutions "depend on different bases of compliance, employ varying mechanisms, evoke differing logics of action, are signalled by different indicators, and offer multiple bases for determining legitimacy".

The view that institutions constrain behaviour has been echoed by Bellah and his colleagues (1991, p. 40), as this quote illustrates:

> *"An institution is a complex whole that guides and sustains individual identity… Institutions form individuals making possible or impossible certain ways of behaving and relating to others. They shape character by assigning responsibility, demanding accountability, and providing the standards in terms of which each person recognizes the excellence of his or her achievements". (cited in Dacin et al., 2002)*

The above view suggests that institutions have failed to adequately address the concept of change (Garud et al., 2007; Hoffman, 1999). Rather, the main emphasis is on how institutions maintain continuity, stability and conformity to institutional arrangements (Garud

et al., 2007). In essence, institutions constrain the means and ends to which organisational behaviour should be directed (Friedland and Alford, 1991). They provide actors with a sense of self and vocabularies of motives. They constitute and constrain actors in a sense that reflects and shapes the preference and the power of units constituting them (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Thus, they "set limits on the very nature of rationality and, by implication, of individuality" (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 251). Routine reproductive procedures and rules support and sustain institutions, furthering its reproduction "unless collective action blocks, or environmental shock disrupts, the reproduction process" (Jepperson, 1991, p. 145).

The qualification ("unless…") suggests that one might witness change using institutional lens. Jepperson (1991) argues that institutions, once established, could change by developing contradictions with other institutions, with their environments, or with elementary social behaviour. He further suggests that these contradictions, or environmental shocks can bring about institutional change by impeding the successful completion of reproductive procedures or by blocking its activation, thus adjusting, or destroying the institution. Similarly, Meyer (1982) suggests that the environmental shocks create disruptive uncertainty for actors, forcing the creation of unorthodox experiments that depart from established practice. To bring about change, actors interpret, give meaning and respond to such contradictions (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). As portrayed by Dacin et al. (2002), changes in dominant norms go through a stage of theorisation and legitimation. In their words, theorisation involves the specification of contradictions and failings of the dominant practices and norms, *and* the justification of new practices and norms within the border cultural and institutional accounts. As this process diffuses throughout the organisation, new practices and norms gain a great degree of legitimacy and, as a result, become institutionalised (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).

Another channel through which change can occur was provided by Powell (1991). He argues that most organisational changes come from outside of institutional channels. The locus of change within organisational fields will originate in the organisational units that are least apt to isomorphic pressure (Powell, 1991). Change and diversity are more likely to come from outside sources or the periphery of organisational fields in the absence of incentives embedded in the dominant institutional arrangements (Powell, 1991). Powell (1991) further suggests that if organisations are becoming more homogenous, and if the individuals who

demand the services provided by organisations are heterogeneous, this results in a limited range of organisational outputs and a growing demand for services that are unmet. This provides an opportunity for entrepreneurs to bring about new organisational forms to fulfil the increasing demand of services.

2.3 Entrepreneurship

The current profusion of entrepreneurship research can be traced to institutional changes that took place between financial organisations and business corporations in the 1980s (Tolbert, David and Sine, 2011). It was the era of 'creative destruction' in which changes in the industrial structure were taking place, new technologies were gaining ground, questions about the efficiency of larger companies were being raised, and attitudes toward small businesses and entrepreneurship were emerging ('small is beautiful' became a catchphrase) (Landström and Benner, 2010). Society and political interests within society changed from big scale structures towards new sources of economic organisation, dynamics and disintegration, explained by factors such as changes in consumer tastes, unemployment, intensified global competition and privatisation (Peters and Waterman, 1982). The proliferation of policy agencies reinforced these societal interests at various levels that supported entrepreneurship. Government labour market policies shifted from employment and industrial subsidies to the exploration of new market opportunities and firm formation (Landström, 2014). Regional policies incrementally moved from industrial location to the creation of new firms and network building (Landström and Benner, 2010).

A huge array of scholars with an emergent interest in small business and entrepreneurship began to conduct studies on this new phenomenon. Those researchers from different fields of studies, mainly from management studies, relied on theories and concepts anchored in their home field of research to research entrepreneurship (Landström and Benner, 2010). This is due to the newness of entrepreneurship as a field of research, and the lack of identity in terms of theories, concepts, and methods. As a consequence, entrepreneurship research became highly fragmented and diversified (Landström and Benner, 2010). This line of observation resonates with William Gartner, who is developing thoughts and ideas about entrepreneurship research. He conceptualises entrepreneurship as 'organising emergence' (Gartner, 2014). By 'organising emergence', he suggests "a commonality in phenomena (both theorized and studied) that involve situations where something develops from one

state to another and that within that development there is a process in which the phenomena become more organized." (Gartner, 2014, p. 4). As an 'organising emergence', entrepreneurship can be theorised and studied from a wide range of disciplines, which in turn can add value to the concept of entrepreneurship (Fayolle, 2014).

The definition of entrepreneurship has been the largest obstacle to create a conceptual framework for the entrepreneurship field (Venkataraman, 1997). Different researchers have identified various attributes and themes associated with entrepreneurship and entrepreneur (Gartner, 1990; Hébert and Link, 1989). Yet, there has not been a consensus on defining the term 'entrepreneurship'. Rather, the discussion on entrepreneurship tended to shift research interests between various ways to approach the concept (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Spencer, Kirchhoff and White, 2008). Some researchers have defined the term in light of who the entrepreneurs are and what they do (Bolton and Thompson, 2003; Venkataraman, 1997), while others focus on the creation of opportunities and innovation (Baumol, 1968; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Schumpeter, 1934, cited in Spencer et al., 2008). More recently, Venkataraman (1997) notes that entrepreneurship includes the nexus of two phenomena: the presence of enterprising individuals, and the presence of lucrative opportunities. Thus, the field includes the study of the group of individuals who discover and exploit opportunities, and the study of sources of opportunities (Sarason, Dean and Dillard, 2006; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Below are different definitions of entrepreneurship according to the way various scholars approach the term.

Entrepreneurship as:

> An activity: *"the process of (1) identifying an invention worthy of commercialization; (2) converting the invention into a salable product/service; (3) creating or finding a small firm to sell the product/service; (4) obtaining the resources to operate the firm and sell the product/service; and, (5) successfully operating the firm and generating product/service sales so as to achieve firm survival and growth."* (Kirchhoff, 1994, p. 62)
>
> Attitudes: "*the manifest ability and willingness of individuals, on their own, in teams, within and outside existing organizations, to perceive and create new economic opportunities (new products, new production methods, new organizational schemes and new product market combinations) and to introduce*

their ideas in the market, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles, by making decisions on location, form and the use of resources and institutions". (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999, pp. 46-7)

Conjuncture**:** *"study of sources of opportunities; the processes of discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities; and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate, and exploit them."* (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, p. 218)

An innovation: "*managerial process for creating and managing innovation".* (Drucker, 2014, p. xiii)

The distinctions among researchers in defining the concept of entrepreneurship affect the way to approach entrepreneurship research. For example, Schumpeter (1934) defined entrepreneurs in the light of *personality traits* that make one individual to act more entrepreneurially than others. He regarded entrepreneurs as individuals who own special skills and traits, and who instigate significant market changes using the newest technology, which result in creative destruction (cited in Lányi, 2016). On the other hand, Bolton and Thompson (2003) and Drucker (2014) define entrepreneurs according to their behaviour and what they do. An entrepreneur in the words of Bolton and Thompson (2003, p. 49) is "*a* person who habitually creates and innovates to build something of recognised value around perceived opportunities." Based on their definition, they emphasise on what entrepreneurs do, focusing on the habitual behaviour that makes entrepreneurs the way they are.

In addition, research conducted by Duckworth et al. (2007) describe entrepreneurs as having the notion of *grit,* which refers to an individual who has a passion for a particular goal with an unswerving dedication to achieve the goal, regardless of the obstacles and time it takes to do so. The notion of *grit,* which combines determination and perseverance, is reflected in the discussion about entrepreneurship research and *motivation* (Cummings, 2015). For instance, Pink (2009) argues that if people are motivated from within (intrinsic factors), they perform at their peak level. He shows that intrinsic motivation results in more creative outcomes over the long term because intrinsically motivated people have more grit and are more persistent. He identifies three intrinsic factors that improve individual's performance: 'mastery: the desire to make progress and get better at something that matters; purpose: the desire to make a contribution in the service of something larger than

ourselves; and autonomy: the desire to direct our own lives' (Faustino and Booth, 2014, p. 21).

Intrinsic motivation is also presented to be important in 'Self Determination Theory' (Rao, 2014, p. 4). It suggests that individuals have a great sense of belonging, naturally want to increase their competence, and feel in control of what they aim for and how they act (Rao, 2014). Peters and Waterman (1982, p. 80) present the findings of a study of self-determination in the field of psychology; they state, "if people think they have even modest personal control over their destinies, they will persist at tasks. They will do better at them. They will become more committed to them." Moreover, this theory suggests that extrinsic awards (e.g. money) may inhibit the intrinsic motivations if intrinsic motivational factors exist. Praise, on the other hand, may increase people's intrinsic motivation and makes them feel more capable (Rao, 2014). A similar conceptualisation of intrinsic motivation is shown in Expectancy Theory, which illustrates motivation in terms of 'expectancy, instrumentality, and valence' (Rao, 2014, p. 4). The premise of this theory suggests that people' motivation depends on their feeling that a specific efforts leads to expected performance (expectancy), the belief that this performance will lead to certain outcome or reward (instrumentality), and the extent to which this outcome is something individuals want (valence) (Rao, 2014, p. 4).

While entrepreneurs' motivation shapes the way they behave, the environment of their institutions is also an influential factor. This notion is supported by Battilana's work (2006) on the conditions that enable entrepreneurs to act entrepreneurially from an individual level of analysis. She argues that individuals' social position embedded in a given organisational field and their organisations influences them to act as entrepreneurs who conduct divergent organisational change despite institutional pressure. This line of observation resonates with Bourdieu (1994, p. 28) who argues that individuals' social position influences their perception and point of view about the field, the stands they take to transform the field or maintain the status quo, and their access to resources (cited in Battilana, 2006). Inter-organisational mobility may, therefore, influence the willingness and ability of individuals to change existing organisational practices. Individuals with high inter-organisational mobility have experienced different organisational contexts and arrangements, and therefore are less likely to take-for-granted the existing organisational logic(s), but to initiate institutional change (Battilana, 2006).

An individual's motivation and personality traits may determine that they are more inclined to work entrepreneurially, but entrepreneurs do not work in isolation. Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright (2011) note that entrepreneurship is being regarded as a *collective activity*, where it sheds light on the relationship between actors that enable change to occur. In essence, the term 'entrepreneur' is used to regard the actors within institutions who have "the ability to motivate the cooperation of other actors by providing them with common meanings and identities" (Fligstein, 1997, p. 397). This understanding of entrepreneurs suggests that entrepreneurs are "active arbitrageurs that intervene to find common solutions to collective problems." (Pacheco et al., 2010, p. 989). Also, they work in collaboration with other actors, relying on collective action and taking advantage of convergent interests (Zucker, 1988, cited in Pacheco et al., 2010).

In a similar vein, Dubini and Aldrich (1991) argue that networking is a fundamental part of entrepreneurial behaviour. The core assumption behind the networking perspective is that entrepreneurs do not possess all the resources required for their entrepreneurial act. Rather, they combine and exchange their resources for mutual benefits (Hadjikhani, Lee and Ghauri, 2008; Prashantham and Young, 2011). This allows the entrepreneurs to discover some hidden opportunities and explore areas of grey concerns within the context of collaboration, which would not be possible without network integration (Cho and Kim, 2017; Thornton, Henneberg and Naudé, 2014). Furthermore, entrepreneurs linked by strong ties are likely to share information and contacts, so it facilitates the generation of fresh perspectives and new information to exploit and create opportunities for growth and development (Chell and Baines, 2000). Dubini and Aldrich (1991, p. 305) explain:

> *"mobilizing resources to pursue opportunities requires entrepreneurial contacts, knowledge and confidence. Mobilizing resources also involves asking others to raise money, labor and effort for a venture with an uncertain future. Entrepreneurship is thus inherently a networking activity."*

Another way to approach entrepreneurship is through *innovation*. Drucker (2014, p. xiii) defines entrepreneurship as a "process for creating and managing innovation." As the definition highlights, innovation and creativity are distinctive marks of entrepreneurship. Bolton and Thompson (2003, p. 214) explain that creativity is a continuous activity where the entrepreneurs are always seeking new ways of doing things. They further highlight that

creativity is combined with the ability to innovate; taking an idea to the end and not being satisfied until it is implemented, which is a central motivation for entrepreneurs. In the same context, Peters and Waterman (1982, p. 206) cited Harvard's Theodore Levitt, who states that "Creativity is thinking up new things. Innovation is doing new thing. . . . Ideas are useless unless used. The proof of their value is only in their implementation. Until then, they are in limbo". In a similar vein, Czarniawska-Joerges and Wolff (1991) suggest that entrepreneurship largely fits contexts that are new and cannot be dealt with by means of routine and experience. They further point out that entrepreneurs in such situations work against social structure by acting as if the prevailing structure did not exist.

The above approach for entrepreneurship regards innovation as a specific instrument of entrepreneurs where it "endows resources with a new capacity to create wealth" and disturb the status quo (Drucker, 2014, p. 36). This recalls Schumpeter's notion of 'creative destruction' who defines entrepreneurship as an innovation (Schumpeter, 1934, cited in Spencer et al., 2008). He presents innovation as an evolutionary process where entrepreneurs occasionally and creatively destruct the existing social order and break with the familiar knowledge or ways of operating to bring about revolutionary change (Lassen and Nielsen, 2009; Nightingale, 2015). When these changes become routinised over time, a new status quo is created. This routinisation then is deemed as an opportunity for new entrepreneurs to start a new cycle of innovation (Nightingale, 2015). Innovation is thus seen as activities and behaviour, dependent on the destruction of existing frames of action and thoughts, which leads to the creation of new logics, and hence breaks with the existing (Lassen and Nielsen, 2009).

While innovation is seen as 'windows of opportunity' (Drucker, 2014, p. xiii), we must have first entrepreneurial opportunities to have entrepreneurship (Sarason et al., 2006; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Entrepreneurial opportunities are those situations that involve the discovery of new means-ends relationships (Kirzner, 1997), in which new organising methods, goods and services can be introduced and sold at better than their cost of productions (Casson, 1982). In this respect, Sarason et al. (2006) argue that sources of those opportunities provide context for creating entrepreneurial ventures. In essence, the act of entrepreneurship takes place as an entrepreneur specifies and acts upon the sources of opportunity (Sarason et al., 2006; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Sarason et al. (2006) viewed this dynamic process of interaction between the entrepreneurship and entrepreneur

as a duality, where entrepreneurs both create and are created by the entrepreneurial process. The mechanism of this co-creation includes the recursive interaction between opportunity and entrepreneur over time and can also be viewed as a continuously evolving cycle of entrepreneur/opportunity inter-dependence (Sarason et al., 2006).

Entrepreneurial opportunities exist primarily because there are asymmetries of beliefs and information (Bolton and Thompson, 2003; Sarason et al., 2006; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). People in the society have different beliefs on the relative value of resources, so they tend to make conjectures about the possibility of creating new certain markets in the future, and that given resources are not put to its best use (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). More to the point, Sarason et al. (2006) argue that multiple entrepreneurs do not pursue the same opportunity because every individual has a unique perspective which causes the entrepreneurs to create unique ventures around their idiosyncratic interpretation and view their opportunity idiosyncratically. Thus, entrepreneurship requires that individuals hold different information and beliefs about opportunities because the entrepreneurial process involves different resources that have to be brought together to create a new state (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). To gain control over these resources in a way that makes the opportunity lucrative, the conjectures of entrepreneurs on the accuracy of resources value must be different from other potential entrepreneurs and resource owners (Casson, 1982).

Since asymmetry of information and beliefs is a precondition for entrepreneurial opportunities, the exploitation of these opportunities is dependent on the individual differences among entrepreneurs (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Spencer et al., 2008). Not all individual entrepreneurs will exploit opportunities and use resources with the same expected value. Their decision to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities relies on the opportunity cost which includes identifying entrepreneurial profit of an opportunity against the cost, and the cost to obtain the profit in other alternative ways (Reynolds, 1987). For example, Evans and Leighton (1989) showed that when individuals have greater financial capital, their exploitation of opportunities is more common. Moreover, Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1989) found that when entrepreneurs develop useful information from their previous experience for entrepreneurship, they are more likely to exploit opportunities as, presumably, this information reduces opportunity cost. Other individual differences may affect the entrepreneurs' willingness for opportunity exploitation. Chen, Greene and Crick (1998) argue that individuals with a more internal locus of control and greater self-efficacy

are more likely to exploit opportunities, as the decision of opportunity exploitation requires individuals to act in the face of scepticism of others. Similarly, opportunity exploitation is a setting where individuals can achieve, which provide a valuable cue for people who possess a high need for achievement (McClelland, 1967). Consequently, entrepreneurs with a high need for achievement may be more likely than others to exploit opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).

2.4 Institutional Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurs often take a reflective position towards dominant practices to create a product or services and can envision alternative approaches to getting things done (Beckert, 1999). They may work (or collaborate) to destroy established taken-for-granted rules, if they perceive such action to be profitable, to create a new state that helps to promote their field or organisation (Beckert, 1999; Bruton, Ahlstrom and Li, 2010). Recently, studies of entrepreneurship attempt to explore the influence of entrepreneurs on institutional change by bridging entrepreneurship and institutional theory, bringing about new organisational forms (Kalantaridis and Fletcher, 2012; Tolbert et al., 2011). Composed of networks of organisations and institutions that together establish a recognisable area of life (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, cited in Maguire et al., 2004), an organisational field develops through "patterns of social action that produce, reproduce, and transform the institutions and networks that constitute it" (Maguire et al., 2004, p. 659). Groups of organisations develop common practices and understandings through repeated interactions, and entrepreneurs may have to play the role of institutional entrepreneurs to form the institutions that define the field (Bruton et al., 2010).

Research on institutional fields suggests that fields vary in their level of maturity (David et al., 2013; Dorado, 2005; Fligstein, 1997). Mature or established fields have collectively agreed upon norms, rules and practices to which their members adhere (Purdy and Gray, 2009). Relationships and roles are relatively stable, coalitions and power relations are sharply defined, and participants perceive that they are involved in a common enterprise (David et al., 2013) with some actors exercising influence over norms governing legitimate behaviour (Maguire et al., 2004; Purdy and Gray, 2009). The situation is rather different when a field is emerging (Fligstein, 1997). Research on emerging fields suggest that organisational practices and norms have yet to develop, and no dominant logic has emerged

(Purdy and Gray, 2009). Relationships and roles are neither clearly defined nor stable, coalitions and power relations have not jelled, and participants seldom recognise that they have mutual interests (David et al., 2013; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), with no established structure of domination for actors (Fligstein, 1997; Purdy and Gray, 2009).

The concept of institutional entrepreneurship has emerged to provide a lens to explain how new institutions arise (Maguire et al., 2004). It focuses attention on the struggles that take place over stakes, resources and access within organisational field, and the manner in which actors shape their institutional context (Beckert, 1999; Maguire et al., 2004). Thus, institutional entrepreneurship refers to the "activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones" (Maguire et al., 2004, p. 657). This term is most closely associated with DiMaggio (1988, p. 14) who states that "new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly" (cited in Garud et al., 2007, p. 957). These actors, institutional entrepreneurs, form a new system of meaning that links the functioning of a distinct set of institutions together (Garud et al., 2002). They can be individuals (Maguire et al., 2004; Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis, 2011), groups of individuals (Buhr, 2012; Dorado, 2013; Maguire et al., 2004), or organisations or groups of organisations (Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002).

Institutional entrepreneurs hardly refer to themselves by that name, but they are unwitting actors who are frustrated with dominant institutional logics and structures and start to challenge them implicitly, often trough illegal and informal means (Droege and Marvel, 2010). To qualify as institutional entrepreneurs, actors must break with existing practices and rules associated with the existing institutional logic(s) *and* institutionalise the alternative practices, logics and rules they are championing (Battilana, 2006). When challenging dominant institutional structures is successful, it brings more institutional entrepreneurs into the fold since the genesis of change starts to unfold, hence further challenging institutional inconsistencies (Droege and Marvel, 2010).

Institutional entrepreneurship requires actors to break with dominant practices, present new ones, and then ensure that these become taken-for-granted and widely adopted by other actors in the field (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). How do institutional entrepreneurs succeed

in their efforts to bring about change? A large portion of the literature focuses on this question by identifying the strategic intervention made by institutional entrepreneurs to make change. In an attempt to provide an insight into how institutional entrepreneurs bring about change, this research synthesises this diverse work into two broad themes: discursive strategies and resource mobilisation.

2.4.1 Discursive Strategies

Discursive or rhetorical strategies represent themselves as a crucial strategic intervention that institutional entrepreneurs use to bring about change (Leca, Battilana and Boxenbaum, 2008; Seo and Creed, 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Discursive strategies refer to the deliberate use of persuasive language to manipulate the meaning systems that underpin institutions (Maguire and Hardy, 2006; Phillips et al., 2004; Whittle, Suhomlinova and Mueller, 2010). The focus is on the role of language to legitimate or resist an innovation by building congruence or incongruence among existing institutional logics and broader templates of institutional change (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Such rhetorical strategies involve two elements:

The first is the *specification* of existing organisational contradictions (Leca et al., 2008). It includes the use of institutional vocabularies, or the use of referential texts and identifying words to expose the contradictions in institutional logics embedded in the dominant institutional arrangements (Leca et al., 2008; Maguire and Hardy, 2006; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). In this context, Seo and Creed (2002) suggest that institutional contradictions – inconsistencies and ruptures both among and within the present social arrangements – represent a key driving force of institutional change. They further highlight that ongoing social construction generates complex contradictions that create tensions and conflicts within and across social systems. Actors sensitive to contradictions embedded in the dominant institutional logics skilfully interpret and exploit them to displace or affirm the dominant logic (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Similarly, Rao, Monin and Durand (2003, p. 802) state “Logics are mutable to the extent that they value autonomy or rely on ambiguous language that can be appropriated. …Institutional logics also sow the seeds for change to the extent that they embody contradictions.”

In addition, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) maintain that rules are not unequivocal. They further explain that rules embody ambiguity which opens up avenues for creativity;

organisation actors then exploit their inherent openness to make new precedents for action that can change the way power and authority is allocated within institutions. These contradictions and ambiguity become the means to contest the legitimacy of new organisational form and make comprehensible the need for change (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Consequently, insurgent logics may arise from institutional contradictions and ambiguities or as a result of exogenous shifts that reshape the dominant arrangements and allow the ascendance of new logics (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).

Seo and Creed (2002) suggest different sources of contradictions. One source is the inefficiency resulted from the conformity to institutional arrangements. Institutional rules, which tend to be general and categorical, are apt to conflict with efficiency logic (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Meyer and Rowan (1991) explained that institutional rules are expressed at high levels of generalisation, while technical activities vary with unstandardised, specific, and possibly unique conditions, and entail customised and diverse solutions. This creates inconsistencies in institutionalised organisations, which make a concern for efficiency and tight control and coordination problematic (Meyer and Rowan, 1991). In the same vein, Seo and Creed (2002) maintain that the conformity of organisations to institutional arrangements increases varied rewards such as resources and reputation at the expense of efficiency. Similarly, Powell (2012, p. 190) states that "organizations adopt structures and practices that are in some respects suboptimal in order to gain needed resources." Even if organisations make decisions that improve technical efficiency in the short term, these decisions can easily become suboptimal, if organisations do not continually pursue and adopt new optimal solutions (Seo and Creed, 2002).

Interinstitutional incompatibility is another possible source for institutional contradictions (Seo and Creed, 2002). Meyer and Rowan (1977) point out that organisations are rooted in pluralistic institutional environments filled with inconsistent prescriptions for action. In the search for legitimacy, organisations incorporate all kinds of incompatible structural elements, procedures and practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Seo and Creed, 2002). Thus, organisations and individuals are increasingly exposed to various and contradictory institutional prescriptions and arrangements. Conformity to the taken-for-granted behavioural expectations and institutional arrangements may create inconsistencies, and therefore, incompatibilities with behavioural expectations of institutional arrangements at various levels or in different sectors of society (Seo and Creed, 2002).

In addition, Benson (1977) suggests that the current institutional arrangements are likely to reflect the goals and ideas of the more powerful political actors, while structures and practices often last through the active efforts of those who benefit from the status quo. In other words, the formation of institutional arrangements is a political process involving multiple actors who have various interests and unequal power. This formation and reproduction are unlikely to satisfy the various interests of all actors, especially the interest of the less powerful (Seo and Creed, 2002). Specifically, actors whose interests and ideas are not sufficiently served by the dominant social arrangements are viewed as potential institutional challengers who take action to change the present order (Buhr, 2012; Seo and Creed, 2002).

A second element of rhetorical strategies is the *justification* of the proposed change project as superior to the dominant arrangement (Leca et al., 2008). It involves actors de-legitimating the dominant institutional logics and legitimating the proposed change project at hand (Leca et al., 2008; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). In the early phase of an innovation, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) argue that legitimacy is based on comprehensibility, or the extent to which aspects of the innovation connect with existing institutional logics. In their sake to justify or defend changes in institutional logics, institutional entrepreneurs must make their innovation in a way consistent with broader cultural and myths accounts (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). To theorise change, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) stress on the importance of language to manipulate the degree of uncertainty within an innovation. They further suggest that using language to ameliorate contradictions by connecting selected aspects of contradictory meanings to broader myths and cultural templates, the *justification* process makes new forms comprehensible by naturalising some contradictory meanings and suppressing others.

While institutional entrepreneurs develop and deploy alternatives practices and logics that can overcome the limits of the existing arrangements, they are unlikely to develop totally new logics (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Clemens and Cook (1999) argue that no institution is created completely anew, but are created and transformed within socially accepted models or frames, because the entirely new frames make it costly and difficult to gain support and acceptance among varied institutional actors. As Maguire et al. (2004, p. 658) put it, “Key to their success is the way in which institutional entrepreneurs connect their change projects to the activities and interests of other actors in a field, crafting their project

to fit the conditions of the field itself." Novel ideas and actions cannot register because of the absence of established logics (Hardy and Maguire, 2008) to describe them (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001).

To be accepted, entrepreneurs must present their value and meaning of their innovation within the existing set of understandings, norms and practices that constitute the institutional environment (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). However, justification of innovation is rather different in emerging fields. It is not possible to demonstrate consistency between the innovation and field's norms and other cultural elements because those are not yet developed (David et al., 2013; Maguire et al., 2004). Instead, institutional entrepreneurs in emerging fields make salient inconsistencies with broader social values and propose solutions that "invoke cultural elements external to their field." (David et al., 2013, p. 366). In doing so, they draw on a related set of institutions that are affected by the new field (Purdy and Gray, 2009) which often provide important raw material from which actors can produce their innovation (Lawrence and Phillips, 2004). Consequently, they must maintain a "stable set of agreements" in ways that meet the interests of key actors within the affected institutions (Fligstein, 1997, p. 401). Thus, institutional entrepreneurs are likely to embrace a frame that is consistent within the broader institutional context; a frame that creates a significant departure from the past while adequately resonates with some present societal beliefs (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). In combination, *specification* makes comprehensible the need for change, while *justification* makes change itself comprehensible

2.4.2 Resource Mobilisation

Central to the notion of institutional entrepreneurship is resources mobilisation since DiMaggio's (1988, p. 14) definition stressed on the necessity of 'sufficient resources' to change or create institutions (cited in Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Resources such as financial, political, discursive and material resources (Hardy and Maguire, 2008) are essential for actors who question the existing institutions to bypass the sanctions likely to be imposed on them (Leca et al., 2008) and buffer the risks involved in not following the existing norms (Dorado, 2005).

Hardy and Maguire (2008) suggest that institutional entrepreneurship often involves a degree of dependence on other institutional actors and the resource they control to make negotiating and bargaining inventible. This point of view resonates with Colomy (1998) who

highlights that institutional entrepreneurs adopt strategies that operate through exchange mechanisms: supporting change project is subject to the perception that benefits, either tangible or/and intangible, are forthcoming to other actors. Thus, institutional entrepreneurs mobilise resources to be used as a lever against other actors – allies, subsidiary actors, and external constituencies – in order to negotiate support for the change project at hand (DiMaggio, 1988 cited in Hardy and Maguire, 2008). In addition, the formal authority of actors can be harnessed as a resource to bring about change (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Battilana (2006) shows that individuals' position in the organisational hierarchy and their social position may be a key resource for institutional entrepreneurs as it relates actors to the structural context in which they are embedded. She further highlights that actors who occupy higher positions in the organisational hierarchy are more able to conduct organisational change, as they are more likely to have access to resources, and rely on the authority connected with their position to impose change.

The stress on the importance of mobilisation recalls Dorado's approach to resource mobilisation. Dorado (2005) identified three processes of resource mobilisation: leveraging, accumulating, and convening. Leveraging involves actors defining a project and garnering support for their project, and gaining acceptance from the powerful individuals and organisations in the organisational field affected (DiMaggio, 1988 cited in Dorado, 2005). The key forces behind this process are the politically skilled actors and their talents at convincing others of the need for change (Dorado, 2005). Accumulating does not involve a key role player, but a web of independent actions and interactions of multiple actors (Andrews, 2013; Dorado, 2005). These interactions accumulate probabilistically and, as a result, make a new design that is then diffused and replicated (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Convening, as explained by Dorado (2005, p. 390), requires the creation of inter-organisational arrangements that bring different actors, their functional strengths, and resources together to "jumpstart processes of change".

The discussion on discursive strategies and resource mobilisation has explained the actions done by institutional entrepreneurs themselves, who act strategically to bring about change. In reality, those agents do not work in isolation; they act in concert with other institutional supporters and challengers (Battilana et al., 2009). The next section discusses the collective dimension of institutional entrepreneurship.

2.5 The Collective Dimension of Institutional Entrepreneurship

Recent studies of institutional entrepreneurship have begun to account for a collective dimension of institutional entrepreneurship (Dorado, 2013; Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007). These studies point out that institutional entrepreneurship might be a collective phenomenon that involves various actors with access to varying levels and kinds of resources (Battilana et al., 2009). Given that institutional entrepreneurship involves changing deeply embedded values, norms and practices, it is not surprising that a single individual or groups of individuals are involved in the process (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). In situations where groups of actors are concerned about a common issue, the only possibility of achieving change is by developing collaborative solutions (Hardy and Phillips, 1998). The success of different agents in their change initiatives depends significantly on the coalitions they deliberately forge or emerge unpredictably during the distributional struggle (Hall, 2010; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2004).

As Mutch (2007, p. 1137) puts it, “the actual spread and diffusion of institutional change depends not on the original actions of the agent for change, but on their enrolment in a wider network, work that might be carried out by other actors building on the possibilities now indicated by the original actor.” This is because institutional changes are complex social processes that incorporate highly diverse perspectives interests (Wijen and Ansari, 2007). This kind of change results from spatially dispersed, heterogeneous activities by a broad group of actors with diverse resources and on the basis of mutual interests (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Wijen and Ansari, 2007), and is beyond the capacity of individual institutional entrepreneurs (Wijen and Ansari, 2007).

Similarly, Dorado (2013) argues that institutional entrepreneurship is not an individual-bounded endeavour at the hands of dispersed individuals, but a group-bounded behaviour at the hands of individuals inhabiting groups. The rationale is that engagement in institutional entrepreneurship requires resources, opportunity and motivation, and these elements can exist at the group level (Dorado, 2013). For instance, in her study of the emergence of commercial microfinance in Bolivia, Dorado (2013) shows that two groups of individuals, with their institutional entrepreneurial efforts, launched commercial microfinance organisations (BancoSol-NGO and BancSol, and Los Andes) that provide financial services to the poor, and their actions paved the way for others to start new commercial microfinance

organisations. She also shows that the launching of both organisations was enabled by the know-how and access to local and international sources of financing and networks that the various group members collectively possessed.

Achieving change in such domain requires inducing cooperation among unsure, unaware or sceptical actors in the absence of hierarchy (Wijen and Ansari, 2007). 'Collective institutional entrepreneurship' (Möllering, 2007) is a way to induce such cooperation, which refers to the "processes of overcoming collective inaction and achieving sustained collaboration among dispersed actors" to bring about institutional change (Wijen and Ansari, 2007, p. 1079). Achieving collaboration under complex conditions entails overcoming the collective action problems (Abdelnour et al., 2017; Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007). In collective environments, individual interests may work against cooperation, and actors may want to free-ride on the contributions of others or action can get held up when actors are waiting for others to take the leadership (Hardy and Phillips, 1998; Wijen and Ansari, 2007).

To overcome the problem of collective inaction, Wijen and Ansari (2007) identify some drivers of collective institutional entrepreneurship. They suggest that the concentration of power by skilfully reconfiguring power in a specific domain can reduce the differences in opinions and underpin collective institutional entrepreneurship. This is because the differences in power among participants can hinder the formation of collaborative relationships (Hardy and Phillips, 1998). Wijen and Ansari (2007) further suggest that creating a common ground by setting an agenda that other actors believe to be in their own interests and promoting overriding values that all actors accept can pave the way for collaboration. Moreover, enrolling a large number of like-minded actors to generate diffusion processes for the collective action at stake and building alliances are essential drivers for collaboration (Hardy and Phillips, 1998). Wijen and Ansari (2007) also stress on the importance of invoking ethical factors such as fairness and equity in motivating other actors to cooperate and employing particular instruments such as information transfer to implement collective agreements.

A more distributed notion of institutional entrepreneurship starts to appear by giving other actors equal billing. Said alternatively, a complete notion of institutional entrepreneurship would not attend only to the group of actors that explain a particular change, but also to their relations to the broader meaning systems and identities (Wijen and Ansari, 2007). This

recalls the notion of distributed agents who have to implement change project (Andrews, 2013; Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, 2013). Distributed agency allows for the involvement of every member of an organisation to construct, maintain and dismantle institutions (Andrews, 2013; Muamar, 2016; Whittle, Suhomlinova and Mueller, 2011). As further emphasised by Whittle et al. (2011, p. 551), it implies the "interaction and conjoint of multiple actors" who enact and turn institutional change into a taken-for-granted element of organisational reality.

To facilitate the dynamic interaction and allow broad engagement between institutional entrepreneurs, Andrews (2013) stresses on the importance of agents who mobilise others. These are identified as mobilisers, facilitators, connectors, motivators, and are considered pivotal players in any change process (Andrews, 2013, p. 193). These agents can be individuals or organisations whose roles generate transitions from one state to another. Different agents have different capabilities, social positions, and functions roles. Some provide power or resources, whereas others act as bridgers or connectors. Some act as 'carriers' of reforms ideas, who also play the role of translator by deconstructing reforms ideas to help other agents in fitting the idea in its context (Andrews, 2013, p. 183). The argument here is that change results from their connections, not from isolated capabilities; change is more likely to happen when at least two agents bring together the ideas and power (authority) to make change (Andrews, 2013).

The stress on the significant amount of collaboration, relationship building, and mobilisation in institutional entrepreneurship (Hardy and Maguire, 2008) points out that institutional entrepreneurs do not need to be heroes, with enough resources and superhuman foresight to spark institutional change (Dorado, 2013). In fact, this is in line with DiMaggio's (1988) definition that referred to the activities of organised actors. Based on this view, institutional entrepreneurs do not work in isolation, but in the context of other social groups (Dorado, 2013). Institutional processes are then shaped by a collective of institutional entrepreneurs who despite their divergent interests (Wijen and Ansari, 2007) may join together to create a shared meaning system (Buhr, 2012).

Research on the collective dimensions of institutional entrepreneurship has also shown that actors act in either a coordinated or uncoordinated way (Battilana et al., 2009). For example, in their study of the institutional effects of coordination of an Non-Governmental Organisation

(NGO) in the State of Palestine, Lawrence, Hardy and Phillips (2002) show that inter-organisational collaboration can act as a source of institutional change, especially when the collaborating partners are deeply embedded within the organisational field and highly involved in the project. Thus, having the potential for organisations to work together to overcome resource and size limitations and start to shape their institutional field (Lawrence et al., 2002).

Efforts of collective institutional entrepreneurs can also be uncoordinated (Battilana et al., 2009). This is consistent with Lounsbury and Crumley (2007, p. 993) who note that institutional change results from "spatially dispersed, heterogeneous activity by actors with varying kinds and levels of resources". Dorado (2005, p. 400) labelled such institutional change as "institutional partaking", in which change results from autonomous and uncoordinated actions of countless actors that accumulate and converge over time. In such situations, partakers act as a collective and no single actor or organisation can be specified as responsible for the change (Dorado, 2005). In this way, institutional change might be brought by unintended actions of ordinary actors who break with the prevailing embedded practices without being aware of doing so. However, because the institutionalisation process often remains political, particular practices may not be institutionalised without the intervention of actors who act collectively in a coordinated and strategic manner (Battilana et al., 2009).

The conceptualisation of institutional entrepreneurship as a collective activity not only adds diversity to our knowledge of different actors involved in the institutional change process, and the degree of interdependence between them. It also suggests that institutional change is a multilevel process entailing different activities at each level, which play different but complementary role in bringing change (Heinze, Soderstrom and Heinze, 2016; Tracey et al., 2011). This is clearly evident in Tracey et al. (2011)'s study of the creation of new organisational form for a social enterprise that combines the for-profit and non-profit logics. Despite the fact that the enterprise was ultimately unsuccessful, they showed that the change process involved three kinds of activities at three different levels. At the individual level, institutional entrepreneurs articulated the problem in a novel way that resonated with the interests of other actors and developed a solution to the new articulated problem. At the field level, they drew on the existing logics and their associated practices to build new organisational template to address the articulated problem, and then justify the template to

the key organisation stakeholders. At the societal levels, they connected with the appropriate discourses in the society and aligned themselves with highly legitimate actors in the field, thereby augmenting the legitimacy of their activities (Tracey et al., 2011).

