University of Birmingham

Building State Legitimacy Through Territorial Reform

Pemekaran in Papua Indonesia

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Abstract

Territorial reform by enlarging or reducing the size of local government territory has long been implemented in many countries to improve the performance of state institutions. Until recently, however, only a few studies linked territorial reform with state legitimacy. Employing a post Weberian perspective that sees statebuilding as a process to improve the relationship between state and society, this thesis examines the impact on state legitimacy of statebuilding through territorial reform.

Drawing on the case of territorial reform through district formation, known as *pemekaran*, in the province of Papua, Indonesia, this thesis presents a qualitative account of how territorial reform facilitates the process of state legitimisation as well as de-legitimisation. In doing so, the research examines stakeholders' subjective understandings of the intentions, mechanisms and the outcomes of *pemekaran* in Papua. These understandings are captured and interpreted through an in-depth study employing an ethnographic style of data collection, conducted during five months fieldwork in four different locations in Papua and the national capital, Jakarta.

This research finds that territorial reform through *pemekaran* has been a framework not only for an administrative process of public service improvement but more than that as a political process of state legitimisation. Through *pemekaran,* the state legitimisation process is aimed at achieving official and unofficial intentions. The official intentions focus on the improvement of state institutional capacity in service delivery and welfare distribution. The unofficial intentions centre on the mitigation of the region's separatism campaign by accommodating local elite interests, containing the security campaign of the separatist group and fostering social integration by promoting migration from other areas of the country.

The findings show that, albeit in limited ways, the progress made in the official intentions of *pemekaran* through the improvement of service provisions and welfare distributions have contributed positively to public trust in the state. On the other hand, the outcomes of the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran*, particularly those related to the security and migration issues, have undermined public trust in the state.

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Notes on Transliteration and Language

Most of the research in this project was conducted in the Indonesian language. All translations from Indonesian language are my own. Interviews were transcribed into Indonesian and, after analysing them, translated for quotation in this thesis. The original words added in italic are usually in Indonesian language.

Declaration

I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work. Some parts of the thesis have been presented in two following conferences:

1. "Comparative Peacebuilding in Asia" workshop at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, December 2017

2. "The Northeast Conference", at Cornell University, Ithaca New York, USA, October 2018.

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Table

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Research Background

Territorial reform by enlarging or reducing the size of local government territory has long been implemented by many countries to increase government efficiency and responsiveness (Keating, 1995; Swianiewicz, 2010). However, territorial reform, particularly in the Global South, has been implemented for a wider range of purposes than merely improving public service efficiency. In many nations in Africa, Latin America, South Asia and Southeast Asia, the establishing of more local government units has been developed as national policy to address challenges such as inter-regional development gap, poverty, electoral politics and ethnic conflicts, as well as to mitigate the impact of separatist movement (Grossman & Lewis, 2012; Resnick, 2017). Territorial reform expands the central state's authority into the areas of limited statehood (Karim, 2020). As such, territorial reform is not only a managerial strategy to increase the efficiency of state institutions, but it can also be a deliberate endeavour of the state to win the hearts and minds of its people while establishing its legitimacy and right to rule.

Following on from the ideas of leading scholars in the field of state legitimacy, it understands state legitimacy as the right of the state to rule in the eyes of its people (Gilley, 2009; Beetham, 2004). This definition of legitimacy places both the state and the people as active players in the process of legitimisation, where the state provides the reasons to support and the people approve or disapprove of these. Therefore, the “reasons” are related to people's expectations of how the state should behave, or what is termed “justifiability” in legitimacy literature (Beetham, 1991a). In line with this view,

the thesis shows that territorial reform can be a process of state legitimacy building that involves a reciprocal process between state and society where the state's action is evaluated by the people. In this regard, territorial reform by establishing new district governments provides a framework for the action of the state and evaluation by the society. There are many examples of implementation in nations of the Global South, including Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Brazil, Vietnam, the Philippines, India and Indonesia (Dickovick, 2011; Grossman & Lewis, 2014; Kimura, 2013). In these countries, territorial reform is not only an administrative rearrangement to improve the efficiency of state institutions but, more significantly, a process of state legitimisation by improving the state's institutional performance as well as its social acceptance.

This thesis investigates the impact of territorial reform through district1 proliferation, known as *pemekaran*, on state legitimacy in the case of Papua Province, Indonesia. Papua province, located in the western half of the island of New Guinea, was previously under Dutch administration, including in the immediate years after Indonesia declared independence in 1945, and the transfer of control of the territory to Indonesia remains contested (Drooglever, 2009). Although the outcome of the UN-sponsored referendum in 1969 determined West Papua was part of Indonesia, some Papuans disputed the result and have consistently challenged the legitimacy of Indonesian rule through violent as well as non-violent means (McGibbon, 2004).

A heavy-handed Indonesian military approach to suppress the movement during the authoritarian New Order era (1966-1998) served to fuel Papuan nationalism (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004). Some scholars predicted that Papua would eventually separate from Indonesia, following in the footsteps of East Timor which gained independence from

Indonesia in 1999 to become the state of East Timor or Timor Leste (King, 2004; Robinson, 2010). However, since the democratisation process began in Indonesia in 1998, Jakarta has considerably changed its approach to Papua by emphasising development and improving general welfare using the vehicle of establishing additional provinces and scores of new districts across the region (Viartasiwi, 2014).

This research chooses the case of territorial reform in Papua Indonesia for two reasons. First, Papua is a prominent example of national legitimacy that is challenged by the existing and arguably growing demand for independence (LIPI, 2016; MacLeod, 2015). Jakarta has tried to assuage the independence movement through a military approach as well as a persuasive approach by granting special autonomy status and forming a number of new districts (Bertrand, 2014; Viartasiwi, 2014). The latter strategy has been carried out by three presidents of Indonesia since 1999, adding 22 new districts to the 29 in Papua Province, or 75% of the total. This thesis aims to understand the extent to which the formation of new districts, which is largely went through a bottom up process, has an impact on the legitimacy of the state in Papua. While there has been extensive research on the determinant of *pemekaran* as well as its economic cost and benefits, (Firman, 2013; Kimura, 2013; Simandjuntak, 2015; Sjahrir et al., 2014), *pemekaran* has rarely been linked with state legitimacy.

The second reason for selecting the case of Papua is related to the increase of the nationalist movement in Melanesian countries namely Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and New Caledonia, with which Papuans are often ethnically identified. The region is home to several independence movements such as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) in Papua New Guinea, the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFB) in the Solomon Islands, as well as Kanak and Socialist

National Liberation Front (FLNKS) in New Caledonia. Recently, the region witnessed the referendum for independence in Bougainville and New Caledonia. Much has been learned from statebuilding among these countries, notably from the peace process in Bougainville (Boege, 2014; Braithwaite et al., 2010; Island, 2017; Regan, 2010), the regional assistance mission in the Solomon Islands (Braithwaite, 2010; Dinnen, 2008; Dinnen & Allen, 2016; Fukuyama, 2008; George, 2018), as well as the idea of a hybrid political order which is largely drawn from the practice of governance in this region (Boege et al., 2009; Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012; Nadarajah & Rampton, 2015; Volker et al., 2008). In contrast, despite often being regarded as the largest part of the Melanesian political entity, very little is known about statebuilding in Papua.

Employing the lens of statebuilding theory, this thesis argues that territorial reform in Papua is a process of state legitimacy building. This approach of seeing territorial reform as a process of state legitimisation has received limited attention in territorial reform studies. Previous research in this field tends to associate territorial reform with state performance, such as in promoting public participation (Sharpe, 1995), encouraging accountability and transparency (Keating, 1995) and deepening local democracy (Dahl, 1973) as well as improving public services provisions (Swianiewicz, 2010). This orientation has made the study of territorial reform relatively depoliticised (Keating, 2008). Recently, several scholars have brought a more political and sociological perspective into the study of territorial reform. They link territorial reform with issues such as ethnic conflict (Grossman & Lewis, 2014; Resnick, 2017), electoral politics (Awortwi & Helmsing, 2017), as well as political identity and patrimonialism (Kimura, 2013; Santoso, 2017). While these studies have significantly expanded the boundary of territorial reform studies, territorial reform's impact on state legitimacy remains little understood.

Through the case of territorial reform in the province of Papua, this thesis seeks to contribute to the emerging debate on the politics of territorial reform by undertaking an empirical analysis on how territorial reform impacts state legitimacy. The empirical evidence presented here shows that territorial reform is more than just an administrative rearrangement with the aim to promote efficiency; it is a reciprocal process of state and society where the state's right to rule is at stake.

1.2. Research Questions and Objectives

To understand the impact of territorial reform on state legitimacy in Papua Province, this research is guided by the main question: **How does territorial reform through district formation impact on state legitimacy?** By posing this question, this research starts from a neutral view on administrative fragmentation without prior assumption about the relationship between district formation and state legitimacy. This main research question then breakdown into three sub questions as follow: (1) What are the underlying intentions for *pemekaran* in Papua Province? (2) How does the state pursue the official intentions of *pemekaran* and how do stakeholders in Papua perceived the outcomes? (3) How did the state pursue the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* and how were the outcomes of *pemekaran* perceived by stakeholders in Papua?

Territorial reform through district formation has been one of the prominent approaches of state-building in Indonesia in recent decades years (Eilenberg, 2009). Since 1999 the number of local governments has increased significantly with the government initiating a programme of territorial reform known as *pemekaran* by establishing

additional provinces and *kabupaten/kota* (urban/rural districts). The number of provinces increased from 27 in 1999 to 34 in 2014, and the number of rural and urban districts expanded from 298 to 508[1]. The increases in numbers of local government units are parallel with the broader evolution of central-local relations through decentralisation and regional autonomy in Indonesia begun in 1999 (Hofman and Kaiser, 2002). While local government previously functioned merely as the extension of the central's authority, since 1999 they have been vested with an increased level of autonomy including the authority to manage a wide range of governmental functions as well as local public budgets.

Papua is the province with the largest number of new districts in the country. In this research, "district" means a second-tier level of local government within the provincial boundary. In Indonesia there are two form of district government i.e. *kabupaten* and *kota*. *Kabupaten* is district government in a more rural area whilst *kota* is district government in a more urban area. The head of *kabupaten* is called *bupati* (regent) and the head of kota called *walikota* (mayor). In Papua, since 2001 district refers to the level of government within a *kabupaten* or *kota* which in other part of Indonesia is known as *kecamatan.* To minimise the potential terminological confusing, this research defines *kabupaten* or *kota* as district and *kecamatan* as sub-district.

With only 10 districts in 1999, by 2015 Papua had been split into two provinces and 42 districts. More than 75 percent of the new districts resulting from *pemekaran*. While the provincial division was viewed sceptically by some Papuans as an Indonesian tactic of divide and rule (Bertrand, 2014), the establishment of additional districts

[1] This figure is more likely changes as until 2018 another 314 proposals of new local governments' creation have been submitted to the central government.

quickly gained support among Papuan elites and general public as a developmental policy (Kossay, 2012). In 2002, 14 new districts emerged through a largely bottom-up process. During 2007-2009, another 14 new districts were established through the same process, followed by two more districts in 2012. These facts lead to the first subsidiary question of this research: **"What are the underlying intentions for *pemekaran* in Papua Province?"** In addition to being driven by the needs of development such as improving infrastructure and reducing poverty in the easternmost area of the nation, several studies indicate that the formation of new government units in Papua has also been driven by political considerations to assuage separatism (McWilliam, 2011; Nolan and Jones, 2014). The opportunities brought by *pemekaran* – such as authority to manage public funds, jobs in local governments and local economic development – has created strong incentives for Papuan to divert their support from the separatist movement (Brata, 2008; Kossay, 2012). This thesis, however, analyses that both the development considerations and political considerations of *pemekaran* in Papua can read as the state's effort to strengthen its legitimacy in the eyes of Papuans. Hence, rather than seeing the two considerations dichotomously, the thesis analyses development considerations and political considerations of *pemekaran* simultaneously.

To construct a comprehensive analysis of the intentions of *pemekaran* in Papua, this research is designed not only to utilise empirical evidence that is available in the public domain but also obtain underlying items that are not publicly accessible, especially pertaining to political considerations and the related mechanisms. Therefore, this study examines the official intentions as well as the unofficial intentions of state officials regarding district formation in Papua. Investigations into the official aspects of the policy are guided by the following questions: **How did the State pursue the**

official intentions of *pemekaran* and how was the outcomes of *pemekaran* perceived by stakeholders in Papua? This question leads to discussion of government institutional performance as part of consolidating the sources of legitimacy in the newly established districts. Through this question, this thesis shows how stakeholders perceive the state's actions in strengthening its performance in Papua.

In contrast to the official objectives of *pemekaran* which have revolved around state institutional performance, the unofficial intentions are tied to the relational aspects between the state and the people, the Papuan community. However, more often than not, the aim of *pemekaran* as an approach to improve state-society relations are tacit rather than explicitly stated in official documents or formal speeches. In the case of Papua, the underlying relational objectives have often been linked to the intent to assuage Papuan disappointment with the central government and counter the long-held demand for Papuan independence (Aspinall, 2013; Heiduk, 2014). Thus, the third subsidiary question that guides the investigation in this thesis is: **How did the state pursue the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* and how was the outcomes of *pemekaran* perceived by stakeholders in Papua?**

Addressing the above subsidiary questions, the thesis shows that territorial reform through district creation is a process of state legitimisation where the state aims to win over the people. In the case of Papua Province, *pemekaran* provides a framework for the state to implement mechanisms for strengthening its institutional performance while at the same time improving the state's relational dimension with Papua that has long been problematic, particularly with the presence of a separatist movement. This thesis claims that the extent to which *pemekaran* impacts on the state's legitimacy in

Papua is determined by people's perception on the outcomes of the policy both in terms of institutional and social aspects.

1.3. Understanding State Legitimacy

State legitimacy is the central analytical concept in this thesis and hence needs to be defined from the very beginning. It is, however, not easy to define the concept of legitimacy which, according to many scholars, policy-makers and international organisation, is a major element in understanding power relations. Scholars argue that the construction of legitimacy is a crucial issue in supposedly "failed states"(Weigand, 2015). Policy-makers acknowledge that a lack of legitimacy makes development more expensive and less sustainable (Buzan, 1991). In the same vein, development agencies suggest that institutional legitimacy is the key to stability (World Bank, 2011) and provides the basis of rule by consent rather than by coercion, hence making peace more likely (OECD, 2010).

While scholars, policy-makers, as well as international organisations share a convergent idea about the foundational role of legitimacy, different definitions of legitimacy exist in the literature. Among the widely shared definition of legitimacy are "the right to rule", "the right to loyalty", "worthiness of support", "the prestige of being considered exemplary or binding" and "the appropriateness of an institution to exercise its rule" (Gilley, 2006; Lamb, 2014; Weber, 1964). Legitimacy is also seen as the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority (Tilly, 1985, p. 171). While from the population perspective, legitimacy is seen as the population's willingness to obey the authority (Levi & Sacks, 2009) which is resonates

with Weber's definition. According to Weber, 'the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige' (Weber, 1964, p. 382). In other words, the authority is legitimate when people believe in its rightfulness. In this thesis, following the approach of those leading theorists, legitimacy is understood as a prerequisite for exercising authority or the right to rule.

To claim legitimacy, an authority needs to have modalities upon which the beliefs of the people to the rightfulness of its authority can be grown. However, there is no general consensus on what factors influence the strength or weakness of a state's legitimacy. Some scholars refer to the tangible and intangible sources (Pouligny, 2010), input and output dimension (Scharpf, 2011), quantifiable and unquantifiable (Andersen, 2012) or institutional and social legitimacy (Chandler, 2007; Lemay-Hébert, 2014b). The term institutional and social legitimacy will be employed in this thesis and discussed further in Chapter Two.

Institutional legitimacy is related to the process and performance of state institutions in providing services such as security, health and education. In other words, the legitimacy is stronger when the state is able to meet the demand of its citizens over public goods. In contrast, legitimacy is lower when the state is unable to meet these needs. Social legitimacy, meanwhile, is related to people's expectations of how the state should behave or what is commonly referred to as "justifiability" in legitimacy literature (Beetham, 1991a; Mcloughlin, 2017). Legitimacy is conferred or withdrawn based on whether those actions or outcomes can be morally justified against the shared values (Beetham, 1991a). These expectations are influenced by social contexts such as shared values, norms, history and tradition. Hence, state social

legitimacy lies in the conformity between governmental output and the value pattern of society which is the criterion to justify the beliefs of the rightfulness of the state (Beetham, 1991a; Stillman, 1974). The more the state is able to produce outcomes that are in accordance with public expectations, the stringer legitimacy of the state will be and vice versa. For example, a lack of state capacity to distribute public welfare has an impact on inequality, poverty and injustice that encourages the formation of "relative deprivation" which degrades legitimacy toward the state and at an extreme stage can trigger rebellion (See Gurr, 2000).

Legitimacy must also be seen in a relational framework which is influenced by its context and social settings. As Lundry stressed, “what is legitimate varies between and within cultures and over time, and is continuously (re-)established through conflict and negotiation” (Lundry, 2009). Moreover, it depends on the interest of leaders, politicians, officials, administrators, chiefs, rebels and other individuals and groups who claim to represent the state or who claim public authority (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010). Hence, defining the sources of legitimacy should not be limited to the elements that conform to liberal values, but it should be informed by social context. Practices perceived as corrupt by Weberian definition, for instance, might correspond to cultural perceptions of how to behave. Hence the dichotomy of liberal vs illiberal values is not helpful in defining the sources of legitimacy.

1.4. Territorial Reform as State Legitimacy Building

While state legitimacy is the analytical lens of this thesis, its subject matter is territorial reform. In the general definition, territorial reform is a strategy to put local government

functions in a territorially more viable basis (Wollmann, 2004, p. 641). It concerns the number and size of local government units in order for them to perform more efficiently and effectively. It can be done through amalgamation, which means combining several government units into one larger unit, or through dividing one government unit into several government units. Amalgamation has been more common in developed countries aiming to achieve higher efficiency and increase regional competitiveness via economic of scale. The division strategy, on the other hand, is more common in developing countries with the intention to strengthen governance responsiveness and accountability (Swianiewicz, 2010). This thesis focuses on the second approach of territorial reform by investigating the case of district formation in Papua.

Territorial reforms by creating new local government units have been conducted for various reasons. In sub-Saharan countries like Uganda, Ghana, DRC, Senegal, Nigeria and Ethiopia, ethnic conflicts and minority issues have triggered a more than more than 50% proliferation of local governments since 1990 (Aggrey et al., 2013; Grossman & Lewis, 2014). In these countries, district creations were designed by the ruling regime to weaken the opposition by dividing their territorial base (Kraxberger, 2004; Resnick, 2017). In Uganda and Kenya, it was used by the ruling elites as electoral strategy to maintain their power by expanding patronage networks (Green, 2010; Hassan, 2016). In other countries, territorial reform was sometimes designed to accommodate previously marginalised ethnic groups or as an instrument in the peace process by allowing people to have their own local government (Resnick, 2017; Santoso, 2017). Although it can have various different purposes, the cases of territorial reform in the above countries suggest that it is an integral component of statebuilding agendas, meant to reinforce the links between the central state and local citizens. Hence, through the case of territorial reform via district formation in Papua Province,

this thesis investigates more closely the mechanisms through which territorial reform affects state legitimacy.

1.5. Statebuilding through *Pemekaran* in Papua Indonesia

Territorial reform through the establishment of new local government in Indonesia, known as *pemekaran*, flourished after the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. The Indonesian government structure is divided into provinces (*provinsi*) that are composed of regencies (*kabupaten*) and municipalities (*kota*) that have their own local government and parliamentary body. Regency and municipality are divided into districts (*kecamatan*) and rural and urban village (*desa*/*kelurahan*). While the term *kecamatan* refers to the third tier of the government in most parts of Indonesia, the term district has been used in Papua and West Papua since 2001. Following previous studies on territorial reform in Indonesia (Pierskalla & Sacks, 2017; Santoso, 2017; e.g. Sjahrir et al., 2014) in this thesis the term district is used throughout to refer to regency and municipality, the second tier of government.

Within a 15-year span from 1999-2014, the number of district governments in Indonesia increased dramatically from 298 to 508, while the number of provinces rose from 29 to 34. The wave of local government proliferation known as *pemekaran* began following the decentralisation policy in 1999 with the establishment of Law 22/1999 on Local Government which was regarded as “Big Bang Decentralisation'” (Hofman & Kaiser, 2004). Papua is the region which experienced the largest increase in its local government. Up to 1996 there were only 10 districts, but by 2015 the region was split

into two provinces and 42 districts. This means that a staggering 75% of districts in Papua have resulted from *pemekaran*.

It is also necessary to clarify the use of the term “Papua”, as it is used in multiple ways, which can lead to confusion. During the colonial period, the western half of New Guinea Island, which was under Dutch administration was known as Netherland Nieuw Guniea. In 1961, the Papuan National Committee proposed the name of West Papua as part of the plan to establish an independent state. The proposal was adopted by the Nieuw Guniea Council (Nieuw Guinea Raad) on 19 October 1961 and since November 1, 1961 the name of West Papua was officially used by Papuan nationalists (Chauvel, 2005). After incorporation into the Republic of Indonesia and the conferring of status as a province in 1969, the region was renamed Irian Barat (West Irian) with Jayapura as its capital. The name was changed again to Irian Jaya in 1973. In 2000, based on the demands of the Papuan people who consider the name of Papua as more representative of their culture and history, the Indonesian government officially changed the name to Papua Province.

In 2005 the central government created a second province within the western part of Papua, namely Provinsi Papua Barat or West Papua Province. There are thus two provinces in the Indonesian part of New Guinea; Papua Province and Papua Barat or West Papua Province. This thesis analyses the formation of new districts in the current Province of Papua alone. However, in many parts of the thesis, “Papua” is used without the word province; this refers to Papua in a socio-political manner and also includes the current West Papua Province.

The establishment of new provinces and new districts in Papua is among the policies that marked a distinct shift in the Indonesian government’s approach to Papua, from

a heavy-handed military approach to developmental one (Bertrand, 2014; Viartasiwi, 2014). Moreover, some researchers claim that *pemekaran* is the main instrument for the central government in reshaping its relations with Papua (Djojosoekarto, 2008). While *pemekaran* has been applied nationwide, the increased number of districts in Papua and West Papua provinces is the highest in the country. The increases in numbers of local government units were particularly concerted during the Habibie presidency (1998-1999) with three districts, Megawati Soekarnoputri presidency (2001-2004) with 14 new districts, followed by Susilo BambangYudhoyono's successive terms in office (2004-2014) also with additional 14 districts.

Prominent among the official intentions behind the policy in the region, as stated in the formation law of the districts, are to accelerate development and to improve public services that are still lacking in most areas. The government believes that by forming the new districts, administrations become closer to the people, development funds can be more evenly distributed, people's access to public services can be improved and general welfare may increase (Bappenas, 2007). Likewise, some scholars often cite the Papuan poverty rate and its ranking on the human development index – respectively, the highest and lowest nationwide – as the driving factors in territorial reform (Fitrani et al., 2005). Other scholars, however, contend that the central government's support for *pemekaran* in Papua is partly derived from its political agenda of assuaging the separatist movement (Kimura, 2013; Nolan & Jones, 2014).

This thesis argues that the overarching intention of *pemekaran* in Papua is to strengthen state legitimacy by winning the hearts and minds of Papuan through providing material needs as well as improving relational dimensions. Ensuring provision of material aspects such as basic education and health are urgently needed

as most Papuans live in remote areas with very limited access to public services. Its vast territory marked by extreme geographical conditions is a major obstacle amid limited government capacity. At the same time, the relationship between the state and the Papuan people is also characterised by a strong disappointment among the latter that is tied to the controversial historical issue of integration and a notoriously repressive approach taken by the state. At its most extreme, this discontent is expressed in the desire for separation to form an independent state.

Building state legitimacy in such a context, requires more than just the fulfilling of people's material needs but must also consider approaches that are oriented towards improving relations between the state and society. This thesis examines the extent to which *pemekaran* in Papua can provide opportunities to improve the material and equally important relational demands simultaneously.

1.6. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter provides a literature review and discussion on the main concepts broached in this thesis; statebuilding, state legitimacy, and territorial reform. It begins by revisiting the epistemological debate on statebuilding, particularly whether the state is an autonomous or non-autonomous entity. Following leading scholars on statebuilding, this thesis sees the state as a non-autonomous or porous institution which can shape and be shaped by other institutions. The second section explores the idea of legitimacy as well as the contested ideas on the sources of legitimacy. It analyses that the institutional and social sources of legitimacy are intertwined; both can be mutually reinforcing or undermining state legitimacy. The third part compares and contrasts two approaches of statebuilding, i.e.

the institutional approach and the societal approach. This part concludes by proposing a conceptual framework by seeing statebuilding as the consolidation of institutional and social sources of legitimacy.

The third chapter provides a theoretical and empirical account on territorial reforms both through local government amalgamation and proliferation. It underlines how territorial reforms can be seen as part of statebuilding process. Drawing from the practices of territorial reform through local government proliferation in the developing world, this chapter finds that countries embark on reforms with economic and political motivations. The outcomes of the reform, however, should not be taken for granted. Toward the end of the chapter, the case of territorial reform in Indonesia is briefly discussed, particularly by underlining the political background of the reforms in Indonesia and particularly in Papua Province.

Chapter four discusses the methodology of this thesis which includes an explanation of researcher positionality, research approach and method, as well as research limitations. A substantial portion of this chapter discusses the case study design in this research as well as the process of case selection and gives a description of the cases' locations. Subsequently, the process of data collection in five different locations is discussed followed by the procedure for data analysis. At the end of the chapter, a reflection on the fieldwork process is presented.

Chapters five, six and seven expose and discuss the empirical findings of this research which respectively address the three sub research questions. Chapter five answers the question; **what are the underlying intentions for *pemekaran* in Papua Province?** The findings suggest that *pemekaran* in Papua is imbued with two sets of intentions: strengthening the state's institutional capacity and mitigating separatism

while promoting social integration. This chapter then discuss potential causal mechanisms for how *pemekaran* facilitated these sets of intentions. This thesis categorises these mechanisms as the official and the unofficial mechanisms. By identifying official and unofficial intentions, this thesis maps the government's motivations of *pemekaran* more deeply, covering issues that are unstated in formal documents.

Chapter six addresses the second research sub-question; **how did the state pursue the official intentions of *pemekaran* and how the outcomes perceived by stakeholders in Papua?** It discusses the implementation of the official intentions for how *pemekaran* facilitated state institutionalisation and how stakeholders perceive its outcomes especially in the area of public services, economic development, and local government capacity building. The findings suggest that the achievement of the official intentions of *pemekaran* had been perceived differently among stakeholders. While most of the respondents support the idea of *pemekaran* as a policy to improve state capacity in serving its people, most of the respondents were not satisfied with the progress that *pemekaran* has brought to them so far. This thesis observes that stakeholders' dissatisfaction in the performance of the new local government indicates a gap between the general expectation and the progress of the official intentions of *pemekaran*.

Chapter seven answers the third research sub-question; how did the state pursue the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* and how was the outcomes of *pemekaran* perceived by stakeholders in Papua? It discusses the mechanisms in pursuing the unofficial intentions through three mechanisms: accommodating local elite interests, strengthening state military presence, and undermining local support to separatism

through migration to new districts. The findings suggest that all the mechanisms above have had limited impact in mitigating the impact of the separatist movement. Moreover, these mechanisms have created unintended outcomes that led to further disappointment and distrust in the government.

Chapter eight, as the concluding chapter, highlights the empirical findings that answer the questions established at the beginning of the research. It also reflects on the contribution of the thesis, particularly to the literature of territorial reform. Finally, reflecting on the findings, this thesis proposes issues to be explored in further studies.

Chapter 2. Statebuilding and the Search for State Legitimacy

2.1. Introduction

This research aims to understand the link between statebuilding and state legitimacy by investigating the case of territorial reform through district formation in Papua Indonesia. Using the lens of statebuilding and legitimacy theory, the thesis argues that territorial reform is more than just an administrative rearrangement as it is generally understood to be; it is a reciprocal process of state and society where the state's right to rule is at stake. This chapter provides a theoretical framework for this study that places the concepts of statebuilding and state legitimacy as its central themes.

Based on the idea that institutional performance determines the strength of the state, the current dominant approach of statebuilding puts an emphasis on the institution of the state (Eriksen, 2016; Fukuyama, 2004; Kaplan, 2009). This approach is known as institutional statebuilding or the liberal statebuilding approach (Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert, 2016; Richmond, 2013). The institutional approach sees the state through the presence of its institutions and apparatus. The strength of the state, in this view, depends on the performance of state institutions. Hence, statebuilding means strengthening state institutions and apparatus through institutional reform, capacity building and providing essential infrastructures for the state to function (Lun, 2009; Rotberg, 2004). Institutional reform, for instance, targets the security sector, judicial system, bureaucracy, parliamentary sphere, police reform as well as re-establishment of public service systems such as health and education sectors.

Another group of scholars adopts a different viewpoint of statebuilding by emphasising the role of society and social dimensions. In this perspective, the strength of the state lies more in the relations between state and society rather than the institutional aspects of the state (Guevara, 2017; Karim, 2020; Pouligny, 2010; Risse & Stollenwerk, 2018). The supporters of this approach which is also known as the bottom up perspective understand the state in terms of its relational dimensions, i.e. how the state relates with its people and how the people assess their experience - good or bad – with the state (Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016; Karim, 2020; Pouligny, 2010). They believe statebuilding should be focused on improving relations between the state and society in everyday interactions as well as promoting public trust and engagement with the state.

The differences between the institutional and societal approaches hinges on the contrasting epistemological understanding of the state as a political order. The institutional approach which embraces objective epistemology believes the state is an autonomous entity that acts independently from its social context. On the other hand, the societal approach adheres to subjective epistemology that the state and its social context influence each other. The two approaches also take divergent interpretations of state legitimacy. For the institutional approach, legitimacy is the consequence of well-functioning state institutions (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Rotberg, 2004). Improved state performance is measured by the public goods produced and the welfare distributed, linearly improved state legitimacy. In the societal perspective, legitimacy is more related to the affective dimension of state-society relations and the subjective understanding of the people about the state (Lemay-hébert et al., 2016; Pouligny, 2010; Risse & Stollenwerk, 2018). Hence, legitimacy is not defined by the presence and performance of state institutions, but by the experience of society in dealing with

the state through the public service, bureaucracy, law enforcement, and how society evaluates their experiences against their expectation and shared beliefs.

Rather than rejecting the institutional approach on the basis of the societal approach's arguments, this thesis aims to find a nexus between the two approaches. As Kamrava argues, "the struggle of state institutionalisation and legitimisation drive politics in the developing world" (Kamrava, 1993, p. 2). The state is under a constant challenge to navigate between improving its capacity in delivering functions while at the same time improving its relations with society. The challenges are presumably even higher in post-authoritarian or conflict-affected societies where relations between the state and society have been coloured by mutual distrust. This chapter seeks to sketch a conceptual contribution on how the differences between the institutional and the societal focuses can be bridged in such context.

This chapter begins by revisiting the epistemological debate around whether the state should be understood as an autonomous or non-autonomous entity. Following leading scholars on statebuilding, this thesis sees the state as a non-autonomous or porous institution which can shape and be shaped by other institutions. The second section explores the idea of legitimacy as well as the contested ideas on the sources of legitimacy. It maintains that the institutional and social sources of legitimacy are intertwined; both can be mutually reinforcing or undermining state legitimacy. The third part compares and contrasts two approaches of statebuilding, i.e. the institutional approach and the societal approach. This part concludes by proposing a conceptual framework by seeing statebuilding as the consolidation of institutional and social sources of legitimacy. The chapter concludes by underlining statebuilding as a struggle for institutionalisation and legitimisation.

2.2. Understanding the State and Statebuilding

This section discusses the perspectives of statebuilding which stem from a different conception of the state. The autonomous perspective which understands the state apparatuses as a clearly distinguishable entity from society, sees state building as developing state's institutional capacity and ability to wield power. On the other hand, the non-autonomous perspective sees statebuilding as strengthening state-society relations such as improving people's feeling of justice, nurturing social cohesions, and promoting trust and engagement between state and society. This section underlines the idea that the state is a porous entity which can shape as well as be shaped by other entities, thus statebuilding should be seen as a parallel process of state institutionalisation as well as improving state-society relations.

2.2.1. Autonomous vs Non-Autonomous Debates

This idea of separating state and society has long been linked to Max Weber as expressed in works by the so called neo-Weberian scholars such as Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Randall Collins and Michael Mann, among others (Lemay-Hébert, 2010; Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert, 2016). The works of these scholars present the state as a unified institution with autonomy from society and with capacity to govern society given its monopoly of legitimate violence. Tilly, for example, defines the state as,

> "Relatively centralised, differentiated organisations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory" (Tilly, 1985, p. 170).

Likewise, Theda Skocpol conceives the state as

> "Organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society" (Skocpol, 2010, p. 9).

Tilly's and Skocpol's definition indeed comply with Weber's famous conception of the state. For Weber, the state is defined as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1946). He also modelled a rational-legal type of authority that he termed the "ideal state", a form of domination conducted through a group of people called the "bureaucracy" (Weber, 1946).

Bureaucracy, in Weber's concept, is characterised by several attributes such as hierarchical structure, routine, strict and uniform discipline, impersonality, recruitment through a merit-based system and being bound to maintain official secrets and secretiveness (Haro M. Höpfl, 2006; p10-11). Although Weber himself stated that the ideal type does not exist in the real world, the "ideal state" concept has been a profound influence and becomes the point of reference as well as the yardstick upon which the trajectory of the modern state is evaluated. However, there is a fundamental difference between Weber's work and the subsequent works of the neo-Weberian scholars. Central in Weber's work is the idea of legitimacy. On the other hand, legitimacy is overlooked in the works of the neo-Weberian scholars (Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert, 2016; Seabrooke, 2002). Nonetheless, the idea of the state as an autonomous entity has gained strong supporters both in academic publications as well as in the policy literature (e.g. Evans & Rauch, 1999).

It goes without saying that the idea of an autonomous state has received much criticism. Some scholars criticise Weber (Beetham, 1991) while others see neo-Weberian scholars who have misinterpreted Weber's idea (Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert,

2016; Migdal & Schlichte, 2005; Seabrooke, 2002). Critics contend that the neo-Weberian perspective created a narrow conception of the state, reducing the complex and diverse nature of the state into the institutional and technocratic dimensions. For many leading scholars such as Alexander Wendt and Anthony Giddens, the state is a porous institution that can influence other institutions as well as be influenced by other institutions. “No society, no state,” stated Wendt (1999, p. 209). Whilst for Giddens, “the state sometimes means an apparatus of government or power, sometimes the overall social system subject to that government or power” (Giddens, 1986, p. 17). Hence, separating the state from its social system is impossible because although the state actors are differentiated from their societies, internally they are related to them.

Similarly, for other scholars such as Joel Migdal and Klaus Schlichte, the shape of the state, its organisation as well as its norms are the result of negotiation among the power-holders within the state and society (2005, p. 15). Hence, the non-autonomous perspective sees that the state and society are intertwined and influence each other. The nature of state and society as inseparable entities is previously conceptualised by Barry Buzan. Drawing on his study on international security, Buzan believes that the most fundamental element of a state is not its institutions or its physical aspect, but the ideational basis of the state (Buzan, 1991). The latter may involve ideas that move people to establish a state in the first place, including common history and shared visions. In Buzan’s words, “the state is more an idea held in common by a group of people than it is a physical organism” (1991, p. 63). This conception resonates with Durkheim's conception of the state as an organ that comprises “sentiments, ideas and beliefs that the society has worked out collectively and with time” (1986, p. 84).

More recently, drawing on the concept of neopatrimonialism which is a combination between patrimonial and legal rational domination (Erdmann and Engel, 2007). Scholars develop the idea such as ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund, 2006) and ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege et al., 2009; Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012; Richards, 2015). These concepts refers to the understanding of the state as neither the only players, nor homogenous and static entities’ (Balthasar, 2015, p. 35). In ‘twilight institutions’, Lund (2006) analyses that state institution is in constant changes moulded by a variety of local institutions and the imposition of external institutions. Through the case of Niger, Lund shows the porosity of the state vis a vis other actors ranging from home-town association, chieftaincies, and vigilante groups, in defining the role of public authority (Lund, 2006, p. 688).

Likewise, the concept of hybrid political order refers to a mixture of different logics of the state, particularly between modern system and the existing local form of government (Boege et al., 2008). This form of mutual domination is common in Pacific countries such as Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Tonga (Boege et al., 2009). In Vanuatu, the customary institutions take role in the process of governance through the National Council of Chiefs (The Malvatumauri) (Boege et al., 2008). In Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, the political order is a combination between elements of modern statehood and the customary institutions including council of elders and councils of chiefs. Similarly, locally elected customary leaders and chieftains formed the Papuan People’s Assembly to represent the interests of indigenous communities in Papua Province of Indonesia (Haryanto et al., 2018). In short, state action is not something external to society, rather, the state is the institutional expression of society's collective autonomy, and state action is the collective action of the people of that state. The

contemporary idea of the state, therefore, expresses a unity of ruler and ruled, of the subjects and objects of government.

While many scholars are concerned about the sociological aspects of the state, the conceptualisation of the mechanism of interaction between state and other entities remains less developed. It was the work of Pierre Bourdieu that inspired the development of the study on the relational dimension of the state and society. For Bourdieu, society consists of various fields or arenas where power is concentrated, such as economy, art, religion, mass media and politics. The arena in which different actors exercise power is called “the field of power” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 76). At the same time, according to Bourdieu, the state is the ultimate reservoir of power where different forms of capital (resources) are concentrated, including the capital of force (army or police), economic capital, cultural capital and symbolic capital (1994, p. 4). Hence, the power struggle among actors culminates in the struggle to control the state and its resources (Arnholtz & Hammerslev, 2013, p. 50; Bourdieu, 1994, p. 5). It involves efforts by state and non-state actors to have their rules become the routine basis upon which people act (Schlichte, 2005).

Building upon the work of Bourdieu, scholars such as Joel Migdal (2001), Klaus Schlichte (2005) and Bliesemann de Guevara (2008) have developed an understanding of the state as a field of power with multiple competing actors. Migdal, for instance, offers a more fluid conception of the state as “a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence” (2001, pp. 15–16). For Migdal, the state, as with any other group or organisation, is constructed and reconstructed, invented and reinvented, through its interaction with other actors in the field of power. Migdal’s conception provides a chance to capture the complex nature of the interaction

between the state and non-state actors which was missing from the neo-Weberian discourses. This definition even allows us to capture sub-national resistance against state domination, as previously expressed in the works of James Scott (1985) among others.

More radically, Migdal also stated that “the state is a contradictory entity that acts against itself” (2001, p. 22), meaning that, in many ways, the state image is undermined by practices of various parts or fragments of the state. Hence, Migdal proposed two levels of analysis of the state; i.e. the state as a unitary actor and the state as the myriad of reinforcing and opposing practices. In other words, the state may be seen as an integrated actor when it deals with external actors, but it is seen as constituting multidimensional actors when it deals internally. This conception provides a broader scope of the state regardless of its level of monopolisation of force (Weigand, 2015).

While distinguishing state agents from societal agents, Bourdieu observes that each agent is assumed to move by the institutional interests where they belong (*habitus*). According to Bourdieu, state actors should devote themselves entirely to their function and sacrifice their particular interests in favour of the general interest (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 18). On this matter, Migdal and Schlichte (2005, p. 14) seem to provide more space for the plurality of actors’ interests by describing the state as a dual entity: state image and state practice. The state image is the construction of the state as an integral entity, its wholeness, while state practice reflects the myriad of state actions and responses in the interaction with other actors. In other words, the state image and state practice are not always coherent because the practice of the state influenced by external factors such as the perceptions and preferences of the individual state actors.

Migdal's and Schlichte's notion of influence of individual actors in shaping the 'state practice' is in line with the idea of 'informal structure' suggested by Philip Selznick in his work on the influence of individual interests within an organisation. Selznick, an American sociologist who played an essential role creating the New Institutionalist paradigm in organisational studies, maintains:

> "An organisation is a group of living human beings. The formal or official design for living never completely accounts for what the participants do. It is always supplemented by what is called the "informal structure," which arises as the individual brings into play his own personality, his special problems and interests. Formal relations co-ordinate roles or specialized activities, not persons." (n.d., pp. 7–8).

Different from Weber who sees individual as part of a professional apparatus working to achieve organisational interest, for Selznick individuals do not act purely based on their formal roles. Likewise, organisations do not act purely based on formal structures. Selznick is concerned with the nexus between the political, cultural and value-laden aspects of an organisation, on the one hand, and the more technical elements of an organisation on the other.