In a similar context, Heinze et al. (2016) provide another insight into the agentic actors in the change process. They developed the concept of “linking organizations” as key actors that connect the broader field and societal levels in institutional change (p. 1141). Unlike institutional entrepreneurs who are regarded as leaders of institutional change at the field level (Leca et al., 2008), linking organisations play a more facilitative and localised role. They embed and adapt new practices and understandings locally, and thus shape local organisations’ responses to institutional demands (Heinze et al., 2016). As local actors who have legitimacy among citizens, linking organisations connect actors within the community around a set of practices or idea, and interface between the community and field levels.

In this process, linking organisations must accommodate and consider local needs, interests, and power to ensure acceptance and success of change efforts (Binder, 2007), while adapting field-level models to local needs (Heinze et al., 2016). In their study of a community foundation, as a linking organisation, that promotes wellness in the United States, Heinze et al. (2016) showed that a community foundation played a key role in the institutional change process by enacting change locally through community coalitions. In particular, the linking organisation interpreted the main tenets of a new wellness approach, defined them locally around relevant aims, and regulated local organisations’ adherence to ensure legitimacy with the field. The foundation also enabled the community to fill in the locally defined wellness approach with practices that meet their needs, by negotiating and engaging with the community and helping manage ambiguity associated with the institutional change process (Heinze et al., 2016).

The research on the collective dimension and distributed notion of institutional entrepreneurship suggests that the entrepreneurial efforts may involve a wide group of actors, who collaborate to challenge institutional arrangements. The question that remains is: where do these actors come from? The next section attempts to provide an answer for this question by discussing the location of institutional entrepreneurs.

2.6 The location of Institutional Entrepreneurs

Since the efforts of institutional entrepreneurs, at either the group or individual levels, take place in the context of other actors, this suggests that institutional entrepreneurs can come from within the institutional fields (Dorado, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2002; Tracey et al., 2011) and/or outside the fields (Hardy and Maguire, 2018; Maguire and Hardy, 2009). Powerful members of the field usually initiate insider-driven institutional change. They can force regulatory bodies to pursue their own ends, perhaps because they are of sufficient scope and size to break with certain regulations and make up their own rules (Hardy and Maguire, 2018), or they control resources to impose change (Dorado, 2005). Institutional change can also be initiated by peripheral actors who are positioned at the fringe of the field (Dorado, 2013). Outsiders to a field may find it easier to develop ideas for change since they are less embedded in the field (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). They are often disadvantaged by existing practices and thus are more likely to be motivated to bring about change (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). However, the paradox in this situation is how they get other field members to adopt their novel ideas, rather than how they come up with ideas for change (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). Outsiders to a field are not located in leading elite positions, and lack the communication networks, centrality, and legitimacy in the eyes of actors whose practices they are challenging (Phillips et al., 2004). In addition, their efforts are likely to encounter resistance and opposition from insiders whose interests are threatened by abandoning prevailing practices. The evidence shows that the abandonment of taken-for-granted practices of DDT pesticides between 1962 and 1972 in the United States was initiated by outsider-driven deinstitutionalisation (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). The use of DDT was challenged by actors outside the field, such as Rachel Carson, who problematised the use of DDT in her influential 1962 book, Silent Spring, as not effective or safe for human and environment (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). New actors emerged to speak and act in support of the problematisation, who, over time, become widely accepted as legitimate contributors to the debate over DDT practices (Maguire and Hardy, 2009).

In this way, outsider-driven change requires a heterogeneous and wider actors to push for change because outsiders are unlikely to have the resources necessary to successfully challenge insiders who defend the status quo (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). This view is consistent with Faustino and Booth (2014) who show that outsider-driven institutional change involves varying actors, including insiders who are more knowledgeable about the

logics that sustain the status quo and who bring robust network in the targeted reform area. Consequently, efforts to bring about institutional change could involve a combination of both insiders and outsiders institutional entrepreneurs (Hardy and Maguire, 2018) who act in an organised form (Buhr, 2012). In her study of the climate change policy for aviation, Buhr (2012) demonstrated that the institutional entrepreneurs who developed and pushed a climate policy for aviation to be included in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme were an organised collective of actors. They consisted of consultants, NGOs, think tanks, actors from the European aviation industry, and government representatives, who acted according to their interests despite their variety (Buhr, 2012).

The push for the climate policy recalls Kingdon's (2003) framework of policy window for policy breakthrough. The policy window is split into three broad process streams: streams of problems, policies, and politics. Each stream develops according to its own rules and dynamics, and they are largely independent of one another. When the problem is recognised, a proposed solution is developed and made available in the policy community, and political forces make it the right time for policy change, the three streams come together. This coupling is most likely when policy windows – an opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to push their proposal or attention to their conception of problems – are open (Kingdon, 2014). Some windows are predictable, while others are not. They open very rarely, but once they open, actors must immediately size the opportunity for action.

Despite the similarity between policy entrepreneurs and institutional entrepreneurs, the former is a relatively narrow description of actors in favour of changing a particular policy (Buhr, 2012). Kingdon (2003, p. 190) emphasises that policy entrepreneurs "must develop their ideas, expertise, and proposals well in advance of the time the window opens." They make linkages far before the window opens to propose a prepacked set of solutions. Without such early consideration, they cannot take advantages of the open window. Their success is highly dependent on acting at the right time. If one of the three windows is missing – if a proposed solution is not available, a problem is not sufficiently compelling, or political stream is not supporting a particular issue – the issue fleets from the decision agenda (Kingdon, 2014). Thus, the primary concern of policy entrepreneurs is managing time rather than tasks. Whereas the concept of institutional entrepreneurship offers tools to understand how individuals transform or create institutional arrangements through ongoing and complex struggles, that involves negotiation (Hardy and Maguire, 2008).

The above review of institutional entrepreneurship shows that institutional entrepreneurship clearly introduces the issue of human agency and interest into institutional analysis. Institutional entrepreneurs, either individually or collectively, outside or inside the fields, serve as agents of legitimacy garnering supports for the creation of institutions aligned with their interests. Consequently, new mechanisms arise from the changes in power alignments that both de-legitimate prevailing rules and bring to the fore new avenues that provide the basis for new legal frameworks and new mechanisms (Dacin et al., 2002). But how actors display agency in the first place? The following section attempts to provide an answer by presenting the paradox of embedded agency and explaining the different forms of agency through which actors can display the agentic level necessary to bring about change.

2.7 The Paradox of Embedded Agency

The introduction of institutional entrepreneurship places a great emphasis on the role of human agency and actors in institutional change (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009; Garud et al., 2007). Institutional entrepreneurs seem to display a high level of human agency because they deviate from existing institutional structures and create new rules and practices (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009). This broader structure-agency debate, presented by institutional entrepreneurship, is often referred to as the ‘paradox of embedded agency’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Garud et al., 2007; Seo and Creed, 2002); a paradox that places purposeful change-seeking actors against the institutions that “define their interest and produce their identities” (Garud et al., 2007, p. 961). If actors embedded in the institutional field and their actions and beliefs are determined by the institutional practices they aim to change, how are they able to display such a high level of agency to create new practices? Addressing this paradox entails distinguishing between different forms of agency, and the conditions that promote these forms and provide actors with rooms to display the required level of agency to bring about change (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009).

The concept of human agency has become a source of increasing confusion and strain in social sciences (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). It maintained an elusive vagueness (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) despite the long list of terms it has been associated with: motivation, intentionality, interest, will, autonomy, choice, and freedom (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009). Agency is often referred to as actors’ ability to act somewhat independently of the shaping constraints of social structure (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009). There are,

however, different interpretations of this conceptualisation of agency. For instance, actors are regularly presented as driving change and institution building with little or no account for the mechanisms through which individual actors affect collective arrangements (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). In some cases, actors are portrayed to be institutional superheroes with the ability to purposefully alter, create and destroy institutions (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). Thus, actors may display different levels of agency ranging from the ability to operate independently of dominant social structure to the ability to take strategic action to transform or reproduce an environment's structure, depending on the context in which these actors are embedded (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009).

Following Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 970), the agency is defined as the engagement of actors from different structural environments which "through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, both reproduces and transforms" those environment's structures. Emirbayer and Mische (1998) highlight that this definition encompasses three different dimensions that constitute human agency: iteration, objectivity, and practical evaluation. The exercise of each dimension depends on the relations with the enablements and constraints supplied by a particular context (Mutch, 2007). The first constitutive element, iteration, is oriented toward the past and describes "the selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity" (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 972). They further explain that the primary locus of agency lies in the schematisation of social experience. It is present in actors' ability to select, recall, and appropriately apply the taken-for-granted schemas of action that actors have developed through past interactions. The agentic dimension lies in "how actors selectively recognize, locate, and implement such schemas in their ongoing and situated transactions", thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain interactions and institutions over time (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 971).

The second constitutive dimension of agency is the 'projective element' and involves an imaginative engagement of the future. It encompasses "the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors' hopes, fears, and desires for the future." (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 971). Since actors attempt to reconfigure schemas by creating possible alternative reactions to the problematic situations they face in their lives, the locus of agency lies in the hypothecation of experience. Actors move beyond themselves

into the future and compare the changing images of how they can get into the future from where they are at present (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Thus, projectivity is the first step toward reflectivity, as actors' response to problems cannot be satisfactorily resolved by the reactivation of past patterns of thought and action. The third dimension of human agency is the 'practical-evaluative', which responds to the demands and contingencies of the present. It corresponds to actors' capacity "to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations." (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 971). The locus of agency lies in the contextualisation of social experience. In essence, actors exercise agency in a mediating fashion, enabling them to seek their projects in ways that transform and challenge the situational contexts of actions themselves (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998).

The above discussion conceptualises human agency as a "temporally embedded process of social engagement" that is oriented towards the present and the future, but also informed by the past (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 962). The three constitutive elements of human agency can be found in varying degrees, depending on the context and the nature of institutions, one constitutive element might dominate the others (Battilana and D'aunno, 2009). For example, it is possible to speak of action that is more (or less) directed towards the future, more (or less) oriented towards the present, and more (or less) informed by the past (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). This is because institutional processes are complex, where different types of agents and forces are involved (Jepperson, 1991). Hence, institutional change may involve a wide range of levels of reflexivity, self-consciousness, and temporal orientations (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Such constitution of human agency as assemblages of different roles and orientations precisely allows for "mobilization of particular faculties and thus enables action along highly selective paths" (Kallinikos, 2003, p. 607).

But how human agency can be linked to institutional change? One way to comprehend this link is to understand how actors instigate change from within the context of current opportunities and constraints, working around institutional and contextual elements they cannot change while trying to utilise and harness others in novel ways (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). The next section explains the types of institutional change and types of actors that are likely to follow each mode.

2.8 Institutional Change and Change Actors

Mahoney and Thelen (2010) offer a framework for explaining and identifying the types of institutional change along with the types of human agency who instigate the change. Sketched in Figure 2.1, the model shows that the characteristics of both the institution in question and political context determine the type of change we can expect. This is because institutions and political context shape the type of change agents that are likely to appear and flourish in any institutional context, and the types of strategies those agents are likely to adopt (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The need to enforce institutions allows in itself the political change, emanating from the degree of openness in rules interpretations and implementation (Hacker, 2005). As Mahoney and Thelen (2010) put it, the guiding expectations of institutions often remain ambiguous and always are subject to debate, interpretation and contestation even when institutions are formally codified. Moreover, the struggles over application, meaning and enforcement of institutional rules are intertwined with the allocation of resources they entail (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Actors with varied interests will contest the degree of openness in rules ambiguity because the issues of interpretation and enforcement can have strong effects on resources allocation (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Thus, institutional change can take place through disaggregated processes of reinterpretation where “the meanings actors associate with a particular institution change over time”, creating shifts in the patters of action (Hall, 2010, pp. 216-217).

Figure 2. 1: Framework for Explaining Institutional Change



Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2010)

The discussion on the degree of openness in rules recalls the notion of performativity (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). This notion suggests that the variations in individual performances and enactment of rules can significantly contribute to altering and reproducing a given rule. Actors within a given practice field can perform activities in a variety of ways (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). This is because rules are resources for action, but they do not fully specify the action (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007). As Blau (1955, p. 23) puts it, rules “must be abstract in order to guide the different courses of action necessary for the accomplishment of an objective in diverse situations.” (cited in Feldman and Pentland, 2003). The interpretation of one rule, or part of it, requires more rules, so no amount of rules is sufficient to determine behaviour fully (Feldman and Pentland, 2003).

The inherent capability of rules performativity to generate change lies in the agentic quality (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Human agency combines elements of the past repertoires of a specific rule or action to deal with present situations, with an orientation of how this specific combination influences future understandings of what the rule is (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). As Feldman and Pentland (2003) point out, organisational rules involves the coordination of different actors. They further suggest that this involvement of multiple actors ensures that the structural aspect of rules cannot be undifferentiated. The agentic knowledge required to perform the rules will be distributed, as not everyone can know everything. Thus, it is unlikely that there is a single goal or a single understanding of any organisational rules as the involvement of multiple actors introduces diversity in interpretive schemes, information and goals of actors (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). As a result, the subjective interpretations of a particular action will differ. In addition, the actions of individual agency are interdependence (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Actors act in a context created by the actions of other actors, so each performance of a rule is a collective performance. Each actor may face a variety of possibilities, based on the actions of other actors, next time the rule is performed (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Such interdependence between actions can generate variations within performances, and open the boundaries of the rule to outside effect (Abdelnour et al., 2017; Feldman and Pentland, 2003).

2.8.1 Types of Institutional Change

Returning to the Mahoney and Thelen's model of institutional change, the model starts with identifying four different modes of change, as shown in Table 2.1: *displacement, layering, drift, and conversion.* Understanding the different modes of change helps to explain how and why one mode rather than another happens, and the role of institutional challengers and supporters within each mode (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

Table 2. 1: Modes of Institutional Change

	Displacement	**Layering**	**Drift**	**Conversion**
Removal of old rules	Yes	No	No	No
Neglect of old rules	-	No	Yes	No
Changed impact/enactment of old rules	-	No	Yes	Yes
Introduction of new rules	Yes	Yes	No	No

Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2010).

The first mode of institutional change is *displacement*. It occurs when new forms emerge and diffuse, which call into question prevailing, previously taken-for-granted practices and forms (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Such type of change may well be abrupt and entail a radical breakdown of institutions and their replacement with new ones (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). However, it can also be a slow-moving process when new institutions are created and directly compete with an older set of institutions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Streeck and Thelen (2005) elaborate and suggest that change through displacement can take place endogenously through the activation or rediscovery of previously suspended or suppressed possibilities. However, they further highlight that it can also occur through supplanting of indigenous institutions with new ones, or through the importation and then cultivation of 'foreign' institutions and practices by local actors.

Different from displacement, *layering* happens when new additions, amendments and revisions are attached to the existing institutions, thereby changing the direction in which

prevailing rules affect behaviour (Hacker, 2005; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2003; Thelen, 2004). Layering can, however, bring about substantial change, if the alterations affect the logic of institution *growth* mechanism, where new elements actively supplant or crowd out by defaults the old system as “the domain of the latter progressively shrinks relative to that of the former.” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p. 25). Such type of change often occurs when actors lack the capacity to actually change the prevailing rules. They instead challenge the prevailing system by adding new rules and amendments on the top or alongside the original ones (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2003). While each element may bring a small change in itself, such small changes can accumulate and lead, in the long run, to a big change (Thelen, 2004).

As with layering, change through *drift* may be concealed by the stability in the surface. Hacker (2005) suggests that change through drift occurs when the impact of rules and policies changes due to the shifts in the context of policies. The surrounding environment of institutions evolves in ways that alter their meaning, scope and functions (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). When actors choose not to react to environmental changes, a change in the impact of institutions can take place as a result of their very inaction (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). This opens up a gap between rules and their enforcement, allowing actors to abdicate previous responsibilities (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).

In the fourth mode of change, *conversion*, institutions are not so much altered or allowed to decay, but they are redirected to new functions, goals, or purpose (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2003). Rules and regulations remain formally the same, but they are enacted and interpreted in new ways (Hacker, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Actors' ignorance does not drive the gap between rules and their enforcement to a changed setting (as is true with drift). Rather, the gap may be produced by actors who respond to new environmental changes by deploying current institutional resources to new ends (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). As Thelen (2003) puts it, institutional conversion can be set in motion by a shift in the environment, where institutional actors address the new problem they confront by using the existing institutions in novel ways. In some cases, conversion may result from changes in power relations, such that the incorporation of new supporters or political coalition (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2004). In such case, the incorporation of new groups can lead to the addition of new elements that change the renegotiation (Thelen, 2003) and generate trajectory due to the

changes in coalitional foundations which could redirect institutions towards new functions and goals (Thelen, 2004). Interestingly, as Mahoney and Thelen (2010) put it, the less powerful actors who are lacking the capacity to change institutions can get traction out of conversion strategies. They further add that they may be able to exploit the inherent ambiguities of institutions in ways that allow them to fit their interests or redirect institutions toward more favourable goals.

The variations in modes of institutional change are subject to the differences in the characteristics of institutions and political context (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The likelihood that specific types of change take place depends on the extent to which the political context provides the defenders of the status quo with weak or strong veto possibilities, and whether the targeted institutions provide actors with opportunities for exercising discretion in enforcement or interpretation (Hacker, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Table 2.2 shows that the differences in the extent of discretion in institutional interpretation and enforcement, and veto possibilities are linked with different modes of institutional change.

Table 2. 2: Institutional and Contextual Sources of Institutional Change

		Characteristics of the Targeted Institution	
		Low Level of Discretion in Enforcement/ Interpretation	**High Level of Discretion in Enforcement/ Interpretation**
Characteristics of Political Context	**Strong Veto Possibilities**	Layering	Drift
	Weak Veto Possibilities	Displacement	Conversion

Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2010)

Taking, first, the dimension of political context, which derives from the powerful veto players. When actors have access to extra-institutional or institutional means of blocking change, the

veto possibilities are high in blocking change. Those actors may have such access regarding both changes in rules' enactment in practice and changes in rules themselves. Moreover, when change agents face political context with numerous veto possibilities, it will be challenging for them to assemble a coalition and mobilise the resources to displace the dominant institutional rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Hence, displacement as a mode of change is unlikely in the political context with strong veto possibilities. Similarly, conversion mode will be challenging in such context as the powers of veto also apply to rule enactment. In such political environment with strong veto possibilities, layering and drift are more promising strategies because they do not rely on amending the rules or shifting their enactment and do not require a direct change to old institutions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Institutional change with layering grows out of the introduction of new rules onto or alongside present ones. Powerful veto players cannot necessarily block the attachment of new elements when protecting old institutions. Likewise, institutional change with drift grows out of the failure to update and adapt an institution to the shift and change in the environment. Veto powers are often insufficient to block change through drift since doing so requires defenders of institutions to take active steps to garner support for an institution as the economic, social, or political context shifts (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

The other dimension that matters in explaining variations in modes of institutional change is the characteristics of institutions. It concerns the variations in the extent of discretion that actors have in the enforcement and interpretation of rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). If agents of change find little room for discretion in enforcement in the institution they face, the outcomes of drift and conversion are less likely. Conversion, for example, normally happens when rules are ambiguous enough to allow for different interpretations (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Similarly, change through drift takes place when there is a gap between rules and their enforcement. By contrast, layering and displacement are likely strategies for actors who realise that change cannot occur by exploiting the disjuncture between rules and their enforcement (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

The discussion on human agency and the link it has with the modes of institutional change leaves a question of what types of actors are likely to instigate change. The next section discusses the types of change actors that are likely to appear in different institutional contexts and the mode of change they are likely to follow.

2.8.2 The Types of Change Actors

The discussion on the different modes and strategies of institutional change and how the characteristics of institutions and political environment influence the likelihood of specific types of change raises the question: who are the agents that bring such change? Identifying those agents of change is useful as different types of agents appear in different institutional contexts, and they are likely to follow specific modes of change suited to their embedded context (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Following Mahoney and Thelen (2010), they identify four types of change agents in relation to whether those agents seek to preserve the existing institutional rules, and they linked those agents back to the modes of institutional change they are likely to adopt. Table 3.2 specifies those agents: insurrectionaries, subversives, symbionts (either parasitic or mutualistic), and opportunists.

Table 2. 3: Types of Change Agents

	Seeks to Preserve Institution	**Follows Rules of Institution**
Insurrectionaries	No	No
Subversives	No	Yes
Symbionts	Yes	No
Opportunists	Yes/No	Yes/No

Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2010)

Insurrectionaries seek to eliminate dominant rules or institutions by visibly and actively mobilising against them. They reject the status quo and do not follow its regulations. When they prevail in a conflict, they may lead critical-juncture periods that allow for rapid change of the institutional status quo to create a radically new one. Thus, they may be especially associated with the displacement mode of change. More to the point, rapid displacement is their goal, and when it happens gradually, it is likely because they are unable to make an abrupt change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

Subversives seek to displace institutions, but they do not break with the institutional rules while pursuing their goal. Rather, they effectively cover their goal to make institutional

change and work within the system. They wait for the time when they can actively take a stance of opposition. They encourage the promotion of new rules on the edge of the old ones. In this sense, they may be favouring layering mode of change, where new rules are attached to the old ones. They may also follow conversion and drift modes of change, depending on the political context of institutions. Either way, they start their change initiatives from the periphery, which makes their way to the centre (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

Symbionts come in two forms – parasitic and mutualistic – and in both forms, they seek to preserve institutions. In the parasitic form, parasites depend on and exploit the existence and broad efficacy of institutions to achieve private gain. They can carry out actions that violate the purpose of institutions, thus undermining institution over the longer run. Symbionts in the parasitic form can flourish in an environment characterised by high expectations about institutional conformity, but the capacity to enforce those expectations is limited. As a consequence, those actors are likely to be associated with drift mode of change where there are gaps in compliance due to neglect of rule enforcement (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). In their mutualistic form, symbionts also seek to use the rules to advance their interests and preserve the status quo, but they do not compromise the efficiency of the rules. Instead, they violate the rules to support their spirit and contribute to the robustness of institutions, increasing the support coalition of institutions.

Opportunists do not seek to preserve institutions, nor do they try to change the rules. They instead adopt a wait-and-see approach and achieve their goals by exploiting whatever opportunities arise within the dominant system. They prefer to exploit existing opportunities over following the riskier strategy of mobilisation to bring about change. The preferred mode of change for opportunists is conversion: the ambiguities in the implementation of interpretation of current rules provide them with a room to redeploy these rules in a different way that serves their goal.

Putting together the characteristics of both the political context and institutions, and the types of change agents, as Mahoney and Thelen (2010) note, determine the kinds of environment in which change agents are likely to appear and thrive. Table 2.4 highlights that agents of change become the intervening step through which the aspects of the political context and institutional rules do their causal work.

First, insurrectionaries are more likely to thrive in environments where there are weak veto possibilities and low discretion. Low discretion is compatible with displacement mode, while weak veto possibilities means that the supporter of status quo, who are expected defend the dominant logic, will not be well-positioned to resist the insurgent efforts aimed at displacement. Second, subversives can emerge in an environment characterised by few rule interpretations and enforcement opportunities, and strong veto possibilities. Such an environment makes it challenging for actors to break or even bend the institutional rules. In this context, institutional challengers must work from within to bring change, and maybe favouring layering mode where they attach new amendments to the existing rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

Table 2. 4: Institutional and Contextual Sources of Change Agents

		Characteristics of the Targeted Institution	
		Low Level of Discretion in Enforcement/ Interpretation	**High Level of Discretion in Enforcement/ Interpretation**
Characteristics of Political Context	**Strong Veto Possibilities**	Subversives (Layering)	Parasitic Symbionts (Drift)
	Weak Veto Possibilities	Insurrectionaries (Displacement)	Opportunists (Conversion)

Source: Mahoney and Thelen (2010)

Third, symbionts in the parasitic form flourish in an environment characterised by high enforcement discretion and strong veto possibilities. Since parasitic symbionts seek to preserve the institution and do not challenge the status quo, strong veto possibilities help to secure this outcome. However, they need a high level of discretion in rule enforcement as this provides them with enough room to alter the meaning of institutionalised rules while following drift mode (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Finally, opportunists can be expected to flourish in an environment characterised by a high level of discretion in how institutions are

enforced, and few veto players to resist institutional change. In this context, the defenders of the status quo may ignore those who convert institutions to new purposes as long as they do not violate the institutional rules. Moreover, opportunists do not need to adopt insurrectionary modes since gaps between rules and their enforcement allow them to redeploy the existing rules for their own goals (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

In the same context, the specific setting in question shapes the coalitional politics. For instance, the strategies of insurrectionaries to displace institutions are at odds with the defenders of the status quo. Thus, insurrectionaries must forge a coalition with other actors who challenge institutions. In contracts, opportunists adopt a wait-and-see approach, and so they are available for all types of coalitions, including coalition with insurrectionaries (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Opportunists can be brought into coalition with insurrectionaries, depending on the political winds, and only if insurrectionaries can convince them that change is inevitable (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Subversives represents another aspect of coalition building. They tend to work under the radar of prevailing actors. Therefore, they may not seek an alliance with insurrectionaries despite their preferences for change. Rather, they work in the shadows on their own to attach amendments to the current rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Interestingly, symbionts may become opponents of insurrectionaries and ready allies of defenders of the status quo because their interests are broadly consistent with the preservation of institutions.

Prior research on institutional entrepreneurs indicates that they are skilled actors who draw on different cultural materials to theorise change in ways that induce collaboration among social groups. What skills they possess to do so is what the next section discusses.

2.9 Characteristics of Institutional Entrepreneurs

Efforts to bring about change and shape institutions can easily go awry as these attempts will not go uncontested (Garud et al., 2002). Institutional entrepreneurship is often seen to be the doing of actors who mobilise resources and articulate their change projects in a specific way that identify the interests and potential opposition of other actors, and enable collective attribution (Garud et al., 2007; Khan, Munir and Willmott, 2007). Through their astute identification of new opportunities, they draw on current linguistic and cultural material to theorise and narrate change in a way that provides other field members and social groups reasons to cooperate (Colomy, 1998; Garud et al., 2007; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).

If institutional entrepreneurs engage in different kinds of activities, then different types of skills are required (Perkmann and Spicer, 2007). In this context, Fligstein (1997) suggests that institutional entrepreneurs are those actors who display a set of social skills. He further suggests that "the idea that some social actors are better at producing desired social outcomes than are others is the core notion that underlies the concept of institutional entrepreneurs" (p. 398). He defines social skills as the ability to induce cooperation among other actors and motivating them by providing them with common identities and meanings in which actions can be accepted and justified (Fligstein, 1997). This involves the use of different tactics, including agenda-setting, the exertion of authority, brokering, and framing the institution in a way that appeals to wider adopters and supporters (Fligstein, 1997; Perkmann and Spicer, 2007).

Against the all-encompassing notion of social skills, different scholars have suggested more fine-grained sets of skills in institutional entrepreneurship. For example, Garud et al. (2002) stresses on the importance of *political* skills such as skills in bargaining, interest mediation and networking to bring actors together and mobilise collective resources. As Maguire et al. (2004, p. 658) point out, institutional entrepreneurship highlights that "institutional change is thus a political process that reflects the power and interests of organized actors", who seek to reconfigure distributional outcomes and power relations (Levy and Scully, 2007). Others point to the necessity of *analytical* skills such as developing abstract models of an institution (Strang and Meyer, 1993) since institutional entrepreneurs are able to reflect on existing practices and envision alternative ways of meeting their goals (Beckert, 1999).

Cultural skills are also seen as essential skills required by institutional entrepreneurs (Perkmann and Spicer, 2007), allowing them to frame innovations and novel activities by linking them to broader values, creating common identities, and building into particular normative attitudes (Creed, Scully and Austin, 2002; Seo and Creed, 2002). While Fligstein (1997) singles out certain types of skills as the main trait of institutional entrepreneurs, Perkmann and Spicer (2007) conceptualise institutional entrepreneurship, as shown in Table 4.5, as a multidimensional process where different activities and skills are successively added over time.

Table 2. 5: Activities and Skills in Institutional Entrepreneurship

Activities	**Skills**	**Outcome**
Networking Resource Mobilisation	Political	Innovative organisational form
Analysing Designing	Analytical	Theorisation of organisational form
Framing Propagating	Cultural	Diffusion of organisational form

Source: Adapted from Perkmann and Spicer (2007)

Institutional entrepreneurs are seen as capable, skilled and motivated actors who have the skills to produce successful organisational change. What if, however, actors who led change projects triggered unintended consequences from their initiatives, especially the qualities of actors who manage others in the way required by institutional entrepreneurship may not be easy to find (Booth, 2014). In their study of a project to de-institutionalise the issue of child labour in the world's largest hand-stitched soccer balls manufacturing cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan, Khan et al. (2007) explored the 'dark' aspects of institutional entrepreneurship. The project aimed to switch the stitching of balls from homes, where children are involved, to monitoring stitching centres (factories or workshops), so that the child labour cannot be hidden within the privacy of stitchers' homes (Khan et al., 2007). A coalition of institutional entrepreneurs made and involved the companies that organised the production of soccer balls, NGOs such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and industry associations.

The finding of the study reveals that the 'success' in eliminating child labour came at a high price (Khan et al., 2007). The majority of women stitchers dropped out of the workforce, leaving their families into abject poverty. Women stitchers highlight that factory-based stitching does not provide flexible working hours as they have to work according to fixed hours, and they felt that commuting to factories was a waste of time. Importantly, they emphasised that home-based stitching saved them from verbal, physical and sexual abuses, which were sometimes reported at the factories. The stitchers lacked access to political,

cultural, legal, and economic resources. The stitchers' representatives could not travel to ILO offices in Geneva to convey their grievances and concern. Little or no effort was made to notify the stitchers of the international controversy as the communications were conducted in English. Lacking any kind of symbolic, capital or material, the illiterate stitchers were handicapped in gaining access to agenda-setting processes. As a consequence, women stitchers withdrew from the workforce, and the project lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the stitchers, including children, because the burning issue for women stitchers was a living wage that enables them to meet their basic necessities (Khan et al., 2007).

The above example of the unintended consequences of institutional entrepreneurship suggests that institutional entrepreneurs should not only be powerful people doing something, but they should use their power through the existing system (Khan et al., 2007). In the Sialkot case, the institutional entrepreneurship coalition seems to have overcome dominant working practices involving child labour despite ball stitchers opposition, but scant attention is paid to the women stitchers. The institutional entrepreneurship coalition excluded stitchers from participation to shape the nature of the reforms and excluded consideration of the effects of reforms for women, who were negatively affected by the collation. Either they continued working at home on an illegal basis, or they faced humiliation while working at the stitching centres, which also meant losing the flexibility of working hours at home (Khan et al., 2007).

2.10 Conclusion

The literature review on the term of institutional entrepreneurship shows that the underlying streams of research that underpin institutional entrepreneurship – institutions and entrepreneurship – have different, and yet, conflicting focus. Prior research demonstrates clearly that institutions constrain the behaviour of organisational actors as a result of the regulative aspects of institutions and taken-for-granted assumptions. They provide blueprints for organisations by identifying the forms and procedures an organisation should adopt (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Thus, they set bounds on rationality by constraining the options that individuals and collectives are likely to choose (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). The main emphasis is on how institutions maintain stability, continuity and conformity to institutional arrangements (Garud et al., 2007).

In contrast, the literature shows that the research on entrepreneurship started in an era where changes in the industrial structures of market and business corporations were taking place. Entrepreneurship was regarded as a process of creating and managing innovation. The main focus is on how entrepreneurs instigate significant market changes, break with the existing ways of operating, and discover new means-ends relationships in which goods and services can be introduced and sold at better than their cost of production (Casson, 1982; Drucker, 2014; Kirzner, 1997). In this way, entrepreneurs often take a reflective position towards dominant practices and envision alternative approaches to getting things done (Beckert, 1999).

The research reviewed shows that the juxtaposition of institutions and entrepreneurship into a single concept, institutional entrepreneurship, offers a lens to explain how actors shape institutions despite pressures towards conformity to institutionalised arrangements. It refers to the activities of actors who initiate changes that challenge the existing institutional arrangements to create new institutions or transform existing ones, thus introducing the issue of human agency and interest into institutional analysis (Battilana, 2006; Maguire et al., 2004). These actors, who are regarded as institutional entrepreneurs, can be individuals or collective of individuals, and they may come from within or/and outside the institutional fields.

While institutional entrepreneurship has been presented as a promising way to address the role of interest and agency in institutional change, it faces a paradox. Termed as the paradox of embedded agency, it refers to the tension between institutional determinism and agency. The controversy is around the ability of institutionally embedded actors to contribute to changing the institutional environment that defines their interests and, in the limit, produces their identities. In addition, prior work suggests that entrepreneurial strategies for change is context-specific. The intervention strategies highlighted in the prior work – discursive strategies and resource mobilisation – are most likely to take different forms and have different targets in mature and emerging fields due to the contextual challenges each field poses, thereby shaping the type of change one can expect. Prior work also suggests that the positions that institutional entrepreneurs occupy in the field are most likely to shape their strategies. From this perspective, it is necessary to call for finer-grained analysis to address actors' embeddedness in different institutional fields and considering the different positions they occupy in the field.

This research seeks to address this call. It aims to strengthen the theoretical foundation for institutional entrepreneurship and develop a theory of action that address actors' embeddedness in emerging and mature fields. It also accounts for different positions the institutional entrepreneurs occupy in the field by conducting a multi-case comparative study of institutional entrepreneurship. The study focuses on how actors:

1. Deviate from existing institutional arrangements,
2. Institutionalise their innovation, and
3. What explains the success or failure of their change efforts in different fields and actors' positions.

The following chapter discusses the methods adopted in this research along with data and other methodological issues.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Research methodology, which represents the way of how research should be undertaken, is core to scientific activity (May, 2011). It provides a means through which intellectual understanding and development of phenomena are enhanced. Nevertheless, methodology is inherently problematic in social science research. There is no one best way for undertaking all research. Rather, there are different perspectives on investigating a particular phenomenon with several methods of data collection and analysis. This means that researchers need to make a series of informed decisions on the research philosophical assumptions, strategies, tools, and procedures that are most suitable to their research and able to justify them.

The fundamental rule in research is that methods should follow from research questions (Punch, 2013). How we do something in research is dependent on what we are planning to find out. Connecting the most appropriate methods to research problem and questions, and analysis becomes a condition for generating evidence that provides convincing answers to the research problem. In this research, the introduction of institutional entrepreneurship into institutions creates a promising tension that opens up avenues for how institutional change occurs in light of processes associated with change and continuity. The controversy revolves around the ability of institutionally embedded actors to distance themselves from the existing institutional arrangements and act entrepreneurially. Thus, this research aims to investigate how those actors bring about change in the institutions that create their realities. The research questions, as a result of this, provoked are:

1. How do institutional entrepreneurs deviate from existing institutional arrangements?
2. How is innovation institutionalised?
3. What explain the success or failure of institutional entrepreneurs' efforts?

Starting with the research questions, this research presents first the research philosophy underpinning this research. Next, the research paradigm followed in this research will be discussed, as well as the research strategy adopted. The following sections discuss the research design, data collection, and data analysis. Research ethics is then presented

before discussing the research journey in the fieldwork section. The last section includes the conclusion.

3.2 Research Philosophy

The term research philosophy refers to a system of assumptions and beliefs about knowledge development (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016). These include assumptions about realities researchers encounter in their research (ontological assumptions), and about the human knowledge (epistemological assumption) (Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2004; Saunders et al., 2016). Well-thought-out and consistent assumptions shape how researchers understand research questions, and underpin the methodological choice, research strategy, data collection methods and analysis (Saunders et al., 2016).

Ontological assumptions refer to the study of the nature of existence (Crotty, 1998; Gray, 2004). They shape the way in which researchers study and see the research objects (Saunders et al., 2016). The main issue of orientation is reflected in two ontological positions; the first is objectivism. It implies that social entities should and can be considered as objective entities that have an existence independent of and beyond the influence of social actors (Bryman, 2016). So, research should aim to discover the objective truth and universal laws and facts (Gray, 2004), from which law-like generalisations can be drawn about universal social reality (Saunders et al., 2016). Ontologically, objectivism embraces realism which considers social entities as physical entities of the natural world that exist independently of our awareness of them (Saunders et al., 2016). For example, an organisation can be considered as an objective entity, in which it has rules and regulation, mission statement, and hierarchical relationships. As a result, it can be assumed that an organisation has a reality external to the individuals who inhabit it (Bryman, 2016).

Constructionism is the second ontological position, which asserts that social entities should and can be considered as social constructions built up from the actions and perceptions of social actors (Bryman, 2016). Unlike objectivism, constructionism implies that social entities are produced through social interaction and are in a continual state of revision (Crotty, 1998; Gray, 2004). Meaning is constructed and not waiting for someone to discover it (Crotty, 1998). For instance, an organisation is seen as a social reality produced through the interaction of social actors, and in a constant change (Bryman, 2016). Consequently, rules and policies by the management within the organisation are the output of the interactive

process and negotiation. This output is also in a constant process of revision. This means that it is essential for constructionism researchers to study situations in details, including socio-cultural and historical context, with different narratives and opinions to understand how realities are being experienced (Saunders et al., 2016).

Investigating the role of institutional entrepreneurs in bringing about institutional change might start with an ontological perspective that institutional entrepreneurship really exists. In particular, the researcher's ontological position is that institutional entrepreneurship does not exist independently from human conceptions. Institution, where institutional entrepreneurs operate, is also a reality that is produced and reinforced by institutional actors (Battilana, 2006; Bryman, 2016). Thus, the reality of an individual who is regarded as institutional entrepreneurs to create or transform institutions is context-specific (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Therefore, constructionism becomes the researcher's ontological stance.

Epistemology concerns assumptions about knowledge (Saunders et al., 2016), and tries to understand what it means to know (Gray, 2004). The focus is on what is (or should be) regarded as legitimate and valid knowledge in a discipline (Bryman, 2016), and how we can communicate knowledge to others (Saunders et al., 2016). The central issue is whether the social world should and can be studied according to the same procedures and principles of the natural science (Bryman, 2016). It deals with the nature of knowledge, its scope, possibilities, and how we know what we know (Crotty, 1998). Thus, epistemology gives us different philosophical backgrounds to decide on the adequate and legitimate knowledge needed to explain the research. Each epistemological position offers a distinct way of knowing, and each reveals a specific methodology to conduct the research (Bryman, 2016; Saunders et al., 2016).