The idea of dualism of institution as reflected in 'state image and state practice' (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005) or 'formal and informal structure' (Selznick, 1984) are different from Weber who valued impersonality and formality as the main characteristic of modern bureaucracy, and sees state as singular actor represented by bureaucracy. In Selznick view, for instance, leadership plays a crucial role in promoting and protecting the institutional value system (Selznick, 1984). It implies that leadership capacity, vision and commitment is more crucial than organisational apparatus. This differs again from Weber who positioned modern bureaucracy as the main feature of the state.

Moreover, while Weber theorises the institution will be at its best when it is separated from the social context, Selznick remarks that infusing values is the main point of institutionalisation as character building (1984). Hence, the success of an institution depends on the extent to which it can integrate the social values to meet organisational missions.

The perspective offered by Bourdieu, Migdal, Schlichte, and Selznick inform this study particularly in seeing the state as a plural entity rather than an autonomous and capsulated entity detached from its social context. Further, the perspective of these scholars suggests that most of the time the state image is not always mirrored in the state practice as state comprised of individuals actors capable to bring their own personality and influence the conduct and eventually the image of the state. In Bourdieu's conception, the field of power eliminates the dichotomy between structure and agency. The state is a structure that affects the behaviour of state agencies, but at the same time, the state agencies (as well as non-state actors) can influence the structure.

2.2.2. Statebuilding as State Institutionalisation

Despite much criticism, the neo-Weberian conception of the state informs the institutionalist approach to statebuilding that continues to be upheld by international organisations as the prescription for solving state-society problems in many countries (Lemay-Hébert, 2014a; Mac Ginty, 2011). The World Bank’s continuing campaign for a set of principles of good governance is among the prominent example (Chandler, 2007). From Somaliland to remote villages in Nepal, and reaching to Bougainville in

the Pacific island, good governance is seen as a solution for state-society problems (George, 2018; Miklian et al., 2011; Richards, 2015). It is not an exaggeration that the institutionalist approach of statebuilding has been prevail among scholars, policy makers, as well as international donors at least in the last twenty years.

The narrative of statebuilding emerged as a response to the phenomena of state weakness, fragile state or state failure (Chandler and Sisk, 2013). Hence, a significant amount of the literature on statebuilding has been linked to the concept of peacebuilding as forms of international intervention to rescue the failed or potentially failed state in conflict affected societies (Beswick, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2014; Richmond, 2013). in this view, state institutional performance defines the strength of the state. The dysfunction of institutions reflects the failure of the state, or as Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, “state collapse is the collapse of state institutions” (Lemay-Hébert & Mathieu, 2014, p. 237). Hence, the institutionalisation or the strengthening of state institutions is the hallmark of this approach of statebuilding. It involves establishment of the rules, rule adaptation and rule changing (Bevir, 2007, p. 453). Hence, the overarching agenda of statebuilding in this perspective, as Simon Chesterman claims, revolved around the institutional reforms and capacity development “to make the state works’ in the way that the modern states do” (2005, p. 2).

Many scholars offer further perspective as well as a priority agenda of statebuilding in this narrative. Some scholars emphasise the promotion of modern state values such as liberal democracy, the rule of law and accountability, in order to establish effective state institutions (Fukuyama, 2004). Fukuyama for instance, remarks that the modernity of liberal West is the trajectory that many nations in the world would pursue. In his words,

> The modern world offers a very attractive package, combining the material prosperity of market economies and the political and cultural freedom of liberal democracy. It is a package that very many people in the world want, as evidenced by the largely one-way flows of immigrants and refugees from less developed to more developed countries. But the modernity of the liberal West is difficult to achieve for many societies around the world (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 2).

Further for Fukuyama, the central issue in order to pursue the liberal modernity lies in the state institutional capacity to which he proposes four nested aspects that needs to be addressed, namely; organizational design and management, political system design, basis of legitimization, and cultural and structural factors (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 23). Thus, the main challenges of statebuilding from this perspective are, for example, how to make democracy as "the only game in town" (Linz & Stepan, 1996), how to "make democracy work" (Putnam, 1993) or more specifically the struggle on how to "make democratic governance work" (Norris, 1999, 2012).

Other scholars have linked institutional capacity with other basic functions of the state such as providing security, representation and delivering welfare (Milliken & Krause, 2002; Rotberg, 2004). Rotberg for instance, defines statebuilding as the state's obligation to provide political goods such as security, healthcare, education, roads, railway, harbours and other physical infrastructure (2004). More specifically, based on their experience in international development and statebuilding interventions, Ghani & Lockhart (2008) suggest a framework for statebuilding. The authors outline ten fundamental functions that the state has to maintain including rule of law, a monopoly of the legitimate means of violence, administrative control, and sound management of public finances. Equally important, according to both authors, in order to avoid failing the state must strengthen their commitment and capacity in human capital investment, creation of citizenship rights through social policy, provision of

infrastructure services, formation of a market, management of public assets, and effective public borrowing (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008).

Meanwhile, several scholars focus on human resources, especially through bureaucrat capacity-building and establishing a meritocratic system (Chandler & Sisk, 2013; Richards, 2014). A comparative study of 35 less-developed countries conducted by Peter Evans and James Rauch, for instance, suggests that bureaucratic rationalisation, the main tenet in a Weberian state, is the key to effective state governance (1999). The availability of such a standard also justifies western countries or international organisations evaluating the feasibility of a state or the "stateness" of a state. It is based on this logic that a global state fragility index, for example, has been formulated.

Many of these processes involve the promotion of certain values and replacing others. In many cases, this process indeed proceeds in a top-down manner, leaving less room for negotiating different values. Following the assumption of the ideal type rooted in the Western context, the Western state becomes the standard against which other states are measured (Lemay-Hébert, 2009a; Newman, 2009). Accordingly, the Western state system has been regarded as the model that should be applied elsewhere, regardless of the contextual circumstances. Any entities other than those that resemble the modern Western state are deemed substandard, labelled as non-western, non-state, traditional, quasi-state, informal or at best hybrid (Schlichte, 2005, p. 11). This approach to statebuilding tends to remove other values considered illiberal and pathologic toward the modern state, such as patronage, kinship relations or patron-client relations (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010).

Despite being the dominant perspective, the institutional approach to statebuilding has been subject of criticism from many scholars, particularly related to legitimacy issue (David Chandler, 2006; Lemay-Hébert, 2009a). Drawing from the case of Kosovo, for example, Lemay-Hebert (2009a) asserts that the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) lost its credibility in the eyes of Kosovars as it was widely viewed as unaccountable and lacking in cultural sensitivity. Attempts at statebuilding without taking into account the existing power structure have sometimes not only ended with the loss of legitimacy but have also provoked resistance from local actors, as in Somalia, Sudan and Uganda (Richards, 2015).

The international experiences of statebuilding interventions also suggest that statebuilding has created a dual system instead of institutionalising a stable government. In the case of statebuilding in Tajikistan, Bosnia and Sierra Leone, international support to established wester

n state institutions created a dualism, as the work of newly created institutions relies heavily on the role of traditional authority (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010; Heathershaw, 2008). Further, instead of promoting a stable and peaceful governance, the establishment of liberal principles such as meritocracy and accountability invite resistance from stakeholders. In Somalia, for instance, the exclusion of warlords from the statebuilding process backfired with increased levels of violence and fragmentation within the state (Richards, 2015, p. 183).

There is mounting criticism that the institutional approach is depoliticising statebuilding. Statebuilding which is essentially a political process that brings together various interests, is reduced to a technical process of bureaucratic capacity building (Chandler, 2007; Lemay-Hébert, 2009b). As such, statebuilding fails to capture the

nuances of societal dynamics in which different forces pursue various agendas. While most authors claim that this shortcoming is mainly a problem of international statebuilding interventions (externally-led statebuilding), this thesis maintains that domestically-led statebuilding is not exempt from such risks. After all, the influence of neo-Weberian thinking of the state has been dominant whether or not international statebuilding intervention is physically present. The continuing recognition of good governance principles in the global south, where in fact many conflicting values exist, is a clear example.

2.2.3. Statebuilding as Improving State-Society Relations

In response to the limits of the institutional approach, some scholars propose that statebuilding is not only focus on the state institution alone, but also its relations with society. This view is informed by the idea that state and society are interlinked and influence each other rather than two separated entities. Instead of as a single autonomous entity, the state is understood as plural and permeable entities that shape and can be shaped by other actors. Since the state and society actors are interrelated, what matters are not only the tangible dimensions but also the intangible or affective elements, such as perception, trust, beliefs and norms. Moreover, the sociological approach tends to see these ideational elements as more essential in defining the state's strength rather than its physical dimensions (Buzan, 1991; Milliken & Krause, 2002; Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015).

Statebuilding in the sociological perspective is not only about improving the capacity of state institutions, but first and foremost, about improving the relationship between

state and society. It is related to meaning and social interaction, trust and engagement between the state and society. It is about legitimacy, without which the state institutions would find it difficult to function. Buzan believes that “without a widespread and quite deeply rooted idea of the state among the population, the state institutions themselves have difficulty functioning and surviving” (Buzan, 1991: 64). The idea of the state is related to the sociological aspect of the state that serves as the glue that binds the people together, including the aspects of history, tradition, culture, nationality and ideology (Holsti, 1996, p. 83). More dramatically, some authors claim that statebuilding without legitimacy would only create a “phantom state”, ‘hollow institution”, “zombie government” or “empty shell” (Bickerton et al., 2007; Lemay-Hébert, 2011). In other words, statebuilding should also be seen as a political process to negotiate mutual demands between state and society. Hence, the provisions of public goods become a means as well as an arena to establish and strengthen state-society relations, not merely as an expression of state function.

The pertinent issue of legitimacy is also an increasing concern for many international development organisations. The World Bank has stated that “institutional legitimacy is the key to stability” (2011, p. xi). Interestingly the World Bank used the term institutional legitimacy rather than institutional performance or capacity. This suggests the crucial role of relational aspects within the work of the institutions in assuring the protection of citizens, guarding against corruption, providing access to justice and stimulating job opportunities. The World Bank also suggests that building social cohesion or strong relations between groups in society is crucial to reduce state fragility (Alexandre et al., 2012). In the same vein, the UNDP has developed a social cohesion approach in its statebuilding activities in vulnerable societies such as Nepal, South Africa, Cyprus, Bosnia, Burma, Colombia and Yemen (UNDP, 2015). The Organisation for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) emphasised that the lack of legitimacy created state fragility as it undermines state-society relations (OECD, 2010, 2012). The OECD also sees that different concepts of legitimacy coexist and compete, and suggests statebuilding should look beyond state institutions and pay more attention to people's shared beliefs and traditions, particularly in non-Western societies (OECD, 2010).

Together, these developments show that the intangible aspects of state-society relations are important elements in strengthening state legitimacy. The increased opportunity for public participation encourages government to be more accountable and responsive which in turn strengthen public trust in the state. Equally important is the social cohesion among community groups which is essential for improving stability, so that society and the state can jointly focus on advancing the common good. However, while it is an increasingly common concern, finding the avenue to develop legitimacy is still challenging for both international state builders as well as for local parties. For the international actors, obviously, it requires in-depth local knowledge and trust, as well as substantial time and commitment over the long term. For domestic actors, the challenge is no easier, particularly when social cleavages and distrust are deeply rooted. The existing perception of injustice among a group of people who have suffered long-term oppression from the state, for instance, makes it difficult for the state to stake a claim to legitimacy. Restoring public trust in such a situation would require not only time and material resources but also commitment and consistency.

2.3. The Nexus Between Statebuilding and State Legitimacy

The scholarly debates on statebuilding perspectives as discussed in the previous section suggest that statebuilding should not only focus on building the capacity of state institutions but first and foremost should take into account the societal dimension. Illustrations from several international statebuilding initiatives suggest that treating the state as an autonomous institution while overlooking the existing societal institutions tend to weaken instead of strengthen the state. Statebuilding must be placed as an effort to improve relations between state and society. Strengthening the capacity and competence of state institutions in carrying out their functions must be oriented to win the hearts and minds of the people. In other words, statebuilding must lead to strengthening the legitimacy of the state. This section provides a conceptual basis for understanding the link between statebuilding and state legitimacy.

2.3.1. Understanding State Legitimacy

The centrality of legitimacy in the political world is widely acknowledged by many scholars. Some scholars stated legitimacy as the “ideational basis of the state” which is sometimes more important than physical plane or performance (Schlichte & Schneckener, 2015). International development agencies have also recognised that the main challenge in so-called failed states is the construction of legitimacy (The World Bank, 2011). In this regard, legitimacy is linked to the stability of institutions or political system as they induce voluntary compliance and encourage participation, hence generates stability (Lamb, 2014, p. vii; The World Bank, 2011, p. xi). Consequently, if legitimacy is associated with stability, those seeking to develop,

sustain or change a system, must be interested in understanding, achieving or challenging legitimacy.

While scholars, as well as activists and politicians, have a convergent idea about the foundational role of legitimacy, different concepts of legitimacy exist. Among the most widely used are “the rights to rule”, “the rights to loyalty”, “worthiness of support”, “the prestige of being considered exemplary or binding” and “the appropriateness of an institution” (Gilley, 2006; Lamb, 2014; Weber, 1964) or the “license to govern” (Schmelzle & Stollenwerk, 2018). Legitimacy is also seen as the probability that other authorities will act on to confirm the decisions of a given authority (Tilly, 1985, p. 171). According to Weber, “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” (Weber, 1964, p. 382). In other words, the authority is legitimate when people believe in its rightfulness. In this regard, legitimacy is a prerequisite for exercising authority or “the right to rule”.

In his famous lecture “Politics as a Vocation’”, Weber remarks that “the state represents a relationship in which people rule over other people … based on the legitimate use of force” (2004, p. 34). He stated the idea of relationships between the authority holder and the people who believe of its rightfulness, between the ruler and the ruled, or between state and society. It is within this relationship that the idea of legitimacy has been anchored with “hope and fear” as the instrument of obedience. Weber said:

> “If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?” (Weber, 1946, p. 78).

Following this concept, Weber clustered three different factors upon which domination can be justified, what he called “the pure types of legitimate domination”. The pure types of domination are defined by: first the legal-rational domination as resting on a belief in legality of statutory order; second, the traditional domination that rests on the belief in sanctity of tradition and the belief in the way things have always been done; third, the charismatic domination that rests on the extraordinary character of an individual (Weber, 1964, p. 215). Weber’s pure types of domination show that the sources of domination can be both material and non-material.

Although it has been enormously influential, Weber’s notions of legitimacy have been contested by many scholars (Beetham, 1991a; Blau, 1963; Pitkin, 1972; Schaar, 1981). Among the most influential criticism is that from David Beetham (Beetham, 1991a, 1991b). According to Beetham, although Weber is one of the most influential thinkers in social science with an enormous contribution across disciplines, his contribution to the subject of legitimacy has been an almost “unqualified disaster” (2013, p. 8). He points out that Weber’s definition "reduces legitimacy from a complex of factors which give people good grounds for compliance to a single dimension: their belief in legitimacy” (2013, p. 23). Moreover, Beetham writes, Weber’s definition of legitimacy not only misinterprets the nature of legitimacy but also offers a misleading research strategy for determining whether power is legitimate simply by associating with people’s beliefs (2013, p. 13). For Beetham, legitimacy does not lie in people’s beliefs, but it can be justified in terms of their beliefs. He suggests a new definition of legitimacy in which, “power is legitimate to the extent that the rules of power can be justified in terms of beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate” (2013, p. 17).

This definition implies a more active orientation of legitimacy as a substance of reciprocal relations between state and society.

Beetham proposes three dimensions for power to be regarded as legitimate: “its conformity to established rules; the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared beliefs; the express consent of the subordinate or, the most significant among them, to the particular relations of power” (2013, p. 18). His notions of legitimacy differ to Weber’s. Instead of relating to the sources from which legitimacy emerges, he emphasises a multidimensional and symbiotic nature of legitimacy. In Beetham’s legitimacy, relations between the ruled and the ruler placed in a more dynamic nature where both actors can contribute to the construction of justified authority. From this perspective, legitimacy is not a “routine submission” where the ruled are inclined be in a passive position, instead, it is an interactive process in which the ruler and the ruled engage in mutual roles in the process of legitimisation at the various levels.

Three Dimensions of Legitimacy

Criteria of Legitimacy	Form of Non-Legitimate Power
Conformity to rules (formal and informal)	Contravention of rules
Justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs	Discrepancy between rules and the shared beliefs.
Legitimisation through expressed consent	Withdrawal or refusal of consent

Source: Beetham 2013, 20.

The process of justification of the ruler by the society as reflected in Beetham’s work (Beetham, 1991b) shows that legitimacy is not merely a consequence of the functioning of the state, instead, it has to be approved by the majority of society. Moreover, the functioning of state institutions does not automatically generate state

legitimacy, as recent research suggests (Mcloughlin, 2015). Mcloughlin, for instance, analyses that the impact of public services provision and state legitimacy is mediated by several factors, such as citizen's expectations of what the state should provide, public perceptions of impartiality and justice, relational aspects of delivery, attribution and sector characteristics (2015). All of these mediating factors meant a sharp break with the long-standing common wisdom among development organisations that public service provisions linearly improved state legitimacy.

Indeed, studies in Africa, Latin America and Arab countries revealed that the increase in public service infrastructure, which is often seen as a state achievement in itself, is not always in line with citizen satisfaction for these services (Sacks, 2011). A study from Indonesia indicated that increases in infrastructure and budget allocations for public services do not necessarily improve public trust in the central state (Ruhyanto, 2016). Unless improved services and infrastructure have a positive impact on citizen welfare, individuals are unlikely to credit the government for these outputs (Levi & Sacks, 2009). Regarding the perception of impartiality and justice, a study in Nepal, Liberia and Colombia suggested that unequal access to public services impacts negatively the citizen's view of the state. On the other hand, greater impartiality in the provision of public services is constructive to building public trust in the central state (Rothstein, 2009).

Another crucial element that could interrupt the direct relations between service delivery and state legitimacy is the relational aspect of service (Mcloughlin, 2015). While Weber suggested that the emotion reflected in a relationship inhibits organisational efficiency and effectiveness, research found that it is the essence of the services. Studies from China, Burundi, DRC, Nepal and Palestine suggested that

through collaboration, engagement, cooperation and better channels of communication between state and society, service delivery can be more effective and constructive to state legitimacy (Stel & Ndayiragije, 2014; Tsai, 2011). Service delivery that merely serves as a supply and demand transaction is unlikely to establish a mutual understanding and trust between state and society. Ultimately, as Kramer (2003, p. 10) puts it, “All public service is people service. It is all people and relationships. For governance to mean anything, it must mirror the souls of people”.

Taken together, the existence of multiple definitions and interpretations about legitimacy suggest that it is not a static concept but subject to constant change. At this point, it is suffice to say that legitimacy is central in all power relations. The varied conceptions of legitimacy, as discussed above, can also be clustered into two broad epistemological foundations; the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences. The logic of appropriateness believes that the pursuit of purpose is driven more by identity and set of rules rather than a rational expectation. Conversely, the logic of consequences assumes that action is driven by expectations of consequences that rationally calculated (March & Olsen, 1998). These epistemological differences affect the formulation of what could be regarded sources of legitimacy. Scholars embracing the logic of consequences tend to find the sources of legitimacy in the tangible and quantifiable dimensions. In contrast, those with the logic of appropriateness are likely to investigate the sources of legitimacy through the intangible and qualitative dimensions.

2.3.2. Mapping the Sources of State Legitimacy

To claim legitimacy an authority needs modalities upon which the beliefs of the people in the rightfulness of the authority can be nurtured. Therefore, understanding the sources of legitimacy is crucial to provide a comprehensive and meaningful agenda of statebuilding that contribute to the strengthening of legitimacy. This section elaborates the existing approaches in defining the sources of legitimacy. In general, there are two different points of views; the state-centric or the institutionalist approach in contrast to the society centric or the sociological approach. In the statebuilding literature, the debate between two approaches is characterised by top down vs bottom up, tangible vs intangible, as well as static vs dynamic arguments (Andersen, 2012; see Lemay-Hébert, 2010). This thesis categorises the two sources of legitimacy as institutional sources and social sources of legitimacy. The former is informed by institutionalist perspective of legitimacy whilst the later informed by the societal or sociological approach of legitimacy.

Influenced by Weber's rational-legal view of legitimacy which has been developed further by the neo-Weberian scholars, the institutionalists believed that state legitimacy derived from the functioning of state institutions. The source of state legitimacy, in this view, lies in the extent to which the state can provide public goods such as security, public services, as well as the provisions of economic goods (Chesterman, 2004; Rotberg, 2004). This perspective posits that the performance of state institutions in delivering goods and services may improve public perception of the state (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Zartman, 1995). Yet, more recent research suggests that the performance-based legitimacy mechanisms require public attribution to the state agencies (Risse & Stollenwerk, 2018) and the improvement or failure of performance

of services is not always attributed to the central authority (Mcloughlin, 2015). Thus, state performance may not lead to a direct impact on legitimacy as has long been believed by the institutionalists.

Putting emphasis on the state, the institutionalists also argue that the system of the state such as elections, accountability mechanism and public participation, are also influential in state legitimacy. Fukuyama, for instance, firmly believes that democracy is the best source of legitimacy. In his words, “while there have historically been many forms of legitimacy, in today’s world the only serious source of legitimacy is democracy” (2004, p. 26). More explicitly, one of the most prominent scholars on democracy, Guillermo O’Donnell observes that, “across most of the globe today, the ultimate claim of a political regime to be legitimate—or at least acceptable—rests on the kind of popular consent that purportedly finds expression in the act of free voting” (O’Donnell, 2007, p. 6). Other scholars such as Rothstein (2009), Scharpf (2011), Risse and Stollenwerk (2018) also provide institutional explanations for legitimacy, such as input-based participatory governance or output based performance (effective goods and service delivery). In other words, the legitimacy of being an authority is justified by looking at the input, such as the procedures and mechanisms to assure its accountability, and by assessing the output which relates to the state performance in delivering political goods.

State legitimacy in the institutionalist perspective is based on the logic of consequences, where an action is informed by rational calculation of the outcome. This principle is derived from the economic principle of utility maximization where the action of individuals is always driven by the consideration of gain. This logic also prioritises material elements as the main factor in building relations between state and

society. Rotberg, for example, has provided a long list of political goods, including the provision of security, opportunity to participate in the political process, public service provisions, to the physical infrastructures such as schools, roads, railways and harbours (Rotberg, 2003, p. 3). A state's legitimacy is based around its ability to provide political goods. In other words, state legitimacy is strong when the state performs well in delivering the political goods, it is weak when the state underperforms or fails to deliver what is expected of it.

In fact, in many countries the situation and results are mixed; states show arguably good performance in certain areas but underperform in others. This is not only the case in weak states or conflict-affected countries in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East or Southeast Asia. Even in Western developed countries such as the UK and France, public disappointment toward the state is a common phenomenon. In the UK, public protests against the government can be seen on an almost daily basis on a wide range of policy issues, from pensions, health insurance, job opportunities, university tuition fees, to Brexit (BBC, 2018).

Another perspective posits that the sources of legitimacy not only lie in the state but also the societal realm. This perspective is known as the society approach or social approach. While acknowledging the critical role of state capacity as the generating factor of legitimacy, it emphasises that the societal sources of legitimacy rest in the societal values, norms, shared beliefs, and common expectations, on the role of the state. Following Beetham (1991), the societal approach sees that state legitimacy depends on whether action of the state can be justified against common values or shared beliefs. The societal approach does not neglect the state's institutional capacity as a source of legitimacy. In this perspective, however, state-society relations depend

more on the quality of trust, fairness, social justice, social cohesion, participation accountability, as well as conformity between societal values and state principles. Hence, in assessing state legitimacy, the society approach looks at how the society perceives its interaction with the state, which may or may not be influenced by the performance of the state.

Unlike the institutional perspective of legitimacy that rests on the logic of consequences, the relational perspective understands legitimacy in the context of appropriateness. To this view, legitimacy is driven by identity, set of rules, and belief to the rightfulness of authority. Hence, while the source of legitimacy under the logic of consequences can be universal and quantifiable, legitimacy under the logic of appropriateness bound in the context such as value, norms, history, and shared beliefs. Different societal norms concerning legality, appropriateness, morality and constitutionality can be more important in defining legitimacy. Because it is in the dimension of perception, value and belief, legitimacy cannot be defined as something tangible. In this regard, legitimacy is no longer a quantitatively assessable concept, but a qualitative phenomenon specific to distinct communities and their actions (Andersen, 2012, p. 207).

The need to look at the societal aspects is also crucial since the establishment of the modern state in non-Western societies often challenges the legitimacy of “illiberal values” deemed incompatible with modern state norms. In most the non-Western societies in Africa, Asia as well as Pacific regions, local politics are still very much influenced by customary laws and religious institutions as well as the traditional social structure such as kinship, tribe, and clan. The role of traditional leaders such as village elders, clan chief, healers, the powers that be as well as religious leaders are also

pertinent and influence the daily social relations in these societies (Boege et al., 2009). The concept of public-private separation, for instance, is not as clear as in Western societies. For instance, the idea of communal property rights are very common in the societies in Pacific regions, such as Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji as their people live along tribal lines (Ward, 2013). Hence, individual rights among the fundamental norms of the modern state are incompatible in these societies.

2.3.3. Linking the Institutional and Social Sources of Legitimacy

From the above discussion, it is clear that while most scholars agree that legitimacy is central to political stability, they hold different views in defining the sources of legitimacy and how it can be generated. For those who believe that state legitimacy is derived from the quantifiable outputs of state institutions, then the problem is how to ensure that the institution works efficiently and effectively. For those who believe that state legitimacy stems from the nature of state-society relations, the problem is how to create a more constructive relationship, building more trust and social cohesion as well as conforming institutional procedures and outcomes to the existing common values. Either way, these processes are what this thesis means by statebuilding; that is, a process of establishing the institutional as well as the social basis of legitimacy.

The endeavour to bridge the institutional and social bases of legitimacy is gaining more traction both in academic and policy realms. This process comparable with the idea of linking statebuilding and nation building, or state building and peace building particularly when statebuilding is understood from the institutional perspective. Within the academic sphere, there is a growing literature on bringing statebuilding and nation-

building together to reflect the concern that both state and society are interlinked and influenced each other. Statebuilding without nation-building is unlikely to succeed since the state is not only sustained by its institutions but also by the complex nature of socio-political cohesion (Lemay-Hébert, 2009b, p. 22). Chandler (2006) for instance opines,

> "it was the links between political institutions, political parties and individuals which were considered key to strengthening the state, both institutionally and in terms of its popular legitimacy" (2006, p. 52).

In fact, efforts to strengthen local government have been promoted by many countries and international development agencies. Following criticism of the shortcomings of the top-down liberal statebuilding approach, international organisations such as the World Bank, the UNDP and the OECD have reoriented their approach. Accordingly, their framework of interventions and technical assistance have been shifted to expand the scope of stakeholders and particularly to include societal actors and social institutions. While previously overlooked, ideas such as "participation", "engagement" and "local ownership" became buzzwords among international organisations (The World Bank, 2011; UNDP, 2012).

Similarly, the OECD approach of statebuilding has shifted from focusing on transferring the institutional model to focus on the local political processes and generating social legitimacy (OECD, 2008, p. 3). In its 2008 report, the OECD defines statebuilding as, "a purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups" (2008, p. 14). The OECD emphasises the improvement of state-society relations through institutional development while relating it to social expectations. The term "negotiating mutual

demand" also reflects the understanding that the political dimension is crucial since negotiation is always involved in power relations.

The UNDP is another key player in promoting the bridging approach between the institutional and the social approach of statebuilding. In fact, the UNDP has a specific framework to strengthen the informal institution as part of its strategy to foster a resilient society. The localized customary structures are often perceived as more effective and legitimate than state institutions (UNDP, 2012, p. 96). The UNDP also believes that restoring the social contract should be seen as the priority of statebuilding in conflict-affected societies. To do so, it emphasises four fundamental interlinked elements of statebuilding. One of them is supporting inclusive politics that allow for the legitimate and peaceful expression of interests.[2] Hence, in countries such as South Sudan, East Timor, Nepal, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Haiti and Cambodia, the UNDP worked not only with the government but also traditional leaders, religious leaders, the council of elders, as well as customary leaders to form the hybrid governance.

The above discussion suggests that the institutional and social sources of legitimacy are essentially intertwined, where both can mutually reinforce or undermine state legitimacy. As OECD stated, the lack of legitimacy is a major contributor to state fragility because it undermines state authority and capacity; likewise, the lack of capacity undermines state legitimacy (2010, p. 7). Without the material basis embodied in the functioning of state institutions, no political regime in modern times can enjoy real legitimacy. At the same time, a state claim of legitimacy requires

[2] The other three elements include: supporting a responsive institution capable to deliver services; promoting the resilience of society; and promoting partnership as a means of operationalizing responsive institutions, inclusive politics and resilient societies.

approval and justification from the society based upon people's shared norms and beliefs.

2.4. Research Theoretical Framework

The two approaches of statebuilding discussed above seem to be set in a dichotomous manner between tangible vs intangible, top down vs bottom up, state centric vs society centric, or institutional vs relational orientations. Such a dichotomy prevents the emergence of a more nuanced analysis of statebuilding that is able to capture the complexity of relations between actors. This thesis agrees that both approaches could contribute to state legitimacy in an equally important way since the state constitutes both material and social dimensions.

Instead of seeing both approaches as a separate orientation of statebuilding, this thesis sees statebuilding as a parallel struggle of both state institutionalisation and legitimisation. The struggle is particularly apparent in statebuilding in non-Western societies. After all "the politics of the developing world is driven by continuous struggles on the part of governments to attain legitimacy and in the process to consolidate their rule in relations to their societies" (Mehran Kamrava, 1993, p. 2). The logic of statebuilding as parallel struggle between state institutionalisation and state legitimation can be simplified in the following diagram.

Diagram 2.1. Research Theoretical Framework



Through the above diagram this thesis argues that statebuilding and state legitimacy form a cyclical relationship which can be mutually reinforcing (virtuous cycle) or undermining (vicious cycle). The relationship, however, is not linear or direct but depends on how people perceive the progress of statebuilding process. Hence, this thesis sees statebuilding as a process of state legitimisation taking place in two dimensions simultaneously; the institutional dimension and the social or relational dimension. Informed by the works of the institutional statebuilding scholars (e.g. Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Rotberg, 2004; Zartman, 1995), the institutional dimension involves state's effort in developing and improving its capacity to functions including in public goods provisions and maintaining the monopoly of force within its entire jurisdiction.

Whereas statebuilding in the social dimension, informed by the societal statebuilding scholars (e.g. Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012; Lemay-Hébert, 2009b; Pouligny, 2010), relies on state's effort in promoting relational aspects such as the quality of trust,

fairness, social justice, social cohesion, tolerance, as well as promoting conformity between societal values and state principles. Following prominent scholars on legitimacy (e.g. Beetham, 1991a; Stillman, 1974), this thesis claims that state legitimacy lies in the conformity between the statebuilding outcomes and the value pattern of society as the criterion to justify the beliefs of the rightfulness of the state. Thus, how people perceive the progress and outcomes of statebuilding in both dimensions determines whether it strengthen or undermine state legitimacy.

2.5. Conclusions

Seeing statebuilding as a multidimensional effort of the state in strengthening its legitimacy this thesis circumvents the dichotomy between institutional and social approach of statebuilding. It seems to be a common understanding that the tangible or material sources of legitimacy are assumed to rest in the domain of state institutions, whereas the non-material or intangible sources of legitimacy lie in the social realm. This thesis considers that the dichotomy is inappropriate because the material and non-material sources of legitimacy can be found both in the realm of state and society. State institutions can produce the intangible source of legitimacy, for example, a law that gives a sense of justice, or a public service provision based on humanitarian principles. The social sphere which is generally linked to the intangible basis of legitimacy actually possesses a material foundation, such as common pool resources, communal property as well as the cultural artefacts that serve as the source of symbolic power.

Concerning legitimacy, this thesis maintains that state legitimacy requires both material and social elements, the tangible and intangible aspects of the state. It is not only about the result but also rests on the process reflected in the relational dimension among actors. Hence, legitimacy is not only defined by the presence of the state but also how the society experiences the state and justifies its experience against the shared beliefs, collective history as well as other justifications derived from the social and structural settings. This process of interaction and justification is referred to as legitimisation or the process of providing legitimacy in this thesis.

The conceptual framework outlined in this chapter will be operationalised through the case of territorial reform in Papua, Indonesia. Territorial reform has traditionally been considered an integral component of statebuilding, meant to reinforce the links between the central state and local citizens. In the case of Papua, territorial reform serves as a development policy and concurrently as a political instrument to prevent the country from disintegration. Overall, this thesis aims to analyse how the state struggle for institutionalisation and legitimisation are taking place through the case of territorial reform in Papua.

Chapter 3. Local Government Territorial Reform as Statebuilding

3.1. Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis analyses the link between statebuilding and state legitimization through the case of local government territorial reform. Although territorial reform itself is widely implemented in many nations to enhance the effectiveness of government administration, there are few studies relating it to the questions of state legitimacy. This chapter briefly discuss the concept of territorial reform, how it has been implemented in various countries and how existing literature discusses territorial reform. Through the lens of legitimacy theory, this thesis builds the argument that territorial reform, rather than functioning solely as an administrative process, provides a framework for state legitimisation through institutional and relational dimensions. After all, through local government most citizens in developing countries experience relations with the state. This chapter shows that local government territorial reform is a dual process of state institutionalisation and state-society relation building, hence fitting into the theoretical framework developed in chapter two.

With the aim of increasing government effectiveness and strengthening local democracy, territorial reform has been implemented in many developed as well as developing countries through two different strategies: local government mergers (or amalgamations) and local government proliferation (Keating, 1995; Swianiewicz,

2010). The amalgamation strategy focuses on increasing state efficiency and scaling up capacity to produce and improve the capacity of public services delivery. It assumes that the production of some public services and infrastructure, such as clean water and electricity, are more efficient with a larger local government size (John, 2010; Swianiewicz, 2010). The size of the government relates to both the population and the geographical area of the government units. This strategy, popular in developed European countries, tends to promote the merger of two or more local governments to form a larger local government.

The second strategy of territorial reform, often termed local government proliferation, entails splitting an existing local government into two or more local governments. By dividing a government into smaller units, proponents of this approach argue that the policy is better suited to serving citizens' needs, promoting public participation and a more accountable government – ultimately meaning that local governance can be more effective (OECD, 2017). Research, however, indicates that neither of these strategies is always superior since the efficacy of the approach depends on the context within which it operates (Martins, 1995).

Territorial reform in Indonesia has been conducted through the creation of new provincial and district government units across the country. While the policy was effectively stagnant for more than three decades during the New Order regime (1966-1998), the advent of democratisation in 1998 ignited a wave of territorial reform. Papua is the region that experienced the highest increase in local government, with 19 of its 29 districts established during 2000-2010. Against this background, the chapter aims to provide a theoretical as well as empirical understanding of territorial reform and determine a link between it and statebuilding.

This chapter consist of five sections. Following this introduction, section two discusses the competing approaches of territorial reform between amalgamation and proliferation. It discusses the assumptions underpinning both approaches as well as its theoretical advantages and disadvantages. The last part of this section underlines how territorial reform, both through amalgamation and proliferation, can be seen as part of statebuilding process. The third section focuses on local government proliferation and the strategy's implementation in many parts of the world. It suggests that countries embark on this reform amid different circumstances and overriding intentions. In particular, this section categorises the intentions into economic and political motivations. It suggests that the economic and political outcomes of the reforms are not always as intended and demonstrate some unintended consequences.

The fourth section of this chapter briefly discusses the local government proliferation in Indonesia, with special attention to Papua Province as the case study of this thesis. It indicates that the national political setting, especially relations between central and local government in Indonesia, is a driver of reform. The last two parts of this section hone in on the case of district proliferation in Papua by underlining its context and the development of the reform. Finally, this chapter concludes by underlining the importance of viewing territorial proliferation as part of statebuilding and state legitimisation.

3.2. Two Approaches to Territorial Reform: Merge or Divide?

In its simple definition, territorial reform is an effort to put government functions on a territorially more viable basis (Wollmann, 2004). The debate over territorial reform

centres on whether the size of local government influences government efficiency, performance, distributive capacity and democracy (Keating, 1995). Two different theoretical approaches have emerged. The first, derived from the economies of scale theory, supports territorial consolidation or amalgamation, with an emphasis on government efficiency and capacity to deliver wider functions. The other approach, referring to public choice theory, emphasizing competition among local government and deepening local democracy, supports territorial proliferation (Swianiewicz, 2002, p. 22). The first approach considers that territorial consolidation or merger between two or more local governments is more likely to promote efficiency and performance. The second approach maintains that smaller local government can be more effective because the government becomes closer to the people and more accountable in its actions. There is no consensus among scholars on which approach has better outcomes. Although this thesis focuses on the second approach overall, this section briefly discusses both approaches' main ideas, implementations and respective advantages and disadvantages.

3.2.1. Territorial Reform Through Amalgamation

Amalgamation can be defined as "the fusion of one or more municipal entities into a new organization" (Belley, 2012, p. 1). Advocates of amalgamation believe that larger local governments are more efficient in producing and delivering a broad set of public services (Askim et al., 2016; Ebinger et al., 2019a; John, 2010). According to this approach, the cost of production or maintenance of public goods can be reduced if it serves a larger population; accordingly the bigger the size of the population, the lower the unit cost of production of the services (John, 2010; Swianiewicz, 2018). A larger

organisation also allows for bigger budget and better capacity of staff and hence is more able to deliver a complex and specialised set of services, such as transportation, railways, water supply and telecommunications. Such high levels of functional differentiation can only be accomplished in larger municipalities (Newton, 1982). These beliefs explain why amalgamation has repeatedly emerged on the administrative reform agenda in many countries, particularly in times of financial stress (Ebinger et al., 2019a; Gendźwiłł et al., 2020; Swianiewicz, 2018). A systematic review of amalgamation in 40 European countries from 1950-2015 concludes that the arguments relating to the costs and capacity of service delivery occurred in all of the countries studied (Swianiewicz et al., 2017).

In particular, amalgamation is popular in countries with a primarily functional perspective on the role of local government, such as Western nations (Swianiewicz, 2010, p. 191, 2018). Here, reducing the number of local governments is often portrayed as a solution to reduce administrative costs for enhanced efficiency and competitiveness in the global economy (Askim et al., 2016; Swianiewicz, 2010, 2018). During the period 2008-2017, for instance, the number of municipalities across Western Europe decreased by more than 5,000 (Swianiewicz, 2018). In Denmark, amalgamation slashed the number of municipalities from 238 to 65 units in 2007. Similarly, in 2011 Greece reduced the number of municipalities from 1,033 to just 325 (Tavares & Feiock, 2014, p. 31). In the Netherlands, the number of local governments decreased from 489 to 406 in 2004. Territorial reforms have also been introduced in Macedonia (2002), Georgia (2006), Denmark (2007), Latvia (2009), Albania (2015), Ireland and Estonia (both 2017). In total, among the 44 member states of the Council of Europe, at least 18 have undergone more or less radical territorial amalgamation reforms since 2000 (Gendźwiłł et al., 2020). Outside Europe, other developed

countries such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Canada and United States have merged some of their local governments to form larger governmental jurisdictions (Blom-Hansen et al., 2016).

While amalgamation is often linked with efficiency, there is no theoretical or empirical consensus concerning whether larger size of government is more cost effective than smaller one, or to what extent a government's tasks yield significant economies of scale (Allers & Geertsema, 2014; Blom-Hansen et al., 2016; Dollery et al., 2014). Several empirical studies show that despite reduced administrative costs of government, amalgamation does not necessarily promote efficiency in public service provisions. A study by Hansen (2016), for example, suggests that the economies of scale impact from amalgamation did not occur because of the large variety of public goods and services provided by the government where the optimum size of each public good and service was different. In addition, costs in public services are more influenced by the size of service units such as schools, hospitals or libraries rather than the size of government territories (Blom-Hansen et al., 2016).

Other studies suggest that amalgamation reduce administrative spending but there is no significant impact to public services efficiency or its quality (Allers & Geertsema, 2014; Gendźwiłł et al., 2020). Further, scholars suggest that the link between amalgamation efficiency in public service provisions is not direct. Factors such as the size of the merged local government influence the outcomes, where smaller local governments usually enjoy more efficiency when merged with the larger government (Gendźwiłł et al., 2020). Other scholars suggest that the efficiency of government administration is not only determined by territorial size but also other factors that are

usually overlooked by amalgamation approaches, such as population density (Lin, 2012) or the socio-economic composition of local communities (Hansen, 2014).

Scholars also criticise amalgamation with regard to its impact on local democracy, dating back to research by Dahl & Tufte (1973), Keating (1995), Newton (1982) through to more recent studies from Kjaer (2010), Lassen & Serritzlew (2011), Denters (2014), Zeedan (2017) and Harjunen (2019). They come to the same conclusion that the larger the territory of the government, the weaker democracy tends to be. Keating (2008), for instance, asserts that territorial politics at the local level tends to be depoliticised as it focuses largely on the search for efficiency. In line with Keating, Zeedan (2017), claims that amalgamation tends to erode local democracy. In his study of amalgamation in Israel, he finds that amalgamation reduced voter turnout and representation (Zeedan, 2017). The finding is consistent with a previous study by Denters (2002) which suggest that political trust is higher in a small size local government than in the larger one. Quoting Denters, “Social trust is based on strong personal ties in small communities; decline of community and social trust resulting from increasing scale will be reflected in declining political trust” (2002, p. 796). Indeed, larger size increases the heterogeneity of the local government and makes it more difficult to tailor local services to meet the preferences of citizens (Harjunen et al., 2019). Further, a study of amalgamation in Denmark reveals that local politicians are increasingly losing their influence in amalgamated regions (Kjaer et al., 2010), simultaneously with a decline in citizen’s political efficacy (the feeling of having an impact on local policies) (Lassen & Serritzlew, 2011).

Taken together, the theoretical and empirical studies suggest that amalgamation allows administrative cost reduction, however, it should not be presumed that there

would be other expected impacts, such as efficiency and improved quality in public goods provisions. Research underlines that while the reduction of administrative costs can be expected as a direct outcome from an amalgamation, efficiency and improved quality of service provisions are influenced by many other factors such as population density and socio-economic heterogeneity. The literature also indicates that when it comes to local democracy, amalgamation tends to be the less favourable strategy as it reduces participation and representation.

3.2.2. Territorial Reform Through Local Government Proliferation

The second approach of territorial reform is opposite to the first. Instead of reducing the number of local governments, it suggests more local and smaller local government. Grossman et.al (2017) describe this approach as a political process through which administrative units are split into a larger number of smaller units. While creating more local government is often conflated with decentralisation, the two are analytically distinct phenomena. Decentralisation is the delegation of authority to local governments regardless of the spatial configuration of those units whereas territorial reform through local government creation concerns on redrawing administrative boundaries and does not necessary involve devolution of authority from central government to local government (Grossman et al., 2017).

Scholars have various terms to describe this phenomenon, from simply “district creation” (Hassan, 2013; Kuuml & Jane, 2014), “administrative fragmentation” (Grossman et al., 2017; Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2016; Tavares, 2018), “territorial splits” (Booth, 2011; Firman, 2013; Pierskalla, 2016), “territorial proliferation” (Bazzi &

Gudgeon, 2015; Grossman & Pierskalla, 2014; Kimura, 2010; Lewis, 2017), to "municipal divorce" (Swianiewicz, 2019). Some other scholars prefer using local terms in their publications such as "territorial Découpage" in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Gobbers, 2019), and *pemekaran* in Indonesia (McWilliam, 2011; Simandjuntak, 2015). To maintain consistency and clarity, this thesis uses "proliferation" to describe the general case of territorial reform through creating more local government. For the specific case of territorial proliferation in Indonesia, this thesis uses the term *pemekaran*, which literally means to bloom.

While amalgamation is popular in developed countries, territorial proliferation is predominantly found in the developing world. In Africa, during the period 1990-2010, at least 25 countries increased their number of local governments by over 20% (Grossman & Pierskalla, 2014). In Uganda, for instance, the number of local governments has increased from 55 in 2000 to 113 in 2010. Territorial proliferation also flourished in Eastern European countries after the collapse of the communist system. Czechoslovakia and Hungary increased their number of local governments by about 50% between 1989 and 1993 (Illner, 1997). In the same vein, the number of municipalities in the Czech Republic increased by 51% during the period 1989 to 1993 and reached 6,196 by January 1, 1993 (Illner, 1997). Brazil also enlarged its number of local governments by over 50% following its return to civilian rule (Dickovick, 2011). Asian countries such as Vietnam, Philippines, India and Indonesia also experienced a similar trend (Grossman & Lewis, 2014). In Indonesia, the local government proliferation known as *pemekaran* almost doubled the number of municipalities from 298 in 1999 to 514 in 2015.

Informed by public choice theory, this approach believes that a larger number of small authorities can maximise efficiency by promoting competition among service providers (Keating, 1995, p. 123). Among the earliest advocates of this theory was Tiebout (1956) who views local governments as comparable to firms and citizens as consumers. Like a company, the government as service provider will try to provide the best service at the lowest possible cost. On the other hand, citizens are free to choose the service provider that best suits their needs. The more service providers, the more options available for citizens. According to this perspective, an increased number of local governments in a certain territory will encourage competition among local governments as well as promote local innovation that eventually improves performance in public service provision (Martins, 1995; OECD, 2017). Moreover, scholars in this approach a argue that smaller government reduces spending through a more decentralised structure and at the same time competition among local governments stimulate innovations for more efficient services provisions (Brennan & Buchanan, 1977; Swianiewicz, 2002).

Following Keating's categorisation of four dimensions of territorial reform i.e. service delivery, democracy, development and redistribution (1995), scholars have linked local government proliferation with the issue of distributive justice. They suggest that the establishment of new local governments, particularly in remote and marginal areas, improves state capacity in distributing welfare (Green, 2010; Grossman et al., 2017; Pierskalla, 2016). Grossman et.al (2017) for instance, analyses that the creation of new local governments encourages the improvement of social service provision and local economic development by redistributing a substantial fiscal and administrative resources to the under-served area.

The most cited argument for supporting the proliferation of local government is related to democracy. As Dahl and Tufte observe in their classic work “Size and Democracy” (1973), small units are more conducive to grassroots democracy, a sense of belonging and increase political participation since people have more opportunity to influence the decision of their local government. Further, proximity matters according to this argument because social trust is based on strong personal ties in small communities, decline of community and social trust resulting from increasing scale will be reflected in declining political trust (D. Denters, 2002). Consistent with this reasoning, Oliver (2001) finds that people living in smaller cities are more likely to report voting in municipal elections, participate in political meetings and contact city officials. Increased political participation and public engagement thus pave the way to a more accountable government (Goel & Nelson, 2011). Similarly, Grossman & Lewis (2014) suggest that public policy will better reflect people’s demands and the delivery of services can be more effective as the government becomes closer to the people.

Most of the criticism of the proliferation approach is a mirror of the consequences of mergers, which have been studied more frequently. Thus, the issue of government inefficiency and incapacity is often seen by the critics as the direct impact of local government proliferation. OECD, for instance, suggests that territorial proliferation increases capacity gaps among local governments due to the limited available human resources (OECD, 2017, p. 113). In earlier research, Swianiewicz (2010, p. 188) analyses that the lack of functional capacity of local governments resulting from proliferation overshadows the “sociological beauty” of a small community, and negatively influences popular perceptions of local government performance. Similarly, Prud’homme (1995) contends that extreme proliferation may result in the short supply

of the human capital, financial and infrastructural resources needed to effectively maintain high-quality decision making.

Another common criticism of the proliferation approach is that it tends to increase administrative costs (Blesse & Baskaran, 2016; Blom-Hansen et al., 2016; Sjahrir et al., 2014; Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2019). The formation of a new unit of government means there are additional costs entailed for the more employees, police and politicians that are required. New local governments are usually formed in remote areas with limited infrastructure and supporting facilities, requiring extra budget allocations. Moreover, local governments' budgets are mainly used for administrative spending, leaving little for service-related purposes in some extreme cases (Swianiewicz, 2002). The unit cost for producing services is also much higher in small local government as consequence of the population size. Hence, the impact of local government proliferation to the administrative spending of government is much clearer than its benefits (Sjahrir et al., 2014). In terms of local democracy, some scholars argue that there is no clear evidence that the smaller size of government increases the likelihood of citizens contacting officials and politicians as well as attending meetings on local issues (Oliver, 2001). Instead of promoting democracy, the proliferation of local government tends to stimulate elite capture, particularly when it is used to promote patronage network (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Green, 2010).

The promise of territorial reform through local government proliferation creates hope especially for the community underserved in the previous system. Proliferation creates smaller jurisdictions and arguably encourages better distribution of state resources, more accessible services, as well as more accountable and democratic local government. However, research suggests that its outcomes appear to be a contingent

effect, dependent on many other factors such the institutional setting and socio-political characteristics.

3.2.1. Territorial Reform as Statebuilding

The literature briefly reviewed above shows that there are two seemingly unreconciled approaches on territorial reform, either merge or divide. Scholars conclude that there is a “trade-off” between efficiency and democracy, where the smaller unit tends to be more democratic but the less efficient and larger unit tends to be more efficient but less democratic (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Newton, 1982; Keating, 1995). After more than 40 years, this trade-off is still relevant as confirmed by empirical research (Zeedan, 2017; Tavares, 2018; Gendźwiłł et al, 2020). Apart from the trade-off, this thesis argues that both types of territorial reform share the same overarching goal: to improve state effectiveness. In other words, both amalgamation and proliferation are a process of statebuilding.

As discussed in chapter two, the definition of statebuilding proposed by scholars encompasses the idea of developing an effective state as opposed to a failed state or fragile state. Institutional statebuilding scholars such as Eriksen (2017) define statebuilding as "the intentional policy of creating effective state institutions". Rotberg (2004) defines statebuilding as the state’s function to provide political goods. Ghani & Lockhart (2008) suggest a framework for statebuilding including rule of law, sound management of public finances as well as provision of infrastructure services, among others. Meanwhile Fukuyama, claims that the main challenges of statebuilding is to

make democracy work because "in today's world the only serious source of legitimacy is democracy" (2004, p. 26).

Meanwhile, society-approach statebuilding scholars suggest statebuilding as an effort to promote relational aspects between state and society which include social justice, trust and social cohesion, among other values (e.g. Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012; Lemay-Hébert, 2009b; Pouligny, 2010). Hence, while institutional scholars focus on the "hardware" side of statebuilding, the society scholars emphasise the "software" side that underpin state institution and ensure that they function (Pouligny, 2010). These differing emphases are reflected in the overarching ideas of amalgamation and proliferation which comprise effectiveness of service delivery, local democracy, capacity to support local economic development and the challenges of redistribution (Keating, 1995).

Some classic literature on size and democracy link territorial reform with state legitimacy. Referring to Dahl & Tufte (1973), small-scale government supports input legitimacy and large-scale government improves output legitimacy. Input legitimacy is concerned with public participation and representation in the process of public policy making as well as mechanisms to assure public accountability, whereas output legitimacy refers to the state performance in providing and distributing political goods (Risse, 2006; Scharpf, 2011). Until recently, however, the discourse on territorial reform has been occupied by the output aspects, focusing on economic cost and benefit analysis rather than democracy (Baldersheim and Rose 2010, Swianiewicz 2010a, Drew and Dollery 2016). As Swianiewick and Lukomska observe, "even in countries where local democracy is a part of the territorial reform discourse, it is usually

an additional item on a ‘check list’ rather than a motivation for the reform" (2016, p.760).

Moreover, recent research on amalgamation in 11 European countries suggests that economic efficiency was considered a highly important argument in all of them, while issues related to local democracy were usually of no consideration (Steiner et.al., 2016). Similar phenomenon is also apparent in the analysis of territorial reform in non-European countries such as Indonesia (Sjahrir, et.al., 2014), China (Zhen et.al, 2010), Nigeria (Nwankwo, 1984), and Uganda (Kuuml, 2014). The dominance of economic perspectives in the territorial reform literature is reminiscent of the literature of statebuilding which has been dominated by the institutional perspective for almost 30 years since Helman and Ratner's article "Saving Failed States" published in 1992.

As in statebuilding literature, territorial reform scholars also increasingly emphasise the importance of the "software" dimension as well as the prominent issue of socio-political characteristics in defining the trajectory of reform. As Swianiewicz suggests in the revisited version of his widely cited 2010 article, the future research on territorial reform should encompass when, where and under what circumstances territorial reform, whether amalgamation or proliferation, can be a solution (Swianiewicz, 2018, p. 7). All together, the growing body of literature on territorial reform not only puts socio-political context as a background or check list but as the centre of analysis, showing that territorial reform is not just an administrative matter. Instead, it is part of a more fundamental process of statebuilding.

3.3. The International Practices of Local Government Proliferations

Literature on territorial reforms largely link the issue of size of local government with efficiency, state capacity and democracy (Gendźwiłł & Swianiewicz, 2016; Keating, 1995; Tavares, 2018). Another strand of research links territorial reform with other issues such as identity, representation, justice, electoral politics and conflict mitigation. While most of the literature in the former group draw on experiences of developed countries, most published works in the latter group are derived from the practices of territorial reform in developing countries, from South and Southeast Asia, North and Sub Sahara Africa, South America, as well as Central and Eastern Europe (Grossman & Lewis, 2014; Resnick, 2017; Swianiewicz, 2019). This section briefly reviews the empirical literature by analysing the background, intentions and outcomes of territorial reforms in those regions which mostly underwent the territorial proliferation approach. Through all these cases, this section supports that local government proliferation has been integral part of statebuilding in many different contexts.

3.3.1. Democratisation, Decentralisation and District Proliferation

While it is less common in developed countries, territorial reform through the creation of new local governments is pronounced in many developing countries. In particular, local government proliferation has been adopted in countries experiencing a transition from the authoritarian system to democracy as well as those that suffered from conflict and instability (Boone, 2003; Hassan, 2016; Resnick, 2017). The formation of new local governments in such settings emerged as a strategy to re-establish the state institutions and reclaim state legitimacy through improving state capacity as well as

improving state-society relations. Hence, territorial reform in these contexts is viewed not as technical or administrative problem of state capacity but as a highly political process which involves different interests (Boone, 2003; Resnick, 2017). Following Knight (1992), institutional reform is seen as the outcome of political negotiation between rulers and societal groups.

Research shows that in many cases territorial proliferation is feasible after state and society renegotiate the fundamental elements of their relationships, such as the political system. The wave of territorial proliferation in Central and Eastern European countries, for instance, is inseparable from the decision to alter the socialist regimes in the late 1980s and early '90s (Ebinger et al., 2019a; Swianiewicz et al., 2017; Tavares, 2018). As Swianiewicz et.al (2017) maintains, the wave of local government proliferation in this area was a response to the forced merger carried out during the socialist regime. The formation of new local governments was even seen by the people as part of the right of community groups to self-rule, an expression of local autonomy (Swianiewicz et al., 2017, p. 7). As a result, during the early to mid-90s there was a ballooning in the number of local governments in several post-socialist countries such as Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Swianiewicz, 2019).

In Latin America, the process of power renegotiation culminated in the wave of democratization in the mid-80s and also encouraged people in countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia to undertake a redistricting process. In Brazil, the number of *municipios* (municipality) have increased from 3,000 to nearly 5,000 in the 15 years following the nation's return to democracy (Burki et al., 1999). In Venezuela, they report the number of *municipios* increasing from 202 to 330 within a

decade (Burki et al., 1999). The increase was also driven by the incentives created by the intergovernmental transfer system because per capita transfers are inversely related to the population of a municipality (Dahlbyy, 2011, p. 23).

Decentralisation, which is often endorsed by international donors and financial institutions, has also become a driving force for territorial reform in various developing countries. Following the region-wide financial crisis and democratisation in Southeast Asia in the mid to late1990s, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand had embarked on decentralisation (Hadiz, 2007). Several nations in Africa such as Uganda, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria, experienced similar path (Dickovick, 2011). In these transitional countries, Western donors and financial institutions proposed structural adjustment programs with a major tenet being the decentralisation of central government power to better align with local preferences (Bardhan, 2002). Furthermore, as stated by Hassan (2013), leaders in developing countries have created new local government units to comply with donor demands for decentralisation and service improvement. Leaders who advocate unit proliferation often claim that this tactic will “bring the services closer to the people” (Ayee, 2013).

Another form of political change that encourages territorial proliferation is the transformation of the party system from a single party system to a multiparty system (Hassan, 2016; Resnick, 2017). The introduction of the multiparty system allows more elites and community groups to involved in a contestation of power, hence creating a more competitive election. This change motivates elites, especially the ruling party, to change the territorial basis in order to maintain its political support or as a divisive strategy to weaken opposition. This phenomenon is widespread, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where almost half of the countries – including Uganda, Kenya, Ghana,

Cameroon, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, among others – have increased their number of local governments by at least 20% during the period 1990-2010 (Ayee, 2013; Green, 2010; Hassan, 2016; Resnick, 2017).

In sum, democratisation seems to be the important factor behind the wave of local government proliferation in developing countries. More often than not, democratisation was followed by decentralization and the implementation of a multi-party system in the cited countries. This development creates incentives for the ruling elite and community groups to support the formation of local government units which become a new arena where state and society interests are negotiated. Thus, territorial reform through local government proliferation is part of the effort to improve state-society relations.

3.3.2. The Intentions of Reforms: Economic and Political

Scholars have identified a wide range of objectives of local government proliferation. These objectives can be broadly categorised as economically informed and politically-informed objectives (Hassan, 2016; Resnick, 2017). The economically informed objectives concern improving the distribution of state resources, improving service delivery and promoting local economic development, among other aspects. Political objectives involve aspects of electoral support, patronage, identity accommodation and conflict mitigation. Obviously, each of these intentions may overlap since territorial reform involves stakeholders with different interests. Arguably, there are also motivations that belie those intentions which are formally stated or expressed publicly.

The most common objectives of territorial proliferation are generally associated with redistribution of public funds, the improvement of public services, local economic

development and jobs creation (Green, 2010; Grossman & Lewis, 2014; Resnick, 2017).

By increasing the number of government units, the distribution of state resources will arguably reach wider beneficiaries. At the same time, as the government becomes closer to the people, the availability of public services also increases and become more accessible to the people. For Swianiewicz (2019), these goals are relevant because in many cases the demand for territorial proliferation stems from the existing perception of marginalisation or gaps of development with other regions. In the same vein, Grossman and Lewis (2014) posit that the demand for new government is likely to succeed where there is widespread perception of marginalisation in the local community. Hence, the creation of new local governments serves as remedial policy to improve the redistribution of state resources and generate the improvement of public welfare in the previously neglected communities (Green, 2010; Grossman & Lewis, 2014; Resnick, 2017).

This economic perspective has profoundly influenced the discourse on proliferation in developing countries, not only among academics but also among political elites as well as public in general. In 2015, President Kiir Mayardit of South Sudan claimed that his decision to establish 28 new states was intended to bring resources closer to the rural population (Butty, 2015). Likewise, the late Zambian president Michael Sata announced that the creation of additional districts in the southern-central African nation was “determined to decentralize government operations for the effective and efficient delivery of services to the masses” (Resnick, 2017, p. 48). In Uganda, a petition requesting a district was signed in 2011 by over 17,000 residents of Bughendera county; it noted the county was “was geographically hard to reach, hard to stay in with

extremely poor service delivery which had denied the people a chance to access services" (Grossman & Lewis, 2014, p. 204).

Apart from economic motivation, territorial proliferation in developing countries is also carried out to meet political objectives such as conflict mitigation, accommodation of minority groups' interests, also as part of patronage and electoral politics. In fact, researchers contend ethnic conflicts and minority issues have triggered the proliferation of new local governments since 1990 in African countries such as Niger, Uganda, Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ethiopia (Aggrey et al., 2013; Grossman & Pierskalla, 2014). Meanwhile, other researchers find that incumbents in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe have used territorial proliferation as a tactic to win re-election (Green, 2010; Hassan, 2016; Resnick, 2017).

Proponents of territorial proliferation believe that the creation of local government can help to mitigate conflicts as it facilitates the emergence of a more homogenous ethnic population, strengthening links between citizens and local leaders (Bazzi, 2016; Brancati, 2006). Moreover, in a more homogenous composition of society, public policies can be more easily adjusted to people's preferences and minimise conflict, especially identity-based issues such as ethno-linguistic conflict (Treisman, 2007). As an example, the Aringa ethnic group was a minority group within Arua district in northwest Uganda. In 2000 the Ugandan government created Yumbe district and allowed the Aringa community to speak their own language at council meetings (Green, 2010). A similar approach is found in India and Nigeria (Mawdsley, 2002; Suberu, 2001). More recent research, however, suggests that the proliferation of states in Nigeria has provoked rivalries and conflict among ethnic groups within some states concerning access to state power and resources (Eze et al., 2015, p. 116).

Electoral politics is another political motivation often at play. It is generally employed by the incumbent or the ruling party because they have the opportunity to mobilize resources to influence public preferences. Meanwhile, for the opposition, it is at most only a campaign promise to gather public support. In Nigeria, Senegal and the DRC, for example, the ruling regime adopted proliferation to weaken the opposition by dividing their territorial base (Kraxberger, 2004; Resnick, 2017). In Uganda and Kenya, the ruling elites used territorial proliferation to maintain public support by injecting the new local government with central government resources with electoral support in return (Green, 2010; Grossman & Lewis, 2014; Hassan, 2013). In Ghana, a study found the incumbent party used redistricting as a tactic of malapportionment and predominantly targeted non-competitive districts where gaining an additional legislative seat in subsequent elections was more likely (Resnick, 2017). Similarly, incumbents in Cameroon and Zimbabwe also used this tactic to secure political support (Resnick, 2017, p. 47). In Vietnam, according to Malesky (2009) the creation of provinces was intended to weaken the powers of regional oppositional forces by enabling reformers to secure a majority of votes in the ruling Communist Party's Central Committee.

3.3.3. The Intended and Unintended Outcomes

Existing literature largely views territorial reform through local government proliferation as a remedial measure to address state misconduct in the past and as an exchange between central governments with locals, where the former bequeaths central resources and, in return, the latter provides support or stability. The actual implementation and its outcomes, however, are not always as intended.

Empirical researches show that the outcomes of territorial proliferation, both in economic and political dimensions, tend to vary in different countries. In many cases, resources redistribution has improved as theoretically expected, especially in terms of public fund transfers to the local governments (Grossman et al., 2017; Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2019). However, the redistribution of resources in many cases only have limited impact on improving public services as more resources are absorbed for administrative costs and government spending instead of public service provision (Grossman & Pierskalla, 2014; Sjahrir et al., 2014; Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2019). Nonetheless, for areas that are extremely disadvantaged and isolated, territorial reform increases the availability of public facilities because the formation of new government units is accompanied by the construction of government facilities (Gottlieb et al., 2018; OECD, 2017).

Other unintended outcomes are related to a heightened perception of corruption. Based on a cross-sectional comparison study of 166 countries, Treisman (2002) finds that the perception of corruption increased in line with the increasing number of government units. A study by Nelson (2013) in 94 countries also suggests that greater proliferation is associated with greater perceived corruption. Other study suggests that the increase number of local governments has opened up opportunities for bureaucratic and political rent-seeking (Fitrani et al., 2005). As a result, it is not surprising that scholars argue getting the government closer to the people does not necessarily mean improved public services (Blom-Hansen et al., 2017; Lewis, 2017; Swianiewicz & Łukomska, 2019).

In terms of political outcomes, research suggests that local government proliferation results in higher political participation, especially in terms of voters turn (Swianiewicz,

2019, p. 32). This is in line with Denters (2002) argument that in smaller jurisdiction people tends to vote because it will “weigh more” compared to those in larger jurisdiction. However, other studies indicate that territorial proliferation is not positively correlated with citizens' likelihood of contacting officials and politicians or attendance at meetings on local issues or participation in local organizations (Ebinger et al., 2019b; Martins, 1995; Rose, 2002).

Researchers also find that the proliferation of local government tends to trigger elite-captured. The flow of funds to the new government becomes the source of patronage to sustain elites in power, as shown in the case of African countries such as Kenya (Hassan, 2016), Ghana (Resnick, 2017), Uganda (Green, 2010) and South Sudan (Butty, 2015). In the analysis of Hasan (2016, p. 512), unit creation is a powerful strategy for the ruling elite for three reasons: first, unit creation allows the leader to distribute government resources to many voters altogether ; second, unit creation as part of decentralization gives the impression that the leader is complying with demands from international donors; third, the incumbent has the monopoly on these goods.

3.4. District Proliferation in Papua Indonesia as a Case Study

The resurgence in territorial reform in Indonesia, known as *pemekaran*, began in 1999 after being dormant for more than 30 years when Indonesia was under a centralistic regime (1966-1998). Democratisation that was followed by decentralisation and the implementation of a multi-party electoral system created political and economic incentives for national and local elites to pursue *pemekaran* (Kimura, 2010). Within a 15-year span from 1999-2014, the number of district governments increased

dramatically from 298 to 508, while the number of provinces rose from 29 to 34. While an increased number of local governments is desirable to combat the considerable gap in size and level of development among regions, the political motivations of mitigating centrifugal pressures appear to be at the forefront of the motivations. Moreover, the historical as well as contemporary relationships between central and regional government in Indonesia have always been characterised by political bargaining. Territorial reform in Papua is one of the most prominent not only in terms of number of new local governments created, but also because of its historical and political context within Indonesian state-society relations. This section briefly describes the trajectory of the reform to provide context for empirical analysis in proceeding chapters.

3.4.1. National Context of District Proliferation: Splitting to Survive?

As discussed previously, different background circumstances and purpose underlay territorial reform in many countries. Democratization, the collapse of socialist regimes and the adoption of a multi-party electoral system were driving factors for territorial reform in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The wave of territorial reform in Indonesia also took place in such a transitional setting. Arguably, it occurred when the level of public trust in the state was at its lowest after a series of economic and political crises during the second half of the 1990s. This situation was exacerbated by the “loss” East Timor after the 1999 UN-supported referendum led to it becoming an independent state. Some experts were concerned that economic disruption and political crisis would trigger a Yugoslavia-like “balkanization” in Southeast Asia’s largest nation (Crouch, 2000; Emmerson, 2000; Heiduk, 2014).

While most foreign scholars believed the 1998 economic crisis was unlikely to lead to the disintegration of Indonesia (Aspinall & Berger, 2001; Emmerson, 2000), such a concern was valid due to strong public discontent with the government, especially outside Java. Inequality in development and economic distribution between the centre (Java) and the periphery (outside Java) as well as repressive state practices were among the main factors for disappointment with Jakarta (Crouch, 2000). Secessionist demands were particularly strong in natural resource-rich areas such as Aceh and Papua, amid the feeling they were nothing than cash cows for Java's development.

Apart from East Timor, Aceh and Papua, Indonesian territorial integration has also experienced several other challenges in the past. By the late 1950s regional military leaders in Central Sumatra, North Sumatra, South Sumatra, South Kalimantan, West Java and North Sulawesi took a stand against Jakarta and supported local civilian leaders (Maulida, 2018, p. 176). The movement was known as the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in Sumatra and the Universal Struggle Charter-Permesta (*Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam*) in North Sulawesi. Despite differences in the movements, both were united in a strong regional dissatisfaction toward the centralistic government and the perceived unequal treatment toward the regions (Aspinall & Berger, 2001; Maulida, 2018).

Similarly, during 1950s to early 1960s people in Aceh, West Java, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi also expressed disappointment with the national leadership by launching a movement to establish an Islamic state through the organisation called DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia, or Indonesian Islamic Army) (Dijk van, 1981). The government's heavy-handed security approach to quell these movements and the practice of centralism which worsened in the next period of government only

served to heighten resentment toward Jakarta (Simons, 2000). These historical references confirm that serious central-periphery tensions existed from the early years of the Republic of Indonesia, and have continued to shape the journey of the nation.

Shadowed by the threat of disintegration, the government launched a decentralisation policy in 1999 through Law 22/1999 on Local Government and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance. The first law regulates the large scale transfer of power from central government to the provincial and district government. Observers dubbed the decentralization measures as "near federal" (Mietzner, 2017, p. 46) and an example of "big bang" decentralization (Hofman & Kaiser, 2004) in transforming one of the most centralised systems in the world into among the most decentralised. Apart from regulating the transfer of authority, the regional government law also provides opportunities for the formation of new regional governments at the provincial and district levels, stipulated in details in the Government Regulation 129/2000 on procedure and criteria of territorial reorganisation.

The second law regulates the regional financial scheme, including the general allocation fund and the profit-sharing scheme for natural resource extraction. As a result, the share of regional spending in total government expenditure increased from 17% in 2000 to 40% in 2009 (The World Bank, 2009).

Several observers assess that Indonesia's decentralization policy, including the provision for local government proliferation, was driven more by political considerations than a drive for government effectiveness (Aspinall, 2013; Mietzner, 2017; Timmer, 2005). The authority delegated to the regions was too broad, with the likelihood that local governments may not be able to exercise it due to the lack of human resources as well as infrastructure. Meanwhile, the criteria for creating new

regions were also seen as too loosely defined and would be prone to creating greater inefficiencies (Firman, 2013). Scholars argue that for a nation as diverse as Indonesia, decentralisation bears many risks such as increased disparities among regions and the possibility of widespread corruption (Hadiz & Robison, 2005; Prud'homme, 1995). The government, only just emerging from a devastating economic crisis, also needed to shoulder the drastic increase in administrative spending as indicated by the World Bank (The World Bank, 2009).

While it entailed many risks and triggered pessimism, there are scholars who acknowledge that decentralisation saved Indonesia from disintegration (Aspinall, 2013; Crouch, 2000; Mietzner, 2017). Aspinall, for instance, says that decentralization creates an 'immediate taming effect' on separatist sentiment in some regions by providing opportunities for local elites to rule (2013, p. 132). Mietzner (2017, p. 46) elaborates on four things that are important for decentralization policies and the formation of regional governments to improve central-regional relations, namely: strong public satisfaction with decentralization; the non-violent flourishing of local identities; the increased level of state penetration; and the effective design of local elections as a channel for cross-constituency cooperation and the rise of alternative leaders.

Interestingly, the Indonesian government embarked on similar steps nearly five decades earlier. Kurniawan (2016) noted that in response to the PRRI/Permesta rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the national government established new provinces as a strategy to isolate rebellion movements and to strengthen the national government control of local politics. These were also the reasons that the then Kalimantan province consisting of the entire Indonesian Borneo was divided into three

new provinces – : West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and East Kalimantan – in 1956 (Kurniawan, 2016).

3.4.2. The Political Context of District Proliferation in Papua

The national political crisis in the late ‘90s fuelled the centrifugal pressure in several regions in Indonesia (Ostwald et al., 2016). Among others, Papua was the region with the longest call for independence with OPM started launch its independence campaign in 1960s. During 1999-2000 the idea of Papuan independence aired across the island marked by series of mass rally and public meetings during 1999-2000, the period that dubbed 'Papuan Spring' (Jaap Timmer, 2007, p. 463). A defining moment occurred in February 1999 when 100 representatives of the Papuan community met President BJ Habibie and expressed the wish of the Papuan people to separate from Indonesia and form an independent state (Rutherford, 2008; Sumule, 2003).

This rejection of Indonesian authority in Papua began even *before* Papua officially integrated into Indonesia in the 1969 referendum. Spearheading the movement was the Free Papua Movement (OPM) which was established in Manokwari in 1965 (Drooglever, 2009). The controversy over the decolonization process from the Netherlands is one of the main roots of contention between Indonesia and the OPM. The Indonesian government’s claim for the then Dutch possession of Irian Barat was based on *uti possidetis juris*, a principle of international law that stipulates that territorial boundaries of post-colonial states should match those of the colonial territories they replaced (Saltford, 2003). Based on that argument, President Soekarno

launched the Trikora operation for the territory on December 19, 1961 (Subandrio, 2000).

OPM believes the principle of decolonialization is based on self-determination and Papua proclaimed itself as an independent state on December 1, 1961, before Trikora was launched. Through the intervention of the United States and the United Nations, the 1969 referendum known as "The Act of Free Choice" was held to determine whether Papua would become a separate state or remain with Indonesia (Drooglever, 2009). The result of the referendum established Papua as part of Indonesia and was passed through UN resolution number 2504. OPM outright rejected the referendum on the grounds that the referendum process was manipulated and there was intimidation by the Indonesian army. The full-on military approach adopted by the Indonesian government during 1970-1998 exacerbated Papuan' grievances and reinforced Papuan nationalism (Chauvel, 2005). This rejection of Indonesian authority was restated by elements of Papuan society at the Second Papuan Congress held in Jayapura (Port Numbay) in 2000 (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004). This historical dispute continues to be the root of the problem in strained relations between the Papuan people and the Indonesian state.

After 1998, despite the continuation of the militaristic approach to stifling the alleged separatists, the Indonesian government implemented a new approach to Papua that emphasized development and welfare through the framework of decentralization and special autonomy (Mcgibbon, 2004; Viartasiwi, 2014). Among the main features of this framework is provision of “Dana Otsus” or a sizable amount of special autonomy funds, and the creation of district governments across Papua as well as West Papua province. While the discussion on special autonomy attracted considerable attention

from national as well as international scholars (Bertrand, 2014; Eilenberg, 2009; Elmslie et al., 2010; Mcgibbon, 2004; Viartasiwi, 2014; Widjojo & Budiatri, 2016), only a handful of research has been published on the topic of territorial reform (Kimura, 2013; McWilliam, 2011; Riani & Pudjihardjo, 2012; Suryawan, 2011).

3.4.3. The Wave of Territorial Proliferation in Papua

The proliferation of district formation in Papua after 1998 occurred in three presidential administrations: President BJ Habibie (1998-1999), President Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004) and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014). There was no *pemekaran* during the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and current leader Joko Widodo (2014-present). The characteristics of the *pemekaran* in each leadership period are quite different, both in terms of setting, approach and priority. This section briefly describes these three waves of *pemekaran* in Papua.

The first wave occurred when the Papuan people were experiencing a process of political consolidation. The political crisis at the national level compounded with the euphoria of democracy after the authoritarian New Order regime, the delegitimization of the army and East Timor's independence bolstered the spirit of Papuans to express demands for secession. Sumule (2003, p.354) observes, at that time "M (for *merdeka* or independence) was the topic of discussion in almost every household. Expectations for independence ran high". In February 1999, the group of 100 Papuan representatives comprised of customary leaders, church elders, women's right

advocates and intellectuals met the president and expressed their wish for a peaceful separation from Indonesia (Rutherford, 2002).

The Indonesian government responded to the demand by passing Law 45/1999 that oversaw the separation of Papua into three provinces by establishing two new provinces and four districts. The designated provinces were Central Irian Jaya and West Irian Jaya provinces, with proposed new districts of Paniai, Mimika, Puncak Jaya and Sorong. This top-down policy was immediately rejected by Papuans even though the president issued a decree appointing Papuan figures as governors in the two new provinces. Officially, the Irian Jaya (Papua) Province Representative Council (DPRD) expressed rejection of Law 45/1999on behalf of the Papuan people of the Papuan to the. Confronted by the widespread rejection by the Papuan people, the government postponed the formation of provinces and districts. This first attempt at *pemekaran* in Papua failed.

The second wave took place during the presidency of Megawati, who succeeded Abdurrahman Wahid in July 2001. Unlike during the rule of Habibie, the regulatory framework for *pemekaran* was established through Government Regulation 129/2000 on territorial reorganisation criteria and procedure. It covers economic capacity, regional potential as well as the number of population and the size of territory. It also outlines the proposing procedure that was conducted largely through a bottom-up process. On December 11, 2002, Megawati signed Law No. 26/2002 which stipulates the formation of 14 new districts simultaneously: Sarmi, Keerom, South Sorong, Raja Ampat, Bintang Mountains, Yahukimo, Tolikara, Waropen, Kaimana, Boven Digoel, Mappi, Asmat, Teluk Bintuni and Teluk Wondama.

After successfully forming 14 districts, the Megawati government attempted to revive the idea of forming new provinces by issuing a presidential instruction on the acceleration of the implementation of Law 45/1999. However, in contrast to the formation of districts, the idea of forming new provinces was controversial. The formation of West Irian Jaya province received broad support from the elite and the community, on the other hand, the formation of the province of Central Irian Jaya drew concerted resistance from Papuan leaders and people. The declaration of the establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province was marked by violent clashes between opponents and supporters that left four people dead. The government postponed the province's formation while proceeding with establishment of West Irian Jaya.

Some observers argue that Papuans rejected the formation of Central Irian Jaya because it contravened the Papuan special autonomy law which stipulates that any proposal for establishment of a province in Papua must be based on the recommendation of the Papuan People's Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua). However, other observers claim the rejection was driven by the lack of consensus among the Papuan elites regarding the location of the capital city at either Biak or Timika. Conversely, the elites were in more agreement in the case of West Irian Jaya Province.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was the leader during the third wave of *pemekaran* in Papua. . Yudhoyono's administration served for two periods – 2004-2009 and 2009-2014. Twelve new districts were formed in the first period and two districts in the second period. In total during his tenure, Yudhoyono formed 14 districts, nine in Papua Province and five in West Irian Jaya Province which later changed its name to West Papua Province. The nine districts established in Papua Province are Nduga, Lanny Jaya, Intan Jaya, Dogiyai, Puncak, Mamberamo Tengah, Mamberamo Raya, Deiyai

and Yalimo districts. The five districts in West Papua province are Kaimana, Tambrau, Maybrat, South Manokwari, and Arfak districts. As with the Megawati era, *pemekaran* took place in a bottom-up process. During this period, the government amended the regulation on territorial reorganisation from PP 129/2000 to PP 78/2007. Procedurally, both use the bottom-up approach, whereby the proposal for *pemekaran* is submitted in stages, starting from the district community level to the central government, which then discusses it with the House of Representatives.

Unlike the previous regulations, requirements were more stringent, for example in relation to the age of establishment of the parent district which is set at least 10 years for provinces and seven years for city districts (there was no such stipulation in the previous regulation).. This provision is informed by the government evaluation of regional expansion which shows the weak performance of most of the new autonomous regions (Bappenas, 2007). Therefore, the government tightened the requirements for proposing new districts. In addition, in PP 78/2007 proposals must be outlined in the form of a Village Consultative Body (BPD) Decree or a Village Communication Forum (Forkom). This is intended to avoid members of the elites claiming to make proposals for *pemekaran* on behalf of the community and ensure these are purely garnered from the aspirations of the community.

3.5. Conclusions

This chapter aims to establish the link the between territorial reform with statebuilding as a process of improving state and society relations. By acquiring a deeper understanding of the concept of territorial reform, this thesis proposes an argument

that its overarching objective, either through amalgamation or proliferation, is enhancing state effectiveness. As such, territorial reform could be seen as part of the process of statebuilding. With this notion in mind, the chapter looks at the implementation of local government proliferation, especially by examining its background, underlying intentions as well as its intended and unintended outcomes, in various contexts.

Territorial reform through local government proliferation is pronounced in countries experiencing a transition from an authoritarian system to democracy, as well as those societies that have endured social conflict and instability. In these contexts, territorial reform serves as a remedial policy aimed at assuaging feelings of injustice due to past state misconduct as well as to increase statehood and cultivate public trust toward the state. Hence, in such settings, territorial reform is viewed not as technical or administrative problem of state capacity but as a highly political process of reclaiming state legitimacy through improving state-society relations.

More specifically, drawing from the practice of territorial reform in different contexts, this chapter defines the intentions of local government proliferation into economic-informed and political-informed intentions. Among others, the economic-informed intentions involve the issues of resources redistribution, service delivery and local economic development. Meanwhile, the political-informed intentions involve aspects such as electoral support, patronage, identity and conflict mitigation. Obviously, these intentions may overlap since territorial reform involves stakeholders with different interests.

While authorities or societies may have a long list of expectations of the reforms, studies suggest that the outcomes of the reforms may not necessarily meet the

assumptions. More often than not, territorial reform through local government proliferation creates a mixed result of intended and unintended outcomes. The improved distributive capacity on one hand is not essentially followed by the improvement of service. Likewise, the increase of voter turnout is not always reflected in more accountability. Furthermore, in some cases local government proliferation creates unexpected outcomes such as promoting rent-seeking behaviour, corruption and patrimonialism. Although strengthening democracy and building more effective governance usually appear as the intentions of reform, its outcomes may instead threaten democracy and undermine governance efficacy. Hence, this thesis argues that, as with other measures of statebuilding, the outcomes of territorial reform in either strengthening or undermining legitimacy should not be taken for granted.

This chapter also provides a brief illustration of how the Indonesian government embarked on territorial reform through the proliferation of local government, with Papua as a particular example. As in many other cases discussed in this chapter, political transition is an important factor that provide incentives for the reform. While the increased number of local governments is desirable in terms of economic considerations, the political motivations of mitigating centrifugal pressures also seems to be among major reasons. How the nation navigates between these two objectives is examined further throughout this thesis.

Chapter 4. Research Methodology and Methods

4.1. Introduction

As explained in chapter 2, statebuilding in this research is understood as not only limited to the process of improving the performance of the state institution to deliver its function but as an overarching process to strengthen the belief of the people in the rightfulness of the state to rule. In other words, statebuilding is actually a process of winning the hearts and minds of the people, including but not limited to the functioning of state institutions in delivering goods and services to the people. Through the case of *pemekaran* in Papua, this research aims to understand how the state's efforts have been perceived by the people. This chapter discusses the methodological approach of this research as well as the specific methods employed in order to understand how statebuilding through *pemekaran* impacts on state legitimacy.