There are two main epistemological positions that have emerged in social science, positivism and interpretivism (Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2004). The former asserts that social world exists external to researchers, and that the inquiry should be measured directly through observation (Gray, 2004). It advocates the application of natural science methods to study the social reality (Bryman, 2016; Crotty, 1998). Positivist researchers derive knowledge through the gathering of facts about the world to produce law-like generalisations

(Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2004; Saunders et al., 2016). An ontological perspective that is linked to positivism is objectivism (Gray, 2004).

In contrast, interpretivism, developed as a major anti-positivist stance, asserts that humans are different from physical entities because they create meanings, and therefore cannot be studied in the same way as physical phenomena (Saunders et al., 2016). Interpretivists study these meanings to create rich and new interpretations and understandings of the social world and context. The argument is that there is no one-to-one relationship between the world (object) and humans (subjects) (Gray, 2004). The subject matter of social science – people and institutions – is essentially different from natural sciences (Bryman, 2016). In general, interpretivism places emphasis on language, history and culture in shaping our experiences and interpretations of the social life-world (Crotty, 1998). A theoretical perspective that is closely linked to interpretivism is constructivism (Gray, 2004).

The notion of institutional entrepreneurship describes the activities of actors who create a meaning system that links the functioning of different set of institutions together (Garud et al., 2002). The activities of people have a meaning for them, and they act based on the meaning they attribute to their activities and the activities of others (Bryman, 2016). Interpretivists study these meanings to create fuller and new understanding and interpretations of the social world and context (Gray, 2004; Saunders et al., 2016). Epistemologically, the researcher embraces an interpretive position to study institutional entrepreneurs' experience in creating the meaning system in their efforts to bring about institutional change. It is not the researcher's interest to gather facts about the probability of occurrence of specific phenomena, as the case with positivist researchers. Rather, the researcher's interest is to study the meaning of the social action of institutional entrepreneurship.

The above discussion reveals that this research adopts constructionism as an ontological stance and embraces interpretive epistemological position. The next section discusses the research paradigm adopted in this research.

3.3 Research Paradigm

There are two major research paradigms that form the basis of social science research methodology, quantitative and qualitative paradigms (Bryman, 2016; Kumar, 2014;

Saunders et al., 2016). The essential question that divides the two main paradigms is whether the natural science methods can be applied to study social realities (Kumar, 2014).

The quantitative paradigm is rooted in physical sciences, and is called systematic, scientific or positivist approach to social enquiry (Kumar, 2014; Saunders et al., 2016). It emphasises the quantification in data collection and analysis (Saunders et al., 2016). It is usually associated with a deducted approach to the relationship between research and theory (Bryman, 2016), where the focus is on the testing of theories (Saunders et al., 2016). However, it may also use inductive reasoning, where data is used to build theory (Saunders et al., 2016).

Quantitative research is generally linked with positivist epistemology and objectivist ontology (Bryman, 2016; Punch, 2013), especially when used with highly structured data collection techniques (Saunders et al., 2016). It is based on the assumption that quantitative researchers collect facts and study the relationship of one group of facts to another to produce quantified and generalisable conclusion (Bell, 2014). Thus, they view social realities as an external and objective reality that can be measured numerically (Bryman, 2016), and analysed using a range of graphical and statistical techniques (Saunders et al., 2016). Quantitative researchers are mainly concerned to study the causal relationships between variables in the study rather than a mere description of how things are (Bryman, 2016). The researchers are seen as independent from those being studied (Saunders et al., 2016).

In contrast, the qualitative paradigm emphasises words rather than the quantification in data collection and analysis (Bryman, 2016). It is mainly associated with inductive reasoning of the relationship between theory and research (Punch, 2013), where the research is used to build a theory or further develop the theoretical perspective that already exists in the literature (Saunders et al., 2016). However, qualitative research can start with deductive reasoning to test existing theories (Yin, 2014). In this context, Saunders et al. (2016) argue that much qualitative research in practice uses an abductive approach to the relationship between theory and research, where deductive inferences are tested, and inductive inferences are developed iteratively throughout the research.

Qualitative research is often linked with interpretive epistemology and constructionist ontology (Punch, 2013). This is because qualitative researchers need to understand the subjective and socially constructed meanings expressed about the social reality being

studied (Saunders et al., 2016). The main focus in qualitative research is to explain, understand, discover, clarify and explore feelings, situations, perceptions, experience and attitudes of a group of people (Kumar, 2014). Such research is sometimes called naturalistic as researchers need to operate within a research context, or natural setting to build trust, participation, in-depth understanding and access to meanings (Saunders et al., 2016). Thus, qualitative researchers view social reality as a continually shifting property of people's creation, and emphasise on how people interpret their social world (Bryman, 2016). They seek close involvement with the research participants to build rapport to gain cognitive access that allows the researchers to understand the world through the participants' eyes (Saunders et al., 2016).

The above discussion of quantitative and qualitative paradigms for research suggests that the adoption of each paradigm depends on the purpose of the research. Whether the researcher is concerned with people's behaviour or with the meaning of action, however, it is worth noting that both paradigms have their own limitations that relate either to ontological and epistemological foundations, research strategies, or the methods employed in both paradigms. On the philosophical grounds, quantitative research fails to distinguish between social institutions and people from the world of nature (Bryman, 2016; Kumar, 2014). Rather, it turns a blind eye to the differences between the natural and social world. Unlike qualitative research, that rejects the application of norms and practice of natural science in its emphasis on how people interpret their social world (Bell, 2014; Punch, 2013). In addition, the reliance on procedures and instruments in quantitative research impedes the connection between the research and everyday life (Bryman, 2016). In essence, the meaning of events to people is neglected, and so we do not know how findings are linked to everyday context (Bryman, 2016).

In contrast, qualitative research is criticised for being subjective and impressionistic (Bryman, 2016). Its findings rely extensively on the unsystematic view of researchers about what is significant, and also upon their efforts to seek agreements of the participants with the researchers' interpretation (Kumar, 2014). This is due to the unstructured nature of qualitative research, which offers a flexibility that allows the researchers to change their study more easily (Bryman, 2016). As a result, the subjective leanings of researchers influence their interpretation and make the qualitative research difficult to replicate as they are hardly any standard procedures to be followed (Bryman, 2016; Kumar, 2014). By

contrast, quantitative research is well structured and starts with a predetermined starting point and continues through a fixed sequence of steps (Saunders et al., 2016). In addition, the findings of qualitative research are more to generalise to theory rather than the relevant population (Yin, 2014), due to the representation issues of samples selected (Bryman, 2016).

In an attempt to combine the strengths of qualitative and quantitative paradigms, a mixed-methods approach has emerged as a separate orientation to combine qualitative and quantitative paradigms in a single project (Bryman, 2016; Kumar, 2014; Punch, 2013; Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2014). Some scholars consider an approach to be mixed methods even if more than one method is used from only one paradigm, while others such as Kumar (2014) believes that one or two methods can come from one or two paradigms for a study to be classified as mixed methods. Yet, some scholars call study that uses different methods from one paradigm as multiple methods study (Bryman, 2016; Saunders et al., 2016). The rationale underpinning this orientation is based on the assumption that combining the strengths of different paradigms while at the same time compensating the weaknesses of each paradigm will improve the accuracy and depth of the findings and best achieve the objective of the study (Kumar, 2014; Punch, 2013). Similarly, Kumar (2014) suggests that mixed methods approach provides a complete picture of a situation when a researcher wants to explore a phenomenon from different perspectives, especially when the study has different objectives. This is because using different methods enriches the quality of data as each method looks at the issue from a different angle (Bryman, 2016).

However, this approach is not without limitations. Bryman (2016) points out that each research paradigm is rooted in different and incompatible ontological and epistemological commitments. For instance, participant observation as a qualitative method is consistent with interpretivism but inimical to positivism. Combining methods from different paradigms may result in a significant disagreement between data sets (Kumar, 2014), as each paradigm is rooted in incompatible views of how social reality should be studied (Bryman, 2016). In addition, mixed methods is costly and time-consuming as more data means more resources and work (Kumar, 2014).

This study concerns with how institutional entrepreneurs instigate processes of institutional change within the institutional context. Institutional entrepreneurs operate in an institutional

context, where they attempt to break with the prevailing institutional arrangements and institutionalise new set of logics that is consistent with the context in which they operate (Battilana, 2006; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The formation of such arrangements is a political process that involves several actors who have different interests in the same institutional context (Seo and Creed, 2002). As such, the political and institutional contexts can shape the type of institutional entrepreneurs that are likely to appear in a given context, and the strategies they are likely to adopt (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Said alternatively, the likelihood that institutional entrepreneurs bring institutional change depends on the extent to which the institutional context allows some change possibilities (Hacker, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

A key advantage of qualitative research is its provision of detailed accounts of the context within which individuals' behaviour takes place, and various processes shaping that behaviour (Bryman, 2016). Understanding institutional entrepreneurship demands detailed analysis that takes contextual consideration into account (Garud et al., 2002). As such, this study adopts a qualitative approach as it is best suited to understand and explore the experience of institutional entrepreneurs (Kumar, 2014), through their eyes in the context of institutions. Moreover, a qualitative approach is needed to identify the processes of strategic intervention that institutional entrepreneurs develop to de-institutionalise existing practices and institutionalise new ones. The study does not seek to quantify the phenomenon being investigated – institutional entrepreneurs – nor does the researcher view reality as external that can be measured numerically as the case with quantitative paradigm (Kumar, 2014), and so quantitative paradigm is deemed inappropriate for this research. The study does not also seek to combine both paradigms, and so mixed methods are not suitable for this research as well.

This section makes it clear that this research adopts a qualitative paradigm to study institutional entrepreneurship. Regardless of which paradigm a research might adopt, every research follows a specific strategy for the role of theory in the research. The following section explains the research strategy followed in this research.

3.4 Research Strategy

Every research involves the use of theory which provides justification and framework within which social phenomena can be understood. Such use entails whether a research should

begin with theory, or should theory itself induced from the research? The choice researchers make pertaining to the use of theory is so important in informing the design of their research (Saunders et al., 2016). This will help them in determining the methodological choice that will work for them, those that will not, what kind of evidence is gathered, and how it is interpreted to provide accurate answers to the research questions (Bryman, 2016; Saunders et al., 2016). There are two main contrasting strategies relating to the use of theory in research: Deductive or Indicative (Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2004; Saunders et al., 2016; Suddaby, 2006; Yin, 2014).

The deductive reasoning represents the commonest view of the relationship between social research and theory, whereby the researchers draw on what is known on specific theoretical ideas to deduce hypotheses that must be translated into operational terms (Bryman, 2016; Saunders et al., 2016). In other words, researchers start with a theory, deduce hypotheses (hypothesis) from that theory, and design research to test these hypotheses (Punch, 2013). The deductive approach is the dominant research strategy in the natural sciences, where laws allow the anticipation of phenomena, predict their occurrence, and present the basis of explanation in the relationship between variables and concepts (Saunders et al., 2016). In this vein, Gray (2004) suggests that the underlying concept – that is abstract ideas that form the hypotheses – needs to be operationalised (made measurable) in a way that can be observed to confirm or disconfirm its occurrence. Eventually, this strategy aims to falsify or verify the theories tested (Saunders et al., 2016).

The inductive reasoning moves towards developing theory systematically from the data collected (Punch, 2013). In inductive strategy, researchers start with data collection, and then analyse the data to observe any patterns that suggest relationships between variables (Gray, 2004). They may construct generalisations from these observations (Bryman, 2016; Saunders et al., 2016), and often take multiple cases or instances to base their conclusion rather than one case (Gray, 2004). Although the inductive strategy moves towards theory generation and building, it would not be true to say that it does not consider pre-existing theories when approaching a problem (Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2014). In fact, selecting an issue for research implies judgments about what is an essential subject for research, and these decisions depend on concepts and values (Gray, 2004). However, this approach does not seek to falsify or support a theory. Instead, it seeks to develop meanings, patterns and consistencies through an inductive process of data gathering (Gray, 2004). In addition,

Saunders et al. (2016) suggest that research using induction reasoning is likely to be specifically concerned with the context in which social phenomena take place. More to the point, researchers adopting this strategy are more likely to adopt the qualitative paradigm of data collection in order to establish different views of phenomena (Punch, 2013; Saunders et al., 2016).

The use of deductive and inductive strategies in the research, however, is not mutually exclusive. Instead of moving from theory to data or data to theory as the case with deductive and inductive strategies, respectively, a study can combine both strategies. This approach is called abductive, and it moves back and forth between data and theories (Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2004). It starts with an observation of a surprising fact (which can occur at any stage in the research process), and then works out a plausible theory that explains its occurrence (Saunders et al., 2016). In this approach, researchers ground a theoretical understanding of the people and context they are studying in the meanings, language and perspectives that form their worldview (Bryman, 2016). Having understood the world through the eyes of participants, researchers must come to a social scientific account of the social world, as explained by the participants' perspectives (Bryman, 2016). They would then integrate the explanations gained by the participants in an overall conceptual framework and test it through existing and new data and revise as necessary (Saunders et al., 2016). The aim is to develop or modify theories by incorporating existing theory to build a new one or modify the existing theory (Saunders et al., 2016).

This research starts with an observation of the fact that the notion of institutional entrepreneurship provides a lens to explain how actors shape institutions and transform existing ones. Its central premise is that actors must break with the taken-for-granted rules of institutions, and institutionalise new patterns and practices that overcome the limits of the old ones ((DiMaggio, 1988 cited Garud et al., 2007; Maguire et al., 2004). However, those actors and their interests are institutionally constructed, and their behaviour is largely founded on taken-for-granted scripts of organisational reality (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Thus, the introduction of institutional entrepreneurship does not adequately provide a place in its theoretical framework for how actors can take a calculating position pertaining to the taken-for-granted rules.

As such, the researcher aims to understand and explain this paradox from the perspective of institutional entrepreneurs. Since the notion of institutional entrepreneurship is grounded in the worldview of institutional entrepreneurs (Battilana, 2006; Battilana and D'aunno, 2009; Garud et al., 2007), the researcher moves iteratively between the notion of institutional entrepreneurship and the participants' data. The aim is to integrate the explanations gained by institutional entrepreneurs in the overall conceptual framework of institutional entrepreneurship to understand how institutionally embedded actors can bring about change. Such interpretive, systematic strategy is used regularly in empirical studies where phenomena are complex and context-specific, and the research is based on constructivist assumptions (Maguire and Hardy, 2006), as is the case here. Based on the above, this research adopts an abductive reasoning to the role of theory in the research.

The decision to adopt one or two research strategies or paradigms will not get the researcher far along the road of doing a piece of research. Two other main decisions have to be made about how the research will be carried out, and the data collection and analysis. The next section presents the research design that explains how the researcher finds answers to research questions.

3.5 Research Design

Research involves controlled, systematic, and rigorous exploration of what is not known. It also involves identifying knowledge gaps and verification of what is already known. The strength of *what* a researcher finds largely depends on *how* it was found. The main purpose of the research design is to describe, decide, justify, and explain how researchers find answers to research questions (Kumar, 2014; Saunders et al., 2016). It serves as a road map that researchers follow during the research journey to find answers to the research questions. As Yin (2014, p. 28) puts it, the research design is the "logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions." Another way of thinking about research design is as a framework for the research project, dealing with at least four issues: what questions to study, who or what will be studied, what relevant data to collect, and how to analyse data (Punch, 2013; Yin, 2014). Therefore, these four issues of research design situate the researcher in the empirical world, showing what procedures and tools to use in answering the research questions (Gray, 2004).

The key to researchers' choice of research design is therefore guided by the research objectives and questions, and the coherence with which these link to research paradigm and philosophy (Saunders et al., 2016). A predominately qualitative research design, which is also prevalent in quantitative research, case study research design is ideal when 'how' and/or 'why' research questions are being asked (Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2004; Kumar, 2014; Punch, 2013; Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2014). Such types of research questions deal with operational links that need to be traced over time, rather than mere incidence or frequencies (Yin, 2014). Unlike 'who', 'what', and 'where' questions that are likely to be used to show the incidence of a factor (Gray, 2004; Yin, 2014). In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the case study can be considered as a method by some scholars rather than a design (Gray, 2004). The argument is that the case study aims to understand the situation (case) in-depth in its natural setting, recognising its context and its complexity (Punch, 2013). The case study has a holistic view, aiming to understand and preserve the unity and wholeness of the case (Bryman, 2016; Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2014). As Goode and Hatt (1952) contend, the case study is then a way of organising social data to preserve the unitary feature of the social object being researched, and not a specific technique (cited in Punch, 2013, p. 120). Hence, a case study is more a design than a method (Punch, 2013).

The most common use of the term 'case' links the case study with a location, such as an organisation or community (Bryman, 2016). The focus is on an intensive and in-depth examination of the setting, process, and interactional dynamics within a unit of study (Kumar, 2014; Saunders et al., 2016). Yin (2014, p. 16) defines the scope of case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the "case") in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident." Thus, the case may refer to a person (e.g. an entrepreneur), a business (e.g. an organisation), a group (e.g. a work team), a change process (e.g. institutionalisation), and many other types of case subject (Punch, 2013; Saunders et al., 2016). It is an essential design when exploring a phenomenon where little is known, or we want to have a holistic understanding of the phenomenon, situation, context, process, or group (Kumar, 2014).

In this research, the aim is to provide a holistic understanding of the institutional entrepreneurship phenomenon in its real-life setting. The boundaries between this phenomenon and the institutional context within which it is being studied is not clearly

evident. It is not clearly apparent how the institutional context influences institutional entrepreneurs and how they could shape the context in which they operate (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Thus, understanding the institutional context is essential to understanding the process by which institutional entrepreneurs instigate the institutional change and the implications it has for their actions, which is fundamental to case study research (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Saunders et al., 2016). More to the point, the main research questions in this research are 'how' and 'why' type questions, which is compatible with case study design. Such questions deemed best suited to achieve the aim of this research as they help uncover the link between institutions and institutional entrepreneurs on the one hand, and they help to understand the influence of context on the way institutional entrepreneurs operate, on the other hand. In this sense, the case study is useful in advancing theory on institutional entrepreneurship (Buhr, 2012). Thus, in this research, the researcher adopts case study as the main design.

Despite the widespread use of case study research, it is not without a limitation. A common criticism of case study research centres around its ability to produce generalisable results from a specific case (Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2004; Kumar, 2014; Punch, 2013; Saunders et al., 2016). How can a single case be representative so that it might generate findings that can generally apply to other cases? This criticism is largely based on positivist ground of using small samples to obtain results of the whole population (Saunders et al., 2016). In response to this critique, writers of case study research claim that generalisation is not the first emphasis of case study research (Bryman, 2016). Rather, as Stake (1995, p. 8) states, "the real business of case study is particularisation, not generalisation." The emphasis is on the uniqueness of the case to understand what it is and what it does (Schwandt and Gates, 2018; Stake, 1995). However, in defence of case studies, Yin (2014), who is widely recognised as one of the leading authorities on case study research, points out that generalisation in scientific inquiries is rarely based on a single experiment. It is usually based on a series of experiments that have studied the same phenomena under varied conditions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). Case studies can also be based on multiple cases of the same phenomenon (Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2004; Kumar, 2014; Yin, 2014).

This section points out that case study design is well suited to study institutional entrepreneurship. But how cases are chosen to provide explanations for the research questions is what the following subsection attempts to discuss.

3.5.1 Case Selection

In case study research, the researcher has to choose between a single and a multiple case design (Dasgupta, 2015; Yin, 2014). According to Yin (2014), a single case study design is appropriate when the case has specific rationale – that is a *unique* circumstance*,* or *common* case, or the case serves a *longitudinal or revelatory* purpose*, or* it represents a *critical* case in testing a well-formulated theory. Multiple case study design is suitable for examining something having lots of cases, members or parts (Stewart, 2012). However, multiple case study design could involve different cases having the rationales of single-case design (Yin, 2014). For example, we might have multiple cases that are unique, common, and critical. Within multiple case study research, each case is analysed on its own as a single case, and/or in the cross-case analysis (Ridder, 2017). Comparison in cross-case analysis explains differences and similarities and how they affect findings (Ridder, 2017).

The focus of attention in the case study is the case in its idiosyncratic complexity; where researchers attempt to reveal the unique features of the case, not the entire population of cases (Burns, 2000). The selection of cases therefore usually does not depend on random selection techniques, but on purposive, judgemental and information-oriented techniques to provide as much information as possible to study the case in its totality (Kumar, 2014). As Stake (1995, p. 4) puts it, “case study research is not sampling research. We do not study a case primarily to understand other cases. Our first obligation is to understand this one case.” The aim is to select cases strategically so that the selected cases are relevant to the research questions posed (Bryman, 2016; Saunders et al., 2016).

As Pettigrew (1990) noted, due to the limited number of cases that can be studied, it makes sense to choose extreme cases where the process of interest is ‘transparently observable’. Moreover, purposive techniques are more suited when trying to select cases that are not feasible due to the absence of an identifiable frame (Bryman, 2016). However, purposive selection techniques do not allow the researcher to generalise to a population (Bryman, 2016), but it allows theoretical or analytical generalisation (Gray, 2004; Yin, 2014). This is because case or cases are not a sampling unit and will be too small to make inference about the population (Schwandt and Gates, 2018; Yin, 2014). In analytical generalisation, researchers compare and contrast the results of the case with an accepted theory or set of

principles (Gray, 2004). If two or more cases are presented to support the theory, it becomes possible to assert that the theory has been replicated (Yin, 2014).

One form of judgemental techniques for the selection of cases is a *theoretical sampling* (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). Since case study research has to cover the phenomenon and its context, the application of statistical sampling would be misplaced (Yin, 2014). In statistical sampling, researchers randomly select samples in order to get precise statistical evidence on the distribution of variables within the population (Eisenhardt, 1989). In contrast, the aim of theoretical sampling is to select cases that are likely to extend or replicate the emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014); cases are chosen because they are suitable for illuminating and extending logic and relationships among constructs (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Data collection is controlled by the emergent theory, where researchers jointly collect, code, and analyse data and decide on what data to collect next to develop the theory at it emerges (Bryman, 2016).

This research examines the process of institutional entrepreneurship that takes place within change projects. The aim is to research institutional entrepreneurs' efforts to bring about change in these projects. The rationale behind considering change projects as cases is that it provides an opportunity to clearly identify the people involved in the project and their contribution throughout the process of institutional entrepreneurship. As Battilana et al. (2009) highlight, most research on institutional entrepreneurship discuss the first phases of the implementation process without focusing on how they may contribute to change institutionalisation. Since this research studies the change project as a whole, the researcher can identify the start of institutional entrepreneurship, and how actors intervene and mobilise resources to institutionalise the innovation. Moreover, studying projects makes it accessible to triangulate data through either projects' documents or interviews with other people involved in the project, especially project members are more likely to be in one setting or institution.

The researcher studies different change projects, and therefore multi-case comparative research design is best suited for this research (Yin, 2014). The reason for selecting this design is that the context in which institutional entrepreneurs operate is an essential determinant of their actions (Garud et al., 2007; Garud et al., 2002; Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Maguire et al., 2004; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). As Fligstein (1997, p. 398) puts it,

the acts of institutional entrepreneurs “depends very much on whether or not an organisational field is forming, stable or in crisis”. The positions they occupy in the field are likely to influence their means to drive change (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). Since contextual factors influence individuals’ behaviour, it is essential to ensure that such behaviour is observed in different locations (Bryman, 2016). As such, this research examines and compares the process of institutional entrepreneurship in mature and emerging organisational fields and led by different actors with reference to their position in the field. Doing very different work means that the researcher can compare the outcomes of institutional entrepreneurship in different contexts and fields and analyse how contextual forces affect institutional entrepreneurs’ strategies to bring about change. This view is supported by Battilana et al. (2009, p. 95) who state that qualitative comparative analysis is well-suited to “examining which combinations of variables lead to specific outcomes – in terms of the emergence of institutional entrepreneurs, the process of divergent change implementation in which they engage, and the diffusion processes”. Thus, studying different projects in different contexts will ensure representativeness of diversity, not only of fields, but also of the entrepreneurial strategies followed by institutional entrepreneurs in different institutional context.

Having identified the nature of cases to be studied, it is vital important to clearly identify how the cases will be selected. Building on DiMaggio’s definition and subsequent studies of institutional entrepreneurship (e.g. Battilana, 2006; Maguire et al., 2004), this research designs two selection criteria for cases. For change projects to be selected as cases, they must meet at least the first of the following two conditions:

1. They have challenged the existing institutional arrangements.
2. They have transformed the existing institution or created new ones.

Only projects that challenge the dominant institutional arrangements, in which they are embedded, qualify as cases in this research. The projects can be initiated by actors from within the institutions or/and actors located outside the institutions. These projects, however, do not have to be successful in creating or transforming the institutional logics. Projects in which projects members mobilised resources needed to introduce new practices but failed to induce potential adopters to embrace their change project, would still be qualified as cases in this research even though the change was ultimately not adopted. The reason is

that actors do not have to be successful in implementing their project to be regarded as institutional entrepreneurs (Battilana et al., 2009).

Determining the adequate number of cases in qualitative research is a matter of experience and judgement in assessing the quality of information gathered against the uses to which it will be put (Sandelowski, 1995). The decision on the number of cases also depends on several factors such as heterogeneity of cases, budget and resources available, and access to the research participants (Mason, 2010). Another key factor is the degree of data saturation (Bowen, 2008; Bryman, 2016) – when researchers continue to add instances of the same phenomenon being studied until they stop learning something new about the phenomenon under investigation (Morse, 2018; Schwandt and Gates, 2018).

Following the above selection criteria for cases, the budget, times, access to participants, and the heterogeneity of cases, the researcher selected two cases in this research. The cases were selected because specific theoretical issues were clearly transparent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). First, preliminary investigations made it clear that significant changes have been introduced within the target institution in each case. It was also apparent that these changes challenged the existing institutional arrangements. Second, the cases are well-documented examples of institutional entrepreneurship in different organisational fields and contexts for which data collection and analysis were feasible. The first case represents the emerging field of positive psychology in Kuwait, while the second case represents the mature field of business incubation and enterprise development in Kuwait as well. Third, actors initiated the changes were located differently with reference to their positions in the field in which the cases took place. For example, actors who led the change in the first case were located outside the institution and field of education, while the second case was led by actors inside the field of business incubation. Fourth, the cases are recent (2010 onward), and the fact that the people involved in the projects were clearly identified and events related to the cases were well-documented meant that the researcher could triangulate data through numerous sources.

This heterogeneity of cases will develop our theoretical understanding of the dynamics of institutional entrepreneurship across multi-contextualised views. Table 3.1 below summarises the two cases and the reasons for selection in each case.

Table 3. 1: Summary of Cases

Case	Location of Actors	Reason for Selection
1. **The establishment of Bareec – the first educational programme for positive psychology in Kuwait and the Middle East**	Outsiders to the institution – Ministry of Education (MoE)	The case challenged the prevailing institutional arrangements at MoE and introduced new practices for positive psychology education for the first time in all over Kuwait.
2. **The establishment of the first business incubator for women in Kuwait and the Gulf region**	Insiders to the institution – Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MOSAL)	The case challenged the pre-existing practices of women entrepreneurs at MOSAL and established a business incubator that introduced new practices and replaced them with the old ones.

However, in selecting cases that can be some events such as organisational change, Yin (2014) warns us that these cases are not easily defined in terms of the start and the endpoints of the case. As such, it is essential to delineating the unit of analysis in the case to determine the scope of data collection. The following subsection presents the unit of analysis for cases.

3.5.2 Unit of Analysis

Defining the case' unit of analysis is an essential step in bounding the case under investigation. The aim is to distinguish data about the subject of the case from data outside the case (Yin, 2014). For example, if the unit of analysis is a group of people, the individuals to be included within the group must be distinguished from those who are outside it. The definition of the unit of analysis is related to the definition of research questions that help identify the relevant data to be gathered about research participants (Yin, 2014). In this research, the research questions are about how institutional entrepreneurs bring change within institutions. Relevant data pertaining to the process of institutional entrepreneurship

will need to be collected from institutional entrepreneurs. This is because the process of institutional entrepreneurship depends extensively on institutional entrepreneurs' view about their efforts to bring about change (Maguire et al., 2004). Thus, the unit of analysis is the institutional entrepreneurs.

Institutional entrepreneurs hardly refer to themselves by that name. They are unwitting individuals who might implicitly challenge dominant institutional structure through informal and illegal means (Droege and Marvel, 2010). Thus, the adoption of random selection techniques will not be feasible due to the absence of an identifiable frame for institutional entrepreneurs (Bryman, 2016). Rather, more judgmental techniques such as theoretical sampling are suitable to identify actors that serve the purpose of the research precisely. As such, having adopted theoretical sampling, it is necessary to design selection criteria for the research participants – institutional entrepreneurs.

Building on Battilana's (2006, p. 657) conception of institutional entrepreneurs – "individuals who somehow break with the rules and practices associated with the dominant institutional logic(s) and thereby develop alternative rules and practices can be regarded as institutional entrepreneurs.", actors must fulfil two conditions to qualify as institutional entrepreneurs. They must:

1. Initiate changes that challenge the existing institutional arrangements; *and*
2. Actively participate in the implementation of these changes that could transform existing practices *or* bring to the fore new ways of doing things in the field of governance.

Only when actors initiated changes that challenged the dominant institutional environment in which they are embedded do change actors qualify as institutional entrepreneurs. Informed by the literature review and discussion with Steve Maguire, a prominent scholar on institutional entrepreneurship, these changes can be initiated by actors from within and/or outside the institution in question. The other requirement for institutional entrepreneurship is active participation in change efforts. To be regarded as institutional entrepreneurs, individuals must also actively mobilise resources to implement those changes. The candidates who meet the selection criteria will be deemed qualified to serve as institutional entrepreneurs in the cases in this research. Table 3.2 shows the institutional entrepreneurs selected in each case and their institutional location.

Table 3. 2: The Institutional Entrepreneurs in the Research

Case	Institutional Entrepreneurs	Institutional Location of Institutional Entrepreneurs
Bareec	Sheikha Intisar Al Sabah	Outsider
	Mr Rokaya Hussain	Outsider
The Business Incubator	Mrs Fayza Alamiri	Insider
	Mrs Awatef Alqattan	Insider
	Mrs Sahar Shawwa	Insider
	Dr Turki Alshemmari	Insider

In this section, the researcher adopted multi-case comparative study design, designed the section criteria for cases and institutional entrepreneurs, and selected them accordingly. The next section discusses the data collection methods.

3.6 Data Collection

In case study research, there are different sources of evidence pertaining to data collection. It is beyond this research to discuss all sources of evidence. However, the researcher explains the sources selected in this research, and the reasons behind this selection. In this study, the researcher aims to collect data not only from institutional entrepreneurs, but also from the institutions in which they inhabit. Therefore, taking into account the research purpose and questions, the main two sources of qualitative data collection are semi-structured interviews and documentation. Other qualitative methods of data collection, such as observation is not suitable for this research. This is because this research investigates the projects that had already taken place. Consequently, observing and assessing the behaviour and actions of people involved in those projects after project completion does not provide accurate information on their activities during projects as their activities are bound by projects objectives. Other quantitative methods such as questionnaires are not suitable as the researcher adopts qualitative research in this research.

3.6.1 Interviews

Interviews are the most prominent data collection tool in qualitative research. It is the most powerful way of accessing people's meanings, perception, constructions of reality and definition of situations (Brinkmann, 2018; Gray, 2004; Kumar, 2014; Punch, 2013). Essentially, it is about asking purposeful questions and listening to the answers carefully to explore these further (Saunders et al., 2016). In case study research, interviews are one of the most important sources of case study evidence because most case studies are about human actions or affairs (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2014). Well-informed interviews can provide essential insights into such actions or affairs where people can tell us in their terms about the substance of their actions (Punch, 2013).

There are different types of interviews, and the choice of which will largely depend on the objectives of the research. Interviews may be divided into three categories: structured interviews, unstructured interviews, and semi-structured interviews. The important dimensions of this variation are how deep an interview aims to go, and the degree of structure in the interview (Punch, 2013). For example, structured interviews are tightly standardised and planed in advanced (Brinkmann, 2018; Gray, 2004), and do not attempt to go to any great depth (Punch, 2013). They are generally used to collect data for quantitative analysis (Saunders et al., 2016). The interviewer asks questions in the same wording and order as specified in the interview schedule (Brinkmann, 2018; Bryman, 2016; Kumar, 2014), and the interviewees tend to be more controlled than any other types of interviews (Punch, 2013). Thus, structured interviews do not allow enough flexibility to access people perceptions and meanings, which this research aims to achieve, and so it is considered unsuitable for this research.

In contrast, unstructured interviews allow an interviewee to talk freely about the subject matter (Gray, 2004), and questions are not standardised or pre-planned (Punch, 2013). Unstructured interviews are generally used to explore in-depth a general area of interest, and are used to gather data for qualitative analysis (Saunders et al., 2016). The interviewees have much flexibility and space to reflect on their experience and perspectives. The main role of the investigator is to remain a listener and occasionally ask questions that may clarify the story (Brinkmann, 2018). However, the researcher may be challenged by being deviated from the interview topic. By their very nature, in unstructured interviews, the direction the

questions take depends largely on the responses of the interviewees (Gray, 2004). This can lead to losing the desired discussion issues and failing to address the research questions. This type of interviews is not suitable for this research as the researcher will identify certain issues in advance to direct the interviews around the research questions.

When the researcher is beginning the research with a fairly clear focus, where more specific issues can be addressed, semi-structured interviews will be best suited (Bryman, 2016). Semi-structured interviews are not standardised and are often used to collect data for qualitative analysis (Gray, 2004). The researcher has a list of issues and themes to cover (often referred to interview guide) (Saunders et al., 2016) to enable the researcher to glean the interviewees' perspectives on their social world, while allowing flexibility in conducting the interviews (Bryman, 2016). In semi-structured interviews, the interviewees have a great deal of leeway in replying to the questions (Bryman, 2016). This means that the questions may vary from interview to another, and the researcher might omit certain questions in particular interviews in response to specific organisational context encountered in relation to the subject of research (Saunders et al., 2016). The researcher has a greater say compared to unstructured interviews in focusing the conversation on the issues deemed essential to the research project (Brinkmann, 2018). Additional questions may also be required given the nature of events within specific institutions. In addition, semi-structure interviews will provide the researcher with an opportunity to probe the participants' answers, where there is a need to build, or explain their responses (Gray, 2004; Punch, 2013).

In this research, semi-structured interviews are considered the most suitable type of interviews to achieve the purpose of the research. The reason is that the researcher starts with a clear focus on issues pertaining to the process of institutional entrepreneurship – deviation from institutional arrangements, the institutionalisation of innovation, and success or failure of entrepreneurial efforts. These issues will direct the discussion in the interviews in a way that helps to answer the research questions on how institutional entrepreneurs challenge the existing institutional arrangements in their efforts and bring novel practices. Additionally, institutional context shapes the way institutional entrepreneurs operate, so the interviews for the various institutions will not be conducted in the same manner as each institution is rooted in a different context. Therefore, each institution needs to be treated differently. The questions in the interviews will vary due to the differences of contexts.

However, there is still a need to ensure some structure in the cases in this research to ensure cross-case comparability (Bryman, 2016).

In addition, as explained earlier, the researcher adopts an interpretive philosophy, where the focus is on understanding the meanings that institutional entrepreneurs ascribe to their actions. It is necessary to probe the participants' responses for further explanation. Such probing may also allow for a discovery of new areas that have not been previously considered, and that help meet the research objectives (Gray, 2004; Saunders et al., 2016). The interviewees may use ideas or words in a specific way, and the opportunity to probe these meanings will add depth and significance to the data obtained (Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2014). To ensure reliable results, the researcher will maintain neutral but engaging posture during all interviews to avoid any bias that could result when the participants tailor answers that conform to the researcher's expectations. The researcher will avoid using leading questions that put words in the participants' mouth to control any bias that may result from their use. Rather, open questions using institutional entrepreneur's language and words will be used to encourage them to provide developmental and extensive answer.

Since institutional entrepreneurship evokes a complex political process, where several actors with varied interests and unequal power are involved (Battilana et al., 2009), it is necessary to develop a finer-grained analysis that accounts for actions of actors affected by the process of shaping institutions. Such complementary approach should "document the actions of institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators" (Battilana et al., 2009, p. 95) and "take the viewpoints of actors other than institutional entrepreneurs more seriously" (Hardy and Maguire, 2018, p. 275). In addition, entrepreneurial efforts might be a success or failure. In such situations, people might exaggerate their success stories or their contribution to change initiatives. They might even blame others for any failure. As such, the genuineness of their views might affect the quality of data collected. Yin (2014) suggests that one way to test the genuineness of the interviewees' views is to deliberately check with people known to be familiar with their work and who might hold different perspectives.

To present a balanced picture of institutional entrepreneurship, the researcher does not only aim to conduct interviews with institutional entrepreneurs, but also with their collaborators. Focusing on the viewpoints of actors other than institutional entrepreneurs offers a vantage point to look at institutional entrepreneurship (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). The identification

of collaborators depends on the researcher's ability to inquire about the key individuals who were involved in the change initiatives from the institutional entrepreneurs during the interviews, and through projects documents available. The inclusion of several participants can ensure data triangulation and improve the validity of the research (Mathison, 1988). Those people will be asked about their opinions on 1) the development of change projects and 2) the effects that they and the institutional entrepreneurs had on the project.

Prior to the interviews, interviews guides that contain questions drawn from the literature were developed for the institutional entrepreneurs (see Appendix 1), and their collaborators (see Appendix 2). The guides aim to assist the researcher to keep the interviews focused on the key themes and issues for discussion, and thereby ensuring reliability (Arksey and Knight, 1999). The guides were not given to the participants but loosely referred to by the researcher during the interview. Participants were provided with a list of interview themes (see Appendix 3) before the interview to help promote validity and reliability (Saunders et al., 2016). This is because it informs participants about the information that the researcher seeks to collect and provides them with the opportunity to prepare for the interview by collecting the required documentation from their files. Follow up interviews, if needed, will be conducted to discuss new issues that are of relevance, or seek calcifications of comments made. A decision was made that during the interviews, the researcher will not refer to the thoughts, discussion, findings, or outcomes of interviews in the other case. It was considered vitally important in this research to initially preserve the individuality of institutions before the start of data analysis. The reason is that this process focuses the interviews on the participants' views, rather than the researcher's interpretations of influences from other institutions.

In this research, the researcher conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with the institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators. Table 3.3 classifies the interviews and interviewees in each case. The interviews were conducted in English and Arabic, according to interviewees' preference. The interviews took place in Spring 2019 in Kuwait, lasted between 45 minutes to 120 minutes, and were tape-recorded and transcribed. The interviews focused on the development of change projects in each case and the set of actions that contributed to institutionalisation. Follow-up interviews were conducted by phone in Winter 2019/2020 with some participants. The follow-up interviews sought some clarifications on some comments made earlier and lasted between 15 to 30 minutes. All

names of the interviewees are followed with identical letters – Institutional Entrepreneurs (IE) and Collaborators (C) – to identify who the interviewees are easily whenever they are mentioned.

Table 3. 3: Interviews Across Cases

Case Name	Number of Interviewees		Follow-up Interviews	
	Institutional Entrepreneurs (IE)	Collaborators (C)	No.	Interviewee
Bareec	2	7	1	1 Entrepreneur
The business incubator	4	3	4	3 Entrepreneurs 1 Collaborator

6.1.1 Pilot Interviews

At the very early stage of the research, the researcher aimed to consider individual institutional entrepreneurs as cases instead of change projects. Accordingly, he conducted four pilot interviews with institutional entrepreneurs in three different countries. He met with Mr Kamal Zoubi – a former Secretary-General of Water Authority Jordan – and Mr Khaldon Khashman – the Secretary-General of Arab Countries Water Utilities Association and former Undersecretary for the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation – in Amman, Jordan in November 2018. He also met with Dr Nabil Qaddumi – Chairman of SPECTO International Petroleum Company, Chairman of Projacs International, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Welfare Association (TAAWON), and Palestine's Governor at the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in Kuwait. The researcher also met with Mr Geert Vasintjan – Change Manager at the Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs (Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in Brussels, Belgium.

While the pilot interviewees reflected on their entrepreneurial experience in several projects, the pilot interviews showed that considering institutional entrepreneurs as cases would be problematic. The institutional entrepreneurs interviewed during the pilot stage have involved in different projects with many people involved in each project. It was not possible to access other people who worked with the institutional entrepreneurs nor accessing related

documents, especially their entrepreneurial efforts took place in the late 1990s and the beginning of the second millennium. It was even hard to understand the start of institutional entrepreneurship process and provide explanations for how they deviate from institutional determinism and institutionalise their innovation. Absence of documents and collaborators made it difficult to assess the pre-existing institutional arrangements in order to identify the form of change that had been institutionalised.

To sum, this subsection presented the main method of data collection adopted in this research – interviews. The researcher conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with the institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators in the two cases selected in this research. The four pilot interviews show that process-centric accounts appear more appropriate approach to study the process of institutional entrepreneurship than actor-centric accounts. The next subsection presents another method for data collection – documents.

3.6.2 Documentation

While interviews represent themselves as the most important source of case study data, documents play an explicit role in data collection within case study research (Yin, 2014). The most important use of documents in case study research is to corroborate and augment the evidence from interviews (Punch, 2013; Yin, 2014), thereby allowing data triangulation (Stake, 1995). The triangulation of data will not only become a way to confirm what is already know from interviews, but also a source of extra knowledge about the issue under investigation (Flick, 2018). Unlike interviews that are considered primary source of data, documents are considered secondary data and seen as providing insights into events, actions and reasons that might not otherwise be readily available (Stake, 1995). The range of documents that might be used by researchers might include diaries, minutes of meetings, progress reports, reports, government decrees, policy papers, and rules & regulations (Bryman, 2016; Gray, 2004; Punch, 2013; Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2014). Such documents include data that endure physically as evidence, allowing data to be reanalysed for a purpose different to that for which they were originally gathered, and transposed across time and space (Saunders et al., 2016).

In this research, the sources of documents will largely depend on the access given to the researcher to specific institutional files, and the researcher's ability to locate other Internet sources. All participants will be asked for suitable documents that have relevance to the

discussion during the interviews. Similarly, the researcher will do Internet search to collect data related to change projects instigated by institutional entrepreneurs. Information from a variety of sources such press reports and other published materials relevant to particular case study will be independently obtained and analysed. A decision was made in this research to consider documents prior to interviews to allow specific incidents to be mentioned and commented upon during the interviews. This approach is particularly helpful in providing a background for various aspects of cases studied and serves as a significant record of activities. However, additional sources often emerge during or subsequent the interviews.

The researcher collected a range of documents in this research. First, given the popularity of cases, he searched the media for coverage of each case. He used Google search engine, searching for key search terms in each case. For example, in the business incubator case, he used the term “Al Salam Business Incubator Kuwait”. He also uses the terms “Bareec” and “Alnowair” in the second case of Bareec. All terms were searched in English and Arabic, and this process took place before and after the interviews. During the interviews, the participants were asked for some clarifications in relation to certain project related actions presented by the media coverage. The collected media coverage includes news articles, press releases and conferences, as well as TV programmes that hosted some institutional entrepreneurs in every case, discussing their change efforts. Second, the researcher asked the participants for related project documents. In every case, some participants, including institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators, provided some documents. These documents included booklets, newsletters, internal letters and correspondences, project documents, progress reports, and term of references. The documents obtained provided important background information about the objectives and activities of each case as well as the actors involved.

In this section, the researcher selected two methods for data collection: interviews and documents. How the data collected will be analysed is discussed in the next section of data analysis.

3.7 Data Analysis

The data analysis consisted of four main stages. The first stage involved developing a narrative account (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois III, 1988) that chronicled the emergence and

institutionalisation of change in each case. Drawing on the interviews and secondary data – various internal documents, and the collected media coverage – the researcher was careful to ensure, as far as possible, the narrative precisely and chronologically ordering descriptions of the process leading to the institutionalisation of innovation in each case. This analysis captured 'who did what, and when', which in turn formed the basis of the cases' description.

The second stage of data analysis involved assessing the form and degree of change within each case. The juxtaposition of multiple accounts of events from different sources and actors' evaluation of these events showed clear agreement that significant changes took place in each case. For example, the introduction of Bareec in the first case created new practices for positive psychology education for the first time in all over Kuwait. In the second case, the establishment of the business incubator introduced new practices of women entrepreneurs, which replaced the pre-existing practices for women empowerment.

The third stage of data analysis involved identifying the institutional entrepreneurs who initiated and led the change. To identify the institutional entrepreneurs in each case, the researcher analysed all interview transcripts and official documents to examine actors' attributions of responsibility for the change. In doing so, he identified the activities that contributed to the deviation from institutional arrangements and institutionalisation of change in each case, as well as the individuals who participated in them. The researcher then returned to the interviews to examine actors' contribution for the changed practices and identified the institutional entrepreneurs who had met the selection criteria presented earlier in this chapter. Interestingly, other project members in each case had referred to the institutional entrepreneurs as such. The evidence, however, strongly suggests that their activities were central in leading the change process and motivating the cooperation of other actors.

The last stage of data analysis directly addressed the research questions. The researcher examined data and identified broad themes, refined them into more precise categories (Yin, 2014), and interrogated these categories by noting patterns (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014). Consistent with abductive qualitative methods, this was not a linear process, but an iterative procedure that moved between data, theories and emerging patterns (Snow, Morrill and Anderson, 2003; Yin, 2014). This process involved noting actions taken by the

institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators. To address the first research question, concerning the deviation from institutional determinism, the researcher examined a number of reasons that explain the institutional entrepreneurs' engagement in the entrepreneurial efforts, and how they constructed and justified the rationale for change. In relation to the second research question pertaining to the institutionalisation of their institutional project, the researcher examined the data for ways in which the innovation become institutionalised and taken-for-granted. Regarding the final research question, the researcher identified a number of reasons that explain the success of institutional entrepreneurs' efforts.

In the following section, ethical considerations and data confidentiality related to this research are discussed.

3.8 Research Ethics

Research ethics concern the appropriateness of the researcher's behaviour in relation to those who are affected by it or the subjects of the research (Gray, 2004). As research deals with individuals and the things that affect them, ethical issues can arise at all stages of the research process. These issues are related to the confidentiality of data that need be provided and the anonymity of individual participants or organisations (Saunders et al., 2016). However, the rise of such issues largely depends on the nature of research. For example, participant anonymity and confidentiality are not appropriate to this research project. This is because many interests in the field of this research is about organisations and individuals. Institutional entrepreneurs are usually ranked highly in the organisation and are open to talk about their initiatives explicitly. The nature of the research makes it relevant to the participants to be able to identify themselves or their organisations.

However, if participants ask for their data to be confidential and anonymous, the researcher will respect this concern. Accordingly, data will always be anonymised and confidential. All information from data that may make research participants easily identifiable and traceable including personal information – such as job titles, names, place of work, detailed institutional description, and other information that the researcher considers relevant – will be removed. During the research, every participant will be given an ID code. This code will be used to track the data back to each individual participant. In addition, transcripts will be anonymised, and details that could be used to identify participants will be removed from transcripts or concealed in write-ups. All data will be stored with restricted access both on

an external and online hard drive in password-protected folders to ensure the security of the data and only the researcher will have access to it. Data will be disposed of after ten years, following the Code of Practice for Research of the University of Birmingham.

The participation in the research is voluntary, and informed consent obtained from all participants to take part in the research. All participants were asked to sign a written Consent Form (see Appendix 4) before the beginning of the interview. The Consent Form involves ensuring that all participants are given sufficient information, the time to consider without any coercion or pressure, and the opportunity to ask questions to be able to reach a fully considered, informed, and freely given decision on whether or not to participate in the research. They were also made informed that they were free to withdraw their agreement at any time during the research process. To help them reach a fully informed decision regarding their participation, the researcher provided all participants with the Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix 5). This sheet includes information about the nature of the research project, its purpose, how data will be stored and reported, and whom to contact in case of concerns. The sheet was sent to them via email (or handed in where possible) at least a day before the interview to give the participants enough time to read it before the interview.

The University of Birmingham ethical guidelines guided the conduct of this research. The Ethical Review Committee at the University of Birmingham approved the data collection strategy – Ethical Review Form. This ensured that the research methodology and instruments used in the research were reviewed in accordance with the University of Birmingham's Code of Practice for Research and Data Protection Act 1998.

3.9 Fieldwork

In this section, I discuss how the fieldwork was planned and carried out in order to clarify the research journey involved. The fieldwork took place in Kuwait, not my home country, Palestine. While this may provide me with a better position to avoid any influence that may appear between the research process and my cultural background, it proves to be challenging. The main challenge was to identify the change project and the key people who were involved. Most importantly, the most challenging part was to get the actors involved to speak about their change efforts. As such, I relied on my personal network to gain access to the change actors and their organisations.

Before embarking on my research journey in Kuwait, it is worth mentioning that I contacted several organisations, expressing my interest to conduct the research fieldwork within them. For example, after reading some policy papers for certain projects delivered by Oxford Policy Management in the UK, in which significant entrepreneurial changes took place, I contacted the projects leads for interviews, but they refused to take part in the research. In a business conference in London, I met with a senior staff member at Qatar Financial Centre and discussed my research project and the possibility of studying some projects at the centre. As advised by the staff member, I sent an electronic mail with a brief of my research to the staff member's mail as to be circulated to other staff at the centre, but I never received any reply back. I also contacted different organisations that led some entrepreneurial change projects such as The Asia Foundation, Belgian Development Agency, and many others, but I did not receive any response back until now.

The realisation for the need to conduct the fieldwork in Kuwait came after I read about an initiative led by Sheikha Intisar Al-Sabah, a member of Al Sabah Royal Family of Kuwait. I was following her on social media – Instagram – where I read some posts about Alnowair and Bareec initiatives. After preliminary investigation, I found the change brought by Bareec initiative meets the selection criteria for cases in my research. I then contacted Sheikha Intisar office, inviting her to participate in my research and reflect on her experience in bringing Bareec. She replied, and we agreed on a date for the interview. I then travelled to Kuwait on the 4th April 2019. Until that time, the other case in Kuwait (the business incubator) was not there yet.

When I first arrived in Kuwait, I met with a family friend who connected me with his cousin, Sahar Shawwa. I then met with Sahar on 09th April 2019 and discussed the selection criteria for cases in my research. At the beginning, I was using the term 'institutional entrepreneurs' when talking about my research. I then figured that the term is a bit misleading for the potential research participants. Many of them conceived institutional entrepreneurs as entrepreneurs and started to refer me to some business projects carried out by entrepreneurs. I then used the term 'change agents' instead of 'institutional entrepreneurs' while discussing my research with the potential participants, but still following the same selection criteria for both the cases, and institutional entrepreneurs. Sahar discussed several initiatives that had taken place, and we agreed on the one that includes the establishment of the first business incubator in Kuwait and the Arabian Gulf as it met the selection criteria

for cases. During the discussion, I enquired about the main actors in the project, and a brief description of their roles. Sahar then contacted the main actors involved, informing them about my research, and provided me with their contact information. Two days later, she sent me some important project documents.

On the 14th April 2019, I had a dinner with Awatef Alqattan and Sahar Shawwa at the beach. During the dinner, we discussed Awatef's efforts to push for the change in the business incubator project. It was not a recorded meeting, but a social and introductory one to discuss further my research and to gain the participants' trust as well as understanding other actors involved and their contribution. We then scheduled for the interview with Awatef. On the following day, I met with Dalal Sabeel at the business incubator. It was also an introductory meeting to gain her trust and allow her to understand my research and what I aim to collect. We discussed the establishment of the incubator and its activities, and she gave me some documents about the incubator. On the 17th April, I conducted an interview with Awatef, and it lasted for 85 minutes. On the next day, I had an interview with Dr Turki Alshemmari in his office at Kuwait University. The interview lasted 71 minutes, and he provided me with many project documents. In the following week, I had interviews with Dalal, Fyza Alamiri, and Sahar on 22nd, 23rd, and 24th April, respectively. Dalal and Sahar had also provided me with additional internal project documents. In April 2020, I contacted Sahar and Turi to connect me with Munther Almatouq and Narges Mohammad. I conducted an interview with Munther online using Whats application on 24th April 2020. On the following day, I conducted an interview with Narags using Whats application as well.

On 21st April 20190, I had an interview with Sheikha Intisar and Rokaya Hussain at Lulua Group, where Bareec management office is. At the end of the meeting, Rokaya provided me with some booklets and books about Bareec. I also requested to conduct interviews with schools' teachers and principals who implement Bareec. Rokaya then arranged for meetings with school principals and teachers. In the same week, I had interviews with Amal Alqallaf – Principal of Al Salmiya Secondary School – on the 24th April, and teachers at Salah Eldeen Secondary School on the 23rd April including; Ali Brogerdian, Vice Principal of Salah Eldeen Secondary School; Ibrahim Malek, Teacher of Geology; Ali Alshawwaf, Teacher of Chemistry; Dhari Alsafran, Teacher of Art; and a student. In the same week, I attended an event, where, Dr Khalid Mahdi, the Secretary-General of the Supreme Council for Planning and Development (SCPD), was a guest speaker. I met him briefly during the event and

managed to arrange for an interview with him. In the following week, I had the interview with Dr Khalid in his office at the General Secretariat of the SCPD on the 2nd May 2019.

3.10 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to discuss the methodological concepts followed in this research as well as methods of data collection and analysis employed. Starting with the research questions, the researcher chose the methods that help in providing an answer to the research problem. In discussing the research philosophy, it becomes clear that the researcher's ontological stance is constructionism, while his epistemological position is interpretivism. The research paradigm section highlights that qualitative research is well suited to this research, and abductive reasoning is deemed a suitable strategy to study institutional entrepreneurship. The chapter shows that multi-case comparative study is a well-suited research design to study institutional entrepreneurship in different contexts. It has also designed selection criteria for cases and defined institutional entrepreneurs as the unit of analysis in this research. Interviews with both institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators were considered the main method of data collection. Documents were also chosen as a method to augment and validate the data in the interviews. Pilot interviews informed that process-centric accounts seem well suited to study the process of institutional entrepreneurship. Data analysis discussed four stages for analysing data in the research, where the researcher identified the nature of change and the institutional entrepreneurs in each case as well as ways to address the research questions. The researcher then discussed the ethical approval for the research, and the practicality of his research journey and fieldwork.

CHAPTER FOUR: OUTSIDER-DRIVEN INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EMERGING FIELDS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter draws on an empirical case of outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in the emerging field of positive psychology to address the research questions. The case is about the institutionalisation of Bareec – the first educational programme of positive psychology – within the Kuwaiti Ministry of Education (MoE). The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, are actors outside the established institution of MoE. The research questions are: 1) 'How do institutional entrepreneurs deviate from existing institutional arrangements?' 2) 'How is innovation institutionalised?' and 3) 'What explains the success or failure in institutional entrepreneurs' efforts?'.

To address the research questions, the researcher drew on interviews with the institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators, project documents, presentations, internal documents, and the collected media coverage. To address the first research question, concerning the deviation from institutional determinism, the researcher examined a number of reasons that explain the institutional entrepreneurs' engagement in Bareec, and how they constructed and justified the rationale for change. In relation to the second research question pertaining to the institutionalisation of their institutional project, the researcher examined the data for ways in which Bareec become taken-for-granted. Regarding the final research question, the researcher identified a number of reasons that explain the success in the institutionalisation of Bareec.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents a narrative account for the development of Bareec. Next, the researcher draws on the data to present the analysis and findings for the research questions. Last, the researcher concludes with a discussion of contributions.

4.2 Bareec: A Case of Outsiders-Institutional Entrepreneurs

This section outlines the establishment of the first educational programme for positive psychology in Kuwait and the Middle East within the Kuwaiti MoE. The programme aims to increase wellbeing among high schools and university students in Kuwait by implementing

positive psychology interventions. The institutional entrepreneurs who led the efforts to institutionalise the programme within the MoE are Sheikha Intisar Al Sabah, and Rokaya Hussain. Their collaborators include Khaled Mahdi, Amal Alqallaf, Ali Brogerdian, Ali Shawwaf, Dhari Alsafran, and Ibrahim Malik. The researcher also interviewed a Bareec student at a high school.

Drawing on the interviews, internal documents and letters, project documents, media coverage, and governmental and non-governmental websites, we developed a narrative account that chronicled the establishment of Bareec. The first subsection discusses the emergence of positive psychology in Kuwait. In the second subsection, the researcher outlines the development of the new practices of Bareec

4.2.1 The Emergence of Positive Psychology in Kuwait

The state of Kuwait, sharing its borders with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, is located on the coast of the Arabian Gulf. Its total population is 4.2 million based on 2020 statistics (WPR, 2020). Kuwaiti citizens amount to only one-third of the total population, while the remaining two-thirds of Kuwait's population is comprised of foreign workforce (HRW, 2020). Due to its sixth-largest oil reserve in the world, the country entered what is known as the Golden Era (1946–1982), where it followed oil-based development model (Lambert et al., 2019). It was considered the most developed country in the region in the 1970s. However, the country was rocked by the crash of its stock market and Iraqi invasion in the 1980s and 1990s. Coupled with extreme oil price volatility, this situation resulted in an increase in unemployment and deterioration in the standards of living. The country has socio-economically stagnated in the past few decades to the extent that it is now considered one of the least dynamic economies in the region (Olver-Ellis, 2019). In a report by Gallup (2011) on the subjective well-being and health of the Gulf nations, it is noted that 53% of Kuwait nationals were classified as 'struggling'; reporting financial worry, daily stress, and double the sick days. The introduction of 'New Kuwait' vision has brought urgency to the fact that the oil-based development model is not sustainable (Olver-Ellis, 2019). The new vision places a great importance on human capital as a key pillar for development. As a result, the government welcomed any intervention programmes from different stakeholders in the public and private sector, NGOs, and other Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that could boost the development plans.

In 2013, Sheikha Intisar Al Sabah (IE), a member of Al Sabah Royal Family of Kuwait, founded Alnowair – a non-profit organisation aims to promote wellbeing within Kuwaiti society (Alnowair, 2020). Alnowair is the first NGO in Kuwait to work in the field of positive psychology. It targets youth and seeks to promote positive attitudes as a contributor to happiness and wellbeing. They run different campaigns and programmes to spread positivity and bring about positive social behaviour among youth. In 2015, Alnowair decided to incorporate some of their activities at the educational institutions such as schools and universities as these institutions are the main incubator for youth. In doing so, they conducted a pilot project to implement simple positive psychology exercises in three public high schools during the academic year of 2015/2016. They made an informal agreement with the schools to incorporate five simple exercises, each takes from five to ten minutes within the modules being taught, and one exercise is implemented per week. At each school, one class implemented the exercises. In November 2015, Rokaya Hussain (IE), former Director of Kuwait City School District, joined Alnowair as a Director of Educational Projects. At the end of the 2015/2016 academic year, Alnowair evaluated the pilot project and found that Alnowair classes recorded better results than other classes. In a booklet for Alnowair, two school principals out of the three schools in the pilot project provided testimonials on the pilot project. They mentioned that students participated in Alnowair's classes recorded lower levels of school absenteeism and violence compared to other classes. Amal Alqallaf (C), Al Salmiyah School Principal – third school in the pilot project – said that students at Alnowair's class showed more self-confidence compared to others. After these results, Alnowair decided to expand their intervention and develop a positive psychology curriculum based on scientific research in positive psychology.

4.2.2 Bareec: New Practices of Positive Psychology Education

In Jun 2016, Alnowair developed Bareec – the first educational programme to implement positive psychology curriculum in Kuwait and the region. Bareec is a positive psychology intervention programme that targets high school students (from Grade 10 to 12) at public schools in Kuwait, and students at Kuwait University (Bareec, 2020). It consists of 15-min weekly interactive intervention delivered by teachers during regular class time. The interventions used in the programme come from the positive psychology research and modified to fit the gender and culture, as well as context and age differences between high

school and university students (Lambert et al., 2019). The programme consists of six books. Book one and Book two introduce students at Grade Ten to the programme, a book for one term. In Grade 11, Book three and Book four encourage students to connect with others. Book five and Book six targets Grade 12 students and train students to express by writing. The programme is an attempt to increase wellbeing, enhance a desire to live life effectively, and in a meaningful manner that is consistent with who one is (Lambert et al., 2019). Table 4.1 describes the interventions delivered during the first term of grade 10 students.

In summer 2016, Bareec management approached the MoE to get official approval to work with the schools. They received written approval from MoE to implement Bareec programme at some schools in the country. The official approval means that Bareec management can intervene without any financial sponsorship from the MoE. Before the intervention in the schools, Bareec management ensures that all teachers who participate in Bareec receive the required training for effective Bareec implementation (It is worth mentioning that the participation of schools and even teachers within schools in Bareec is optional). The training on Bareec programme takes place twice a year, each before the beginning of academic terms. The most qualified teachers get training on positive psychology at the Greater Good Science Centre at the University of California, Berkeley, to learn more knowledge and tools to become trainers of positive psychology. At the beginning of the 2016/2017 academic year, ten schools participated in Bareec programme in addition to the three schools that implemented the pilot project. In total, 13 schools participated in 2016/2017, including 96 teachers and more than 1600 students. Meanwhile, Bareec management approached Kuwait University to implement their programme at the University. Since the programme is optional, four colleagues at Kuwait University (social science, life social science, engineering, and computer science) agreed to implement Bareec programme, including eight lecturers and 500 students.

Between January and June 2017, Bareec management, along with the specialist who developed Bareec programme conducted a study to assess the impact of the programme on the students. The study aimed to determine whether positive psychology interventions could increase wellbeing and satisfaction in samples of secondary school students and Kuwait university students. The school sample includes students from the new ten schools participated in 2016/2017 (excluding the three schools of the pilot project). On the university sample, students come from the four collages participated in Bareec. Published in the

Journal of *Social Indicators Research*, the study found that levels of wellbeing were higher in both high school and university students who received the intervention compared to control groups in both samples (Lambert et al., 2019). In the same year, Sheikha Intisar presented Bareec to Sheikh Nasser Al Sabah, former Prime Minister of Kuwait, who praised the programme and became the Honorary Chairman of the Board of Directors for Bareec (Ebaid, 2017). On 21st February 2017, Bareec programme launch ceremony took place at Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Cultural Centre with the presence of the Minister of Education, Bareec management and Bareec students (Ebaid, 2017).

In summer 2017, Sheikha Intisar (IE) and Rokaya Hussain (IE) approached Dr Khaled Mahdi (C), the Secretary-General of Supreme Council for Planning and Development (SCPD), to include Bareec in the development plans. The SCPD supervises the development of Kuwait Vision 2035, New Kuwait, and identifies the state's developmental strategies (SCPS, 2020). Being listed among the development plans of Kuwait means that it becomes compulsory for the MoE to implement it. In other words, the Cabinet approved the plan, allocated budget, and the SCPD will monitor the plan implementation. On 28th August 2017, the SCPD approved Bareec programme within the MoE's development plans, starting from 01st April 2018. The inclusion of Bareec in the development plans by SCPD took place after the MoE agreed to implement the programme. After being part of MoE's development plan, Bareec programme will receive financial sponsorship through the MoE.

In the meanwhile, more schools showed interest in Bareec. In the academic year 2017/2018, 24 schools participated in Bareec, including more than 100 teachers and 3000 students. Around the same time, Bareec management developed Bareec application – a mobile application that students can use to implement Bareec activities and allow teachers to follow up with their students. In the following academic years more schools joined Bareec. In 2018/219, the number of schools to participate in Bareec rose to 36, with 275 teachers and around 8000 students. In 2019/2020, 47 schools participated in the programme. In March 2019, Bareec management and MoE signed a binding contract where Bareec management receive financial sponsorship to fulfilling Bareec programme. This contract was a result of Bareec being included in the MoE's development plans.

Table 4. 1: Interventions Used in Bareec programme

Week	Intervention	Description
1	Introduction	What is happiness? (consuming/materialism versus being, doing and relating) What you think you need to be happy may not actually make you happy.
2	What makes me happy?	Notice and appreciate the positive, connect with other students.
3	Three good deeds	Students engage in three good deeds towards others during the week.
4	Ask your family	Students connect with their families over purposeful activities to generate emotional bonds.
5	Plan a great day	Students plan for purposeful positivity to elicit positive emotion.
6	Cool classes: are they right?	Students check their beliefs and how they could limit their positive mindsets.
7	Get moving!	The role of physical activity in boosting positivity; students plan to increase their activity in the week.
8	Good news only	Find good news; students limit their media exposure to negativity.
9	Awesome Kuwaiti, right there!	Create the positive, national pride, hope, and collective action.
10	Give your best advice	Create confidence in decisions and self-efficacy.

Source: Bareec (2018b, pp. 32-33)

Since the official launch of Bareec, the programme started to receive attention within the national, regional, and international arenas. In Kuwait, different TV programmes at the state's official TV station presented Bareec and the effect it had on the students' social behaviour (KuwaitTV, 2017a; KuwaitTV, 2018b). On a similar view, Bareec students talked

about the positive outlook they have after participating in Bareec (Bareec, 2018a). Similarly, different national and regional newspaper presented Bareec as a new experience in the field of positive psychology. In an article by *Enferaad* news agency, the Assistant Undersecretary for Educational Development at the MoE said that Bareec has positively influenced the student's social behaviour and their academic progress (Enferaad, 2019). He also mentioned that the MoE seeks to expand the programme by including more schools. In another article by *Aljarida* newspaper, the Undersecretary for Research at MoE mentioned that the content of Bareec programme is one of the most important needs for students as it tackles school violence (Aljarida, 2019). Moreover, according to an article by the *Business Women Magazine*, the Kuwaiti Minister of Education during the official launch of Bareec in 2017 said:

> *"The programme [Bareec] is a complement to the Ministry's education system. It is the start of the success in this experience [positive psychology], and we hope to expand the programme to be implemented in all schools in Kuwait. It [Bareec] is a complete and proven scientific project." (Abualmajd, 2017a)*

In addition, in an article by *Ahram Alyoum*, an Egyptian newspaper, the Assistant Secretary-General of the SCPD said that Bareec contributed to developing the human capital, a key pillar of the development plan, and spreading positivity among youth (Awwad, 2019). On an international level, the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations invited Sheikh Intisar (IE) to participate in High-level Interactive Dialogue on the International Day of Education on 24th January 2020. During the event titled '*Aligning Inclusive Quality Education Policies with the Sustainable Development Goals',* Bareec was presented as an experience of policy changes for transforming education.

4.3 Analysis and Findings

4.3.1 Institutional Entrepreneurs and Deviation from Institutional Determinism

The researcher now returns to the research questions and provides some answers for each question. The first research question asks, how do institutional entrepreneurs deviate from institutional determinism? The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, are actors outside the MoE. As such, the focus of deviation is on how the institutional entrepreneurs are able to let actors inside the MoE, who are embedded in institutionalised arrangements, to deviate

from institutional determinism of MoE. In examining our data, the research identified two board themes that explained the deviation from existing institutional arrangements. The first theme highlights the conditions that enabled actors to form their interest and engage in institutional entrepreneurship. The researcher referred to this theme as interest formation. The second theme investigates the ways in which the institutional entrepreneurs constructed and communicated the rationale for their institutional project. The researcher referred to this theme as rationale construction. The research maintains that engaging in both themes enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to let actors inside the MoE deviate from the constraining conditions of MoE's prevailing arrangements.

In the following subsection, the research explains how the institutional entrepreneurs formed their interest. The next subsection investigates the rationale construction.

4.3.1.1 Interest Formation

Without exploring why actors get involved in institutional entrepreneurship, it is difficult to understand how among actors exposed to the same institutional context some engage in changing status quo while others preserve it (Dorado, 2013). In examining the data, the researcher identified two categories that enabled actors to engage in institutional entrepreneurship and formed their interest. These categories are the actors' social position and field conditions. The research begins by discussing how actors' social position motivated their engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. In the analysis of findings, actors' social position refers to the hierarchical position and inter-organisational mobility that influence actors' perception of the existing opportunities for change (Battilana, 2011; Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). The research then examines how the degree of institutionalisation in the field influenced their engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. The research maintains that both categories identified could influence actors' engagement in institutional entrepreneurship not only independently, but also jointly.

4.3.1.1.1 Actors' Social Position

Hierarchical position: The motivation for Sheikha Intisar (IE) to establish Bareec was rooted in her experience of managing Alnowair that works on the wellbeing of youth, and, in particular, from her assessment that positive outlook can contribute to behavioural change. She believed that people could have positive thought or negative thought, but they cannot

have them combined. As the founder of Alnowair, she wanted to provide youth with tools that could assist them in having a positive outlook on life. Since educational institutions are the main incubator for youth, she decided to create an educational programme (Bareec) that could be implemented at schools and universities, focusing on the wellbeing of students. Said alternatively, her position at Alnowair formed her interest to establish Bareec programme at the MoE. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

> *"The idea for Alnowair came when I realised that there were some people who thought that by highlighting the bad, we could have behavioural change. I did not agree with that... I realised that if we continue highlighting what we do not want, we continue having what we do not want. I wanted to be able to give the people in Kuwait research-based tools to allow them to change into a more positive mindset or a more positive outlook on life, and that is how Alnowair started. We worked in public campaigns, digital campaigns… our target was the youth. From that, the idea was what if we did something in schools."*

Inter-organisational mobility: the engagement of Rokaya (IE) in institutional entrepreneurship was facilitated by her exposure to different organisational contexts at MoE. In her 30 years of experience within the MoE, Rokaya (IE) moved across different positions and departments at the MoE. She started as an English Teacher at high school, to School Principal, Manager of Educational Affairs at MoE, and, lately, Director of Kuwait City School District. She believed that the positive thinking culture could positively influence behaviour. She joined Alnowair because she found it a place to pursue her interest due to the alignment between her belief and what Alnowair does. According to Rokaya (IE):

> *"Alnowair was spreading the culture of positive thinking, which is totally aligned with my beliefs and thoughts. When I joined Alnowair, two things drove my motivation to join. First, my work experience at the MoE, especially my work that focused on high schools. Second, the culture of positive thinking, which I strongly believe has positive influence on behaviour."*

Thus, the analysis reveals that in outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship, actors' social position formed their interest to participate in change efforts that deviate from the institutional status quo in institutions different from their own. In particular, their hierarchical position in other entities outside the targeted institution for change allowed for assessment

of the existing opportunities for action, and therefore enabled their engagement. In addition, actors who moved across different organisational roles were usually exposed to different organisational contexts and are less likely to take for granted the current functioning of the institution. The case shows that the inter-organisational mobility influences the likelihood that actors will initiate changes in their former institutions even after they stepped down from their institutional roles and became outsiders to the institution in question.

The next subsection discusses how field conditions may influence actors to engage in outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship.

4.3.1.1.2 Field Conditions

Degree of institutionalisation: the data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs in the case were less constrained by the dominant arrangements of MoE. They are external actors who developed ideas for change far from the constraining effects of institutional practices of MoE that define and limit their interests and vision for change. Being external to MoE's taken-for-grantedness, they were able to develop clear and new ideas as to what change might look like. Positive psychology is a new field in Kuwait, and Bareec is the first programme to call for the implementation of positive psychology curriculum within schools in all over Kuwait. Sheikha Intisar (IE) states:

> *"Bareec is the first programme to focus on positive psychology in Kuwait and the Middle East… coming up or using positive psychology and making it a class for every day needs a lot of foresight in doing that. When I started Alnowair, there were some people who made fun of it. Some understood it, and some made fun of it. And even for positive psychology curriculum being implemented in schools, some teachers in the same school loved it while others did not"*

As indicated by the data, when Rokaya (IE) was embedded in MoE's institutionalised arrangements during her career at MoE, she did not call for any programmes of positive psychology despite that fact that she believed in its effects on behaviour. This was due to not only the absence of any institutional norms for this new field, but also her embeddedness in the institutional arrangements that impeded the realisation of new ways of doing things. However, when she left the MoE and became less embedded in MoE's institutional determinism, she joined Alnowair, where she engaged in efforts to establish Bareec within

MoE. In other words, her degree of institutionalisation influenced her agency and enabled her engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. According to Rokaya (IE):

> *"During my work at MoE, the culture of positive thinking was not there due to the newness of this field. I have always believed in the importance of positivity in influencing behaviour, but this belief was not translated into action until I joined Bareec."*

Based on the analysis, the degree of institutionalisation influences actors' engagement in change efforts that deviate from institutional determinism. Actors with a lower degree of institutionalisation are less embedded in the institutionalised arrangements, and therefore are expected to be more innovative and find it easier to develop a vision for change. However, while external actors are more likely to have the motivation and vision for change, they lack the means to drive the change, especially if it needs convincing other field members to alter or bring new practices.

The analysis indicates that social potion and field conditions explained actors' engagement in outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship. In the following subsection, the research discusses how the institutional entrepreneurs convince other field members at MoE to construct the rationale for change and institutionalise Bareec.

4.3.1.2 Rationale Construction

The data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs led a set of actions to construct the rationale for change. They communicated their rationale for change to others concerning why they should support the adoption of Bareec. In examining the case, the research identified four categories that explained how the institutional entrepreneurs construct the rationale for change. These categories are normalisation, connecting with macro-cultural discourse, mobilising allies, and resource mobilisation (see Figure 4.1). The research begins by explaining how the institutional entrepreneurs normalise their institutional project by showing its positive impact. Then, it investigates their efforts to connect with macro-cultural discourse to disseminate their change massage. Next, it examines how the institutional entrepreneurs in the case mobilise allies to gain acceptance and legitimacy for their project. Lastly, the research discusses the resources used during the rationale construction. While The researcher discusses these sets of action as distinct, he maintains that they are intertwined in practice.

Figure 4. 1: Rationale Construction Theme



4.3.1.2.1 Normalisation

The field of positive psychology is new field in Kuwait (Lambert et al., 2019). As explained by Maguire et al. (2004), institutionalised practices do not exist in new fields. The specification of existing failing of dominant practices or highlighting the negative impacts of continuing them is less important in new fields. In outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in new fields, the findings suggest that rationale construction starts with highlighting the positive impacts and the economic advantages afforded by the proposed new practices of positive psychology. Thus, the starting point for the rationale construction is the production of claims, arguments, stories, evidences and examples that promote the effectiveness of the newly proposed practices and build the case for their adoption. The researcher refers to this process as “normalisation”. In outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship, the case suggests that the institutional entrepreneurs produce claims to promote and normalise particular meanings of their proposed institutional project.