Informed by post Weberian theorists (e.g. Migdal & Schlichte, 2005; Seabrooke, 2002), this thesis support the argument that the state is a field of power in which actors interact and influence each other. Hence, understanding statebuilding is to understand what the state does and how it does, and more importantly, how society perceives those actions. In other words, this research involves a subjective interpretation of the state actors and societal actors to the process of statebuilding through territorial reform. In methodological terms, this perspective of knowledge-inquiry is known as interpretivism or *verstehen* in Weber vernacular, which means understanding (Bryman, 2016, p. 26).

This chapter describes the methodology of the research which, following the interpretivist methodology, employs a qualitative approach in examining how the subjective understanding about the rightfulness of the state is constructed and deconstructed. In subsequent sections, there is discussion of the design of the research that follows a single as opposed to multiple case study design. The rationale of the case selection, i.e. territorial reform through *pemekaran* in Papua Province, is also explained. The chapter also discusses in detail the research methods, including participant selection, data collection and data analysis. The selection of research participants was conducted through a combination of purposive and theoretical sampling methods. In gathering data, this research follows an ethnographic style of data collection, particularly through in-depth interviews and group discussions, although documentary analysis was also involved.

The data gathered through these investigations was examined through a thematic analysis process in which the evidence was interpreted and synthesized by the researcher. Toward the end of this chapter, researcher positionality and research limitations are highlighted to consider technical as well non-technical issues that may influence the outcome of this research. The chapter concludes by underlining the researcher's reflection on the fieldwork process in order to provide insight on the potential challenges and strategies in conducting interpretive research on statebuilding, particularly in a conflict-affected setting.

4.2. Methodological Perspective and Research Design

This section explains the epistemological perspective employed in this research in order to understand the idea of statebuilding. In this regard, the research follows a constructivist point of view and focuses on comprehending people's subjective understanding of the state and statebuilding. Subsequently, the section discusses the design of this research by employing the case study research design by selecting the case of territorial reform in the Province of Papua. Drawing on the case of territorial reform through district creation in Papua Province, the thesis analyses how territorial reform impacts on state legitimacy both in terms of performance and social legitimacy.

4.2.1. Understanding Statebuilding Through Constructivism Point of View

In order to understand how people perceive the state, this thesis employs a constructivist approach to knowledge inquiry. Constructivism follows an interpretative perspective which focuses on the role of ideas, norms, and knowledge, and particularly emphasises on the role of shared understandings of social life and social facts (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). For constructivists, knowledge of reality is a social construction attached within the interaction among human actors instead of a separate object (Stake, 1995). Thus, constructivists understand the world through the subjective point of view by capturing the voices, emotions and action of those who are studied (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). The subjective interpretation as a way of understanding a phenomenon is relevant in this study, especially because the concept of state legitimacy is closely tied to the subjective evaluation of citizens towards the state. As discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis sees that state legitimacy lies in people's belief in

the state or how the state is perceived by its people. Hence, this thesis maintains that state building should not be viewed as a state-centric process detached from social moorings; instead, it should be viewed as an embedded process involving interaction between state and societal actors and institutions.

The constructivist holds that individuals seek to understand the world they live in by developing subjective meanings of their experiences (Creswell, 2003, p. 9). These meanings are varied and multiple, leaving the researcher with the complex task to interpret and draw a justifiable understanding of how things work (Stake, 2010). As such, this approach relies heavily on the subjective understanding of the research participants as well as the researcher's experience of the situation being studied. In order to understand people's viewpoints on the process of statebuilding, in this research the researcher and the participants interact in a natural environment where the participants share their understanding, expectations as well as evaluation of the role of the state. The "natural environment" means the interaction takes place where the participants live or work. The choice of this setting is expected to allow participants to more freely articulate their opinions without the potential for distortion in an unfamiliar situation (Bryman, 2004, p. 58). By conducting the research in the natural setting, the researcher is also able to observe "the real world" to provide the empirical sense of the research phenomenon. The researcher is immersed in the research setting and interacting directly with the participants at the research location.

Embracing the constructivist approach, this study supports the notion that society is shaped primarily by shared beliefs that define the interests of actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). In the constructivist account, actors' motivation is informed first and foremost by ideational elements such as their beliefs, norms, values and identities

(Wendt, 1999). Furthermore, according to Wendt, an institution consists of shared identities and interest that are often codified in formal rules and norms. Thus, actors and institution are mutually constitutive, and institutionalisation can be seen as the process of internalising new identities and interests (1992, p. 399). In the literature of statebuilding, the constructivists' perspective has been characterised by an attempt to bring socio-political issues into the process of statebuilding (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012; Lemay-Hébert, 2011).

The constructivist approach enables this research to look at statebuilding as a dual process where state and society constitute each other rather than merely a state-centred process aimed at improving the state's tangible performance. It also allows the taking into account of not only the institutional aspects of the state but also the moral purpose of the state that is reflected in the shared beliefs, identity, norms and values, upon which the rightfulness of the state is justified (Reus-Smit, 1999, p. 6). In line with the constructivist perspective, this research seeks to explore how the rightfulness of the state, or state legitimacy, is constructed through the relations between the state and society in Papua. In particular, it seeks to analyse the construction of state legitimacy through territorial reform. This thesis identifies the formation of new districts in Papua through the process called *pemekaran* as the state's effort to generate the sources of legitimacy by improving its institutional performance as well as its relational performance. How the community interprets these processes is the subject of this research.

Employing the constructivist approach, however, is a challenging task as it requires the researcher to become immersed in the research context and interpret meaning from the participants' point of view. As interpretation can be faulty, establishing

engagement between researcher and the research participants is crucial to minimise the prospect of flaws in observation and assertions (Stake, 2010, p. 37). Some qualitative theorists, however, argue that the involvement of the researcher in the research processes does not mean that the research lacks rigour since the result of the interpretive research is not facts *per se*, but is constructed through the interaction between the participants, the data and the researcher (Guba & Licoln, 1994). In the same vein, Dahl (1997) emphasises that all facts are interpreted facts that gain their meaning form the subjective view of the observer. As such, the interaction between the researcher and the participants is not only unavoidable but is an integral part of the knowledge formation in the interpretive tradition.

Finally, the challenges of the interpretive research also lie in how the results are evaluated. As it deals with subjective knowledge, the value of interpretive research is not in its generalisability but in the extent to which the result fits and works with the perspective of the participants (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The result of interpretive or qualitative research is often accused of being biased and displaying a lack of rigour because of the perceived attachment of the researcher. However, when it is conducted properly, the qualitative or the interpretive research may produce unbiased, in depth, as well as valid and credible research findings.

4.2.2. Single Case Study Research Design

Equipped with the constructivist approach of knowledge inquiry as explained above, this research investigates a case as an attempt to develop a better understanding of the link between territorial reform through *pemekaran* and state legitimacy. In

methodological terms, this is a case study design (Bryman, 2010). Through a case study design, this research engages in a deeper exploration of how the process of statebuilding through territorial reform is interpreted by stakeholders in a particular area. An in-depth understanding of stakeholder interpretations of the state performance as well as their experiences in interacting with the state are important factors in this research, considering that the legitimacy of the state lies in how the public perceives the state. Such a deep understanding would be less feasible to attain through other designs, for example through surveys which may succeed in capturing general attitudes towards state institutions but are less likely to provide a detailed nuance.

Case studies are one of the most widely used research designs, especially for research employing qualitative methods. However, understanding of case studies are often confused because of the lack of a rigid definition stipulating whether it is a way of study (the method) or what is studied (the case itself). Among the most cited definitions is by Robert Yin (2014); he defines it as "an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". For Yin, the validity of the case study research depends on several issues, such the use of multiple sources of evidence, ability to construct causal relationship, degree of generalisability as well as the possibility of replication of procedures in other research. By employing these criteria of evaluation, Yin tends to rely on the a positivist paradigm (Yazan, 2015, p. 136). In addition, he divides case studies into single and multiple cases, where he suggests the latter would provide a stronger effect that contributes to validity and reliability (Yin, 2014, p. 64).

Differently, Stake argues that the most important element of the case study is the case itself (Stake, 1995). For Stake, case study research is "the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances" (1995, p. ix). According to Stake, as a form of research the case study “is defined by interest in an individual case, not by the methods of inquiry used”, and that “the object of study is a specific, unique, bounded system” (2008: 443, 445). Hence, Stake’s case study interpretation is more concerned with what is studied (the case itself) rather than how it is studied (the method). For Stake, a case study is expected to look for the details, the uniqueness, and the complexity of a case; it follows that he emphasised a single case instead of multiple cases for efficacy. Stake categorises the case study into intrinsic case study and instrumental case study, based on the aim of the research. The intrinsic case is study conducted when the researcher is interested in a particular case, its details and uniqueness. In contrast, the instrumental case study aims to draw a general understanding of a phenomenon by using a particular case (1995, p. 3).

This research aims at providing an in-depth understanding of how people in a particular area perceive the state and the process of statebuilding. Through a single case study – *pemekaran* in Papua Province – it investigates people’s perception of the conduct of the state while also examining how territorial reform in Papua is interpreted by the state actors in the central government and the local government. Focusing on the case itself, the research adheres to Stake’s definition of a case study rather than Yin’s. However, this research benefited from Yin’s guidance on the method of data collection that must be empirical, real-life and gathered from multiple sources (Yin,

2014). The opportunity to use multiple data sources to provide corroborating evidence increase the confidence of this research.

Through a single as opposed to multiple case study design, this research has the opportunity to conduct an ethnographic style of data collection, where the researcher is immersed in the daily life of the studied group in order to gather as much first-hand information as possible. In this context, ethnographic style means that the research employs a similar method of data collection as ethnographic research, such as in-depth semi-structured interviews and group discussion. This research, however, is different from classic ethnographic studies that are usually conducted over longer periods of time and more likely to involve a mix of participation and observation than case studies (Gray, 2014). Through in-depth study, this research does not intend to produce a statistical generalisation which usually results from a large N study, but to provide an understanding of the phenomenon under study and to some extent contribute to the wider context through analytical generalisation developed in this thesis.

4.2.3. Case Selection: Single-Embedded Case Study

Selecting the case in a single case study research design is a challenging task. According to Yin (2014), the selection of of single cases should satisfy at least one of three conditions: (1) the case is an unusual phenomenon, (2) the case has not been accessible to researchers before, or (3) the case can be observed longitudinally. Other scholars suggest that the selection of the case in a case study research design should consider the ability to produce a fine-grained level of detail that is difficult to achieve

through multiple cases or other methods such as large sample statistical studies (Stake, 1995). In the same vein John Gering (2008) suggests that a single case designs are ideal for research that aims to understand complex socio-political processes such as democratization or conflict mitigation. Following these seminal methodolgy scholars, this research employ the single case study design to provide a detail empirical-based analysis on how territorial reform through *pemekaran* impacts Papuan people's perceptions of the state.

As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, the territorial reform case in Papua was chosen because it represented a case where state legitimacy has been challenged at the local level (Bertrand, 2014a; Heiduk, 2014). Although it cannot be generalised to similar cases in other contexts, the results of this study are expected to provide insight into similar research for different cases where territorial reform is one of the ways to strengthen state legitimacy. Another reason is that there have been few studies on the subject in the region, despite Papua experiencing the highest rate of *pemekaran*. The lack of research may be partly attributed to the limited access granted to foreign researchers by the Indonesian government due to the area's political sensitivities. By conducting an in-depth investigation in areas that are still under-researched, this thesis has the opportunity to contribute new findings to the discussion on the topic of study as well as to area studies, i.e. the Asia-Pacific region.

Three out of 19 new district governments in Papua Province are selected for study to capture the dynamic of statebuilding through territorial reform in Papua. Selection represents the variety of social and cultural context to capture the dynamic of statebuilding in the *pemekaran* region across Papua. This research uses the existing typology which divided Papuan society based on habitation; *pegunungan* (highlands),

kepulauan dan dataran sulit (islands and difficult lowland areas) and *dataran mudah* (easily accessible lowlands). This typology is widely used in government reports, as well as demographic, anthropological and political studies (BPSDM Papua, 2013; Elmslie, 2017; e.g. Mansoben, 1994; Mollet, 2011). The ecological-related differentiation also overlapped with cultural identity and structural conditions, especially related to transportation access.

The highland area, dominated by the highland tribes of Papua, is characterised by very poor infrastructure. It is also known as a hotbed for separatists. The region constitutes 14 LGs, with11 of these new additions that resulted from *pemekaran* during 2002-2008. The islands and difficult lowland areas such as swamps and river basins are dominated by coastal tribes native to the region and a small number of non-Papuan inhabitants. While infrastructure and public service facilities are still lacking, this area has relatively better conditions compared to the highland region, as seen in its human development index (BPSDM Papua, 2013). The “easy” lowland are is generally the most populated and developed area in Papua with a highly mixed population of Papuans and migrants. From these groups, this research selected three new LGs; Keerom District (easily accessible lowlands), Supiori (island), and Puncak District (highlands).

1. **Keerom District** represents a district where the majority of the population are migrants who were part of the transmigration programme conducted by the national government since the 1980s, moving people from densely populated areas. It was established in 2002 as a result of *pemekaran* from existing Jayapura District. Located 60 kilometers from the provincial capital, the district has relatively better infrastructural conditions and transportation access compared to other new

districts. Keerom is at the top of the human development index among other districts.

2. **Supiori District** represents the district with a majority of coastal Papuan people with limited infrastructure and transportation access. Supiori is an island district that was established in 2003 as a separation from Biak District. Supiori is in the middle ranks of the human development index for Papua province.
3. **Puncak District** represent the district majority highland Papuan population. Puncak District was established in 2008 in the separation from Puncak Jaya. Puncak District is among the most remote and isolated districts in Papua with limited infrastructure and transportation access (air transportation is the only means to access this district). It ranks among the lowest on the human development index compared to other districts in Papua Province.

Apart from the three new districts in Papua, interviews were also conducted in the national capital, Jakarta and the provincial capital, Jayapura.

4. **Jakarta** is the national capital of Indonesia. Fieldwork in Jakarta is targeted to interview with central government actors including senior officers from several ministries, presidential office, national police, national intelegent, as well as national parliament members. Fieldwork in Jakarta also targeted to interview national politicians and figures of Papua.

5. **Jayapura** is the capital of Papua Province. In Jayapura this research conducted interviews with government figures, politicians, community leaders, religious leaders, academics and NGO activists.

Figure 4.1. Research Locations



4.3. Research Method: Ethnographic Style of Gathering Evidence

This research aims to develop an understanding on the impact of territorial reform on state legitimacy by specifically looking at the case of *pemekaran* in Papua Province. Through the lens of statebuilding theory, this thesis analyses that *pemekaran* in Papua is the process of state legitimisation where state and society actors both exchange their subjective understanding. Therefore, this research concerns what the government thinks and also what the people think about the intentions and the outcomes of *pemekaran*.

The simple and straightforward way to understand the government's line of thinking is by investigating official documents, such as regulations, policy papers and formal speeches by the state's actors. However, this research assumes that state actors may have a different understanding and perception from the official perspectives of

pemekaran. Hence to obtain a comprehensive understanding about the state's intention of *pemekaran*, the thesis also explore the views of state actors directly through a series of interviews.

The more important element of this research is to understand what the people think about *pemekaran*, especially related to the extent to which the outcomes have or have not met their expectations. In other words, people's perception of *pemekaran* determines the impact of *pemekaran* on bolstering or weakening state legitimacy. To obtain as much as information about people's perception, a series of in-depth interviews and group discussions with stakeholders were held directly in the field.

The process of data collection, both through documentary analysis and through interviews, as well as group discussions, is briefly explained in the following sub-sections. Before that, the next subsections explain who the participants in this research were and how they were recruited.

4.3.1. Research Participants

This research aims to elaborate on the impact of statebuilding through *pemekaran* on the legitimacy of the state in Papua. By referring to the view that legitimisation is a reciprocal process that involves state and society, the research invites two groups of participants: state actors and community actors. Participation in this research is voluntary, and participants had the right to withdraw from this research at any point. In addition, prior to the process of research, participants were asked for their consent in writing or verbally recorded for verification. Overall, the research has conducted in-depth interviews with 66 respondents and six group discussions (FGD) with a total of

42 participants. All interviews and FGDs were conducted from February to June 2018 during fieldwork in the three selected districts in Papua; Puncak (22 participants), Keerom (25 participants), and Supiori (18 participants), the provincial capital, Jayapura (26 participants) and the national capital, Jakarta (17 participants). Participants in this research are categorised into state actor and society actor.

State Actor

Research Participants from a state background, i.e. bureaucrats, politicians, police and military personnel, were recruited through a formal mechanism of an official invitation letter sent to their respective organisation. In the invitation letter, the researcher explained the background and objectives of the research as well as personal background information. In addition, the interview topic guide was attached to the letter to provide an initial picture of the information or opinion that would be expected from the participant. Besides this formal approach, the researcher also drew on his social and professional network to expedite the contact and introduction process. These procedures for recruitment were also applied for participants from provincial and districts government (formal invitation letter attached).

At the national government level this research has conducted interviews with senior officers from several organisations including: Home Affairs Ministry, State Secretary Office, National Development Planning Ministry, Presidential Office, National Police and National Legislature. At the provincial government level, the series of interviews was conducted with senior officials from the provincial development planning agency (*Bappeda*), health service agency (*Dinas Kesehatan*), education service agency (*Dinas Pendidikan*), Provincial Government Secretariat (Setda), members of the

provincial legislature, members of Papua People Assembly, Chief of Papua Police and a senior officer from Papua Military Command (*Kodam Cenderawasih*). At the t district level, interviews were conducted with senior bureaucrats, including deputy district head and the respective chiefs of the education, district development and health service agencies. . At the district level, interviews were also conducted with several teachers, nurses and doctors to investigate the actual service provisions.

Society Actor

Participants from a community background were recruited through a less formal procedure that relied on direct communication via phone, WhatsApp or SMS. Most of the process was achieved with the help of a gatekeepers or fixers and through the researcher's social network. There are two gatekeepers who assist researchers in this research. The first gatekeeper is a provincial employee who has a strong network among bureaucrats at both the provincial and district levels. The second gatekeeper is a youth leader who is well known to activists and informal leaders. A combination of purposive sampling, snowball sampling and theoretical sampling methods were employed in the process of recruitment. Purposive sampling means the researcher selects the participants based on a certain criterion that would fit the purpose of the research. In snowball sampling, the participant is recommended by another participant upon the request of the researcher, usually at the end of the interview. Meanwhile, in theoretical sampling, the emerging research findings inform the need for a different data and sources that were not previously identified. While the number of research participants can be increased based on the theoretical sampling, it also can be

reduced when there is an excess of information and no new information or themes are observed in the data (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006, p. 59).

Prior to the fieldwork the researcher identified prospective participants from Papuan society, including local community leaders, customary leaders, religious leaders, women leaders as well as youth leaders. With the fixers' assistance, each of these figures was identified and contacted for interview scheduling. On several occasions, the researcher also obtained resource recommendations from other participants. Apart from this group of participants, interviews were conducted with academics, journalists and NGO activists. This study assumes that the large variations of participants' backgrounds would provide rich information based on experiences, identities and subjective interests of each participant.

4.3.2. Data Collection through In-depth Interviews & FGD

This research seeks to answer the main question, **how does territorial reform through *pemekaran* impact on state legitimacy?** By posing this question, it puts the state and society as the units of analysis. By conducting investigation into these two domains, this study relies on perceptual information provided by participants. The perceptual information is the most critical information in the qualitative research that provides the main material for the analysis (Stake, 2010). In the study, the perceptual information was gathered to understand participants' accounts on the process of state legitimisation, including their conception, expectations and assessment of the interaction between state and society.

In-depth interviewing is the main method used in this research to explore and understand people's perceptions of t the state. Through in-depth interviews in natural situations, participants can freely articulate their experiences of interacting with the state and their subjective interpretations of these experiences. To be able to delve into the information more deeply, the study follows a semi-structured interview in which the researcher prepared several guiding questions but remained open to explore new questions that emerged during the interview process. Thus, the interview runs in a natural manner, not only in terms of setting but also the conversational interaction between the researcher and the respondent. Hence, researchers are more likely to be able to become privy to people's expectations, perceptions and understanding about the state (Stake, 1995, p. 64). In addition, the semi-structured style of interview also gives the opportunity to clarify, to probe for more detail or ask new questions that follow up on the interviewee's replies. It allows for obtaining deeper information as well as the broaching of important issues that have not been covered by the researcher.

Obtaining such opportunities will be less likely if other methods of data gathering, such as surveys, are used. Surveys may be appropriate to generate a wider respond on a certain topic but they have limitations in elaborating the subjective experiences of each respondent. In addition, technical constraints such as a respondent's inability and unwillingness to express their opinions in writing, may prevent the obtaining of accurate information. In contrast, through interviews, respondents can more freely share their experiences and opinions without being burdened by such difficulties. For confidential matters, the respondents are informed that they can request that they are off the record.

All of the interviews in this research project were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia as the main language of communication in the region. In total, during five months of fieldwork (February-June 2018) in five different locations, there were 66 semi-structured interviews. On several occasions when arranging a one-on-one interview was not feasible, for instance due to time constraints, a group discussion was conducted. During the fieldwork, there were five group discussions involving 42 participants. In total, 108 participants were involved as respondents in this research, producing nearly 100 hours of recordings. The following section briefly describes how the process of data collection was conducted in each location.

Table 4.1. List of Interviewees

Location	Interviewees	
	State Actors	Society Actors
1. Puncak 2. Supiori 3. Keerom	District head/vice, district secretary, district police chief, district military commander, senior bureaucrats (particularly related with development planning, infrastructure, education and health services), civil servants (teachers, doctors), speaker or members of local parliament.	Customary leaders, local community leaders, former OPM members, migrant community leaders, religious leaders, youth leaders, women leaders, local entrepreneurs, local NGOs.
4. Jayapura	Governor, secretary of provincial government, speaker or members of Papuan Peoples Assembly, provincial police chief, provincial military command.	Regional journalists, academician, NGO activists, church leaders, student activists.
5. Jakarta	Directorate General for Regional Autonomy (MoHA), Regional Autonomy Advisory Council (DPOD), National Development Planning Bureau (Bappenas), National Parliament Speaker (Commission II-Home Affairs), Presidential Staff Office, National Police.	National Committee on Human Rights, Papuan senior leaders, academicians, researchers, NGO activists,

4.3.3. Data Collection through Documentary Analysis

Besides interviews with stakeholders, this research also carried out documentary analysis on *pemekaran*, particularly to comprehend the formal objectives and design of *pemekaran*. These include formal documents related to *pemekaran* dating back to its introduction by the government in 1999, encompassing the form of laws, government regulations, presidential decrees, as well as official statements such as presidential speeches. Research into these documents aims to investigate the purpose and design of *pemekaran* and how it changes over time. These documents can be accessed freely from official Indonesian government websites. The design and objectives of *pemekaran* would be treated as the official version as opposed to the unofficial version based on the interpretation of state actor participants in this research. Both official and unofficial versions would then be synthesized to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of *pemekaran*.

Table 4.2. List of Documents Consulted

Law and Governmental Regulation	Presidential Decree and Instruction
Law 22/1999 on Local Government	Presidential Decree no 7/2005 on National Development Plan 2005-2009
Law 45/1999 on the Divisions of Irian Jaya	Presidential Decree no 5/2010 on National Development Plan 2010-2014
Law 32/2004 on Local Government	Presidential Decree no 2/2015 on National Development Plan 2015-2019
Law 32/2004 on Local Government	Presidential Decree no 65/2011 on Development Acceleration for Papua and West Papua Province
Law 23/2014 on Local Government	Presidential Instruction No. 5/2007 on Development Acceleration for Papua and West Papua Province.
Law on the establishment of Supiori District	Presidential Instruction No. 9/2017 on Development Acceleration for Papua and West Papua Province.
Law on the establishment of Puncak District	
Law on the establishment of Keerom District	
Government Regulation 129/2000 on the mechanism of *Pemekaran*	
Government Regulation 78/2007 on the Procedure of *Pemekaran*	

4.3.4. Data Analysis: Interpreting and Synthesizing Evidence

This study aims to understand the Indonesian state's efforts to consolidate the institutional and social sources of legitimacy through territorial reform. More specifically, it looks at how the process takes place in the context of societies that have long been neglected (B. Anderson, 2012) and have a problematic relationship with the state due to misconduct or mistreatment carried out in the past, such as human rights violations (Chauvel, 2005). In other words, the process of legitimization is at the same time a process of improving public trust of the state. Consequently, the analysis was carried out in two separate but related domains, the state realm and society realm. Accordingly, the information gathered was clustered along these two broad categories. Subsequently, in each data set, a thematic analysis was performed. Thematic analysis is a method for identifying and analysing patterns in a dataset that focuses on capturing recurring themes on the studied phenomenon (Joffe, 2012). This process was followed by data classification to develop patterns which involved the establishment of emerging sub-themes from participants' stories and put together to construct a solid argument (Aronson 1995).

During the research, the theoretical framework slightly evolved due to the emerging findings. The initial framework focused on territorial reform as a process of consolidating the institutional sources and the social sources of state legitimacy. However, the emerging fieldwork findings suggested that what is more prominent is the distinction between the official and unofficial process of consolidating the sources of legitimacy. Compared to the former, the latter framework places more emphasis on how the sources of legitimacy are consolidated. The distinction between institutional and social sources of legitimacy is still relevant but the most prominent feature of this

framework is the distinction between formal and informal design and mechanism of *pemekaran*. This framework governs the investigation.

4.4. Researcher's Positionality

Prior to conducting this study, the researcher had conducted several studies and working visits to Papua in his capacity as a researcher and lecturer at state universities. The researcher is aware that his experience, views and subjectivity related to Papua may influence the research process, hence it is prudent to declare his positionality in this research. Many prominent theorists have underlined the importance of clarification of research positionality, as stated by Sikes (2004),

> "It is important for all researchers to spend some time thinking about how they are paradigmatically and philosophically positioned and for them to be aware of how their positioning -and the fundamental assumptions they hold- might influence their research related thinking and practice. This is about being a reflexive and reflective and, therefore, a rigorous researcher who is able to present their findings and interpretations in the confidence that they have thought about, acknowledged and been honest and explicit about their stance and the influence it has had upon their work. This is important given that a major criticism of much educational research is that it is biased and partisan" (Sikes 2004 p. 15).

Driven by the awareness of researcher subjectivity, this research is not intended to produce an "objective" knowledge where there is a clear distinction between the researcher's subjectivity and the research itself. Hence, this investigation follows the research tradition that accommodates researcher subjectivity through the interpretive research methodology. As stated by leading theorists in research methodology, in interpretive research, the researcher as an individual is an integral part of the research

(Bryman, 2016; Robson, 2011). Furthermore, several scholars acknowledge the researcher as the primary instrument in qualitative interview studies (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

This research also does not presume that knowledge is an objective truth that is separated from its context. On the contrary, this research relates to the philosophical stance that our knowledge is socially, culturally and historically constructed. It follows that an investigation to understand a particular phenomenon must be context specific (Stake, 1995). In other words, the research process is not a value-free process, but is bound to certain values because the process is influenced by the researcher and the context in which the research is carried out. In this approach, the main challenge for researchers is not finding the most objective truth, but *understanding* multiple realities from the perspective of the research participants (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This issue leads to the epic and emic debate in the research methodology which defines a researcher's proximities with the research context (Chen, 2010; See Morris et al., 1999; Numa Markee, 2013).

The etic perspective refers to the outsider's view on a certain phenomenon or behaviour which is context specific. A researcher with the etic perspective will use pre-existing concepts, theories and perspective to understand the phenomena. On the other hand, the emic perspective refers to the insider's view of phenomena which provides insight into cultural nuances and complexities (Bryman, 2016). A researcher with the emic position would emerge to the local culture to gain a detail description from the perspective of the actors. As Yin points out, regardless of how a culture's scope is defined, "an emic perspective attempts to capture participants' indigenous meanings of real-world events" (Yin, 2014, p. 11). In this research, the researcher

investigates the process of statebuilding from the actors' point of view and rely as much as possible on the primary evidence gathered from the participants through in-depth interviews. In other word, this research embraces the emic perspective. However, a purely emic perspective is impossible to achieve given the researcher's nature as an outsider. To minimise the researcher's bias, the analysis will incorporate participants' own words.

Embracing an emic position is not an easy task, particularly when the researcher comes from a different background to the majority of the research participants. Although the research site is in the researcher home country, the researcher hails from a different cultural background to most of the research participants. As such, the researcher is both insider and outsider. As a fellow citizen of the country, the researcher is an insider. When it comes to ethnicity, cultural background, dialect or religious affiliation, however, he qualifies as an outsider to most of research participants. Moreover, as part of the largest and dominant ethnic group in the country, the researcher would potentially be seen not just as an outsider among Papuans but also part of the "enemy'" ranks, particularly by participants who consider themselves as victims of the existing political system. Although these concerns were raised during the designing of this research project, none of them materialised during the actual fieldwork.

Unexpectedly, it turned out that the researcher's identity as a scholar from a Western higher education institution created a positive impact on building communication with the participants, especially those from society actors. At the same time, the researcher's occupation as a staff member of a highly reputable university in Indonesia also helped facilitate the communication with research participants. Moreover, most of

the participants want their voices be heard, recorded and communicated to policy-makers and believed the researcher had the capacity to convey these sentiments to the central government. To prevent overly high expectations, the researcher took pains to emphasise his status as a post-graduate researcher who did not have access to policy-makers, while also noting that there was the possibility the research results would be available to a wider audience.

The researcher did encounter some obstacles in accessing participants, particularly from local bureaucrats and security officers. Initially the researchers took a formal route by submitting a request for interview with the police and military commander. However, the request was not responded until the researcher uses informal channels with the help of his social network. Some participants from local government refused to be interviewed while other participants were willing to be interviewed but only provided general and less substantive information. To overcome this obstacle, researcher tried to find other bureaucrats who were willing to be interviewed. In addition, researcher also interviewed former officials assuming they would be more open in providing information. Apart from these shortcomings, in general the research process ran smoothly and the researcher was able to reach key participants as resource persons.

4.5. Research Limitations

During fieldwork, I encountered two issues that may limit this research; first the problem of geographical coverage, and second the problem of representation. The first problem related to the geographical size of Papua which is the largest province in Indonesia. The size of one district in Papua can be equivalent to one province in other

areas; as a result, there are often great distances separating the district capital to subdistricts. The condition is exacerbated by poor transportation infrastructure. In Puncak, for instance, air transportation is the only convenient way to reach other districts that would otherwise require a lengthy trek through jungles.

Security issues were also a problem. I was advised by the locals not to go beyond the district capital border for this reason. The lack of transportation infrastructure also curbed my mobility in Supiori district. As a result, this research was mostly centred in the district capitals with limited coverage of the surrounding areas. Indeed, public perception was different between those who live in the district capital with better access to public services, compared to those living in other subdistricts. Fortunately, however, I was able to visit some remote districts in Keerom as well as Supiori. In Puncak, although I did not manage visit other subdistricts, I did meet people from outside the district capital who happened to be in Ilaga.

Another obstacle that has limited this research is related to participant representation, particularly due to the absence of the pro-independence militia and political prisoners. Interviews with these groups were extremely difficult due to procedural and security reasons. While I could not obtain the voice of this group, I managed to interview a number of parties known as sympathizers for the pro-independence Papua. In addition, I also interviewed several ex-militia members who expressed their reasons for engaging in resistance to the Republic of Indonesia. Their voices, however, might be different from those activists in prison or militia in the jungle. It follows that this research would have benefited from further exploration of different areas other than the district capital, as well as the involvement of participants who are politically opposed to the state.

4.6. Conclusions

The methodology of this research provides an alternative to the mainstream cost and benefit approach to territorial reform study. By emphasising the relational aspects between state and society, this research seeks to provide a different analysis of territorial reform studies by taking into account the non-material dimensions of territorial reform. Moreover, by conducting data collection directly from central government actors, provincial governments, district governments and community leaders from various layers, this research seeks to present a more comprehensive analysis of territorial reform as a statebuilding strategy.

Regarding the research process, despite some limitations, the gathering of data from more than 100 participants in five different locations suggests that social networking is a crucial factor that influenced the accomplishment of this research. It confirms that statement of Guba and Lincoln (1985) that researchers are the main instruments in qualitative research, especially those that use interviews as the primary method. In addition, the role of fixer is also essential. With the assistance of the right fixer, obtaining access and building trust with informants can be more effective. This is especially true in societies with strong patrimonial culture, such as Papua, where personal guarantees and recommendations are often viewed as more important than the academic portfolio of the researcher. I often found that informal approaches were more effective than formal procedures in establishing contact with participants. In addition, another seemingly trivial but crucial factor is studying the particular habits and culture of the people in the research site. An understanding of these two aspects can help the research proceed more effectively.

Chapter 5. Understanding the Underlying Intentions of *Pemekaran* Through District Formation in Papua

5.1. Introduction

This is the first of the three consecutive chapters that present the empirical findings of this research. As noted in the opening chapter, this chapter aims to explain the underlying intentions of district proliferation in Papua. The explanation is guided by the question: **what are the underlying intentions for *pemekaran* in Papua?** The official governmental argument and several studies viewed the intentions of *pemekaran* mainly through the institutional perspective, such as improving public services and promoting the distribution of welfare (A. G. Brata, 2009; Firman, 2013; Fitrani et al., 2005; Simandjuntak, 2015). Equally important, this research reveals that *pemekaran* posits an unofficial intention aimed at improving social legitimacy of the state.

While the institutional perspective is valid, this chapter suggests that it only tells part of the story as it is centred on the institutional aspect with little attention to social dimensions. Informed by theoretical framework in chapter two that state legitimacy can be derived from institutional and social sources, this chapter seeks to provide a deeper explanation on the underlying objectives of *pemekaran* by synthesising the institutional and social dimensions. Unfortunately, unlike the former, the latter dimensions are less explicitly expressed in the formal documentations. Thus, this research employs evidences both from official and unofficial sources. Evidences from the official sources,

hereafter official intentions of *pemekaran* while evidences from the unofficial sources hereafter unofficial intentions of *pemekaran*.

This chapter argues that the overarching intentions of *pemekaran* are a combination of the official and unofficial intentions. Official intentions are expressed in formal documents such as law, regulations and formal speeches/statements of the state leader. The unofficial intentions, conversely, are the intentions of *pemekaran* according to the perception of the policymakers in the government; these emerged during interviews with the researcher. The findings suggest that the official intentions of *pemekaran* relate with the institutional perspective of legitimacy whilst the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* reflect the idea of social legitimacy focusing on strengthening social bond between state and society.

More specifically, this research finds that policy makers tend to look at state legitimacy from the institutional perspective. Through the institutional lens, state legitimacy depends first and foremost on the institutional performance. Thus, state legitimacy increases along with the improvement of state performance, especially in providing public services, improving public welfare, encouraging economic development, and ensuring the accountability and transparency of government's conduct as well as providing sufficient room for public participation in the policy processes. In fact, in all of these institutional aspects, Papua is far behind compared to other regions in Indonesia. The creation of new local governments through *pemekaran* is a strategic entry point for achieving these goals, according to some policy makers in this research.

While giving emphasis to the institutional aspect of legitimacy, the policy makers in this research also acknowledged the importance of relational elements of legitimacy in the context of Papua. The ongoing challenge to state legitimacy in Papua is

influenced by relational issues such as historical problems, human rights violations, as well as marginalisation of Papuan in the process of economic development. All of these have seriously injured Papua-Jakarta relations and fuelled the separatist movement that has been on for more than half a century (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004; Widjojo, 2010). Therefore, while being an entry point for institutional legitimisation, policy makers also view that *pemekaran* creates opportunities for improving Jakarta-Papua relations by allowing Papuan to rule their homeland within the Indonesian system.

In line with the idea that legitimisation is a two-way process in which state action is justified (or not) by the people (Beetham, 1991b; Haldenwang, 2016), the chapter finds that both official and unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* provide mechanisms for legitimisation. While the audiences for each intention (official or unofficial) cannot be clearly defined, it can be said that the official intentions are more specifically directed at Papuans living in remote areas that suffer from the lack of state performance. Hence, the largest number of *pemekaran* in Papua took place in the most remote and isolated area with limited infrastructure and basic services facilities such as in the Highland region and remote islands. Meanwhile, the audiences of the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* are more specifically Papuan elites, both the existing elites in the government as well as informal leaders. *Pemekaran* provides opportunities for the elites to claim or strengthen their leadership or fill up strategic positions in the newly established districts.

These findings are presented in four sections in this chapter. Following this introduction, section two discusses the findings on the official intentions of *pemekaran*. It shows that in Papua the policy is intended to strengthen state capacity in the

provision of public services and accelerating development. The third section discusses the unofficial intentions that emphasised improving state-society relations while curbing the separatist movement. These intentions are pursued by accommodating Papuan elites' interests, reinforcing the military presence and forging social integration by attracting migration to new districts. The fourth and concluding section underlines the main findings and links these to answer the question on state legitimacy.

5.2. The Official Intentions: Strengthening State Presence and Performance

This research identifies the official intentions of *pemekaran* by analysing official documents such as acts or laws, governmental regulations and presidential regulations. In Indonesia, the main legal framework for *pemekaran* is the local government regulation enacted in 1999 and amended in 2004 and 2014. General provisions stipulated in the law are then described in more detail in government regulations, such as the local government formation procedures, budget allocation as well as monitoring and evaluation scheme. Meanwhile, presidential regulations usually related to targets, priorities and strategy to improve local government performance. Analysis of these documents suggests that the ultimate objectives of *pemekaran* are to improve state performance in bringing general welfare through the improvement of public services, the acceleration of development and the improvement of local government in carrying out its functions. This section discusses these findings further.

5.2.1. *Pemekaran* to Improve Public Services Provision

Among the arguments about the purpose of *pemekaran* appearing in formal documents is that *pemekaran* is expected to improve public service provision. Public services are simply defined as services provided by the state for citizens in the form of goods, services and administrative services. By establishing new local government units, the breadth of the administrative territory will be streamlined, hence making provision of services more manageable. Beside reducing the size of local government territory, *pemekaran* also increases the availability of funds and human resources to produce public services. Hence, it creates a smaller territory and provides greater resources for service provision. This idea has been highlighted in different legal frameworks pertaining to *pemekaran*.

Government Regulation (GR) No. 129/2000 on *pemekaran* emphasises the objective of *pemekaran* being to improve public services. Similarly, Law No 32/2004 on Local Government and subsequent GR on *pemekaran* no 78/2007 underlines public service as the principal objective of *pemekaran*. Law 32/2004 on regional government states, "the formation of local government is intended to improve public services in order to promote the general welfare of the people".[3] The emphasis on the public service dimension was also underlined in the GR 78/2007 on the management of new local government. It includes the following stipulation:

> "The formation of local government is based on 3 (three) requirements, namely administrative, technical and physical territoriality. With these requirements it is expected that newly formed local government can grow, develop and is able to conduct its functions, to improve public services, to promote public welfare and

[3] General explanation of Law 32/2004, author's translation.

> strengthen the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia."[4]

The present law on local government, Law 23/2014, also emphasises the importance of public service improvement as one of the main objectives of *pemekaran*. The general explanation of the law stated:

> "The formation of local government is principally intended to improve public services in order to accelerate the actualisation of public welfare while also serving as a means of political education at the local level."[5]

Moreover, in line with Law 23/2014, the government formulated a bill on regional arrangement which includes *pemekaran*. The bill emphasises the readiness of a proposed district in order to be able to deliver its functions, especially in providing basic services such as education, health and essential infrastructure. The bill envisages a three-year preparation period prior to the establishment of a new district to ensure its capacity to conduct its tasks, especially in public service provision (article 18). In line with regulations at the national level, regulations regarding *pemekaran* in Papua also emphasise the improvement of public services as one of the main objectives of *pemekaran*. In Law No 45/1999 on the division of Irian Jaya province, the vision to enhance public service is also clearly enshrined. It stated:

> "The establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency, and Sorong City will encourage the improvement of governmental services in the fields of governance, development and society, as well

[4] General explanation of GR 78/2007, author's translation.

[5] Law 23/2014, General explanation, author's translation.