The analysis reveals that the institutional entrepreneurs started to normalise their educational programme by conducting a pilot project at three high schools. At that time,

Bareec programme was not there yet, but Alnowair as the first NGO to work on positive psychology practices in Kuwait, was adopting positive psychology in their programmes within Kuwait. Due to the absence of positive psychology practices for educational institutions, the institutional entrepreneurs borrowed some of the existing practices adopted by Alnowair to target students at high schools. In doing so, they aimed to assess the potential of creating a research-based educational programme that could be implemented at educational institutions in Kuwait (Schools and Universities). They targeted three high schools informally during 2015/2016 academic year and implemented the practices adopted by Alnowair. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

> *"Because Alnowair started two years earlier, the ground was already done to be able to speak to the teachers…I wanted to be able to give the people in Kuwait research-based tools to allow them to change into a more positive mindset or more positive outlook on life, and that's how Alnowair started. We worked in public campaigns, digital campaigns… our target was the youth. From that, the idea was, what if we did something in schools. So, we had a pilot study in three schools with three teachers. Three different schools, three different teachers. One in each school. All are girls' schools. We gave five simple exercises. One of them being positive affirmation."*

As indicated by the data, the pilot project enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to produce claims and evidences about the feasibility of their newly implemented practices. At the end of the pilot project, which took place during both terms of the 2015/2016 academic year, the institutional entrepreneurs in cooperation with the principals of the three schools evaluated the impact of the pilot project. They found that the students who participated in the pilot project reported lower levels of school violence and absenteeism compared to other classes. They noticed a positive change in students' behaviour. For example, according to Amal (C) – a principal of Al Salmiya Secondary School that participated in the pilot study:

> *"Many students have changed. One had excessive obesity, and another student used to stutter and was shy to appear in front of the audience. Now, the first started to accept herself and thanked us for helping her in looking at herself from a different perspective. The second now can speak to audience publicly with confidence."*

The analysis suggests that the result of the pilot project was pivotal stage in constructing the rationale for the institutional project. On the one hand, the results enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to link between the implemented practices and its effectiveness in addressing the behavioural issues at schools, thereby producing claims about the advantages of adopting positive psychology programmes at schools. This allowed them to promote their institutional project as a solution to behavioural issues at schools. On the other hand, the positive results they received from the pilot study motivated them to approach officials at MoE, calling for positive psychology interventions at schools. However, they need to create a clear and well-prepared programme of positive psychology that can be feasibly implemented at educational institutions to present it to the officials at MoE. In doing so, they approached positive psychology experts, and created Bareec that includes some practices selected from positive psychology literature and modified to suit the Kuwaiti context and culture. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

> *"The teachers comment on how much their students were changing. The students were flourishing. They were happier at schools… and then we thought this is going to work. Then we approached positive psychology specialist, and we devised a curriculum."*

Rokaya (IE) also echoed this point. She said:

> *"The principals told us very awesome impact of the programme, so we decided to do something in an official way. At the same time, we thought of creating the curriculum, and then we approached our experts"*

Based on the analysis, the research argues that in outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in new fields, where institutionalised practices do not exist, the institutional entrepreneurs produce claims and evidences about the positive impact of their newly proposed practices to promote their adoption. The researcher referred to this process as normalisation. The analysis reveals that the pilot project may lead to the identification of potential problems through which the institutional project in question may be promoted as a solution to these problems. While normalisation constituted an important phase towards rationale construction, the institutional entrepreneurs still need to disseminate the claims they produce about their newly

devised practices and begin to legitimate them. In the next subsection, the research discusses how the institutional entrepreneurs communicated these claims.

4.3.1.2.2 Connecting with Macro-Cultural Discourse

As part of their strategy to disseminate their produced claims and legitimate their approach for wellbeing, the institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, drew on a wider macro-cultural discourse – "the broad discourses and associated sets of institutions that extend beyond the boundaries of any institutional field and are widely understood and broadly accepted in a society" (Lawrence and Phillips, 2004, p. 691). Specifically, they tapped into a discourse in Kuwait that advocated the role of wellbeing in promoting healthy lives and addressing behavioural issues among 'adolescents' at educational institutions. This discourse was central to the aim of some resolutions issued by international organisations and signed by Kuwait.

For example, Kuwait has signed "The Global Strategy for Women's, Children's and Adolescents Health 2016-2030" issued by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in September 2015, which aims to improve "overall health and wellbeing" of women, children and adolescents (EveryWomanEveryChild, 2016; WHO, 2015). In addition, the Emir of Kuwait had also signed the United Nations General Assembly's (UNGA) Resolution 70/1 concerning "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" issued in September 2015(UN, 2015). Goal 3 and Goal 16 of this UN resolution state:

> *"Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels" (UN, 2015).*

Since Bareec coincided the signing of these documents by Kuwait, it was by tapping into these macro-cultural narratives that the institutional entrepreneurs were able to amass legitimacy for their educational programme. To disseminate their message and participate in this macro-cultural discourse, they courted the national media. Most notably, they gave several interviews to national and regional newspapers in order to communicate the claims and evidences they produced about Bareec and emphasise its alignment with the resolutions signed by Kuwait. On the one hand, they emphasised that Bareec pilot project

showed a positive change in student's behaviour at school. In an article by *Business Women Magazine* Sheikha Intisar (IE) said:

> *"We conducted a pilot study for Bareec at three schools. The results were amazing. We recorded a positive change in student's behaviour at schools. These encouraged us to launch this initiative. (Abualmajd, 2017a).*

On the other hand, they emphasised consistency between Bareec's objectives and the international resolutions sighed by Kuwait. For example, according to an article in *Sout Alkhaleej* newspaper Sheikha Intisar (IE) said:

> *"We put forward the international treaties and resolutions signed by Kuwait in this field while we were planning for Bareec. Particularly, the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in relation to 'Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development', which was signed by the Emir of Kuwait, and the 'The Global Strategy for Women's, Children's and Adolescents Health 2016-2030' issued by World Health Organisation. Bareec's objectives are in line with these international strategies. We aim to promote psychological wellbeing for youth to be active members in the society, and for active sustainable development." (Ebaid, 2017).*

The analysis shows that by positioning these statements in the public domain, the institutional entrepreneurs gained exposure, and Bareec became increasingly central to the realisation of the singed resolutions. According to Sheikh Intisar (IE):

> *"The fact that Kuwait sighed the UN treaties was part of the documents sent to the ministry of education to approve the research we were doing with the students. We wanted to tell the officials at the Ministry of Education that our work is in accordance with these treaties."*

Thus, the findings indicate that connecting with macro-cultural discourse is an important step that allows the institutional entrepreneurs to disseminate their claims and begin to legitimate their institutional project. In particular, the research maintains that communicating the claims produced about the feasibility of the institutional project, and its alignment with broader different legal frameworks is central in new fields. This is because institutionalised norms that provide the basis for which institutional entrepreneurs can draw upon to justify new practices do not exist in new fields. Instead,

the institutional entrepreneurs will need to link their new project with the widely accepted norms in the society to garner support and amass legitimacy.

While normalisation and connecting with macro-cultural discourse enabled to disseminate the change message and begin to mass legitimacy, the institutional entrepreneurs still need to mobilise allies and resources to legitimise their institutional project. Importantly, as outsiders to the MoE the institutional entrepreneurs need to get insiders to adopt their institutional project, and therefore deviate from the institutional determinism of MoE. In the next subsection, the researcher discusses mobilising allies phase towards rationale consecution.

4.3.1.2.3 Mobilising Allies

The institutional entrepreneurs sought to mobilise highly legitimate actors behind their institutional project. Those actors included prominent figures in politics and senior figures at the MoE. Specifically, they were able to convince allies of the visibility of their project and leverage these allies to legitimate Bareec as an effective programme of positive psychology, its effects on students' progress, and to suggest a new approach to tackling student's behavioural issues. Some of these allies occupied very high-profile positions, including the former Prime Minister, who is also a member of the Royal Family of Kuwait. According to Sheikh Intisar (IE):

> *"We presented Bareec to HH Sheikh Nasser Mohammed Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, and he became the Honorary Chairman of the Board of Director for Bareec. He is former Prime Minister and, he is a mentor for me. He is someone who always encourages me. We only wanted his name for us."*

The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, have high-profile positions as well. For example, Sheikha Intisar (IE) is a member of the Royal Family in Kuwait. She received the Arab Women of the Year Award in 2018 (Alnowair, 2020). She founded Intisars Foundation – an NGO that provides psychological support to women affected by war (Intisars-Foundation, 2019) (See Alnowair.com for full profile). Rokaya (IE) has a high profile as well. In her 30 years of work at the MoE, she served in different positions, the latest being the Director of Kuwait City School District at MoE before becoming the Director of Educational Projects at Alnowair. The institutional entrepreneurs were able to leverage their profiles to build relationships with potential allies. According to Rokaya (IE):

"When others know she [Sheikha Intisar] is the founder of the programme, this creates credibility and trust. She is very well known and popular person. Sheikha Intisar creates trust with those people we dealt with in the government. They know that this programme is in safe hands."

Because of the increasing public profiles of the institutional entrepreneurs and other allies they mobilised, Bareec gained legitimacy among some officials at the MoE. For example, the institutional entrepreneurs leveraged their relationship with a senior figure at the MoE to gain official approval for Bareec to work with schools. The analysis reveals that this official approval to work with schools is a key step toward rationale construction and thus, the deviation from institutional determinism of MoE. However, the schools are still not abided by this approval. Rather, the schools' participation in Bareec is optional, and there will be no financial sponsorship for Bareec from the MoE. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

"We got their official approval to work with the school. And what facilitated the approval from the ministry is, basically, I am having it, Mrs Rokaya heading it. Both have a very good reputation. So, we had an agreement with a senior figure at the Ministry of Education. Because we know them personally, we said this is what we want to do, you can see the curriculum, and there is no politics, and no racism. We already have the curriculum, it was shown to them, and they approved it, and the goal was to have better wellbeing."

After the approval Bareec received to work with schools, it started to gain legitimacy among schools' principals and teachers. For example, the schools' teachers and principals interviewed commented on the feasibility of the programme in building better relationships between teachers and students, and in effecting students' behaviour. According to Amal (C) – the Principal of Al Salmiya Secondary School – whose school has been participating in Bareec since the pilot project in 2015/2016:

"We were among the first three schools (pilot project) that implemented the programme in the first year. We tried to implement it so the teacher can benefit from how to build a relationship with the learner. The programme is a valuable one, meaning that it spreads positivity by practising a value in a physical way whether in classrooms, school clubs or educational trips… So it's full of vales. The values are there, but we provide a way to practice them."

Thus, the research argues that mobilising allies to confer legitimacy upon the institutional project is an important phase towards rationale construction and deviation from institutional determinism. The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, were able to mobilise highly legitimate actors from other fields to augment the legitimacy of their institutional project. The analysis reveals that they leveraged their high profiles to build relationships with actors in the institution in question. These relationships played a significant role in gaining approval for the outsider-institutional entrepreneurs to intervene in the institution in question, and thus allowing for deviation from institutional determinism. Consequently, the research maintains that in outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship, the deviation from institutional determinism is more likely when insider-actors, who are aware of the institutional logics that sustain the status quo, are mobilised behind the institutional project led by outsiders.

The analysis so far found that in outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship, the institutional entrepreneurs engaged in three sets of actions to construct the rationale for change and let insiders to deviate from the institutional determinism and adopt their institutional project. First, they normalise the change project by producing claims and evidences about the effectiveness of their newly proposed institutional project. Second, they connected with macro-cultural discourse to communicate their claims and amass legitimacy. Third, they mobilised allies – most importantly, allies inside the institution in question – to augment the legitimacy of their project. Although these sets of actions allowed the institutional entrepreneurs to gain acceptance to intervene in the schools, it does not fully construct the rationale since the intervention requires resource mobilisation to induce the intervention. In the next subsection, the researcher discusses resource mobilisation.

4.3.1.2.4 Resource Mobilisation

The data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs in the case mobilised financial resources to facilitate their intervention at schools after receiving the official approval form MoE. Based on this approval, they do not receive any financial sponsorship to cover their intervention. Rather, they will finance the implementation of Bareec programme at schools and Kuwait University themselves. In doing so, they leveraged the financial resource to cover their intervention in relation to two main sets of activities: Bareec's curriculum, and training.

On Bareec's curriculum, the data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs approached psychology specialists to devise a curriculum that suits the students at Grade 10, 11, and

12 as well as students at Kuwait University. The curriculum includes several books for both teachers and students at each level. Sheikha Intisar (IE) has financed the entire programme (curriculum and training) from her own financial backing. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

> *"We approached positive psychology specialist, and we devised a curriculum…I sponsor the whole programme…printing books, Bareec products, Bareec clubs in every school, training etc."*

On the training, the institutional entrepreneurs mobilised financial resources to fund the programme related trainings. The purpose of training is to ensure that all teachers who participate in Bareec are equipped with the required skills to implement the programme effectively. The data shows that there are two types of training. The first is a training delivered by experts in the field to all teachers on implementing the curriculum, and the second is in the form of scholarships for the most qualified teachers on positive psychology at the University of California, Berkeley. On the first type of training, Rokaya (IE) said:

> *"We got the training from our experts, and we trained the trainers (teachers), and then we trained the teachers. We ensured that the teachers were able to implement the curriculum inside the classrooms."*

On the second type of training, Sheikha Intisar (IE) reasoned that they want the teachers to learn new tools on positive psychology education and be able to develop the programme further. Sheikha Intisar (IE) commented:

> *"Because we want to train the trainers, and we want to have head trainers. They already have the ability, and we send them to The Greater Good Science Centre at the University of California, Berkeley for ten days training course where they learn more tools of how to become trainers of positive psychology. We want to grow it within the system.*

As indicated by the data, Sheikha Intisar (IE) has covered the finance of Bareec related activities from the time of receiving the approval until it became part of MoE's plans, where it started to receive fund from the MoE. This applies to both schools and Kuwait University. However, at the end of the academic year 2016/2017 – the first year of intervention after receiving the official approval form MoE – the institutional entrepreneurs stopped implementing Bareec at Kuwait University. They reasoned that they did not want to exhaust

their resources, and they would rather focus on schools and grow the programme to include all high schools in Kuwait. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

> *"We actually stopped the university programme now because we don't want to exhaust our resources. Within a few years, we will go back. What we want to do is to grow the team within high schools and cover all high schools in Kuwait within five years."*

In combination, the institutional entrepreneurs mobilised financial resource to induce Bareec intervention. In doing so, they fund two main set of activities – Bareec's curriculum and training – from one of the institutional entrepreneurs' own financial backing. These sets of activities were critical to induce and facilitate Bareec's intervention. The analysis suggests that resource mobilisation through successful "small steps" (Andrews and Bategeka, 2013, p. 30) is an important approach to show progress towards the overall goal of institutionalising Bareec, especially in the early process of the institutional entrepreneurship where the institutional project grows with results.

In sum, the researcher devoted the discussion in this section to understand how outsiders-institutional entrepreneurs work to let insiders in a given institution to deviate from institutional determinism, and adopt their institutional project. To constitute to this understanding, the researcher first discussed how institutional entrepreneurs formed their interest in outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship. He found that actors' social position and field conditions formed their interest. Second, he examined how the institutional entrepreneurs constructed and communicated the rationale for change. He found that rationale construction involves four intertwined sets of actions: Normalisation, where the institutional entrepreneurs produce the claims and evidences about the effectiveness of their newly designed practices; connecting with macro-cultural discourse, where they disseminate their claims and amass legitimacy; mobilising allies, to augment the legitimacy of their institutional project; and resource mobilisation, to induce the project intervention. The research argues that interest formation and rationale construction provide an answer for how outrider-driven institutional entrepreneurs were able to let actors inside the institution in question to deviate from institutional determinism. In the next section, the research discusses the outsider-driven institutionalisation.

4.3.2 Institutional Entrepreneurs and Institutionalisation

The second research question focuses on the institutionalisation of Bareec within MoE, the process in which the innovation became accepted and taken-for-granted (Phillips et al., 2004). In examining the data, the researcher identified two patterns that show how the new practices of Bareec came to be accepted and taken-for-granted. The new practices were institutionalised by legitimating them through aligning with different stakeholders' values on an ongoing basis *and* by attaching them to pre-existing organisational practice. In addition, the research found that as the new practices were integrated with pre-existing organisational practices and aligned with different stakeholders' values, new norms were created. Although the researcher treats both sets of actions as distinct in the analysis, he maintains that they occur in parallel rather than in series.

4.3.2.1 Legitimating the New Practices on an Ongoing Basis

Key stakeholders have to perceive the new practices as legitimate if they are to be institutionalised (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Maguire et al., 2004). However, institutionalised norms that form the socially constructed basis regarding legitimate behaviour do not exist in new fields, consequently, cannot be drawn upon to justify new practices (Maguire et al., 2004). The analysis reveals that the institutional entrepreneurs drew on related fields and its associated set of institutions to align the new practices with the interests and values of key stakeholders within those institutions. In doing so, they ensured that Bareec conformed to the interests of two institutions: SCPD and MoE. On the one hand, SCPD is the governmental authority that is responsible for identifying the development plans and strategies that influence all governmental bodies. Thus, their endorsement of Bareec will facilitate it becoming part of MoE's plans. On the other hand, MoE is the target institution where Bareec takes place. In combination, the institutional entrepreneurs attempt to gain the legitimacy needed to institutionalise Bareec in the MoE's arrangements by including it in the MoE's plans and strategies.

On SCPD, the data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs ensured alignment between Bareec and the pillars of New Kuwait Vision supervised by SCPD. One key pillar of the Kuwait 2035 vision is "*Human Capital: Reform the education system to better prepare youth to become competitive and productive members of the workforce*." (New-Kuwait, 2019). Specifically, the institutional entrepreneurs promoted Bareec as a key contributor in

preparing schools and university youth to become productive members of society by promoting their social behaviour for the better. In doing so, they approached the Secretary-General of SCPD, presenting the evidences for their claims about the feasibility of Bareec to gain his support and acceptance. According to Rokaya (IE):

> *"We met the Secretary-General of SCPD. We presented our programme and how it works. We showed him some testimonials from teachers, parents, and students. And we presented the study we conducted that provides evidence for the effectiveness of Bareec in impacting students' behaviour."*

By aligning Bareec with the interests of SCPD, it became increasingly central to the realisation of one key pillar of Kuwait's development plan. As a result, the SCPD endorsed Bareec as a contributor to Human Capital pillar of the development plan. In addition, the data shows that the fact that Bareec had already started to work with the MoE facilitated the endorsement by SCPD. According to Khaled Mahdi (C) – the Secretary-General of SCPD:

> *"We have gaps related to the education. Part of developing the education system in Kuwait is teacher development. This component includes developmental programmes for education techniques. There is a theme that is always missing, the psychological theme. In order for teachers to communicate with students effectively, we need to use all themes, including the psychological one, to be able to share knowledge. Bareec bridges this gap. It was evidenced in the study they provided, which was published in a good publisher…after we grouped the evidences and studied the programme, we asked them to go to the MoE and sell the idea under our blessings, and especially they already had a connection with the MoE."*

However, this endorsement of Bareec by the SCPD does not mean that Bareec becomes part of MoE's development plans. Rather, it means that the institution, where the plan is being implemented, has to approve any new plans as well. Said alternatively, in order for Bareec to be part of MoE's plans and strategies, the MoE and SCPD together have to approve Bareec. To gain the MoE's acceptance and support for Bareec, the institutional entrepreneurs approached two senior figures at the MoE, whose authorities were needed to confer legitimacy upon Bareec to become part of MoE's institutionalised arrangements. In doing so, they reminded those two senior figures that Bareec is consistent with the interests

and values of MoE in relation to education development. They constantly provided them with the evidences and claims about the effectiveness of Bareec in tackling behavioural issues at educational institutions, and in positively effecting on students' academic progress. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

> *"There were two people at the MoE. One was not sure about it [Bareec]. We then gave him the research that was published in Springer that says this [Bareec] works. He was shocked. The second person was a bit dismissive. And what we did basically we kept showing him why it is working. Just kept sending him the principals and teachers saying how they are changing and how their students are changing. He just got it because he could see a legitimacy in the programme. Now, he is a big advocate."*

By aligning Bareec with the interests of the MoE on an ongoing basis, Bareec gained the legitimacy and support of MoE to be part of its development plans. The analysis reveals that the endorsement of SCPD for Bareec along with constant legitimisation of the programme facilitated the MoE's approval for Bareec to be part of its plans. After both institutions agreed to include Bareec in the MoE's plans and arrangements, the SCPD officially approved Bareec as part of MoE institutionalised arrangements. In other words, Bareec became embedded in MoE's taken-for-grantedness. According to the Secretary-General (C) of SCPD:

> *"We approved Bareec within the MoE's plans… Since they already had a connection with the MoE, it was not hard for us to approve it. Now, it becomes compulsory for the MoE to implement it. The MoE cannot say after a period of time we cannot do it. They agreed, and the plan was approved, got the financial approval, and the Cabinet approved it. Now, we monitor the implementation. Our monitoring reports go to the Parliament. We monitor the project, its implementation, and output based on what we agreed and against the timelines".*

Based on these dynamics, the research argues that institutional entrepreneurs in emerging fields draw on related mature fields and their associated institutions to legitimise their innovation. Central to legitimisation is the constant alignment between the institutional project and the values and interest of key actors within those institutions. The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, were able to legitimate their

project by ensuring its alignment with the realisation of development plans supervised by SCPD, and with MoE's interests of education development by presenting the claims produced about the feasibility of the programme.

While legitimating the new practices on an ongoing basis enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to gain the legitimacy needed for institutionalisation, we still need to understand what form the change takes. In the next subsection, the researcher presents the type of change through which the new practices become institutionalised.

4.3.2.2 Attaching the New Practices to Pre-existing Practices

The analysis reveals that the institutional entrepreneurs attached the new practices of Bareec to the pre-existing organisational practices. The term 'practice' refers to "activity patterns across actors that are infused with brother meaning and provide tools for ordering social life and activity." (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007, p. 995). The researcher uses 'pre-existing practices' to refer to the pre-existing activity patters operating at the educational institutions that are institutionalised, and that are distinct from the new practices that are the focus in this case. However, this is not to say that both sets of practices, pre-existing and new practices, belong to the same field. Rather, they have different field-origins; the new practices stem from the field of positive psychology education, while pre-existing practices represent different fields. The data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs attached the new practices of positive psychology to existing practices followed at the educational institutions. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

> *"It's [Bareec] small tools… interactive exercises that the students perform in the class for 5 to 10minutes a day. Repeat it as many times at they can… one, two, three times a week. It is part of what is implemented in the class. What happens is that teachers implement these small exercises with students. It could be part of any module from Art to Arabic to Religion. Anything."*

The data shows that teachers at the educational institutions now had incorporated and integrated the new practices into the day-to-day aspects of their work. Teachers in different fields of study started to incorporate the new practices within their fields' pre-existing practices. For example, the teachers interviewed at Salah Eddin Secondary School including; Ali Shawwaf (C) – Teacher of Chemistry, Dhari Alsafran (C) – Teacher of Art, and Ibrahim Malik (C) – Teacher of geography, mentioned that they had integrated Bareec within

their classes. By attaching Bareec's practices to the institutionalised practices of other fields in the institution, the institutional entrepreneurs ensured ongoing reproduction of Bareec's practices. Ove time, the repeated activation of the new way of behaving – that is the integration of new practices in the conduct of pre-existing practices – contributed to the new practices becoming taken-for-granted. For example, Ali Brogerdian (C) – the Vice Principal of Salah Eddin Secondary School stated:

> *"Bareec composes of a set of tools and activities that teachers perform within classes. Those activities last between 5 to 10 minutes and take place within any module. There are six books for Bareec; two books for each grade (from 10 to 12), one for each semester. Each book focuses on a specific aspect. Teachers are trained before they start to implement Bareec."*

As the new practices are attached to pre-existing practices, new norms are created around new practices. As discussed earlier, widely shared norms do not exist in new fields. Thus, the analysis suggests that new norms are created during the institutionalisation of new practices, as they are aligned with stakeholders' values and attached to existing institutional arrangements. According to Ali Brogerdian (C) – the Vice Principal of Salah Eddin Secondary School:

> *"Some teachers took on Bareec and did not implement it not because they loved the idea, but because they did not want others to look at them negatively."*

Based on these dynamics, the research argues that the institutional entrepreneurs in emerging field are likely to attach their innovative practices to other pre-existing practices associated with related institutionalised fields. This is because institutionalised arrangements do not exist in new fields, and thus new practices are most likely to be institutionalised when they are embedded in the durable practices of related mature fields. The case shows that the institutional entrepreneurs attached Bareec to other related institutionalised practices. In doing so, Bareec became taken-for-granted due to the repeated activation of the new way of conducting the practices – that is the embedding of Bareec in pre-exciting practices. This research also argues that, as the new practices are attached to pre-existing institutional arrangements and aligned with stakeholders' values, new norms are created around the new practices.

In this section, the research discussed how outsider-institutional entrepreneurs institutionalise their innovation in the target institution. The researcher found that the field where the intervention takes place is a new and that the institutional entrepreneurs led two intertwined sets of actions. First, they legitimated the new practices on an ongoing basis by aligning them with interest and vales of key actors. Second, they attached the new practices to pre-existing institutional arrangements associated with related institutionalised fields. As the new practices are attached to pre-existing practices and aligned with stakeholders' values, new norms are created around the new practices. In combination, the research maintains that those two sets of actions provide an answer for the second research question concerning how institutional entrepreneurs institutionalise their institutional project.

In the next section, the researcher examines whether Bareec is a successful or failed institutional project and discuss what explains its success or failure.

4.3.3 The Success or Failure of Institutional Entrepreneurship

The final research question investigates what explains the success or failure of institutional entrepreneurs' efforts in institutionalising Bareec. As the question implies, we need first to determine whether the institutionalisation of Bareec is a success or failure before explaining why it is so. Determining whether a project is a success or failure can be a complex job. As Pinto and Slevin (1989) put it, there can be ambiguity to measure projects success because the parties involved in the project perceive project success or failure differently. A project perceived as a success by the senior management might be perceived as a failure by end-users or beneficiaries. In the same context, Belassi and Tukel (1996) provide another reason for the ambiguity in measuring project success. They suggest that the success or failure factors vary in the literature. For instance, delays in project completion times incur penalties and thus more costs. Yet these projects are still perceived as success. However, De Wit (1988) suggests that the most appropriate criteria for determining the success or failure of a project are whether the project meets its objectives. In this process, the objectives become the success criteria.

Following De Wit (1988), the institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, aimed to institutionalise Bareec within the MoE. Bareec aims to increase wellbeing among university and high schools' students, generate positive emotions and increase their levels of flourishing. According to the analysis, the institutional entrepreneur has succeeded to institutionalise

Bareec within the MoE's institutionalised arrangements, and it became part of MoE strategies and plans. They attached Bareec's practices to pre-existing institutional arrangements, and it became accepted and taken-for-granted at the MoE. In addition, the data shows that Bareec enhanced student's wellbeing and flourishing. For example, Lambert et al. (2019) conducted a study co-authored with the institutional entrepreneurs in this case in 2017 before the institutionalisation of Bareec to determine whether Bareec could increase wellbeing and flourishing among students. They found that Bareec students "showed greater levels of flourishing" and "enhanced positive affect" (Lambert et al., 2019, p. 741). Similarly, the Teachers and Principals interviewed mentioned that Bareec succeeded to meet its objectives of increasing wellbeing and positivity. Interestingly, Ali Brogerdian (C) – the Vice Principal of Salah Eddin Secondary School referred that Bareec influenced not only the wellbeing of students, but also the teachers. According to Ali (C):

> *"When Dhari [a teacher interviewed] joined Bareec and started to do good drawings that impressed others such as the school principal, he started to feel he is doing a good job and becomes more motivated to do his work. He used not to speak publicly, and now he is so motivated to speak to the public, and recently he spoke at the Opera House in the presence of Minister of Education. So, not only the students changed, but also the teachers."*

Meanwhile, different media coverage presented Bareec as a successful experience in positive psychology and called for an expansion to include all high schools and universities in Kuwait. (Awwad, 2019; Enferaad, 2019). Therefore, the researcher maintains that Bareec has successfully met its objectives and the institutional entrepreneurs' efforts to institutionalise Bareec were a success.

Having determined that Bareec is a successful institutional project, we need to discuss the underlying reasons that explain this success. In examining the data, the researcher found four reasons that explained the success in institutional entrepreneurship of Bareec (see figure 4.2). The reasons are ongoing political support, assembling coalition for change, understanding the context, and keeping the message consistent with institutional interest. While the researcher discusses the four reasons as distinct, he recognises that all of them together explained the success in institutional entrepreneurs' initiative of Bareec.

Figure 4. 2: Reasons for Success in Outsider-Driven Institutional Entrepreneurship



4.3.3.1 Ongoing Political Support

One of the most critical factors that explain the success in Bareec is the political support and coverage for the project. The analysis shows that institutional entrepreneurs succeeded to institutionalise Bareec only when they secured enough and constant political support for their project. This is because constant political support facilitates the successful implementation of project strategies (Smith, 2002). The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, aligned with highly legitimate actors whose political advice and access to power and political influence were necessary to realise Bareec. The data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs presented Bareec to the former Prime Minister, who became the Honorary Chairman of the Board of Director for Bareec. Although the former Prime Minister did not use his direct influence in Bareec, the data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs leveraged his social capital to influence others during their efforts to institutionalise Bareec. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

"*He is former Prime Minister, and he is a mentor for me. He is someone who always encourages me. We only wanted his name for us. He did not use his influence in the programme."*

The data also shows that Sheikha Intisar (IE) leveraged her public profile as a member of the Royal Family of Kuwait to gain the legitimacy and support needed. As referred by Rokaya (IE), her public profile facilitated the political support needed to institutionalise Bareec, and her financial sponsorship for Bareec induced its implementation as she has fully sponsored the programme. As indicated by the data, her increasing public profile facilitated the MoE's approval for Bareec to work with schools, which was a critical step towards the institutionalisation of Bareec. According to Rokaya (IE):

"Sheikha Intisar's name is the most important resource. When others know she is the founder of the programme, this creates credibility and trust. She is very well known and popular person. Sheikha Intisar creates trust with those people we dealt with in the government. They know that this programme is in safe hands. Together with the generosity of Sheikha Intisar in the programme, we had the fruit of her devotion for Bareec in a magical way."

Thus, the research argues that ongoing political support for the institutional project is a key determinant for success. In outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship, the institutional entrepreneurs are more likely to align with highly legitimate actors and leverage their own public profiles to gain access to political support necessary to realise change. The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, were able to intervene at the MoE only when they ensured ongoing political support from decision-makers at MoE and leveraged their profiles and access to financial resources.

4.3.3.2 Assembling Coalition for Change

The analysis reveals that the institutional entrepreneurs built an alliance for change by enrolling a number of like-minded actors. They connected with the people who share the same belief and interest in bringing about Bareec. The data shows that the coalition they assembled played a significant role in the success of their project as it facilitated access to support and power necessary to institutionalise Bareec. On the one hand, the institutional entrepreneurs tend to work with teachers who have faith in Bareec and have an interest to implement it effectively. The purpose was to grow their pool by showing results. As evident

by the data, this positively influenced the legitimacy of Bareec, as more schools' teachers and principals perceive Bareec as legitimate programme. The data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs leveraged the legitimacy of Bareec among teachers and principals as an evidence about the feasibility of the programme for decision-makers to approve it. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

> *"We get the ones who believe in it and grow that pool. The more we grow it, the more others who little bit dismiss it realise that there is something there they do not see. Part of our success is to implement the programme on teachers themselves to be able to implement it on their students. If you do not live the experience, you cannot pass it down. The biggest part of our success has been they have to role-play."*

On the other hand, in their attempts to institutionalise Bareec the institutional entrepreneurs tend to connect with potential allies who are aware of MoE institutional arrangements that sustain the status quo. Being outsiders to the field, the institutional entrepreneurs connected with insiders to the field through which they institutionalise their project. For example, at the early stages of Bareec Sheikha Intisar (IE) allied with Rokaya (IE), who is aware of the institutional status quo of MoE due to her substantial career experience at the MoE. The data indicates that the inclusion of Rokaya (IE) in Bareec was a critical step towards the success of the programme in all its phases. After her engagement in institutional entrepreneurship, institutional entrepreneurs developed Bareec programme and started their efforts for institutionalising it within MoE. Her profile, along with Sheikha Intisar's (IE) influence facilitated the MoE approval to work with schools and Bareec's inclusion in development plans, which were critical steps towards the institutionalisation of Bareec. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

> *"By the time Rokaya came on board, we started to think in a much more strategic level because she comes with such huge experience within the education sector. She was the Director of Kuwait City School District at MoE. She has the strategy, managerial ability, and passion. She is known the crazy one who works all day. Without Rokaya there will not be a success in Bareec. Together we worked as a very good team because we both believe in what we are doing."*

The data also shows that the institutional entrepreneurs continued to grow their support base and included some gatekeepers. They enrolled a senior figure at the MoE in their project, through which they secured approval to work with schools and thus deviated from institutional determinism of MoE. They broadened their support base further to include another senior figure at the MoE whose support was necessary to include Bareec in the MoE's development plans. These two people became partially enrolled in the institutional project, and they secured enough political influence to institutionalise Bareec.

Based on these dynamics, the research argues that assembling coalition for change of like-minded actors is a necessity for success. The analysis reveals that key to the success in outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship is the inclusion of a large number of actors inside the institution in question, who embrace the institutional project and secure enough political influence necessary to realise change. This is because these actors are aware of the conditions that sustain the status quo. The institutional entrepreneurs in the case were able to enrol a number of insiders whose support where necessary to deviate from the institutional determinism and institutionalise Bareec.

4.3.3.3 Keeping the Message Consistent with Institutional Interests

The third important reason that explains the success in the institutionalisation of Bareec is the alignment between Bareec and the institutional interests. The institutional entrepreneurs kept their project consistent with the interests and values of two institutions – SCPD and MoE – whose endorsement was necessary to institutionalise Bareec. They presented Bareec to senior figures at the MoE and ensured its alignment with the MoE's interests pertaining to education development. Similarly, they reminded the Secretary-General of SCPD that Bareec is central to the realisation of one key pillar of development plan. The data shows that they promoted Bareec as a contributor to the human capital pillar of the development plans. The analysis reveals that both institutions perceived Bareec as legitimate and central to the realisation of their interests and plans, thereby paved the way for approving it within the MoE's plans. According to Khalid Mahdi (C), the Secretary-General of SCPD:

> *"The initiative [Bareec] by the NGO [Alnowair] was presented to us and got our blessings because it fits very well with the missing component [psychological them] in teacher development. Now, the triangle has to be completed; the*

beneficiary party [MoE] has to have belief in it… And since they already had a connection with the MoE, it was not hard for us to approve it."

Based on the analysis, the research suggests that keeping the change message consistent with the interests of related institutions is the key to gain the legitimacy necessary for institutionalisation. The institutional entrepreneurs in the case presented their project as central to the realisation of SCPD's and MoE's plans and strategies. In doing so, they gained the legitimacy needed to approve Bareec within the MoE's institutionalised arrangements.

4.3.3.4 Understanding the Context

The findings suggest that understanding the context is a key determinant of success in institutional entrepreneurship. This is because contextual elements shape the type of institutional change and influence the strategies actors are likely to adopt (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, seized the moment and exploited the contextual opportunity to include their project in the development plans of New Kuwait Vision, which significantly facilitated its institutionalisation. The data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs approached the SCPD to include Bareec in the development plans after attending a conference where the Secretary-General of SCPD was a guest speaker. In the conference, the Secretary-General of SCPD expressed the SCPD's interest in sponsoring any feasible initiatives that help in realising the development plans. The institutional entrepreneurs seized this opportunity and presented their institutional project to the SCPD. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

"Dr Khaled is in a position for change, and he wants to be an agent of a change. In the conference that Rokaya attended he said bring a very good project, and we will help you. So, he was calling for projects to help in the New Kuwait plan."

As evident by the data, Bareec gained the endorsement of SCPD since it bridges one of the main gaps necessary to realise the development plans. This initial approval by the SCPD facilitated the approval from MoE to include Bareec in its development plans, and thus embedding Bareec in MoE's institutionalised arrangements. According to Sheikha Intisar (IE):

"Because we were working with the MoE, it was easier for the higher authority at the SCPD to approve it, and because it was initially approved by the SCPD it facilitated the MoE taking it further."

The Secretary-General (C) of SCPD echoes this view. He said:

"If the MoE is not ready to cooperate, the project will not succeed. We do not have planning by force but planning by census. And since they already had a connection with the MoE, it was not hard for us to approve it."

Based on the analysis, the research suggests that a good understanding of the contextual elements is the key to success in institutional entrepreneurship. The data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs were able to secure the support necessary to institutionalise their project when they exploited the contextual opportunity. Their good understanding of the context enabled them to seize the moment to include their project in the development plans, and thus ensuring its institutionalisation.

In sum, the analysis reveals that Bareec is a successful institutional project. The research found that four reasons explained the success in Bareec. First, ongoing political support enabled access to power and political influence necessary to realise Bareec. Second, assembling coalition for change to include some insiders and gatekeepers was necessary to secure approval and support from decision-makers. Third, keeping the message consistent with the interests of related institutions was essential to gain the legitimacy for the institutional project. Last, a good understanding of institutional elements secured enough support to embed the institutional project in the institutionalised arrangements. The research recognises that these four reasons altogether contributed to the success in Bareec becoming taken-for-granted.

4.4 Discussion and Conclusion

In examining outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship, the research has addressed three specific aspects – deviation from institutional determinism, institutionalisation of institutional project, and success of institutional entrepreneurship – and identified critical components associated with each aspect. It is important to emphasise that the research has not explicitly included a temporal phases associated with each aspect (institutional entrepreneurs clearly need to get involved in change efforts before they construct the

rationale for change and ultimately institutionalise their project). The case suggests that institutional entrepreneurship is an ongoing process in which different sets of actions occur in parallel rather than in series.

Regarding deviation from institutional determinism, the research found that interest formation and rationale construction enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to let actors inside the target institution to deviate from institutional constraints. In relation to interest formation, the research found that actors' social position – that is hierarchical position and inter-organisational mobility – and the degree of institutionalisation in the field formed their interest and enabled their engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. These findings are similar to those reported by studies of enabling conditions of institutional entrepreneurship. In her study of the enabling role of social position in divergent organisational change that diverge from the institutional status quo in the UK National Health Service, Battilana (2011) found that actors' hierarchical position in the organisation and their inter-organisational mobility influence the likelihood that they will initiate changes that diverge from the institutional status quo. Besides, Battilana et al. (2009) suggests that the actors' degree of institutionalisation in the field influences their level of agency, and thus affects whether they become institutional entrepreneurs.

In examining rationale construction, the research found that normalisation, connecting with macro-cultural discourse, mobilising allies, and resource mobilisation enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to construct the rationale for their institutional project. These are important in emerging fields due to the lack of cultural elements, established structure of domination for actors, and clearly defined relationships and roles that provide a resource on which the institutional entrepreneurs can draw to justify their institutional project. The findings indicate that rationale construction commences with normalisation to produce claims about the effectiveness of new practices to make a case for their adoption. The researcher's concept of normalisation resonates with Maguire and Hardy's (2009) notion of "bodies of knowledge". They argue that the construction of practices as effective, beneficial, and appropriate to normalise a certain way of behaving is a particularly demanding approach to challenge the prevailing institutional arrangements.