> as improving capabilities in utilizing the regional economic potential to implement regional autonomy."[6]

The public service dimension has consistently been the main consideration in every law that has regulated the formation of new districts in Papua since 2002. For instance, Law No. 26/2002 regarding the establishment of several new districts in Papua, namely Sarmi, Keerom, South Sorong, Raja Ampat, Bintang, Yahukimo, Tolikara, Waropen, Kaimana, Boven Digoel, Mappi, Asmat, Bintuni Bay and Wondama Bay, stated:

> "The establishment of the aforementioned districts is expected to encourage service improvement in the fields of government, development and society, as well as to improve local government capacity to manage local potential."[7]

This emphasis on improvement of public services was also mandated in the law on the formation of several new districts in the Central Highlands region of Papua during 2007-2008, such as Nduga (Law 6/2008), Lanny Jaya (Law 5/2008) and Dogiyai (Law 8/2008). Located in the Central Mountains region, these new districts are among the most isolated areas and are marked by very limited infrastructure and the absence of government services (B. Anderson, 2012).

Table 5.1. The Formation of New Districts in Papua Provinces (1999-2008)

District	Legal Foundation	District	Legal Foundation
Paniai	Law No. 45/1999	Waropen	Law No. 26/2002
Puncak Jaya	Law No. 45/1999	Supiori	Law No. 35/2003
Mimika	Law No. 45/1999	Mamberamo Tengah	Law No. 03/2008

[6] General explanation of Law 45/1999, author's translation.

[7] As appeared in the consideration c, Law No. 7/2008 on the establishment of Puncak District of Papua Province, author's emphasis and translation.

Sarmi	Law No. 26/2002	Yalimo	Law No. 04/2008
Mappi	Law No. 26/2002	Mamberamo Raya	Law No. 19/2007
Tolikara	Law No. 26/2002	Lanny Jaya	Law No. 05/2008
Asmat	Law No. 26/2002	Nduga	Law No. 06/2008
Boven Digoel	Law No. 26/2002	Puncak	Law No. 07/2008
Pegunungan Bintang	Law No. 26/2002	Dogiyai	Law No. 08/2008
Keerom	Law No. 26/2002	Intan Jaya	Law No. 54/2008
Yahukimo	Law No. 26/2002	Deiyai	Law No. 55/2008

The vast geographic area and limited infrastructure have prevented the establishment of government services in many areas in Papua. The creation of dozens of new districts as well as the division of the province have created a smaller administrative territory to make the delivery of services more manageable. Moreover, as the law stated, with more power, authority and resource in the region, the public services should be more available and accessible to the Papuan.

5.2.2. *Pemekaran* to Accelerate Equitable Development

Pursuing more equitable development nationwide is another intention of *pemekaran* that is defined in state regulations. By supporting *pemekaran*, which is an integral part of decentralisation in Indonesia, the government aims to foster development of less developed regions, especially outside the population hub of Java. At the same time, *pemekaran* invests regional governments with broader authority in managing local development in many sectors, including education, health, infrastructure, social security, environment, public housing and local economic development. The transfer of authority is followed by the transfer of financial resources by the central government, thereby encouraging fiscal redistribution to the regions. In addition, local governments are also given the authority to manage the potential resources available in their regions

to finance their own development. This objective is explicitly stated in GR 129/2000 article 2 (c-d):

> "The formation, expansion, elimination and incorporation of local government aims to improve public welfare by accelerating the regional economic development and promoting the actualization of local economic potential."[8]

Further, the GR envisages that the formation of new districts will improve the redistribution of financial and administrative resources as well as human resources to areas that were previously overlooked. Natural resource-rich regions outside Java such as Papua were exploited in the past while their local populations remain impoverished. Papua is perhaps the most egregious example of "milk cow" in Indonesia; it remains at the bottom of national development indicators such as the human development index (BPS, 2018). Hence, the formation of new districts through *pemekaran* aims to speed up regional development. Presidential Decree no 7/2005 on National Midterm Development Plan 2004-2009 stated:

> "The lack of regional development due to the vast territory amidst the limited government capacity to provide public services is among the main reason for the local government to propose *pemekaran* as solution."[9]

Moreover, in GR 129/2000 it was explained that:

> "*Pemekaran* must be beneficial for national development in general and regional development in particular with the aim of improving the welfare of the community which is indirectly expected to increase regional income."[10]

[8] GR 129/2000 article 2 (c-d), author's translation.

[9] President Regulation No 7/2005, Appendix III.13, p.3, author's translation.

[10] GR 129/2000, General explanation, author's translation.

The central government's attempts to foster more equal development among regions through *pemekaran* are reflected in the resource allocation scheme for newly formed districts as detailed in the GR 129/2000, GR 78/2007 and the current bill on regional arrangement. Within these frameworks, the resources required for the process of *pemekaran* and for financing the newly established district are derived from the central government, provincial government and the "parent" district (*kabupaten induk*). Articles 26 to 29 of GR 78/2007, for instance, stipulates that the funds required for district formation are borne by allocations from the parent district's budget and provincial budget. The central government will allocate development funds for the new districts after the establishment law has been enacted. The amount of the development fund is calculated proportionally based on population, expanse of area and personnel expenditure from the parent district budget.

A similar scheme is also adopted in Law 23/2014. Article 40 regulates that funds for the preparation of the new district are derived from the national budget as well as budget of the parent district. Furthermore, Article 47 of the draft bill on Regional Arrangement regulates that funding for the preparatory district comes from the following:

1. Development assistance fund for the preparatory district sourced from the national budget (APBN)
2. Share of income from original income of the parent district;
3. Revenue from the proportionate share of the parent district balance funds; and
4. Other legitimate and non-binding sources of income in accordance with statutory provisions.

Despite financial redistribution, *pemekaran* also encourages the distribution of human resources as well as government facilities and infrastructure. Personnel and facilities for the preparation district mainly comes from the parent district, as regulated in article 41 of Law 23/2014.

> "The obligations of the parent district to the preparatory district include: 1. Prepare government facilities and infrastructure; 2. Administer the required personnel, finance, equipment and documentation for the preparatory district; 3. Present a statement of willingness to hand over personnel, financing, equipment and documentation if the preparatory district is determined to be a new district; and 4. Prepare financial support for the new district.

In the setting of decentralization and regional autonomy, the formation of new districts means creating new channels for fostering a more equitable development in all regions of Indonesia, including Papua which is among the most underdeveloped parts of the nation. It is therefore unsurprising that the provinces of Papua and West Papua are the regions that have experienced the most increases in the number of districts, from 10 in 1998 to 42 in 2014.

Another argument reiterated during the interviews with state actors' respondents was that *pemekaran* represents a mechanism of peacebuilding through development and social welfare in Papua. This argument is based on the government assumption that the "Papuan problem" is rooted in economic and development issues as it is always framed by the central government. However, unlike in the official documents of *pemekaran*, state actors interviewed were more explicit in defining the policy as part of peacebuilding measures to improve state-society relations in Papua.

A senior officer in the National Planning Board (*Bappenas*) reflects:

> "We realize that our approach [to Papua] is still limited to certain issues in the context of prosperity development. For me, there's nothing wrong with that. It is the choice of the state that sees that Papua has complicated problems compounded by global and national dimensions. But we see that the government wants to build trust, the government wants to win the hearts and minds of Papuan through development."[11]

The emphasis on development as an effort to resolve this oft-stated "Papuan problem" is also endorsed by General Tito Karnavian, speaking in his capacity as national chief of police (2016-19) and formerly the head of the police command in Papua (he is now home affairs minister for the period 2019-2024. For Karnavian, the root of the problem is deficient public welfare due to unbalanced development and long-time marginalisation of Papuans.

> "Welfare is indeed the most important problem. I noticed that after the government has accelerated development, implementing special autonomy, as well as allocating a greater share of the budget to Papua, the call for independence is not as strong as before. We hardly hear the voice for independence in regions with relatively better economies, such as Sorong and Merauke. These regions were once the base for the OPM, now they are not. Other examples are Fakfak, Kaimana and Manokwari, which were formerly the hotbed for the pro-independence movement. Now there is almost no loud clamour from there. Well, there is but not as loud as before. Why? Because the regions have become more developed"[12].

His statement argues for economic development as the most fitting approach to counter the issue of Papuan independence. Karnavian, who served as the *Kapolda* or chief of Papua Regional Police (2012-2014), recounted his experience of hearing the complaint of a community leader in a village in Papua.

[11] VW, interviewed in London, November 2018

[12] Karnavian, interviewed in Jakarta, May 2018.

> "*Mr. Kapolda*, this kampong is among the first villages where the blue strip of the Dutch flag was torn off to make it into the Red and White (Indonesian flag). We support Papua's integration to Indonesia with just the one hope – that our fate can change. But, after almost 50 years, what do we have here? Not even clean water! It's no different from the Dutch era. Are we wrong to replace the Red and White with the Morning Star (Papuan flag) [in the hope] that our fate might change?"[13]

The view of *pemekaran* as an approach that can reduce Papuan demands for independence was also raised by Papuan elites. Among them was Admiral (ret.) Fredy Numberi, a senior Papuan figure who served as transportation minister (2009-2011) as well as a governor of Papua Province (1998-2000).

> *"Pemekaran* can counter the independence demand if it is managed properly. As the government span of control becomes shorter, local policy can better reflect people's demands, development can be more effective and people's prosperity may increase. This is only if *pemekaran* is conducted properly. If it is not, then, no matter how much money the government gives, it is worthless, like tossing salt into the sea." [14]

Komaruddin Watubun, a national legislator, also believes the policy can make a difference to Papuans if implemented correctly. Watubun remarks that although the promises of *pemekaran* have not been fully achieved, for people in Papua and Eastern Indonesia in general, the approach is an "important breakthrough" that is helping address issues for communities that would otherwise remained neglected.

> "Despites its limitations, I think *pemekaran* has brought some progress. Many areas that were once isolated are now become more accessible, with transportation of goods and for people increasing. Without *pemekaran*, electricity would still be unavailable in some of the central highland areas. I think for the majority of Papuans and people in Eastern Indonesia in general, *pemekaran* is a breakthrough policy. They can feel the impact of the development, even though it may not yet meet

[13] Karnavian, interviewed in Jakarta, May 2018

[14] Numberi, interviewed in Jakarta, May 2018.

> their expectations. Besides, there are many other areas in Indonesia that are still underdeveloped, let alone Papua!" [15]

The idea that development can assuage the demands of separatism was also shared by bureaucrats in the newly created districts. For them, although violence incidents involving armed separatists still occur sporadically, they are less frequent amid the government's pursuit of development. AB, a senior bureaucrat in one of the highland districts, was among those with this viewpoint.

> "As they now can feel for themselves the development and improvement of services, the community starts to change its mind. The City of Wamena used to be a dangerous area, but not anymore. Similarly, other areas that have been on the receiving end of increasing development such as Yahukimo and Tolikara, the people there are no longer keen to support separatism. Another example is Puncak Jaya. It once was classified as a red security zone, where violent incidents often occurred. Now, there are fewer and fewer incidents because the leaders are able to embrace the pro-independence supporters. We hope, through use of the right approach, that more and more people become supportive of the government."[16]

While most of the informants support the argument that development and the promotion of public welfare will eventually pacify the separatist sentiment, a different view was expressed by a member of Papuan Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua*-DPRP). In his opinion, the view that *pemekaran* may assuage discontent and support for independence movement can be misleading since the demand for independence does not only stem from developmental or welfare issues but from other grievances, such as historical mistreatment and human rights. In response to the question whether implementation of *pemekaran* may lower the demand for independence, he laughed and replied:

[15] Watubun, interviewed in Jakarta, May 2018.

[16] AB, interviewed in Puncak District Papua, June 2018.

> "No, no, that one (independence question) can't be answered by *pemekaran*. We had better view *pemekaran* in the context of development, not as [an attempt at] political settlement. You won't get the answer. It is better for us to talk about *pemekaran* in the context of regional development. Don't talk about politics, it cannot be the solution for that political question. It is like heaven and earth. There is no connection between *pemekaran* and the campaign for independence. *Pemekaran* is purely for development, that's all."[17]

Interestingly, doubts about the merits of *pemekaran* in working toward Papuans' question of separatism were not only raised by Papuan leaders but also emerged from elites within the central government. While the former focused on the lack of coherence in the design of *pemekaran*, the latter addressed a perceived lack of Papuan capacity in implementing the policy and making the most of the opportunity of *pemekaran* for a long-term goal. Take the opinion of a senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Home Affairs:

> "The political aspects, the bureaucracy, not to mention the interests of the central government elite, were involved [in *pemekaran*]. My question is whether *pemekaran* is the only way to promote Papuan welfare? I don't think so. Bappenas has data related to underdeveloped districts, why don't we focus on developing these areas in the first place? Because who benefits from *pemekaran*? Mostly the elites, politicians and bureaucrats. Moreover, the 'disease' in Papua, the political bureaucracy, is an ethnic representation. The governor will bring people from his own clan [to work with him]."[18]

In the same vein, another source from a military background blamed an alleged lack of competency of Papuan bureaucrats as the main issue that prevented reaping optimal rewards from *pemekaran*.

> "Ideally *pemekaran* brings closer [relations] and accelerates development. But in the case of Papua, with limited human resources

[17] Interviewed in Jayapura, March 2018.

[18] TP interviewed in Jakarta, April 2018

> available, I don't think it is the time for *pemekaran* to take place. From a geographical aspect, Papua is indeed eligible, but if you consider the population, there are many areas that do not meet the requirements. As a result, the condition of education and public health remains unchanged. New districts have been formed but still education and health services are not in place. One of the problems is the lack of capacity of the local government officials."[19]

While it was not the predominant view among state actors, such a dissenting opinion indicates that there is a potential gap between the expectations and the reality of *pemekaran*. As noted above, whether *pemekaran* can be the political solution or not depends very much on the quality of its implementation and how the Papuan community responds to it. This will be elaborated further in chapter six.

5.2.3. *Pemekaran* to Promote Local Governance

The third official intention of *pemekaran* that appeared in state documents is to develop a strong local governance capable of managing decentralisation and regional autonomy. The adoption of decentralization and regional autonomy since 1999 gives a large responsibility to regional governments in carrying out government affairs, development and public services in the regions. As the integral part of the regulation on decentralisation and regional autonomy, the provision of *pemekaran* is meant to support the implementation of the Law 22/1999. Article 4 of Law states:

> "In accordance with the implementation of decentralization, provinces, regencies and municipalities government are established with authority to regulate and manage the interests of local communities at their own initiatives based on the aspirations of the community."[20]

[19] ES interviewed in Jayapura, May 2018.

[20] Article 4 Law 22/1999, author's emphasis and translation.

Furthermore, the creation of new local government units is also intended to promote the implementation of regional autonomy, as stipulated in article 5 of Law 22/1999:

> "Regions are formed based on the consideration of economic capacity, regional potential, socio-cultural, socio-political, population, area and other considerations that enable the implementation of regional autonomy."[21]

In principal, both articles infer that the increase of proximity to government may encourage public participation and policy formulation that can be more attuned to local demand. Moreover, as the local government leader is directly elected, *pemekaran* also encourages local government accountability and promotes local democracy. In more detail, the provisions regarding *pemekaran* are set forth in GR No. 129/2000. Article 2 of the GR is envisioned as:

> "The formation, expansion, elimination and incorporation of local government aims to improve local prosperity through: (i) improving delivery of services to the public; (ii) promoting democracy; (iii) accelerating regional economic development; (iv) accelerating the mobilisation of regional potential; (v) strengthening security and order; (vi) developing more harmonious relations between the central government and the regions."[22]

The explanation in the GR emphasises that *pemekaran* is aimed at creating an effective government that is able to carry out its basic functions ranging from providing public services, strengthening local democracy, accelerating economic development, strengthening defence and security, promoting a harmony between the central and

[21] Article 5 Law 22/1999, author's emphasis and translation.

[22] Article 2 GR 129/2000, author's translation.

regional governments. Further, the ability of a district government to execute its regional autonomy function was reaffirmed in the provisions on regional formation which were published in the later period. Article 22 GR 78/2007 concerning the procedures for the formation, incorporation, and revocation of a district government states:

> "New district government may be revoked if it is unable to carry out regional autonomy tasks. The decision to revoke a local government is taken after the evaluation of local government performance and evaluation on its capacity to manage local autonomy, especially related to public welfare, public service and regional competitiveness in accordance with the regulations."[23]

The aspect of the government's ability to carry out regional autonomy has also been emphasised in the establishment of new provinces and districts in Papua. Law 45/1999 concerning the division of the province of Irian Jaya (Papua) declared:

> "The establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency and Sorong City will be able to encourage the improvement of public administration, development and public services, as well as to strengthen local government capacity in utilizing local potential to carry out regional autonomy."[24]

A similar phrase has appeared in more recent regulation on the formation of new districts in Papua, such as Law 24/2012 on the formation of Arfak district.

> "The formation of Arfak Mountains District is intended to encourage the improvement of governmental services, development, and public services, as well as to strengthen local government capacity to utilize local potential for the implementation of regional autonomy."[25]

[23] Article 22 GR 78/2007, author's translation.

[24] Law 45/1999, author's translation and emphasis.

[25] Law 24/2012, author's translation and emphasis.

The breadth of territory of the local government compounded by poor transportation and telecommunication infrastructures are major burden for some local governments, especially outside Java. The formation of new government units through *pemekaran* is aimed at addressing these problems and reducing the distance between the government and the community to make public service more accessible. Presidential Decree No 7 of 2005 concerning the National Midterm Development Plan 2004-2009 stated:

> "The lack of development due to the breadth of the administrative territory and the lack of government capacity in providing public services are often the reason for proposing the formation of a new autonomous region as a solution."[26]

More recently, the Law 23/2014 on regional government also reaffirms that regional rearrangement, including *pemekaran*, is aimed at improving the effectivity of the local government. The law stipulated that district creation is an effort to foster the effectiveness of local government in promoting general welfare, improving public services, strengthening regional competitiveness and maintaining the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Furthermore, article 58 of the law underlined principles of the conduct of good local government, such as legal certainty, accountability, proportionality, professionalism, transparency as well as efficiency.

In sum, based on the investigation on the official documents as discussed above, this thesis analyses that the formation of districts government through *pemekaran* is intended to promote local governance. As such, besides aiming to provide institutional

[26] Presidential Decree No. 7/2005, p. III.13 – 3, author's translation.

deliverables such as public services, *pemekaran* also aims to enable an environment for a stronger local governance where issues such as public participations, local government capacity, as well as leadership commitment are concerned. The progress and challenges of these intentions is discussed further in chapter six.

5.3. The Unofficial Intention: *Pemekaran* as Mitigation for the Secession Movement

Besides the formal intentions as stated in legal documents and statements, this study also elaborates on the informal intentions. The term unofficial in this thesis refers to nature of the data source which is the personal perspective of state actors revealed during the interviews. The sources who shared their perspective in this research are bureaucrats, politicians, police and military officers as well as former bureaucrats. These state actors, arguably, may have different conceptions of the rationale for *pemekaran* compared to that stated in regulations. In fact, this research finds some dissenting ideas of *pemekaran* emerged during interviews with state actors. These information provide an alternative account of the intentions of *pemekaran* to the official narrative.

The unofficial account of *pemekaran* in Papua expressed by some government actors in this research could be seen as part of contextualisation of the national policy or *pemekaran*. In fact, the regulatory framework of *pemekaran* based on national regulation that applied throughout the country. Thus, the framework contains a general element of *pemekaran*. On the other hand, in many aspects, Papua is different from the majority of the rest of Indonesian area, in terms of geographical difficulty, lack of infrastructure, and especially the political relations with the central government related

to the existence of Papuan independence movement. Hence, elaboration on the unofficial account of pemekaran is crucial to provide a more complete understanding of pemekaran in Papua.

It should be noted that although the data is unofficial, it does not mean that the data is secret or completely hidden from public domain. While inexplicit in regulations and rarely stated in the public domain, it is not difficult to link the waves of *pemekaran* in Papua with the existence of political and security issues generated by the independence movement. The establishment of dozens of new districts in the Central Highland region, known as the Homebase of the separatist groups, is a clear move of the government to persuade these groups to alter their vision. The lower requirements for *pemekaran* in Papua compared to other area, is an indication that the government has different agenda through *pemekaran* in Papua. Again, it is not too difficult for the public to relate the *pemekaran* in Papua with political intentions of assuaging separatism. Observers and academics also play an important role in revealing the covered intentions of *pemekaran* in Papua (Kossay, 2012; Suryawan, 2011; Tabloidjubi, 2017). Hence, the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* in Papua is actually an open secret.

In order to reveal the unofficial intentions of pemekaran in Papua, this research investigates the perspectives of *pemekaran* from the state actors at national, provincial and district levels to present a more holistic understanding of the intentions. At the national level, the researcher interviewed several key government actors, including senior officials in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of National Development Planning, Presidential Staff Office, National Police Headquarters and Indonesian National Intelligence Agency. The researcher also conducted interviews with several

members of the National Parliament, including the speaker of the legislature. Similarly, at the provincial and district levels, the perspective of senior bureaucrats, politician and security officers was sought.

In general, respondents supported the official goals of *pemekaran*, but some qualify this with their consideration of orientations that are unstated in the official documents. This section presents the findings of these interviews which are categorised into three main themes; first, *pemekaran* as an elite accommodation strategy to reduce Papuan discontent with the state; second, *pemekaran* as a strategy to contain the armed separatist movement; thirdly, *pemekaran* as a strategy to promote social integration and undermine support to separatism. Each of these three unwritten intentions of is explained in the following sub-sections.

5.3.1. *Pemekaran* as Local Elite Accommodation

The idea of *pemekaran* as a strategy to undermine support for Papuan independence emerged during interviews with several central government officials and national politicians in Jakarta. Respondents acknowledged that *pemekaran* provides opportunities for Papuan elites to run the local government. This orientation was particularly clear in the early stages of the approach's implementation in of Papua in 1999 when the government adopted Law No 45/1999 on the division of Irian Jaya Province. According to VW, a senior bureaucrat in Jakarta, although the formal consideration was the spirit of nationwide decentralization as stated in Law 45/1999, the fact that the regulation was adopted after 100 Papuan representatives met President Habibie and expressed support for separation from Indonesia suggested a strong political reason behind the decision.

> "I think at that time Jakarta was trying to handle Papuan demands for secession by meting out power among the Papuan elites. By dividing Papua or Irian Jaya at that time into three provinces, there will be many [leadership] positions available to accommodate Papuan elites so that they no longer demand separation. It was also a strategy to strengthen state's legitimacy in the eyes of Papuans. Unfortunately, this policy was unable to keep abreast of the mainstream Papuan spirit at the time."[27]

Efforts to divide Papua into three provinces were delayed due to strong resistance from the Papuan people. In 2002, the central government legalized the formation of 14 new districts simultaneously through Law No. 26 of 2002. The districts are Sarmi, Keerom, Sorong Selatan, Raja Ampat, Bintang Mountains, Yahukimo, Tolikara, Waropen, Kaimana, Boven Digoel, Mappi, Asmat, Teluk Bintuni and Teluk Wondama. In contrast to the effort to divide up the province, the creation of new districts did not elicit significant opposition. According to VW, this is because the formation of districts is seen by the Papuan people as a step to accelerate and distribute development rather than a politically-driven divisive orientation. A similar view was also shared by other respondents such as SM, JG and TAH.

After successfully forming 14 new districts, Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri in 2003 revived the idea of forming new provinces in Papua by signing Presidential Instruction no 1/2003. It once again met fervent public resistance, especially the idea of establishing Central Irian Jaya Province. Chauvel (2005) noted that five people died in clashes between the measure's supporters and its opponents in the mining town of Timika over a two-week period from August to September 2005. It was a different situation in West Irian Jaya, where the formation of the province gained support from a large part of the elites and public. At the end of 2003, West Irian

[27] VW, interviewed in London, November 2018.

Jaya province became a reality, while Central Irian Jaya province remains in limbo until now.

The establishment of West Papua province was possible, according to VW, because of the consolidation of local elites who gained support from the national elites.

> "West Papua managed to become a province because the consolidation of the elites was relatively strong and also supported by the national elites. The consolidation of social organisation in the region was also strong, especially with the formation of the Team 315. The Team 315 consists of various elements of society that encouraged the formation of the Province of West Papua, including customary leaders, religion leaders, youth leaders, academics and politicians. That was lacking in Central Irian Jaya. The consolidation of the elites in Central Irian Jaya was not strong. In addition, the town of Timika, the candidate to become the capital of the province of Central Irian Jaya, was the centre of the Free Papua Movement at the time. Hence, there was quite strong friction between those who rejected Central Irian Jaya Province and those who supported it."[28]

The idea of countering the demand for separatism by establishing local government units to accommodate local elites' political interests appeared viable as the government passed the Law No. 21/2001 which conferred special autonomy status on Papua. Among the most important features of the law is related to budgetary provisions in which Papua receives a special autonomy fund equal to 2% of the national budget. The fund was granted to Papua Province and subsequently to West Papua Province for 20 years beginning in 2001.

Another important element of Papua's special status is the priority allocation for Papuans to hold public office. Article 12 of the Special Autonomy Law states that the governor of Papua must be a native Papuan who is of Melanesian ethnicity. According

[28] VW, interviewed in London, November 2018.

to some respondents in this research, even though the article only regulates the position of governor, in practice all top positions at all levels of government, from provinces to villages, are occupied by native Papuans. Unsurprisingly, the establishment of new districts in Papua was followed by the "Papuanisation" of bureaucracy where Papuans occupied strategic positions in the local government structure where it was previously held by non-Papuan bureaucrats (Widjojo, 2010).

The objective of *pemekaran* as an *instrument* to assuage separatist rumblings by providing strategic and material access for Papuan within the Indonesian unitary state system was also recognized by Lt Gen Bambang Dharmono, former chief of Special Unit of Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B).

> "One of the objectives of the special autonomy and *pemekaran* is to reduce separatism by giving wider concessions to the people of Papua, for example by stipulating that the governor must be a native of Papua. In practice, the MRP even asked the regent and deputy regent to be indigenous Papuans. That exceeds the provisions stipulated in the special autonomy law, but the central government seems unable to control."[29]

The above statement confirms that the central government gave priority to Papuans in recruitment for government positions. More recently, other strategic positions such as the Regional Military commander and the Papua Police chief have also been held by native Papuans. In the same vein, Karnavian, affirmed that the state accorded Papuans greater opportunities to govern themselves. He added that the National Police also encouraged Papuan youth to join the force in Papua and allocated 30% of its recruitment for native Papuans.[30]

[29] Bambang Dharmono, Interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

[30] Tito Karnavian, interviewed in Jakarta, May 2018

The government's policy to provide the widest scope for Papuans to occupy positions in the government, according to some respondents, was the right approach to channel their political aspirations without threatening national unity. Moreover, some respondents observed that in line with decentralization and regional autonomy, the formation of districts in Papua serves at the same time as a process of civic education, political education and political recruitment[31]. *Pemekaran* brings the idea of how to govern and being govern by a set of rules and regulations, which is in many ways different to the traditional customary system of Papuans.[32]

Fadli Zon, the deputy speaker of the national parliament, suggests, “through the establishment of local government, Papuans will learn how to govern and how to become a citizen”. Simultaneously, Papuans are also exposed to elements of democracy, such as political parties, elections and the parliamentary system. In Fadli's opinion, *pemekaran* provides opportunities for political education and political recruitment in Papua.

> “By creating more local government there will be a process of political recruitment and the formation of leaders. They will learn how to manage the region. Therefore, in my opinion Papua should have more provinces and districts because of the vastness of the region and cultural diversity. The establishment of new provinces, in particular, should take into account cultural diversity in Papua." [33]

Seeing *pemekaran* as a strategy for political education and recruitment was also supported by JG, a *local parliament* member. However, in contrast to Fadli, JG

[31] Fadli Zon, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

[32] Tito Karnavian, interviewed in Jakarta, May 2018.

[33] Fadli Zon, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

favoured *pemekaran* at district level rather than provincial because district government agencies are the government institutions that directly provide services to the people.

> "After new districts are formed, locals might enter into the bureaucracy and occupy strategic positions. At the district level, I meant. I disagree with *pemekaran* at the provincial level. I think we are better served by optimizing development in one province, don't stir things up more. We can optimize development by focusing on five customary territories, each of which stand as a regional development unit led by a deputy governor."[34]

During the interviews with state actors at national and provincial levels, the idea to divide *Papua* based on cultural diversity also emerged, particularly based on the seven customary territories that were in effect during Dutch rule. Of the customary territories, Bomberay and Doberay are in West Papua Province. The remaining customary territories – *Seireri*, Mamta, Mepago, Lapago and Animha – are in Papua Province. During a *meeting* with President Joko Widodo at the State Palace in Jakarta in September 2019, a number of Papuan leaders conveyed the idea of forming five provinces in Papua based on these customary territories. On subsequent occasion, Minister of Home Affairs stated that ideally there would be five provinces in Papua[35].

Apart from the pros and cons of the idea of *pemekaran* as an instrument to defuse separatist flare-ups, there is also the fact that the number of provinces in Papua has not increased in the last 17 years (as of the completion of this thesis). Likewise, the number of *districts* has remained constant since 2008. On the other hand, the campaign for separatism by pro-independence Papuan elements has continued both in peaceful and violent ways. As such, while the Indonesian and Papuan elites have

[34] JG, interviewed in Jayapura, March 2018.

[35] https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2019/10/31/mendagri-idealnya-ada-lima-provinsi-di-tanah-papua accessed 10 September 2020.

often seen *pemekaran* as a strategy to ameliorate the demand for separatism, it seems that the policy has nothing to do with the separatist movement, as one of the respondents observed. The extent to which the political effectiveness of accommodation carried out by the government through *pemekaran* and how the Papuan people perceive this idea will be discussed in chapter 7.

5.3.2. *Pemekaran* and the Reinforcement of Military Force

The state's aim to improve security in the country's last separatist stronghold emerged as the second unofficial intention of *pemekaran.* In this regard, respondents acknowledge the formation of districts in the Papuan hinterland will pave the way for greater penetration of the security apparatus, both military and police. Consequently, *pemekaran* limits the movement of the armed separatist groups. This argument was conveyed by several respondents in this research, both from the central government and local governments.

Theoretically, providing security for its citizens is one of the main responsibilities of the state, and therefore should have been included in the official intention of territorial reform. In the case of *pemekaran* in Papua, however, there is the strong impression that the government has obfuscated the security issue by emphasizing developmental objectives. Security considerations are not stated explicitly in the regulations of *pemekaran* or in the law that promulgated the establishment of districts in Papua, even though several researchers argue that it was security driven (Hedman, 2007; IPAC, 2013). It was only in 2014 that security aspects entered explicitly as one of the main considerations of *pemekaran* as stated in Local Government Act No 23/2014. The

government, however, has not established any new districts or province in Papua since 2014. Therefore, the security argument is identified as one of the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* in this research.

VW, a senior official at a ministry in Jakarta, was among those who cited the security factor. According to VW, apart from technocratic considerations such as territorial size, infrastructure condition and local government capacity, the issue of security figured as an important consideration in the formation of several districts in Papua. As an example, VW cited formation of several districts in the central mountainous region, such as Puncak Jaya, Paniai and Nabire. He added that technocratic arguments and political-security concerns over the potential division of Papua have predominated since the 1980s. Apart from the sheer size of the territory, the intensity of security disturbances was also a major concern that motivated the government to split the then Irian Jaya into three provinces through a gradual process, including establishing three region of governor assistant.[36] As noted by several researchers, there was chronic unrest in the late 1970s to early 1980s that forced thousands of people to flee to Papua New Guinea, especially from the Keerom, Boven Digoel and Merauke regions (Al-Rahab, 2006; Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004; Osborne, 1985).

The argument that *pemekaran* will heighten and reinforce the presence of security apparatuses is supported by the fact that the structure of police and military territorial command in Indonesia runs parallel to the structure of civil administration. Thus, the formation of new administrative units from provincial down to the sub-district level, encourage the establishment of military and police commands at the corresponding level. Moreover, the leadership of the local government system in Indonesia, from

[36] https://soeharto.co/presiden-setujui-*pemekaran*-wilayah-irian-jaya/ accessed 14 September 2020.

provincial to subdistrict level, comprise of civilian, military and police.[37] ES, a senior military officer in Papua Regional Military Command, claimed:

> "The establishment of new districts, ideally followed by the installation of parallel military and police structure at the corresponding level so that they can be equal counterparts of the government."[38]

Although not always established concurrently, military command units in Papua have increased along with the rise in the number of civilian governments. At present, Papua Province and West Papua Provinces have Regional Military Commands (*Kodam*), namely *Kodam* Cenderawasih and *Kodam* Kasuari. At the district level, there are already 10 District Military Commands (*Kodim*) in the 29 districts in Papua Province. According to ES, in the near future he will propose the establishment of new districts, so that each district will have Kodim and coordination between civilian and military leaders can be more effective. He believes that the establishment of Kodim in every district in Papua would improve security in the area.

> "Unlike in Java, with every place accessible by land transportation, we must take airplanes between districts here. So, coordination and communication are constrained. It becomes even more difficult when a Kodim has to cover more than one district, such as Jayawijaya Kodim which covers eight districts. Although there are liaison officers stationed in each district, it's not optimal because the role of a Kodim commander requires certain abilities and experience. Thus, in the near future, we propose to develop some more Kodims. But building a new unit is also a complicated task, as it takes a huge cost and also political considerations."[39]

[37] The formation of these three elements of leadership is known as Muspida (Musyarawah Pimpinan Daerah) or regional leaders' assembly. In the local government Act No 23/2014 the term Forkompimda or regional leaders' communication forum was introduced as a replacement of the Muspida, although essentially serving the same function.

[38] ES, interviewed in Jayapura, May 2018.

[39] ES, interviewed in Jayapura, May 2018.

Again, although never explicitly stated in legal documents, *pemekaran* as a political instrument and conflict resolution mechanism often appeared in statements made by elites and the national leadership. In her state of the nation address before the Indonesian Parliament on August 16, 2001, President Megawati stated:

> "To solve fundamental problems in a just and comprehensive manner, among the policy steps taken are through the establishment of new village, sub-district, rural and urban districts as well as improvement of regional financial management."[40]

Meanwhile, President Yudhoyono expressed the following in his August 2005 state of the nation address in conjunction with Independence Day:

> "Exposure of the latest developments in Papua has also been conducted to prevent the internationalization of the Papua issue by clarifying the existing problems and explaining various developments that have been carried out over the Papua region, specifically the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law and the division of the Papua Province."[41]

Although Yudhoyono imposed a moratorium on *pemekaran* in the nation due to the lack of results, he was willing to make an exception for Papua by specifically mentioning *pemekaran* as one of measures deemed effective to counter separatist sentiment. As he stated in his 2009 state of the nation address:

> "The formation of new local government trough *pemekaran* based on the consideration and interests of community development in the region will continue to be the priority if it can help the people in the area to

[40] State of the Nation Address, Plenary Session of the House of Representatives, 16th August 2001, author's translation and emphasis. Available at https://www.bappenas.go.id/id/data-dan-informasi-utama/dokumen-perencanaan-dan-pelaksanaan/pidato-kenegaraan-tahun-2001/ author's translation and emphasis.

[41] State of the Nation Address, Plenary Session of the House of Representatives, 16th August 2005, author's translation and emphasis. Available at https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/4914/5042/9101/Lampid2005.pdf author's translation and emphasis.

> obtain justice and prosperity so as to prevent the emergence and development of embryo of separatism."[42]

In 2007-2012, Yudhoyono's government oversaw the establishment of nine new districts in Papua Province, all of them are in the highlands – a hub of OPM guerrilla activity – namely Tolikara, Yalimo, Puncak, Lani Jaya, Intan Jaya, Mamberamo Raya, Nduga, Dogiyai, and Deiyai.

5.3.3. Pemekaran for Social Integration

Social integration issues emerged as the third theme emerged regarding the question of the underlying reasons for the proliferation of district division in Papua. Several respondents say the formation of districts in Papua is not only related to the material reasons described above but also tied to the government's efforts to promote social integration. The formation of new districts created new jobs and economic opportunities that invited population migration from other area in Indonesia to Papua. According to several high-ranking government officials in Jakarta and Papua, the existence of migrant communities, besides providing human resources for the local government and stimulating the local economy, also promotes cultural assimilation between Papuans and the migrant communities from major population centres of the

[42] State of the Nation Address, Plenary Session of the House of Representatives, 16th August 2009, author's translation and emphasis. Available at https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/4914/5042/9101/Lampid2009.pdf author's translation and emphasis.

nation. This process is expected to usher in a natural “Indonesianisation” of Papuans and lessen Papuan support for the separatist movement.

Among the respondents who paid attention to the dimension of social integration is Lieutenant General Bambang Dharmono, head of the Special Unit for Development Acceleration in Papua and West Papua Province (UP4B). For Dharmono, one of the roots of the problem in Papua is weak social integration between the Papuan community and Indonesian society in general. Papuans, due to this lack of social “belonging”, feel estranged from the nation.

> “For me, the territorial integration of Papua in the Republic of Indonesia is already final. The problem lies in the social integration of Papuan people into the social system of Indonesia as a nation. In fact, our social integration in Papua appears increasingly fragile. Social integration is an effort to bring the Papuan people together as part of the Indonesian nation. It must be woven and preserved."[43]

For Dharmono, who played a crucial role in the peace pact between the government and separatists in Aceh, the process of social integration has never been taken seriously by the state. The development approach adopted by the government in Papua ignores the socio-cultural context of the Papuan people, with a staggering 250 different ethnic groups. As a result, there are Papuans who feel marginalized or even excluded in the development process. It is a view that is similar to Benedict Anderson’s recommendation for Jakarta to embrace Papuans in the common project of nation and statebuilding after being excluded from it for years (1999, p. 5). Dharmono suggests the government learn from its failure to integrate the people of East Timor and pay greater attention to the social and cultural dimensions of development in Papua.

[43] Dharmono, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

> "The socio-cultural aspects should be an important consideration in the government policy. The loss of East Timor in 1999 was actually the result of insensitive approach of the government to the local social structure that had existed among East Timor societal system. The government must learn from its mistakes in East Timor and take a better approach in Papua. *Pemekaran* has the opportunity to become an instrument for cementing social integration as long as the government has conducted the right approach."[44]

The view that district formation can encourage social integration as a crucial element to nurture nationalism was also expressed by Tito Karnavian, in his capacity as the National Police chief. He believed that the presence of migrants from other areas of the nation brought a positive impact for Papua because they were the skilled human resources needed for development. For Karnavian, one of the keys to the success of several regions in Papua is the migrant community who become key workers in the public as well as private sectors.

> "Many important positions in the provincial and district governments in Papua are filled by migrants; they become the second layer to back up their local colleagues. I think the Papua management model in the future must be a collaboration between the locals and the migrants. The role and presence of migrant communities in Papua cannot be avoided."[45]

Population migration from other parts of Indonesia to Papua (then known as Irian Jaya) actually dates back to the early 1960s, long before the wave of district creation. Their presence brought about important changes in the monetary structure of the economy (Garnaut & Manning, 1974). Manning and Garnaut noted that Indonesians who came to Irian Jaya on a large scale between 1961-1963 consisted of three groups; first, government employees and company experts to fill positions left vacant by Dutch

[44] Dharmono, Interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

[45] Karnavian, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

officials; second, farmers who were brought in from Java to settle in Irian Jaya for transmigration; third, immigrants who entered Irian Jaya of their own accord and at their own expense to find work in Irian Jaya (Garnaut & Manning, 1974, p. 49). Due to this long history, it's unsurprising that migrant communities in many parts of Papua have come to identify themselves as Papuan rather than their ancestral homelands. Karnavian noted:

> "On many occasions I've met people who are Javanese, Bugis, Batak and other ethnic groups in the interior regions of Papua. They have lived there for generations. Some of them have never even visited their place of origin. They feel Papua is their birthplace and their future."[46]

The above statement suggests the long-held belief among Indonesian leaders that sending people from the rest of the country to Papua will promote the Indonesianisation of Papuans. The presence of migrant community in Papua can encourage the process of integration of the Papuan people into the Indonesian social system through natural interactions as fellow Indonesians. At the same time, this view also emphasizes that the Papuans are indeed different from the rest of Indonesians, and therefore must be Indonesianised. Researchers argue that the Indonesianisation process of the Papuan people took place systematically through cultural, education system, media, economic development and transmigration since the beginning of Papuan territorial integration to Indonesia (Gietzelt, 1989; Sands, 1992; Tebay, 2005). Tebay for instance noted as part of Indonesianisation, Papuans were prohibited from showing their cultural symbol such as singing Papuan folks' song (2005, pp. 11–12). Since early 1970s, the Indonesian government also sponsored transmigration programme, moving people from other densely populated area in other islands to

[46] Karnavian, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

Papua. Later on, the transmigration programme was ceased by the government due to strong resistance from the Papuan leaders blaming the programme has marginalised the indigenous Papuan.[47]

The issue of social integration figured more prominently during interviews with respondents who are society actors, both Papuan and migrants. The researcher had the strong impression that instead of becoming a glue for social integration, as some government respondents hope and claim, *pemekaran* has created unintended consequences, such as economic gap between migrant and local community that can create social disintegration. The evidences of these issues will be presented in chapter seven.