Interestingly, the findings suggest that institutional change is more likely to be realised when the instigators of change adopt a gradual approach for showing results and sustaining

support. As Andrews and Bategeka (2013) put it, support for reforms is usually limited and grows with results. Working in this tradition, the institutional entrepreneurs will need to make regular results that show progress towards the realisation of institutional change in order to sustain the support for their project. The findings indicate that the institutional entrepreneurs in the case gradually sustained support for Bareec by showing regular results towards its institutionalisation. At the early stage of their institutional project, the institutional entrepreneurs conducted a small-scale pilot project at only three schools. The results of their pilot project enabled them to produce claims about the effectiveness of their interventions. These claims were later used to amass legitimacy and support for Bareec by connecting them with macro-cultural discourse. Together, these results enabled official approval for Bareec to intervene at schools, and thus expanding the scope of intervention to include more schools.

In examining the institutionalisation of Bareec, the research found that the institutionalisation of the new practices of positive psychology depends upon 1) ongoing legitimisation of the new practices by aligning them with the interests and values of key stakeholders, 2) and attaching them to pre-existing practices associated with related institutionalised fields. The findings suggest that the repeated activation of the newly attached practices contributed to the new practices becoming taken-for-granted. As the new practices are institutionalised, new norms are created around them.

This form of change resonates with the layering mode of institutional change discussed earlier in the *Literature Review*. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) point out that layering occurs when new additions are attached to existing institutions, thereby changing the direction in which existing arrangements affect behaviour (Hacker, 2005; Thelen, 2003). Since new fields are characterised by the absence of institutionalised practices and "widely shared, convergent norms" that form the socially constructed basis for legitimate behaviour (Maguire et al., 2004, p. 674), it becomes necessary for institutional entrepreneurs to draw on related mature fields and their associated set of institutions to legitimise their institutional project. As such, the research argues that the impact of other related mature fields on the innovative practices will depend on their availability and legitimacy to key actors. The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, drew on two related institutions – MoE and SCPD – whose support was necessary to institutionalise Bareec. They ensured alignment between Bareec and the interests of key actors within both institutions. Consequently, Bareec became

increasingly central to the realisation of their interests, thereby gaining the legitimacy needed for its institutionalisation.

Finally, in examining the success or failure in institutional entrepreneurship, the research found that Bareec is a successful institutional project. The findings indicate that the success in Bareec depends upon four elements: 1) ongoing political support, 2) assembling coalition for change, 3) keeping the message consistent with institutional interests, 4) and a good understanding of the context. The research maintains that success in entrepreneurial efforts seems to revolve around one key point – that is ongoing legitimacy. This is because institutional change needs legitimacy to be viable (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Rao, Morrill and Zald, 2000), but the question that remains is how it gains legitimacy. As suggested by Rao et al. (2000, p. 241), legitimacy accrues when innovation "conforms to legal rules and gains endorsement from other powerful actors". The four determinants of success in institutional entrepreneurship mentioned above present some tactics to gain constant legitimacy. Each tactic addresses a specific dimension to legitimise the institutional change. For example, ongoing political support enabled access to power, coalition for change secured approval from decision-makers, and consistency with institutional interests and a good understanding of the context enabled endorsement for the project and enough support for institutionalisation process. These findings resonate with the work on the success and failure of organisational change. In his study of the major reasons why organisational changes fail and succeed, Smith (2002, p. 81) found that successful projects were characterised by "sustained sponsorship" from the top management.

The findings also indicate that outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship is more likely to succeed when legitimate insiders are mobilised behind the entrepreneurial efforts. This is because outsiders are unlikely to have the adequate power in the field to successfully challenge the institutional status quo (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). Thus, mobilising the insiders who are more aware of the conditions that sustain the status quo, and may control sufficient access to resources necessary to realise change becomes essential. The analysis shows that the institutionalisation of Bareec was made possible when institutional entrepreneurs mobilised insiders who secured approval for their intervention and then legitimised and approved Bareec. According to this view, the research maintains that outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship requires the mobilisation of a broader and heterogeneous set of actors to push for the change. The institutional entrepreneurs, in this

case, built a broad support base and enrolled a large number of actors in their project. Each actor had a different but complementary role. For example, they mobilised teachers as implementers for the new practices (some teachers work as trainers), schools principals as supervisors for implementation, decision-makers as authorisers of the practices, and the institutional entrepreneurs themselves as leaders for change.

CHAPTER FIVE: INSIDER-DRIVEN INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN MATURE FIELDS

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the researcher draws on an empirical case of insider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in the mature field of business incubation to address the research questions. The case is about the establishment of the first business incubator for women in the State of Kuwait. The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, are actors inside the institution of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MOSAL). The research questions are: 1) 'How do institutional entrepreneurs deviate from the existing institutional arrangements?' 2) 'How is innovation institutionalised?' and 3) 'What explains the success or failure in institutional entrepreneurs' efforts?'.

To address the research questions, the researcher drew on the interviews with the institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborator, project documents, internal documents, presentations, and the collected media coverage. In relation to the first research question, concerning how institutional entrepreneurs deviate from the taken-for-grantedness of institutions, the researcher examined a number of reasons that explain institutional entrepreneurs' engagement in the business incubator project, and how they explained and justified their new change project. Regarding the second research question, concerning the institutionalisation of new changes, the researcher examined the data for ways in which the new practices of the business incubator became taken-for-granted. To address the final research question, the researcher identified several reasons that explain the success in the institutionalisation of the business incubator.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first section outlines the development of Al-Salam Business Incubator. The second section presents the analysis of the case, where it addresses the three research questions. The final section concludes with a discussion of contributions.

5.2 Al-Salam Business Incubator: A Case of Insiders-Institutional Entrepreneurs

This section outlines the establishment of the first women business incubator in Kuwait and the Gulf region in February 2013 within the MOSAL. The incubator targets unemployed

Kuwaiti women to unleash their entrepreneurial potential by developing their skills and expertise to start-up enterprises. The institutional entrepreneurs who led the establishment of the business incubator are as follows: Fayza Alamiri, Awatef Alqattan, Sahar Shawwa, and Turki Alshemmari. Their collaborators in this case includes: Dala Sbayel, Munther Almatouq, and Nargas Mohammad.

Drawing on the interviews, project documents, internal documents and letters, media coverage, and governmental and non-governmental websites, the researcher developed a narrative account that chronicled the establishment of the business incubator. The first subsection discusses the situation of Kuwait, where the incubator took place. In the second subsection, the researcher presents a narrative account that describes the emergence and establishment of the business incubator practices.

5.2.1 Situation **Analysis**

As an oil-based economy, the State of Kuwait is a major oil supplier. Oil comprises nearly half of the country's GDP, approximately 90% of the government revenue and around 95% of exports, and the country hosts the sixth-largest proven oil reserves in the world (Olver-Ellis, 2019). Despite the exceptional wealth, the country has socio-economically stagnated in the last decades. The role of the State as the sole provider in social and economic spheres is considered a weak foundation for building a future in a highly globalised market economy. The professional community and Government are aware that continued dependence on oil is untenable. The combined windfall effect of welfare provisions and plentiful oil revenues on the part of the State has created a social situation where the public expect myriad types of subsidies. The public sector has come to provide employment for the majority of the national citizenry, while the private sector has remained largely dominated by foreign labour. Despite all State's efforts of generous incentives for Kuwaitis to work in the private sector, only 4% was the average increase of Kuwaitis employed by the private sector in 2007. Kuwaiti women comprise more than half of the Kuwaiti population. They are employed largely in the public sector. Their participation in the private sector is very small compared to the public sector. However, many women work in the informal sector supplying services such as handicrafts and catering. Inadequate business skills and limited financial resources have limited the participation of women entrepreneurs in the private sector. Unemployment

among women, who are registered to receive unemployment benefits, is for the most part higher than among men.

In 1997, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MOSAL) and the Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation (KAPF) in Kuwait started a cooperation to empower the Kuwaiti families who receive social benefits. They named this cooperation as the Fruit of My Labour Project (FOMLP). In the organisational structure of MOSAL, FOMLP does not have a separate structure, but a project that takes place at the Training and Production Awareness Division (TPAD). The TPAD reports to the Family Welfare Directorate (FWD) of MOSAL, which oversees granting social benefits to families in need (Figure 5.1 illustrates MOSAL's organisational structure). The FOMLP aims to empower and train Kuwaiti women, who comprise the vast majority of benefits recipients, to exhibit their entrepreneurial potential by being job creators rather than job seeker. This goes well with tackling the problem of unemployment and reducing the government spending on the welfare system for unemployment benefits. The government financial support offered to the social benefits is estimated at around 1 billion USD annually.

Within the FOMLP, women receive various trainings on different handicrafts such as tailoring, and acquire the skills needed to do these handicrafts. In some instances, women may get access to certain equipment needed to perform their handicrafts and sell their products, thus generating more sources of income. At MOSAL, there are also different Social Development Centres (SDCs) that provide training support to women on social benefits to start-up businesses. However, the FOMLP is the only centre that receives support from the KAPF.

5.2.2 The Emergence of Business Incubation Practices

In 2007, the newly appointed Head of Training and Production Awareness Division, Fayza Alamiri (IE), who also held FOMLP Manager at the same time, found that the place of FOMLP was not enough to accommodate more trainees. Women within FOMLP had great ideas but lacked the skills to bring their ideas into practice. They lacked the machines and place to produce and present their product, and other trainings to run their businesses. Fayza Alamiri and Dala Sbayel (C) – FOMLP Deputy Manager – attempted to find a better place to accommodate the trainees at the FOMLP, but their efforts stalled.

Figure 5. 1: MOSAL's Organisational Structure



In October 2007, the creation of the Supreme Council for Planning and Development (SCPD) to replace the former Ministry of Planning (MoP) had produced an inspiring and wide-ranging strategic vision for Kuwait. The Kuwait Vision 2035 'New Kuwait' envisaged by the Emir of Kuwait, His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Sabah, is as follows:

> *"[To] transform Kuwait into a financial and commercial hub, attractive to investors, where the private sector leads the economy, creating competition and promoting efficiency, under the umbrella of enabling government institutions, which accentuate values, safeguard social identity, and achieves human resource development as well as balanced development, providing adequate infrastructure, modern legislation and inspiring business environment." (New-Kuwait, 2019).*

Based on the New Kuwait vision, the government claimed that to maintain social stability and economic growth, it should have an effective system of governance and efficient and capable public administration (UNDP, 2019b). Plans for improving the performance of public agencies and ministries are thus given high priority in the government action plan. Consequently, a comprehensive reforms package is planned to deal with the existing social and economic policies to bring polices into line with the realisation of the vision. The necessary conditions will be put in place by the government to achieve the 'New Kuwait' vision.

To reach this strategic vision, the government proposed five-years National Strategic Development Plans (NSDP). The five-year NSDP (2009-2013), which was endorsed by the parliament, reflects a policy of renewal and continued growth. The government Action Plan was then created in accordance with the proposed five-year NSDP for 2009 to 2013. In a practical sense, the SCPD runs a series of discussion workshops with different implementing partners and stakeholders from the public sector, private sector, CSOs, NGOs, and academics. They discuss various development problems in Kuwait and try to find ways to resolve them. Some stakeholders may then see how they can intervene and collaborate with the government, bringing their expertise to particular developmental areas.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Kuwait is one of the main partners that work closely with the government of Kuwait. UNDP has been working in Kuwait since 1962 cooperating with the government and other local stakeholders to realise the state's aspirations for sustainable human development. UNDP programming is fully funded by the government of Kuwait. Programming is designed to meet the development priorities in the country. Together with the goals of the United Nations' (UN) Charter, these national priorities create the basis of all UNDP programmes in Kuwait. UNDP collaborates with all Kuwaiti stakeholders to build national capacity to support women's empowerment, and private sector development and develop a more efficient public sector. They agreed with the government to follow National Execution modality to implement different projects that fall within the respective development priorities. This modality seeks to enhance the national capacity of General Secretariat of SCPD as a national implementing partner, and other implementing partners in the government and civil society. The UNDP had been working closely with the SCPD to

support its efforts to launch a comprehensive national planning process that receives both government and parliament approval.

In April 2009, the Government of Kuwait signed the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP). The CPAP focused on four areas: gender and social development, governance and development planning, economics and private sector, and environmental sustainability (UNDP, 2019b). Aligned with the national development priorities, the CPAP seeks to create fundamental structural changes in institutions, allocation of resources, and policies to promote gender equality in all programmes and operations. The CPAP contained 25 projects with a total budget of $20 million, covering the years of 2009-2013. The International Cooperation Department (ICD) at SCPD, supervised by Nargas Mohammad (C), supervises the work of the UNDP based on the agreed Action Plan. Building upon other UN agencies and expertise, the UNDP then developed the projects in light of the main four areas of CPAP. In her efforts to develop the Gender and Social Development portfolio, Sahar Shawwa (IE) – the Head of Gender and Social Development Programme of UNDP Kuwait – hired eight consultants, each working on a specific aspect. One of these aspects was women empowerment. After careful analysis of the local context and several meetings with MOSAL in relation to the issues of women empowerment, the consultant developed the *Economic Empowerment of Kuwaiti Women* (EEKW) project.

The EEKW project aimed at contributing to the social and economic development of Kuwait, with a special focus on women empowerment, by addressing the unemployment problem among Kuwaiti women. The UNDP's role in this project is two-pronged: "to support the empowerment of women to expand their capabilities, opportunities and choices, claim their rights and move into full substantive equality; and the capacity development of governments to respond positively to women's interests and concerns" (UNDP, 2019a). The project strategy, therefore, aimed to provide technical assistance and strengthen the institutional capacity of MOSAL to address the challenges of unemployment in general, and particularly among women. The purpose was to enable Kuwaiti women to establish their businesses, while generating employment opportunities for the rest in the society without any gender bias. The project focused on four main areas:

1. Raising awareness about entrepreneurship and its necessity to economic development,
2. Developing the national institutional capacity of MOSAL to run and sustain a complete package of enterprise development tools and techniques,
3. Enhance Kuwait's women capacity to develop income-generating and entrepreneurial activities, and
4. Enhancing the performance and growth of existing enterprises owned by women (UNDP, 2019a).

Of specific interest to the researcher is the institutional capacity building. It focused on two SDCs and the FOMLP centre, which expressed strong interest in pursuing enterprise development package. The aim was to assess the potential of establishing handicraft business incubator in one of the three centres. After conducting a situation analysis and several meetings at MOSAL, the project consultant found that the FOMLP centre had already made some entrepreneurial inroads in terms of empowering unemployed women to initiate income-generating activities. Thus, FOMLP was chosen to be developed as a business incubator. The other two SDCs were providing generic and focused training programmes, but nothing in the area of entrepreneurship development. After finalising the project document, all parties – the UNDP, MOSAL, and SCPL – agreed on the project and signed the project document in October 2010.

To start project implantation, all parties agreed to assign two project managers. The first was a National Project Manager from within MOSAL. They assigned Awatef Alqattan (IE), the Assistant Undersecretary for Planning and Development at MOSAL, for this position. Her job was to coordinate the project's work across the different departments at MOSAL. Later in 2012, Awatef (IE) become the Assistant Undersecretary for Finance as well. The second was an external Project Manager. His job was to supervise and coordinate the project‘s activities between UNDP, MOSAL, SCPD and other external stakeholders. They Recruited Dr Turki Alshemmari (IE) to serve in this position for two years and a half, who is also an associate professor of finance at Kuwait University. In addition, at the beginning of 2011, a steering committee had been formed to manage the project implementation. It included Awatef Alqattan (IE), Dr Turki Alshemmari (IE), Sahar Shawwa (IE), and Fayza Alamiri (IE).

The committee used to meet regularly to discuss project delivery. In some occasions, the committee included some more members from other related departments at MOSAL and outside entities, depending on the nature of project activities, including, for example, Munther Almatouq (C) – Manager of Shuwaikh Vocational Incubator (SVI).

During the two years of project duration, the steering committee supervised project work in relation to three main areas in parallel: the place, staff, and trainees. On its work on the place, the committee discussed where to locate the incubator. After conducting visits to the social development centres, they selected the FOMLP to be developed as an incubator. They then chose a MOSAL building that used to serve disabled, but it needed some renovations. The committee then supervised the renovations and decorations of the selected building to suit an incubator. Meanwhile, the committee worked on training the MOSAL staff to run the incubator. The staff were already working at MOSAL, but they were reallocated to the incubator. They received training inside and outside Kuwait on incubator management. Lastly, the steering committee created another committee that focused on the selection of trainees to feed the incubator. Dr Turki Alshemmari (IE), Fayza Alamiri (IE) and Munther Almatouq (C) were members of the new committee for trainee selection. Its job was to select the trainees from the FOMLP to fill in the incubator once established, and assess their needs pertaining to their businesses. The selection of trainees for the incubator through a committee became a rule in the incubator's Rules and Regulations.

In February 2013, the first business incubator for women in Kuwait and the Gulf was launched. It hosted 38 women incubatees. Their incubation period lasted from six months to three years. The businesses ranged from traditional crafts and catering to media and software application. It provided the physical infrastructure needed to start-up small businesses and supported the development of technical skills that the incubatees needed to launch, manage, and sustain businesses. The steering committee moved responsibility to MOSAL staff to manage the incubator. As a result, Fayza Alamiri (IE) became the first Incubator Manager and continued managing FOMLP and TPAD. However, there had not been an official title for Incubator Manager, nor was there any new structure for the incubator at MOSAL. Although the steering committee made some attempts to create a new structure for the incubator,

their efforts stalled, and the incubator remained under the supervision of FWD without a separate structure.

In mid-2015, the new Undersecretary stripped Fayza Alamiri (IE) of her position to manage the incubator. She remained serving in two jobs; the FOMLP Manager, and Computer Controller, which she took over in 2014. The first new Undersecretary then appointed a MOSAL staff member to manage the incubator; especially the incubatees were still at the incubator. The newly appointed incubator manager left the position only after a few months. In Late 2015 and beginning 2016, most of the incubatees finished their incubation period except five who did not graduate yet. The incubator remained without a committee to manage it or select new incubatees. Only in mid-2016, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) – a government entity that organises the structures of government agencies, creates positions, and determines grades – issued a structure for the incubator within MOSAL's structure. It also created a new division for Follow-up and Enterprise Development (FED) that reports to the incubator management and renamed the Training and Production Awareness Division (TPAD) to Training and Programmes Preparation (TPP). In the new organisational structure, the business incubator reports to the FWD. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the new organisational structure of MOSAL.

In August 2016, Dala Sbayel (C) became the FOMLP Manager and Acting Head of FED Division. She started to take care of the incubator in late 2016 and garner support for the incubator. Around the same time, Fayza Alamiri (IE) became the head of FWD beside her job at the Computer Controller. She remained in both positions until she finished her service in December 2018 due to her reaching the age of retirement. In December 2016, Dala Sbayel (C) became the first Head of FED Division. Only in March 2019, the second new Undersecretary agreed to form a committee to select new incubatees in the incubator after Dalal's (C) constant lobbying. Dalal (C) then became a member of the newly formed committee to select the incubatees.

Since the launch of the incubator in February 2013, the national media covered the business incubator and its role in small enterprises development. Most notably, the Kuwait Television – Kuwait's official state-run television station – presented the business

incubator in different TV programmes as a new experience to empower women by creating an enabling environment for entrepreneurship (KuwaitTV, 2017b; KuwaitTV, 2018a).

Figure 5. 2: MOSAL's New Organisational Structure.



Al Kout Channel – Kuwaiti TV channel - also presented a programme titled 'Small Enterprises', where they discussed the enterprises at the business incubator and its role in tackling unemployment among women on social benefits (AlkoutTV, 2013). Different national and regional newspapers and magazines have also covered the business incubator and presented it as a unique establishment. For example, in an article by *Alnahar* newspaper, the reporter stated that the business incubator supported the incubatees by

creating an environment where they were able to market and sell their products (Radi, 2018). Moreover, according to an article in the *Business Women Magazine* in 2017:

> *"The business incubator project started a couple of years ago, and it developed and achieved great accomplishments. Women were able to present their projects outside Kuwait, and some of them became self-dependent and started their own business. This was due to the result of the trainings that the business incubator provided to the incubatees, which assisted the women incubatees to start their own business and tackled unemployment." (Abualmajd, 2017b).*

5.3 Analysis and Findings

5.3.1 Institutional Entrepreneurs and Deviation from Institutional Determinism

The researcher now returns to the research questions and provides some answers on how the institutional entrepreneurs in the case were able to deviate from the institutional determinism of MOSAL in their attempts to establish the business incubator. The first research question asks, how do institutional entrepreneurs deviate from the existing institutional arrangements? In examining the data in the case study, the research identified two broad themes that motivated and initiated the deviation from the prevailing institutional arrangements. The first concerns the conditions that enable actors to engage in institutional entrepreneurship and form their interest. The second theme involves institutional entrepreneurs creating and communicating reasons or rationales of the institutional change. The researcher refers to the first theme as interest formation, and the second theme as construction of rationale for institutional change. Engaging in both themes led the institutional entrepreneurs to deviate from the constraining conditions of MOSAL's prevailing arrangements.

5.3.1.1 Interest Formation

Without explaining why individuals become institutional entrepreneurs, it is difficult to explain how among individuals exposed to the same institutional context some work to change existing conditions while others sustain them (Dorado, 2013). In examining the case study, the researcher found three categories that explained actors' motivation and enabled their engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. These categories are actors' social position, field conditions, and individual's characteristics (see Figure 5.3). The research begins by

explaining how actors' social position motivated actors' engagement in change efforts. In the analysis, actors' social positions refer to the hierarchical positions that provide actors with formal authority, interpersonal network position in the social network relations that provides access to support and resources (Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy and Maguire, 2018) and multiple embeddedness (Battilana et al., 2009). The research then examines how the changes in the field enabled actors to engage in institutional entrepreneurship. Lastly, the research presents how individual traits motivated their entrepreneurial activities. The researcher maintains that the three factors could influence actors' motivation to engage in institutional entrepreneurship not only independently, but also jointly.

Figure 5. 3: Interest Formation Theme



5.3.1.1.1 Actors' Social Position

For Fayza (IE) and Awatef (IE), the motivation to establish a business incubator was rooted in their experiences of working with women on social benefits and their assessment that the existing ways to support women to become self-dependent was lacking. Both of them

believed that the FOMLP was not providing enough training and support for women. Their past interactions with trainees influenced their perception of what is needed. Thereby affected their expectations of the future. As a FOMLP Manager and Head of TPAD, Fayza (IE) worked closely with women trainees. Her formal positions at MOSAL provided her with interest to provide the women trainees with the needed support. Interestingly, she did not know at the beginning that what she was calling for is named as a business incubator, but called for a place to accommodate the existing trainees and provide better services when she started her formal positions at MOSAL in 2007. According to Fayza (IE):

> "*The idea came up when I was heading FOMLP. I did not know what meant by the incubator. I only called for a place that accommodates those families, or an exhibition for the families, which later on was called incubator. What I knew was that the families we were working with needed rehabilitation, financial and logistics support to enable them to enter the market and sell their products."*

While Fayza's (IE) two formal positions of managing women trainees enabled her to engage in institutional entrepreneurship, she lacked the authority to legitimise her idea of finding a place to accommodate the trainees. At the same time, she found a place to accommodate the trainees and provide them with additional support. The place belongs to MOSAL, but it needed some renovations. Due to MOSAL regulations, Fayza (IE) still needed the senior management approval of the place for expansion. She approached the senior management several times, explaining the need to have a new place for the trainees at FOMAL and TPAD. However, the senior management refused to assign the building for the trainees. Fayza stated (IE):

> *"I approached the senior management around five times, asking for a building to accommodate the training workshops and incubate the families, but they refused. They expelled me out of the office in the last time. This was in 2007 and 2008. I saw the current place of the incubator, it used to be for disabled project, and it was empty. Whenever they wanted to do a project in it, the project just stalled. It belongs to MOSAL".*

The data also shows that Awatef's (IE) position formed her interest to engage in change efforts. She was holding the Assistant Undersecretary for Planning and Development position. The nature of her formal position was to supervise the development projects at

MOSAL and improve the services where needed. As part of her job, she had to move between different units and departments at MOSAL to assess the potential for development. During her work, she found that many women had some handcrafts in the social development centres (including FOMLP) at MOSAL but had no place to present and sell their products. As part of her formal position to improve and develop MOSAL services, she had to present the proposed development to the senior management for approval as she lacked the authority needed to assign the place for the trainees. In doing so, she sent letters to the senior management in 2009, expressing the need for a new place for the trainees at FOMLP. However, the senior management did not approve the idea. When asked about the reason for the senior management to refuse the approval of new place to accommodate the trainees, Awatef (IE) said, "*They were not interested nor convinced of the idea*."

For Sahar (IE), her engagement in the incubator was also facilitated by her hierarchical position at UNDP. Her motivation was rooted in her job to manage women empowerment and social development programmes, her assessment of the local context of gender mainstream, and Kuwait's position in relation to Millenniums Development Goals at that time. According to Sahar (IE):

> "*At the UNDP, gender mainstreaming is a cross cutting-issue that we must incorporate in all projects. We make sure that any project that is to do with governance, environment, or any other sectors, have gender mainstream in it. We use gender indicators and gender markers in the project to see how much the project is relevant to women empowerment... As I am heading the Gender and Social Development Programme, I have to have projects that focus on women empowerment. Gender mainstreaming and women empowerment is necessary for UNDP and within its strategy."*

Sahar's (IE) focus on the business incubator as a way to empower women was further enhanced after her exposure to the local context, and her interaction with other actors at MOSAL. In her search for areas of concern regarding women empowerment, she recruited several consultants to assess what needed to be done to empower women in Kuwait. Until this point, the idea of business incubator was not there yet. In late 2009, she, along with the consultants, visited MOSAL to assess gender mainstream issues. Sahar stated (IE):

"*I was trying to develop my portfolio of Gender and Social Development, and I recruited eight consultants to do so, each working on a given aspect. One on women empowerment, other on civil society etc. I then arranged visits for them to get them exposed to the local context and see what is lacking at MOSAL".*

At the same time, Fayza (IE) was still calling for a place to accommodate the trainees at FOMLP. When Sahar (IE) visited MOSAL, Fayza (IE) was called to explain the work of FOMLP to the UNDP. It was the first meeting between Fayza and Sahar. Sahar commented that Fayza's words triggered the idea of the business incubator. She also said that the fact that UNDP was working with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to implement a package of entrepreneurship development at the Kuwait Foreign Investment Bureau (KFIB) intrigued EEKW. Sahar stated (IE):

"*Fayza was telling us she needed something that takes care of women at the project she headed and empowers them economically. Fayza's words triggered the idea of business incubator... And since we were working with UNIDO who already had a package for entrepreneurship development for incubators, this intrigued the EEKW project, and even a consultant at UNIDO wrote the project document. We then developed the project in cooperation with UNIDO*."

The analysis so far reveals that actors' positions in the organisational hierarchy enabled their engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. Their assessment of the existing ways of doing their jobs motivated them to seek further improvement. However, the engagement of Turki (IE) in institutional entrepreneurship was jointly facilitated by his position in the informal relations network and his multiple-embeddedness. Turki (IE) worked with the MoP from 2005 to 2009 to develop a business incubator at Kuwait University. At Kuwait University, he headed the Entrepreneurship Development programme, where they provided business counselling training for the incubatees. In 2010, the SCPD approached him to engage in the establishment of the business incubator at MOSAL. According to Turki (IE):

"*In 2010, SCPD contacted me to work on a new project with the UNDP to create an incubator at MOSAL. I already worked with them to develop an incubator at Kuwait University. They invited me for a meeting with the UNDP to discuss the feasibility of the project and how to bring the incubator into existence."*

In this way, the interpersonal relations not only influenced his motivation to participate in establishing the incubator, but also bridged Turki (IE) with the UNDP in a way that facilitated access to resources held by both parts. Turki (IE) held the know-how resource as he had access to multiple practices in other fields. Working in this tradition, his multiple engagements in different practices also influenced his motivation to engage in the business incubator to transpose practices of incubator management from Kuwait University to MOSAL.

Based on the analysis, it appears that actors' social position formed their interest to engage in the institutional entrepreneurship. Their formal positions facilitated their reflection and assessment of the existing ways to do their jobs. Moreover, their positions in the interpersonal network not only motivated their engagement in the change efforts, but also advanced this engagement by facilitating access to support and resources. The findings show that actors' multiple embeddedness influenced their engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. Actors with multiple embeddedness may have access to alternative practices in the field, and thus reflect on their diverse experiences to introduce new practices in a new setting. While social positions may produce actors' interest to act as institutional entrepreneurs, other field conditions may influence who becomes institutional entrepreneurs in relation to the position they occupy in the field. In the next subsection, the researcher explores how field conditions produce actors' interest to act as institutional entrepreneurs.

5.3.1.1.2 Field Conditions

The data shows that the regulatory changes in Kuwait in 2007 to create the SCPD and develop the NSDP influenced Sahar's motivation to engage in institutional entrepreneurship. The replacement of MoP with SCPD invited the introduction of Kuwait Vision 2035. In its efforts to achieve the national vision, the government introduced a package of reforms to improve the performance of public ministries and agencies – the package aimed to develop existing social and economic policies to have an effective system of governance. To operationalise the New Vision, the government proposed different NSDP every five years, each plan focused on specific strategic objective and endorsed by the parliament. The first NSDP was for (2009-2013). To achieve this five-year plan, the government met with different implementing partners and stakeholders to discuss the development problems and ways to

resolve them and created the Action plan accordingly. UNDP is one of the main partners for the government. According to Sahar (IE):

> "*The UNDP works in Kuwait within the National Cooperation Project (NCP) with the state of Kuwait, represented by the General Secretariat of SCPD. We usually develop the NCP through a series of discussion workshops with different stakeholders from the public sector, private sector, and academics. We discuss the problems inside Kuwait and try to find solutions. UNDP then sees what vale can add to the projects that lie within its expertise*."

Sahar's (IE) motivation to engage in the change efforts started to unfold at this point. She was triggered by the need to take part in the governmental efforts to achieve the New Vision. The discussion about the development problems allowed her to reflect on the existing arrangements. However, she still had not identified which areas for change to engage in. Only after the government signed UNDP CPAP, Sahar found the way to participate in the efforts to establish the business incubator. The CPAP focused on four areas, one of which was gender and social development. Sahar stated (IE):

> "*We developed the country programme based on the priorities and plan of the government of Kuwait, and in relation to the millennium development goals at that time…. I was trying to develop my portfolio of Gender and Social Development, and I recruited eight consultants to do so, each working on given aspect… As I am heading the Gender and Social Development Programme, so I have to have projects that focus on women empowerment…. One of the MDGs was to promote gender equality and empower women at that time. To support this aim, we initiated women economic empowerment project*."

In this way, Sahar's (IE) motivation to engage in institutional entrepreneurship was jointly facilitated by her hierarchical position and the regulatory changes in the field. The field condition allowed her to reflect on the existing arrangements, and her social position motivated and furnished ideas for change.

While actors' social position and field conditions seem to play an enabling role in institutional entrepreneurship, not all actors embedded in the same institutional field are equally likely to act as institutional entrepreneurs. Only some actors will exploit entrepreneurial opportunity to become institutional entrepreneurship. This suggests that specific characteristics of

actors could also enable actors' engagement and motivation in institutional entrepreneurship, as the researcher explores in the next subsection.

5.3.1.1.3 Individual Characteristics

The evidence shows that some characteristics of specific actors motivated their engagement in efforts to establish the business incubator. Although all actors interviewed perceived the need for an incubator and their social positions and field conditions motivated their engagement, they were varied in their characteristics. For example, Fayza (IE) and Awatef (IE) had the strong will to pursue and fight for their goal. Fayza (IE) had the determination and perseverance to create a place for the trainees. She approached the senior management several times until she was expelled from the office of the senior management. She started to call for a place to accommodate the trainees from 2007 until 2010, spending almost four years calling for further development to the TPAD. Fayza stated (IE):

> *"I wrote a letter to the senior management, and they refused. I met them four times, and in the last time they expelled me out of the office. I used to come to the place (the same place that later selected for the incubator) and say to myself this place is for me and it will be one day as I want it to be. My husband started to accuse me of getting craziness. I ask the superior management to give me the place, and I will renovate it myself, but they always refuse. I just wanted the place to implement what I planned to do, regardless you call it an incubator or not."*

She had constant dedication to change the prevailing conditions for trainees, despite the obstacles and time it took her to achieve her purpose. After the senior management at MOSAL inhibited Fayza (IE) to achieve her goal, she started to look for other ways outside MOSAL. She approached Zakat House – independent government authority under the direct supervision of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs Minister that aims to collect and distribute Zakat (charity) to those in need – to assist her in meeting the needs of the trainees and develop them further. They agreed to implement her idea in their organisation and offered her a better salary, but she refused, as she was not calling for her idea for any personal gains. According to Fayza (IE):

> *"I then approached Zakat House to help me in getting a place where I can accommodate the families and train them. They offered me a job to do this idea with them after I resign from MOSAL. They also offered 3000 Kuwaiti Dinar as*

monthly salary (7,700 Sterling Pound). I refused and said to them, I wanted you to help the families at the MOSAL, and not for any personal gains. They refused to provide help at MOSAL but agreed to do it at their organisation."

In this way, her persistence and passion for doing her work and contributing to trainees' development also influenced her motivation to change the existing arrangements at MOSAL beside her formal position. Actors, who worked with Fayza (IE), also support this finding. Turki (IE) said that Fayza was a big factor in establishing the incubator. According to Turki (IE):

"Fayza had a pivotal role in establishing the incubator. Without the passion she had, the incubator would not be there."

In addition, Sahar (IE) echoed:

"*We discussed the idea of business incubator and Fayza said this is the dream of my life… She [Fayza] was a big factor in motivating the trainees and the people who were working at the incubator and making it a success."*

Awatef (IE) also had the determination to develop further MOSAL department. In particular, she was persistent in transforming the TPAD to provide better services for the beneficiaries. In doing so, she sent several notes and had some meetings with the senior management to present and negotiate the idea of expanding the work of TPAD and assigning a new place for it. Awatef (IE) said:

"I wrote several letters and notes to the senior management explaining the idea [the business incubator]. I tried to convince them of the idea, and then they could present it to the Minister."

Sahar (IE) also echoed:

"She [Awatef] has been a very influential actor and a decision taker, and always trying to find solutions. She played a big role, and she was persistent on getting things done."

In this way, the analysis reveals that individual characteristics influence their engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. The data shows that Fayza (IE) and Awatef (IE) had a strong will to change the existing conditions of MOSAL, despite the time and challenges they faced.

In sum, the analysis of interest formation shows that actors' social position formed their interest and motivated their engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. Their past interactions and future expectations motivated their ideas for change. However, the analysis also shows that their social position did not provide them with authority necessary to drive the change. Moreover, the analysis suggests that field conditions enabled actors to engage in institutional entrepreneurship by reflecting on the existing institutional arrangements. It also suggests that specific characteristics of individual facilitate their motivation to engage in change efforts. Importantly, the analysis revealed that these enabling conditions of institutional entrepreneurship influenced actor's motivation to engage in institutional entrepreneurship jointly and independently.

While the findings suggest that interest formation explains actors' engagement in institutional entrepreneurship, it is, however, the first step towards understanding how actors embedded in institutional field deviate from the taken-for-grandness of institutions. To develop this understanding further, it is necessary to specify the process by which actors construct the rationale for institutional change to deviate from the prevailing institutional conditions. The next section discusses the rationale construction.

5.3.1.2 Rationale Construction

The data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs engaged in a set of activities to construct the rationale and make a case for change. They communicated their rationales to other actors concerning why they should support or, at minimal not resist the establishment of a new business incubator at MOSAL. In examining the data, the researcher found three categories that explained how actors construct their rationale for change. The categories are problem specification, solution justification and mobilising allies (see Figure 5.4). The researcher begins by explaining how actors make explicit the failing of an existing arrangement to empower women at MOSAL. Then, he investigates how institutional entrepreneurs justify the business incubator as a solution superior to previous arrangements. Finally, he examines how actors mobilise allies and cultivate alliance and cooperation to gain support and acceptance of the idea of a business incubator. Although the research treats the three sets of actions as distinct, it recognises that they are intertwined in practice.

Figure 5. 4: Rationale Construction Theme



5.3.1.2.1 Problem Specification

Before embarking on the deviation from institutional constraints of MOSA, it is necessary to explain the nature of the organisational field in which the entrepreneurial acts took place. The business incubation context is characterised to a large extent by stable relationships and roles. Actors involved accepted the views of who the key players are and the balance of power between them. They collectively agree upon and adhere to pre-existing rules and practices associated with the business incubation and enterprise development context. Thereby, the researcher maintains that business incubation represents a mature organisational field.

Fayza (IE) and Awatef (IE) believed that existing training to empower women to become self-dependent at FOMLP was not sufficient because it did not provide them with the needed resources to produce their products. Moreover, women trainees lacked the skills to improve their opportunities and make the transition to job creation. The place of FOMLP was not enough to provide the support needed for trainees. The absence of required materials and skills gave the trainees little incentive to change their situation. According to Fayza (IE):

> *"The problem was that the Families at TPAD/FOMLP, needed rehabilitation, financial and logistics support to enable them to enter the market and sell their products. They had great ideas but lacked the skills to bring their ideas into practice. Our purpose was to enable them to enter the market and compete with others in the marketplace, and as a result, be self-dependent. Our place at the FOMLP was not big enough to accommodate the trainees."*

In the same way, Awatef (IE) framed the problem in a way that resonated with the main purpose of empowering women on social benefits. For Awatef, the ultimate goal of empowering women was to reduce government spending on social benefits. The prevailing practices at MOSAL were not helping to achieve that goal. Awatef said (IE):

> *"MOSAL aims to empower those women who receive social benefits to become self-dependent and have the place that provides them with the training and other requirements to enter the marketplace. We found that there were plenty of those women who had some handcrafts but had no place to present and sell their products."*

From this perspective, the current arrangements to empowering women to unleash their entrepreneurial potentials could never provide viable opportunities for women to become a job creator. Based on the analysis, problem specification constitutes an important part of the rationale construction. This part involves the framing and expression of a novel understanding of the problem at hand. Central to problem specification is the framing of the problem in a way that is likely to resonate with the interests of other actors. In this way, problem specification provides the required motivation for institutional entrepreneurs to develop and justify a solution. The following subsection discusses how institutional entrepreneurs developed and justified a novel solution to the problem they specified.

5.3.1.2.2 Solution Justification

Although the analysis shows that problem specification was an essential step towards rationale construction, the data shows that institutional entrepreneurs engaged in the process of solution thinking to develop a novel solution to the problem they specified. The research found that institutional entrepreneurs *collectively* visualised the idea of the business incubator and justified it as superior to existing ways to empower and train women at FOMLP.

Awatef (IE) and Fayza (IE) doubted the effectiveness of existing arrangements of FOMLP to empower women, as noted in the previous subsection. They believed that to tackle the problem of lack of resources and skills in a meaningful way, they had to expand their current place and equip the trainees with more resources and skills. In doing so, they had been calling for a place to expand their work and justify it as a solution to develop the skills of the trainees further. Although they did not name the place as a business incubator, the data

shows a great similarity between the business incubator and the place they called for, which later on had been developed as an incubator. Fayza stated (IE):

> *"I did not know what the incubator is and did not know what its purpose is, and even did not perceive its meaning…. I only called for a place that accommodates those families. Or an exhibition for the families, which later was called an incubator. I did not know the exact name for such a thing. But it is different in a way that it accommodates the trainees from six months to three years. It targets individuals who are doing well in their work at FOMLP. Then it provides them with machines needed, marketing training necessary to market their products, and the space (booths) to sell their products and other training necessary to run the business."*

To communicate the solution to the senior management, Fayza (IE) and Awatef (IE) approached the senior management several times to explain the problem and present their solution to the place for expansion. The senior management refused to expand and develop FOMLP further. However, when the UNDP first visited MOSAL to develop their country programme, Sahar (IE) along with UNDP consultants met Fayza (IE). In the meeting, Fayza explained the existing situation at FOMLP to Sahar, who was trying to develop her portfolio of gender and social development at UNDP. The meeting was the spark of the business incubator. According to Sahar (IE):

> *"The officials there introduced us to Fayza who was heading FOMLP. Fayza we telling us she needed something that takes care of women at the project she headed and empowers them economically. Fayza's words triggered the idea of business incubator. We discussed the idea of the business incubator, and Fayza said this is the dream of my life."*

After the meeting, Sahar (IE) and her consultant started to analyse and assess the existing conditions of SDCs at MOSAL. They aimed to assess the potential of developing an incubator in one of the SDCs. They chose three centres, including FOMLP, at different directorates. According to Sahar (IE):

> *"The consultant visited them [MOSAL] and listened to them in many meetings to analyse the current situation and see the baseline on which he sets the targets*

and indicators. He needed to do background analysis for the current situation when including any project activities."

After the assessment, the consultant developed EEKW project and sent the project document to MOSAL. The project concluded that FOMLP could be developed as a business incubator. According to Sahar, the consultant reasoned that the FOMLP had already made some entrepreneurial inroads in terms of training women to make the transition to initiate income-generating activities. This was echoed by Fayza (IE), who said:

"We discussed what we needed, and after that, they said the FOMLP could be developed as an incubator more than the other two SDCs. In the other centres, they had seen the trainers were the ones who were producing, not the trainees. They chose the centre I was heading, and they aimed to establish an incubator in their definition."

Based on the analysis, the institutional entrepreneurs appeared to engage in efforts to develop and justify a novel solution that addressed the problem they had specified. In doing so, they conveyed the purpose of the new solution, and explained why it was a superior approach compared to the prevailing arrangements. The analysis also shows that their collective engagements with each other refined the solution in a way that resonates with the interests of potential allies and generates collective action. In this way, solution justification constitutes the second step towards rationale construction. However, to fully construct the rationale for change, the institutional entrepreneurs still need to mobilise allies and provide them with compelling reasons to support their project. The following subsection discusses the allies' mobilisation.

5.3.1.2.3 Mobilising Allies

In addition to Problem Specification and Solution Justification, the analysis found that institutional entrepreneurs convinced allies embedded in MOSAL of the need for change and mobilised them behind it. Specifically, they provided other actors, who have the authority to drive change, with compelling reasons to encourage them to participate in establishing the business incubator. In doing so, institutional entrepreneurs were able to legitimate the establishment of the business incubator and convince a range of actors about its viability. Thereby constructing the rationale for the establishment of the business incubator and deviating from the existing ways to empower women at MOSAL.

Awatef (IE) started to mobilise the senior management to legitimate the business incubator. Awatef (IE) had the motivation and vision for change, but she lacked the means to establish the business incubator. As an Assistant Undersecretary, she wrote a letter to the Minister, explaining the need for the business incubator. In the letter, she highlighted the role that the UNDP could play in transferring their expertise to MOSAL and funding the project. She also explained how the project would assist MOSAL to achieve its plans. According to Awatef (IE):

> *"I wrote a letter to the Minister explaining the idea, and that the UNDP can help us in this matter. In the letter, I said that as part of our plans to empower women, this project resonates with our plans and it empowers those who receive social benefits to become self-dependent, which could result in reducing the government spending on this matter. We already got a budget for the project."*

Due to MOSAL regulation, she had to follow the hierarchical ladder and send the letter to her superiors who in turn submit it to the Minister. Since her superiors were not interested in establishing a business incubator, Awatef (IE) started a negotiation and persuasion process to convince her superiors of the idea which would, in turn, convince the Minister. Awatef said (IE):

> *"I tried to convince my superiors of the idea. When they were convinced of the idea, they then presented the letter we wrote to the Minister. The Minister then agreed to go for the project and requested us to do what needed to do so. It took some time until they got convinced of the idea."*

Having the senior management's endorsement for the project after the UNDP became an ally leaves a question of why they agreed at this point of time. The data shows that Awatef (IE) and Fayza (IE) approached the senior management several times before the UNDP presented the idea of business incubator to MOSAL. The senior management refused their proposed idea of expanding FOMLP even though they specified the problem they had and presented a solution that could address the problem they framed. In examining the case study, the analysis reveals that the senior management agreed on the project due to the approved government budget for the project, and the status of UNDP in Kuwait. According to Awatef (IE):

"Since we already got an approved budget for the project, the finance department at MOSAL had no role to play during this stage except for issuing expenditures because the money will be in their account and what they need to do is covering the project expenses. This helped us since the project is part of the government programme that has its own funding."

Sahar echoed the fact that the project had an approved budget. She said (IE):

"The project is 100% funded by the government through the General- Secretariat of SCPD. The country programme for the UNDP already had a budget within the government budget plan. Every year we are budgeted within the government budget. This county programme was about 20M$ for five years."

In Kuwait, the UNDP is a key partner for the government. Its programmes are fully funded by the government and aim to help the county in meeting the development priorities. In this way, UNDP enjoys not only a well-reputed international status, but also a local status as a key government partner, whose status provided them the credibility to speak of perceived development priorities and plans. According to Sahar (IE):

"The UNDP came to Kuwait 50 years ago and agreed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help the government. UNDP is very credible. When you come to other government ministries and say I have a project for you with funding, this affects their perception."

To fully legitimate the establishment of the business incubator and deviate from the existing arrangements, the institutional entrepreneurs engaged in efforts to incorporate the project within the government programme. This means that once the Cabinet approves the government programme, the implementing parties have to implement the projects enlisted in the programme, and they will be held accountable for any poor implementation. Sahar (IE) stated that after she sent the project document to MOSAL and SCPD, both parties agreed on the project without any alteration. To follow, the UNDP had to do Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC), where they meet with both parties and present the project. Sahar stated (IE):

"We did the Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC). We met all together and presented the project document. The project document writer did a presentation for the project. We usually send it to them before the presentation by post to read

it and get their comments ready. Both agreed on the project document without any alteration. We then signed it [project document] in October 2010 and sent copies to both parties."

Signing the project document means that the project, along with other projects at MOSAL, is now part of the government programme. As a result, the SCPD sent the programme to the Cabinets for approval. According to Awatef (IE):

"We agreed on it [project] with the SCPD, and the Ministry of Finance approved the budget. The SCPD sent it to the Cabinet to approve it. We usually send all projects that form our five years plan and not only this on. After that, we had to agree with UNDP on how to do the implementation…. Gladly, the project was part of the government programme, so we had to implement it. If not, we will be held accountable to the Cabinet as to why we did not implement it."

Thus, the analysis suggests that institutional entrepreneurs mobilised potential allies who had the power to authorise the change. Central to allies' mobilisation is to provide the potential allies with convincing reasons on why they should support the proposed change project. This involves negotiations to link the change project with the values and interest of potential allies and showing them the political consequences of supporting the new arrangements. The analysis also shows that the institutional entrepreneurs leveraged the status of organisation and the availability of resources to induce alliances and cooperation. In this way, the institutional entrepreneurs encouraged allies' participation in the network of actors who become enrolled in the change project. To further legitimating their proposed project, the institutional entrepreneurs exploited the current changes in the field initiated by the government to achieve its new vision and positioned their project in the existing and approved government programme. Thereby, mobilising political support and augmenting the legitimacy of their change project and lock the stakeholders into stable coalition.

The findings indicate that mobilising allies, along with problem specification and solution justification enabled actors to construct their rationale for the business incubator fully. According to the analysis, interest formation and rationale construction seem to provide an answer for how actors deviate from the existing institutional arrangements and provide them with the motivation to institutionalise the business incubator in MOSAL. In the following

section, the researcher explores how the institutional entrepreneurs institutionalised the business incubator within MOSAL.

5.3.2 Institutional Entrepreneurs and Institutionalisation

The second research question focuses on the institutionalisation of the business incubator in MOSAL, the process in which the new practices of the incubator became accepted and taken-for-granted (Phillips et al., 2004). In brief, the institutional entrepreneurs institutionalised the new practices of the business incubator by replacing them with pre-existing MOSAL practices. In examining the case study, the research identified three categories that showed how the new practices of the business incubator were institutionalised (see Figure 5.5). In their attempts to institutionalise the business incubator, the institutional entrepreneurs designed the organisational template for the incubator, legitimated the practices on an ongoing basis, and mobilised the resources needed. While the research treats the three patterns as a distinct set of actions, it recognises that they occur in parallel rather than in series.

Figure 5. 5: Institutionalisation of New Practices



5.3.2.1 Designing the Organisational Template

To create the new organisational form for the business incubator, the institutional entrepreneurs developed a set of structures and practices that became the basis of the business incubator, and that would guide the behaviour of MOSAL staff members and the potential women entrepreneurs. They drew on existing logics and their associated practices to establish the characteristics of the business incubator and the mechanisms of its operations. They began by drawing on the practices and approaches from the logic of vocational incubators and integrated them into the logics of handicraft business incubator. All of the institutional entrepreneurs mentioned that they approached the management of Shuwaikh Vocational Incubator – vocational incubator for light industry such as carpentry, metalwork and tank making – to advise on the operating logics for incubators. They invited two members of SVI, including Munther (C) – the incubator manager, to present the operating logics for SVI. According to Munther (C):

> *"Based on the operating logics of Shuwaikh Vocational Incubator and other incubators we have seen, I advised on the management system that suits the handicraft business incubator. It includes the admissions criteria, incubation period, type of services offered in the incubator, control system, and daily follow up for incubatees and the renewal of incubation period."*

Fayza (IE) echoes this view. She said:

> *"Munther presented the basics of incubators, which we then adapted to our environment and the nature of work. We then tried to take the pillars that fit with our handicraft nature of the incubator and build up."*

Having looked into the established logics of incubators in the field of incubation, the institutional entrepreneurs led three significant actions, the result being a new organisational template that fits the handicraft business incubator.

First, they conducted a needs assessment survey targeting the Kuwaiti women receiving support from MOSAL to identify the real needs of potential women entrepreneurs. Accordingly, 504 questionnaires had been filled in the first half of 2011. The needs assessment document shows that 91% of the respondents were unemployed, leaving a very small group who run a business or having a job. It also shows that 70% of the respondents were divorced women. The findings demonstrate that 7.94% of the respondents owned

business and were facing challenges in running their businesses. The main challenges ranked as follows; finance 43%, location 23%, business development 18%, and legal 13%. Interestingly, the findings show that 81% of the respondents indicated their interests to start a business, 70% had the willingness to get some training, and 73% indicated that they want to start a business to generate income. This suggests that the trainees lacked the skills to start a new business, and the existing training did not equip them with the needed skills to turn their ideas into a business and enter the market. The result also shows that the trainees who had a business were facing some challenges to grow their business. The results of the needs assessment survey motivated the institutional entrepreneurs to look for a modality that could meet the needs of those potential women entrepreneurs. A modality that could help the potential women entrepreneurs to create a business and grow their businesses.

Second, the institutional entrepreneurs requested the assistance of UNIDO to develop a holistic package of enterprise development tools and techniques to empower the women entrepreneurs at MOSAL. Enterprise Development & Investment Promotion (EDIP) programme of the UNIDO is a multifaceted package approach that aims to assist potential women entrepreneurs to transform their ideas into an existing business, and, at the same time, assist them to grow and expand their businesses. According to Sahar:

> *"We built upon other UN agencies and expertise… we were working with UNIDO who already had a package for entrepreneurship development…They [UNIDO] have the Enterprise Development Programme. It was a package of training they offer…We then developed the project in connection with UNIDO."*

In reviewing the project documents, the research found that EDIP is composed of two modalities: Enterprise Creation and Enterprise growth. The former aims to stimulate the emergence of new enterprises that provide income and employment for people, and help the potential women entrepreneurs to translate their ideas into commercial ventures through four stages: preparation and empowerment, business counselling, financial linkages, and incubation. The latter focuses on assessing the problems facing existing enterprises, and devising solutions to enhance their competitiveness. The aim is to bring tangible results in the quickest possible timeframe to businesses that have growth potential but are hindered by problems related to productivity and competitiveness. However, the adoption of both modalities requires building the capacity needed to run them. Thus, the institutional

entrepreneurs still need to ensure that MOSAL staff are trained to run the enterprise development modalities.

Third, to implement EDIP, the institutional entrepreneurs ensured that two capacity-building programmes had to be conducted: Training of Trainers (ToTs) for enterprise creation, and 'Developing Business Counsellors' for enterprise growth. The purpose of both programmes was to build the capacity of MOSAL staff to manage and run the incubator, and, at the same time, provide the needed training for potential women entrepreneurs in the incubator. Sahar stated (IE):

> *"We also trained the MOSAL staff who were in charge of managing civil services organisations on how to run incubators. This was one of the first project activities. We have trained them different times. We sent them to Bahrain for training. The UNIDO staff also came and trained them. We also discussed how to purchase the equipments needed by the trainees."*

ToTs were held in Kuwait from 24th to 28th April 2011. It targeted seven MOSAL staff (including Fayza (IE)) and aimed at equipping MOSAL staff with the necessary competencies to identify and select 'developable' talents and nurturing them from opportunity identification to business creation. Developing Business Counsellors involved two components, which were held in Bahrain and Kuwait. Bahrain's part of the programme took place from 11th to 15th March 2012, targeting four MOSAL staff (including Fayza (IE) and Awatef (IE)). This part focused on developing trained and skilled business counsellors to assist the women entrepreneurs in formulating plans for enterprise growth. In Kuwait, the second component of the programme took place between 25th and 27th September 2012 and targeted six MOSAL staff (including Fayza (IE)) and 20 Kuwaiti women entrepreneurs. This part was practical business counselling sessions to reflect on the existing women entrepreneurs and assist them in growing their businesses.

The data shows that institutional entrepreneurs managed to develop an organisational template for the incubator after leading the three actions mentioned above. In essence, they developed a set of practices that reflected the two modalities adopted for enterprise development. The data also shows that these practices responded to the need of potential women entrepreneurs in relation to enterprise creation and enterprise growth. To ensure the

adoption of these practices, MOSAL staff were trained to diffuse the practices among other MOSAL staff and women entrepreneurs.

However, these practices still require internalisation and institutionalisation on a sustainable basis within the MOSAL structure. In doing so, the institutional entrepreneurs designed an appropriate organisational structure for the incubator that reflected the new practices for enterprise development. In particular, the new structure of the incubator contained two divisions. The first is the Division of Training and Programmes Preparation (TPP), which came in response to the first modality of enterprise creation. This division was designed to replace the pre-existing Training and Production Awareness Division (TPAD). The second is the Division of Follow-up and Enterprise Development (FED), which responded to the second modality of enterprise growth. The institutional entrepreneurs collectively designed the new form of the incubator that reflected the new practices adopted and the new organisational structure, and communicated it to the Undersecretary, who in turn submitted it the Minister. A ministerial latter dated on 31st October 2012 from MOSAL to the Head of CSC showed that MOSAL requested the initiation of a new structure for the incubator with the new divisions as described above. The letter also requested that the incubator belong to the Family Welfare Directorate, which belongs to the Community Development sector (see Chart 5.2).

Based on the analysis, the research found that institutional entrepreneurs built a new organisational template for the business incubator which responded to the needs of potential beneficiaries and that addressed the problem they had specified. In doing so, they drew strategically on the established institutional logics and their associated practices to develop the basis of the new organisational template. In particular, they combined the practices of vocational incubation and enterprise development modalities to develop new practices that fit the nature of the business incubator. To ensure diffusion of the new practices, they trained the stakeholders on the new practices, and thus influencing their behaviour. The analysis also shows that the institutional entrepreneurs engaged in efforts to incorporate the new practices in MOSAL's organisational structure, and thus ensuring institutionalisation of the newly adopted practices. However, they still need to legitimate the new practices and mobilise resources on an ongoing basis in order for the new practices becoming taken-for-granted, as the next subsections explains.

5.3.2.2 Legitimating the New Practices on an Ongoing Basis

To institutionalise the new practices, key stakeholders have to perceive them as legitimate (Maguire et al., 2004). The analysis reveals that the institutional entrepreneurs conferred legitimacy upon the new practices of the business incubator by constantly aligning them with the values and interests of decision-makers, and women entrepreneurs. The purpose was to create a favourable environment for launching and sustaining the new practices of the business incubator. The following subsections explore how institutional entrepreneurs align the practices of the business incubator with decision-makers and women entrepreneurs.

5.3.2.2.1 Aligning the New Practices with Decision Makers' Interests

The data shows that institutional entrepreneurs formed a steering committee in the beginning of 2011 in a way that enabled access to support and authority. The institutional entrepreneurs mentioned in this case were permanent members of the committee, who used to meet monthly and sometimes weekly, to supervise the work progress. To align the committee's interests with decision-makers and to facilitate and authorise its actions, the institutional entrepreneurs included some other MOSAL staff members in the committee. They also proposed that a member of MOSAL senior management heads the committee to gain the authority and support needed for the committee' actions. The argument was that the establishment of the incubator entails different actions across different departments at MOSAL. There was a need to include some other MOSAL staff whose work influences the establishment of the incubator, and to gain the authority needed to legitimate the committee's work. According to Sahar (IE):

> *"We created it [the committee] because the idea of the incubator required involving different departments within MOSAL in the project. One department was for Family Welfare Directorate, another for engineering, another one for FOMLP headed by Fayza who was the most active one in all meetings, and another department for community development, which included the social development centre."*

Awatef also supported this view. According to Awatef (IE):

> "*The team we created played a major role in bringing the incubator. The team included Sahar Shawwa, Dr Turki, Managerial Development Manager, The Head*

of Service Development, Fayza, and Dala Sbayel. We developed the team based on their specialisation. All members deal with the group of women who receive the social benefits. I insisted that the senior management heads the team as to give it more power. Every member had their own role in doing."

On aligning the business incubator with decision-makers' interests, the analysis also reveals that the institutional entrepreneurs connect with field-level practices to augment the legitimacy of their new designed practices. Fayza (IE) mentioned that, on some occasions, the committee included some members from SVI to advise on the logics of incubators. She also added that the members from SVI conducted some presentations to the senior management on incubator establishment, and thus augmenting the legitimacy of their actions. According to Fayza (IE):

"The members were relevant to the establishment of the incubator. Some departments at MOSAL that had to do with the incubator, and we included two staff members from SVI who had background and experience of establishing incubators. Munther had met with the senior management and done presentation with what we need to establish an incubator."

To further legitimating the project activities and its newly designed practices, the institutional entrepreneurs used to meet regularly with other related governmental decision-makers, whose support was necessary to authorise the committee's work on a larger scale outside MOSAL. Since the Cabinet approved EEKW project as part of the government programme, the SCPD had to supervise the progress of all projects, including EEKW, and report the progress to the Cabinet. The purpose of these regular meetings was to update the decision-makers on the progress of establishing the incubator and request any support needed. According to Nargas (C) – Supervisor of ICD at SCPD:

"Dr Turki used to present the progress of the project periodically; what they have achieved, what obstacles are there, what will be the plan for the following three months. Based on the progress and the required future work, we issue the fund necessary to the UNDP to cover any needed work for the project implementation. We also address any potential obstacles and risks the project may face and that we are authorised to do so."

Based on the analysis, the institutional entrepreneurs managed to gain legitimacy for the business incubator by aligning it with the decision-makers' interests. In doing so, they included the key officials at MOSAL in the coalition for the incubator and ensured support from other field-level governmental institutions. Although CSC approved the incubator's organisational structure after the launch of the incubator, the senior management at MOSAL issued a letter authorising the launch and start of work in the incubator. This shows that gaining the support from the decision-makers enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to run the incubator and start the incubation for the newly selected incubatees. This means that the incubator had to receive *constant* support from decision-makers until CSC approved the new structure of the incubator and institutionalised it within the MOSAL structure. Said alternatively, a lack of support or a change of the senior management with a new one that does not embrace the incubator would negatively influence the running of the incubator.

In this tradition, the analysis reveals that the change of MOSAL's senior management before CSC approved the incubator's structure with a new management who did not support the incubator influenced the running of the business incubator. As shown in the interviews, the new management was not embracing the idea of the business incubator and did not follow the previous management's decision to support the incubator. Rather, the new management suspended the fund for the incubator, and changed the staff who were managing the incubator. According to Fayza (IE):

> *"The new senior figures came from the Ministry of Transportations. They were not supporting nor believing in the idea of the incubator. They removed me from managing the incubator. "*

Turki (IE) also mentioned that the new management replaced the whole staff, who were trained to manage the incubator, with new staff who had no experience in incubation management. Turki (IE) also added that he tried to meet the new management to explain how the incubator is aligned with MOSAL goals and interests to influence their decision regarding the incubator, but the new management refused to meet him. Turki said (IE):

> *"The new management stopped the work in the incubator. They suspended the fund. They also changed the whole cadre who was managing the incubator and assigned new cadre who had no experience of managing the incubator, nor did they believe in it. I contacted them and suggested to conduct a presentation on*

the incubator, they told me they would give me an appointment, and they never gave anything. They were not convinced of the idea."

The analysis reveals that when Dalal (C) became the first head of the FED Division after CSC approved the incubator's structure, there was also a change in the senior management for the second time. However, although the new second senior management did not embrace the idea of the business incubator at the beginning, the incubator became now an institutionalised part of MOSAL. Therefore, the new management had to ensure all units of MOSAL, including the business incubator, work properly. The challenge was to induce the new management to form a new committee to select the incubatees since their selection has to be by a committee. Members of the previous committee had either retired or moved to other units. Dalal (C) said:

"I was sending notes and letters to the new management to form a committee to recruit incubatees at the incubator since the first day I came inboard, but I did not get any response back."

To induce the new management to form a committee, Dalal (C) started a process of lobbying and negotiations to align the business incubator with the new management's interests. In doing so, she organised several exhibitions at the business incubator and invited the senior management for each exhibition. Each exhibition lasted for a couple of days, where former women entrepreneurs presented their products. The aim was to present the incubator work to the senior management and persuade them to form a committee to recruit incubatees. According to Dalal (C):

"I organised exhibitions for the productive families at the incubator and invited the senior management to attend the exhibition…. All the exhibitors were there informally. The exhibition usually lasted for three days, and we did not incubate the exhibitors because we were not allowed to do so unless there is a committee. When I chose the exhibitors for the exhibitions, I checked whether their products are innovative and can attract customers' attention, because I wanted it to be an event that can impress decision-makers and other influencers, so that we can gain their support to rerun the incubator. The senior management was surprised by the number of exhibitors and their products."

Following the exhibition, Dala (C) also approached a senior member of Entrepreneurship Service Sector at the National Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise Development (SME) to garner support for forming the committee. She reasoned that this senior member of SME fund is part of a government entity that specialises in a work similar to the incubator. She aimed to leverage the senior member to induce the senior management of MOSAL on the importance of forming a committee to run the incubator. She facilitates a meeting for him with the senior management at MOSAL. According to Dalal (C):

> *"I booked an appointment for him with the senior management. The senior management at MOSAL met with the member from the SME fund, me, and the head of FWD. The senior management was impressed by his talk and was convinced about forming the committee and agreed to do so."*

Thus, the analysis suggests that the institutional entrepreneurs connected the new practices of the business incubator with the interests and values of key decision-makers whose authority was necessary to legitimate the incubator. In doing so, they engaged key decision-makers into their coalition, connected with field-level practices to augment the legitimacy of their practices, and aligned with field-level institutions to gain endorsement and support needed. The analysis also reveals that constant support and authority is needed from the powerful decision-makers until the new practices are embedded within the existing arrangements of institutions. The data shows that only when the institutional entrepreneurs ensured ongoing support from the senior management, the new practices of the business incubator become embedded in the MOSAL structure. However, other stakeholders have to perceive the business incubator as legitimate as well. In the next subsection, the research discusses how the institutional entrepreneurs connected the business incubator with the interests of potential women entrepreneurs.

5.3.2.2.2 Aligning the New Practices with Women Entrepreneurs

To communicate the new practices of the business incubator and align them with the interest of potential women entrepreneurs, the institutional entrepreneurs conducted a series of awareness-building activities and media campaigns, targeting women on social benefits during and after the establishment of the incubator. They reminded the potential women entrepreneurs that the practices of enterprise creation and enterprise development were consistent with their interests and values – highlighting that the EDIP modalities equip them

with the needed skills to start their businesses. In doing so, they conducted promotional brochures and gave several interviews to regional and national newspapers and TV channels on the incubator, the charms of being entrepreneurs and the contribution the women entrepreneurs can make to the socio-economic development of Kuwait. According to Sahar (IE):

> "*We did media campaign, proportional brochures, TV interviews, and press conference to gain the attention of the stakeholders and to let people who are affected by the incubator know about it. This was before, during, and after the launching of the incubator."*

Fayza (IE) mentioned that they communicated the idea of the business incubator to women at FOMLP and raised their awareness about it. She presented how the incubator could provide them with better services and skills required to start businesses. Fayza also added that they posted advertisements in the national newspapers, marketing the incubator and requesting women on social benefits to apply for the incubation. Fayza (IE) stated:

> *"We advertised in the newspapers that any of the families receiving benefits from MOSAL and have an idea for a start-up can apply. We then shortlisted the applications and interviewed the candidates."*

In reviewing the media coverage, it appears that a press conference took place in the incubator building in February 2013 to launch the incubator. The conference was under the patronage of the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour. According to an article in *Alrai* newspaper, the conference panel included Fayza, UNDP, Family Welfare Directorate of MOSAL and the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour (Alfarhan, 2013). The panel communicated the aim of the incubator, the services it provides, the admission criteria, and the effects it has on women empowerment (Alfarhan, 2013). According to the article in Alrai:

> *"The incubator supports and funds small business by women and supply them with all required services and skills to do so. It empowers women to become self-dependent and generate income. It creates a favourable environment to nurture talents among Kuwait women." (Alfarhan, 2013).*

In another article by *Al-Watan Newspaper* in June 2013, Fayza gave an interview on the importance of the incubator in empowering women and developing the skills needed to start their business (Alwatan, 2013). The media coverage also shows that Dalal (C) gave several

TV interviews at Kuwait national TV channel in 2017 and 2018 just after the period where the incubator stalled and recruitment of incubatees was suspended. In the interviews, Dalal (C) was marketing the incubator and its importance in creating jobs for marginalised women in the society and invited women to apply for incubation (KuwaitTV, 2017b; KuwaitTV, 2018a).

Based on the analysis of legitimating the new practices of the business incubator, this research argues that aligning the new practices with the key stakeholders' interests and values on an ongoing basis is an important step towards the institutionalisation of practices. The institutional entrepreneurs in the incubator case were able to connect with key decision-makers from their institution and the field-level institutions, thereby augmenting the legitimacy of their practices. They also connected the practices with the interest of other stakeholders who are significantly affected by the business incubator. The analysis suggests that this alignment played a significant role in the institutionalisation of their project. In this way, legitimating the practices on an ongoing way constitutes the second part of the institutionalisation process.

While designing the organisational template and legitimating the practices on an ongoing basis represent two main parts of institutionalisation process, the institutional entrepreneurs still need to mobilise resources necessary to fully institutionalise the business incubator. The next subsection explores how the institutional entrepreneurs mobilised resources.

5.3.2.3 Resource Mobilisation

While the institutional entrepreneurs leveraged resources to construct the rationale for the business incubator at the start of their institutional project, the data shows that they mobilised resources to induce support for the project implementation. In reviewing the data, the research identified two types of resources that the institutional entrepreneurs mobilised in the institutionalisation of the business incubator. The resources are financial resources, and resources related to social position. Chart 5.6 illustrates the resources used in the project. In the next subsections, the research explores the resources and what is done with them.

Figure 5. 6: Types of Resources



5.3.2.3.1 Financial Resources

The institutional entrepreneurs used financial resources to facilitate the institutionalisation process of the business incubator. In doing so, they did not only mobilise the already approved fund for the project to cover the activities during implementation, but they also covered some project-related expenses from their own personal financial backing. The data shows that the financial resources mobilised to cover the cost of two main activities: the incubator building, and the training.

On the incubator building, the institutional entrepreneurs visited several buildings at MOSAL to see which one can best suit the incubator. In their search for a building, they looked for a well accessible building and has the capacity to accommodate the incubatees. The current building of the incubator was for a disabled project at MOSAL. At the start of EEKW, the building was empty and not well designed to serve an incubator. Thus, the institutional entrepreneurs recruited an engineer to renovate and decorate the building in a way that suits the business incubator. According to Awatef (IE):

> *"We have seen many buildings at MOSAL, but they were not suitable to be an incubator. The one we chose was well located and easily accessible and already belonged to MOSAL, yet it needed some renovations. It took us a while to choose the building. We chose it around 2011."*

Sahar (IE) also supports this view. She said:

"We conducted many visits to MOSAL buildings accompanying the engineers with us to see which one can be best renovated as incubator. When we agreed on the current place to develop it as an incubator, we had sent many letters back and forth to MOSAL in general and the senior management in particular to facilitate the renovation process. We used to monitor the renovation progress regularly."

The data also shows that Fayza (IE) covered some project-related expenses from her own personal financial backing. She approached a consulting company to help in drawing an organisational structure for the incubator, which was sent to CSC. She explained that this would speed up the approval for the structure since it usually takes a long time to get anything approved by CSC. Sahar also echoed this and said that in order to get a department to approve something, it took lots of efforts and time. According to Fayza (IE):

"I approached a consulting company which analysed the incubator to see what units and departments are needed in the incubator. This was on my own expenses (2200KD) – equivalent to 5500 Sterling Pound. They identified what skills are needed in the individuals managing the incubator, and the organisational structure of the incubator. They did some scales that all staff went through to specify the individuals needed in each position according to their expertise and skills."

On the training, the data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs mobilised financial resources to fund training-related activities. They ensured that the staff at MOSAL are equipped with the required skills to run the incubator. They also facilitated the capacity building training for the MOSAL staff who would be training the incubatees. They ensured that those staff are well trained to transfer the skills and train the potential incubatees on the new practices of enterprise creation and enterprise development within the incubator. According to Sahar (IE):

"*We also trained the MOSAL staff who were in charge of managing civil services organisations on how to run incubators…. We have trained them different times. We sent them to Bahrain for training. The UNIDO staff also came and trained them. We also discussed how to purchase the equipments needed by the trainees."*

Turki (IE) also added:

> *"We were able to have human cadres through training. Through training of staff, we developed the skills needed. These skills were necessary to run and manage the incubator. We brought a Training Consultant that specialises in training programmes development."*

The analysis reveals that the institutional entrepreneurs mobilised financial resources to support the implementation process of the business incubator. In doing so, they used the allocated fund for the incubator to cover the expenses related to the establishment of the incubator. They also fund some project expenses from their own financial backing to speed up and facilitate the institutionalisation of their institutional project. In addition to financial resources, the data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs also mobilised resources related to social position during the institutionalisation of the business incubator, as the next subsection explains.

5.3.2.3.2 Social Position

While social position enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to engage in the change efforts, the data shows that they leveraged their social position as a resource to support the institutionalisation of the business incubator. In reviewing the case, the data shows that the institutional entrepreneurs harnessed the hierarchical position to support the institutionalisation process. They mobilised the authority conferred by their position to facilitate and legitimise the implementation of project activities. For example, Awatef (IE) leveraged the authority conferred by her position to support the coordination of work related to the establishment of the incubator. As part of her job, she was able to move across different departments at MOSAL to get the needed work done. According to Awatef (IE):

> *"I have been assigned as a National Project manager for the incubator because as an Assistant Undersecretary for Planning and Development I have some authority needed in the project implementation. I was in charge of coordinating work within the ministry and between different sectors such as Planning and Development, Legal Affairs, Benefits etc. I had to move across those sections to get the work of incubator done."*

The data also shows that when Awatef (IE) became the Assistant Undersecretary for Finance as well, she also harnessed her new position as a resource to facilitate the project finance. She said:

> *"When I took on the Assistant Undersecretary for Finance, I became in charge of issuing the project expenditures. My new assignment facilitated the project finance as planned in the project."*

Fayza (IE) also supported this view, she said:

> *Thanks to Awatef, who facilitated the furnishing of the incubator. When she became Assistant Undersecretary for finance in 2012, she facilitated the financial needs of the incubator."*

Based on the analysis of social position, the institutional entrepreneurs mobilised the authority conferred by their formal positions to legitimise and facilitate the establishment of the incubator, and thus contributing to its institutionalisation. Thus, the analysis suggests that through resource mobilisation the institutional entrepreneurs were able to induce the implementation of their institutional project. They were able to fund the activities needed to institutionalise the incubator and harness their social position to authorise support for project implementation.

In this section, the research discussed how the institutional entrepreneurs institutionalised the business incubator. The research found that they institutionalised the new practices of the business incubator by replacing them with the old practices. In doing so, they led three intertwined sets of actions. First, they designed an organisational template to include new practices that reflected enterprise creation and enterprise growth modalities. To ensure internalisation of the two modalities within MOSAL structure, they designed two divisions at MOSAL; each sustained and adopted a modality of enterprise creation and enterprise development. Second, they legitimated the newly adopted modalities by aligning them with the key stakeholders on an ongoing basis. Third, they mobilised the resources – financial and social position resources – necessary to induce the implementation of their newly designed template. Over time, the repeated and regular activation of the organisational relationships ensured ongoing reproduction of new practices and contributed to the new practices becoming taken-for-granted. Thus, the research argues that those sets of actions

provide an explanation for the second research question pertaining to how institutional entrepreneurs institutionalise their innovation.

The research so far explored how institutional entrepreneurs deviated from the institutional determinism of MOSAL and how they institutionalised their innovation. But what explains the success or failure of their attempts to deviate from the status quo and bring about new arrangements? The next section provides an explanation for the success or failure of the institutional entrepreneurs' efforts.

5.3.3 The Success or Failure of Institutional Entrepreneurship

The final research question investigates what explains the success or failure of institutional entrepreneurs' efforts. As the question implies, we need first to determine whether the establishment of the business incubator was a success or failure before explaining why it was so. Determining whether a project is a success or failure can be a complex job because success or failure factors vary in the literature (Belassi and Tukel, 1996) and parties involved in the project perceive them differently (Pinto and Slevin, 1989). However, De Wit (1988) suggests that the most appropriate criteria for measuring project success are the degree to which the project objectives have been met.

Following De Wit (1988), the EEKW project aimed to develop the institutional capacity of MOSAL to establish handicraft business incubator in one of the SDCs. The incubator is to run and sustain enterprise development tools to build the capacity of the Kuwaiti women to start their own business. According to the analysis, the institutional entrepreneurs succeeded in institutionalising the business incubator, and sustained a holistic package of enterprise development tools that developed the capacity of women to run their enterprises. They internalised two new sets of practices – enterprise creation and enterprise development – to influence the behaviour of incubatees and sustained these practices in MOSAL organisational structure.

Although efforts to run the incubator stalled at some point of time, the incubator was finally institutionalised and became part of MOSAL. The data also shows that the institutional entrepreneurs regarded their efforts as a success. Meanwhile, different media coverage presented the incubator as a success story and expressed the need for having more business incubators in the country (KuwaitTV, 2017b; KuwaitTV, 2018a). Therefore, the research maintains that the business incubator is a successful institutional project.

Having determined that the establishment of the business incubator is a successful initiative, the researcher now discusses what explains this success. In examining the data in the case, the research found four reasons that explained the success in institutional entrepreneurs' initiative. The reasons are ongoing political support, assembling coalition for change, keeping the message consistent with the institutional interests, and understanding the context. Chart 4.7 illustrates the reasons for the success in the institutional entrepreneurs' efforts. While the researcher presents the four reasons as district, he maintains that all of them together contributed to make the business incubator a success.