5.4. Conclusions

This chapter presents an analysis on the state's intentions of *pemekaran* in Papua by posing the question: *what are the underlying intentions for pemekaran in Papua?* The findings suggest that *pemekaran* in Papua has two sets of intentions: improving state institutional performance and countering separatism. These two intentions revealed through two different sources of evidences that I categorised as official and unofficial sources. The official intentions of *pemekaran* were identified in legal documents on *pemekaran* whereas the unofficial intentions were revealed through a series of interviews with state actors at the national and local level. By identifying official and

[47] https://republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/15/06/18/nq5gdi-warga-papua-tolak-program-transmigrasi-menteri-marwan accessed on 16 September 2020.

unofficial intentions, this thesis gained a deeper understanding of the government's motivations by covering the unstated intentions of pemekaran.

The official intentions of *pemekaran* emphasised on strengthening state institutional performance especially in promoting public welfare through improving public services provision, accelerating local development, and strengthening local government capacity. The unofficial intentions, conversely, stressed on countering the campaign of separatist movement by accommodating local elites' interests, reinforcing security presence, and encouraging social integration. In the literature of legitimacy these two categories reflect two different epistemological understandings. The official intentions of *pemekaran* reflect the rational-legal view of legitimacy that believed state legitimacy derived from the functioning of state institutions. Hence, *pemekaran* is intended to improve state capacity at the local level in delivering services and fostering local economic development.

The unofficial intentions of *pemekaran*, conversely, emphasise on improving state-society relations and promoting social integration. Through the formation of new districts in Papua, *pemekaran* provides a framework in pursuing these intentions, particularly by accommodating local elites' interests to rule their own region, limiting the movement of the armed separatist groups, and promoting social integration among community groups. In the literature of legitimacy, these intentions of *pemekaran* reflect the notion that legitimacy lies on people's perception of the state including the perception fairness, social justice, and social cohesion. Thus, besides improving state institutional performance, *pemekaran* is also intended to improve state-society relations by providing more roles for the locals in managing their region, improving security, and promoting social cohesion.

Moreover, the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* provides a different avenue of developing state legitimacy in Papua. By keeping the idea out of the formal documents, the unofficial approach has the advantage of flexibility so that it can be more adaptive to a more specific demands, such as local elites' interests, although it sometimes contradicts the formal procedures. Regarding the requirements of *pemekaran*, for example, it will be very difficult for any proposed district in Papua to pass the minimum requirements even when the presence of the new district is expected by the Papuan people. Thus, this unofficial approach can bridge national regulation and local context and at the same time provide a way for state legitimisation. The extent to which these goals have (or not) been achieved and how the Papuan people perceive it, will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 6. The Official Intentions of *Pemekaran*: Progress and Limitations

6.1. Introduction

As discussed in chapter two, an authority seeking to claim legitimacy requires foundation upon which the belief of the people in its right to rule can be built. This chapter aims to address the question: *how did the state pursue the official intentions of pemekaran and how the outcomes perceived by stakeholders in Papua?* This thesis argues that territorial reform is part of a process of securing legitimacy of the state. As discussed in chapter five, this research finds two sets of intentions of the district formation through which legitimacy can be nurtured. This chapter presents further findings and discussion of the first set of intentions that were expressed in state documents and official statements. Further, how these intentions have been implemented and how stakeholders perceived the implementation and its outcomes are also presented in the subsequent sections.

Three official intentions of *pemekaran* in Papua are explored in this chapter, namely the provision of public services, acceleration of development and strengthening of local governance. Specifically, this chapter looks at how stakeholders in Papua perceive the progress of these intentions. It relies on information gathered from interviews and group discussions with community leaders, church leaders, journalists, activists, school teachers, nurses as well as security officers, bureaucrats and politicians during fieldwork in three districts and the provincial capital of Papua.

The presentation of findings and discussion in this chapter is structured as follows after this introduction; sections two to four delve into stakeholders' perceptions on the implementation of the three official intentions. In each of these sections, the perceptions are grouped into supportive and critical view, followed by the researcher's reflections on them. Lastly, section five provides a summary of the chapter and underlines the argument that while *pemekaran* has managed to bring the state institution closer to the people, it has not succeeded in making meaningful changes in the lives of most Papuans.

6.2. *Pemekaran* and Public Services Provision

In chapter five this thesis analyses that one of the main objectives of *pemekaran*, as stated in regulations and formal government statements, is to improve public services, such as education and health. Through *pemekaran* the territorial scope of local government becomes smaller; thus, it is expected that the provision and distribution of public services can be executed more effectively and efficiently (Wollmann, 2004). At the same time, decentralization and the regional autonomy system allows local governments to manage local budgets and local revenue sources.

In practice, as some studies have suggested, the smaller the scope of territory and the closer the physical distance between local government and the community do not always go hand-in-hand with improvement of public services (Grossman & Pierskalla, 2014; Lewis, 2017). Likewise, wielding authority over the budget allocation does not always lead to an increase in allocations for public services (A. G. Brata, 2009; Simandjuntak, 2015). Some studies have shown that district governments resulting

from *pemekaran* are still lagging in performance in public service delivery (Bappenas, 2007; World Bank, 2011). A study by Anderson (2013) indicated that *pemekaran* actually tends to downgrade the quality of public services due to the lack of human resources. This section addresses the impact of *pemekaran* toward public services and how it has been perceived by stakeholders in Papua.

6.2.1. Improving Availability and Access

Several respondents suggested that *pemekaran* exerts a positive impact on the availability and access to public services as the transportation infrastructure has increasingly improved. The issue of access and availability is particularly crucial in Papua – the largest province in Indonesia with very low inter-regional accessibility due to challenging geographical terrain and lack of infrastructure (McWilliam, 2011). As a result, before *pemekaran* was introduced, most Papuans lived in remote and isolated areas. Through the establishment of new district government, transportation access to remote areas in Papua has improved. SM, a senior NGO activist, claimed:

> "For me, *pemekaran* brings many positive impacts although there has been jostling for power among some people. I have travelled to various districts in the hinterland of Papua, I cannot imagine how people there would have access to education and health services if there was no *pemekaran*. *Pemekaran* has provided opportunities and authority for the local [leaders] to serve their people. Some progress has been made, yet there are many things to improve."[48]

In line with SM, studies reveal that the presence of new districts in Papua and West Papua have helped address the severe isolation of the region (McWilliam, 2011). Although there are still some regions that can only be accessed through air

[48] SM, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

transportation, the presence of the government encourages economic growth and increases the traffic of people and goods in and out of the region (BPS Kabupaten Puncak, 2019 PDRB). Puncak District Government, for example, purchased two aircraft in 2018 to improve public services.

Dr Neles Tebay, a respected religious leader and peace activist, also cites positive impacts from the policy at the district level. While the initial broaching of *pemekaran* was highly controversial, it's implementation in districts generally received support among Papuans who considered it as fostering development. However, he added there was a strong suspicion among Papuans that the creation of the new province was an attempt by the central government to divide Papuans. Tebay, the former chair of the Papua Peace Network, a network of academicians and activists pursuing peaceful dialogue for Papua, stated:

> *"Pemekaran* of districts, in general, gained more support from the public. I think it's because people see that the establishment of new district brings service closer to them. As an example, in the past, government staff in Oksibil must go to Wamena to process their promotion. That requires taking a flight from Oksibil to Jayapura, then another flight from Jayapura to Wamena. It is very costly. Now they do not need to travel to do that as such matters can be sorted out in Oksibil."[49]

The gains effected by *pemekaran* through improvement in access to public services were also shared by Apollo Safanpo, the rector of Cenderawasih University, the oldest state University in Papua Province. He acknowledged that there was greater access to public service facilities that otherwise would still inaccessible to most Papuans. Safanpo opined:

[49] Neles Tebay, interviewed in Abepura, April 2018.

> "I think *pemekaran* has a positive impact on improving access to public services, especially in education and health. As you can see, even now after the number of districts has increased from nine to 29, it's still difficult for the government to reach some communities in remote areas. Imagine if there was no *pemekaran*?"[50]

Similar positive accounts also emerged during a group discussion with villagers in Keerom. One of the participants, BB, suggested that *pemekaran* created better access to public service.

> "Access to health service is getting better. In the past, when we were still part of Jayapura District, the roads were very poor, the security situation was also not good. There used to be frequent bouts of malnutrition among children. Now, such occurrences are is hardly heard of."[51]

The above statement is fitting as Keerom is one of the "easy" access districts which lies only 70 km from the provincial capital and boasts better road infrastructure compared to most of other districts in Papua. For decades, Keerom was also one of the destinations for the state-sponsored transmigration programme and this ultimately led to a shift in demographics where the migrant population outstripped the native community.[52] In 2008 Keerom ranked 6th of 29 districts on the Human Development Index for Papua province (BPS Papua, 2018). It is also the highest performing new district in Papua in terms of public services provision (World Bank, 2011).

[50] Apollo Safanpo, interviewed in Waena, March 2018.

[51] BB, Group Discussion in Waris, May 2018.

[52] AS, interview in Keerom, March 2018.

6.2.2. The Lack of Improvements

While the general impression of *pemekaran* is positive, especially related to the improvement of access, one gains a different perspective from closer examination of more specific issues involving health and education. Most of the respondents were critical of the performance of new district governments in both sectors. Several respondents acknowledged that *pemekaran* has brought some improvements but they were far below people's expectations. Other respondents complained that public services provisions had not improved and even deteriorated due to the lack of human resources and basic infrastructure.

Several respondents in Keerom, Supiori and Puncak observed provision of public services, especially in the education sector, remained deficient. A young journalist from Puncak District, for instance, view that the quality of education services there was declining due to the lack of teachers as well as the unequal distribution of teachers.

> "The education service in Puncak has been worsening since the establishment of the district because of the problem of teacher distribution. Most of the teachers stay in the district capital which has better facilities. In the non-capital areas, there are school buildings but no teachers. Many teachers have become district employees. Other teachers are more focused on trading activities following the emerging economic opportunities. They have abandoned their job as a teacher."[53]

The above indicates that the problem is not only in the number of teachers but also in the demographic distribution of teachers, as well as their actual presence in the classroom. This is in line with previous studies that have found that teacher absence rate in Papua was the highest in the country at 34%, far above the national average

[53] HE, interviewed in Waena, April 2018.

of 14.8% (ACDP, 2014). It also correlates with the poor teacher-pupil ratio of the province. In 2019, the Papua Province Bureau of Statistics stated that only four of 22 districts resulting from *pemekaran* have met the national standard ratio of 1:20, meaning there should be one teacher for 20 pupils. In most of the districts, a teacher has to teach 41 pupils on average, whilst in some districts a teacher is responsible for 88 to 92 pupils (BPS Papua, 2019).

One might argue that a lack of teachers is common in remote areas throughout Indonesia. Hence, the local government is established to improve such condition. For several respondents in this research, however, *pemekaran* exacerbates the problem due to the absorption of teachers into bureaucratic positions. As mentioned by HY, a university student who also a young journalist.

> "In remote areas, teachers are considered as role models who are respected by the local community. When the district government was formed the government needed influential people to fill positions in bureaucracy. With better incentives as local government officer, many teachers leave their role as educators and choose to become bureaucrats."[54]

Moreover, the secretary of education agency of Papua Province said that teachers are often the most qualified candidates to fill managerial positions in the new districts because usually they meet the administrative requirements, such as the rank and service period. Hence, nearly 90% of officials in the education departments in all districts in Papua were teachers.[55]

[54] HY, interviewed in Jayapura, February 2018.

[55] Protasius Lobya, interviewed in Jayapura, February 2018.

The absorption of teachers into the bureaucracy has also created problems of a poor education management system because it is conducted by a less competent personnel.[56] This development is different from what was practiced in the past where managerial positions were filled by well-trained staff.

> "In the past, the heads education agency in district governments were prepared by the provincial government. So, the assigned officer is a well-trained and experienced staff member. Nowadays, a primary school teacher, physical education teacher and the like can be appointed the head of the education agency in a district. It shouldn't be the case as these positions require knowledge and managerial capacity that is not possessed by teachers."[57]

As a result, educational services in most of the new districts are constrained by administrative problems such as gaps in teachers' distribution, delay in disbursement of school operational funds and teacher salaries. A schoolteacher in Waris, a subdistrict in Keerom located on the border with Papua New Guinea, said:

> "Recently, the transfer of our operational funds was delayed for six months. In 2017, the second part of the fund was not paid until we went to the district office and made a complaint to the *Bupati* (regent). Wages of non-permanent teachers were delayed for nine months due to budget allocation issue. A*D*s a result, teachers did not teach because they had to do other jobs to make money to feed their families." [58]

It was a similar situation in Puncak and Supiori. As in Keerom, there is often a months-long delay in payment of teacher salaries. [59] While the problem is common in remote areas due to the isolated location and the lack of infrastructure, in the new districts the

[56] This claim emerged during the FGF with teachers in Puncak and Keerom.

[57] Protasius Lobya, interviewed in Jayapura, February 2018.

[58] AA Group Discussion in Waris, May 2018.

[59] As informed by a school principal in Ilaga and Sowek.

situation is compounded by the lack of managerial capacity of new district governments and the alleged graft of local elites. A respondent from Keerom said:

> "We are not blaming the central or provincial government but the district government. The district head and officers only think about the personal benefits they can get. So far *pemekaran* has not brought significant changes in education services because of the corrupt behaviour of the elites."[60]

In Puncak District, a respondent who is a high school head teacher complained about the lack of coordination between the district head and the head of the district education agency. "District heads tend to take over everything and don't trust his own men," the respondent said. Consequently, the implementation of programmes was poorly coordinated and even created tension among stakeholders that ultimately affected school activities.

The lack of human resources and leadership in new districts was also suggested by Dr Julius Ary Molet, an academic at Cenderawasih University. In his view, *pemekaran* actually provides opportunities to improve public services in Papua given the availability of budget and local government's authority. Unfortunately, he observes, this opportunity cannot be fully utilized due to the lack of human resources capacity.

> "I think *pemekaran* provides a good opportunity for public services improvement, unfortunately, it has not been accompanied by the preparation of human resources. Strategic positions have been filled by incompetent staff due to the strong culture of patrimonialism. As a result, the provision of public services in many places don't meet people's demands, and it's even getting worse."[61]

[60] AA Group Discussion in Waris, May 2018.

[61] JAM, interviewed in Waena, February 2018

For Molet, the key to solving the problems lies in leadership, who should be able to find a balance between social pressure on the one hand and professional requirements on the other to ensure the effective work of governance.

The problem of human resources has also impacted the health sector. Based on Health Minister Decree No 81/2004, the ideal ratio of general practitioners in 2019 is 96 per 100,000 population or 1: 1,042. In effect, there should be at least one GP for every 1,042 inhabitants. However, none of the new districts in Papua meet this requirement, and in fact fall woefully short. On average, every GP in a new district in Papua must serve 5,850 inhabitants. Moreover, in some remote districts such as Nduga and Lanny Jaya, there is only one doctor for every 19,000 inhabitants (BPS, 2018).

Besides the lack of medical staff, the issue of personnel distribution has also become a challenge for the health sector. As in the education sector, the distribution of medical staff in the new districts in Papua is highly concentrated in the district' capitals. For example, in 2019 in Puncak there were 10 general practitioners, five dentists, 48 midwives, and 116 nurses. Four out of 10 doctors (40%), 19 of 48 midwives (30%) and 48 from 116 nurses (41%) are stationed in Ilaga, the capital of Puncak District (BPS Puncak, 2018). Apart from the limited facilities and infrastructure that made doctors reluctant to live in other subdistricts of Puncak, security conditions were also a major issue. This was conveyed by a senior officer in Puncak District Health Agency during an interview in Ilaga.

> "The security situation in some subdistricts in Puncak District is still unconducive until today. Subdistricts such as Pogoma, Agandugume, Sinak and Doufo are red (categorised as dangerous) areas that are still prone to security threats from civilian armed groups. In Agandugume, a group threatened a doctor and took his mobile phone

> and camera. We had to move the doctor to a safer area. Consequently, health services in Agandugume have stopped." [62]

Criticism of the performance of public services in the new districts of Papua is not only expressed by activists, Papuan community members, and Papuan officials, but also by military officials. In an interview at the Papua Province Military Command (Kodam Cenderawasih), a middle ranking officer who has served in Papua for more than 10 years said:

> "Ideally *pemekaran* would bring public services within closer reach of the people. But with such limited human resources, I don't think *pemekaran* should have been done. It is feasible in terms of geographical size, but in terms of human resources, both the quantity and quality, it's still very limited. As a result, although many new districts emerged, there is no substantial change in the education nor in the health sectors."[63]

A similar account was given by a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Home Affairs. He remarks that while the idea of *pemekaran* is to bring services closer to the community, years of implementation suggested that most districts resulting from *pemekaran* are still underperforming. "Even the parent districts itself are still problematic, let alone the new districts," he says.[64]

6.2.3. Managing Public Expectations

[62] KK, interviewed in Ilaga Puncak, May 2018.

[63] ES, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

[64] TU, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

The above discussion shows that the impact of *pemekaran* on public services is perceived differently by respondents. Some respondents believed that *pemekaran* has brought improvements, especially the increasing access to public services. Other respondents believed that the improvements made, if any, were limited and progress was slow. More critically, several respondents assess that instead of improving, public services in some of the new districts, especially in the Highlands region, had deteriorated since the policy took effect. While each of these opinions is justified and based on a legitimate reason, the difference in opinions reflected subjective underlying expectations at play in judging the situation.

In contrast to what one might expect, respondents who are from activist and academic backgrounds gave measured and positive evaluations of the development. Although acknowledging that the achievements of *pemekaran* had yet to fulfil people's expectation, the respondents view that tangible progress was noticeable in the new districts, especially the areas that were previously untouched by the government. This perspective may also be influenced by the physical distance of the respondents. While their understandings of life in the new districts is not questioned, the fact that they are not living there may influence their subjective expectations.

Respondents living in the new districts who have more direct interaction with the new district government on a daily basis and have become part of the system – such as teachers, medical staff, youth and local community leaders – tended to have a different view. As they have experienced the difficulties on daily basis, they hold greater expectations for rapid improvement. Likewise, the same was true for people living outside the district capital who see a widening gap between their village and the district

capital region. These subjective feelings then accumulated into disappointment with the government.

Interestingly, respondents blamed the district government alone for the poor performance but not the provincial and central governments. Several respondents explicitly mentioned that the problem lay in the district leadership and lack of local bureaucratic capacity. On the other hand, respondents appreciated the central government that already showed its responsiveness by establishing new districts, providing them with autonomy as well as development funds. Seen from this perspective, *pemekaran* as an effort to improve relations between the state and society has actually been successful.

However, the growing concern of the lack of concrete performance of new districts and widening perception of a service gap within districts may undermine public trust in the government, not only the local administration but also the national government. As Rotberg (2004) put it, “public services provide content to the social contract between ruler and ruled (p, 2-3). Expressed differently, they are "the glue that binds the state and society together" (Milliken and Krause 2002, 761). Without sufficient progress or at least perceived progress, especially in provision of public services, the establishment of new districts through *pemekaran* would come up short in the goal to strengthen state-society relations. Instead, the growing belief among Papuan that *pemekaran* only benefited the elites and particular communities may undermine social cohesion, the real glue of state-society relations. Hence, while the public seems to blame the local government for failure of local services, lack of improvement in public service in the long run can undermine the state’s legitimacy.

6.3. *Pemekaran* and Development Acceleration

Besides improving public services, the Indonesian government stated that *pemekaran* aims to encourage equality and to accelerate development through the improvement of budget distribution. With the increasing budget transfer from central government, the development is expected to be faster and more evenly distributed across the region. In Papua, infrastructure development following the establishment of new districts, is particularly aimed at ending the severe isolation that detracted from improvements in general welfare. Based on a series of interviews and group discussions, this section discusses how public perceived the progress of economic development in new districts.

6.3.1. Promoting Development to Remote Areas

Although most respondents seem dissatisfied with the status of improvements in public services since *pemekaran,* they concede that it has led to development in remote areas in Papua that would otherwise remain backward. The formation of new districts was followed by the improvement of transportation, telecommunication facilities, health service centres as well as traditional markets and shops that stimulated the local economy. These positive assessments emerged from interviews with various respondents in Jayapura, Keerom, Supiori, Biak, Puncak and Jakarta during fieldwork in the summer of 2018.

Among the respondents who shared a positive impression of *pemekaran* was Komarudin Watubun, National Parliament (DPR) legislator from Papua. He asserted *pemekaran* promoted the acceleration of development in previously marginalized

areas such as the hinterland of Papua. Although the performance of new districts has yet to meet people's expectations, he believed *pemekaran* ushered in a significant breakthrough.

> "Certainly, local communities feel the positive impact of *pemekaran*. It is true that *pemekaran* has not yet fulfilled all of the expectations, as is the case in many areas in Indonesia. The size of a district territory in Papua can be as big as one province in Java. Just an n inch of asphalt in the hinterland will be seen as an effort to distribute development. Electricity is now becoming more widely available in rural areas. Without *pemekaran*, all of these areas would have remained dark and inaccessible."[65]

The emerging development facilitated by district creation was also confirmed by other respondents such as JG, a member of the Papuan Provincial Parliament (DPRP). For JG, the establishment of new districts has improved connectivity between regions in Papua. Places such as Wemena and Mulia in the Central Highlands that previously could only be accessed through small aircraft can now be reached by land [66]. On this point, a respondent from Puncak District says that most of the people appreciate the positive impact that has emerged since the establishment of district government in their area.

> "People wanted to enjoy things like in the city, such as riding motorcycles or driving a car. All this time they only heard the sounds of airplanes. Then there was heavy equipment coming to open the road. Now motorcycles and cars have entered their territory. There are health centres, kindergartens and so on. So, they say "wow, our village has become a city now". This shows that the community appreciates the development that they are starting to feel."[67]

[65] Komarudin Watubun, interviewed in Jakarta, May 2018.

[66] JG, interviewed in Jayapura, February 2018.

[67] AB, interviewed in Puncak, May 2018.

Progress in development driven by *pemekaran* in the hinterland of Papua was also recognized by a respondent who was a former senior official in Keerom District and a long-serving bureaucrat in Papua.

> "From my 40 years of service in Papua, I can see that *pemekaran* has brought many changes. In the past, the government only developed areas that are easy to access, such as Sorong, Biak, Jayapura, Manokwari and Merauke. The highlands area was completely untouched. Now that there are more than 10 districts in the highlands, infrastructure in the region is much better than before." [68]

Indeed, most of the *pemekaran* measures in Papua occurred in the hinterland of Papua, the Central Highlands region. Of the 22 new districts, 15 are located in the Central Highlands. Until 1999, the region that is home to more than 60% of Papua's population consisted of only four districts covering one third of the province's territory. The Central Highlands is also the area with the highest poverty rate in the province. Based on the latest available statistics, this region contributes 53% to the total people living below the poverty line in the province (BPS, 2019). According to head of the Regional Planning Board of Papua Province, however, the number is decreasing.

> "During the last 15 years, the poverty rate in Papua has fallen from 58% of the total population in 1999 to 27% in 2018. This means that more than half of the poverty rate has been successfully eradicated. That is an extraordinary achievement. So, don't say that we aren't doing anything."[69]

Some attribute this reported decline in poverty figures to regional development triggered by *pemekaran.* Dr Tebay is among them. During an interview in his office at Fajar Timur School of Philosophy in Abepura, Tebay remarks that implementation of

[68] WS, interviewed in Keerom, March 2018

[69] Mohamad Musa'ad, interviewed in Jayapura, February 2018.

territorial division encouraged the redistribution of resources and access to these resources for more people to benefit.

> "*Pemekaran* has made possible the redistribution of resources. Suppose that in the past one village could get only one portion, now the village is divided into three and each village gets its share. So, if in the past there was only one *bupati*, now there are three. Likewise, with members of the DPRD and officials in the government. I think people can see it; not only see but also feel it because the district (position) is close to the community. The impact is not far afield, but close and people can feel it directly."[70]

Apart from reducing poverty, Tito Karnavian, speaking at the time in his capacity as National Police chief, believed that more balanced and equal development in Papua would also improve security conditions. Tito, who subsequently became home affairs minister for the period 2019-2024, reflects that Papua's major issue was the development disparities that kindled a feeling of unjust treatment among Papuans.

> "The lack of development is indeed the important root of the problem (in Papua). I observed that after the government accelerates development, implementing special autonomy, as well as allocated more budget to Papua, the voices of independence are not as loud as before. We hardly heard the call for independence in the developing regions such as Sorong, Merauke, Fak Fak, Kaimana and Manokwari. Previously these regions were the base of the OPM. Now there is almost no loud voice from these regions. Well, there is but not as loud as before. Why's that? Because the regions have been more developed."[71]

Tito's comment endorses economic development as the approach to mitigate the call for Papuan independence. For Tito, the acceleration of equitable development is the solution for the Papua problem as well as to enhance state legitimacy in Papua.

[70] Neles Tebay, interviewed in Abepura, April 2018.

[71] Karnavian, Interviewed in Jakarta, November 2018.

6.3.2. Development Disparities Within Region

From the outsider's point of view, the progress of development driven by *pemekaran* in Papua looks promising. However, a less positive account was shared by respondents with more direct experience of living in the new districts. For respondents of Supiori, Keerom and Puncak, the progress of development and public services made by their respective local governments is still below expectations. Most of the respondents were also concerned about the widening gap in development between district capitals and their surrounding areas, let alone compared to a remote subdistrict. In addition, several respondents expressed concern at increasing economic disparity between migrant and native communities.

Some respondents interviewed in Supiori, Keerom and Puncak District claimed the development in their districts was slow despite the central government's allocation of a higher amount of development funds. In Puncak District, for instance, a community member claims that the infrastructure condition in Ilaga, the capital of the district, was almost unchanged in the last decade.

> "The district has been in existence for more than 10 years, but until today those of us who live in the district capital still cannot enjoy electricity and clean water, even though these are two basic needs for everyone."[72]

Most people in Ilaga rely on rainwater catchment for their clean water supply. Electricity supply is also limited and cannot supply the whole community, even people living in the vicinity of the district capital.[73] According to a teacher who has worked in

[72] MT, interviewed in Ilaga, May 2018.

[73] MT, interviewed in Ilaga, May 2018.

Ilaga for the last five years, there is no electricity or mobile phone reception even in villages only two miles from the district capital.[74] A village secretary in Supiori District vouched to similar problems at the family residence on the outskirts of Sorendiweri, the district capital:

> It has been more than 15 years since this district was established [2002] but there has been no meaningful development. We want our village to progress quickly, too, but the development has been stagnant. For example, the development of a 1,000-meter-stretch of coastal embankment that started in 2013 has only completed 350 meters as of today. It's still unclear what will happen with the remaining 650 meters."[75]

According to the respondent, the problem mainly lies in the leadership. The district chief and district officials are rarely in the office and most district employees also do not live in Supiori, hence implementation of development programmes was poorly managed.

The gap in development is not only felt by communities located in a remote geographical setting like Puncak and Supiori, but also in areas such as Keerom that are more accessible. Keerom is only about 80 km from Jayapura with a good road network. However, the gap between Arso, the transmigration area which is considered the unofficial capital of the district, and other areas of Keerom is pronounced. [76] WS, a former senior officer in Keerom District, was among the respondents who noted this discrepancy.

[74] MT, interviewed in Ilaga, May 2018.

[75] YA, interviewed in Supiori, April 2018.

[76] Based on Law No 26/2002 on the establishment of Keerom district, the capital of the district is Waris which is located closer to the border area with PNG. However, since the beginning the district administration is centered in Arso, a transmigration area that has much better infrastructure and facilities.

> "The infrastructure and public facilities are indeed more widely available in Arso because the size of the population here is far larger than other areas of Keerom. That is why Arso is considered the de facto capital of Keerom even though Waris, 50 km away from Arso, is the legally designated capital.[77]

Ironically, despite its status, Waris still does not have an electricity supply. A respondent made the following comment during a group discussion in Waris:

> "We feel unfairly treated in our homeland. Until now we have not enjoyed electricity, while the people in Arso and Senggi have electricity 24/7. We do not get the same service. Are we not equal citizens? Electricity is basic. The community's economy will be able to progress if there is electricity. Education is also hampered because there is no electricity available." [78]

Respondents reported similar circumstances in small fishing villages in Sowek, Rani Island, and Insumbabi Island, which are part of Supiori District. They complained about the lack of clean water, electricity and the high price of fuel which hampered their fishing activities. They often were unable to go to sea because of shortages of fuel to run their boat, or its high cost. The availability of electricity would allow them to keep their catch in cold storage; otherwise, their only option was to sell it to a broker at a much lower price. The community did not feel *pemekaran* had brought much positive impact on their lives or livelihood.[79]

Limitations in the scope and performance of local governments were acknowledged by a senior official in Puncak districts. For him, the problems confronted by new

[77] WS, interviewed in Keerom, March 2018.

[78] AA, FGD in Waris, May 2018.

[79] Interviews with fishermen in Rani Island, Insumbabi Island and Sowek village, April 2018.

districts in Papua, especially those in the highlands, are not only related to the dearth of qualified human resources but also tied to the high cost of construction materials.

> "There is a gap between public expectation and government capacity, including budget limitations. In facing such a difficult terrain, we need a much larger budget if we want to cover every corner. With the budget as it is now, we have so far only been able to focus on the area that is more accessible, such as district capitals and their vicinity." [80]

The development gap between the district capital and subdistricts is fuelling demands for further *pemekaran*. A subdistrict in Puncak, for example, has broached *pemekaran* in East Puncak District due to the slow progress in development of its area compared to the district capital. According to a legislator from Papua, as of 2019 at least 30 proposals for new districts had been submitted to the central government[81].

Although giving a positive opinion of *pemekaran* as a development instrument, several interviewees rejected the idea that *pemekaran* can moderate secessionist aspirations. JG, a member of the DPRD, asserts that development is the state's obligation and should not be related to the idea of independence. In response to the question if *pemekaran* may reduce the demand for independence, JG opined:

> "Ah no, that cannot be changed. So, it's better to view *pemekaran* in the context of development. Don't see *pemekaran* in the political context of independence because there won't be an end to it. You won't get the answer. It's better for us to talk about *pemekaran* in the context of regional development, which is why we want it. Don't mix up *pemekaran* and development with political issues, you can't. That is like heaven and earth, it has nothing to do with it. *Pemekaran* is purely for regional development, that's all."[82]

[80] DT interviewed in Ilaga, May 2018.

[81] JR, interviewed in Jakarta

[82] JG, interviewed in Jayapura, February 2018

JG's argument was echoed by SM:

> "There is no correlation at all. As to why there's no correlation, I always say that development is the right of citizens and the government's obligation. The ideology of Papuan nationalism cannot be bought with anything, it cannot be reduced by anything.[83]

Similarly, VM, a senior Papuan journalist, doubted that developmentalism can bring a solution the Papua problem.

> "I do not agree with the assumption that if welfare in Papua improves, then the legitimacy of the state will be strengthened. Papua's problem is not welfare. I have repeatedly complained, why is it so difficult for this country to admit its mistakes? Punish people who have committed violence, apologise to the Papuan and resolve cases of human rights violations. I don't deny that there has been change. But as long as this country cannot stop bullets targeting civilians, then this (freedom movement) will continue. Even if the state brings heaven to Papua, if Papuans continue to be tortured, it won't change anything."[84]

For some Papuans, the dream of independence will persist regardless of the actions of the Indonesian government. "Whatever this country gives, it would never change our dream to see our own flag raised in this land. I am sure one day it will happen, although not in my lifetime," said an ex-OPM combatant.[85]

6.3.4. The Needs for Inclusive Development

Similar to provision of services, the progress of infrastructure and economic development in the new districts has been perceived differently by respondents. Some

[83] SM, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

[84] VM, interviewed in Jayapura, May 2018

[85] EA interviewed in Keerom, March 2018.

respondents suggest the establishment of scores of districts had helped open access to many areas in Papua that would otherwise remain disconnected from the outside world. Some other respondents, however, complained about the slow and limited progress of development and its inability to empower economy, especially the local communities. While both arguments are justified, the discrepancy between people's expectations and the capacity of local government to manage public expectations has preserved (if not reinforced) Papuans' historic grievances about unfair development, the important source of Papuan distrust toward the state (Widjojo, 2010).

Managing public expectations is a challenge for the government, not only for the district governments that resulted from *pemekaran* but also the central government which has granted the demand for *pemekaran*. As suggested by many respondents, the presence of local government has raised hope for a better life among communities that have experienced decades of marginalisation. At this point *pemekaran* presents a prime opportunity to restore the state's legitimacy in the eyes of Papuans. These opportunities will be optimal when the outcomes of *pemekaran* can be felt by as many people as possible. In other words, *pemekaran* should be followed by an inclusive development where the benefits of growth are shared equitably among societies, particularly the vulnerable groups. The failure to meet public expectations carries the risk of chipping away at confidence in the government. Uneven development among regions and unfair competition among community groups in accessing economic opportunities may weaken social cohesion, the very element required for state legitimacy.

After more than 10 years[86] of new district establishment, most respondents said infrastructure and economic development in most of the districts have not made a significant impact on the welfare of the majority of population. Furthermore, the development of new districts resulting from *pemekaran* tends to create a gap in development in the region, especially between the district capital and other areas. Emerging economic opportunities in new districts have also benefited the migrants' community more than locals who have fewer skills and the capital l to engage in market economic. Hence, instead of fulfilling public expectations, development in the newly established districts in Papua tend to preserve and reinforce grievances toward the government, especially the local government.

6.4. *Pemekaran* and the Strengthening of Local Governance

The third official goal of *pemekaran* found in this research as has been discussed in chapter five, is promoting local governance that is capable of implementing decentralisation and regional autonomy. As such, besides addressing the institutional deliverables such as public services, economic development and security provisions, *pemekaran* also aims to enable an environment for an effective governance. Hence, aspects such as public engagement and participation, bureaucrat capacity, leadership vision and commitment, among others, become important objectives of *pemekaran*. This section aims to elaborate to what extent these goals have been achieved and what obstacles have been encountered, in the views of respondents.

[86] Several districts have been established for more than 15 years, such as Supiori and Keerom that were established in 2002.

6.4.1. The Increase of Local Participation

Several respondents said one of the most visible results of *pemekaran* is the increasing involvement of local communities in managing their local government. Since 2005, district leaders as well as local legislators are elected by the people in a direct election (Pilkada Langsung"). The newly created districts have also provided many government administrative positions. Meanwhile, the adoption of the special autonomy law gives indigenous Papuans a feeling of pride in filling governmental positions. As a result, civil service and bureaucrat recruitment are based more on ethnicity than meritocratic principles, creating the "Papuanisation of bureaucracy" (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004; McGibbon, 2004).

As SM noted "Papuans need to be involved in the decision-making that they have never been part of".[87] Therefore, the formation of new districts through *pemekaran* is welcomed by Papuans as an opportunity to manage their own land and determine the direction of local development. JG, a member of the Papuan Regional Government, said:

> "One of the positive effects of *pemekaran* is the opening of opportunities for the locals to fill strategic positions in district government and determine the direction of development for the community."[88]

In the same vein, Neles Tebay said that the increase number of districts in Papua province has created wider opportunity for Papuan to be involved in ruling the government, both in executive as well as legislative organisations.

[87] SM, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

[88] JG, interviewed in Jayapura

> "*Pemekaran* provides Papuans with access to sources of power. So, if in the past there was only one regent, now there are three regents. Likewise, with members of the DPRD and officials in the government. If previously there was only one head of the education unit, now there are three similar positions, and so on."[89]

The increasing number of district government were followed by the growth in the number of subdistricts and kampungs or village across the region. In 2005 with 20 districts in Papua, there were 250 subdistrict and 2442 villages. Following the established of nine new districts, in 2010 the number of subdistricts increased to 385 and kampungs rose to 3565. Until 2020, the number of districts is constant, but the number of sub-districts and villages had significantly increased to 576 districts and 5549 villages respectively. In other words, in the last 10 years there has been an increase in the number of districts by 66% and an increase in the number of villages by 64% (BPS, 2020).

The growth of local government institutions from district to village level, followed by the increasing number of civil servants. In 2005, the number of civil servants in Papua was 45,186; it increased to 70,342 by 2010, and 85,457 in 2015. By end of 2019, the number of civil servants in Papua province was 89,241 (BPS Papua, 2020). The sharp increases in the five-year span from 2005-2010 can be attributed to the establishment of nine district governments during that period.

The increasing involvement of local communities should be seen as a positive achievement, irrespective of actual performance in their roles. Groups of indigenous people who were apathetic toward the government are now taking part in managing local governance, whether as a chief executive, bureaucrat or politician. This can be

[89] Neles Tebay, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

seen as positive progress, especially when related to the basic goal of *pemekaran* to build public trust in the state.

6.4.2. The Lack of Capacity, Commitment, and Leadership of Bureaucracy

While the increasing participation of Papuan in local administration is welcomed by many respondents, some studies argue that it has created paradox as the phenomenon benefit only the elites and sacrifices more Papuan due to the inability of the elites to carry out their function properly (Suryawan, 2011; Widjojo, 2010). In line with this argument, several respondents in this research complained about the underperformance of Papuan bureaucracy. At least three fundamental issues about the government performance emerged during the interviews; i.e. lack of competency, lack of commitment, rampant corruption. These findings confirm previous studies related to *pemekaran* in Papua (e.g. Bertrand, 2014; Suryawan, 2011). In addition, while most of the previous studies focused on individual members of the elites, this study also examines the bureaucracy as an institution, hence adding the layer of analysis of statebuilding in Papua.

As discussed in the previous chapter, most of the implementation of *pemekaran* in Papua was based more on political and security considerations rather than technocratic considerations such as the number of population, human resources and local revenue (Loen, 2014). Consequently, it tends to ignore technocratic requirements, such as the availability of human resources and minimum infrastructure required to run the government. On the other hand, effective decentralisation demands expertise and basic facilities without which little of value can be achieved (Prud'homme, 1995). As a result, most of the districts were unable to operate

optimally. This issue was confirmed by the Papua Province police chief (2017-2018), Boy Rafli Amar.

> “Papuan people have actually been given considerable opportunities to play a role in development, such as priority to fill various strategic positions of government. The problem is that their human resources are very limited. Hence, improving the capacity of Papuan human resources is crucial.”[90]

The lack of competence of the Papuan bureaucratic apparatus is also recognized by JG who highlights the problem of development planning. For JG, the lack of capacity of Papuan bureaucrats lead to an uninspired development plan. As a result, many districts have made very slow and limited progress of development. Furthermore, in JG’s opinion,

> “Among the obstacles to accelerating development lies in poor planning, which does not answer the regional needs. The development planning apparatuses are unable to improvise and tend to serve the interests of their officials, politicians or regional heads.”[91]

Meanwhile, according to TAH, a Papuan community leader who has been detained on charges of treason, the poor performance of the government in Papua is mainly due to district leaders who are unable to maintain the people's trust. TAH said,

> "They (the district heads) misused the public budget for the benefit of themselves and their families. Many of them like to drink, gamble, and sex. They never stay for long in their area to think about policy innovations and so on. Meanwhile, the supervision from the central government is lacking, they even seem to let the local elites behave

[90] BR, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

[91] JG, interviewed in Jayapura, March 2018.

> as they wish. So, in this case I would say, the elites in Jakarta and in Papua are the same."[92]

In line with TAH, a local community leader in Supiori, YA, said that the good and bad performance of the local government is largely determined by the leadership's commitment, especially in Papuan society where the role of a leader is very influential. He said,

> "It all depends on the regent and how he is able to cooperate and mobilize the organisational instruments. If a regent can provide good direction, the government system will run well, public services can be delivered appropriately. But in reality, here (in Supiori) as you can see for yourself, the regent's office is always empty, we never know where the regent is. I visited his office several times but the regent was never there. We hope that, as the people who voted for him, the government can work normally. Well, if there are obstacles, invite us to talk."[93]

Confirming YA statement, another respondent in Supiori said that the district head of Supiori has never met with the community since his second inauguration. He deliberately avoided the people, including his own election campaign team, the respondent alleged, because he had promised Rp 15 million rupiah to everyone who voted for him in the last local election.[94]

The lack of commitment among the leadership affects commitment of the general bureaucrats, including the high rate of absenteeism among bureaucrats. This problem complained by respondents in all of the districts during my fieldwork. There are various reasons for the problem, including distance for some areas, lack of infrastructure and the poor discipline and work ethic among elements of the bureaucracy. The Supiori

[92] TAH, interviewed in Jayapura, March 2018.

[93] YA, interviewed in Supiori, April 2018.

[94] FA, interviewed in Supiori, April 2018.

District deputy chief acknowledged the attendance rate is a problem in Supiori because most of the employees still lived in Biak, the capital of the parent district. Before the division, Supiori employees were employed in Biak District and most resided there. In addition, public infrastructure and facilities in Biak are far better than in Supiori.

> "The reason is there is no housing available in Supiori. But the district head already mandated that all employees, without exception, must be in Supiori. It is permitted to live in Biak but at 9 a.m. they must already be in the office in Supiori, which is a two-hour drive." [95]

Keerom District shares a similar situation with between 70% to 80% of its employees residing in Jayapura. Meanwhile, in Puncak, besides the lack of infrastructure, civil servants are reluctant to reside in Puncak District due to continuing security concerns. Some Puncak employees and officials have chosen to remain in Timika or Jayapura and only occasionally journey to Puncak. However, according to a respondent in Puncak District, the main cause is the lack of role model since the leaders also have poor commitment.

> "The district head and officers rarely visit Ilaga. They usually come only if there are events, such as public meetings, the Independence Day ceremony, Christmas celebrations and other ceremonial activities. Last year, the district head did not show up for about four months, and neither did his staff. If the district head takes the first flight out, then the rest take the next flight."[96]

Besides hampering a district's performance, the employee residency issue hindered expected economic growth of the districts. The presence of district government was

[95] OE, Interviewed in Supiori, April 2018

[96] JL, interviewed in Ilaga, June 2018.

forecast to galvanize local economies through the increase of local transactions. This expectation, unfortunately, did not materialise because most of the funds were spent outside the district. This account was shared by SS, a village chief in Keerom District and also a local businessman.

> "Through *pemekaran* we hoped there would be an economic spillover driven by the spending of local government employees. It didn't happen because 95% of the Keerom District employees do not live here. Imagine if 3,000 of the district employees and their families lived here, the economy would definitely move much faster."[97]

The above statement supports the argument that *pemekaran* creates a paradox of benefiting the elites at the expense of most Papuans, as Widjojo (2008) suggests. Yet, unlike infrastructure, the capacity building of the Papuan bureaucracy does not seem to be the concern of the government. Some of the respondents, for example, indicated that schools were built but there were no teachers for them; there are health centre facilities but no medical staff on standby; government offices that stand idle most of the time because officials are unavailable.[98]

6.5. Conclusions

This chapter investigated stakeholder assessments on the implementation of state institutionalisation through *pemekaran* – the establishment of new district governments in Papua. As discussed in the previous chapter, *pemekaran* is aimed at bolstering the process of state legitimisation by improving state performance in Papua. Respondents provided their perceptions on the performance of new district

[97] SS, interviewed in Arso, Keerom, April 2018.

[98] As mentioned by HY, AK, and NT.

governments, particularly related to provision of services and local development. The findings exposed that while the establishment of district governments through *pemekaran* received widespread support, there are shortcomings in the implementation of *pemekaran* of districts in Papua which can be summarised in two issues.

First, there is a striking gap in development between district capitals and outlying areas. Respondents contended that the improvements brought by *pemekaran* centred only in the district capital area. This gap created disappointment among communities and prompted demands for the formation of another new district. Second, the progress of development has been slow with low tangible achievements, even in the district capital. While the establishment of local government brought great hope for better welfare, so far, the local government has lacked the capacity to meet public demands. On the other hand, decentralisation and the regional autonomy system have limited the role of the central and provincial government at the local level.

These criticisms show that the problem lies more in the failure to manage public expectations. In principle, the public believes that *pemekaran* has brought change, such as greater availability of public services, more transportation access and increased economic infrastructure. At this point, *pemekaran* succeeded in creating public awareness that the state has begun to devote more attention to a population whose needs were neglected for decades. Yet, to the respondents, the progress of the development in the new districts in Papua has not benefited the majority of people. Apart from creating gaps among the “haves” and “have-nots” of regions, development is also unable to empower local communities due to the lack of local government capacity.

Besides providing their assessment of local government performance, respondents also indicated the obstacles that may have been responsible. Among the recurring issues cited by respondents is the lack of human resources to run the district governments. As some respondents acknowledged, *pemekaran* in Papua was based more upon political considerations rather than local readiness, including the availability of human resources. On the other hand, new districts in Papua have the same obligatory functions as other districts in Indonesia, hence they require sufficient human resources. This situation becomes even more complicated since the rise of "Papuanisation of bureaucracy" which has tended to eschew the merit-based recruitment of bureaucracy. Strategic positions have instead been filled by incompetent personnel who were recruited based on kinship, family ties or political affiliation. This phenomenon reinforced strong patrimonialism in Papuan society which ultimately prevented the machinery of bureaucracy from being able to deliver its functions properly. As a result, although many buildings and facilities were built, there are no significant changes in the concrete provision of public services.

Another obstacle to the districts' performance is weakness of leadership. Leadership characteristics strongly influence the conduct of local government, especially in weak bureaucratic institutions. Many respondents view that the progress of the district depends largely on the leadership capacity and commitment. Unfortunately, despite a lack of vision and commitment, some leaders are often unable to separate their private interests from the greater public interest that they have pledged to serve.

Although the above constraints are also shared by many local governments in Indonesia, for newly formed districts in Papua these issues create serious impact on government performance. For most people in newly created districts in Papua, the

government is a new entity that is expected to bring change. Other entities such as the private sector and civil society have not yet emerged. The existing entities are the customary institution and the church; however, these also have limited resources. In fact, they rely more on the government than being equal partners capable of providing alternative resources or having control functions. As such, the government is the only actor who provides public services as well as drives economic development. The failure of bureaucracy means the collapse of public services and economic development. This is different from other regions where economic development and public services are not entirely dependent on the government and other non-state institutions exist to provide partnership.

In short, the findings discussed in this chapter suggested that the formation of new districts through *pemekaran* has indeed created opportunities to improve the state's legitimacy in Papua. However, the lack of capacity and the absence of capacity-building arrangements have hindered the performance of districts to meet public expectations. Hence, while *pemekaran* did manage to bring the government closer to the people, it has not yet succeeded in making meaningful changes in the lives of most Papuans. In this sense, it has not fulfilled the quest for state legitimisation and may, in fact, have diminished it further.

Chapter 7. The Unofficial Intentions of *Pemekaran*: Progress and Limitations

7.1. Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapters, apart from the official goals of *pemekaran* which largely focus on improving the Indonesian state's institutional performance, there are also unofficial objectives centring more on relational aspects. More often than not, the relational objectives of *pemekaran* are unofficially stated rather than explicitly written in available official documents or formal speeches. In the case of Papua, the underlying relational objectives of *pemekaran* have often been linked to Papuan disappointment in its treatment by the central government as well as long-held calls for Papuan independence (Aspinall, 2013; Mietzner, 2017). Based on fieldwork findings, this chapter aims to explore possible underlying mechanisms that linked *pemekaran* with the state's aims to ameliorate its problematic relations with Papuan. The exploration is guided by the final research sub-question; *How did the state pursue the unofficial intentions of pemekaran and how was the outcomes of pemekaran perceived by stakeholders in Papua?*

Understanding *pemekaran* as a measure to improve state-society relations is in line with current statebuilding discourses which consider statebuilding as a relational process rather than solely as state capacity building (Mac Ginty, 2014; Marquette & Beswick, 2011; Pouligny, 2010). While acknowledging the salience of state capacity in managing public goods, the relational approach underlines the importance of social aspects such as trust, fairness, justice and social cohesion (Beetham, 1991b;

Chandler, 2007; Pouligny, 2010). As Beetham (Beetham, 1991b) argues, statebuilding achievements are seen from the extent to which things done by the state can be justified against common values or shared beliefs. In Papua, the question of Indonesian state legitimacy has been contested since its territorial integration in 1969. Hence, any policy pursued by the central government will be viewed as part of state strategy to strengthen its legitimacy.

Establishment of new districts in Papua, which was largely conducted through a bottom-up process, was part of the Indonesian government's effort to assuage Papuan grievances (Haryanto et al., 2018; Mcgibbon, 2004). Working from this view and following the research findings discussed in chapter five, this thesis proposes three mechanisms through which *pemekaran* serves as a strategy to improve state-society relations in Papua. First, *pemekaran* provides the opportunity for the local elite to control their territory under the decentralised system. Second, *pemekaran* limits the mobility of Papuan freedom fighters with an increased Indonesian military presence along in conjunction with the establishment of new districts. Thirdly, *pemekaran* triggered an influx of migration to Papua that changes the demographic structures and promotes national identity, both of which might combine to weaken public support for the independence movement.

This chapter discusses how these mechanisms are perceived by stakeholders. In doing so, the chapter is divided into three main sections; section one discusses *pemekaran* as an instrument of accommodation for elite interests. *Pemekaran* as an instrument of expanding security coverage is discussed in section two. The third section discusses *pemekaran* as an instrument of social integration. In each section the achievements and limitations of each mechanism is discussed, followed by a

discussion on its impact with regard to the state's legitimacy. This chapter concludes by drawing the linkage between the overall mechanisms with state legitimacy in Papua and suggests that *pemekaran* has further undermined state legitimacy due to the lack of attention to local context.

7.2. *Pemekaran* as Elite Accommodation

Pemekaran acting as an instrument for elite accommodation is discussed in chapter 5 as one of the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran*. By accommodating local elites' interests and distributing power among them, the state aims to maintain the stability of Jakarta-Papua relations that is required for development, according to several respondents. Although the idea of elite accommodation through *pemekaran* has never appeared in formal documents, this idea was widely shared among state actor respondents as well as by activists. It also in line with the argument broached by academics that the power provision aims to moderate local elites and reduce anti-centralist or even secessionist sentiment (Aspinall, 2013; Mietzner, 2017). This section addresses how the implementation of this idea has been perceived by stakeholders in Papua.

7.2.1. Co-Opting Local Elite through Power Distribution

Many respondents in this research appreciated the central government's step to provide political space for local stakeholders by granting the proposals for *pemekaran*. They considered this as a remedial policy for the highly centralised system that has marginalised Papuan for decades. Thus, through *pemekaran* the central government

acknowledges the role of local actors to manage the development of their region. This view was shared by Fadli Zon, Deputy Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament (2014-2019), among others.

> "Allowing Papuans to run their own local government is an affirmative action that was also granted to other regions such as Aceh that suffered from state mistreatment in the past. However, we cannot please every party. Dissatisfied groups are everywhere, especially driven by those seeking political power and position."[99]

The government's effort to embrace Papuan elites was also seen by some as the right step to improve Jakarta-Papua relations. General Tito Karnavian, the National Police Chief (2016-2019), said that while some Papuan leaders had not performed optimally in office, this effort was quite successful in mitigating Papuan discontent.

> "I think many people are quite happy with the current situation in which most of the positions are held by Papuans. Voices opposing the government are also diminishing. Granted, there are certain groups that are still not happy. But it is normal. What we need to be alert to is outside support to this group, especially from Western countries " [100]

Appreciation for the elite accommodation approach was also conveyed by several Papuan respondents. Among them was JG, a member of the provincial Papuan Parliament.

> "Among the positive outcomes of *pemekaran* is opening up opportunities for the locals to fill strategic positions in district government and determine the direction of development for the community."[101]

[99] Fadli Zon, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

[100] Tito Karnavian, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

[101] JB, interviewed in Jayapura

He added that *pemekaran* and the increasing number of Papuans occupying strategic governmental positions also help to redistribute the wealth to the local community by providing jobs and access to economic resources. Within a strong kinship tradition, the accommodation of elites from particular community groups would mean providing access to the rest of the community members. Hence, most Papuans support the idea of *pemekaran*. In the same vein, Neles Tebay, a Papua Peace activist reflects,

> "I think people see it (the benefits of *pemekaran*); not only see but also feel it directly for themselves because the district government (location) is close to the community. So, the impact is not from a distance, but up close and one that people can feel."[102]

Tebay said that he did not dismiss the existence of pragmatic interests of the local elites concerning the idea of *pemekaran*. People are aware of these interests, but they still support the idea of *pemekaran* offered by the elites because they believe it brings opportunities for them, he said. Moreover, Tebay explicitly mentioned that *pemekaran* creates channels for more Papuans to access state resources that were previously only enjoyed by a handful of people selected by elites in Jakarta.

> *"Pemekaran* provides Papuans with access to sources of power. So, if in the past there was only one *bupati*, (regent) now there are three *bupati,* and so on with members of the DPRD (provincial legislature) and officials in the government. If previously there was only one head of the education unit, now there are three similar positions, and so on."[103]

[102] Neles Tebay, interviewed in Jayapura

[103] Neles Tebay, interviewed in Abepura, April 2018.

Support for providing political access to locals through *pemekaran* was also conveyed by SM, a Papuan NGO activist. For SM, such opportunities encouraged local participation and fostered a sense of ownership in development.

> "Papuans need to be involved in the decision making that they have never been before. Hence, the formation of new districts through *pemekaran* was welcomed by the Papuans as an opportunity to manage their own land and determine the direction of local development. To be the master of their own land."[104]

In SM's opinion, providing opportunities for the local people to manage their homeland is a positive political gesture by the central government so that Papuans would begin to feel part of Indonesia. SM admitted a potential drawback of the idea of "the master of our own land" in that it could create a sense of complacency among Papuans and "spoil" them. As a consequence, Papuans would again be marginalized because they lacked the capacity to compete members of other communities. For this reason, according to SM, the upholding of the objective "being a master in his own land" must be accompanied by serious efforts to empower the indigenous Papuans.[105]

The idea of allowing local elites to rule was also supported by Papuan community leader who were initially opposed to *pemekaran*. During an interview in Biak, AK, an ex-separatist guerrilla leader said,

> "At the beginning, I rejected the idea of *pemekaran*, I showed the *palang* (customary symbol for refusal) to reject it. Only after I was summoned by the Biak Customary Council and was explained what it entailed, did I allow *pemekaran*. But I demanded that local people who were still unemployed be given jobs. Our community must be taken care of and empowered. The government must be able to guarantee a decent life

[104] SM, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

[105] SM, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

> for fishermen and farmers. Not to make them dependent but to support them to be able to do something for their future and their family."[106]

AK, however, regretted that many Papuan elites who gained office put the pursuit of their personal interests above serving the public. AK, who claimed he received many invitations to join political parties, warned of possible repercussions if this continued. "Don't force me to take my people back to the jungle and oppose the government!", he said.[107]

7.2.2. The Limits of Elite Accommodation

Central government actors as well as various groups of Papuans are among critics of the policy of elite accommodation through *pemekaran*. For some of the former respondents, efforts to build political stability by dividing power through *pemekaran* were seen as not only unsuccessful but also counter-productive by causing greater discontent. Papuan circles also viewed elite accommodation as fuelling the pro-independence movement through its missteps instead of calming it down.

According to several central government respondents, there are two main reasons why employing elite accommodation through *pemekaran* has limited impact on pacifying the independence supporters. The first is related to Papuan ethno-cultural heterogeneity. The area is home to hundreds of different tribes, each of which is autonomous with particular identity such as language, norms, tradition, and leadership pattern (Mansoben, 1994). Hence, the influence of certain elite members is limited to

[106] AK, interviewed in Supiori, May 2018.

[107] AK, interviewed in Supiori, May 2018.

their tribe members and does not cut a broad swathe across Papuan society. *Pemekaran* can only accommodate a limited number of local elites; the rest of the elites and their groups are left even more deprived as they become subordinate of the ruling elite from different tribes. This argument was, among others, conveyed by Bambang Dharmono, former chairman of the Special Unit for Papua Development (UP4B).

> In Papua there are 252 tribes, not to mention the church (Christianity) which has 54 denominations, let alone the Islamic group. Among these Papuan tribes there is no subordination, they hold equal position. Today, the elites' group who support independence is much bigger than it was in the Pepera (plebiscite on integration with Indonesia) in 1969. After the various interventions carried out by the state their numbers should have decreased, unfortunately this is not the case. It means there is something amiss in the government's approach. [108]

Similar views were expressed by a respondent from MoHA and a respondent from the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) who have considerable experience in Papua. Both respondents stressed the high fragmentation and discord among Papuan elites. While the social hierarchy lies within each tribe, relations among the elites of hundreds of tribes are based on equal and autonomous principles. Hence the elite approach will be difficult to succeed. As a respondent from NHRC reflected,

> "Papuan society is not pyramidal but trapezoid. All groups have the same rights. If you gather them in one room, rest assured that everyone wants to have their say. So, if a Papuan says, "I am the supreme head of Papuan tribe", that is nonsense. Unless he is out to fool you. "[109]

[108] Bambang Dharmono, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

[109] AR, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

Apart from being ineffective in quelling the call for independence, allowing local elites to control local governments is also counterproductive to efforts to establish effective government. Furthermore, for respondents from MoHa, placing Papuan elites in a strategic governmental position would strengthen patronage (use of public resources for private means) that undermines the governmental meritocratic system and accountability system that the central government is striving to build. In his words,

> "Most of the Papuan elites do not know how to run a government. They do as they please. In one district, for example, the district head moved the district capital to his village simply because the current location is the stronghold of his political opponent. Unfortunately, the central government often cannot act decisively in cases of such misconduct. The central government tends to be too laid-back with Papuan elites in terms of financial accountability. It seems like the Papuan can do anything they want as long as they do not ask for independence. If the government actually enforced the law consistently in Papua, I think the prison would be a full house of Papuans." [110]

The same respondent claimed that due to misconduct among the Papuan elite, the sizable development funds disbursed by the central government have only created limited impact in improving the general welfare of the people. Thus, it is not surprising that the clamour for independence continues to grow despite the benefits allocated to Papua. [111] According to a senior Papuan informal leader who used to be a strong supporter of Papuan independence,

> "The corrupt elite bureaucrats are actually the truly separatists. They breed separatism by misappropriating public funds while leaving their people to starve. They are trusted to help the country in quelling the disappointment of the Papuan people but instead betray that trust for their personal ambitions."[112]

[110] TUP, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018.

[111] TUP, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018

[112] TAH, interviewed in Abepura, May 2018.

Other Papuan respondents concurred that instead of weakening the call for independence, the elite accommodation tactic through *pemekaran* has reinforced the movement. SY, a senior Papuan church leader, for example, termed *pemekaran* "a failed attempt at divide and rule".

> "Indonesia's strategy to divide the Papuan Nation through *pemekaran* will not work. These efforts have failed and instead made the spirit of resistance even stronger because Papuan children have gone to school, they have the smarts to know about the history of their people. Papuan nationalism is increasingly crystallizing everywhere. [113]

The same respondent opined the division was actually beneficial for the Papuan independence struggle because it provided logistical supplies for the movement. The view was also reiterated by VM, a Papuan senior journalist. The pro-Papua independent movement has actually strengthened, especially driven by the younger generation, instead of declining, the person said. Further, VM asserts, this new generation is difficult to be co-opted by the state because they consider the state (central government) to be their enemy. However, according to VM, this new generation maintain linkages with their senior elites who held positions in provincial and district governments for supply of materials.

> "The new generation of Papuan independence supporters is descended from victims of military violence. They heard stories from their relatives about the state's atrocities in the past. As the information access is increasingly opened, they become more knowledgeable about their people history. They become more critical of Jakarta, but not of their own elites, even if they are corrupt. There seems to be a mutual symbiotic relationship between the youth and the local elites. The elites need the young pro-independence group to increase their

[113] SY, interviewed in Jayapura, March 2018.

> bargaining position with Jakarta, while the youth needs the elites as a source of logistical support." [114]

In line with SY and VM, according to YR, a senior national politician from Papua, the new generation of pro-independence supporters is not easily co-opted by the state because the nature of the movement is different. In contrast to the scattered and uncoordinated struggle of the previous generation, today's pro-independence movement is well organised with an extensive network not only in the domestic but also in the international arena.[115] Driven by young, well-educated people, he claims, this new generation is capable of garnering public support for its cause, especially by strategic use of the internet and social media. In facing this change, the state's strategy of elite co-optation appears to be lacking as a ploy to derail the call for independence.

7.2.3. A Counterproductive Measure?

Some scholars believe that the accommodation of elites' interests is a crucial factor that saved Indonesia from disintegration after the fall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto in 1998. In his article entitled 'How Indonesia Survived?', Aspinall (2013) observes that redistribution of power to local elites is one of the key factors in maintaining national integration. Mietzner (2017, p. 63) calls the step of accommodation of local elites as a "necessary precondition" to reduce secessionist sentiment. Other scholars analyse that through decentralization and *pemekaran*, local elites who were previously marginalized had the opportunity to become "little kings", hence reducing their incentives to oppose the state (Hadiz 2010; Nordholt and

[114] VM, interviewed in Jayapura, May 2018

[115] YR, interviewed in Jakarta, June 2018

van Klinken 2007). Presumably a similar assumption also underlies the formation of dozens of new districts in Papua. In fact, until today Papua is still an integral part of Indonesia. But does this actually affirm that the elite accommodation approach works?

While some scholars suggest a positive impact of the elite accommodation approach to the state legitimacy, this research argues that such causal linkage is not always the case. Instead, several respondents in this study suggested that distributing power among local elites through *pemekaran* amid a strong culture of patrimonialism will strengthen patronage and prevent the emergence of effective government as the basis for acquiring state legitimacy. Furthermore, the newly created district government has become the source of patronage. In addition, elites' accommodation strategy in a plural society with less hierarchical authority could sow greater disruption in society and deepen people's disappointment in the state.

The elites' accommodation strategy through *pemekaran* is also counterproductive to the agenda of weakening the pro-independence movement. Some respondents suspected that the local elites and the pro-independence elements have developed a mutually beneficial relationship. The elites provide supply of materials, while the pro-independence group become the instruments to improve the elites' bargaining position against Jakarta. This claim needs further justification, however, when viewed culturally, for the existence of strong kinship ties between Papuan groups makes it likely that there is a mutual relationship between the elites and the pro-independence activists. If it is true, then it is not the elites who are co-opted by the state but the state co-opted by the elites.

7.3. *Pemekaran* and the Reinforcement of Military Force

The second unofficial intention of *pemekaran* as discussed in chapter five is that *pemekaran* is a strategy to contain the movement of Papuan armed separatist group by reinforcing military units following the establishment of new districts. While this idea has never been explicitly included in formal documents of *pemekaran*, at least until 2014[116], scholars as well as practitioners have suggested that this objective motivated many examples of *pemekaran* in Papua (IPAC, 2013; Santoso & Lay, 2006). Moreover, there is an argument the establishment of security deemed crucial for the accomplishment of other political goods such as service provision and economic development (Rotberg, 2004 p.3). This section discusses stakeholders' perspectives on *pemekaran* as a security strategy in Papua.

7.3.1. *Pemekaran* Improves Security?

Just as with the elite accommodation strategy, the implementation of *pemekaran* as containment strategy has invited differing views among respondents. Some respondents suggest that security conditions improved after *pemekaran*, particularly a significant decrease in the armed conflict between military and OPM guerrillas. This perception was conveyed by respondents in Supiori and Keerom districts. Meanwhile, in Puncak District, respondents stated that the security conditions remained uncertain as violence sporadically occurred in some local areas.

[116] In 2014 the Indonesian government passed Law No. 24/2014 on Local Government which also stipulates several provisions on *pemekaran*. The law explicitly stated that *pemekaran* can be carried out on the basis of national strategic interests to maintain state sovereignty (article 49). This provision marks the recognition of security objectives of *pemekaran*.

From the 1960s until late 1990s, Supiori (formerly part of Biak) and Keerom (formerly part of Jayapura) were widely known as the base for OPM guerrillas. Violent clashes between OPM combatants and Indonesia army flared up periodically in both regions. Many Papuans involved in the event known as the Biak Massacre[117] in 1998 were allegedly from Supiori.[118] While Keerom, which is located in the borderline of Papua New Guinea, has long been known as the headquarter of OPM where the guerrillas were recruited and trained. Some respondents claimed that the establishment of Supiori and Keerom as an autonomous district government cannot be separated from these historical and security narratives. The establishment of Keerom District, according to one of its senior bureaucrats, has succeeded in reducing the intensity of the OPM movement in the region.

> "In terms of security issues, I think *pemekaran* is rather successful. I can say so because since 2013 there has been no armed contact between the security forces and the OPM in Keerom. Even the Morning Star (flag of the OPM) was never raised again here. Indeed, there were some conflicts among communities, but it was not related to nationalism or separatism."[119]

In echoing the opinion above, a community leader from the PNG border area suggested the situation had been far more conducive to peace.

> "In the past, this area was vulnerable because it was the centre of OPM's struggle. At that time people could be shot at the mere mention of the name 'Papua' people could be shot. In the past we could only utter "Irian Jaya" (Jakarta's official name for Papua). If you said "Papua" you were looking for trouble. After reform in 1998, we were free to call it Papua."

[117] The Biak massacre occurred when hundreds of Papuans observed Papua's Independence Day by raising the separatist Morning Star flag. Security forces opened fire on them, reportedly killing at least 200 people in a tragedy also known as as Bloody Biak (Rutherford, 2009).

[118] YA, former district executive secretary of Supiori, interviewed in Biak.

[119] SA, interviewed in Keerom, 26 March 2018.

Unlike in Supiori and Keerom, security conditions in the Puncak district are still not under the full control of the state. This assessment was conveyed, among others, by a military officer in Puncak District. He said, “during the last three years since 2016 the situation was quite calm, only two shootings occurred against military personnel, luckily there were no fatalities”.

A senior government officer of Puncak District also reiterated this view by saying that the security condition remained a problem in some local areas even though it was vastly better than in the past.[120] The diminishing intensity of the resistance of the OPM was also confirmed by one of the community leaders in Ilaga, the capital of Puncak District. He stated that the activities of the OPM group had greatly diminished, leaving only minor group, and even that was not overt.[121] However, according to several other respondents, the improvement in security conditions is not necessarily linked to the increase in security forces which served to narrow the space for armed civilian groups as previously assumed by supporters of *pemekaran*. In fact, respondents maintain that the change in security situation is mainly influenced by the awareness of the community from starting to feel the benefits of *pemekaran*. As one community member mentioned,

> “It was not the army, it was the people themselves who promoted the security. Communities took the initiative to urge OPM members not to cause disruption. People just want to be able to do farming and work peacefully. So, it was not someone else who promote peace, nor the army. [122]

[120] AB, Interviewed in Puncak, May 2018.

[121] GK, interviewed in Puncak, May 2018.

[122] DM, interviewed in Waris, May 2018.

Likewise, according to a senior officer in Puncak District, the improvement in security conditions in Ilaga hinged mainly on public consciousness. The challenge is to grow the public consciousness as some people have experienced deep trauma from state violence in the past. In addition, according to the respondent, the role of local leaders is crucial, whether they can embrace the community or not. He also gave an example in several districts where people who were previously against the government were willing to step down, support the development and even become part of district's apparatus.[123] Thus, as some respondents suggested, the relative improvement of security in some districts was not because of the increase in military presence. Rather, it was more likely influenced by the relative progress of development and the relative improvement of public services. This argument is in line with the general narrative of statebuilding which was also reflected in the official intentions of *pemekaran* discussed in previous chapter.

7.3.2. *Pemekaran* Promotes Military Penetration

While some respondents perceived a relative improvement in the security situation after *pemekaran*, others disagreed. They consider the penetration of the military deep into the jungle of Papua in tandem with *pemekaran* is problematic because of the lingering trauma from military transgression in the past. These perceptions emerged during interviews with several state as well as society actors in Papua and Jakarta.

TAH, a senior Papuan informal leader, warned that the increased military presence in remote areas in Papua could be counterproductive to the goal to gain Papuan trust.

[123] AB, Interviewed in Puncak, May 2018.

> “In the hinterland of Papua, red and white flags [the Indonesian national flag] and soldiers represent the state's presence. No wonder there are frequent human rights violations happening in those areas. That is what they [the military] do. Civilian government does not exist.[124]

In line with TAH, BG, one of Papuan church leaders, remarks that *pemekaran* is a tactic solely to justify military penetration in remote areas of Papua. According to BG, by not preparing human resources to be able to carry out public service and government functions in new areas, the state provides a reason for the military to play a greater role than civilian institutions. BG sees that what was needed was change in the demeaning attitude of the army and police toward Papuans. In his view, *pemekaran* has not altered negative stereotypes of Papuans among the armed forces, a reflection of the patronising viewpoint of the tribespeople as “uncivilized”. “If the army, the police and the people of Indonesia keep defining Papuans as separatist, primitive and other negative stigmas, the situation in Papua will never change,” BG remarked.[125]

Inconsistency in the words and actions of the state in Papua, for BG, were the main factor that hindered efforts to build greater trust in the country's institutions. In fact, there are indicators that Papuan confidence to the state is increasingly eroded.

A similar sentiment was expressed by SY, another Papuan church leader. In SY's opinion,

> *Pemekaran* is nothing but a new style military operation and a new mode of transmigration in the name of development. And we also

[124] TAH, interviewed in Jayapura, March 2018.

[125] BG, interviewed in Jayapura, May 2018

> know that *pemekaran* of the province (West Papua) was really an intelligence operation to create a favourable condition to enhance military command and to narrow the space for the Free Papua Movement. Without *pemekaran* it would be difficult to justify the establishment of extensive military command chain inside Papua, let alone the logistical difficulties. So, *pemekaran* was not based on a good intention, it was just politics. After all, there has never been any good intentions from Jakarta for Papuans."[126]

Amid the controversy, in 2013 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued a decree ordering TNI to take over the completion of the Trans Papua road project.[127] For AR, a former deputy of UP4B, the involvement of TNI through its *zipur* (engineer) battalion was the only way to complete the project due to the security risks involved. [128]. Despite disquiet at the military's participation, AR said the TNI was equipped with everything necessary to complete the project in the absence of civilian contractors willing to take the security risks. However, JJ, a Catholic priest who has served in Papua for more than 30 years, expressed similar unease with TAH. He noted that expanding the TNI's role beyond defence in Papua was insensitive to Papuan people who were traumatized by military violence in the past.[129]

The military's participation in infrastructure development in Papua creates a dilemma. On the one hand, the stated reason for military involvement is due to the security threat from the OPM. On the other hand, the military role in construction work in a *pemekaran* region reinforces the assumption that the policy is only a ploy to expand military penetration. Moreover, the assumption that construction work will be more safely conducted by military personnel was challenged by the killing of 19 construction

[126] SY, interviewed in Jayapura, March 2018.

[127] Presidential Decree No 40/2013 on the Road Construction for Development Acceleration of Papua and West Papua Province.

[128] AR, interviewed in Jakarta, May 2018

[129] JJ, interviewed in Waena, March 2018

workers in Nduga District in December 2018.[130] According to NP, a Papuan human rights activist, the OPM considers the workers to be part of the army or army spies, because all they know is that the road section is being built by the Indonesian Army.[131] Furthermore, a senior district officer in Puncak opined public grievances against the military still ran deep.

> "It is better if we don't involve the military and the police in our projects. The community rejects them. So, if there are jobs such as roadwork that can be done by the community, let them do the job. Yesterday in Sinak there was a road construction project, but as it is a vulnerable area, the military was invited to do it. But for other areas, let civilians do the job.[132]

The same source underlined the traumatic experiences of some Papuans communities as result of military mistreatment in the past. According to him, the military's treatment of the people of Papua in the past was sadistic, leaving deep-seated emotional scars for people in Wamena and Puncak Jaya. [133] This statement was supported by another respondent who was a former OPM combatant.

> "The military caused trouble in the community not only in Wamena but also in Serui, where I come from. We witnessed the cruelty of the army, how they treated our brothers and sisters like animals. One of my brothers was shot, dragged on the asphalt, then hung like a pig. That hurt us so deeply. My people witnessed this cruelty. So, yes, the grudge is forever. [134]

[130] The Jakarta Post [website] https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/12/07/papua-mass-killing-what-happened.html, (accessed 30 December 2019)

[131] Republika [website] https://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/pj978t428/kata-aktivis-ham-asal-papua-soal-pembantaian-19-pekerja, (accessed 30 December 2019).

[132] AB, interviewed in Puncak, May 2018.

[133] AB, interviewed in Puncak, May 2018.

[134] EA interviewed in Keerom, April 2018.

Criticism of an excessive role of the military in Papua was not only conveyed by Papuans. Equally critical voices emerged from senior bureaucrats in the central government. A high-ranking officer in MoHA, for instance, believed the military remained overly aggressive in Papua, especially pertaining to control of economic resources. Some military personnel have been involved in illegal activities for personal financial gains.

> “If you look at the President’s policy on single fuel prices, who was affected the most? The security apparatus. They used to be the one who transported goods, including alcohol, to every corner of Papua. They are also involved in illegal logging and illegal mining. If you visit Keerom, you can see the military and police trucks transporting timber every day. These are the unintended impact of the President's policy.”[135]

A respondent who is a national politician suspected involvement of unscrupulous soldiers in the trade and distribution of fuel in Papua.

> “Yes, some members (of TNI) also do the trading. The airport is guarded by armed forces members so it complicates the situation even further. The more soldiers there are, the more complicated the situation."[136]

For a senior district officer in Puncak, it is also regrettable that most of the forces deployed to Papua are recently passed out soldiers with limited experience. Further, he observes,

> "Confronted by the intense security pressure and difficult terrain, the emotionally immature soldiers may react in ways that further tarnish the image of the TNI for Papuans, as one respondent suggested."[137]

[135] TP, interviewed in Jakarta, April 2018

[136] KW, interviewed in Jakarta, May 2018

[137] AB, interviewed in Ilaga, May 2018.

This would be another setback for the government as alleged human rights violations by the military have made international headlines. A recent study by Amnesty International, for instance, finds 95 cases of suspected unlawful killings in Papua in the period 2010-2018[138].

7.3.3. Reinforcing Public Distrust

As with the aforementioned unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* discussed above, the causal mechanism between *pemekaran* and security provisions, especially related to the OPM, gave rise to different views among stakeholders. Almost all respondents in Keerom and Supiori Districts suggested resistance of the OPM armed group had diminished since the establishment of the district through *pemekaran*. Meanwhile, in Puncak District which is located in the highlands and has limited transportation access, security has yet to be fully controlled by the state amid sporadic disturbances blamed on OPM members.

The improvement of security conditions, according to respondents, was attributable to the enhanced community awareness of stability and its benefits, not the increased presence of military personnel. Moreover, instead of bringing heightened security, the reinforcement of military command units and the expansion of non-defence military role in new districts has raised concerns among Papuan about human rights violations. This unease is strengthened by a shared believed among Papuans that a culture of impunity persists as only a few extrajudicial killings in Papua resulted in justice for

[138] https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/indonesia-security-forces-unlawful-killings-going-unpunished-new-report

victims' families (AmnestyInternational, 2018). In other words, government efforts to promote security through public service and economic development have gained more public approval rather than traditional security approaches that rely on military force. Traumatic experiences with state violence in the past seem to be the cause of a high-level distrust toward security institutions, especially the army.

Security issues were a dominant reason that led to the formation of districts in Papua. As discussed in chapter 5, the establishment of districts in Papua aimed to improve state control of security in the region with the expansion of the security forces network. However, this has not been the case according to some respondents. Improvement of security conditions in some of the new districts was not due to a stepped-up military presence, but from growing community awareness of the importance of stability for development. On the other hand, respondents indicated that an excessive presence of military personnel is often spark violence. With the traumatic legacy of military atrocities, there is inevitably concern among local communities at the strengthened presence and expanding role of the army and the potential for abuse of power.

7.4. *Pemekaran* and Social Integration

The third unofficial intention of *pemekaran* which emerged during fieldwork is its use of to facilitate social integration, especially by changing the demographic structure through migration. In this regard, *pemekaran* creates opportunities that attract people from other regions to Papua. In the past, the central government had to mobilise people from other regions to relocate to Papua through transmigration programmes, due to its reputation for being undeveloped and lacking the facilities available in Java and other major population centres. Today, people from other regions are migrating to

Papua of their own volition. The presence of migrant communities, while encouraging economic growth, also promotes cultural assimilation as a basis for social integration. Several respondents, as cited in chapter five, described this as following a natural approach of “Indonesianisation” while reducing support for Papuan independence. This section aims to determine stakeholders’ perceptions about this unofficial intention and particularly how the Papuan people view the presence of migrants in their area.

7.4.1. Fostering Social Integration through Migration

Population migration to Papua occurred systematically during the 1970-1990s through the national transmigration programme (McGibbon, 2004). While traditionally transmigration functioned for demographic balancing and fostering economic development, in the case of Papua it also served to forge Indonesian nationhood by exposing Papuans to the dominant culture of Indonesia (Gietzelt, 1989; Yuminarti, 2017). However, scholars have faulted it as another form of colonialization and cultural invasion[139]. More specifically, researchers claim that indigenous Papuan culture has been diluted by the presence of Javanese migrants sponsored by the state (Sumule, 2002, p. 7). Although the government suspended the transmigration program to Papua in 2001, the influx of non-Papuans migration to Papua has increased along with growing economic opportunities brought by *pemekaran* and the implementation of special autonomy which entailed a lucrative transfer of development fund to Papua.

The view that migration is effective to develop social integration and fabled melting pots for the “Indonesianisation” – which Papuans are encouraged to integrate into the

[139] https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1270&context=gsp

national economic, social and cultural system – is popular among the national elite. As briefly discussed in chapter five, the steady stream migration to Papua is often seen by them as a catalyst for this process. Similarly, some Papuan respondents in this research also suggested a supportive account toward migration. JG, a member of Papuan Provincial Parliament, for instance, claims that migration to Papua may help to accelerate population growth in Papua that still the lowest in the country.

> "The presence of migrants is positive to accelerate population growth in Papua which is still very small in comparison to its vast area. Indeed, a sufficient population is needed to accelerate development. Many areas in Papua are underdeveloped because the population is very small. Before it was expanded, for example, regions such as Paniai or Intan Jaya were underdeveloped, but now after they became districts and the population has increased, the regions have marked progress".[140]

Several other respondents noted that migrants provide a source of manpower for development amid the lack of quantity as well capacity of local human resources. Among them was WS, a migrant who has resided in Papua for more than 30 years.

> "Most of the employees in the new districts formed by *pemekaran* are migrants. This is not only because of their capacity but also because they are willing to live here. In contrast, the Papuan elites spent more time in Jakarta or Jayapura rather than in their district, you only find clerical staff remains in the office but they don't know what to do. So, basically it is the migrants who run the government and public services in many districts in Papua".

Similarly, another respondent who is a second-generation migrant asserted that local people are still lacking of the necessary skills and capacity to manage their own territory.

[140] JG, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

> "The problem is that the local people are not ready to take the authority to manage their regions. They want to be the masters in their own land but they still cannot carry out the responsibilities. Instead of advancing the region, the money and authority that comes with *pemekaran* actually destroys the social order and morality of the locals."[141]

The arrival of migrant settlers inevitably fills the need of human resources in the newly created districts. They have filled most positions in the local government structure, both managerial and technical. Moreover, for some positions such as teachers and medical personnel, the local government has been forced to recruit from outside Papua for employees on a contractual basis. A long-serving teacher who is also a migrant in Keerom District, for instance, remarked:

> "Most of teachers here are contract teachers recruited by the local government from outside Papua. In our school, there is only one permanent staff from the local community, an administrative staff." [142]

Besides becoming a source of manpower, the migrant community inspires the local community, several respondents claimed. In general, the migrants are better educated and more highly skilled compared to the locals. Their skills include ability to plant crops more effectively, to process crops, to raise livestock and trading acumen. A benefit of the presence of migrants, according to some respondents, is this motivation of local people to be more open-minded and driven to develop their skills. VH, one of the Papuan community leaders in Keerom, asserts:

> "The presence of the migrant community has a positive impact on Keerom's indigenous people, especially in the field of education. Previously, it was very difficult to ask children to attend school. I had to hold a stick and chase them to the forest. But after the migrants

[141] SS, interviewed in Keerom, March 2018.

[142] FGD with villagers in Keerom District, April 2018

> came, local children are motivated to go to school. They can be developed if they mix with people from other ethnicities." [143]

In the same vein, HY, a young Papuan journalist, claimed the migrant communities helped foster a sense of competition among the younger Papuan generation, something lacking in Papuan communal tradition which prioritizes kinship ties and mutual cooperation. He ventured that his association with non-Papuan people helped build his sense of competition.[144] In this regard, the concern that migration will trigger a cultural invasion, as some experts warned, seems to be confirmed but a positive way.

However, the assumption that the influx of migrants will weaken support to the Free Papua movement was disputed by several respondents. Instead of opposing the movement, according to SY, migrants who had long resided in Papua and considered Papua to be their adopted homeland eventually came to support the cause.

> "Migrants would support (independent Papua), if there is a referendum. Especially those who were born and raised here, this is their homeland. The Indonesian government miscalculated [through this policy]. They thought that by sending lots of newcomers then all will be pro-Indonesia. Nope. These are migrant children born and raised here, they witnessed how we were treated. Sorry to have to say this, but, I think the migrant community will support us."[145]

Although some respondents expressed positive sentiments to the presence of migrants, it does not mean that there is no disharmony between the two communities. In fact, relations are often marked by tension. Differences in religion, language,

[143] VM, interviewed in Keerom, April 2018.

[144] HS, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018

[145] SY, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018

tradition, values, as well as the gap in education and economic status, often cause strains. Moreover, in the earlier period of transmigration in the 1980s, the presence of migrants in Papua was heavily political because they were used by the state as part of the 'Indonesianisation' project for the region (Sands, 1992; Sumule, 2002). Several respondents recalled that during the early 2000s when the clamour for Papuan independence was at its height, migrant communities were targets of intimidation by some local groups. Migrant houses and property were marked as targets for looting if Papua gained its independence.[146] Hence, while tensions among migrants and locals in Papua have never escalated into a major violent conflict, unlike inter-ethnic strife in other areas of Indonesia, respondents felt there was a deterioration in relations between the groups in recent years. The rapid growth of the migrant population and their domination of the private as well as public sectors are major contributors to tense relations.

7.4.2. The Increase of Social Disintegration Between Local and Migrant Communities

Although some Papuan respondents cite the positive impact from the increasing presence of migrant communities, other respondents are concerned about its negative consequences. At least two recurring themes related to these concerns emerged from the interviews. The first concern is related to the risk of depopulation of Papuans amid the rapid increase in migrant numbers. The second concern pertains to the threat of marginalization of Papuans due to migrant dominance in the private and public

[146] WS and UM, interviewed in Keroom and Jayapura, April 2018.

sectors. While previously state-sponsored transmigration was the main vehicle of migration to Papua, nowadays *pemekaran* has facilitated the influx of migration to Papua, several respondents suggested. In some areas such as Jayapura, Keroom and Merauke, migrant population increasingly outnumbered the local population (BPS, 2018). NB, a community leader in Keerom for instance, illustrated that the number of migrant's villages has increased whilst the locals' village has decreased.

> "There were only eight migrant villages in the past, now there are 12 villages with more than 400 households here. On the other hand, the locals only live in one village, and their population is decreasing."[147]

NB attributed the high infant mortality rate among indigenous people to persistently low growth of their population. On the other hand, the migrant population has better health awareness and access to health facilities. Hence, the low level of education, poverty and lack of access to health services contribute to the plight of locals. *Pemekaran* that was expected to improve this situation, according to NB, apparently has not been able to deliver the expected outcome. Conversely, the rapid changes triggered by *pemekaran*, including the funnelling of a of large amount of development funds without sufficient preparation among the local government and community, have been a bane to the local community's welfare. NB continued:

> "Now indigenous people can easily earn money by selling their land for government facilities or private ownership. Suddenly flush with cash, some local people's lifestyle began to change. They fritter away the easy money on alcohol, gambling and sex. In Nafri and Waena, for example, there used to be sago forests and farmland. When the areas were developed, the locals sold their land. After the money has run out, they don't have land to return to farm on. Neither do they have adequate education and skill to apply for jobs, even as a shopkeeper.

[147] NB, interviewed in Keerom, April 2018.

> They are getting frustrated, and ultimately many have succumbed to alcohol and drugs." [148]

Similarly, a senior official in the Papua Provincial Government suggested that the population of indigenous Papuans is being outnumbered by migrant. Like NB, he attributed it to the high mortality and low birth rates of indigenous Papuans, combined with the influx of migrants.

> "The number of the migrant population will soon surpass the number of indigenous Papuans. Imagine every day how many ships dock, how many planes land, all of which bring migrants into Papua. There are more people coming in than going out."[149]

The second concern related to the increasing migrant population in Papua is the threat of marginalization of local communities. Respondents generally suggested that migrant populations are more capable than the locals in taking advantage of the economic opportunities brought by *pemekaran*. The lack of knowledge, insight as well as access to banking facilities impede locals from competing with migrants. As a result, the economic gap between migrants and local communities has increased rapidly, especially in the new districts. Neles Tebay, a co-founder of Jaringan Damai Papua, a forum that promoting peaceful dialog between Jakarta and Papua, noted the capacity gap between migrant and local community. In his opinion, migrants are equipped with abilities that the local community do not have so that they can more quickly adapt to and take advantage of economic opportunities of the *pemekaran*.

[148] NB, interviewed in Keerom, April 2018.

[149] BG, Interviewed in Jayapura, May 2018.

> “Migrant people have a number of skills that indigenous people do not have. Even in certain tribes, the words "sell" and "buy" are not exist in their language.[150]

In line with Tebay, VM, a senior journalist, attributed the inability of local community members to take advantage of development to the fact that the market economic system is an alien concept to them. Concepts such as money, banks and bourses are new to many Papuans who live communally and rely on a subsistence system where production is solely to fulfil family needs. Consequently, VM added, locals were not only unable to compete with migrants, they were not even able to see the economic opportunities available to them. In every aspect, migrants had a head start. Adding to that point, Tebay provided a simple and clear example of the disappointment of Papuans regarding the domination of migrants as ‘ojek’ (motorcycle taxi) driver. In the *pemekaran* region, migrants make up the bulk of ojek drivers. Growing demand for this form of transportation in *pemekaran* districts make ojek a good source of income. Unfortunately, most of the locals have no idea how to ride a motorbike, let alone to own one, claimed Tebay.

Despite the desire of many locals to become ojek drivers, they simply cannot compete with migrants due to the lack of skill as well as access to resources. A village head in Puncak District, for instance, expressed that,

> “Actually, local people also want to be an ojek driver but unfortunately, most of them do not have a motorbike, nor can they ride a motorbike. The locals asked the government to establish a motorcycle ownership scheme as part of local empowerment programme, but until now it has not been realized. Meanwhile, disputes between ojek drivers and locals on ojek rates have occurred several times.”[151]

[150] Tebay, interviewed in Jayapura March 2018.

[151] KK Interviewed in Puncak District, May 2018.

Another example of competition between locals and migrant in the informal sector was conveyed by SM, a community development activist. The profession of ojek driver is a new one for most Papuans, in contrast to the tradition of selling sago and betel nut by locals. However, migrant sellers are increasingly prominent in this field, too, SM says.

> "Sago and betel nut are local products that were formerly only sold by Papuan sellers, but now migrants have started selling them. It is true that there should be no monopoly in the market, but the local community must also be prepared [to compete]. It is obvious that members of the local communities will not be able to compete with the migrant traders, they have different starting points."[152]

Apart from the informal sector, the locals also cannot compete with the migrants in accessing employment opportunities in the formal sector following the formation of new districts. AS, a community development activist, said that although the locals think that they are entitled to occupy the positions in the district government, regulations on staff hiring requires several qualifications that are difficult for them to fulfil, such as the minimum education level. Even if they were hired, AS says most of the locals were on the lowest level of the bureaucracy, with migrants in the middle and top bureaucratic positions.[153] Another respondent who is a senior bureaucrat in one of the districts in Papua admitted:

> "Once the district was formed, members of the local community expected to be accepted as government employees, including those who do not have a higher education diploma or those who only completed junior and high school. Whereas what we need is a bachelor's degree qualification. If, somehow, they manage to be accepted, they only become lowly staff, they come to the office but do

[152] SM, interviewed in Jayapira, April 2018

[153] AS, interviewed in Abepura, March 2018.

> not know what to do. Capacity building programmes are very rare. As a result, in many new districts migrant employees play a bigger role. [154]

The dominance of migrant communities in both the informal and formal sectors was also recognized by another respondent who is a senior community leader and a member of the MRP. According to him, the flood of migrants to Papua made finding a job is much more difficult for the locals.

> "Papuans are unable to compete with migrants. In many fields, they [the migrants] are getting stronger while we are getting weaker. Meanwhile, the local government, which is led by our fellow Papuans, somehow cannot do much on this matter, this is the reality that we face today." [155]

More critically, SY, one of the church leaders in Papua, claimed that current developments in Papua, including *pemekaran*, marginalized local communities, especially the indigenous Papuans.

> "In Papua, currently there is a process of slow-motion genocide of Papuans through depopulation and marginalization. As you can see here (Jayapura), it feels like we are not in Papua. If you go to the shops, hotels, cafes or restaurants, you are unlikely to meet Papuans. So, in fact, *pemekaran* is nothing more than a new mode of transmigration, a new mode of military operations to exterminate Papuans. It's why, from the outset, I rejected *pemekaran*. [156]

VM contended that the issue centred on the lack of government assistance for locals to take the changes in stride.

> *"Pemekaran* invites more migrants to Papua. On the other hand, Papuans were not prepared to adapt to the change. Yes, I agree that infrastructure is still a problem. But the Papuan problem is not just infrastructure. If the government builds infrastructure but does not

[154] NB, interviewed in Keerom, March 2018.

[155] DT, interviewed in Jayapura, April 2018.

[156] SY, interviewed in Jayapura, May 2018.

empower and protect indigenous Papuans, it will not solve the problem."[157]

The above views show that some respondents hold negative perceptions toward the increased migration triggered by *pemekaran*. Most of them are concerned about the threat of depopulation and marginalisation of the local community. The gap of capacity between migrant and local community creates unbalanced competition between the two in taking advantage of *pemekaran*. While the former managed to make the most of the arise opportunities, the later become onlookers as better skilled migrants take advantage of the opportunities afforded by *pemekaran* in their homeland. Amid such circumstances, the stream of migration could spark social disintegration instead of the goal of promoting social integration.

7.4.3. The Needs for Local Community Empowerment

The establishment of new districts through *pemekaran* requires adequate manpower to run the government as well as to deliver public services. Hence, *pemekaran* created job opportunities in public sector. At the same time, *pemekaran* also generated job opportunities in local economic and trading sectors following improvement in transportation access and other basic infrastructure. These opportunities have attracted people from other regions to Papua, especially to the new districts. Meanwhile, local human resources are limited both in quantity and quality.

The arrival of migrants fills the need for human resources so that the newly created districts can start to function properly. In addition, the presence of migrants from

[157] Interviewed in Jayapura, May 2018.

various cultural backgrounds is also expected to encourage acculturation and promote social integration, or a natural process to foster social legitimacy of the state. However, with the lack of local community resources, the presence of the migrant community did not always have a positive impact on social integration. The ability of migrant communities to take advantage of the emerging opportunities surpass that of the locals, who lack knowledge and skills to adapt with the changes. Unsurprisingly, locals have begun to harbour feelings of being systematically discriminated against and marginalised amid the rapid changes in their own territory.

Some respondents suggested that, among other issues, the problem lies in the development approach that focused on growth rather than people's resilience to face changes around them. Local communities have not been prepared to anticipate and adapt to the changes following the expansion of governmental structures. Furthermore, the government's development approach in Papua and especially in the new districts tend to place local people merely as beneficiaries rather than active participants in the development. This lack of knowledge and skills are often used as an excuse to justify their exclusion from development, while focused initiatives for community empowerment are rarely in place.

Besides providing a supply of skilled human resources and fostering economic growth, the presence of migrant communities is also expected to encourage cultural assimilation as an important precondition to cultivate social integration. However, with growing resentment among locals, the influx of migrants to Papua tends to exacerbate social disintegration. The burning of a mosque in Tolikara during Eid 2015 and the dispute over the construction of a minaret at Al-Aqsha mosque in Sentani in 2018

reflect the increasing disharmony among religious communities that mirror the rising tension between t locals and the migrant community.

7.5. Conclusions

This chapter presented the findings and analysis of the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* which are unstated in the formal documents but shared among stakeholders. Referring to unofficial intentions as discussed in chapter 5, this chapter discussed the achievements and constraints of three unofficial intentions of *pemekaran*; first, *pemekaran* as part of elite accommodation; second, *pemekaran* as a strategy to constrain the objectives of OPM, especially its armed movement; and third, *pemekaran* as a strategy to strengthen social integration. These intentions are positioned as part of the Indonesian government's effort to mitigate its often-contentious relations with Papuans, thereby improving the state's social legitimacy. However, implementation of the three intentions have shown varying results.

First, *pemekaran* as a strategy to accommodate local elites' interests by providing them the opportunity to manage their own territory at the district level. The district is autonomous and every district government has the discretion to manage its resources. Some respondents see this as the right approach to combat the discontent among Papuans due to long-time exploitation and marginalisation. However, other respondents suggest the approach was the central government's strategy to divide and rule the elites and Papuan people. Through this strategy, the elites become fixated on competing amongst themselves to seize and defend their power over the local government. For this reason, it is not uncommon for the elites to be in a dual position of allegiance to suit their needs. On the one hand they use their power to build a

patronage network, including with the pro-independence groups. On the other side, they revert to the issue of Papuan independence as a bargaining position vis a vis the central government.

The strategy to pacify the independence movement by embracing local elites was seen as counterproductive by several respondents because they believed it weakened the capacity of local governments to carry out their functions. By accommodating elites' interests, the government compromises the principles of meritocracy and accountability. As a result, administrative misconduct and corruption have become rife in Papua while most Papuans people have failed to gain better access to public services. In other words, instead of co-opting the Papuan elites, the state has increasingly been captured by them for their private interests.

The second unofficial intention of *pemekaran* is to contain the movement of the OPM especially its armed group by reinforcing military presence following the establishment of new districts. More military presence into the remote areas of Papua was expected to curb the OPM movement. Indeed, according to some respondents, the actions of OPM guerrillas in some areas were significantly lowered, particularly in places with improved transportation access such as Biak, Supiori and Keerom. However, according to the respondents, it was not due to the increased number of soldiers but from heightened public awareness of the importance of maintaining stability that would be conductive to development in their areas. In other words, it was not the security approach that improved the security situation but the development approach, as the general idea of statebuilding. Meanwhile, in other more isolated areas such as Puncak, there were reports of sporadic resistance from the OPM. The enhanced military

presence in the area had not contributed to better regional security; in fact, most locals remain traumatized by violence and mistreatment of the past.

The Papuan collective memory of experience with the military seems to determine the result of the containment strategy. Some respondents view that *pemekaran* was merely a state strategy to expand the military network to remote areas of Papua. Other respondents even suspected that *pemekaran* was carried out to strengthen the existence of the military in Papua amid strong pressure to reduce its presence. Economic security factors are also considered by some respondents due to the widespread belief that military personnel are behind illegal logging or illegal mining activities. This is particularly disturbing because the military has also been ordered to carry out non-security roles, such as building roads, and providing public services such as health and education with the concept of military operations outside of war. In short, the security approach in the context of overcoming the OPM guerrillas comes up against the deep-seated trauma and low level of **trust** among the Papuan community towards military institutions.

The third unofficial intention of *pemekaran* that emerged during fieldwork is that *pemekaran* may facilitates social integration especially by changing demographic structure through migration. This strategy also aims to reduce support to the independence movement. The assumption is that with the increasing population of migrant communities as economic opportunities open up in new areas of Papua, support for the independent Papua movement will decrease. Concurrently, it is assumed, a more multicultural composition of society will encourage social integration. However, this assumption was not entirely realized in the field. Several respondents, while welcoming the presence of migrants, see the migrants merely as the source of

employees for the local government as well as economic sectors that the local community cannot fill. The idea that the presence of the migrant community can act as a motivating factor for social integration or to weaken support for the independence movement was not broached. On the contrary, several respondents saw the presence of migrant as undermining social integration.

Concerns about influx of migrants became fairly widespread among respondents. The issues of depopulation and marginalization of indigenous Papuans are among the main concerns. The lack of capacity of local communities has made them unable to compete with migrant communities to take advantage of opportunities that arise as new districts are formed. On the other hand, capacity building programs for the community are also rare. In such situation, the presence of migrant populations becomes a dilemma, on the one hand they are needed to drive development, on the other hand their presence is seen as reducing the opportunities of local communities to enjoy development. Increased tensions between local communities and migrants in several areas in Papua suggest the need to rethink a new strategy to nurture social integration while promoting local resilience.

In short, the findings discussed in this chapter suggested that the formation of new districts through *pemekaran* has created unintended consequences due to the lack of attention to local context such as social cultural factors and social psychology. Hence, instead of improving public trust in the state, *pemekaran* has further undermined trust.

Chapter 8. Conclusions and Implications

8.1. Introduction

This thesis investigates the impact of territorial reform on state legitimacy through a case study of *pemekaran* in Papua Province. Territorial reform has often been understood by scholars and analysts as an administrative process of merging or separating territories in order to achieve governmental efficiency (Keating, 2008; Swianiewicz, 2018; Wollmann, 2004). This study understands territorial reform not only as an administrative process, but also as a process of improving state-citizen relations, as a process of state institutionalisation, as well as a process of strengthening citizenship; in other words, as a process of state building. By using this perspective, this thesis contributes to the territorial reform literature by understanding territorial reform as a political process to strengthen state legitimacy.

Through the case of territorial reform known as *pemekaran* or district creation in the province of Papua, the thesis investigated how territorial reform impacts on state legitimacy. It started the analysis by identifying the Indonesian government's intentions regarding *pemekaran* in Papua. By distinguishing between official and unofficial intentions of *pemekaran*, the analysis constructs a comprehensive picture of the government's intentions behind *pemekaran* in Papua. The official intentions of *pemekaran* were traced through analysing regulations relating to *pemekaran*. The unofficial intentions were identified through a series of interviews with state actors from the central government, including senior bureaucrats and politicians.

The thesis argues that according to the official perspective, *pemekaran* in Papua aims to expand state presence. Three mechanisms have been deployed to that aim; strengthening public services, accelerating economic development and increasing the capacity of local governments. Beyond the official intentions, this thesis also finds that the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* were to mitigate the impact of the long-standing separatist movement in Papua. This aim is also pursued through three mechanisms; first by accommodating the interest of the local elites; second, reinforcing the presence of security institutions in the regions and, third, undermining the local community's support for separatist groups by creating incentives for migration to Papua by people from other regions of the nation.

It is not possible to be entirely precise about the audiences of each mechanisms, either official or unofficial, because these mechanisms created a chain effect that affect communities from different social-economic background, as well as residential location. However, the official strategies which focus on improving state capacity in delivering basic services, providing infrastructures, and promoting local economic development, have been generally related to communities in the rural areas. On the other hand, the unofficial strategies, which emphasis on improving state-society relations through elites' accommodation, promoting social cohesion through migration, and improving security, is more reflected in the need often raised by the urban community. In the empirical chapters, the implementation of these mechanisms and the response of stakeholders are investigated and analysed. The general findings show that, amidst its limitations such as the slow of progress, the official mechanisms

of *pemekaran* tend to gain stronger community approval rather than the unofficial mechanisms.

This concluding chapter highlights the empirical findings that answer the questions outlined at the beginning of the research. It also reflects on the contribution of the thesis, particularly to the literature on territorial reform. Finally, reflecting on the findings, the thesis proposes potential issues to be explored in further studies.

8.2. Summary of Research Findings

This thesis is guided by the research question: **how does territorial reform through district formation impact on state legitimacy?** Three key findings emerged from the investigation; first, *pemekaran* in Papua has dual intentions, i.e., improving state performance and mitigating the influence of the separatist movement. Second, the improvement of state performance through *pemekaran* has been perceived differently among stakeholders, with those living in a more developed area tending to be more positive. Third, *pemekaran* has exerted little impact on undermining the secessionist campaign, especially in rural areas. Overall, the findings of this thesis show that to a certain extent *pemekaran* has brought benefits that contribute to state legitimacy, however, the limitations of *pemekaran* as well as its unintended consequences have created problems that undermine state legitimacy. This section provides highlights of the above findings.

8.2.1. Putting the Institutional Performance First

The first key finding of this research is that *pemekaran* in Papua has two sets of intentions: the official and the unofficial. The official intentions of *pemekaran* were identified in legal documents on *pemekaran* whereas the unofficial intentions were revealed through a series of interviews with state actors at the national and local level. The fulfilment of the official and unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* are aimed at strengthening state legitimacy in Papua. This research, however, sees that the official objectives which are oriented towards strengthening institutional legitimacy, have been prioritized.

Investigation of the official objectives of *pemekaran* showed that efforts to expand the state presence are pursued by using three mechanisms; the improvement of public service provision, development acceleration and building local government capacity. Whereas the unofficial intention of *pemekaran* to mitigate separatism is also pursued through three mechanisms; co-opting Papuan elites by accommodating their interests, containing the movement of the armed separatist group by reinforcing the military presence and forging social integration by attracting migration to new districts. In short, the official intentions of *pemekaran* reflect the effort to consolidate state performance as material sources of legitimacy, whilst the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* reflect on state efforts to develop the social source of legitimacy.

While policy makers acknowledged dual sets intentions of *pemekaran*, it was clear that the institutional perspective have been prioritised in state's policies. The local government law no. 32/2004 and the government regulation no 78/2007 on *pemekaran* for instance, underlined improving public services and strengthening local development as among the principal objectives of *pemekaran*. These priorities were

also confirmed by respondents both from government and society actors in this research. The respondents admitted that *pemekaran* has brought improvements on the availability of public services and infrastructures such as education and health facilities, roads, airports, cellular networks, markets, and governmental offices. Despite some dissatisfactions on the speed of the development progress, these improvements shows that the government is paying attention to achieve the official objective of *pemekaran*.

On the other hand, strategies to achieve the unofficial intentions of *pemekaran* tend to be less coherent and even trigger more unintended outcomes rather than the expected outcomes. While some scholars believe that the accommodation of elites' interests is a necessary precondition to reduce secessionist sentiment in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2013; Mietzner, 2017), in the case of Papua this approach was less instrumental. Instead, the approach become the source of patronage and reinforced patrimonialism that prevent the emergence of effective government. Likewise, this research also finds that the reinforcement of military force has less impact on the security condition in most of the areas in Papua. The long history of military oppression in Papua in the past still leave strong distrust among Papuan in the security institutions. Meanwhile, the approach in promoting social integration through migration has also created a complicated situation due to the increasing tension between local and migrant communities, particularly triggered by a widening economic gap. Hence, instead of strengthening social cohesion, the influx of migrants to the newly established area in Papua has weakened social cohesion.

Nonetheless, the official and unofficial mechanisms of *pemekaran* through which state legitimacy is developed, the case of *pemekaran* at the district level in Papua Province

suggests that state legitimacy is multidimensional where both state and society contribute to the construction of justified authority. In other words, following Beetham's work (Beetham, 1991b), the thesis believes that legitimacy is not merely a consequence of the functioning of the state, but must be approved by society.

Co-opting Papuan elites by accommodating their interests, containing the movement of the armed separatist group by reinforcing the military presence and forging social integration by attracting migration to new districts statebuilding discourse, the emergence of mechanisms that focus on the relationship between state and society suggest that statebuilding cannot be separated from social contexts (Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert, 2016). In this case, the emergence of unofficial *pemekaran* intentions reflects the crucial role of social context in determining the course of statebuilding. While unstated in the regulations, some respondents confirmed that the unofficial intentions are what principally govern the conduct of *pemekaran* in Papua. Thus, in line with constructivist views, statebuilding is not just a state-centric process detached from its social moorings. Instead, it is an embedded process involving interaction between state and societal actors.

8.2.2. Different Expectations of State Performance

The second key finding was that the achievement of the official intentions of *pemekaran* were perceived differently among stakeholders. While most of the respondents support the idea of *pemekaran* as a policy to improve state capacity in serving its people, none of the respondents were satisfied with the progress that *pemekaran* has brought to them so far. This thesis argues that stakeholders'

dissatisfaction in the performance of the new local government suggests a gap between the general expectation and progress of the official intentions of *pemekaran*.

Many stakeholders, especially in more remote and isolated areas, acknowledged that *pemekaran* has helped improve public access to their region and increase public service facilities that otherwise would still be inaccessible to them. Nonetheless, they claimed that the development gap is increasing among sub-districts since the development mainly concentrated at the central district. Thus, while expected to promote more equitable development, *pemekaran* has created a service and development gap between communities, especially when transportation infrastructure is still lacking. Moreover, in some cases, basic services such as health and education remain unimproved due to limited human resources and poor management in the district government.

Most respondents blamed the local government for the lack of progress. On the other hand, local government capacity building, which is one of the main official intentions of *pemekaran*, has been limited by a strong culture of patrimonialism. Public participation in local government is increasing as more community members are recruited as government officials. However, recruitment was based more on kinship and political affiliation than a focused bid to strengthen the local government (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004; McGibbon, 2004). The phenomenon reinforced patrimonialism in Papuan society which in turn has obstructed the functioning of the bureaucracy. As a result, the local governments have underperformed and increasingly lost its social legitimacy.

This research also finds a strong demand from new district governments for training and mentoring to increase the capacity of the bureaucracy. The lack of consideration

for merit in the recruitment process in the new districts resulted in a poor bureaucrat capacity, necessitating intensive training and mentoring. On the other hand, the existing design and methods of capacity building in the national government do not always match the needs of Papuan district government. Without sufficient progress or at least perceived progress, especially in public services provision, the establishment of new districts through *pemekaran* would be hard pressed to strengthen the state-society relations. Instead, the growing belief that *pemekaran* only benefits the elites and particular communities may undermine social cohesion as well as public trust in the state.

8.2.3. Less Impact on Mitigating Separatism

The third key finding of this research is linked to the unofficial intention of *pemekaran* to mitigate the impact/appeal of the separatist movement among the public. This research discussed three mechanisms through which the intention to mitigate separatism was pursued: accommodating local elite interests, strengthening state military presence and undermining local support to separatism through migration to new districts. The findings suggest that all the mechanisms above have limited impact in mitigating the separatist movement. Moreover, these mechanisms have created unintended outcomes that further aggravate public disappointment and distrust in the government.

While some scholars, as well as policymakers, suggest a positive impact of the elite accommodation approach as a form of conflict mitigation (Aspinall, 2013; Mietzner, 2017), this research sees that it is not always the case. Instead, the elite accommodation strategy has obstructed the performance of local governments and

strengthened the pro-independence campaign. This research provides two explanations for this effect. First, as the Papuan people consist of hundreds of tribes, the effort to accommodate the elite by distributing power over new districts has increased disputes among rival groups. The fragmenting of the elite also does not mean that support for the separatist movement is weakening. Instead, it creates financial rewards for combatants from the support they provide to the contending elites. Second, distributing power among local elites through *pemekaran* amid a strong culture of patrimonialism has strengthened patronage and impeded the emergence of a functioning government. Further, the newly created district governments have become a source of patronage at the expense of meritocracy.

The second mechanism in mitigating separatism is by strengthening the Indonesian Military's (TNI) presence to contain the OPM guerrillas, especially in the highlands. Findings suggest that the increasing presence of the TNI in the regions following *pemekaran* have failed at controlling violence. Respondents from the highland districts suggested that the increased presence and role of security forces had created concern among local people who have been traumatised by military violence in the past. Outside the highland, the security situation has relatively improved in terms of fewer clashes between TNI and OPM guerrillas. According to the respondents, however, the progress was not because of the greater presence of TNI but due to increased public awareness of the importance of maintaining a conducive situation for development progress in the area.

The third mechanism in mitigating separatism is by promoting demographic change through migration. *Pemekaran* creates economic opportunities that are a magnet for migration to Papua. It also becomes a natural process to encourage social integration

while undermining social support for separatism. In practice, the influx of migrants to Papua and their economic success has raised concern among Papuans. The issues of depopulation and marginalisation of Papuans, which have long been rallying cries of the separatist group, are now getting more traction. This development, as well as the increased tensions between local communities and migrants in several areas in Papua, suggest the need to rethink a new strategy to nurture social integration while promoting local resilience.

8.3. Empirical Contributions and Theoretical Implications

Through the lens of statebuilding, this thesis aims to contribute to the emerging debate on the politics of territorial reform through district creation by linking territorial reform with state legitimacy. This thesis supports the theoretical proposition that state legitimacy is not merely a consequence of the functioning of the state; rather, it has to be approved by society (Beetham, 1991b; Mcloughlin, 2015). By using this viewpoint, the thesis demonstrates that territorial reform through *pemekaran* is a process of state legitimisation. It is not only a matter of administrative resizing to improve state performance but also as a set of socio-political processes which involved public perceptions and expectations ascribed to the state. While supporting some existing propositions on territorial reform studies, the findings challenge some common conceptions and propose alternative understanding of territorial reform centred on state-society relations.

Territorial reform has been widely discussed through the perspectives of economic development and public administration (D. Denters, 2002; Keating, 1995;

Swianiewicz, 2010; Tiebout, 1956). More recently, scholars have employed political and sociological perspectives in analysing territorial reform. They have linked territorial reform with ethnic conflict settlement (Grossman & Lewis, 2014; Resnick, 2017), electoral politics i.e. consolidating the ruling party or dissolving support to the opposition (Awortwi & Helmsing, 2017) as well as linking to the issues of political identity and patrimonialism (Kimura, 2013; Santoso, 2017).

Adding to these discussions, the thesis views territorial reform through a statebuilding perspective, particularly by considering territorial reform as a reciprocal process of state legitimisation where state and society are both influential. Against the common wisdom that territorial reform has a direct effect in supporting state legitimacy, this thesis argues that the impact of territorial reform on the state legitimacy is not linear, but can both support and undermine it. This perspective is seldom followed in the literature of territorial reform which in general considers legitimacy as a consequence of the functioning of the state. By examining the case of *pemekaran* in Papua, the thesis provides an empirical account on how territorial reform impacts state legitimacy.

As discussed in chapters five and six, this thesis shows how *pemekaran* facilitates the strengthening of state presence in Papua. Through a set of official mechanisms, the Indonesian government attempts to generate legitimacy by improving its performance in public services provision, infrastructure development as well as establishing procedures and norms such as accountability and participation. The legitimacy scholars often refer to these as the input-output dimension of legitimacy (Scharpf, 2011) or performance legitimacy (Gilley, 2006). In the context of *pemekaran* in Papua, the research finds that although *pemekaran* has encouraged fiscal redistribution and improved government performance, especially in providing services and

infrastructure, it does not necessarily improve the state's legitimacy. This research reinforces the argument that legitimacy is not a merely consequence of the functioning state institutions.

Further, this research finds that the gap between public expectation and government performance, unequal access to public services, as well as perception of exclusion due to lack of participation and engagement in local development, have disrupted the causal link between state performance and legitimacy. These findings are in line with previous studies in Africa, Latin America and Middle Eastern countries which find that the increase in public services and infrastructure is not always in line with citizens' satisfaction with services (Sacks, 2011). It also supports the findings of studies on Sri Lanka, Nepal, Liberia and Colombia that demonstrate how unequal access to public services impacts negatively on citizens' view of the state (Mcloughlin, 2017; Rothstein, 2009).

Besides the official mechanisms, this thesis also investigates how *pemekaran* facilitates the process of legitimisation through unofficial mechanisms, including the accommodation of local elites' interests, the reinforcement of police and military and the promotion of social integration through migration. These mechanisms aim to undermine local community support for the separatist campaign while strengthening state legitimacy. In contrast to the official mechanisms that are strongly influenced by liberal perspective of state legitimisation, the unofficial mechanisms of legitimisation show a non-liberal logic, such as reinforcement of neo-patrimonialism. The thesis finds that *pemekaran* facilitates the strengthening of neo-patrimonialism which is considered to be a way to mitigate separatism. This effort is also supported by the

strong conviction among Papuans to strive to become "the masters of our own land", hence neo-patrimonialism has strong social justification.

Such developments contrast with the liberal statebuilding perspective which emphasizes the establishment of good local governance supported by the principles of meritocracy, accountability and transparency. Thus, the empirical findings of this thesis support the findings of research on hybrid political orders that emphasize the synchronisation between liberal logic and non-liberal logic of statebuilding (Boege et al., 2009; Smith, 2014). In the context of Indonesia, these are in line with previous researchers' arguments that the government's ability to accommodate the interests of local elites, including ensuring their access to material resources, were among the crucial factors to prevent the disintegration of Indonesia (Aspinall, 2013; Mietzner, 2017).

Besides providing empirical support for a number of propositions, this thesis also challenges some common arguments in the literature on territorial reform. In the case of Papua, despite significant fiscal redistribution to the new districts, the availability of public services is still limited. Moreover, in some of the new districts the quality of public services has declined because many frontline workers, such as teachers and medical staffs, have become district government administrative employees. The limited managerial capacity of the local government has also placed constraints on delivery of public services. All of these findings are in contrast to the claim that the formation of a new district would encourage improvements in public services due to fiscal redistribution to the underserved region (Grossman et al., 2017).

Another argument advocated by supporters of the territorial fragmentation is that it encourages more variation in service delivery or tax options for which citizens can then

"vote with their feet" (Tiebout, 1956). According to the classical Tiebout Model, the creation of new local government units enhances incentives for migration to areas and local governments that have more attractive combinations of service performance and taxes. However, generally migration is not only influenced by the availability of better services or lower taxation, but also due to other factors such as employment, housing and social environment. In addition, instead of providing better options, many new regions have limited human resources and infrastructure that encumber their ability to offer better performance. This is the case in Papua where many of the new districts were formed in previously isolated areas with very limited facilities and infrastructure. Hence, local government performance is less likely to be a plausible incentive factor for migration. Where there has been increased migration to the new districts in Papua, as discussed in chapter seven, employment opportunities are the driving force.

Lastly, findings from the case of *pemekaran* in Papua also challenge the argument that a smaller size of local government promotes social integration because the population tends to be more homogeneous (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). To the contrary, demographic composition in the new districts in Papua is even more heterogeneous because they create employment opportunities that encourage migration. These migrant residents fill positions in the new government and take advantage of the growing economic opportunities in the new districts. Instead of becoming more homogeneous, as predicted, the demographic composition in the new districts is increasingly heterogeneous. Migrants who on average have a better education than locals have quickly gained economic success. In many areas, this widening economic disparity has created social tensions between migrants and the locals. Meanwhile, intra-ethnic competition among Papuans has also intensified, driven by political competition as well as resources-access competition.

Regarding recent proposals of another phase of *pemekaran* that emerged during a meeting between President Joko Widodo and 61 Papuan leaders in September 2019, this thesis suggests that the idea must be addressed very carefully by taking into account wider audiences. The proposal suggests the formation of four new provinces so that Papua will be divided into six provinces, namely; Papua Barat Daya, Papua Barat, Papua Tengah, Pegunungan Tengah, Papua Selatan, dan Papua Tabi Saireri. Among Papuan themselves this idea has sparked controversy. The Papuan People Assembly (MRP), for instance, has rejected the proposal because it has not been discussed with the MRP. The special autonomy law for Papua article 76 stipulated that the creation of new province in Papua must be conducted upon approval from MRP and DPRP (Papuan Representative Council). On the other hand, the central government tends to support the idea of creating more provinces in Papua even if it has to be done through amending the law. In fact, in the proposed revision of the special autonomy law, the government proposes that *pemekaran* can be carried out without prior approval of the MRP and DPRP.[158]

Despite these debates, the new proposals fall in line with the underlying dynamics identified in this thesis on the elites' accommodation strategy. State's support to the new proposals confirms that proposing more provinces is a practice to expand the number of elites groups that can be accommodated. Current system of government and election, for instance, favour certain groups of Papuan and leave other groups with limited opportunities to influence policy making or to access strategic positions. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government's support for the creation of another provinces in Papua shows that the central government has failed in exercising effective control

[158] As explained by Ministry of Home Affair during special hearing with the parliament (08/04/2001), https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/04/08/12461251/revisi-uu-otsus-papua-mendagri-usul-pemekaran-wilayah-dapat-dilakukan, accessed on 22 April 2021.

in Papua. The limited development progress in Papua over the last 20 years, despite a vast amount of fund transfers, has motivated the central government to strengthen its control by dividing Papua into several provinces. This is also in line with the Indonesian government's interest in optimizing the use of the special autonomy fund which is extended for the next 20 years.

Based on the findings of this research, if the government decides to carry out with the new proposals to establish more provinces in Papua, there are at least two things that should be taken into account; First, adherence to the existing rules of *pemekaran*, especially the Special Autonomy Law (Otsus), which mandates *pemekaran* to be approved by the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) and the Papuan People's Council (DPRP). Government's consistency with the law is important to maintain the trust of the Papuan people who have too often felt cheated by the government. Conversely, government's move on creating new provinces without approval from the two institutions as stipulated in the Otsus Law, will be seen as an act of inconsistency that will further deteriorate Jakarta-Papua relations.

Second, the creation of new provinces is first and foremost for the benefit of the Papuan people. Thus, preparing local human resources, particularly indigenous Papuan, to fill provincial government positions at any level, is a crucial step. This process is important also as a response to the concern that *pemekaran* will only encourage migration and further marginalize the Papuans. Further, the availability of human resources is the key for the new province to perform, particularly given the wider scope of its duty and responsibilities as the first-tier government that play a coordinating rule in the region.

Finally, this thesis supports the theoretical proposition that legitimisation is not merely a consequence of the functioning of the state but is a dual process in which the state's actions requires approval from the people (Beetham, 1991b; Lamb, 2014). In addition to state performance issues such as quality of public service or infrastructure, people's approval often involves non-material aspects such as justice, equality, engagement and appropriateness and respect for shared values or shared beliefs. The case of Papua demonstrates that material performance is still the determinant aspect of people's approval, particularly for the rural community where public services are deficient. Nonetheless, they are also concerned with the relational aspect of service and development, as an expectation widely shared among Papuans: "*membangun dengan hati*" or to "develop with heart/heart-felt".

8.4. Recommendations for Further Research

This thesis investigates how territorial reform through *pemekaran* affects state legitimacy. It sees territorial reform not only as a process of developing state capacity but also as a process of state legitimisation where state and citizen influence each other. Following the idea that legitimacy is a reciprocal process between the ruler and the ruled, it develops an argument that the impact of *pemekaran* on state legitimacy is not direct but rather influenced by citizens' perceptions. In the case of *pemekaran* in Papua, the thesis finds that the process of state legitimisation in Papua hinges on official and unofficial mechanisms.

The official mechanisms of legitimisation through public services improvement, infrastructure development and local government capacity building are in line with a liberal approach to statebuilding. The unofficial mechanisms, involving issues such as

neo-patrimonialism and social engagement, reflect a non-liberal logic of legitimisation. The use of *pemekaran* as an opportunity to expand military outreach aiming at curbing the separatist movement also reflects the non-liberal logic of statebuilding. The fact that both liberal and non-liberal logics exist and operate through *pemekaran* provides opportunities for further investigation on how each approach interacts and influences each other. Such an investigation could link to the growing body of literature on the hybrid political order which seeks to understand how different values or political systems, such as liberal and non-liberal or modern and traditional, can coexist and be in harmony. (Boege et al., 2008; Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012).

In understanding the process of legitimisation, this research focuses on *pemekaran*, particularly at the district level. Under the decentralisation system, a broad scope of authority has been transferred from the central government to district governments such as providing basic infrastructure, public services, civic services and various licensing services. Hence, district governments have become the frontline in state-society relations, where direct interaction between state and citizen mainly takes place. In other words, citizen interaction with district government represents how the citizen experiences the state. However, the focus on *pemekaran* meant this thesis has paid less attention to other issues that are also important, such as the special autonomy arrangements that operate at the provincial government level. Implemented since 2001, the special autonomy law for Papua No 21/2001 is the main legal framework that governs relations between the central Government and Papuan society. The law regulates fundamental aspects in the relationship between the state and the community, ranging from economic, political, legal, historical to cultural aspects. Hence, further research on Papua may explore the issue of its special autonomy status as a further part of statebuilding activity.

This research also provides the stepping stone for further research on the development of local democracy in Papua. Indeed, *pemekaran* has often been linked to enhancing democracy because smaller local government units are seen to be more conducive to effective democracy. In a smaller and more homogenous setting, the community is arguably more keen to participate in overseeing the government (Rose, 2002). Moreover, in the case of Papua, the establishment of new local government units has been followed by the implementation of direct local elections which became an instrument for the process of developing local democracy. Therefore, further studies on *pemekaran* can specifically elaborate on the extent to which *pemekaran* has an impact on strengthening democracy at the local level.

Lastly, in light of recent moves toward another *pemekaran* in Papua, and based on the previous findings, this thesis proposes several questions for further study; Why does the central government continue to provide support for the formation of provinces even though so far there have been minimal official and unofficial achievements? Why do the Papuan elites today tend to support the division of the province compared to the previous period at the beginning of the expansion of Papua? What is the attitude of majority of Papuan toward the idea of creating new provinces? In addition, given the current pandemic situation, I suggest that further research related to these issues can be approached through a more indirect methods, for example by focusing on how the debates of *pemekaran* in Papua have been framed in local and national news media. Public perception on the idea of *pemekaran* in Papua can also be studied by employing social network analysis, for example analysing the debate of the *pemekaran* on social media such as twitter.

Finally, through the case of Papua, this thesis calls for an expansion of the study of territorial reform by analysing territorial reform as a political process and one that is not limited to an administrative rearrangement. For this reason, societal actors' perspectives should be front and centre of future analysis of territorial reform.

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