Figure 5. 7: Reasons for Success in Insider-Driven Institutional Entrepreneurship



5.3.3.1 Ongoing Political Support

One of the most critical factors for making the business incubator a success is the political support from powerful decision-makers. The analysis shows that only when the institutional entrepreneurs ensured political support from the senior management, the business incubator become institutionalised within MOSAL. This is because full support from senior management facilitates the implementation of strategies for successful completion of projects (Belassi and Tukel, 1996) as they control access to resources and power necessary to realise change (Hardy and Maguire, 2018). The data shows that the political coverage was significant in all phases of establishing the business incubator. For instance, in the early stages, the institutional entrepreneurs had been calling for expanding the TPAD to accommodate more trainees for almost four years (2007-2010). Only when the senior management agreed to support the EEKW, the institutional entrepreneurs started to work

on establishing the business incubator. The political support from senior management had also authorised the launch of the incubator in 2013 even though the CSC had not approved its structure yet.

The change in the senior management of MOSAL in 2015 with a new one that did not support the business incubator supports the fact that political support was an important determinant of success in the project. As shown in the interviews, the new management was not supporting the business incubator, and their actions negatively influenced the running of the incubator. With the new management, the incubator did not receive political support. Rather, the work in the incubator was suspended, and the whole staff at the incubator were changed. This suggests that political support and commitment from decision-makers are essential in all phases of institutional project. The institutional entrepreneurs support this view. According to Turki (IE):

> *"There was a strong political support from the senior management…During the time of the cooperative management, there was no critical incident at all. The main incident was when the new management had stopped the project…. the cooperative management was authorising the fund for expenses, but when they left the office, the fund stalled. The new management suspended the fund."*

The quote above suggests that senior management not only controlled the power necessary to authorise the change, but also the financial resources to support project implementation. Their full commitment and political endorsement are key determinants of success. Sahar echoed the importance of having senior management support and commitment in project implementation. According to Sahar (IE):

> *"The change of Fayza by the new management, who was not convicted by the idea of the incubator, was a big challenge. She was a big factor in motivating the trainees and the people who were working at the incubator, and making it a success… Commitment from the decision-makers was also a challenge, like when the new management stopped the project. When they change, and the new ones who come into power do not embrace the idea, this ruins it. "*

Thus, the analysis suggests that constant political support from powerful decision-makers is the key for success. This is because those actors have access to authority and resources

necessary to realise change. The data shows that only when the business incubator enjoyed ongoing support from senior management, its practices become institutionalised in MOSAL.

5.3.3.2 Assembling Coalition for Change

The analysis reveals that the institutional entrepreneurs enrolled a number of like-minded actors to build alliance for their change project. In doing so, they formed a steering committee to include not only the institutional entrepreneurs, but also the key officials at MOSAL to cultivate broad support base. The data shows that the committee's actions were critical to the success of the project since it enabled access to support and authority needed in the institutionalisation process. Through the committee, the institutional entrepreneurs gained the support of key staff at MOSAL who become partially enrolled in the project, and whose positions influenced the project implementation and paved the way for collaboration. To form the committee, the institutional entrepreneurs ensured that all members believe in the idea of the business incubator and possess the required skills.

The data shows that all of the institutional entrepreneurs believed that FOMLP was not providing enough support for women to become self-dependent, and that the business incubator can provide them with the support they need to become job-creator. Awatef (IE) supported this point and stated:

> *"We developed the team in a way that the members believe in the idea and have the capability and skills to manage the work needed and negotiate with others and be able to persuade opponents."*

Every institutional entrepreneur in the committee did different but complementary job. The whole team worked well together and coordinated their work effectively. For example, Awatef (IE) coordinated the work on the incubator within MOSAL. Turki (IE) was a focal point between MOSAL and other parties outside MOSAL, including SCPD, UNDP and other suppliers. Fayza (IE) was supervising the work on the incubator building, design, and incubatees. Sahar (IE) was facilitating the support from UNDP and SCPD. According to Sahar (IE):

> "*We played well together. The team spirit was good among them. All of them want the same thing and success. They, as individuals, are very committed people and*

very successful in their career, and then you put them together. So, something good has to happen."

Fayza (IE) also supports this view. She said:

"The incubator was a dream for all of us. When we all started to communicate, we looked at each other as a completion to our dreams. We all shared the same dream and enthusiasm."

The analysis also shows that the institutional entrepreneurs possessed certain skills that were essential for the success of their initiative. As shown in the analysis, their political skills enabled them to negotiate and network to mobilise support needed in the project. For example, Awatef's (IE) negotiation skills induced her senior management to authorise the change in the early stages. The data shows that she persuaded the senior management to endorse the project after she linked the project with their interests and showed them the political consequences of their support for the business incubator. In addition, the analysis reveals the institutional entrepreneurs' cultural skills were significant to construct the rationale for change. They framed the problem at hand in a way that resonated with the interests of key actors and justified the novel solution that addressed the problem. Thus, providing potential allies with a compelling reason to support their project.

Based on the analysis, the research argues that assembling a coalition of like-minded actors for change contributed to the success of the business incubator. Through the coalition, the institutional entrepreneurs built a broad support base for their project that included some gatekeepers and facilitated the project implementation. These gatekeepers secured enough political influence and approval from key decision-makers. The analysis also reveals that the institutional entrepreneurs' political and cultural skills were essential to mobilise collective resources and link their project to border values to gain acceptance.

5.3.3.3 Keeping the Message Consistent with Institutional Interests

The data shows that the way institutional entrepreneurs connect their project with the interests and activities of other institutional actors was central to their success. The institutional entrepreneurs in the case framed the problem in a novel way that resonated with the interests of senior management at MOSAL to gain their support. They linked the business incubator with the main goal of empowering women on social benefits – that is to

reduce government speeding – and presented it as a superior approach for empowering women at MOSAL. According to Awatef (IE):

> *"I wrote a letter to the Minister explaining the idea, and that the UNDP can help us in this matter. In the letter, I said that as part of our plans to empower women, this project resonates with our plans and it empowers those who receive social benefits to become self-dependent, which could result in reducing the government spending on this matter. We already got a budget for the project… The Minister then agreed to go for the project and requested us to do what needed to do so. It took some time until he got convinced of the idea."*

In this way, they induced the powerful actors to support their project and thus gained their authority to legitimate the business incubator. Similarly, they kept their message consistent and aligned the business incubator with the interests and priorities of potential women entrepreneurs. They conducted a series of awareness-building events stressing that the business incubator can equip potential incubatees with the necessary skills to start up their own business. The potential women incubatees perceived the incubator as legitimate since it is congruent with their priorities. This helped the institutional entrepreneurs to fill in the incubator with women entrepreneurs and thus augmenting its legitimacy.

Keeping the message consistent with the interests of other actors is the third element that contributed to the success of the business incubator. The institutional entrepreneurs kept their rationale for the business incubator congruent with the interests of key decision-makers and potential women entrepreneurs. This enabled them to gain the legitimacy needed to establish the incubator.

5.3.3.4 Understanding the Context

The analysis reveals that context is a strong determinant of institutional entrepreneurship. A good understanding of the contextual elements that are likely to influence the institutional project is the key for success. This is because context shapes the type of institutional change and the strategies that institutional entrepreneurs are likely to adopt (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The data shows that institutional entrepreneurs exploited the changes in the field by the government to achieve its new vision of Kuwait 2035, and positioned the business incubator project in the national development plan introduced by the government. Informed by the analysis, incorporating the project within the government programme means that the

project enjoys full support and legitimacy from the Cabinet. Rather, all parties involved in the project will be held accountable for any poor implementation. The data shows that the Cabinet approval augmented the legitimacy of the project and locked the stakeholders into a stable coalition. Awatef's (IE) words support this view. She said:

> *"We agreed on it [project] with the SCPD, and the Ministry of Finance approved the budget. The SCPD sent it to the Cabinet to approve it. We usually send all projects that form our five years plan and not only this on. After that, we had to agree with UNDP on how to do the implementation…. Gladly, the project was part of the government programme, so we had to implement it. If not, we will be held accountable to the Cabinet as to why we did not implement it."*

The quote above suggests that understanding the context enabled the institutional entrepreneurship to seize the moment and identify the opportunity to gain support for their project. In doing so, they secured fund and ensured expertise necessary for the project through the UNDP. The data shows that the financial resources were essential to induce the project implementation and fund project activities. The data also reveals that through the expertise of UNDP and UNIDO, the institutional entrepreneurs designed the practices of the business incubator, which became the basis of its organisational template. Their understanding of the context enabled them to lock all parties involved in the project – SCPD, MOSAL, and UNDP – into enduring coalition, and thus gaining the legitimacy necessary to establish the business incubator.

In addition, a better understanding of the context led the institutional entrepreneurs to design an organisational template that fits the handicraft nature of the business incubator. As shown in the analysis, the design of organisational template for the business incubator was a result of the institutional entrepreneurs' assessment of the pre-existing conditions that hinder entrepreneurship among women. Their better understanding of the needs of potential women entrepreneurs through the needs assessment survey enabled them to design two modalities that respond to the entrepreneurial needs of women. These modalities – enterprise creation and enterprise development – become the basis of the two divisions within the institutionalised organisational structure for the incubator. Moreover, through their understanding of the field logics, the institutional entrepreneurs drew on the logics of vocational incubator and integrated them into the logics of business incubator. This step was

necessary in understanding the mechanisms for operating the business incubator. At the end, combining the logic of vocational incubator and the practices of enterprise development modalities enabled them to design the new practices of business incubator.

As evident by the data, a good understanding of the context plays a key role in the success of the business incubator. The institutional entrepreneurs secured fund and support for their project by seizing the moment and positioning their project within the governmental plans, and thus gaining more legitimacy. Their understanding of the pre-existing conditions that hinder women in their entrepreneurial initiatives, and field-level logics of incubation enabled them to design new practices that respond to women's needs. These practices become the basis of the organisational template for the business incubator.

In combinations, the analysis reveals that the business incubator is a successful institutional project. As informed by the analysis, there are different factors that contributed to this success. First, ongoing political support from powerful decision-makers was necessary to ensure access to authority and resources to realise the business incubator. Second, assembling coalition for change to include some gatekeepers played a critical role to secure support and approval from decision-makers, and enable the project implementation. Third, keeping the change message consistent with the interests of other institutional actors enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to gain the legitimacy for the business incubator. Last, a good understanding of the contextual elements was essential to mobilise more support for the project and design a new organisational template for the business incubator, which responded to the need of key stakeholders. The researcher maintains that these factors, all together, contributed to the success in the business incubator.

5.4 Discussion and Conclusion

In examining insider-driven institutional entrepreneurship, the research has addressed three specific aspects – deviation from the institutional determinism, institutionalisation, and success of the institutional entrepreneurship. Through the analysis of the business incubator case and the new practices that the institutional entrepreneurs institutionalised, the researcher identified critical components associated with each aspect. It is important to emphasise that the research does not consider the components of each aspect to constitute temporal phases (institutional entrepreneurs clearly need to get involved in institutional entrepreneurship before they begin to construct the rationale for change and ultimately

legitimate it). Rather, the case suggests that institutional entrepreneurship is an ongoing process in which different sets of actions are intertwined.

With regard to deviation from the institutional arrangements, the research found that 1) interest formation and 2) rationale construction enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to deviate from the existing norms. In relation to interest formation, the findings indicate that actors' social position – hierarchical position, interpersonal network position, and multiple-embeddedness – field conditions, and individual characteristics formed actors' interest and motivated their engagement in institutional entrepreneurship. These findings are consistent with studies of enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship. In her study of the enabling role of social position in diverging from the status quo in the British health system, Battilana (2011) found that actors' position in the organisational hierarchy influences their likelihood to initiate changes that diverge from the institutional status quo. Dorado's study of the emergence of commercial microfinance in Bolivia showed that interpersonal bonds influenced actors to engage in institutional entrepreneurship and advanced their engagement by facilitating access to support and resources (Dorado, 2013). Similarly, Boxenbaum and Battilana (2005) found that the individuals who transposed the practices of diversity management from North America to Denmark had multiple-embeddedness in other fields. In addition, the strong will as individual characteristic resonates with work on the notion of grit. As discussed in the literature, Duckworth et al. (2007) described entrepreneurs as gritty individuals, who have perseverance and passion for long-term goals.

Regarding rationale construction, the research found that problem specification, solution justification and mobilising allies enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to construct the rationale for change. The concepts of problem specification and solution justification of rationale construction resonate with the work on theorisation. As discussed earlier, theorisation, which involves the specification of organisational failings and justification of the innovation (Dacin et al., 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), is a key stage of institutional change. Interestingly, the analysis suggests that in mobilising allies, the institutional entrepreneurs leveraged the status of organisation to induce cooperation and construct the rationale for change. This finding resonates with the work of Sherer and Lee (2002) on institutional change in large law firms. They found that the most prestigious law firms adopted new personnel practices and legitimated them for others in the industry.

In examining the institutionalisation of the business incubator, the research found that the institutional entrepreneurs institutionalised the new practices by tearing down the old practices and replacing them with the new ones. This finding is similar to the displacement mode of institutional change discussed earlier. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) suggest that such type of change occurs when new forms emerge and replace the previously taken-for-granted forms. The findings also indicate that the institutionalisation of the business incubator involved three critical components: 1) designing the organisational template for the incubator, 2) legitimating the new practices on an ongoing basis by aligning them with the interest of key stakeholders, and 3) resource mobilisation, including financial resources and social position resources. By linking the new practices with the organisational structure, the institutional entrepreneurs ensured ongoing activation of the new practices, which ultimately became taken-for-granted.

In designing the organisational template, the institutional entrepreneurs drew strategically on the established logics and their associated practices. More specifically, they combined the vocational incubator practices and enterprise development practices to design their new organisational template for the business incubator. As explored earlier, novel ideas cannot register due to the absence of established logics to describe them (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Institutional entrepreneurs must present their innovation within the existing institutional environment (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). Thus, the research argues that institutional logics not only “set limits on the very nature of rationality” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 251) to influence behaviour, but also “sow the seeds for change” (Rao et al., 2003, p. 802) by providing means for the institutional entrepreneurs to contest the legitimacy of pre-existing institutional arrangements and create new institutional configurations. According to this view, the institutional entrepreneurs will have to confer legitimacy upon their institutional project in order for the innovation to become accepted and institutionalised within the institution. The findings indicate that the institutional entrepreneurs legitimated the practices of the business incubator by constantly aligning them with key stakeholders’ values and interest to gain the required authority and support. This finding is similar to those reported by Maguire et al. (2004) in their study of the field of HIV/AIDS advocacy in Canada. They found that the institutional entrepreneurs institutionalised the new practices by aligning them with important stakeholder’s values on an ongoing basis.

Finally, in examining the success or failure of the business incubator, the research found that the business incubator is a successful institutional project. The findings reveal that success depends upon 1) ongoing political support from powerful decision-makers, 2) assembling coalition for change, 3) keeping the change message consistent with institutional interest, and 4) a good understanding of the context.

As explored earlier, institutional change requires legitimacy to become viable (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Rao et al., 2000; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Legitimacy accrues when innovation "conforms to legal rules and gains endorsement from other powerful actors" (Rao et al., 2000, p. 241). The findings point out that ongoing political support from powerful decision-makers is the key for success in the business incubator project. This is because those powerful actors facilitated access to authority and resources necessary to realise the change. This finding resonates with the work on the success and failure of organisational change. In his study of the major reasons why organisational changes fail and succeed, Smith (2002, p. 81) found that successful projects were characterised by "sustained sponsorship" from the top management. Similarly, Belassi and Tukel (1996) showed that top management support was the most critical factor for success in project completion due to the resources they control, which facilitate the implementation strategies of projects.

According to the view above, institutional entrepreneurs will need to enrol the powerful actors, or at minimal the gatekeepers, in an enduring coalition to enjoy the constant support for change. As explained earlier, the realisation of change depends on not only the original actions of institutional entrepreneurs, but also on "their enrolment in a wider network" (Mutch, 2007, p. 1137). Their success in their change efforts depends largely on the coalition they deliberately forge (Hall, 2010; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). This is because institutional change is complex social processes that incorporate a wide array of actors with varied resources (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Wijen and Ansari, 2007), and beyond the capacity of individual institutional entrepreneurs (Wijen and Ansari, 2007). Working in this tradition, assembling coalition for change to build a broad support base for the institutional project is essential to secure the support necessary to realise change.

The findings suggest that keeping the change message consistent with institutional interests is an essential tactic to gain legitimacy. As suggested earlier by Maguire et al. (2004, p. 658), "Key to their success is the way in which institutional entrepreneurs connect their

change projects to the activities and interests of other actors in a field". The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, connected the business incubator with the interests and values of both powerful actors, who have the authority, and women entrepreneurs, whose acceptance of the new practices is necessary to effect on its legitimacy. In this way, they ensured alignment between the interest of institutional actors, and the purpose of the new practices in serving the institutional interest. This finding is similar to the one reported by Burnes and Jackson (2011) in their study of the role of values in success and failure of organisational change. They found that the degree of alignment between the values of the approach and content for change and the values of the organisation undertaking the change influences the success in change significantly.

The findings also suggest that a good understanding of the context is essential for. As suggested by Battilana (2011), institutional fields are political arenas the imply differential access to and control over decision process and key resources. The likelihood that specific type of change to emerge depends significantly on a careful understanding of the opportunities and constraints within the context of the institution in question (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The findings reveal that careful analysis of the institutional context enabled the institutional entrepreneurs in the case to seize the moment and identify opportunity to ensure support and secure fund for their project. Their better understanding of the pre-existing conditions enabled them to design a new organisational template that fits the contextual environment.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter concludes by summarising the contribution to the study of institutional entrepreneurship in different organisational fields – emerging and mature – and to different positions, the institutional entrepreneurs occupy in the field. It is structured into three sections. The first section discusses the comparative analysis across the two cases studied in this research. The following section presents the conclusion before the last section highlights the directions for future studies.

6.1 Cross-Case Comparative Analysis

The evidence suggests that there are significant differences between Bareec case and the business incubator case. Table 6.1 summaries the main differences between both cases. This section compares the entrepreneurial processes across the two cases and sheds more lights on these differences by directly comparing the deviation from institutional determinism, the institutionalisation of innovation, and determinants of success across the cases.

Table 6. 1: Cross-Case Comparison

Cross-case examination	**Bareec Case**	**The Business Incubator Case**
Field's Level of maturity	Emerging	Mature
Position of institutional entrepreneurs	Outsiders to the institution in question	Insiders to the institution in question
Deviation strategies from institutional determinism	Normalisation Connecting with macro-cultural discourse Mobilising allies Resource mobilisation	Problem specification Solution justification Mobilising allies

Institutionalisation strategies of innovation	Legitimating the new practices on an ongoing basis	Designing organisational template
	Attaching the new practices to pre-existing practices	Legitimating the new practices on an ongoing basis
		Resource mobilisation
Determinants of success	Ongoing political support from highly legitimate outsiders	Ongoing political support from powerful insiders
	Assembling coalition for change from a heterogeneous number of insiders	Assembling coalition for change from influential insiders
	keeping the change message consistent with the interests of related institutions	keeping the change message consistent with the interests of the target institution
	Good understanding of the context	Good understanding of the context
Mode of change	Layering – new additions are attached to existing institutions	Displacement – new forms emerge and replace the previously taken-for-granted ones.

6.1.1 Deviation from Institutional Determinism

In Bareec case of the emerging field of positive psychology led by outsider-institutional entrepreneurs, institutionalised practices that provide the basis for which institutional entrepreneurs theorise their innovation do not exist. The field of positive psychology lacked dominant and overarching regulatory framework that could impose field-level standards. Instead, the institutional entrepreneurs create new practices that did not exist before and produce new claims that promote the adoption of their innovation by highlighting the

economic advantages afforded by the new practices of positive psychology. To disseminate their practices and amass legitimacy for their institutional project, they demonstrate consistency between their innovation and broader social values. In doing so, they connect with macro-cultural discourse and draw on a related set of institutions that are affected by the new field of positive psychology. This is because established logics that provide a resource for legitimate actions do not exist in emerging fields, and so it is not possible to demonstrate consistency with them to justify the innovation. Moreover, as outsiders who lack centrality and legitimacy in the institution in question, the institutional entrepreneurs mobilise legitimate insiders behind their institutional project to augment its legitimacy and allow the intervention in the institution. Furthermore, the Bareec case shows that resource mobilisation, especially financial resource, through successful small steps is necessary to grow the support pool with incremental results. The case also shows that outsider-institutional change requires multiple resource pools to enable insiders to deviate from existing institutional arrangements and allow the intervention.

In the business incubator case led by insider-institutional entrepreneurs, the mature field of business incubation and enterprise development is characterised by an established structure of domination. Actors in the case collectively agreed on institutionalised practices and norms governing their behaviour. To make a case for their innovation, the institutional entrepreneurs specify the existing failings of pre-existing practices for women empowerment by developing a novel understanding of the problem at hand. Being insiders to the institution who are perceived as legitimate to comment on women empowerment, they developed a new solution that addressed the problem they had specified and justified it as a superior approach to pre-existing practices. In doing so, they draw on existing practices of enterprise development and business incubation to provide the basis of their novel solution. To confer legitimacy upon their proposed solution, they mobilise allies within the institution who have the authority to drive change and adopt their novel solution. They demonstrate consistency between the novel solution and institutional interests and prevailing values, and show allies the political gains of supporting the new arrangements. Moreover, the case shows that the institutional entrepreneurs augmented the legitimacy of their institutional project by connecting with field-level governmental institutions from which they receive political and financial support necessary to construct the rationale for change and begin the intervention.

6.1.2 Institutionalisation of Innovation

In Bareec case of the emerging field of positive psychology, institutionalised practices and norms have not yet developed. Consequently, the outsider-institutional entrepreneurs attach the new practices of positive psychology to pre-existing practices associated with related mature field. This is because new practices are most likely to be institutionalised when they are embedded in durable arrangements (Maguire et al., 2004). Meanwhile, to confer legitimacy upon the new practices, the outsider-institutional entrepreneurs draw on related mature field, to which they attached the new practices, and its associated set of institutions to constantly align the new practices with the interests and values of key stakeholders within these institutions. The reason behind this, as mentioned earlier, is that institutionalised norms that form the socially constructed basis for legitimate behaviour do not exist yet in emerging fields, and so cannot be drawn upon to justify the new practices. The case shows that the repeated activation of the newly attached practices contributed to their institutionalisation and becoming taken-for-granted. The case also shows that new norms are created around the newly institutionalised practices.

In the business incubator case of the mature field of business incubation, the insider-institutional entrepreneurs replace the pre-existing practices, to which they specified their failings, with the new practices of business incubation and enterprise development. In doing so, they draw strategically on the established institutional logic and its associated set of practices to develop the new practices of business incubation and enterprise development. However, this is not to say that the new practices are entirely new. Rather, they combined some established field-level practices to develop new ones that fit the nature of their handicraft business incubator for woman. To legitimise their innovation, the insider-institutional entrepreneurs align the new practices constantly with the values and interest of key authority holders and stakeholders in their institution. As insiders, they leverage resources and authority conferred by their social position to further the legitimacy of their innovation. Moreover, the case shows that the insider-institutional entrepreneurs connected with related field-level governmental institutions to augment the support pool. The case also shows that the repeated and regular activation of the new practices ensured ongoing reproduction of the new practices and contributed to them becoming taken-for-granted.

6.1.3 Explanation of Success in Institutional Entrepreneurs' Efforts

The evidence shows that both cases share similar broad determinants of success, but they differ in attaining every determinant. The findings suggest that explanation of success in institutional entrepreneurship varies according to whether change occurs in emerging or mature field and whether institutional entrepreneurs are insiders or outsiders to the target institutions. For example, constant political support for change efforts appears to explain the first element of success in both cases. However, in Bareec case, the outsider-institutional entrepreneurs align with highly legitimate actors outside the target institution for change to gain the support necessary to realise change. In the business incubator case, insider-institutional entrepreneurs connect with the powerful decision-makers within the target institution for change to gain access to authority and resources necessary to bring about the change. The second determinant involves assembling a coalition of link-minded actors for change. The coalition in Bareec case of outsider-institutional entrepreneurs includes a large and heterogeneous number of actors inside the target institution for change. In contrast, the coalition in the business incubator involves a group of legitimate insiders whose authority influence the intervention.

The third element that explains success in both cases is the alignment between the change project and the institutional interests. In Bareec case, the outsider-institutional entrepreneurs ensure consistency with the interests of the related institutions affected by the emerging field of positive psychology, whereas the insider-institutional entrepreneurs in the business incubator case ensure alignment with the institution in which they are embedded. Finally, a good understanding of the context to seize the moment for gaining support is the last factor that explains sauces in both cases. In Bareec case, the outsider-institutional entrepreneurs' understanding of contextual opportunities enable them to include Bareec in the governmental plan, and thereby ensuring its institutionalisation. In the business incubator case, insider-institutional entrepreneurs secure fund and support necessary to realise the business incubator by exploiting the changes in the field to position their project in the government national development plan. Moreover, there rich understanding of the context enables them to design new practices that become the basis for the business incubator.

6.2 Conclusion

The research aimed to investigate how institutional entrepreneurs contribute to changing the institutions in which they are embedded in different environments despite pressures towards institutional stasis. It examined which combinations of activities constitute the process of institutional entrepreneurship that involves actors deviating from existing institutional arrangements in a particular context and institutionalising their innovation. It also examined which combinations of factors explain success or failure in institutional entrepreneurship.

The research begins by tracing the origin of institutional entrepreneurship and placing the concept in the context of institutions. Existing research shows that institutional entrepreneurship provides considerable promise for understanding how institutional actors explain institutional change, thereby introducing the issue of human agency and interest into institutional analysis. Prior work demonstrates that entrepreneurial strategies depends very much on whether an organisational field is mature or emerging due to the contextual challenges each field poses. Prior work also demonstrates that the positions that the institutional entrepreneurs occupy concerning the target institution for change influence their entrepreneurial strategies. However, the research highlights that the introduction of institutional entrepreneurship into institutions creates a promising tension between actors as strategic agents, who act entrepreneurially, and the powerful influence of institutional forces on actors. Termed the paradox of embedded agency, this tension might be resolved as long as institutional entrepreneurship addresses how institutionally embedded actors bring about institutional change. This gap in understanding motivates three questions this research is poised to answer:

1. How do institutional entrepreneurs deviate from existing institutional arrangements?
2. How is innovation institutionalised?
3. What explains the success or failure of institutional entrepreneurs' efforts?

To address these questions, the researcher conducted a multi-case comparative research to examine which combinations of contextual elements lead to specific outcomes – in terms of deviation from institutional determinism, the institutionalisation of innovation, and success or failure of institutional entrepreneurship. He chose to study two in-depth cases because certain theoretical issues were transparent. The first case represents the emerging field of positive psychology, while the second case represents the mature field of business

incubation and enterprise development. The former was led by actors outside the institution in question, while actors inside the target institution led the latter. To collect data, the researcher conducted interviews with institutional entrepreneurs and their collaborators, and thus offering a vantage point to look at institutional entrepreneurship by accounting for the actions of actors affected by the process of shaping institutions. He also collected range of documents that provided valuable information about the objectives and activities of each case, and the actors involved.

To study the process of institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields, the researcher draws on the case of Bareec – the first educational programme for positive psychology in Kuwait – that produced new practices of positive psychology education within the established institution of Kuwaiti MoE. The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, were actors outside the institution in question, MoE, so that focus of entrepreneurial acts is on how outsiders enable insiders to bring about the change. To address the first research question regarding deviation from institutional determinism, the findings suggests that it occurs at two levels. First, actors must form their interest in institutional entrepreneurship. The research found that actors' social position – that is their hierarchical position and inter-organisational mobility – and field conditions such as degree of institutionalisation formed their interest in bringing about Bareec. Second, the institutional entrepreneurs must construct the rationale for the change to let insiders deviate from existing institutional conditions. The research suggests that normalisation of the change project, connecting with macro-cultural discourse, mobilising allies, and resource mobilisation enabled the institutional entrepreneurs to construct the rationale for Bareec. Together, interest formation and rationale construction enabled other actors inside the target institution to deviate from institutional determinism.

With regard to the second research question of how the institutional project become institutionalised, the findings indicate that the institutional entrepreneurs institutionalised the new practices of Bareec by attaching them to pre-existing practices associated with related institutionalised fields *and* legitimating the new practices on an ongoing basis by aligning them with the values and interests of key stakeholders. As the new practices are aligned with the interests of key actors and attached to pre-existing institutional arrangements, new norms are created around the new practices. The research argues that the repeated activation of the new practices after they were attached and embedded in the pre-existing

practices of related mature fields, Bareec became taken-for-granted. To answer the last research question concerning success in the institutional project, the findings suggest four reasons that explain the success in Bareec. Ongoing political support, assembling coalition for change, keeping the message consistent with institutional interests, and a good understanding of the context were the critical determinants for success as they secured the support and legitimacy necessary to realise change.

To study the process of institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields, the researcher draws on the case of the first handicraft business incubator in Kuwait that produced new practices of business incubator and enterprise development. The institutional entrepreneurs, in this case, are insiders who come from within the institution in question, MOSAL. To address the first question in relation to deviation from institutional determinism, the findings show that it occurs at two levels. First, actors must form their interest in engaging in changes that deviate from institutional determinism. The findings indicate that their social position – that is their hierarchical position, interpersonal network position, and multiple-embeddedness – field conditions and the individual characteristics such as strong will explained and formed their interest in institutional entrepreneurship. Second, actors need to construct the rationale for change in order to deviate from existing institutional arrangements entirely. The findings suggest that novel specification of existing problems, solution justification, and mobilising allies to authorise change enable institutional entrepreneurs to construct the rationale for change. Interest formation and rationale construction, together, allow actors to deviate from the institutional taken-for-grantedness.

Regarding the second research question of how innovation become institutionalised, the findings reveal that institutional entrepreneurs institutionalised the new practices by replacing them with the pre-existing practices. In doing so, the study shows that they design organisational template for the new practices, legitimating them on an ongoing basis, and mobilised resources (including financial and social position resources). The research argues that ongoing reproduction of the new practices and their repeated activation contributed to the new practices becoming taken-for-granted. To answer the last research question about success in institutional entrepreneurship, the researcher found four determinants that explained success in entrepreneurial efforts. The findings show that ongoing political support, assembling coalition for change, keeping the change message consistent with

institutional interests and a good understanding of the context are essential to gain the legitimacy required to realise the institutional project.

6.3 Directions for Future Research

Although the researcher believes that the research makes a number of important contributions to the notion of institutional entrepreneurship, the research also raises some intriguing possibilities for future research to engage with and extend the contributions of this study. First, the study focused on two different organisational fields along with varying positions of institutional entrepreneurs in every field to understand how nested and complex, and yet different, entrepreneurial activities associated with each field occurred over time. Future research could focus on whether the process of institutional entrepreneurship differs when institutional entrepreneurs have the same positions in the same fields. For example, insider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in a mature field can be compared with another insider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in other mature fields. There is also the opportunity to compare insider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in a mature field with an outsider-driven institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields. Such research may ascertain in more details the similarities and differences between these two forms of institutional entrepreneurship according to the maturity of the field. Second, this research has highlighted the process by which the institutional project become taken-for-granted. Future research could shed light on the impact of institutional project after being institutionalised and taken-for-granted. Such research should investigate who benefits from institutional entrepreneurship and whether there are any unintended consequences for the institutionalised innovation. Studies could also address whether institutional entrepreneurs continue their entrepreneurial acts after the innovation is institutionalised, and whether the institutionalised innovation is being challenged by other actors who did not take part in the previous entrepreneurial acts.

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APPENDICES

Appendix One: Interview Guide for Institutional Entrepreneurs

The main research questions:

1. How do institutional entrepreneurs deviate from existing institutional arrangements?
2. How is innovation institutionalised?
3. What explain the success or failure of institutional entrepreneurs' efforts?

Topic 1: Interest formation

1- What is the change project/initiative about?
2- Where did the original idea come from?
3- How and when did you become personally involved in the project?
4- Why did you decide to get involved (or to start the initiative)?
5- How, when, and why others choose to get involved?
6- Why others (who are not involved) chose not to involve particularly they all are faced with the same circumstances?

Topic 2: The strategies used for change (specification of problems)

1. How does the project achieve its aims and objectives?
2. What have you done to make the need for the project?
3. Why have you chosen this way (strategy mentioned in the previous question) to convince others that there is a need for the project?
4. What worked well? What worked less well?
5. Did you try to tailor this strategy to fit the interest of certain actors? If so, why are them in particular?
6. How actors perceive the need for the project?
7. Did other actors feedback on your strategy for making the need for change? If so, how?

Topic 3: Institutionalisation (justifying and embedding change project)

1. What have you done to (address the problem specified above) fulfil the need for the project?
2. How did the strategy evolve?
3. Does it involve new procedures? (maintain or disrupt institutions)
4. How did you break with the dominant procedures?
5. On what basis did you set the objectives of the project? (linkages with wider field logics)
6. How did you ensure the project addresses the problem (or overcome the limits of existing arrangements)?
7. Is the project an effective way of addressing the problem? What are the advantages/disadvantages?
8. How did you convey the purpose of the project?
9. Whom did you appeal to? Why them in particular?
10. What is their contribution to the project at this stage?
11. Have other actors opposed the project? If so, why?
12. What are the main challenges faced?
13. What would you have done differently?

Topic 4: Institutional context effects

1. Does the surrounding environment (context) influence the project?
2. How did the surrounding environment facilitate or/and inhibit the project?
3. Does context shape the type/nature of activities you did? If so, how?
4. Do changes in context lead to enactment of new procedures or redirection? How?
5. How did you address uncertainty regarding the outcome of the project?

Topic 5: Coalition

1. What sort of people do you connect with to implement the project? (their roles)
2. On what bases you chose to communicate with them? And why?
3. Does the inclusion of new actors affect the project in achieving its aims? How?
4. How do you maintain communication with other actors involved in the project?

Topic 6: Resources

1. What types and sources of resources you use?
2. What do you do with them?
3. What skills are needed to bring success? (political, analytical, and cultural)

- Are there any other points you would like to mention?
- What questions should I have asked?

Appendix Two: Interview Guide for Collaborators

Questions:

1. What is the impact of the project?
2. How did the project meet its objectives?
3. Who are the main instigators of change in the project? And what did they do?
4. Why those people succeeded?
5. Do they possess certain skills? If so, why others do not?
6. Was it only them? Who else was helping them?
7. Why were others not interested in the project?
8. Have any other people tried to do it before? If so, what did they do?
9. What would have happened if the institutional entrepreneurs were not around? (check what other IE's work with them)
10. Was there any critical incidents/problem that happened? If so, what caused them?
11. What role other people played?

Appendix Three: Interview Themes

Dear (participant name),

As part of my research, the interview will provide me with an opportunity to understand how individuals bring about change. Below are the themes for discussion during the interview:

- The rationale for involvement in change projects/initiatives.
- The strategies used to bring about change in the project.
- The nature and influence of the surrounding environment on the project.
- The role of other people in the project.
- The nature and types of resources used.

Appendix Four: Interview Consent Form

Title of Research: INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EMERGING AND MATURE CASES

Name of Researcher: Mohsen Abumuamar

- Kindly indicate with an **X** in the box provided if you have read and agreed with each statement:

I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. ☐

I understand that the research I am being asked to participate in aims to collect data regarding change efforts and **the results from the research** will be used in a PhD research thesis. ☐

I understand that my participation in the research is voluntary. I understand that once I have taken part in the interview, I will be able to withdraw my comments from the research, without providing any specific reason. I understand that I am free to withdraw after the interview at any point before 1st October 2019, and my comments would not then be taken into consideration in the data analysis. ☐

I agree to the interview being audio recorded to provide the researcher with an accurate note of the discussion for later transcription and analysis. ☐

I understand that audio recordings from the interview will be held secured for a minimum of ten years and then destroyed in line with the University of Birmingham's Code of Practice for Research. ☐

I understand that summary of the research findings will be distributed to all participants by the end of the study. ☐

I understand that if I have any concerns about the research, I should contact Dr Adrian Campbell, the research lead supervisor by emailing ☐

I understand that the name of the organisation(s) and people mentioned in the interview may be shown in the dissertation **unless I specifically request otherwise**. ☐

Please tick this statement only **if you prefer your identity to be confidential.** ☐

I agree to take part in the above study. ☐

Participant Name (optional)	Date	Signature
Witness (Researcher):	Date	Signature

Appendix Five: Interview Participant Information Sheet

Title of Research: INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EMERGING AND MATURE CASES

Dear Participant,

The following information is provided to help you decide whether you wish to participate in the present study. The study is being carried out by **Mohsen Abumuamar,** a postgraduate researcher at the University of Birmingham.

Please note that you are free to decide not to participate or to withdraw after the interview at any point before 1st October 2019 without providing any specific reason, by simply emailing the researcher via the address below. After you consent to take part in this research, you will be asked some questions related to your experiences on change efforts, which are associated with the topic of the research.

The purpose of this study is to understand how institutional entrepreneurs – a category of change agents – bring about change in light of organisational processes associated with change and stability. The study will include different change initiatives or projects in which institutional entrepreneurs involve. Understanding how different institutional entrepreneurs leverage their resources and skills to instigate change projects will enable the researcher to understand how organisational actors can bring about change and explain successful implementation of change initiatives.

The interview will be recorded unless you request otherwise. It will last approximately 45 minutes but maybe shorter depending on your availability. The recorded data from the interview will be stored online and, in a password-secured portable hard drive to which only the researcher will have the password. In line with the University of Birmingham's Code of Practice for Research, information will be stored securely for a minimum of ten years and then destroyed. Should you choose to withdraw from the research at any point before 1st October 2019, all recorded data will be deleted from transcription and all audio recordings.

Identities, including your name and the name of the organisation(s), will be mentioned in the research unless you specifically request otherwise. If you are happy to be attributed, this will

be done using your name, your role, and the organisation. If you ask for specific data to be confidential, the researcher will respect that, and reporting will be anonymised.

The findings of the research will be used to inform a further understanding on how institutionally embedded actors can bring about change. The researcher would be happy to share a summary of his findings with you after the research is completed.

Please do not hesitate to ask any questions about the study either before participating or during the time that you are participating.

Academic supervisor: Dr Adrian Campbell, email:

Postgraduate researcher: Mohsen Abumuamar, email: