INTERGROUP APPROACHES TO BIAS REDUCTION, WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND UNCERTAINTY-THREAT MODEL WITH RELATION TO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND IMMIGRANT ATTITUDES WITHIN DIVERSE INTERGROUP CONTEXT

BY

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ABSTRACT

The current research explored two aspects of intergroup relations. The first explored intergroup approaches of Multiculturalism (i.e., focus on similarities and differences) and Common Identity (i.e., focus on group commonalities) and whether these would reduce Intergroup Bias and simultaneously increase support for Collective Action towards Pakistani-British ethnic group. It was also hypothesised that political liberals would show less bias and more support for Collective Action than conservatives, and that perceived threat would mediate this relationship. Contrary to predictions, in comparison to Multiculturalism, a Commonality-focus reduced bias and increased support for collective action in Experiment 1 but was not reliably replicated in Experiments 2 and 3. However, political orientation and perceived threat consistently supported our hypotheses. The second section examined the Uncertainty-Threat model as potential explanation for mediating the observed Political Ideology effects in relation to immigrants. Across Studies 4 through 6, more liberalism was related to less negative bias and less implicit bias towards immigrants. Both increased Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance mediated the Political Ideology to Bias relationships. Overall the research has shown potential for future exploration of simultaneous effects of Common Identity on bias reduction and Collective Action, and consistent evidence for the threat management as a strong mediator.

DEDICATION

To my wonderful husband and my beautiful daughters

To my lovely parents and my siblings

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

Chapter 3 is co-authored with Stewart, B.D., Gulzaib, F. & Morris, D.S.M. Frontiers in Psychology.

Author Statement.

B.D.S conceived of the original study idea with F.G. and D.S.M. providing significant input in its development and the general direction and development of this line of research. F.G., B.D.S., and D.S.M developed the study materials. Study Design and Analysis of Data was conducted by F. G. and D.S.M with assistance by B.D.S and writing up of the studies was done by F. G. and B.D.S., with assistance and revision from D.S.M.

Authors Note: Throughout all chapters of the thesis, I use language of 'we' 'our' etc., instead of personal pronouns to reflect the collaborative nature of the research conducted within the thesis.

<u>CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS</u>

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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION OF BIAS REDUCTION APPROACHES, WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGES IN SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND PERCEIVED THREAT.

1.1   Introduction.

An ethnically and culturally diverse post-World War II British society is composed of a mix of languages, nationalities, religions, and races through the arrival of immigrants. Ethnic diversity has become more noticeable in the United Kingdom in recent decades (Office for National Statistics/ONS, 2012) and this diversity and multiculturalism have been perceived in contrasting ways. Generally, these may have positive effects on a country's economy (for example Canada; Heibert, 2016), and culture with an introduction of a variety of foreign cultural festivals, traditional foods, products and languages to make the local culture more vibrant and socially enriched (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004), but on the other hand, may also be perceived as a threat to the national identity in addition to social and cultural values (Card, 2005; Craig, Rucker, & Richeson, 2018; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012; Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010; Verkuyten, 2009). Such conflicting perceptions towards ethnic minorities and immigrants within multicultural and multiethnic societies may encourage negative stereotypes or biased reactions and may produce intergroup tensions (Craig et al., 2018; Licata & Klein, 2002; Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Valentine & McDonald, 2004).

According to a recent briefing report by the University of Oxford (Blinder & Allen, 2016), the results of a public opinion survey showed that 56 % of the British respondents chose the option *"reduced a lot"* in response to a question *"Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should be ...?"*. This briefing report further described that the British majority

picked up immigration as the top social and political issue being faced by the British people (34%) among five other issues such as the EU/Europe (31%), the National Health Service (NHS, 31%), the economy (30%), housing (22%), and defence/international terrorism (19%). The authors also considered that the underlying factors could possibly be the cultural and economic undermining due to increasing immigration.

A research study by Tip, Zagefka, Gonzalez, Brown, Cinnirela and Na, (2012) examined the attitudes of the British majority groups (e.g., students sample from universities in a diverse city; London and from a university in located in less diverse city of England) regarding their perceptions of how the minority groups adapt to British culture (i.e., acculturation preferences) and how the perceived identity threat might potentially affect their support for MC. They tested their hypotheses in three studies towards Pakistani-immigrants (studies 1 & 2) and members of ethnic minority (study 3) through survey questions. They explored as if members of minority group will maintain their indigenous culture, this would affect support for MC negatively, but if they adopt British culture the effect will be reversed. They also predicted that the British majority groups may support MC positively if they perceive the minority groups show willingness to contact the British people. The results indicated that if the immigrant groups preferred to adhere to their individual cultural values, the British majority showed less support for Multiculturalism (MC), therefore this effect was mediated by threat to the perceived British identity. The effect was reversed if the Pakistani-immigrants and people of ethnic minority (i.e., non-specified ethnic group) wished to adopt the British culture and desired to be in contact with British people (Tip et al., 2012). The researchers concluded that the perceptions of majority members towards the minority members rely on their acculturation preferences.

More specifically, in the recent British Social Attitude 31st report (Park, Bryson, & Curtice 2014), it was found that most of the British public still tend to show negative attitudes towards ethnic groups and immigrants. In light of more negativity toward diversity and the increasing ethnic and cultural diversity within the United Kingdom/UK (ONS, 2012), it is important to check that the social policies are sufficiently supported by evidence for their effectiveness in reducing intergroup biases, in helping to maintain strong intercultural relations, and with encouraging support for reducing disadvantages of ethnic communities. To achieve this aim, this thesis has tested various intergroup strategies including Multiculturalism (MC) and Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) with and without highlighting subgroup identities (CWO); it tested their effectiveness in reducing attitude bias and generating support for collective action towards ethnic minorities and immigrants, and the relationship to the political ideology.

1.1.1 Immigration and development of ethnic minorities in the UK.

Immigration in the United Kingdom has a long history including a recent history of immigration and a more ancient history of invasion and immigration of Romans, Anglo-Saxons, Vikings, and Normans from Europe. It also, however, includes non-European immigration beginning in the 19th century with the settlement of ex-army men and arrival of job seeker immigrants from ex-British colonies (Migration Watch UK, 2014). In the post-World War II era, particularly in 1950s till 1960s, people from Europe (e.g., Irish, German war prisoners, Ukrainian, Polish, Hungarian, and Italian labourers) and from Commonwealth countries (e.g., Indian, Pakistani and Caribbean labourers) migrated to UK to fill labour jobs in British manufacturing industries to help the economy recover (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/).

These early immigrants, who have been permanently settled for decades in the UK British citizenship, however, still fall under the category of an ethnic minority, and are often still considered as immigrants. The research community and policymakers hardly agree on one definition of ethnicity due to its changing categories over time. However, in general terms an ethnic minority group is defined as an ethnic group is a collectivity within a larger population having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus upon one or more symbolic elements which define the group's identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an ethnic group are conscious of belonging to an ethnic group (Bulmer, 1996). Further, Modood, Berthoud, Lakey, Nazroo, Smith, Virdee and Beishon, (1997) defined British ethnic minority groups as a community with "common heritage" among its group members which distinguishes 'us' from 'them'. They also identified ethnicity as a "multi-faceted phenomenon" comprising of "physical appearance, subjective identification, cultural and religious affiliation, stereotyping, and social exclusion" (Modood et al., 1997, p.13).

The Office for National Statistics initially operationalized a uniform ethnic minority categorization across England and Whales that included following aspects such as:

- Country of birth
- Nationality
- Language spoken at home
- Parent's country of birth
- Skin colour
- National/geographical origin
- Racial group
- Religion

However, ONS has recently replaced following ethnic categories for England (and other regions too) in the Government Social Surveys to collect harmonised data (Version 3.3; ONS, 2015):

Choose one option that best describes your ethnic group or background
White
1. English / Welsh / Scottish / Northern Irish / British
2. Irish
3. Gypsy or Irish Traveller
4. Any other White background, *please describe*

Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups
5. White and Black Caribbean
6. White and Black African
7. White and Asian
8. Any other Mixed / Multiple ethnic background, *please describe*

Asian / Asian British
9. Indian
10. Pakistani
11. Bangladeshi
12. Chinese
13. Any other Asian background, *please describe*

Black / African / Caribbean / Black British
14. African
15. Caribbean
16. Any other Black / African / Caribbean background, *please describe*

Other ethnic group
17. Arab
18. Any other ethnic group, *please describe*

The above ONS categorisations gives a glimpse of the ethnic diversity and multicultural communities of Britain and it shows that British ethnic minorities gather from all over the globe to contribute to its ethnic diversity. The figure below shows the ethnic population of England and Wales (2011).

Source: ONS (2012)

https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/ethnicity/articles/ethnicityandnationalidentityinenglandandwales/2012-12-11

As the ONS census data (2012) revealed, the non-UK born population has had a 7% population growth rate since 2001 and the percentage of ethnic minorities also doubled between 1991 and 2011 from 6% to 13% of the total population. One of these groups is the Pakistani-British group who had migrated from Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s and settled here

permanently. This group, with a population over 1.12 million, is now among the top three largest

non-UK born minority groups following India and Poland, and one of the fastest growing with an

increase of 157% since 2001 (ONS, 2012). These facts provide one of the grounds for our

selection of the Pakistani-British ethnic minority group as a target group in our research.

The generations of British-born Pakistanis are bilingual, yet they prefer to communicate

in the English language. In addition, 91.45% of Pakistani-British people identify themselves as

Muslims. Pakistani-British Muslims account for 38% of the overall British Muslim population

(ONS, 2012). The Muslim identity makes Pakistani-British Muslim community as a Non-

normative (a group that is seen to deviate from ingroup norms, e.g., British norms of

superordinate or majority group; see Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Wenzel,

Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). This distinction provides another basis for our selection of

Pakistani-British community as a target group.

According to the ONS UK census data (2012), Pakistani-British people are located all

over the UK, but they are densely populated in England, particularly in London (2.7%),

Birmingham (13.5%), Manchester (3.8%), Bradford (16.1%), Nottingham (5.48%) and Luton

(14.4 %) as per local population percentage. In Scotland, they are mostly found in Glasgow (3.78

%). The Pakistani-British community represents all the regions and provinces of Pakistan (e.g.,

Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)

predominantly from Muzaffarabad (capital of AJK) and Mirpur; Mirpuri contribute to the 60% of

the total British-Pakistani community). The Mirpuri community migrated from the Mirpur district

of AJK (i.e., 250 villages and small towns with a population of 140,000) due to dislocation of

their villages caused by the construction of Mangla Dam on the river Jehlum in Pakistan during the 1960s.

However, the Socio-Economic Status (SES) of Pakistani-British community has been comparatively lower than other ethnic communities such as Indians and Blacks. This aspect was evident in the recent report of Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC, 2016), which found that the socio-economic status of the Pakistani-British community was under poverty ratings at 43.9%, as compared with Black (39.9%), Indian (24.6%), and White-British (17.2%). The report further found an increased mean deprivation score (Deprivation is the consequence of a lack of income and other resources, which cumulatively can be seen as living in poverty within a certain area, see EHRC, 2016, p. 29) in 2012/13 among the working-age Pakistani-British, Black and 'Other' as compared with their White-British fellow citizens. A similar effect was seen in ethnic minority households with children and higher rates of children of Pakistani/Bangladeshi living in substandard accommodation (28.6%) than White (18.6%). Further, according to the EHRC (2016) report, in 2012/13 the Pakistani/Bangladeshi community had seen higher rates of over-crowded housing (21.7%) than White people (3.4%). The chair of the commission, David Isaac had shown concern in this report over the inequality in the education, employment, healthcare, policing and other service areas between the ethnic groups and the native White-British people and called it as "worrying". He further emphasized the urgent need for a "comprehensive and coherent race strategy" to overcome inequality. Yet, such concerns and disparities in the socio-economic status of the ethnic minorities in general, but particularly Pakistani-British community provides a justifiable foundation to attempt the current research project.

On the other hand, despite the comparatively low SES difference between White-British and Paksiatni-British families, there was no difference observed at GCSE education level among the children of Pakistani-British families compared with the national average of grades A* to C except deficient performance in English and Mathematics in some regions outside of London. According to the Department of Education GCSE data (Briefing on ethnicity and educational attainment, 2012) in 2012, 46.5% of Pakistani-British students achieved five or more A* to C grades, which exceeded the national average of 36.3% in England & Wales. The recent generations of Pakistani-British people had increased rate of earning an undergraduate degree that was 18% higher than their parents and grandparents (MacInnes, Tinson, Hughes, Born, & Aldridge, 2015). This young generation also holds a 27.6% higher education/degree level qualification (ONS, 2012) and since 2006 their university admissions have risen from 8,460 to 15,015 in 2015 (UCAS, 2015), irrespective of the fact that the Pakistani-British students (and Black, Indian and Bangladeshis) had fewer chances of offers to be accepted by the prestigious universities (Higher Education Funding Council for England, 2005). Such figures of increased number of students achieving higher grades in GCSE results and further entering in the universities however do not show a simultaneous increase in the social economic status (SES) of the Pakistani-British community hence leave them to be socially and financially disadvantaged minority group. This situation is often credited to the prejudiced attitudes towards ethnic applicants as compared to their White-British counterparts (Noden, Shiner & Modood, 2014).

Though Pakistani-British university graduates have a higher percentage of degree level qualification (27.6%) than White-British (26.8%) (EHRC, 2016; England only), their unemployment ratio is twice as large as White-British graduates (e.g., 5.9% versus 2.3% for

White graduates; TUC, 2016; EHRC, 2016 England only). Overall, the Pakistani-British/Bangladeshi ethnic group had the highest unemployment (17.3%), whereas, White - British were only 6.3% unemployed in 2013 (EHRC, 2016; England only). A similar trend has been observed in Wales and Scotland (EHRC, 2016). Furthermore, the Muslims community seems to have faced higher rates of unemployment across England, Wales and Scotland (EHRC, 2016). The literature reviewed above with reference to the social and economic disparities of ethnic minorities including Pakistani-British group as compared with the White-British people provides strong foundations to select the Pakistani-British people and/or immigrants to examine the attitudinal bias against them in our research.

1.1.2   Prevalence of Bias and British Policies.

Britain has promoted equality since the abolition of the slave trade in 1807; however, the Alien Restriction Act of 1905 (UK Parliament, 1905) was introduced to restrict the religiously persecuted Jewish immigrants who fled from Russia and Eastern Europe. Later British governments devised the "Alien Restriction Act (UK Parliament, 1914)" and the "British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act (UK Parliament, 1914)" to further curtail the immigrants. Despite these efforts, immigrant flow continued during World War I and II. The anti-prejudice legislation also started in the 1960s and the Race Relations Acts (UK Parliament, 1965, 1968, & 1976) were implemented as policy guidelines to encourage equality between minorities and the local communities in the provision of public services, housing, employment and guidelines for police to ensure equality. Most recently, the Race Relations Amendment Act (UK Parliament, 2000) and the Equality Act (UK Parliament, 2010) have been introduced with further policy guidelines to improve circumstances.

Within the European context that includes the UK, minorities, often immigrants, have frequently experienced prejudice and discrimination particularly during economic pitfalls (Kuntz, Davidov, & Semyonov, 2017; Zick, Pettigrew & Wagner, 2008). Economic disparities have pushed them to live in the isolated communities with minimal interaction with the native majority. Fewer employment opportunities and lower wages as compared to the local/native Europeans further added to the disadvantaged status of the ethnic groups (Davidov & Samyonov, 2017; Glikman & Semyonov, 2012; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2017; Mallon, 2017; Musterd, 2005). For example, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2017) analysed data from five European Social Surveys (ESS, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 & 2010), and selected nine EU member countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) who welcomed mainstream immigration flow following WWII (i.e., World War II) but varied in immigration and integration policies. The purpose of the analysis of such widespread data was to explore whether the immigration status (i.e., the early generation of immigrants or their generation born and brought up in Europe,) of the Non-European residents influenced their integration into the economic conditions (i.e., labour market) in the same way as the native Europeans, including women. The results showed that the comparison was similar across countries, regardless of their country-specific immigration and labour integration policies yet the Non-EU immigrant generation (both men and women) remained more disadvantaged than even the European immigrants in seeking employment. The results discussed the nine representative countries still face the issue of economically disadvantaged and unemployed Non-EU immigrants who often have fewer chances to enter into the mainstream economic activity, often as a result of employement discrimination towards their ethnicity by prioritising the EU nationals, and also non-consideration of their skills and professional caliber as equivalent to the

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native Europeans (see Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, & Manning, 2010; Carlsson & Rooth, 2007; Derous, Peperman & Ryan, 2017; Grubanov-Boskovic, Natale & Scipioni, 2017; Oreopolous, 2011).

In general, the experience of negative attitudes by the non–European minorities has been analogous throughout Europe and the UK, and these negative attitudes have been explained as due to a cultural, economic or safety threat and their involvement in criminal activities (Ceobanu, 2011; Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013; Schoon & Anderson, 2017; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Zick, Pettigrew & Wagner, 2008). The recent wave of Islamic terrorist attacks in various European cities, such as the Madrid bombing (2004), London bombing (2005), Paris attack (2015), the Nice, France truck attack (2016), and Manchester arena attack and London Bridge attack (2017) have further inflamed the anti-Muslim hostility with decreased willingness to stand for action towards them within Europe (Meuleman, Abts, Sloothmaeckers & Meeusen, 2018; Van der Noll, Saroglou, Latour & Dolezal, 2018). Negative attitudes expressed by the native majorities might also be linked with minority and immigrant groups being more of a concern among British and European local population, particularly during recent economic downfall where unemployment and scarcity of financial opportunities was attributed to the arrival of immigrants (Boeri, 2010; Facchini & Mayda, 2012; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, & Yun, 2013; Hatton, 2015; Mocan & Raschke; 2016; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Salamońska, 2016; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Vezzali & Giovannini, 2011).

In this context, Birkelund, Chan, Ugreninov, Midtbøen, and Rogstad (2018) compared two field experimental studies (i.e., conducted seven to eight months pre and four to five months post terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011) in order to see the effects of terrorist attacks on the

employability of ethnic minorities within the Norwegian city of Oslo. They used typical Pakistani names compared to typical Norwegian names in the job applications. The call for interview rates decreased for Pakistani applicants after the attacks (e.g., 2010 = 12% and 2011 = 11%) although the attacker was a Jewish person with anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim intentions. However, the results suggested that modern Norway has not yet achieved racial equality regardless of its liberal and immigrant-friendly policy claims. At a broader level, the results suggested the impact of terrorism on attitudes (see for example *US* studies; Huddy et al., 2002; Traugott, Brader, Coral, Curtin, Featherman, Groves, Hill, Jackson, Juster, Kahn, Kennedy, Kinder, Pennell, Shapiro, Tessler, Weir, & Willis, 2002; *Netherlands*, Boomgaarden & de Vreese , 2007; *Germany,* Schuller, 2016; *Sweden,* Aslund & Rooth, 2005) and its association with Muslims (i.e., represented through several terrorist attacks and EU and American anti-terrorism policies) which resulted in the similar discriminatory results pre and post-attacks. Birkelund et al., (2018) concluded that these results contradicted some local surveys (e.g., Jakobsson & Blom, 2014) claiming progressive attitudinal changes among Norwegian population towards immigrants and Muslims following the attacks.

Various ethnic minority groups have reported the experiences of similar discriminations in either securing a job or working at the job; according to the End Racism survey report (2013) by the Runnymede Trust UK, 3 out of 5 British ethnic minority groups (Black-Caribbean, Black-African and Pakistani-British) reported discrimination in the fields of education and in job seeking and working, and with integration into mainstream society as compared to native White-British people. The survey results revealed that prejudice was associated with the development of discrimination towards ethnic minorities in the process of seeking a job or working at a job. The

results of End Racism survey (2013) further found that 33% of Black-Caribbeans, 28% of Black-Africans, and 23% of Pakistanis reported experiencing discrimination while seeking a job. However, the discrimination rates were even higher while working on the jobs for Black-Caribbean (44%), Black-African (40%) and Pakistanis (35%) as compared to the only 3% for White- British. The survey further reported that the children of Gypsy, Roma, and Irish travelers were more prone to be excluded from schools as compared to their local fellows (see Exely, 2016). Yet the most recent British Social Attitude Survey (BSAS, Kelly, Khan & Sharrok, 2017) has observed stability in the prejudiced attitudes of White-British towards ethnic minorities showing 26% very or very little racially prejudiced, with being 25% in thirty years prior.

The BSAS (Kelly et al., 2017) has further found that one in every four British people has shown prejudice by considering other races as "less intelligent". The survey also reported three groups with higher prejudice than many other groups, such as at the political level, the conservative party followers have been found to report more bias (33%) than the labour party (18%). Men showed more racial bias (29%) than women (23%), and 34% leave voters in the Brexit referendum (2016) found themselves racially prejudiced as compared to the 18% remain voters. These figures portray the patterns of prejudices and biases among various British social groups and their impact on the social and political relationships among the different communities; for example, the campaign and the results of Brexit (2016) indicated their attitudes towards immigrants (Wadsworth, Dhingra, Ottaviano, & Reenen, 2016).

According to the recent ethnicity facts and figures of 2016/17 published in 2018 by the Home Office on the gov.uk website, 29 out of 1000 Black people were stopped and searched by Police in England and Wales in 2016/17 as compared to the 4 out of 1000 White British people.

Thus, Black people are stopped and searched eight times as often as White residents, while

Asians are stopped and searched three times as often. Yet, the percentage of White and Black

people within England and Wales who are arrested after a stop and search is similar (9.9% of

White people and 8.6% of Black people), which indicates that the additional stops and searches

are unwarranted (Tankebe & Ariel, 2016; Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2013; UK

Ministry of Justice, 2010). Following increased anti-immigrant sentiments after the Brexit

referendum (2016), the Home Office urged to review the safety and police practices towards

handling these incidents by further ensuring secured and improved reporting opportunities by the

most vulnerable immigrants i.e., asylum seekers, refugees, religious groups etc. who feel

reluctant to report such experiences due to their immigration/visa status.

Recently in the press release of the Runnymede Trust (2016) following the UN

Convention on Human Rights, Geneva (2016), the Trust argued in their report that the

colourblind (i.e., an intergroup approach focusing on the group similarities only) approach of the

government appeared as a failure to conform to the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial

Discrimination (UN-CERD, 2016) as well as to overcome the racial inequalities in Britain.

Further to this, the Home Office 2016/17 report (O'Neill, 2017), found a "29 % increase in

overall hate crimes (i.e., Race, Religion, Sexual Orientation, Disability, and Transgender) since

2016 with 27 % based on race hate crimes only. The Home Office report (2017) further stated

that "This is the largest annual percentage increase seen since the Home Office series began in

2011/12" (O'Neill, 2017, p. 4). However, Home Office credited these figures to the

improvements in the recording of the case reporting practices by the security agencies.

The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (UN-CERD, 2016) report of UK and Ireland also showed serious concerns over the racist hate speech and hate crimes following Brexit referendum (2016). The commission report concluded (article 15, p.4),

"The Committee is seriously concerned at the sharp increase in the number of racist hate crimes especially in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in the weeks prior to and following the referendum on the membership of the European Union held on 23 June 2016. In particular, the Committee is deeply concerned that the referendum campaign was marked by divisive, anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric, and that many politicians and prominent political figures not only failed to condemn it, but also created and entrenched prejudices, thereby emboldening individuals to carry out acts of intimidation and hate towards ethnic or ethno-religious minority communities and people who are visibly different. The Committee remains concerned that despite the recent increase in the reporting of hate crimes, the problem of underreporting persists, and the gap between reported cases and successful prosecution remains significant. As a result, a large number of racist hate crimes seem to go unpunished. It also remains concerned at the negative portrayal of ethnic or ethno-religious minority communities, immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees by the media in the State party, particularly in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, as well as the rise of racist hate speech on the Internet. Notwithstanding these challenges, the Committee regrets that the State party continues to maintain its interpretative declaration on article 4 of the Convention (arts. 2, 4 and 6)".

The report (UN-CERD, 2016) further expressed concerns and dissatisfaction about the lack of implementation of UN-CERD codes towards ethnic groups and recommended the British Government to improve the following main areas;

- the opportunities for the ethnic minorities to access the justice system equivalent to native British,

- to devise a national action plan to eradicate discrimination against African descent,
- to invest the human and financial resources to improve the health, education, employment and housing of the Gypsy, Traveller and Roma community,
- to take careful consideration of the ethnic suspects before the stop and search and review the impact of the implementation of such powers,
- to thoroughly investigate the overrepresentation of Black and Ethnic minority in criminal cases to eradicate 'racial prejudice and bias in criminal justice system',
- and also design a humanitarian immigration detention policy by providing access to justice,
- take special measures to overcome 'unemployment, occupational segregation and discriminatory practices in recruitment, salaries, promotion and other employment conditions' among ethnic groups in the UK (UN-CERD, 2016, p.8).

Related to this context, the academic literature, however, shows that such bias might be related to perceived threats. Research by Tip and colleagues (2012) has demonstrated that the majority White population in Britain may think of ethnic minorities as a cultural threat if they show an inclination to follow their own cultural values, instead of completely assimilating to British culture. The underlying explanation of this negative view of outgroups (e.g., Black, Pakistani, immigrant, etc.) may be the perceived violation or difference from core norms, values, or traditions of the superordinate identity group (i.e., British); if White-British people consider themselves as more prototypical of being British than non-white people, they may be more prone to experiencing threats from these outgroups, especially if they consider those outgroups more non-normative. This hypothesis has been supported by various researchers such as Waldzus and Mummendey, (2004), Wenzel, Mummendey and Waldzus (2007), Yogeeswaran and Dasgupta (2010), and Yogeeswaran, Dasgupta, and Gomez, (2012) in the USA among White and Black Americans. The British Social Attitude Survey 34th report (2017) provided further support by showing that changes in attitude from 2002 – 2014 among British people about their impressions

of the immigration as "undermining British culture" has risen six points from 32% to 38% (Elizabeth, Curtice, & Harding, 2017).

As reported by Valentine and McDonald (2004), White-British participants expressed more explicit bias towards Asians (particularly Muslims) with concerns over their lack of integration in British society and their appeals for more mosques. They also show apprehensions about them as a threat to peace (e.g., potential terrorists) and over their persistent use of their own languages. However, surprisingly these concerns were culture-specific in nature and less strong for Black and other ethnic minorities as compared to Muslims which may indicate signs of Islamophobia among White-British following the 9/11 incident and other recent attacks. Such effects were widespread and attitude towards Muslims are more negative now than in the past across Europe with decreasing tolerance towards them (see Adesina & Marocico, 2015; Erisen & Kentmen-Cin, 2017; Hellwig & Sinno, 2017).

1.2   How is bias defined?

Bias is a positive or negative evaluation towards a person, or a group, based on their individual or group characteristics of race, sex or religion (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Fiske, 1998; Nelson, 2002). Bias has been expressed in many forms, for example; overt/explicit and implicit/indirect.

1.2.1   Explicit Bias

Bias can be measured directly or explicitly, or it can be measured indirectly, or implicitly, and the type of measurement may have different repercussions for behaviour (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Leitner, Hehman & Snowden, 2018; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; Wang-Jones, Hauson,

Ferdman, Hattrup & Lowman, 2018). Explicit bias refers to the overt and blatant expression of a biased attitude towards any group or its members and is usually assessed through direct or explicit questions about one's attitude (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). This type of bias has declined for some societal groups, such as towards the Black community due to social pressures (Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, 2011; Burke, Dovidio, Przedworski, Hardeman, Perry, Phelan, & Van Ryn, 2015; Dovidio & Gaertner; 2009), and being ethically unacceptable (Drakulich, 2015; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo & Krysan, 1997) followed by policy guidelines and lawmaking on race relations in America and Europe including Britain (e.g., Race Relations Amendment Act, UK, 2010). Besides the decline in explicit bias, intergroup conflict, however, did not significantly reduce (Dovidio, Gaertner & Pearson, 2017). During the 2008 Presidential elections of United States of America (USA), voters with explicit bias were less likely to vote for Barack Obama and more likely to vote for John McCain, and after controlling for explicit bias, people with more implicit bias against Black people were less likely to vote for Obama (Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, Lelkes, Akhtar, & Tompson, 2010). Further to this, the Associated Press poll (AP, 27 October 2012) reported that during the first term of President Barack Obama, there was a 51% rise in anti-black racial bias compared to a 2008 poll. Recently in England and Wales, there has been a 78% rise in recorded race hate crimes since the Brexit year of 2016-2017 (O'Neill, 2017). Similar trends were observed in the attitudes of White-Americans towards ethnic candidates and towards the increasing ethnic diversity, this increase in perceived threat may have convinced the voters to vote Trump in the 2016 Presidential US elections (Major, Blodorn & Blascovich, 2016).

Explicit bias is not observed only towards people of different races or ethnicities (e.g., Black people, Branton & Jones 2005; Lydecker, O'Brien & Grilo, 2018; Meuleman et al., 2018).

It has also been expressed toward people with disabilities (e.g., Murch, Choudhury, Wilson, Collerton, Patel & Scior, 2018; Ottoboni, Milani, Setti, Ceciliani, Chattat, & Tessari, 2017), immigrants (Falomir – Pichastor & Fredric, 2013; Roth, Grace, McCool, Ma, Amageldinova, Schena, & Williams, 2018; Stephan, Yabarra & Bachman, 1999), Muslims (Disha, Cavendish & King, 2011; Haque, Tubbs, Kahumoku-Fessler & Brown, 2018; Hutchison & Rosenthal, 2011; Mansouri & Vergani, 2018; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008), and communities with non-normative sexual orientation--Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender people (LGBTs; Boldry-Arterburn, 2002; Nama, MacPherson, Sampson & McMillan, 2017). Such negative attitudes had been a great hindrance in school's desegregation (Laurence, Schmid, Rae & Hewstone, 2018; McAvay & Safi, 2018; Simon & Beaujeu, 2017; Wang & Ramsden, 2018), yet the understanding that explicit bias is becoming less acceptable, has initiated efforts to bridge the gap among communities through integration and frequent interaction within policy-making process for minority groups, (Dovidio et al, 2002; Dovidio, Love, Schellhaas, & Hewstone, 2017).

1.2.2   Measures of Explicit Bias.

As discussed previously, explicit bias is a subjective expression of an attitude towards an outroup and is usually measured using self-report questionnaires and other self-reporting methods such as interviews. This type of measurement involves the deliberative and conscious retrieval of responses built on beliefs and experiences about outgroups (Dovidio et al., 2002; Greenwald et al., 2009; McCartan. Elliot, Pagani, Finnegan & Kelly; 2018). McCartan, Elliott, Pagani, Finnegan, and Kelly, (2018) studied the effects of explicit bidimensional attitudes (i.e., negative and positive dimensions of explicit attitudes) and implicit bidimensional attitudes (i.e., negative and positive dimensions of implicit attitude) on the prediction of the speeding behaviour of the

drivers using Implicit Association Test (IAT) and self-reported questionnaires. Two weeks after the administration of the IAT and the self-reported measure, the drivers were tested on a driving simulator to examine their behaviour towards the speed. They observed a stronger correlation, $r = .70$ between the explicit measure and its behavioural outcomes. They found that the explicit attitudes positively predicted the speeding behaviour. The implicit measure had similar effects on behaviour (McCarton et al., 2018). Lundberg, Payne, Pasek and Krosnick (2017) have also observed significant effects of explicit measure (and implicit measure too) in predicting the prejudicial behaviours of Americans (high in racial prejudice, high in disapproval of performance of president) towards the "percieved state of the nation in 2009" (Lundberg et al., 2017, p. 11) and in the remaining tenure of President Obama. Such research evidence supports the motive behind the continued use of explicit measures in our research.

It has been found that there is often a dissociation between implicit and explicit measures (Dovidio et al., 2002; McNamara, Muldoon, Stevenson & Slattery, 2011; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) tested the interracial interaction hypothesis (i.e., the attitudes of Whites affect racial behaviours and impressions while interacting with a Black partner) with the use of Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993) and observed that White partners showed friendliness toward Black interaction partners on Explicit Bias measures, but showed negativity on implicit, non-verbal behaviour (i.e., more speech errors, less eye contact, more distance, etc.). However, implicit and explicit measures do not always diverge, and it depends on a number of factors including increased structural fit between the implicit and explicit measures leading to an increased correlation (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008) and whether the current societal climate reduces social desirability pressures as may be the case with immigration.

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1.2.3 Implicit Bias

According to Sritharan and Gawronski (2010), intergroup contact theorists have categorized overt/subtle expressions of bias with terms such as "symbolic racism" (Sears & Henry, 2003), "aversive racism" (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), "automatic prejudice" (Devine, 1989), and "implicit prejudice" (Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999). With the use of these terms, the researchers have been examining the underlying disparities between the actual beliefs and resultant behavioural expressions towards minority groups such as Muslims, Immigrants, Women, and LGBTs (Lesbian, Gays, Bisexual and Transgenders). In this context, there has been a critique of the use of self-report measures of explicit bias and motivation in situations that strongly influence people to avoid revealing thoughts and attitudes that are not in line with social standards (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Payne et al., 2005; Sritharan & Gawornski, 2010).

Implicit biases stem from known or unknown former experiences that affect the thoughts that can eventually lead to biased attitudes or discriminatory actions towards other social groups (Byrne & Tanesini, 2015; Hardin & Banaji, 2013). Unlike explicit biases, implicit biases are indirect behavioural representations and are often automatically activated, and maybe beyond intentional control (Amodio, & Swencionis, 2018; Hardin & Banaji, 2013; Payne et al., 2005).

Implicit bias has been shown to influence a variety of behaviours. It may influence people to see and observe others based upon their pre-conceived ideology, which could result in intergroup biases among people, as well as professionals such as teachers (Montenson, 2018), health care professionals (FitzGerald, & Hurst, 2017; Maina, Belton, Ginzberg, Singh, & Johnson, 2018; Merino, Adams, & Hall, 2018), and judges and police (Peterson, 2018; Peterson,

Krivo, & Russell-Brown, 2018). These biases often lead to a variety of negative behaviours in intergroup interactions, such as 1) lack of friendliness in non-verbal behaviours towards each other, and 2) unfair recruitment decisions based on bias (Klienberg & Raghavan, 2018; Zigert & Hanges, 2005) and forming discriminatory impressions (Asplund & Welle, 2018).

1.2.4 Measures of Implicit Bias

Since the emergence of implicit bias measures, there has been huge progress in the development and validation of implicit measures. De Houwer and Moors, (2010) characterized the implicit measures as being either task performances, for instance; Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), or target priming (Fazio et al., 1995; Payne, et al., 2005; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park,1997). Above all, the implicit measures of biased attitudes require the least conscious efforts to dig into the mental content, and the responses to an implicit measure have been observed as generally uncontrollable due to the association (i.e., priming) induced in the task (Payne et al., 2005). Based on these aspects of implicit measures, social psychological and social cognition researchers have developed some very effective performance-based associative tasks. So, in our current research, we have used the Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne et al., 2005) to measure the implicit bias, which has been demonstrated to be a reliable and valid indirect measure of bias towards ethnic groups (Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Payne et al., 2008; Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010; Payne & Lundberg, 2014; see details of measure in Chapter 2 methods).

1.3 Approaches for bias reduction.

Group interactions and the frequently observed biases have underpinned wide research to reducing bias. However, limited research has investigated the simultaneous reduction of bias and

increased support for social change to improve the status of disadvantaged groups (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Hayward, Tropp, Hornsey & Barlow, 2018; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Tropp & Barlow, 2018; Wright & Baray, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). This gap in the literature was one major aim of the current research.

Experience of contact between advantaged and disadvantaged groups could potentially be the predictor of decreased bias and boosted motivation to stand for group rights (Tropp & Barlow, 2018). For example, most recently, Hayward and colleagues (2018) examined the role of positive and negative contact and collective action intentions between the advantaged (White-Americans) and the disadvantaged (Black and Hispanic-Americans) groups. Their findings were consistent with the earlier research cited above (e.g., Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, & Heath, 2011; Tropp, Hawi, Van Laar, & Levin, 2012), and they concluded that although the positive contact among both groups was found to be consistently effective in reducing perceptions of discrimination among disadvantaged (Black and Hispanic-Americans), however at the cost of reduced collective action intentions to challenge the status quo and raise voice for equality between White-Americans and their minority groups.

Recently, research studies have observed changing trends in the attitudes of the White/advantaged groups towards the acknowledgment of the racial inequalities and lack of support of equal social policies by them (Becker, Wright, Lubensky, & Zhou, 2013; Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010). Tropp and Barlow (2018) reviewed the intergroup contact literature and suggested three major outcomes; 1) building empathetic attitude towards disadvantaged groups, 2) considering outgroups as humans like themselves, and 3) making cross-group friendships to closely look into the plight of the out-groups. They suggested this could

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possibly reduce biases, discriminations, and inequalities along with inducing a sense of care and concern with the development of the efforts to stand up by the side of the disadvantaged groups.

Within the UK, though, very little research has focused on the investigation of the simultaneous reduction of bias and increasing of support for collective action to improve the status of disadvantaged groups. However, Shepherd, Fasoli, Pereira, and Branscombe (2018) have recently tested the role of threat, certain emotions (such as anger, fear, and angst), and prejudice in eliciting willingness to engage in collective action towards immigrants. They used White-British sample in the study 1 with a control condition in which participants were told that the British immigrant population is unlikely to change in the next four decades, and in the threat condition the participants were told that the immigrants will outnumber the White population. The results showed the indirect effect of threat via both prejudice and emotions to predict a willingness to take collective action among White-British participants (i.e., advantaged). They replicated these results with Italian sample too and discussed that threat and emotions (even the negative emotions such as anger, fear, and angst) could change the progress of collective action efforts among the socially advantaged groups. These findings enhanced the insight into further explaining how the involvement of advantaged groups to take collective action towards disdvantaged could make a difference through emotions and threat despite the fact whether the collective action is in support of the disadvantaged groups or againts them to oppose the equality policies. Consequently, their conclusions possibly support our research in which we intend to discover the aspects of bias reduction and willingness to engage in collective action (i.e., against the inequalities being experienced by disadvantaged groups) among the advantaged (white-British) towards disadvantaged (Pakistani-British/immigrants).

The current dissertation research is aimed at exploring the dynamics of reducing bias and increasing support for collective action in relation to the Pakistani-British group. Political orientation has also been measured because it has often been associated with preference for different types of social biases, especially in relation to ethnicity and immigrants. The bias reduction strategies that we are investigating include a Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) that focuses on commonalities or on recategorisation of two sub-groups as a single super-ordinate group (e.g., British), and Multicultural (MC) approach that emphasizes both similarities and differences among groups. These strategies emphasize conflict resolution and bias reduction among diverse groups in a multi-ethnic and diverse society, but they do so in diverse ways.

1.3.1   Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) and Recategorisation.

The Common Ingroup Identity Model focuses on recategorising group boundaries to reduce bias (Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, Houlette, Kelly & Elizabeth, 2000); it accomplishes this goal by having a person redefine the perceptions about their ingroup in such a way that they now categorise themselves as belonging to the same larger group (e.g., British) as someone who was previously categorised as belonging to an outgroup (e.g., Minority group). The ingroup and outgroup categories merge into new ingroup following the salience of original identity categories (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Thus, the main elements are recategorisation and commonality. Several research studies have tested the common ingroup identity model, and they generally have shown reduced bias and better attitudes toward the outgroup (Bagci & Çelebi, 2017; Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Curtis, 2014; De Freitas, & Cikara, 2018; Guerra, Rebelo, Monteiro & Gaertner, 2013; Kunst, Thomsen, Sam & Berry, 2015; Sengupta & Sibley, 2013). Common Ingroup Identity Model has also been observed to be widely acceptable solution of social cohesion and

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integration of diverse socities. Recatogrisation has manifested positive intergroup relations, positively improved intergroup perceptions and reduced outgroup hostilities (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013).

Vezzali, Stathi, Crisp, Giovannini, Capozza, and Gaertner, (2015) studied CIIM with the Imagined Contact Theory (defined by Crisp & Turner, 2009 as "the mental simulation of a social interaction with a member or members of an outgroup category", p.234) to assess outgroup helping intentions of children and adults within common ingroup imagined contact condition vs control condition. They tested two different age groups of Italian students in their experiments. In one of the experiments, they used a sample of elementary school children and instructed them to imagine they were having an interaction with an immigrant fellow as a member of a common group. In Study two, they used a sample of university graduate students and asked them to imagine a similar contact as children did. Both samples were tested against control conditions in which the group membership (i.e., ingroup/outgroup) of the partners were not specified. The results observed outgroup helping behavioural intention between both samples towards immigrants following the imagined interaction, and the commitment to help immigrants in real situation was still significant even after a two-week time gap following the intervention. Thus, CIIM along with the imagined contact could potentially be effective in development of positive attitudes and helping intentions towards outgroups.

Stoeckle (2016) analysed the data of European exchange (Erasmus proggrame) students of 38 German universities who visited other EU countries in the context of their interaction with the other transnational and EU students in the host countries. One of his hypotheses examined the role of common identity based on shared experiences and its stability over a certain period following the contact. So, he collected data in three waves by panel surveys. These three waves

included surveys from German Erasmus programme students before they started their study in another EU country (i.e., wave 1), during their study period in the other EU country (wave 2) and six months following their return from the other country (wave 3). The results found that the students who had weak national identities had shown strong identification with the European (superordinate) identity following their interaction with international students based on shared experiences and this identity effect remained stable even for a period of at least six months of their return to Germany, $t(25) = 0.47$, $p = .64$ (two-tailed), $d = .02$. Hence, Stoeckle (2016) concluded that common identity appeared to be significant following interacting with international students in another country which indicated a personal meaning to a transnational collective identity by meeting the equal group contact conditions of intergroup contact theory (e.g., Allport, 1954).

Ufkes, Otten, Van Der Zee, Giebels, and Dovidio, (2012) investigated the integrative effect of CIIM and the Ingroup Projection Model, which emphasised thinking of a common group as diverse to avoid negative evaluations (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). They found a positive relationship between a common ingroup identity and outgroup attitudes of majority groups in low and high prototypical conditions (i.e., perceiving ingroup members to be identical with the superordinate group identity instead of subgroup identity). In order to measure perceived prototypicality (e.g., low vs high), the participants were required to rate the seven diagrams of two increasingly overlapping circles each named after subgroup and urban district name. The proximity of the circles increased gradually and in the seventh diagram the circles completely overlapped with each other. The participants rated the proximity of the diagrams from 1 = lowest perceived prototypicality to 7 = highest perceived prototypicality by perceiving the best representation of closeness with either subgroup or urban district group. In this sample of native

Dutch people and immigrants in the Netherlands, two field studies revealed that the majority group members (i.e., Native Dutch) had more positive attitudes towards outgroup members (i.e., immigrants), but only when they perceived their ingroup as low in prototypicality (i.e., Dutch as high in diversity versus low in diversity). In general, these findings showed improved tolerance towards the multicultural neighbours when considering a common ingroup identity and seeing it as diverse.

To explore the generalizability of the positive effects of the superordinate identity (in this case European) of European people in relation with their attitude towards EU/non-EU immigrants (e.g., inclusive or exclusive/negative or positive), Curtis (2014) studied the role of CII Model within the 27 European member states. The researcher used survey based Eurobarometer 71.3 (Papacosta, 2009) which asked seven questions from the participants to conclude a combined dependent veraible Pro-immigration Attitude Index. Those seven questions included whether immigrants pose a security risk, enrich culture, cause unemployement, fill labour jobs, replace EU's agining population, help improve tolerance and intergroup understanding, and pay more taxes than earn benefits. They assessed the independent variable; superordinate identity through "Feel European", "Feel National" and "Feel Regional". The findings concluded that the CII model proved effective in decreasing intergroup hostility as well as positive and inclusive attitude towards immigrants. This study further added that European identity showed positive attitudes towards non-EU immigrants alongwith EU immigrants. They also concluded that strong national identities were found to be associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants, however regional identity did not show such effects on immigrant attitudes.

However, Banfield and Dovidio, (2013) found that the emphasis on commonalities in the CII Model undermines the majority group member's ability to understand the disparities and

disadvantages experienced by minority groups (Study 1). In study 2, they tested an all-White-American sample with the common identity approach and with support for collective action as the dependent variable. White participants in the commonality condition showed poor detection of subtle discrimination as well as reduced willingness to support change policies that produced injustice that a Black job applicant had faced. These results support other work in which the majority group shows reduced willingness to act for equality when commonalities between majority and minority groups are emphasised (Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012; Saguy et al., 2009; Tausch, Saguy & Bryson, 2015; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright & Lubensky, 2009).

Recently, Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, and Dovidio (2016) have also studied the CII model in relation to the collective action. In research using two studies, the researchers highlighted the common US identity among the Black and Latino participants and observed a demotivation for the collective action efforts, and also decreased the sense of unequal treatment in the society. Ufkes et al., (2016) concluded that "creating a strong sense of common ingroup identity" could demotivate the disadvantaged group from taking collective actions, so the mere focus on CII was enough to decrease Collective Action/CA but not the process of recategorisation. They further concluded that if the salience of common ingroup identity and the dual identity (i.e., ethnic/racial identities) was simultaneous then they did not affect the CA among the Black and Latinos. A similar aspect of common ingroup identity on bias reduction and support for CA was earlier examined by Tausch, Saguy and Bryson (2015) with identical results.

Although such findings suggest the effectiveness of CIIM in improving intergroup relations by reducing bias, yet it is not clear whether bias could be reduced while increasing support for CA. Therefore, in order to examine CIIM further within British diversity context

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alongside Multiculturalism (MC) and Common Identity without highlighting (CWO; see below),
we looked into this question in chapter 2 in three experimental studies.

1.3.2 Multiculturalism (MC) Approach.

Multiculturalism has generally been framed as an approach that endorses the
acknowledgment and appreciation of ethnic, cultural, and group identities. In general, this
approach asks people to acknowledge the similarities and differences between groups. The MC
approach emphasises the value of cultural uniqueness that is formed through social, historical,
political, and economic experiences of a particular society; this idea has been explained by
Triandis, (1988) as *"One of the realities of different subjective cultures is that they result in
different expectations and different perceptions of the interactions. Thus, the greater the
heterogeneity within a given society, the greater the possibility that the interactions will be
costly" (p.33).* According to this explanation, MC aims at decreasing the conflicts by developing
an understanding and gaining insight about how the groups interact and form experiences about
others (Wolsko et al., 2000).

Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner, and Wagner, (2013) in their meta-analysis of representative
survey data from twenty-three (23) European countries, to seek an interplay of Right-Wing
Authoritarianism (RWA- a socio-political attitude based on conformity to traditions, Altemeyer,
1988), a relationship between MC and attitudes towards immigrants and feelings of threat. RWA
has been associated with higher perceptions of a dangerous world, which are related to higher
perceptions of threat (Duckitt & Sibley; 2010; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). In study 1, Kauff and
colleagues used the data of round 4 of European Social Survey (ESS, 2008) to assess on Migrant
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, 2012), to observe if RWA would show an effect on the MC

and attitudes towards immigration relationship. The results observed that the individuals high on RWA demonstrated negative attitudes towards immigrants and increased feelings of threat when encountered the MC ideology. However, they argued that this negative relationship was stronger if a country endorsed a liberal immigration policy (i.e., acceptance of differences and allowing immigrants to be inclusive of equal rights), since liberal policy reflects the multicultural and diversity-oriented policies of a country. So, it is comprehendible here that the individuals high on RWA lack positive attitudes towards immigrants. To further replicate the findings of the meta-analysis, in their second study they manipulated multiculturalism in the laboratory settings. They showed a video clip containing a multicultural group of German people (i.e., families of German football team) and required participants to rate the video. Consistent with the survey results (study 1), they found lower pro-diversity beliefs and enhanced prejudice in individuals with high RWA beliefs when confronted with MC condition as compared to the control condition which confirmed the negative effect of RWA (or conservative ideology) on MC and attitudes towards immigrants.

In a different set of experiments, Richeson and Nussbaum (2004) manipulated Multicultural (MC) and Colourblind (CB) perspectives; the colourblind approach decatogrises the social group memberships (e.g., cultural and ethnic categories), and has people consider all members as one group in a manner similar to the CII Model, but it is not similar to the assimilation approach, which explicitly emphasises that the majority group's traits and values are important and that people should assimilate to the majority group values. Richeson and Nussbaum had participants read the MC or CB ideology-endorsing prompts that were identical to those used by Wolsko, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2000). Following reading the prompts, they

instructed the participants to write about why that perspective was good for intergroup relations (i.e., list 5 free responses). Later they presented the participants with the 21 response statements from the previous participants for them to identify those statements which matched their own responses. The aim of using previous responses was to help participants elicit their own responses like those listed. In order to assess the automatic (implicit) and explicit racial biases in relation with MC and Colournlind (CB), the researchers used an IAT (Implicit Association Test; Greenwald et al., 1998) and thermometer ratings (for explicit bias).

Richeson and Nussbaum (2004) predicted that participants in the CB condition would show a more negative attitude towards Blacks than Whites in comparison to the MC condition. To examine their predictions, they analysed the response latencies (i.e., the time taken to respond each pairing) of the *"White – Good"* and *"Black – Good"* pairings to indicate whether the participants showed pro-white or pro-black racial attitude in either condition. Thus, the results indicated that the participants in the CB perspective showed more implicit and explicit bias than those in the multicultural condition. These outcomes further concluded the MC being a positive ideology to harness intergroup harmony (see review Wolsko et al., 2000), as well as the changing nature of the racial attitudes according to the endorsement of an ideological perspective, at least within a US sample. Ng Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten, (2018) concluded the impact of intergroup ideologies dependant on the national framework. They found that the majority Hindu community of Mauritius shows less intergroup bias in MC as compared to a CB, a Polyculturalism (i.e., "ideology focusing on interactions and connections among racial/ethnic groups", Rosenthal & Levy, 2012) or control condition.

Within this context, Visintin, Birtel and Crisp (2017) designed an experiment with a British sample to explore the interactive effect between the ideologies (MC vs CB) and typicality

(typical outgroup vs atypical outgroup) on warmth (e.g., ratings of friendly, likable, and helpful) and competence perception (e.g., ratings of intelligent, competent, and capable) during an imagined contact manipulation. They used the same MC and CB prompts and methodology as used by Richeson and Nussbaum (2004) to involve the participants in the imagined contact with typical outgroup member (i.e., unknown British Muslim who reads the Quran, says prayers five times a day and does not drink, etc.) and atypical outgroup member (i.e., unknown British Muslim who does not live a typical Muslim way of life) by exposing them either to MC or to the CB conditions. They observed less positive outgroup perceptions in MC-atypical condition as compared to the MC-typical condition and in both CB-typical and CB-atypical conditions. The results suggested the effectiveness of the MC in the development of positive outgroup perception in imagined contact with only a typical group may correspond to the focus of MC ideology on differences, hence restrict the outcome of imagined contact (Visintin et al., 2017). When MC ideology compared with CB and Assimilation ideologies, MC observed a negative relationship to implicit and explicit prejudices, whereas, CB observed a negative relation and Assimilation indicated a positive relationship with explicit prejudice (Whitley & Webster, 2018). These findings showed proximity between decreased prejudice and MC as compared to CB or Assimilation. In general, in conjunction with the above research, there is a good amount of evidence demonstrating that a multicultural perspective improves interethnic attitudes and behaviours (Arslan, 2018; Levrau & Loobuyck, 2018; Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Sam, 2018; Verkuyten, 2005; Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009; Wolsko et al., 2000).

The MC approach with the above noted strengths, however, has gone through criticism in recent years. There is some evidence that the majority group members believe multiculturalism is a threat (both realistic and symbolic) to their ingroup values based on their perception of

threatened national and cultural values by the outgroups (e.g., immigrants) (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan & Lahav, 2015; Morrison et al., 2010; Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, & Stellmacher, 2007; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). Nations high in national identity perception (i.e., identifying strongly with a national identity, for example a British identity) feel higher threat (Badea, Iyer & Aebischer, 2018; Yitman & Verkuyten, 2018) from the immigrant's lack of assimilation efforts which leads to prejudiced attitudes (Mahfud, Badea & N'Gbala, 2015; Verkuyten, 2009a). However, to verify the mediating role of perceived immigrant threat in relation to the support for multiculturalism, Badea, Iyer and Aebischer (2018) predicted whether the prejudice of the French majority group would be affected by the role of national identification (i.e., emphasising on national identity over sub-regional and ethnic identities, Verkuyten, 2009b), endorsement of multicultural or assimilation ideology, and perceived threat. The main aim of the study was to find out a link between the factors related to negative attitudes towards immigrants in France. The results showed that higher levels of national identification resulted in higher threat which was related to the endorsement of assimilation and resultant prejudice. However, on the other hand, the results found increased multiculturalism leading towards decreased prejudice against immigrants as compared to the assimilation. Although study highlights the positive role of multiculturalism in reducing bias (see Plaut, Thomas, Hurd & Romano, 2018; Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006; Yitman & Verkuyten, 2018), it also verifies the role of the perceived threat leading towards negative attitudes towards immigrants (Badea, Iyer & Aebischer, 2018).

Guimond, Crisp, De Oliveira, Kamiejski, Kteily, Kuepper, and Sidanius, (2013) investigated four different nations with a notion that multiculturalism (MC) or assimilation (AS) may produce different effects in different countries depending on the intergroup norms of that country influenced by the pro-diversity policy at low, medium or high level. Assimilation (AS),

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in this research, could potentially be framed as a commonality approach by participants to reduce the negative implication of endorsing assimilation. They applied the model of intergroup attitudes, which incorporated factors which belonged to that country (i.e., attitudes and perceived norms related to the diversity policy in that country) and the social-psychological factors (i.e., social dominance orientation/SDO which is defined by the social hierarchies maintaining the power and status quo among the powerful and dominant groups of society, Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Results showed that countries varied in their support for a Multicultural approach versus an Assimilation approach to intergroup relations and attitudes towards ethnic and religious groups depending on their pro-diversity policies. Endorsement of a multicultural norm was highest in Canada (M = 4.45), medium in the US (M = 3.74) and the UK (M = 3.49) and lowest in Germany (M = 2.95). Thus, there is some evidence that a multicultural approach may be as effective in the UK as it is in the US due to lack of national and personal endorsement of pro-diversity/multicultural policy in the recent years. This lack of MC endorsement was indicated by David Cameron; Ex-Prime Minister of England and Wales on many different occasions, and the incidents of 9/11 in the US and the following political attitudes. Similarly, Germany was also observed to be avoiding MC policies as stated by German Chancellor, Angela Merkal as "failure of Multiculturalism" within their country regardless the fact there was no national MC policy being practiced in Germany during the time. In addition, results also demonstrated that prejudice was low toward Muslims in Canada, and was highest in Germany, whereas, in the U.S. and the U.K. they were neither low nor high (between these extremes). Consequently, MC appears to be lacking in support within EU context of perceived diversity, and attitudes towards immigration (currently highly divided) which needs to be further tested with reference to the prejudice and improvement of intergroup relationships.

1.4   Support for Collective Action.

A majority advantaged group's support for collective action to improve the status of a minority group (termed as collective action model of social change by Wright & Lubensky, 2009) may depend on the perception and empathetic acknowledgment of the unequal treatment and unjust policies (Kende, Lantos & Krekó, 2018; Selvanathan, Techakesari, Tropp & Barlow, 2017; van Zomermen, Postmes, Spears & Bettache, 2011). Similarly, perceived inequalities in resource distribution and fair treatment accompanied by the intergroup biases may drive minority groups to challenge the status quo to achieve common goals (Hasan-Aslih, Netzer, van Zomeren, Saguy, Tamir & Halperin, 2018; Simon & Klanderman, 2001; Stewart & Tran, 2018; Van Zomeren et al., 2011; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). According to Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; Van Zommerman, Postmes & Spears, 2008), three underlying socio-psychological factors; Identity, Injustice, and efficacy (i.e., emotional involvement based on group identities) reinforce the protest and joint action among the disadvantaged groups of the society. Theories of intergroup contact and social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and bias reduction (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000) provided the fundamental motives to develop SIMCA with the aim of improving the intergroup relations in a diverse and multicultural society. Yet in this research, we aim to explore support for collective action from the majority group (e.g., White-British) perspective, which has shown to have variable support for collective action.

Involvement in collective action by majority and minority groups has been examined and explored in many different settings (e.g., industry - Costie, Holm & Berardo, 2018), with a variety of (mediating/moderating) variables (e.g., threat, emotions and prejudice – Shephered et al., 2018; political ideology - Moreira, Rique Neto, Sabucedo & Camino, 2018). However, recent

investigations have established a point of view that an emphasis on commonality (i.e., highlighting the common group identity) may diminish the perception of the social inequalities among the majority groups resulting in decreased willingness to support for collective action against minority groups (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). The research with the main focus on the commonalities shows a lack of majority group involvement in collective action while simultaneously reducing biases and group differences (Dixon et al., 2012; Johnston, & Glasford, 2017). The pioneering work by Gaertner and colleagues (2000) has shown some evidence based on the role of commonality in improving intergroup contact (by reducing negative intergroup attitudes, has not been shown increase in support for CA). They have, however, also tested a dual identity strategy, which uses aspects of the Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact, a subgroup (e.g., immigrants) and a superordinate group identity (e.g., British) are made salient simultaneously to allow differences in circumstances to remain noticeable. Banfield and Dovidio (2013) showed that, in the U.S., a dual-identity increased majority-group members' willingness to support collective action (i.e., willingness to protest on the behalf of a disadvantaged group).

However, they did not test the influence on prejudice. Further lack of evidence on the support for collective action and a concurrent decrease in bias regarding the inter-community perspective (e.g., support for CA towards British-Pakistani group in our current research) has been indicated by Pettigrew and Hewstone (2017) as a future direction. The background explained above suggests testing an alternative model of majority group's support for CA and reduced bias against minority groups. Given that our research was begun in 2013, there were a lack of studies testing this simultaneous effectiveness at that time, and a lack of studies showing the potential of alternative approaches (e.g., Dual Identity approach); thus, we initially focused on

Multicultural and Common Ingroup Identity approaches in our first set of experiments (i.e.,

chapter 2).

Further, our research aimed to explore the role of majority group (White-British)

member's willingness to show support towards the policies favouring outgroups (here Pakistani-

British and immigrants) and collective action to oppose the social injustice and inequalities to

reduce bias at the same time. This notion is based on the impact of the supportive collective

action of the majority in favour of the minority which contains paramount significance in an

ethnically diverse society (Kende et al., 2018; Selvanathan et al., 2017). In other recent work,

intergroup contact based on the quality (not the quantity) of the contact increased the willingness

to engage in collective action towards an outgroup with empathy as the mediator of the

relationship (Johnston, & Glasford, 2017), but it was focused on the minority perspective, yet not

much of the research share shows the perspective of the majority group in support for collective

action.

In addition to the role of MC and CIIM in CA, we are interested in exploring the influence

on threat perceptions. Shephered et al., (2018) tested this aspect in two different samples from the

UK and Italy to compare the role of emotions (angst, fear and anger), distinctiveness threat (i.e.,

threat to the prototypicality and distinctive identity of a group; Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1997)

and prejudice in predicting the willingness to involve in collective action efforts among White

majority groups. In study 1, they assessed these variables against the immigrants by manipulating

that the immigrants will replace the White British majority in the impending fourty years (UK

sample). The study 2 was replicated with the Italian sample. The results showed the mediating

role of the threat by emotions in predicting the willingness to participate in the collective action

in both samples. Shephered et al., (2018) concluded that the underlying factor of engaging in collective action toward outgroups may be the result of the emotions and distinctiveness threat.

1.5 Threat.

The arrival of immigrants and other ethnic minority groups in any country may create a sense of threat among the local and majority groups in terms of their cultural values and resources. Such threats may increase defence mechanisms among the majority groups regarding protection of their groups. Such defence mechanisms can take the form of intergroup biases, stereotypes, outgroup exclusion, discrimination, and demand for assimilation outgroups to the values of the majority or dominant group. Such outgroups can be varied in terms of immigration status, linguistic ability, skin tone, or religion, any of which could be perceived as threats to the majority group (Abbas, 2007; Atwell Seate & Mastro, 2016; Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015; Caricati, Mancini & Marletta, 2017; Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2015; Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Stephan, Yabarra & Morrison, 1999). The investigation of these intergroup threats has a long history in social psychology from the initial Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Sherif, 1966), which has influenced later theories such as the Integrated Threat Theory (ITT: Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison, 2009). The Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) has incorporated the four underlining causal elements or antecedents of threat and negative intergroup contact; these include realistic threats, symbolic threats, negative stereotypes, and intergroup anxiety. The ITT theory was revised and called the *Intergroup* Threat Theory and the main change was moving negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety to be antecedents of symbolic and realistic threat (Stephan, Yabarra & Morrison, 2009; 2015). In this revised *Intergroup* Threat Theory, the researchers theorized that the mere perception of the threat was

enough to elicit biased attitudes towards minority/outgroups. Much recent research has focused

on symbolic and realistic threats and has found support for a strong correlation between threat

and prejudice (Caricati et al., 2017; Obaidi, Kunst, Kteily, Thomsen, & Sidanius, 2018; Riek et

al., 2006; Roebroeck, & Guimond, 2018).

1.5.1 Realistic Threat.

Stephan and Stephan (1996) described that the realistic threat resulted from the

subjectively perceived struggle over political power and economic and physical resources. The

communities perceive a fear that the scarcity of these resources would cause loss for their

community. This perception eventually generates outgroup threat leading towards the negative

intergroup attitudes. Accordingly, such fear perception has been a key factor behind the biased

attitudes against outgroups and immigrants (Caricati et al., 2017, Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

1.5.2 Symbolic threat.

Stephan and Stephan (1996) referred to the symbolic threat as a threat to the religious and

cultural values, and beliefs, and ideologies. These are the perceived ideological differences

between the majority and minority groups with effects on intergroup contact as similar as the

realistic threat from outgroups or immigrants (Caricati et al., 2017; Stephan & Stephan, 1996).

An example of symbolic threat could be shown from the attitudes towards Black African

Americans who have been treated with hostility due to perceived contradictory values of the

White-Americans (Esses et al., 1993; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears; 1988). Actual

differences and threats are not necessary for this effect; the mere perception of a threat is enough.

1.5.3 Threat and bias.

Stephan and colleagues (1999) conducted a study based on the Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT) and confirmed that symbolic and realistic threats were significant predictors of prejudice towards Asian, Cuban, and Mexican immigrant groups. Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, and Martin, (2005, study 1) further tested the effects of symbolic and realistic threats on prejudice against immigrants of Tutsi tribes of Rwanda. They used newspaper articles about the Rwandan immigrants discussing either realistic or symbolic threats, or even a combination of both or not threat to the ingroup. The results indicated higher levels of negative attitudes toward Rwandan immigrants in the combined realistic and symbolic threat condition showing how students perceived threats to their symbolic views and physical resources. When they compared realistic threat with symbolic threat, the former showed amplified effects on the perception of the legitimacy of the group status while reducing the prosocial response towards immigrants and raising the levels of group favouritism (Wlodarczyk, Basabe & Bobowik, 2014). In addition, Florack, Piontkowski, Rohmann, Balzer, and Perzig (2003) manipulated perceived threat to see the attitudes of German workers towards Turkish immigrants regarding acculturation (i.e., social or behavioural changes following cross-group interactions; Berry, 1997) and reported that the host community not only perceived the immigrants as a cultural and economic threat but also less likely to assimilate with the host culture. Threat perception among those who highly identify with the national identity also increases the endorsement of acculturation ideology which in turn gives rise to the anti-immigrant bias (Badea et al., 2018).

Rohmann, Florack, and Piontkowski, (2006) also observed the role of cultural difference between the host country (Germany) and immigrants (Turkish and Italian) and whether there was a relationship to the attitudes of the locals. They found that as the cultural difference increased,

the threat from immigrants increased too, but on the other hand, the threat declined when the host culture was seen as being adopted by the immigrants. Albarello and Rubini (2018) studied the implicit and explicit bias towards Roma community via threat (both symbolic and realistic) perception. Among the Italian sample, they used the language abstraction (i.e., describe the Roma people using verbs and adjectives, which were later coded as a positive and negative description for the analysis purpose) as a subtle and implicit measure of discrimination and feelings thermometers as explicit measures of affective prejudice. In the results, the participants indicated increased levels of negative abstractions instead of positive which reflected the augmented implicit and explicit prejudice under threat perception.

The evidence above indicates the potential importance of threat in maintaining biased attitudes against immigrants and other ethnic groups, thus provide us a justification for our research to add threat to verify its role as a mediator.

1.6 Political ideology.

Generally within the literature of social and psychological sciences, the political ideology construct has been measured on a left-right spectrum. The left-wing and right-wing terms developed from the French revolution of the 18th century with reference to the seating arrangements of the members of the legislative bodies, where the speaker sat in front of the house and the members seated either left (Commoners) and right (Aristocrats), (Knapp & Wright, 2006). The terms have evolved with "liberals" commonly referred to as on the "left" and the "conservatives" on the "right". There are personality differences between the liberals and the conservatives, and these ideological differences play a vital role in shaping the thoughts and actions of the individuals who endorse either end of the spectrum (Ordabayeva & Fernandes,

2018). Liberals tend to perceive the people more positively, are more prone to seek experience and change than the conservatives who emphasize on maintaining status quo and social groups inequality (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Hibbing, Smith & Alford, 2014; Jost, Nosek & Gosling, 2008). Researchers have also demonstrated a relationship between the political ideology spectrum (liberal & conservative) and personality characteristics and showed good evidence for a relationship between more liberalism and less "Opposition to Change" and less "Acceptance of Inequality (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost et al., 2017; Sibley, Osborne & Duckitt, 2012).

Political conservatism has also been shown frequently associated with the biased and stereotyped attitudes towards outgroups that are low in status or non-normative (e.g., Caruso, Mead, & Balcetis, 2009; Jost et al., 2003; Krosch, Berntsen, Amodio, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013; Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). In one example, Krosch et al., (2013) tested the principle of hypodescent (i.e., a process of categorising the ambiguous socially subordinate multiracial group members as Blacks instead of Whites (see also Halberstadt, Sherman, & Sherman, 2011; Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011) to see the labelling differentiation of ingroup or outgroup between the politically liberals and conservatives. The researchers manipulated the racial categorisation task by presenting 11 face-type (created as a member of ambiguous race) stimuli in random order across three studies. The racial categorisation task consisted of 11 subcategories of morphed male faces (ranging from 100% Black/White to 0% Black/White) created from original faces with the use of a morphing software (Morph Age Express 4.1, Creaceed Software, 2011; as cited in Korsch et al., 2013). They presented the image stimuli on grey background with a flashing fixation cross while the

images stayed on the screen until the participants chose to categorize the images either Black or White. The results across the three studies found the conservatives categorised the ambiguous faces as Blacks only, which support the principle of hypodescent. The researchers further discussed that these results indicated the excluding attitude of the conservatives towards the racially ambiguous members while not considering them as belonging to ingroup (e.g., White).

Likewise, such biased attitudes by the conservatives are not restricted to one ethnic group (Black people) but appear towards other non-normative outgroups such as ethnic minorities, immigrants, international students, people with disabilities, sexual minorities and even women. For example, Quinton (2018) studied the underlying factors of prejudice among university students towards international students and found conservatism as the key feature of negative attitudes and prejudice. Similarly, Hoyt and Parry (2018) found that increased political conservatism based on the higher levels of prejudice, fostered the negative attitudes and discrimination in the job recruitment evaluation process towards the sexually stigmatized individuals; i.e., characteristics that others perceive as deviant or undesirable (see also Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Van der Toorn, Jost, Packer, Noorbaloochi, & Van Bavel, 2017).

However, to narrow down our discussion within the British social attitudes and immigration context, Brexit (the referendum to help Britain exit from European Union in 2016) appears as the most recent and striking incident of conservative ideology that emerged from anti-immigrant sentiment (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). According to the Gov.UK webpage, the conservative voters' percentages increased in three general elections: 2005 (32.4%), 2015 (36.9%) and 2017 (42.3%). However, with a 71% turnout rate in the Brexit (2016), the 61% conservatives voted for leave along with 95% UK Independent Party (UKIP) supporters. Earlier,

Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann, (2011) in their European report also added that British people with right-wing political ideology show higher levels of prejudice towards the minority groups (i.e., they assessed negative attitudes towards EU immigrants).

In the decade from 2000 until 2010, the free movement of EU immigrants encouraged pensioners, working class, and White-British people with low qualifications to develop an anti-immigrant attitude (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). These individuals were highly identified with British identity and nationalist ideology and perceived the immigrants as the social and economic threat, particularly at the times of the crippling economy. However, the liberal and conservative parties both failed to adequately address the concerns of these groups, which may have paved the way for the rise of the support for the UKIP (far-right British political party, Dennison & Goodwin, 2015) who used the opportunity to highlight the threats of uncontrolled immigration by attracting the conservative mindsets among those at least 67% individuals had shown voting interests in the UKIP prior to the Brexit in general elections (Evans & Mellon, 2016; Ford & Goodwin, 2017). The results of the Brexit (i.e., the leave vote won by overall 51.9% and 53.4% in England) indicated that the majority supporters of the "Leave Vote" belonged to the voters with conservative ideology (i.e., 61%, gov.uk), those concerned by immigration, geographically less diverse (i.e., White-British majority residential areas) areas/cities, had lower GCSE level qualifications (70% leave voters) and were more likely members of the working class (Ford & Goodwin, 2017).

Dennison and Goodwin (2015) discussed the data of the British Election Study (BES, March 2015) on attitudes to immigration by vote intentions among the supporters of the six main parties (i.e., Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democratic party (LibDems), Scottish National Party

(SNP), UK Independent Party (UKIP) and Green party) contested for 2015 general elections. Negative attitude about immigration was assesed on three effects—"bad for economy", "undermines culture", and "burden on welfare state". The results revealed that supporters with conservative ideology perceived immigrants more negatively as compared to the supporters with liberal ideology on all three effects. So the UKIP supporters perceived the immigrants negatively between 80% - 90%, the supporters of the Conservative party perceived them negatively between 45% - 67%, while comparing with Labour party supporters who were between 33% - 44%. Dennison and Goodwin (2015) concluded their analysis of the election outcomes and its political and social impact as following; "*UKIP deliberately set out to target and mobilise long-standing public anxieties over immigration—putting the issue at the heart of a broader narrative about national loss, threat and abandonment, which was directed strongly to lower-middle-class and working-class white Britons*" (p. 18). They further added that the lack of dedication to deal with the resentment of the British middle class over the perceived threats of uncontrolled immigration could give rise to the far-right ideology which later was evident in the initiation of Brexit campaign by the conservative party.

Within the context of our research, it is important to discuss the role of political orientation in biased attitudes towards outgroups/immigrants within MC and Commonality ideologies. With reference to this aspect, a recent research conducted by Yogeswaran and Dasgupta (2014, study 3) provides some evidence to show the role of political orientation in MC and its impact on the attitudes and behaviours towards outgroups. The researchers designed the study to see if the conservatism or liberalism (political orientations differences) would moderate the multicultural construals (abstract vs concrete) on attitudes towards Hispanic-Americans. The

conservatives, however, not only moderated the prejudicial attitudes towards Hispanic-Americans in concrete MC construals but also had shown symbolic threat (mediator) to the national identity. This study provides the support for our research to explore the role of political orientation differences in the UK towards a Pakistani-British group considering the similarity in conservative attitudes towards immigrants in the US and other diverse societies.

1.7 Political Ideology, uncertainty threat model and Bias relations.

Research suggests that motivational underpinnings of Conservative political ideology relate to the endorsement of uncertainty, social instability and threat perception (Jost et al., 2007), and that conservative beliefs become strong following threatening experience (e.g., terrorism) or interaction and mortality salience (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Steele, & Thompson, 2009). In the recent years, US census (US Census Bureau, 2008) revealed that by 2042 American ethnic minorities will take over the American majority which some scholars called as so-called majority and argued that this was shown to pose a future threat to the Republican Party in order to attract political support. However, the common US White-majority group, when perceived their group as a future minority within their own country expressed negative attitudes and emotions (Craig & Richeson, 2014; Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012). Resultantly, high ethnic identification of White-Americans triggered perception of a threatened decline in their racial group and formation of biased attitudes towards non-Americans which appeared explicitly following Donald Trump win in the 2016 Presidential elections. The central theme of the political campaign of 2016 presidential election led by Donald Trump was immigration control and immigrant related security and economic threats (Major, Blodorn & Blascovich, 2018). The Trump win in US and the Brexit referendum success in UK appeared similar in conservative ideology among

the majority group (i.e., White- British/White-Americans) which was developed by their threatened view of increasing racial diversity. Thus, thinking about this triangular relationship between political conservatism and biased attitudes influenced by threat being widely studied within US ethnic and racial diversity context (e.g., Giles & Hertz, 1994; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011; Jost et al., 2007) we have considered to replicate the Jost and colleagues (2007) model of Uncertainty-Threat within American White majority groups in chapter 3. Further, the similarities between American and British political attitudes towards immigrants based on the Trump win and Brexit compelled us to extend this model beyond UK to seek the validation and generalizability (e.g., by recruiting US general adult sample instead of young university students) of political ideology and bias relationship.

1.8   Current research overview.

Considering the current context of intergroup relations within diversity oriented societies and the effective role of Multiculturalism and Common Ingroup Identity Model in development of positive intergroup relationships, the current research was designed to explore which of the intergroup relation approach (i.e., MC, CIIM, and Commonality without highlighting subgroups/CWO) would influence bias reduction and support for collective action according to politically conservative and liberal ideology. This influence was required to seek the effect for particularly non-normative ethnic minority groups (e.g., here Pakistani-British ethnic minority group) and immigrants with reference to assessing support for Collective Action from the perspective of White-British population. This facet of intergroup relationships has not gained significant attention in literature yet and we hope to fill the gap in this context. We also considered the role of political ideology where liberals appeared to be less biased (significantly

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more implicitly) and more supportive towards outgroups, and then incorporated research beyond British context whilst collecting data from American general population to find the generalizability of the threat model of political conservatism. As we have discussed within the literature review above, generally, it has been observed that more conservatism was significantly related to more outgroup bias and negative attitudes due to threat perception. So in the experiments 2 and 3 we have included threat to observe whether political and bias relation was mediated by threat . The mediational findings in conjunction with the consistent Implicit Bias findings would lead us to examine the further role of Threat Management and Uncertainty-Avoidance based upon the Uncertainty-Threat Model (Jost et al., 2003, 2007 & 2017) in order to explain this relationship against immigrants (unspecified) in Chapter 3.

Thus, our current research project is divided into two research dimensions in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2, we will present the experimental studies testing the influence of intergroup prompts MC, Commonality (CIIM and CIIM without highlighting subgroups/CWO) on implicit/explicit bias and support for Collective Action (CA), while also measuring political orientation within the models. We initially hypothesised that Multiculturalism may decrease bias (both implicit and explicit) while also increasing willingness to support for CA among the White-British participants, and we hypothesised that the CIIM would decrease bias while simultaneously reducing willingness to support for CA. In experiment 1, we will test the effects of MC and Commonality manipulations on explicit bias, implicit bias, and support for CA. Experiment 2 was designed with added control condition to replicate the results of Experiment 1. Experiment 3, however, included the CIIM and CIIM without highlighting (CWO) conditions with MC (MC being a comparison with CIIM and CWO prompts) to further explore the intergroup approach manipulations to observe simultaneous bias reduction and increased support

for CA. Our primary motivation for including political ideology in all 3 experiments as an important predicting factor along with intergroup approaches was to validate the role of bias (implicit/explicit) towards ethnic minority and immigrant groups. Therefore, we further intend to replicate the Uncertainty-Threat Model of political conservatism by Jost and colleagues (2007) in 3 studies of chapter 3.

Following the reliable results of political ideology on bias relationship while threat being a mediator to this relation, Chapter 3, will be explaining the wide gulf between liberals and conservatives through extending the Uncertainty-Threat model to intergroup relationships and attitudes toward immigrants with a sample from USA. Considering the role of liberals showing less bias toward non-normative groups, in Study 4, we investigated whether liberals would show less explicit bias toward immigrants and whether this relationship would be mediated by both uncertainty-avoidance and threat management. We further tested if threat management was a more influential factor. In a follow-up Study 5, we extended threat management to include perceived realistic and symbolic threats toward abstract outgroups and bias to negativity. In Study 6, we again use the standard perceived threat measure which we had used in Study 4 but added an implicit measure of bias to test whether the effects of explicit bias replicated with implicit bias toward immigrants. The chapter 4 of the thesis will elucidate the results further to grasp their meaning within the literature and conclude the discussion of implications and future directions based on our findings of intergroup approaches within Pakistani-British context and Uncertainty-Threat Model within broader immigrant (US) context.

2 CHAPTER 2: DO MULTICULTURALISM OR COMMONALITY APPROACHES REDUCE BIAS AND INCREASE SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION SIMULTANEOUSLY?

2.1 Abstract.

The intergroup approaches such as Multiculturalism (MC) and Commonality (CIIM) appear to have shown effective outcomes in reducing intergroup biases, and in the development of positive attitudes towards minority groups. However, the question whether these approaches achieve this goal <u>simultaneously</u> remains undiscovered. To achieve this goal, current research investigates the concurrent effects of these approaches on Intergroup Bias and support for Collective Action (CA) towards Pakistani-British ethnic minority within the perspective of White-British majority group (Experiment 1 & 2). A newly coined Commonality without highlighting subgroup identity (CWO) is also tested with MC and CIIM within the intergroup context (Experiment 3). Political Orientation (Liberalism/Conservatism) is included as a predictor variable, whereas perceived threat from Pakistani-British is added to examine a mediating relationship between political ideology and bias. The results observed unpredictable and contradictory findings of MC within all 3 Experiments which showed more (not less) bias than CIIM (Experiment 1 & 2), and less bias in Experiment 3. Multiculturalism also consistently produced less support for Collective Action than did the Common Identity approach. Thus, the simultaneous effects of intergroup approaches on reducing bias and generating support for CA remained mixed and inconclusive. Liberals, as opposed to conservatives, however consistently replicated the significant effect of less bias and more support for CA in Experiments 1 through 3. Within Experiment 2 & 3,

perceived threat mediated the relationship of political ideology with bias and support for

Collective Action.

2.2 Introduction.

2.2.1 Multiculturalism, Bias and support for Collective Action.

The multiculturalism approach, or the acknowledgment and appreciation of

commonalities and differences between groups, has often been found to be effective in producing

less intergroup bias and enhanced tolerance levels, in producing more positive attitudes towards

immigrants, and bridging the attitudinal (negative perceptions) gap between immigrants and

majority groups (Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012; Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006;

Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2014; Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010; Wolsko et al., 2006;

Reicheson & Nussbaum, 2004). However, other recent research has begun to show situations and

countries in which the multiculturalism approach may be less effective and one such place may

be the United Kingdom (Heath & Demireva, 2014; Guimond et al., 2013; Tip et al., 2012; 2015).

Within this Chapter, we set out to review some of the common approaches used to reduce bias

and increase support for collective action toward disadvantaged groups.

Though the British government has not incorporated the term Multiculturalism within the

official policy documents, the government's policies, however, were introduced with an emphasis

on integration of different ethnicities but keeping their individual and group liberties within

British society. The main aim of the integration and cohesion policy was to overcome the racial

discrimination and develop intergroup harmony among diverse communities (Favell, 2001;

Howarth & Andreouli, 2016; Parekh, 2000), and this focus helped to essentially generate a

multicultural policy in practice. Though, this practice has received less support from the

government since 2010. The fundamental philosophy of multiculturalism was to maintain the cultural colourfulness as a positive aspect of a diverse society in order to encourage acceptance and positive intergroup attitudes (Ashcroft & Bevir, 2018; Kymlica, 2012; Mathieu, 2018; Plaut et al., 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkeutyn, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000). Further, the multiculturalism research focus was in the context of endorsement by the majority or minority groups and it observed a trend of minority groups favouring the ethnic identity (Liebkind, Mähönen, Varjonen, & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2016; Schalk-Soekar, 2007; Verkuyten, 2005; Verkuyten, & Fleischmann, 2017) whereas, majority groups preferred the national (superordinate) identity (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2008; Guerra, Gaertner, António, & Deegan, 2015; Kunst et al., 2015; Staerklé et al., 2010). This aspect was also observed by Hui, Chen, Leung, and Berry, (2015) and Verkeutyn and Martinovic (2006) that the ethnic minorities favour multiculturalism more than the dominant majority groups. The causal factor behind such contradictory perceptions is considered as the perceived threat to social and cultural values (Stephan et al., 2000, 2009; Verkuyten, 2009). Within this context, Tip and colleagues (2012) observed negative perception of MC among White-British people when they saw Pakistani-British people adhering to their individual culture. However, Sivanandan (2007) reflected on his approach on multiculturalism in the UK as a means of cultural diversity leading to take the course towards either integration or separatism depending on the political and social context in the country. People with politically liberal ideology may endorse MC more positively and show more willingness to CA than the conservatives since conservatism is associated with ethnocentrism and focuses on maintaining the status quo (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost, et al., 2003; Tip et al., 2012).

Within the global perspective, one of the first official multicultural policy was introduced by the government of Canada in 1971. This policy statement clearly defined the role of government, local Canadians, and immigrants/ethnic groups by emphasising the individual freedom, intergroup contact ensuing mutual acceptance and cultural cohesion under the supervision of government (Berry 1984; Berry & Kalin, 1995). Berry and Kalin (1995) provided an overview of the National Survey of Canada (Reid, 1991) in which they assessed the need to maintain multicultural and ethnic attitudes on four levels;

1. "there needs to be general support for multiculturalism, including acceptance of various aspects and consequences of the policy, and of cultural diversity as a valuable resource for a society",
2. "there should be overall low levels of intolerance or prejudice in the population",
3. "there should be generally positive mutual attitudes among the various ethnocultural groups that constitute the society",
4. "there needs to be a degree of attachment to the larger Canadian society, but without derogation of its constituent ethnocultural groups" (p. 302).

The results of the 1974 to 1991 survey data found that Canadians not only maintained their support of the multicultural ideology, but actually showed increased levels in later years (i.e., the mean level of support increased from 4.71 to 5.95). Researchers also found an augmented acceptance for a diverse Canadian society with no considerable evidence of bias and discrimination. On the aspect of attachment to Canada, the positive attitudes were observed where the attachment to Canada did not reduce the adherence to the individual cultural identity and vice versa. These findings indicate the role of multiculturalism as a pillar of intergroup relationships where groups perceive each other positively following frequent contact and interaction (Allport, 1954; Hui et al., 2015).

In this context, Wolsko et al., (2000) examined the role of multiculturalism and colourblindness (often operationalised as a focus on intergroup commonalities) in relation to intergroup contact and bias reduction within the United States. They observed that both approaches were equally effective in reducing bias and low stereotypic attitudes towards outgroups. People who endorsed the MC approach perceived outgroups more positively due to the nature of MC as being accepting of the inter-ethnic differences (Wolsko et al., 2006). Verkuyten (2005), however, explored the differences of MC endorsement and perception of ingroup and outgroup in opposite directions between ethnic majority and minority groups of the Dutch society. Comparing an assimilation (i.e., expectation from immigrants to adopt the host culture) condition to an MC condition, the researchers observed that the minority group members in the MC condition perceived their ingroup positively, but the majority group members in the MC condition considered the minority group negatively, and positively only in the assimilation condition.

Other most recent evidence by Whitley and Webster (2018) conducted meta-analysis of the 97 studies, divided in 42 US and 57 non-US experimental and correlational research on intergroup ideologies (i.e., MC, CB and Assimilation) and their relationship to prejudice. The results found a negative association between MC and explicit prejudice (g. = -0.26) which indicated that the endorsement of multiculturalism would lead to decreased prejudice. However, this relationship was stronger in correlational studies as compared to the experimental studies included in this meta-analysis. The assimilation ideology was strongly and positively related to bias in correlational studies. Further, subsequent research based on the findings of Yogeeswaran and Dasgupta (2014) on the Abstract and Concrete representations of MC, this meta-analysis

identified studies that primed those representations with MC to observe the priming effects with control conditions. There was slight increase in explicit prejudice (g. = 0.20) with concrete MC priming (e.g., consistent with Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014), but with abstract priming the results showed a slight decrease in implicit prejudice (g. = 0.07), although both effect sizes were small. According to the discussion of Yogeeswaran and Dasgupta (2014), the concrete representations of MC stimulated the feelings of symbolic threat which cause prejudice, similarly conservatives also showed increased levels of prejudice with concrete representations. When the results of the meta-analysis compared the relationship between CB/MC and reduced prejudice, MC and reduced prejudice showed larger association (g = 0.15) as compared to CB and prejudice, hence confirmed the previous research (e.g., Neville et al., 2013; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013). The findings of this most recent meta-analysis support the literature by indicating that MC is the most promising intergroup approach to prejudice reduction and improving intergroup relationships while compared with CB and Assimilation. In Chapter 2, we have used the MC and CB (i.e., Commonality) approaches that have been used by previous researchers (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).

Considering the rise of cultural and ethnic diversity leading to biased interactions which may interfere with the efforts to induce intergroup harmony and support for each other for both implicit and explicit behaviours of majority group members within the U.S. (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), the purpose of introducing intergroup strategies (i.e., MC or Commonality/Common Ingroup Identity, or Assimilative strategies) was to test their effectiveness in reducing biases (implicit and explicit) (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew,

Wagner, Trop & Christ, 2011). Varour, Gagnon and Sasaki (2009) examined antiracism and used

Colourblind (i.e., Common Ingroup Identity) and Multiculturalism approaches to test how the

dominant group (White Canadian) and minority groups (Aboriginal Canadians) responded to

identity salience manipulations in intergroup contacts. They manipulated these intergroup

approaches in the controlled laboratory settings and White participants read the information about

their partner who belonged to the opposite ethnic group (no actual contact involved) prior to be

randomly assigned to the conditions (i.e., White Canadian was supposed to read a sheet

indicating the ethnicity of Aboriginal and an Aboriginal had to read about the White Canadian;

Study 1). They also adapted the MC and CB prompt manipulations by Wolsko et al., (2000).

Their hypothesis was to explore if MC would generate positivity towards outgroups among the

dominant groups and CB would have negative effect accompanied by the concerns about the

identity of minority members. In their study 2, they studied real interpersonal contact through a

discussion session to see the mediating effect of "enhanced other-focus" on behaviour in the MC

prompt condition. These researchers found consistent results with their hypotheses and observed

that MC generated positive outgroup attitudes and direct outward attention following intergroup

interaction as compared to Colourblind prompts among both the White Canadians and the

Aboriginal ethnic group. Further, Plaut, Thomas, and Goren (2009) investigated the

psychological engagement of the minority colleagues and observed that the White majority

members, in MC condition, perceived better engagement of their minority partners during

interactions than in the CB condition, which improved their positivity towards diversity in

Canada. So, MC may prove more efficient to develop focus on others to generate productive

interaction.

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Visintin, Birtel, and Crisp (2017) assessed the effectiveness of an imagined contact intervention (i.e., in which participants imagine contact with an outgroup and reflect about that imagined contact) within intergroup ideologies with the British sample. In their research, they primed participants with either MC or CB manipulations (adapted from Wolsko et al., 2000) to observe the effects of outgroup attitudes comprising of warmth and competence perceptions on the members of typical or atypical outgroups. The researchers knew the MC ideology had shown positive perception towards an outgroup following an imagined contact better than CB in the literature (see also Brown & Hewstone, 2005), however, this trend was opposite towards atypical groups in which imagined MC contact towards atypical group did not show any difference of attitudes than the CB. Their target groups were British Muslims, Moroccans, Asians (typical of a group) and, physically disabled people and people with Schizophrenia (atypical groups). Participants imagined contact with these groups and a conversation with an unknown British Muslim. The results found that those who were primed with an MC approach perceived atypical groups less positively than those in the CB approach. However, the MC approach produced more positive attitudes for the typical groups than the CB approach, thus as the researchers suggested that a consideration of the group typicality while designing studies and interventions looking into intergroup relations may be vital (Visintin et al., 2017).

Besides the significant role of MC in the promotion of positive intergroup interaction, and in bias reduction, recently MC has been criticised for its emphasis on maintaining individual identities, which may undermine the efforts of integration and acceptance within countries in which there is growing perceptions of threat from outsiders. The incident of 9/11 and the following Islamophobia paved the way for media to target multiculturalism with reference to the

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immigrants / Muslims. The critics argued that MC developed a widespread political divide where liberals support the MC ideology on the one hand, and on the other hand, conservatives feel threatened by it (Morrison et al., 2010). Threats have been measured in relation to core values (i.e., perceived symbolic threats) and fear of scarcity of resources of the host groups (i.e., perceived realistic threats), which surfaced in the form of intergroup biases (Stephan et al., 1998, 1999, 2002; 2015; Thomas & Plaut, 2008; Verkuyten, 2004, 2006). These threats do not have to be objectively real; the simple perception of a threat has been linked to negative intergroup attitudes and biases (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2009; 2015).

The ex-British Prime Minister, David Cameron (Kuenssberg, 2011) declared MC as a failed policy leading to community segregation and his speech about MC proved to be an official backlash to the multicultural policy. The further war on terror to curb Al-Qaeda and Taliban may also have inflamed the biased mindsets against immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants in the UK and the Western European communities. Other factors involved include the perceived economic threat among disadvantaged sections of the host society and perceived threats to the fundamental British values. Consequently, the public has had an increased islamophobia and fear of interacting and supporting the immigrants (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Hagendoorn, 2007). The criticism on MC has begun to be studied in order to explore the perceived side effects of MC, how the efficacy of MC could be improved in diverse countries, and any mediating factors (Banting & Kymlica, 2012).

In an academic research project with White American students, Morrison and colleagues (2010) examined whether MC would negatively, or positively influence the intergroup attitudes of White Americans in the context of their level of ethnic identification within the U.S. In study

1, they manipulated the passages about Multicultural (MC) and Colourblind (CB) and hypothesised that MC prime would bring up increased support for group-based dominance among White-Americans college students (i.e., Social Dominance Orientation / SDO) if they were highly identified with their ethnic identity. The results of the study 1 were consistent to this hypothesis, however, they further tested the model for the generalisability by including an adult sample other than students, and by changing the manipulation in Study 2. Explicit Prejudice against Asian-Americans, Black-Americans and Latinos was measured as a dependent variable in this study. The results supported the predictions and found that the participants in MC condition who identified strongly with their American identity, expressed higher prejudice against ethnic groups than participants in CB or Control conditions. The researchers claimed that the results supported the criticism on MC as one source of intergroup problems. Further, the results also supported the Intergroup Threat Theory because highly identified majority members responded less positively to the MC approach, which would potentially be due to experiencing higher levels of threat (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Morrison, Plaut & Yabarra, 2010; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). This research, however, did not measure perceptions of threat in relation to multiculturalism, but other research has.

Amid the widespread criticism across Europe on multiculturalism as leading towards social isolation of ethnic/immigrant groups, and entrenchment as disintegrated identities of a society, Heath and Demireva (2014) used the statement of Ex-Prime Minister David Cameron concerning the failure of MC in the UK and collected data from 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (EMBES). The survey respondents were a sample of people from various ethnic minority and religious groups of UK such as; Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and Christians from

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Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black Caribbean and black African background. The main aim of the survey was to explore the ethno-religious integration under the "thin" (i.e., less explicit and vague) implementation of Multicultural policies among British ethnic groups. The ethnic groups represented at least three generations (i.e., Non-British born grandparents/adults, British born parents, and British born young generation). Nearly all the generations found themselves compatible with the British identity along with their individual ethnic identity. Yet, on the other hand, ethnic groups agreed that perceived discrimination was the causal factor underlying the poor integration claims. However, the researchers claimed that their results were consistent with the similar findings of Koopmans (2010) and Wright and Bloemraad (2012) who had found British people more favourable towards integrating the immigrants than their other European countries (for review, Koopmans, 2010; Wright & Bloemraad, 2012).

Yet other research has investigated attitudes towards multiculturalism within the UK, Germany, the US, and Canada, and has found a different result. Guimond et al., (2013) investigated four different nations with a notion that multiculturalism (MC) or assimilation (AS) may produce different effects in different countries depending on the intergroup norms of that country. Assimilation (AS) is an approach in which people believe that all groups should assimilate to the values and beliefs of the dominant or majority group within the country, and as such, is not the same as an approach that focuses on commonalities between groups. Results showed that countries varied in their support for a Multicultural approach versus an Assimilation approach to intergroup relations; endorsement of a multicultural norm was highest in Canada ($M = 4.45$), then the US ($M = 3.74$), the UK ($M = 3.49$), and Germany ($M = 2.95$). Thus, there is some evidence that a multicultural approach may not be as effective in the UK as it is in Canada.

This finding lends some evidence to investigating the effects within the UK and recent research

supports the idea that multiculturalism may be experienced as threatening within the UK;

research indicates that people experienced more threat from multiculturalism within the UK if

they believed minority group members wanted to maintain their culture as opposed to wanting to

adopt the British culture (Tip et al., 2012; Tip et al., 2015).

Thus, there is a good amount of evidence showing the positive role of a multicultural

approach in reducing bias. Yet, there also is some evidence that the effect of a multicultural

approach may not be as effective within the UK. Given that our research for this dissertation

began in 2013, the current set of Chapter 2 studies sought to test the unique role of MC within

British context in comparison to a Commonality approach.

2.2.2   Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM).

To fully review factors of intergroup bias and conflicts, it is essential to review the

Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) that has been studied as parallel with MC, and which

has been used extensively as a Commonality approach. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) created the

Common Ingroup Identity Model based upon Sherif's (1961) work on intergroup contact and the

use of a superordinate identity (an identity that two subgroups can both identify with such as

ethnic groups being British), and on the conceptual framework of Self Categorisation theory

(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) and Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner,

1979). They used the CII Model as a basis for a Commonality approach to intergroup

relationships and have conducted extensive studies on its use as an effective strategy to reduce

intergroup bias. The model relies on recategorisation of social categories and identities. Social

categorisation can divide people on the bases of a variety of identities in order to differentiate

from one group to the other such as gender, ethnicity, class, race, culture, and religion. Group categorisation tends to minimise the differences within group members (i.e., forming ingroup) which leads to ingroup favouritism but overemphasise the differences between groups (i.e., forming outgroup) that develops outgroup enmity and bias (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy,2015; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Tajfel, 1969). The process of minimising of social identity categories and of group boundaries is labelled as recategorisation. This process involves the development of the "us", "we" and "our" terms emphasising inclusivity of previously outgroups into ingroups (see review Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2015; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) by involving them into superordinate group membership such as "British" (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to overcome intergroup biases and to develop harmony.

2.2.3   Common Ingroup Identity, Bias, and Support for Collective Action.

The Commonality approach based upon the Common Ingroup Identity Model encouraged recategorisation of sub-group identities into the superordinate identity in order to benefit social relations by reducing biases through positive interaction (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, 2012; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Trust, 1993). The perception of inclusiveness within a superordinate group is the aim of the Commonality approach. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) discussed the "Circle of inclusion" of Allport (1954, p. 43) which described the hierarchical variations among groups and its members and the common ingroup identity goal accomplishment was carried over by the non-salience of this hierarchy.

To examine whether the CIIM approach would show effects on the evaluations (study 1) and behaviours (study 2) of White-Americans towards Blacks, Neir and colleagues (2001) induced a common identity in both Black and White participants within the U.S sample. In

condition 1, participants were to perceive the confederate as a fellow group member, and in condition 2 as an individual person (e.g., outgroup). White participants had to interact with either a Black or a White confederate to rate them as favourable or unfavourable. It was found that, White participants had rated Black confederates more favourably when they were in the Commonality condition as opposed to the Individuation-focused condition. The researchers also tested the effects of CIIM on behaviour in the field during a football match between two universities. The interviewers were White and Black participants and their task was to request an interview from the fans of any university team. Consistently, the results showed the willingness of fans to give an interview to a Black interviewer if he belonged to the university team they were supporting. CIIM had induced prosocial behaviour among majority group members towards even a racial minority group based on their social affiliation (Black / University affiliation). The results indicated the positive role of CIIM for development of positive evaluations and behaviour towards those outgroups who share a common identity with the ingroup (Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker & Ward, 2001).

Although Common Identity approach does not make multiple identities vanish in the process of recategorisation, it may be a flexible approach to help resolve the intergroup conflict by forming an ingroup and changing perspective towards the previous outgroup to which they belonged (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2009; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman and Anastasio (1994) designed a field survey for a multicultural, high-school students to test the perceptions of the conditions of contact hypothesis (i.e., improved intergroup relationships when groups interact under similar conditions, Allport, 1954) and its role in intergroup bias in the context of CIIM. The researchers hypothesised that some aspects of the

contact hypothesis; such as cooperative interdependence (e.g., groups interact in conditions required intergroup cooperation), equal status and interpersonal interaction and supportive norms would transform the student's perceptions from belonging to varied student groups (i.e., subgroup identities) into one inclusive student body (i.e., common identity). The survey results established the effectiveness of the CIIM in reducing bias among students while inducing a sense of inclusivity in them by transforming their cognitive representations of "us" and "them" to "we" within a natural environment (Gaertner et al., 1994).

Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, Matoka, Johnson and Frazier (1997) explained this phenomenon when they observed that recatogrisation and an emphasis on inclusive identity led to reduced bias within the framework of intergroup behaviour of helping, evaluations and self-disclosure in the intergroup relations (Dovidio et al., 1997). This process also directed the group members to prefer common identity when the common resources found to have exhausted and urged group collectiveness to save and share resources among similar groups (Wit & Kerr, 2002). Moyer-Gusé, Dale, and Ortiz, (2018) has recently observed that the non-Muslim Americans (ingroup) expressed less prejudice towards Muslims (outgroup) following a common narrative (i.e., discussion and belief over common issues) based interaction between both groups. However, CIIM has found to be effective in reducing bias and improving the motivation to move on engaging in intergroup contact among members of superordinate common group (i.e., previously belonging to ingroup, outgroup etc.) particularly when these group members act as being negatively influenced by their fellow group members (Gomez, Dovidio, Huici, Gaertner & Cuadrado, 2008).

Our further discussion leads us towards the aspect of cultural diversity within Europe, including the UK. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) had pointed out that the aspect of categorising people based on their cultural backgrounds and associated stereotypes could lead people to compare themselves as a competitive entity resulting into intergroup conflict and bias (see also Putnam, 2007). Thus, group prototypicality plays a key role in the perception of such groups towards each other. In this context, majority group members may perceive their group as more prototypical of the overarching group (i.e., British within the UK), and minority group members may also perceive in the similar way to the other groups. In this case, both groups could discriminate against one another in these categories. Ufkes, and colleagues (2012) conducted two field studies to examine the role of a common identity for minority and majority members of the culturally diverse neighbourhood of Netherlands. They chose native Dutch inhabitants as a cultural majority group, whereas residents with non-Western identity were chosen as a cultural minority with a prediction that both groups would have a strong identification with their shared district (superordinate common identity). The results of both studies validated the role of CIIM to advance the intergroup contacts where the majority and minority groups perceived each other more positively following the knowledge that the other cultural groups belong to same district as themselves. In our current project, we will examine the perspective of majority group (White-British) towards minority group (Pakistani-British) with reference to the influence of CIIM in reducing bias and generating support for Collective Action (Ufkes et al., 2012).

Majority and minority perspectives within the context of Common Identity approach may cause overlooking of individual differences and of disadvantages experienced by groups (i.e., minority groups). Due to the majority group's efforts to possess higher social status to flout the

group disparities, their superordinate group appears homogeneous which undermines efforts of any social action towards minority groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). The dissolution of individual identities into common superordinate identities undermine the efforts of minorities to challenge the status quo and stand up for their collective rights or gather support for collective action due to the non-existence of apparent differences (Dixon et al., 2010). The subsequent power struggle created by imbalanced approaches in identity representations strain the group relations ending in conflict (Dovidio, Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy & Johnson, 2010). This dilemma has been observed as the conflicting preferences of the majority and minority groups. Majority groups prefer to maintain higher social status quo as common identity, whereas minority groups often wish to have their group-identity remain intact (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2009; Gaertner et al., 1989; Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008; González & Brown, 2003). In numerous studies in White and Black Americans relations, induction of the common American identity in both groups, appeared to reduce ingroup bias and promoted group harmony, but at the same time reduced the sensitivity of Whites to realise any discriminations for disadvantaged groups (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Saguy et al., 2009, Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, Pratto & Singh, 2011) or to take collective action to reduce disadvantages ((Dixon, Durheim & Tredoux, 2007; Glasford & Dovidio, 2011).

Banfield and Dovidio (2013) sought to observe the effect of the Common Identity approach on majority group member's perceptions of discrimination and willingness to help protest. In Experiment 2, they found that a commonality focus led to less detection of subtle discrimination, but not blatant discrimination. In Experiments 2 and 3, they found that a common identity led to less willingness to protest blatant discrimination in comparison to a dual-identity

focus; which emphasises a focus on the common identity and the relevant subgroup identity. The current dissertation research within Chapter 2 began prior to the publication of the Banfield and Dovidio study, thus the Chapter 2 research did not initially set out to test the effects of a dual-identity approach, and instead focused on a multiculturalism approach. Overall, while CIIM appears effective in reducing bias and improving intergroup relations, it may not show promising results towards identification of disadvantaged treatment and unfair attitudes towards minorities which would possibly lead to support for collective action (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Ufkes et al., 2016).

A similar trend is observed by the minority group members under the umbrella of single superordinate identity who accept the status quo and system injustices and, ignore the deprived status of their group resulting in lack of interest to take collective action (Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). Thus, this phenomenon creates 'irony of harmony' as Saguy and colleagues (2009) termed it and explained within the minority, majority CIIM framework (Ufkes et al., 2012; Ufkes, Dovidio & Tel, 2015). Saguy and colleagues (2009, study 2) explored the lack of support for social action to change among Arabs who found themselves in favour of Jews through positive intergroup interaction which was associated with minimum levels of social support. Friendships between majority and minority groups also reduced intergroup bias, but this positivity undermined the recognition of group disparities, which could reduce efforts for social action (Dixon et al., 2010; Saguy et al., 2011; Saguy & Chernayak Hai, 2012).

2.3   The current Research.

Following such conflicting results of CIIM and Multiculturalism with reference to bias reduction towards outgroups (including ethnic minority and religious groups) and collective

action efforts, we sought to examine the effects of a Common Identity approach in comparison to the Multiculturalism approach in Experiments 1 and 2. At the time that we had begun this dissertation research, no research had examined the effects of these approaches on both Bias and Support for Collective Action within the same study, so we aimed to measure them both at the same time. Moreover, these studies were conducted prior to many of the dual-identity research that showed its negative effects on discrimination detection and collective action support among majority groups (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Ufkes et al., 2016); thus, we had not included this approach within the initial experiments. Finally, the conflicting results of the CIIM and Multicultural approaches, and the results of our Experiments 1 and 2 led us to test a variation on Common Identity approach in which the group identity (i.e., Pakistani-British / White-British) was 'NOT' highlighted / made salient (CWO; see Appendix H, choose response items without highlighting subgroup identities). This Common Ingroup Identity without highlighting subgroup identities (CWO) is a newly coined term by us and we aimed to examine its effects on reducing bias and willingness to support for CA among White-British sample. The CWO ideology draws attention to non-salience of group identities. In Experiment 1 and 2, we have used the Commonality approach manipulation from Richeson and Nussbaum (2004), which included the 19 items to choose from such items the participants would find most like their own probable responses. These items had been adapted so that Pakistani-British and White-British identities were highlighted (underlined) and in experiment 3 we manipulated these items by removing the highlighted (underlined) group identities in order to make the subgroup identities non-salient (see methodology experiment 3).

Within these experiments, we included political ideology as a critical predicting factor within the statistical analysis model as a means of controlling for ideological effects on the bias outcome measure. In general, based on the research that demonstrated that liberals show less acceptance of inequality and thus may support collective action more and may show less bias toward the immigrant outgroup (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost et al., 2003). In addition to that, political liberalism has been shown to be associated with more positive attitudes toward gays and lesbians, Muslim Americans, and Arabs (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Nisbet & Shanahan, 2004; Webster et al., 2014; Whitley & Lee, 2000; Webster, Burns, Pickering, & Saucier, 2014), show less outgroup hostility (Kugler et al., 2014), and have more positive feelings toward non-normative groups (Luguri, Napier, & Dovidio, 2012) and low-status groups such as immigrants (Brooks, Manza, & Cohen, 2016; Pettigrew et al., 2007). Thus, we included the factor of political ideology in the model of attitudes towards Pakistani-British.

The current research covers three experiments that test the first line of our two-line research. In this Chapter, we examine the role of Multiculturalism (MC), Commonality (CIIM), and Commonality Without Highlighting (CWO) in relation to the bias reduction towards Pakistani-British people (minority group) and willingness to support for Collective Action by the White-British people (majority group). Our research will be exploring the simultaneous role of these intergroup approaches on bias reduction and support for collective action. The aim of the Experiment 1 will be to test whether Commonality or Multiculturalism will be effective approaches in reducing bias and increasing support for CA, we further predict that political conservatives will significantly show more bias and less support for CA than the liberals. In the

Experiment 2, we will include control condition to find the consistency in the efficacy of the

findings of MC and commonality within the same variables and measures used in Experiment 1.

The Experiment 3 will further test the CIIM and CWO with MC to explore if the same CIIM

prompt used as CWO prompt with the removal of identity highlighting would have a parallel

effect on bias reduction and support for CA.

2.4   Experiment 1

2.4.1   Introduction.

Earlier research showed multiculturalism more effective in reducing bias than

commonality approaches (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Voraurer et al.,2009), though these

findings are contradictory, yet willingness to support collective action has usually not been

assessed alongside these intergroup approaches (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005;

Vorauer et al., 2009; Dixon et al., 2011). Further, many of this research has been conducted in

countries that perceived multiculturalism positively (e.g., U.S. and Canada), however, some

research has begun recently to show that different countries may be less supportive of

multiculturalism including UK, and this view may change reactions to this approach (Guimond,

et al., 2013). In view of the effect of MC and CIIM on bias reduction, it was unclear if the same

effect would be observed on support for Collective Action because reducing bias may be

incompatible with increasing support for Collective Action because it may minimize intergroup

comparison and perceptions of disadvantage (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Dixon et al., 2011). We

predicted political orientation to observe whether this would interact with intergroup approaches

considering some previous research has shown that people with conservative ideology react more

negatively to the idea of multiculturalism, so this being a crucial empirical question we tested this also.

2.5 Methodology

2.5.1 Hypotheses.

In the Experiment 1, we predicted that Multiculturalism prompt will show less bias than CIIM condition while increasing support for CA towards Pakistani-British group. This means that lower scores by the White-British participants on both implicit and explicit bias measures was indicated by less bias. Political ideology hypothesized that liberalism would be related to less implicit and explicit bias and more support for CA compared with conservative political ideology. We also predicted an interaction between intergroup prompt and political orientation on implicit and explicit bias reduction. The aim of the experiment was to examine the effectiveness of these approaches in reducing bias and support for CA concurrently.

2.5.2 Participants.

Fifty-eight (N = 58) Psychology undergraduate students at the University of Birmingham completed the lab study in compensation of course credits. No formal power analysis had been conducted at this time because almost no studies had provided measures or effect size or critical information for calculating effect sizes (i.e., Means, Confidence Intervals, and Standard Error). Thus, we aimed to obtain approximately 30 participants per condition, which was often used in these types of studies. The final data analysis included fifty-four (*N = 54*) participants due to filtering of participants. We used the standard procedure for removing three participants who failed to follow instructions and who responded on the AMP implicit bias measure with the same

key response on ninety-eight or more of all test trials (Payne 69 & Lundberg, 2014); as in past research, we also removed one participant who could speak Chinese and therefore read the AMP stimulus materials. The age of participants ranged between 18 and 31 years ($M = 19.72$, $SD = 2.50$). There were 98.1% Caucasian and 88.9% female participants in the final sample.

2.5.3 Design.

This experiment used a 2 (intergroup prompts: Multiculturalism and Common Ingroup Identity Model) $\times 2$ (Political Orientation: liberal vs conservatives) research design with intergroup prompt as a between participant factor and political orientation as a measured, continuous variable. Implicit Bias, Explicit Bias, and Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British people were the outcome variables.

2.5.4 Materials.

Intergroup Prompts: Participants first read the instructions based standard paragraph introducing the topic of our interest in people's impression of various ethnic groups, which was adapted from Richeson and Nussbaum (2004, see Appendix A). We adapted this paragraph to say that we would be asking them about their perceptions regarding two different ethnic groups, Pakistani-British people and White-British people. They then read a paragraph endorsing either a Multicultural or a Common Ingroup Identity approach (see Appendix B/E); these prompts were adapted from Richeson and Nussbaum (2004). Following the paragraph, participants completed five free responses (i.e., thought listings) in which they stated why they considered either of the approach (MC/ CIIM depending on the prompt they saw) as a positive intergroup approach. In the last section of the prompt manipulation, participants finished by circling responses that were most like their own potential responses from a list of nineteen responses selected from Richeson

and Nussbaum (see Appendix C). These responses endorsed either multiculturalism or the

commonality approach depending upon the condition. The reason for using free responses (e.g.,

thought listings) and circle responses was to encourage the agreement of the participants with the

ideological perspectives endorsed within the prompts presented in each condition (Richeson &

Nussbaum, 2004).

Lexical Decision Task (LDT): Following prompt manipulation, we used a Lexical

Decision Task (LDT, Meyer & Schvanevel, 1971) to separate the prompt manipulation from the

bias measures. Two blocks consisted of 96 trials each based on 6 sets of words (LDT Negative =

7, LDT Positive = 7, Negative stereotype = 7, Positive Stereotype =7, Non-words = 20, Words =

4, see Appendix I); these words were matched on length, evaluative extremity, and frequency of

use within the English language and non-words were matched on length. Participants were

briefed about how we were interested in the way people make simple but quick decisions in a

vocabulary processing task. Then they were instructed that they will be presented a letter and

their job was "to determine as quickly and as accurately as possible, whether the letters make up

a word or not". In each trial, a fixation mark (+) appeared for 500ms/milliseconds and was

replaced immediately by either a word or non-word. The word or non-word remained on the

screen until participants responded "Yes / No" on the keys labelled as "Yes" and "No".

Participants first completed 8 practice trials, and then they completed the two blocks of critical

trials. Within each block of 96 trials, participants saw each of the 28 words two times for a total

of 56 trials and each of the non-words two times for a total of 40 trials.

Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP): We used the AMP to measure implicit attitude

bias toward Pakistani-British; this measure has been shown to be a valid indirect measure of

attitude bias (Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2008; Payne et al., 2010; Payne & Lundberg, 2014). In the AMP instructions, the participants were shown a Pakistani/Indian face as immigrant whereas, a White face was shown as a non-immigrant example. We used the standard timing and number of trials for the AMP (Payne et al., 2005). On each trial, participants briefly saw either a photograph of a Pakistani-British face, a White face, or a neutral Grey square as the prime image (75ms/milliseconds), and then this photograph was replaced by a black screen for 125ms, and then the blank screen was replaced with the drawing (a Chinese pictograph) that was presented for 100ms. After the pictograph disappeared, a television-static pattern mask appeared and remained on the screen until participants responded to the pictograph by pressing either the key labelled Pleasant or the key labelled Unpleasant. Participants were instructed to ignore the real-life images of faces and instead make quick judgements about each drawing by judging whether the pictograph drawing appeared to be more or less pleasant than average. They had four practice trials to familiarise themselves with the task prior to completing the 72 critical trials. Seventy-two pictographs were shown one time each for each of the 72 critical trials, while 12 Pakistani faces, 12 White faces, and 12 Grey squares were presented once within the first block of 36 trials and once within the second block of trials (i.e., once in each block of 36 trials for a total of 72 trials). Each prime was randomly paired with pictographs within each block of 36 trials (see Figure 1 for AMP Process & see Appendix J). We used the standard scoring procedure from past research by taking the percentage of pleasant responses after White faces and subtracting the percentage of pleasant responses after Pakistani faces; thus, scores can range from 1 to -1 and higher scores indicated more positive bias toward White faces in comparison to Pakistani faces (AMP; Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010).

Figure: *1*. **AMP process.**

Pakistani face, White face, or Grey square prime: 75ms then disappears

Black mask: 125ms presentation then disappears

Drawing: 100ms presentation then disappears

TV Static: Remains on screen until the participant responds

Response: Unpleasant or Pleasant (Using U/P keys)

Collective Action Measure: Support for collective action was assessed using Collective Action scale adapted from Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, and Pratto, (2009). The scale was based on three questions which were concerned with various levels of support people might have for policies related to Pakistani-British people and life within the UK. The participants were required to rate their responses using a five-points rating scale of (*1*) *Support Not at All to (5) Support Completely*. The example of items is "I support legislation through which Pakistani-British people will be guaranteed equal work opportunities as White-British people in the UK" (see Appendix K). The questions were randomized within the scale. Higher scores indicated more support for collective action (M = 3.26, SD = 1.42, α = .74).

Filler Tasks: Participants completed some filler tasks to separate the collective action and the implicit bias measures from the explicit bias measures. They completed a single question that asked them "To what extent would you consider the inequality between White-British and Pakistani-British groups as fair or just"? They were required to rate their responses on five-point scale (*1*) *not at all just to (5) completely just.* Next, they completed two items that asked them "how often do you feel that you, personally, are discriminated against because of your race", and "how often do you feel that members of your race group are discriminated against in this country. The answers were labelled on five-point rating scale from (*1*) *Not at All to (5) Very Much.* Finally, they answered a Subjective Happiness Scale that included four items that required participants to describe themselves on a seven-point scale, e.g., "Compared with most of my peers, I consider myself"; (*1*) *not a very happy person to (7) a very happy person* (see Appendix L). Higher scores indicated more subjective happiness (M = 4.87, SD = 2.38, α = .89).

Explicit Bias Measure: The next measure was a five-item Feeling Thermometer scale used to assess the explicit bias, which has been previously validated in intergroup research (Haddock, Zanna & Esses 1993; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). In this measure, participants rated their feelings toward Pakistani-British people on a nine-point Likert scale, ranging along the extremes of each of the following five dimensions: warmth = (*1) Extremely warm to; (9) Extremely cold;* positivity = (*1) Extremely positive to (9) Extremely negative*; friendliness = *(1) Extremely friendly to (9) Extremely unfriendly*; trustworthiness = (*1) Extremely trusting to (9) Extremely suspicious;* admiration = *(1) Extreme admiration to (9) Extreme disgust* (see Appendix M). Higher scores indicated a more negative evaluation of bias (*M* = 4.24, *SD* = 1.79, α = .84).

Debriefing and Manipulation Checks: Participants were further asked to answer filler questions to allow them to express their opinion and to further obscure the specific purpose of the experiment so that later participants would not be made aware of the exact hypotheses prior to the completion of the experiment. First question related to the purpose of the experiment "What do you think the purpose of the study was? Next question was "How many experiments or studies have you been in today" with maximum seven numbers to respond. Following this, they were asked, "How hard did you try at the task where you rated the pleasantness of the drawings", to respond on a five-point scale (*1) Not at all hard to (5) extremely hard* with moderately hard as the mid-point.

Demographics: At the end of the experiment, participants completed demographic variables including age, gender (male, female) and ethnicity (southeast Asian, White, African, African American, Middle Eastern or North African, Indian or Indian Subcontinent, Latino or Hispanics, Other, see Appendix N). Participants were also asked three filler questions about the

English as foreign language. Those questions were "Is English your first language (i.e., your native language)?" to answer with "yes/no"; "How many years have you spoken English? Please type in a number (e.g., 10)"; "How many years have you been able to read English?   Please type in a number (e.g., 10)"; and "How many years have you lived in the United Kingdom?" Finally, participants rated their personal political orientation on a nine-point, vertical scale from (1) *extremely conservative* to (9) *extremely liberal,* with a *moderate* as the mid-point (5) as was used in Jost et al (2007). This political orientation item has often been included within demographics in previous research (Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Fitzgerald & Wickwire, 2012).

2.6   Procedure.

To recruit the participants from the school of Psychology, we used the online Research Participation Scheme (RPS) in which psychology students completed the experiment in exchange for course credit. In each session, the research assistant greeted a maximum of four participants and randomly assigned each of them to one of the four lab cubicles with a randomisation of condition. Participants read and signed the consent forms and started the experiment on the computers using Medialab and Direct RT (version 2012, Empirisoft Corporation, 2008) software for stimuli and questionnaire presentation. They then completed either the Multiculturalism prompt manipulation or the Common Identity manipulation depending on which condition they were randomly assigned. Next, participants completed the filler LDT Task that provided a small separation between the Intergroup Prompts and the AMP Implicit Bias measure, which they completed next. They then completed the Collective Action scale, the Filler Tasks (e.g., subjective happiness scale), then the Explicit Bias measure, and finally the final filler tasks and the demographic variables. Participants were debriefed and thanked after experiment completion.

2.7   Results.

A multiple linear regression analysis was performed to analyse the effect of the Intergroup Prompt (Multiculturalism vs Common Identity) on Implicit Bias with Political Orientation included as a predictor variable, and the two-way interaction included within the regression equation model. Higher Implicit Bias scores indicated more positive bias toward White faces in comparison to Pakistani faces (or alternatively, more negative bias toward Pakistani faces in comparison to White faces; the AMP can be calculated in either direction, but the statistical implications remain the same). Fifty-four participants were included in the final analysis. Descriptive statistics and correlations are in the Tables 1 and 2 below. Including this, in all the following experiments, data were checked for linearity, normality, outliers (using degrees of freedom betas), and homoscedasticity. All data met these regression assumptions and no participants had to be removed.

In the first multiple regression analysis the data was found normally distributed, Intergroup Prompt was effects coded (-1 = MC, 1 = CIIM) and Political Orientation was standardized (hence it is referred to as zPoilitical) prior to the Prompt x Political interaction being created as recommended for multiple regression interactions (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 2003). We found a significant simple effect of Intergroup Prompt on Implicit Bias toward Pakistani-British in which Multiculturalism produced more Implicit Bias than the Common Identity approach; $R^2 = .07$, $\beta = 0.26$, $t = 2.05$, $p = .046$ (see Figure 2); the direction of this effect was contrary to the general consensus within the intergroup literature within North America where MC always showed reduced bias (MC, $M = 0.12$, $SD = 0.28$; CIIM, $M = -0.02$, $SD = 0.20$). In the further analysis, political orientation was a significant negative predictor of Implicit Bias,

$R^2 = .12$, $\beta = -0.35$, $t = -2.73$, $p = .009$, which indicated that liberals showed significantly less Implicit Bias than did conservatives, which is consistent with much of the intergroup literature (see Figure 3). However, the Intergroup Prompt x zPolitical Orientation interaction was non-significant, $R^2 = .001$, $\beta = .03$, $t = .27$, $p = .789$ in this model.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4
1. White ingroup bias	.052	.256	-			
2. Prompts	.074	1.00	.268	-		
3. zPolitical	.004	.977	-.345	.011	-	
4. PromptsxzPol	.011	.977	.035	.003	.002	-

Dependent Variable: White Bias/implicit bias, *N* = 54

Table 2. Discriptive Statistics

Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4
1. Support CA	3.284	.993				
2. Effects coded conditions	.074	1.01	-.273	-		
3. zPolitical	.004	.978	.011	.403	-	
4. PromptsxzPol	.011	.978	-.016	.003	.002	-

Dependent Variable: Support for CA, *N* = 54

Figure 2.

Figure 2: Simple effect of effects-coded Intergroup Prompt (-1 = MC, 1 = CIIM) on Implicit Bias toward Pakistani-British people.

Figure 3.

Figure 3: Simple effect of Political Orientation on Implicit Bias toward Pakistani-British people.

A second multiple linear regression was conducted on Support for Collective Action with effects-coded Intergroup Prompt, the standardised Political Orientation, and the Prompt vs Political interaction included in the regression equation model. This analysis found a significant simple effect of Intergroup Prompt on Support for Collective Action, $R^2 = .07$, $\beta = -.27$, $t = -2.19$, $p = .033$ (see Figure 4); In this effect, a Common Identity approach produced more support for collective action, which was contrary to much of the literature that suggested this approach would reduce awareness of disadvantages and support for Collective Action (CIIM, $M = 3.573$, $SD = 1.01$; MC, $M = 3.0345$, $SD = 0.91$). We also observed a significant simple effect of standardised Political Orientation on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British people, $R^2 = .15$, $\beta = .39$, $t = 3.15$, $p = .003$ (see Figure 5). Liberals showed more support for

Collective Action, which is consistent with the general literature. The Intergroup Prompt x zPolitical Orientation interaction was non-significant for support for CA; $R^2 < .001$, $\beta = -.16$, $t = .27$, $p = .89$.

Figure 4.

Figure 4: Simple effect of effects-coded Intergroup Prompt (-1 = MC, 1 = CIIM) on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British people.

Figure 5.

Figure 5: Simple effect of Political Orientation on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British people.

We further analysed intergroup prompts and political orientation in relation to Explicit Bias in a multiple regression. We observed a significant simple effect of effects-coded Intergroup Prompt (Commonality versus Multiculturalism) on Explicit bias; $R^2 = .09$, $\beta = 0.31$, $t = 2.31$, $p = .025$. Again, a Multiculturalism approach produced higher explicit bias than did the Commonality approach (MC, $M = 4.54$, $SD = 0.97$; CIIM, $M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.05$). In contrast to the previous outcome variables, we observed a non-significant simple effect of Political Orientation on Explicit Bias, $R^2 = .01$, $\beta = -.12$, $t = -.91$, $p = .369$. We also observed a non-significant Intergroup Prompt x Political interaction, $R^2 = .004$, $\beta = 0.065$, $t = 0.484$, $p = .630$.

2.8 Discussion.

Within Experiment 1, we observed that Multiculturalism produced an increase in Implicit Bias and a decrease in Support for Collective Action in comparison to a Common Ingroup Identity approach. This result was contrary to our expectations for Bias, though the evidence to support a directional prediction was mixed and there appeared to have been country and region-specific differences that would have supported increased bias within the UK for a multiculturalism approach (Guimond et al., 2013). As such, we determined to conduct a second experiment in which we once again manipulate a multicultural and a common identity approach, but also include a control condition (i.e., discussing just intergroup relations between Pakistani-British and White-British people) in order to observe whether multiculturalism increases Bias or a common identity decreases bias in relation to the control condition. The results of Support for Collective Action were more clearly contrary to expectations that argued that a common identity reduces the salience of the intergroup categories, and thus, reduces the focus on any disadvantages that the lower status group may suffer. Experiment 2 will be able to test whether this increased support for collective action in the commonality condition replicates.

2.9 Experiment 2

2.10 Methodology

2.10.1 Hypotheses.

We included control condition to replicate the effect of MC and CIIM in the Experiment 2, within the same variables and measures used in Experiment 1. First, we hypothesised whether MC would increase bias, or CIIM decrease bias by including a no-policy, control condition (i.e.,

discussed only the intergroup relations between Pakistani-British and White-British people).We included perceived threat measure in this experiment in order to find whether intergroup prompts will significantly differ from each other on threat. We then predicted if liberals would show less implicit bias (i.e., or conservatives will show more bias), and more willingness to support for Collective Action. Being aware of the conservative ideology associated with increased bias due to perception of outgroup threat, we also predicted if this would show a mediating role between political ideology and implicit bias relationship.

2.10.2 Participants

One hundred and seventy-three (N = 173) White Psychology Undergraduates from the University of Birmingham participated in the Experiment in compensation of course credits. Based upon an a priori power analysis for the observed effects of study 1 for some of the main analyses, we determined that we would need at least 142 participants to observe the effects with .75 power. When conducting the experiment, we had collected 173 participants because it was unclear how many we would lose due to incomplete responding or failing to follow instructions on the AMP measure. In accordance with Experiment 1 and the standard procedures for the AMP implicit measure, we removed thirteen participants who had failed to respond on the AMP as instructed, and we removed one person who could read Chinese, and three participants whose data was lost due to a computer 82 error. The final sample was 156 participants who were 84.6% female with a mean age of 18.97 years (SD = 1.34).

2.10.3 Design.

The Experiment used a 3 (Intergroup Prompt: multicultural, common identity, vs control) × 2 (political orientation: liberal vs conservatives) with intergroup prompt as a between participant

factor and political orientation as a measured, continuous variable. Implicit Bias, Support for Collective Action, and Explicit Bias were the primary outcome variables. Perceived threat was included as a mediator to test whether threat mediates the political to bias relationship.

2.10.4 Materials.

All materials were the same as in Experiment 1 with the following changes: 1) we added a Control condition in which participants received the same introductory paragraph (see Appendix D) as was seen in the Multicultural and the Common Identity conditions to think about Pakistani-British people and White-British people, and then they were asked to do a thought listing task similar to the MC and CIIM conditions. Participants in the Control condition, however, were told, "We have found that it helps to first reflect on some issues relevant to ethnic interactions prior to completing the questionnaire in order to make your views more accessible. In the space below, list five ideas, thoughts or reactions that come to mind as you think about the groups Pakistani-British and White-British in the United Kingdom." 2) a second change to Experiment 2 was the addition, immediately after the explicit bias measure, of two Filler Tasks (i.e., Need for Cognition scale; see Appendix P and a Mindfulness scale; see Appendix Q) in order to separate the explicit bias measure from the scale of Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people. 3) Finally, we added a validated scale of Perceived Realistic and Symbolic Threats that is used by research based upon the *Intergroup* Threat Theory, which was adapted to measure perceived threats from Pakistani-British people (Stephan et al., 1999; 2009; 2015; see Appendix R). These new measures are discussed next.

Filler Tasks.

Need for Cognition: The Need for Cognition scale is a validated scale about how much people enjoy thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). It consisted of eighteen questions. An example item is "I prefer complex to simple problems", to be rated on five-point scale from (*1) extremely unlike me, to (5) extremely like me* (see Appendix P). Higher scores indicated a higher need for cognition (*M* = 3.37, *SD* = 0.58, *α* = .87).

Mindful Attention Awareness Scale: This was an eleven-item scale that taps mindfulness by asking about how much participants attend to themselves and the situations they experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003; see Appendix Q). An example item includes, "I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until sometime later," which is answered on a six-point scale from (*1) almost always to (6) almost never.* Higher scores indicated a higher need for cognition (*M* = 3.70, *SD* = 0.67, *α* = .77).

Perceived Threat Scale: This measure was used to gauge the level of perceived realistic and symbolic threats and was a fifteen-item scale adapted from Stephan et al.'s scale (1999; 2009; 2015; see Appendix R). The scale was split into two subcategories including 7 items on perceived symbolic threats (e.g., Pakistani-British immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of UK society as soon as possible after they arrive) and 8 items on perceived realistic threats (e.g., Pakistani-British immigrants get more from this country than they contribute). Participants responded on a seven-point scale from (*1) Disagree Strongly to (7) Agree Strongly* and the items were randomised within the scale. Higher scores indicated more perceived threat (*M* = 3.42, *SD* = 0.96, *α* = .90).

2.11 Procedure.

Once again, participants were recruited through the Research Participation Scheme in which psychology students received course credit for participation. In each session, the researcher greeted up to four participants who were then randomly assigned to one of the three Intergroup Prompt conditions (Multiculturalism, Common Identity, or Control). They then read the introductory paragraph and then completed the relevant intergroup prompt materials. Participants then completed the filler LDT Task and then the AMP Implicit Bias measure, the Collective Action scale, the first Filler Tasks (e.g., subjective happiness), then the Explicit Bias measure. In this experiment, participants then completed the second set of Filler Tasks (i.e., Need for cognition and Mindfulness measures) and then the Perceived Threat scale and finally the demographic variables. At the end, participants were debriefed and thanked after experiment completion.

2.12 Results.

We once again conducted a multiple linear regression analysis with Intergroup Prompt as a between participants factor, Political Ideology as a measured predictor, the Prompt x Political interaction in the model and Implicit Bias as the outcome variable. Initial descriptive analysis of political orientation as continuous variable with dependent variables; implicit bias, support for collective action and threat mediator are reported in the Tables 3, 4 and 5. Intergroup Prompt was dummy coded so that the Control condition was the comparison condition for the other (i.e., MC to Control and CIIM to Control comparisons). To examine whether the MC to Control comparison and the CIIM to Control comparison influenced Implicit Bias towards Pakistani-

British people, multiple regression analysis was conducted with Political Orientation standardised prior to creating the Prompt x Political interaction term and including it in the analysis. The MC-Control comparison was found to be non-significant in the model, $R^2 = .001$, $\beta = 0.04$, $t = 0.43$, $p = .665$. The CIIM-Control comparison was also found to be non-significant, $R^2 = .01$, $\beta = -0.11$, $t = -1.24$, $p = .217$ (MC, $M = 0.18$, $SD = 0.26$; Control, $M = 0.18$, $SD = 0.31$, CIIM, $M = 0.12$, $SD = 0.24$; See Figures 6 and 7). MC produced more bias than CIIM in this experiment, it was not significant within the full model ($p = .102$, $R^2 = .02$) or on its own ($p = .506$, $R^2 < .01$). However, Political Orientation was observed to be significantly related to Implicit Bias, $R^2 = .04$, $\beta = -0.39$, $t = -2.59$, $p = .012$, which showed that liberals exhibited less Implicit Bias. Furthermore, the interaction between Political Orientation and MC-Control comparison on bias, $R^2 = .11$, $\beta = 0.002$, $t = 0.018$, $p = 0.986$ and Political Orientation and CIIM-Control comparison, $R^2 = .11$, $\beta = 0.152$, $t = 1.270$, $p = 0.206$ remained non-significant too.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics

Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Whitebias	.155	.278	-					
2. D1: MC-Control	.318	.467	.063	-				
3. D2: CIIM-Control	.344	.476	-.125	-.495	-			
4. zPolitical	.000	1.00	-.265	.130	-.112	-		
5. zPolxD1	.060	.599	-.211	.147	-.073	.600	-	
6. zPolxD2	-.053	.610	-.063	.060	-.121	.615	.009	-

Dependent variable: White/Implicit Bias, $N = 156$

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics

Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. SupportCA	3.42	.986	-					
2. D1: MC-Control	.318	.467	-.048	-				
3. D2: CIIM-Control	.344	.476	.189	-.495	-			
4. zPolitical	.000	1.00	.295	.130	-.112	-		
5. zPolxD1	.060	.599	.183	.147	-.073	.600	-	
6. zPolxD2	-.053	.610	.154	.060	-.121	.615	.009	-

Dependent Variable: Support for CA**,** $N = 156$

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics

Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Threat	3.42	.957	-					
2. D1: MC-Control	.325	.467	-.021	-				
3. D2: CIIM-Control	.344	.476	-.118	-.495	-			
4. zPolitical	.000	1.00	-.396	.130	-.112	-		
5. zPolxD1	.060	.599	-.289	.147	-.073	.600	-	
6. zPolxD2	-.053	.610	-.219	.060	-.121	.615	.009	-

Dependent Variable: Threat, $N = 156$

Figure 6.

Figure 6: Simple effect of dummy-coded Intergroup Prompt (i.e., MC to Control and CIIM to Control comparisons) on Implicit Bias towards Pakistani-British people.

Figure 7.

Figure 7: Simple effect of Political Orientation on Implicit Bias towards Pakistani-British people.

A second multiple regression was conducted on Support for Collective Action with dummy-coded Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-Control and CIIM-Control comparisons), standardized Political Orientation, and both Prompt x Political interaction terms included in the equation model. We observed a non-significant effect for the MC-Control comparison in relation to Support for Collective Action, $R^2 < .001$, $\beta = 0.03$, $t = 0.32$, $p = .750$. We, however, did observe a significant effect of the CIIM-Control comparison, $R^2 = .04$, $\beta = 0.23$, $t = 2.61$, $p = .010$ (MC, $M = 3.35$, $SD = 0.89$; Control, $M = 3.22$, $SD = 1.06$, CIIM, $M = 3.65$, $SD = 0.96$; See Figure 8). We also observed a significant simple effect of Political Ideology on Support for Collective Action, $R^2 = .03$, $\beta = 0.35$, $t = 2.34$, $p = .02$, which indicated that liberals showed more support

for Pakistani- British Immigrants (see Figure 9). Interaction of zPolitical and MC - Control for Collective Action was non- significant; $R^2 = .14$, $\beta = -.014$, $t = -.116$, $p = .908$ and also non-significant between zPolitical and CIIM – Control; $R^2 = .14$, $\beta = -.032$, $t = -.271$, $p = .878$.

Figure 8.

Figure 8: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-Control and CIIM-Control) on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British people.

Figure 9.

Support for Collective Action

Figure 9: Simple effect of Political Orientation on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British people.

We also analysed the additional Perceived Threat variable in a multiple regression with Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-Control and CIIM-Control), standardised Political Orientation, and the two Interaction terms. We observed a non-significant comparison of MC-Control on Threat $R^2 < .01$, $\beta = -.06$, $t = -.70$, $p = .487$. We, however, observed a significant comparison of CIIM-Control $R^2 = .03$, $\beta = -.20$, $t = -2.31$ $p = .022$ (MC, $M = 3.39$, $SD = 1.01$; Control, $M = 3.60$, $SD = 0.92$, CIIM, $M = 3.26$, $SD = 0.93$; See Figure 10). In addition, the Political Orientation simple effect was significant effect, where conservative ideology found to feel more threat from Pakistan-British Immigrants, $R^2 = .03$, $\beta = -0.34$, $t = -2.34$, $p = .02$ (see

Figure 11). Once again, neither interaction was significant; zPoitical x MC -Control, $R^2 = .19$, $\beta = -.090$, $t = -.795$, $p = .43$ and zPolitical x CIIM – Control, $R^2 = .19$, $\beta = -031$, $t = -.270$, $p = .78$.

Figure 10.

Figure 10: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-Control and CIIM-Control) on Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people.

Figure 11.

Perceived Threat

Figure 11: Simple effect of Political Orientation (-1 SD = Conservative, +1 SD = Liberal) on Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people.

We also conducted two separate regression analyses for MC – Control and then CIIM – Control in order to see whether the results were different than the regressions in the same model above. We did not find difference in these effects of MC – Control comparison and CIIM – Control on implicit bias, support for CA and threat. For example, effect of MC – Control on bias was non-significant; $R^2 = .08$, $\beta = .097$, $t = 1.23$, $p = .22$. It was also non-significant for support for CA, $R^2 = .03$, $\beta = -.085$, $t = -1.085$, $p = .28$ and for Threat, $R^2 = .16$, $\beta = .036$, $t = .479$, $p = .633$.

Further, the results for the CIIM – Control comparison also did not differ from the previous results; i.e., bias, $R^2 = .10$, $\beta = .130$, $t = -1.67$, $p = .022$; support for CA, $R^2 = .13$, $\beta = .22$, $t = 2.831$, $p = .005$ and Threat, $R^2 = .18$, $\beta = -.165$, $t = -2.223$, $p = .028$.

In the separate regressions political observed significant effects on Bias, $R^2 = .08$, $\beta = -.206$, $t = -2.106$, $p = .037$; support for CA, $R^2 = .09$, $\beta = .290$, $t = 2.97$, $p < .01$; and Threat $R^2 = .16$, $\beta = -.350$, $t = -3.74$, $p < .01$.

Mediation Analysis.

To examine the mediation hypothesis for Threat from Pakistani-British group, we conducted mediation analyses for Bias using PROCESS analysis in SPSS with bias corrected confidence intervals/BCIs to 5000 samples as recommended by Hayes (2013, version 2. 13.1). As predicted, we observed a significant indirect effect of Perceived Threat on Implicit Bias (see Figure 12). This represents a medium to large effect, *Complete Standard Indirect Effect / CSIE =* $-.20$ [$-.29$, $-.12$], $K^2 = .20$, CI [.13, .28], which indicates that the indirect effect being about 19.5% of the maximum value that it could have been (Field, 2012).

Figure 12.

Figure 12. Mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Threat as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

We used the combined Threat measure because the Symbolic and Realistic Threat subscales were highly correlated ($r = .73$, $p < .001$), because the subscales share a common theme of threats to the ingroup (Stephen et al., 1999), and because the overall scale had a high reliability ($\alpha = .90$). In addition, including all fifteen items in a single measure has been done routinely for this measure (Tipp et al., 2012; Tausch, Hewston, Kenworthy, Cairns & Christ, 2007; Schmidt & Muldoon 2015; Verkuyten, 2009). Nevertheless, we sought to complete some additional tests to check these conclusions. We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis and a structural equation model in which we tested the fit of a single-factor model and a two-factor model.

Because we did not initially aim to conduct factor analyses within this research, our sample sizes may be less than optimal; there are a variety of recommendation for minimal sample sizes with many researchers advocating for 10 participants per item included within the model (~200 participants) to other researchers indicating that 200 participants would be a fair sample size and 300 would be a good sample size (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012; MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). With 157 participants within our sample, we may not have had an adequate sample size to have good fit, but we would have an adequate sample to compare a one-factor model to a two-factor model. We tested our models with Implicit Bias as the dependent variable, Political ideology as the predictor, and either combined Threat as the mediator or Symbolic Threat and Realistic Threat as the mediators. The fit indices demonstrated that the one-factor model fit the data better than did the two-factor model (i.e., one-factor model RMSEA = .099, TLI = .810, CFI = .835; two-factor model RMSEA = .117, TLI = .733, CFI = .772).

2.13 Discussion.

The current Experiment was designed to test the effectiveness of multiculturalism (MC) and Common Identity (CIIM) approaches in reducing bias and increasing support for collective action in comparison to a Control condition to determine the direction of the effect (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Thomas & Plaut, 2009; Verkuyten, 2005; Verkuyten, 2009; Vorauer et al., 2009; Wolsko et al., 2000;). Contrary to expectations, we observed that the Multiculturalism failed to produce more Implicit Bias than the Control condition and the Commonality condition also failed to produce significantly less Bias than the control condition. The only hypothesis supported was that Political Ideology was significantly

related to Implicit Bias in which liberals showed less bias. Unlike Experiment 1, we did not find any significant effects for Explicit Bias in Experiment 2. This Implicit and Explicit dissociation of bias effects is fairly common for socially sensitive topics for bias toward minority groups. As such, we have focused on Implicit Bias and Support for collective action in Experiment 3. In order to discuss the results observed for Collective Action, MC did not differ from Control condition which means it did not show support for CA, but the Commonality condition did differ and show an increase in support for collective action. In addition, Multiculturalism even showed significantly less support in comparison to the Commonality condition and it did so when using the Bonferroni Correction for multiple comparisons. Following these patterns, Multiculturalism was not significantly different from the Control condition on Threat, but the Commonality condition produced significantly less threat. These inconsistent findings of MC in comparison to CIIM show contrary results found in the previous literature on the effectiveness of MC in reducing bias or on perception of inequality that trigger action-oriented behaviours to overcome group discriminations.

Further, in regard to political ideology, liberalism has been found to be associated with reduced bias towards low status groups and outgroups regardless of the intergroup prompt participants received, which confirmed our hypothesis (Altemeyer, 1988; Critcher, Huber, Ho, & Koleva, 2009; Jost et.al. 2003, Krosch et al, 2013; Perkins & Bourgeois, 2006; Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993; Zick et al, 2011;). These results not only confirm the previous literature on the role of political ideology in taking perspective towards outgroups/immigrants, but also show some effects on increased support for collective action. These attitudes may be the reflection of their ideology to remain socially dominant and having hierarchy based pre-existing beliefs (Crawferd, Kay & Duke, 2015; Perkins & Bourgeois, 2006; Sears & Henry, 2003).

Contrary to the previous literature, but in accordance with Experiment 1, the Multicultural approach produced increased bias in relation to the Commonality condition (Correll, Park & Smith, 2008; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). However, neither the Multiculturalism nor the Commonality conditions were significantly different than the Control condition, so we did not find evidence that either MC or CIIM increased and reduced bias, but we did find that a Commonality approach produced less bias than a Multiculturalism approach (Holoein & Shelton, 2012; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2010). We will need to replicate the effect of Commonality prompt on bias in our future studies to identity if the effect remains consistent with previous research and to test a new hypothesis based upon these findings. In analysing our MC and CIIM manipulations based on previous research, we have discovered that previous research had highlighted sub-group identities (e.g., White-British and Pakistani-British) within **only** the Multiculturalism manipulation. Within the Commonality condition these groups were not highlighted. However, within the Common Ingroup Identity Model, we would expect that both the larger superordinate group (i.e., British) and the two sub-groups should be noted in order to recategorize the two sub-groups into the larger superordinate group. In Experiments 1 and 2, we had naturally done this to the manipulations (in particular within the final step of circling similar responses). However, because we observed that the Commonality approach increased support for collective action, our manipulation of highlighting the subgroup identities and then focusing on commonalities may have tapped into a different phenomenon (i.e., closer to a dual identity perspective, which we discuss later in the chapter). Thus, for experiment 3, we decided to compare the Multiculturalism approach to our Commonality approach with subgroup identities highlighted (CIIM), and to a Commonality approach without highlighting subgroups (CWO), which is more in line with the

classic Commonality manipulations (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000; Yogeswarran & Dasgupta, 2014).

In this Experiment, threat appeared to be a moderately strong mediator of political to implicit bias relationship. Thus, conservative ideology was linked to more perceived threat from the Pakistani-British group than liberals and thus perceived threat mediated the relationship to Implicit Bias (Altemeyer, 1996; Bierbrauer & Klinger, 2002; Bilali, & Vollhardt, 2015; Choma, Hanoch, Hodson, & Gummerum, 2014; Duckitt, 2001; Riek et al., 2006; Schlüter, Schmitt & Wagner 2008; Sibley & Duckitt, 2012; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Zick et al, 2011). In the remainder studies in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3, we explored the role of threat on intergroup bias in relation to political ideology more thoroughly.

2.14 Experiment 3

2.14.1 Introduction

We designed Experiment 3 to replicate the effects of MC and Commonality in addition to a newly devised Commonality without highlighting the subgroup identities (CWO) approach to compare its effects on reducing bias and support for CA. In the CWO approach, the group identity was 'NOT' highlighted. We used the same commonality (i.e., CIIM prompt) prompt and the CIIM list of 19 choose responses that we used in first two experiments. However, to create a variation from CIIM and to emphasise on the non-salience of group identities to see if this would affect bias and support for CA, within the list of 19 responses we removed the underlining of identities; i.e., 'White-British' and 'Pakistani-British'.

2.15 Methodology

2.15.1 Hypotheses.

In the Experiment 3, first, we compared MC and CIIM with CWO prompt to replicate the findings of Experiments 1 & 2. We also predicted to replicate the consistent effects political ideology on bias and support for CA in Experiments 1 and 2. Finally, we predicted if perceived threat would also replicate the mediated effect of Experiment 2 on the relationship between political ideology and bias.

2.15.2 Participants.

Three Effect sizes in Experiment 2 were dramatically smaller than in Experiment 1, so we increased the number of participants we obtained to be closer to the effect size of $R^2 = .04$. According to this power analysis, we needed to obtain approximately 235 participants for .8 power. Three hundred and one (N = 301) participants from University of Birmingham completed the Experiment in compensation of course credits. In this experiment, we wanted to include more than just White participants, but wanted to restrict Pakistani participants because this group was the focus of the bias measure and restrict immigrants because they may show more favourability toward another group that is often perceived as an immigrant group as opposed to the group's ethnic classification. Thus, we removed seven Pakistani participants, fifty-three immigrant (i.e., non-UK born) participants, and then one participant who failed to follow the AMP Implicit Bias instructions. Two hundred and fourty participants (N = 240) were included in the final analysis. The age range of participants was between 18 and 21 years ($M = 18.96$, $SD = .84$) with 83.3% White, and 89.6% female participants.

2.15.3 Design.

This Experiment used three conditions of intergroup prompts: Multiculturalism (MC), Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM), and Common Identity without highlighting subgroups (CWO). Political orientation (liberal vs conservatives) was measured predictor variable, and Support for Collective Action, Implicit Bias, and Threat were the outcome variables.

2.15.4 Materials

All materials were the same as Experiment 2 with the following exceptions: 1) We replaced the Control condition with a Common Identity without highlighting (CWO) manipulation. Again, participants read the standard Introductory paragraph, and then received the same Common Identity prompt as the CWO condition. The main change was that the subgroup identities (White-British and Pakistani-British) were not highlighted in the circle similar responses part of the task at the end of the manipulation (see Appendix H). The objective to manipulate this prompt as CWO was to see that participants might be thinking the standard Common Ingroup Identity Model manipulation, hence they should be focused on "one group" or "commonalities", so they ignore outgroups, and thus, fail to think about Pakistani-British. They would then fail to appreciate the disadvantages that Pakistani-British people face and thus would not think that Collective Action is needed. Though this condition was closer to the standard CIIM manipulation within the literature, yet without the subgroup identities highlighted within the list of 19 responses. 2) In order to reduce the length of the already long experiment, we included just one Filler Task (i.e., Need for Cognition) between the Collective Action measure and the Perceived Threat measure; thus, the Mindfulness measure was dropped. 3) We also dropped the Explicit Bias measure. 4) Finally, we used the same general procedure for the AMP Implicit Bias

measure, but we changed the Chinese pictographs to Korean pictographs that represented non-words (see Appendix J). This change was made in order to avoid having to remove participants who could speak Chinese or Korean. We used Korean because it has a similar look to the Chinese pictographs, but fewer people speak it. In addition, we used Korean non-words so that even Korean speakers would not have to be removed because the non-words would not have any meaning to them.

2.16 Procedure.

Like experiment 1 and 2, participants arrived at the lab and they were randomly assigned to one of the three Intergroup Prompt conditions (MC, CIIM, vs CWO). They completed the filler LDT, then the AMP implicit measure, then Collective Action scale, followed by Need for Cognition, Perceived Threat, and then the Demographic variables.

2.17 Results.

We used the Multiculturalism condition (MC) as a comparison and coded the conditions to create two contrast comparisons (MC to CIIM, and then MC to CWO (Commonality without highlighting). We conducted a multiple regression analysis with dummy-coded Intergroup Prompt (D1: MC-CIIM and D2: MC-CWO) as a between participants factor, standardised Political Orientation as a continuous predictor, and the two Interaction terms in the regression equation on Implicit Bias. The descriptive statistics of political Orientation as a continuous predictor and implicit bias, support for CA and Threat as dependent variables are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8 below. Following our analysis, we observed a significant effect of the MC to CIIM comparison, $R^2 = .02$, $\beta = 0.16$, $t = 2.34$, $p = .020$, and also a significant effect of the MC to

CWO comparison, $R^2 = .03$, $\beta = .20$, $t = 2.85$, $p = .005$. However, unlike the previous

experiments, Multiculturalism produced significantly less and not more bias than the Common

Identity with highlighting (CIIM) approach and significantly less bias than the Common Identity

without subgroup highlighting (CWO), though the bias in the CIIM condition was lower than the

CWO condition (CIIM, $M = 0.05$, $SD = 0.21$; MC, $M = -0.02$, $SD = 0.21$; CWO, $M = 0.07$, $SD =$

0.22; see Figure 13). In addition, the Political Orientation simple effect was in the expected

direction, but was not significant in the model, $R^2 = .01$, $\beta = -.18$, $t = -1.79$, $p = .075$ (see Figure

14). Neither of the interaction terms were significant in the model; zPolitical x MC-CIIM, $R^2 =$

.82, $\beta = .02$, $t = .24$, $p = .82$ and zPolitical x MC-CWO, $R^2 = .09$, $\beta = -.14$, $t = -1.69$, $p = .92$.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics

Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. SupportCA	3.943	.801	-					
2. zPolitical	.000	1.00	.363	-				
3. D2: MC-CWO	.338	.474	-.063	-.017	-			
4. D1: MC-CIIM	.318	.466	.195	.056	-.489	-		
5. zPolxD1	.026	.574	.119	.575	-.033	.067	-	
6. zPolxD2	-.007	.527	.287	.527	-.021	.010	.001	-

Dependent Variable: White/Implicit Bias, $N = 240$

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics

Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Wbias	.031	.213	-					
2. zPolitical	.000	1.00	-.232	-				
3. D2: MC-CWO	.338	.474	.126	-.017	-			
4. D1: MC-CIIM	.318	.466	.058	.056	-.489	-		
5. zPolxD1	.026	.574	-.078	.575	-.033	.067	-	
6. zPolxD2	-.007	.527	-.233	.527	-.021	.010	.001	-

Dependent Variable: Support for CA, $N = 240$

Table 9. Descriptive Statistics

Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Threat	2.85	.822	-					
2. zPolitical	.000	1.00	-.424	-				
3. D2: MC-CWO	.338	.474	.067	-.017	-			
4. D1: MC-CIIM	.318	.466	-.007	.056	-.489	-		
5. zPolxD1	.026	.574	-.177	.575	-.033	.067	-	
6. zPolxD2	-.007	.527	-.253	.527	-.021	.010	.001	-

Dependent Variable: Threat, $N = 240$

Figure 13.

Figure 13: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-CIIM and MC-CWO) on Implicit Bias towards Pakistani-British people.

Figure 14.

Implicit Bias

Figure 14: Simple effect of Political Orientation (-1 SD = Conservative, +1 SD = Liberal) on Implicit Bias towards Pakistani-British people.

We next conducted the regression of dummy-coded Intergroup Prompt, standardised Political Orientation, and the Interaction terms onto Support for Collective Action. In accordance with the previous two experiments, there was a significant effect of the Multiculturalism to Commonality (CIIM) comparison, $R^2 = .03$, $\beta = 0.20$, $t = 2.93$, $p = .004$, but a non-significant effect of the MC to CWO comparison, $R^2 < .01$, $\beta = 0.04$, $t = 0.58$, $p = .563$. Support for Collective Action was higher in the CIIM condition than in the MC condition, but there was a minimal difference between CWO and MC (CIIM, $M = 4.38$, $SD = 0.69$; MC, $M = 3.80$, $SD = .89$; CWO, $M = 3.87$, $SD = .77$; see Figure 15). In accordance with the previous two experiments, the Political Orientation simple effect was in the expected direction and was

significant in the model, $R^2 = .05$, $\beta = .36$, $t = 3.78$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 16). Both interaction

terms were non-significant; zPolitical x MC-CIIM, $R^2 = .18$, $\beta = -.09$, $t = -1.23$, $p = .22$ and

zPolitical x MC-CWO, $R^2 = .18$, $\beta = .09$, $t = -1.25$, $p = .21$

Figure 15.

Figure 15: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-CIIM and MC-CWO) on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British people.

Figure 16.

Figure 16: Simple effect of Political Orientation (-1 SD = Conservative, +1 SD = Liberal) on Support for Collective Action for Pakistani-British people.

We also conducted the regression of dummy-coded Intergroup Prompt, standardised Political Orientation, and the Interaction terms onto Perceived Threat. In this experiment, we observed a non-significant effect of the MC to CIIM comparison, $R^2 < .01$, $\beta = .06$, $t = .85$, $p = .398$, and non-significant effect of the MC to CWO comparison, $R^2 = .01$, $\beta = .09$, $t = 1.34$, $p = .182$. Overall, there were no significant differences on Perceived Threat (CIIM, $M = 2.78$, $SD = .85$; MC, $M = 2.82$, $SD = 0.73$; CWO, $M = 2.92$, $SD = .88$; see Figure 17). In accordance with Experiment 2, the Political Orientation simple effect was significant in the model, $R^2 = .09$, $\beta = -.49$, $t = -5.19$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 18). However, the interaction of

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zPolitical x MC-CIIM on threat was non-significant, $R^2 = .19$, $\beta = .10$, $t = 1.28$, $p = .19$ and also

for zPolitical x MC-CWO, $R^2 = .19$, $\beta = .01$, $t = .07$, $p = .94$.

Figure 17.

Figure 17: Simple effect of Intergroup Prompt comparisons (MC-CIIM and MC-CWO) on Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people.

Figure 18.

Figure 18: Simple effect of Political Orientation (-1 SD = Conservative, +1 SD = Liberal) on Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people.

Yet again in this experiment, following the separate regression analysis used in experiment 2, we conducted two separate regressions on implicit bias, support for CA and Threat. In MC – CIIM comparison we saw non-significant effects on bias; $R^2 = .005$, $\beta = 0.068$, $t = 1.076$, $p = .283$. The effect on support for CA, however, was significant $R^2 = .176$, $\beta = .180$, $t = 3.032$, $p < .01$, but non-significant for Threat $R^2 = .187$, $\beta = .013$, $t = .221$, $p = .825$.

The separate regression effect for MC – CWO comparison was non-significant on bias, $R^2 = .085$, $\beta = .121$, $t = 1.93$, $p = .54$; support for CA, $R^2 = .147$, $\beta = -.005$, $t = -.913$, $p = .59$ and on Threat, $R^2 = .185$, $\beta = .060$, $t = 1.011$, $p = .313$.

Within these separate regression analyses, zPolitical show significant results with MC – CIIM comparison; $R^2 = .054$, p < .001 and significant with MC – CWO comparison; $R^2 = .017$, p = .042. This effect was in expected direction, however, in the previous Model it was non-significant for (p = .075, $R^2 = .01$). Although within separate regressions we observed significant effects, however, our overall results did not change due to this effect.

With reference to the separate regressions in experiment 3, MC-CIIM comparison observed non-significant. Though, this was a very small effect size ($R^2 = .02$, p = .02), so this complicates our interpretation, however, due to the very small effect size we did not intend to follow up this experiment. We observed similar findings in MC – CWO comparison which could be explained by the extra error variance accounted for by adding MC-CIIM to the model with MC-CWO allowed us to see the effect ($R^2 = .03$, p = .005).

To conclude the inconsistency of results in Experiment 3, we can argue that the Implicit Bias results appeared more confusing with the Separate Regressions which we have discussed in discussion section in more details. Most of the differences were related to very small effects, so this did not change our overall interpretations of the results.

Mediation Analysis:

To examine the mediational hypothesis for Threat from Pakistani-British group, we conducted mediation analysis for Threat (mediator) on the Political Ideology (predictor) to Implicit Bias (outcome) relationship and used PROCESS analysis in SPSS with bias corrected confidence intervals/BCIs to 5000 samples as recommended for mediation by Hayes (2013, V2. 13. 1).

Figure 19.

Perceived
Threat

$b = -.199, p < .001$ $b = .15, p < .001$

Direct Effect, b = - .01, CI [-.03, .01]

Political   Implicit Bias

Indirect, $b = -.03$, CI [-.16, -.05], *CSIE* $= -.09$

Total Effect, b = - .02, CI [-.07, -.01]

◄

Figure 19. Mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Threat as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

As expected, there was a significant indirect effect of Perceived Threat mediator on Implicit Bias (see figure 19). The effect size of this mediation was not as large as in Experiment 2, but it did represent a medium effect size, *CSIE* = - .09 [- .16, - .05], R^2 = .04, CI [.01, .08], K^2 = .09, CI [.04, .14] which means that experiencing more Perceived Threat was related to more Implicit Bias and to more conservativism instead of liberalism. We once again tested whether a one-factor model (i.e., Threat as the mediator) or a two-factor model (i.e., Symbolic Threat and Realistic Threat as mediators) fit the data better. We tested our models with Implicit Bias as the dependent variable and Political ideology as the predictor. Once again, the fit indices

demonstrated that the one-factor model fit the data better than did the two-factor model (i.e., one-factor model RMSEA = .111, TLI = .682, CFI = .724; two-factor model RMSEA = .115, TLI = .661, CFI = .771).

In addition, the Symbolic and Realistic Threat subscales were again highly correlated ($r = .62$, $P < .01$) and the overall Threat scale had a high reliability ($\alpha = .87$).

2.18 Discussion.

The aim of the Experiment 3 was to examine the replication of effects of MC and CIIM in the first two experiments on bias and support for CA with inclusion of newly coined commonality without highlighting (CWO) subgroup identities manipulation. The findings of Experiment 3, with reference to implicit bias and MC-CIIM and MC-CWO comparisons, showed significant effects and MC appeared to produce significantly less implicit bias than CIIM and CWO (within simple effect only) which contradicted the effect of Experiment 1. However, bias in CIIM was lower than CWO (i.e., a small difference). Such effects resulted in unclear and inconsistent findings with a lack of evidence regarding simultaneous effect of the intergroup approaches in reducing bias and increasing willingness to support for CA. Further, the MC-CIIM comparison significantly predicted support for CA towards Pakistani-British, but there was an opposite effect in MC to CWO relation. So comparatively MC showed less support than CIIM and CWO, but then there was a very small difference between MC and CWO. Following the results of Political Ideology in initial experiments, conservatives consistently showed more implicit bias and less support for CA than the liberals. In this experiment, we also examined the effect of intergroup prompts on perceived threat from Pakistani-British within interaction and

observed that none of the prompts differed significantly on perceived threat. We included this test based on the previous research which observed MC related to perceived threat towards the minority groups (Guimond et al., 2013). However, political ideology had an effect and the conservatives showed more perceived threat from Pakistani-British than the liberals. Further, perceived threat mediated this relationship between political ideology and implicit bias. So, overall across all the experiments of this chapter intergroup approaches (particularly MC) showed mixed results on bias (i.e., implicit and explicit), but the more consistent effect on bias was Political Ideology, and then perceived threat as a mediator (Experiments 2 & 3), which directed us to further test these effects within wider outgroups (i.e., effects of these variables on immigrants and unspecified outgroups within chapter 3).

2.19 General Discussion

Across three studies, the Multicultural prompt demonstrated an inconsistent pattern. Within Experiment 1, Multicultural (MC) approach produced significantly more (not less) outgroup attitude bias in comparison to Common Identity (CIIM) approach. Within Experiment 2, MC produced more implicit bias as compared to CIIM in the model, but it was not significant within the full model or on its own. In addition, within Experiment 2, MC did not produce significantly more implicit bias than the neutral Control condition and the Common Identity (CIIM) approach did not produce significantly less bias than the Control condition, even though the implicit bias was descriptively lower. The results of Experiment 3 were contrary to Experiments 1 and 2. In this case, MC produced significantly less and not more implicit bias than the CIIM and the CWO conditions. So, Experiment 2 did not support significantly increased implicit bias by Multiculturalism that had been observed in Experiment 1 while Experiment 3

supported the opposite finding in which Multiculturalism produced less implicit bias in comparison to the Commonality (CIIM) condition. Thus, the overall pattern of results in relation to both implicit and explicit bias were inconsistent. Yet, given that there was some indication that the Common Identity (CIIM) approach may have been more effective, we will review another approach (e.g., Dual Identity) later that may be similar to this approach, but that may have some unique characteristics that may allow it to be effective.

Although we conducted separate regression analyses in experiments 2 and all the results were similar in their effects as in the same models with both comparisons. However, the results of experiment 3 did not match with our regressions in the same model, yet, this did not change the explanation of our results to interpret differently due to very small effect sizes unable to be replicated in future studies. For example, if we would replicate these effects it would require over 600 participants to replicate these findings at .8 power which did not worth the time within our time limited project duration.

The pattern for support for collective action was more consistent. Multiculturalism (MC) produced significantly less support and not more support for collective action than CIIM within Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and Experiment 3, though the effects were small to medium in all three experiments. However, MC was not significantly different from the Control condition in Experiment 2 or the Commonality without highlighting condition in Experiment 3. Thus, a main finding is that multiculturalism produced significantly less support for collective action than did the commonality condition, but MC did not significantly decrease support in comparison to either the control in Experiment 2 or the Commonality without subgroup highlighting in Experiment 3. However, within Experiment 2, there also was evidence that showed that the Common Identity approach increased Support for Collective Action in comparison to the Control condition

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in addition to producing more support than Multiculturalism. Given the consistent advantage of the Common Identity approach with subgroup highlighting, it is worth pursuing this approach further and also comparing to the Dual Identity approach, which shares some important characteristics and that we review later in this discussion.

In all three experiments, Political Ideology remained consistent in predicting willingness to support for collective action and significantly predicting bias in Experiments 1 and 2), though Experiment 3 was not significant with both of the non-significant interactions in the model but it was when just the simple effects were included. Overall, more conservatism was significantly related to more implicit bias towards Pakistani-British and less willingness to engage in support for CA to help Pakistani-British people improve their situation. Finally, in both Experiment 2 and 3, we found that Perceived Threat from Pakistani-British people significantly mediated the Political Ideology to Implicit Bias relationships in which more perceived threat was related to less Liberalism and to more Implicit Bias. These mediational findings in conjunction with the consistent Implicit Bias findings led us to examine mediating role of Threat Management and Uncertainty-Avoidance based upon the Uncertainty-Threat Model (Jost et al., 2003, 2007 & 2017) in order to explain the relationship between political ideology and negative attitude bias against immigrants in Chapter 3.

In the context of inconsistent results with the Multicultural, Common Identity, and Common Identity without subgroup highlighting, we move towards considering the potential effectiveness of other intergroup approaches. Given that the Common Identity approach which highlighted subgroups sometimes reduced Implicit Bias in comparison to Multiculturalism (i.e., significantly in Experiment 1, and non-significantly in Experiment 2, and increased Support for Collective Action in all three Experiments, we wanted to review how the highlighting might have

altered the Common Identity approach to be similar to a Dual Idenity approach. A dual identity strategy uses aspects of the Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact in which a subgroup (e.g., immigrants) and a superordinate group identity (e.g., British) are made salient simultaneously to allow differences in circumstances to remain noticeable; this approach could be similar to our commonality approach (British focus) with later highlighting of both subgroups (i.e., White-British and Pakistani-British), but may be different in that it highlights both the common identity (British) and the subgroup identity (Pakistani-British) at the same time. Some recent research has initiated testing this approach in relation to intergroup bias and collective action. Banfield and Dovidio (2013) showed that, in the U.S., a dual-identity approach increased majority-group members' willingness to support collective action (i.e., willingness to protest on the behalf of a disadvantaged group). However, they did not test the influence on prejudice/intergroup bias. Similar research has found that a dual-identity strategy produced a lower stress response to intergroup interactions in the Netherlands, though they did not also examine support for collective action (Scheepers, Saguy, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2014). Further, some other evidence that has been conducted after we completed Experiments 1 through 3, also shows the effectiveness of a focus on the dual -identity (i.e., the salience of common group identity and separate group identity at the same time) in reducing bias and generating support for CA (Ufkes et al., 2016).

We propose that there is some good, preliminary-evidence for the dual-identity strategy, but that there are critical unknowns that need to be investigated to move the research forward. For example, researchers have shown that perceived threat to status (Wenzel et al., 2003) may influence prejudicial responses (i.e., higher status groups experienced more threat), and two of

our experiments (Experiments 2 and 3) have shown large effects of perceived threat toward

ethnic minorities in the UK. Other researchers have also found that UK citizens were more

negative toward a multicultural policy (Guimond et al., 2013) and that people experienced more

threat from multiculturalism if they believed minority group members wanted to maintain their

culture as opposed to wanting to adopt British culture, and perceived threat may inhibit

willingness to help (Tip et al., 2012; 2015). In addition, some researchers argue that reducing

prejudice inevitably leads to less support for collective action because people are not focused on

disadvantages and are less motivated to help (Dixon et al., 2012). Thus, it will be important to

test the dual-identity strategy in these conditions and within the UK to determine its

effectiveness.

 According to the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA), even an

advantaged, majority group can identify with an objective outgroup (e.g., Pakistani-British), and

that increasing this identification can lead to collective action by the advantaged majority group

when they feel a connection with the disadvantaged group (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears,

2008). Recent research by van Zomeren and colleagues (2011) has shown that reading about a

violation of a universal moral value toward Dutch Muslims led to more identification with the

disadvantaged Dutch Muslims. Thus, the simultaneous activation of the British identity and the

Pakistani-British <u>subgroup</u> identity may help to reduce bias more than our Commonality with

highlighting manipulation because the potentially threatening subgroup identity (i.e., Pakistani-

British) is highlighted at the same time as the common identity (i.e., British) and not at the same

time as the potentially threatened identity (i.e., White-British). In addition to reducing threat, it

may allow for British participants to identify with and feel a connection to the disadvantaged

Pakistani-British group. This approach could also increase support for collective action because it

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allows for the subgroup identity to remain salient, which could allow for disadvantages to be noticed and acted upon. In our future research, we could seek to test these ideas in relation to Multiculturalism, Common Identity, and Dual-Identity approaches.

In order to summarise our above discussion of chapter 2, we can conclude that inconsistent findings of intergroup approaches made it difficult to further pursue this line of research due to lack of evidence about dual identity and the time constraints at the time these experiments were conducted. Hence, we decided to divert the direction of our research to focus exclusively on political ideology and further expansion of the threat model of mediation in more depth. So, to follow up the significantly consistent findings of political ideology and bias relation via outgroup threat as a mediator from chapter 2 we designed the studies of chapter 3 based on the Uncertainty-Threat model (Jost et al., 2007). Though the sample in the chapter 3 was from the USA, however, due to the similarity in the results of the political ideology measure in both UK (e.g., observed in our experiments of chapter 2) and USA (found in previous research summarised in the literature review above) we decided to choose this sample. Another reason was the easy and rapid availability of a large number of American adult sample via online participant recruitment platforms such as MTurk.com for a compensation of $ .50 per participant. In addition to that, also the immigration patterns of both countries appear similar in terms of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds thus we considered to test the political attitudes beyond British context to see the generalizability of the political ideology findings.

3 CHAPTER 3: BRIDGING CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DIVIDES: PERCEIVED THREAT AND UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE HELP EXPLAIN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND IMMIGRANT ATTITUDE BIAS WITHIN INTERGROUP CONTEXTS.

3.1 Abstract

The political divide between liberals and conservatives has become quite large and stable, and there appear to be many reasons for disagreements on a wide range of issues. The current research sought to explain these divides and to extend the Uncertainty-Threat Model to intergroup relations, which predicts that more dispositional, perceived-threat and uncertainty-avoidance will be related to more political conservatism. Given that conservatism is also often related to more negativity to low status groups such as immigrants, the relationship between political ideology and negative attitudes toward immigrants may be mediated by more threat and uncertainty avoidance. Study 4 tested this mediational hypothesis in a correlational design and showed that both uncertainty-avoidance and perceived realistic and symbolic threat significantly mediated the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants, and that perceived threat was the more influential mediator. Study 5 extended threat management to perceived threats from unspecified outgroups, as opposed to the immigrant outgroup, and it replicated all significant mediations. Study 6 replicated the mediations observed in Studies 4 and 5 for political ideology to attitudes toward immigrants with uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat from immigrants as mediators; it further replicated the mediations to the negative attitudes measure that had been used in Study 5 and it extended it to an objective and

indirect bias measure [i.e., Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP)]. Overall, almost all of the results supported the idea that perceived threat and uncertainty-avoidance both mediate the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants, and that threat management, as opposed to negativity bias, may be a central concern separating liberals and conservatives. Within all three studies, we also observed more evidence for the Uncertainty-Threat Model predictions than we did for the alternative Extremity Hypothesis, which predicted a quadratic relationship between political ideology and threat and uncertainty, and between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants.

3.2 Introduction.

The cultural divide and polarization between liberals and conservatives has become steadily wide, and is potentially expanding (Hibbing et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2009; Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017). These political groups tend to disagree on a wide range of issues that often appear to not have a common underlying motivation (e.g., same-sex marriage, taxes, flag burning, animal testing, immigration, etc.). To complicate matters, there are several factors that have been proposed to explain the differences between these groups including differences in social dominance orientation (SDO), differences in negativity bias, and differences in endorsement of moral foundations (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Hibbing et al., 2014; Ho, Sidanius, Pratto, Levin, Thomsen, Kteily, & Sheey-Skeffington, 2012). We believe that an essential difference on these divides revolves around risk and threat acceptance or avoidance.

One promising recent theoretical model proposes critical differences that relate to threat, which can shed light on these cultural divides, and may help to bridge this divide and improve dialogue between ideological groups (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017; Jost & Napier, 2012). In their Uncertainty-Threat Model, Jost and colleagues (2007; 2012; 2017) provide some evidence that liberals and conservatives differ in their attention to and management of threats (i.e., Threat Management related to perceived terrorism, belief in a dangerous world, or death anxiety), and in the avoidance of uncertainty (i.e., Uncertainty-Avoidance), where more uncertainty avoidance and more attention to threats was associated with less liberalism and more conservatism (Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfal, & Ostafin, 2007). Here we use Jost's broad "Threat Management" terminology, which encompasses many different types of threat (i.e., threat to self-

esteem, mortality salience, ideological threat to the system, etc.); however, we sought to extend research in this area and test a specific type of threat—perceived threat toward one's group, which is a fundamental motive within intergroup relations (Kurzban, et al., 2001; Stephan et al., 2009) and which may be included within the broader threat management classification that Jost uses; however, this threat is untested within this model.

The Uncertainty-Threat Model may provide theoretical insights into observed differences between liberals and conservatives on a variety of issues, including negative responses to low status or non-normative groups such as immigrants. In Jost and colleagues' original review of the political orientation research (Jost et al., 2003), they posited that "In the context of political conservatism, this means that (a) a *temporary* motive (such as the need for cognitive closure or prevention focus or terror management) could lead one to express liberal as well as conservative beliefs, depending on one's chronically accessible ideology (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999), and (b) some people might adopt conservative beliefs out of a desire for certainty, whereas others adopt the same beliefs because of a threat to self-esteem or an ideological threat to the system [i.e., a *chronic* trait or personality motive]." Thus, they argued that a conservative shift could be related to a *dispositional* preference (from personality or trait measures of threat and uncertainty avoidance) in which conservatives have a higher affinity than liberals with threat and/or uncertainty avoidance, or it could be due to *temporarily* activated motives [i.e., priming] that temporarily shifts and leads to an increase in affiliation with threat and/or uncertainty avoidance. Jost et al., (2007) provided some of the first evidence to explicitly test these ideas. In their paper, "Three studies are conducted to assess the uncertainty–threat model of political conservatism, which posits that [*chronic*] psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat are associated with

political orientation. Results from structural equation models provide consistent support for the hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance (e.g., need for order, intolerance of ambiguity, and lack of openness to experience) and threat management (e.g., death anxiety, system threat, and/or perceptions of a dangerous world) each contributes independently to conservatism (vs. liberalism). No support is obtained for alternative models [i.e., worldview validation, Greenberg & Jonas, 2003], which predict that uncertainty and threat management are associated with ideological extremism or extreme forms of conservatism only" (Jost et al., 2007). The Uncertainty-Threat Model argues that "both temporary, situational factors and chronic, dispositional tendencies pertaining to the avoidance of uncertainty and the management of threat are therefore hypothesized to affect ideological preferences" (Jost et al., 2007; Jost et al., 2017).

While this model could be insightful, there is debate about whether and how uncertainty and threat relate to political ideology and how it might relate to intergroup relations. Our primary goal in this research is to seek to explain this cultural divide by being the first to test the ability of measured/dispositional uncertainty-avoidance and threat management to mediate the relationship to political ideology within an immigration context that is highly relevant to current political debates within a diversifying world, and debates that are likely to continue for decades to come as countries grapple with the need for immigration; this need is likely to continue because economic growth is tied to increased efficiency and increased population growth, which will depend upon immigration because the current US birth rate is below population replacement levels. In our research, we test the hypothesis that measured dispositional uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat are related to political ideology (i.e., less liberalism and more conservativism). We also test the hypothesis that more liberalism is related to less attitude bias to immigrants and that higher uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat will mediate this relationship. At this early stage, we

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do not focus on the temporary conservative shift hypothesis and instead seek to test the chronic personality hypothesis.

A secondary goal of the current research is to test the model against the extremity hypothesis. Several researchers argue that needs to reduce uncertainty and threat should lead to endorsement of *any extreme ideology* (i.e., extremity hypothesis) regardless of one's beliefs and political ideology (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 2012; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). Thus, needs to reduce threat and uncertainty should be higher at both ends of the political range. One standard way to measure this would be to test the linear and quadratic regression effects between political ideology and threat and uncertainty-avoidance. A quadratic effect would show that as political ideology became more liberal or more conservative, the relationship to threat and uncertainty-avoidance would be stronger (i.e., a u-shaped relationship). A linear only trend would be counter to the extremity hypothesis as advocated by this worldview validation perspective, and instead would support the Uncertainty-Threat Model because it would show that more conservatism and less liberalism was related to more threat and uncertainty avoidance in a linear fashion.

Little research evidence, however, has examined either the extremity hypothesis or only extreme responding on both sides of the political spectrum, and the research that does exist is ambiguous (Jost & Napier, 2012). Jost and colleagues (2003) found that 7 of 13 studies in their meta-analysis observed only a linear relationship between uncertainty and conservatism (i.e., support for the uncertainty-threat model), while 6 studies showed both a linear relationship and a quadratic relationship (i.e., support for uncertainty-threat model and for extreme responding on both ends of the political spectrum). Thus, according to Jost and Napier (2012) "psychological needs to reduce uncertainty and threat are associated with political conservatism in particular and

not ideological extremity in general." In newer research, van Prooijen, Krouwel, and Pollet (2015) have observed that people on the left and right political extremes showed more derogation of immigrants and more derogation of societal groups in general than did political moderates; however, their research tested attitudes to multiple groups simultaneously, instead of individually, which could have changed participants' responses compared to having multiple participants rate only a single group; such question order context effects have been demonstrated previously in which the order of questions frames the questions that follow; thus, the order of questions regarding multiple societal groups could easily affect the interpretation and response to those groups (Schwarz, Munkel, & Hippler, 1990; Schuldt, Roh, & Schwarz, 2015); future research will need to investigate this phenomena more thoroughly. Regardless, van Prooijen et al., (2015) observed only a very small relationship to derogation of immigrants ($R^2 = .01$), and they showed that there was still a significant and larger linear relationship in which there was more derogation by conservatives and less by liberals. Overall, there is some research showing that people at the political extremes show more extreme responding, but the research also demonstrates more extreme responses by conservatives on negative responses to societal groups in general and toward immigrants. A further investigation of the evidence is needed here.

Jost and colleagues (2012; Jost et al., 2007) have, however, provided further evidence of the relationship between conservatism, and uncertainty and threat reduction. In their original work, Jost et al. (2007) showed that political conservatism was related to uncertainty-avoidance and threat management, but these factors were not significantly related to ideological extremism noted in the extremity hypothesis; this pattern was demonstrated reliably in three different studies conducted in three different geographic regions within the US. We sought to replicate these relationships between political ideology and threat and uncertainty-avoidance, and to extend them

to immigration. We predicted that liberals would show less threat and less uncertainty avoidance than conservatives, and that we would observe a linear relationship only and not a quadratic relationship as suggested by the worldview validation perspective (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 2012). While this prediction is contrary to Burke and colleagues' meta-analytic findings, Burke's analysis focused on mortality threats, which was not the main focus of our research; we, instead, focused on perceived threat to one's ingroup (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013). We also predicted that liberals would be more positive toward immigrants and conservatives less positive. Thus, if the extremity hypothesis from the worldview validation perspective were to be supported, a chronic tendency toward threat and uncertainty-avoidance would be related to participants being more polarized in their view of immigrants as their chronic tendency to avoid threat/uncertainty was greater (i.e., very liberal participants would be more positive and very conservative participants would be more negative). Thus, the quadratic relationship test could be applied to bias toward immigrants in addition to threat or uncertainty-avoidance. This hypothesis, however, was a secondary interest of the current paper, but one which still could be examined within the current data.

A recent review by Crawford (2017), has indicated that the way threat has been defined within the motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003) and negativity bias (Hibbing et al., 2014) perspectives is too broad. He argues that threats can be differentiated into *meaning threats* and into *physical threats*, which are defined respectively as threats to "systems of meaning and value" and threats to "existential realities," such as mortality salience (e.g., Burke et al., 2013), and he argues that while liberals and conservatives are differentially influenced by *physical* threats, they are similarly influenced by *meaning* threats. Within the current set of studies, we do not use *physical threats* (i.e., mortality salience); instead, we have focused on a measure of perceived

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threat to one's group resources and values (Stephan et al., 1999; Stephan et al., 2009); thus, our measure of perceived threat is in line with the category of *meaning threats*, this is particularly true if we focus only on the subscale of symbolic threat to one's group values. Thus, the current research used a concept of threat that is more closely tied to meaning threats and also not in the realm of mortality salience, which has sometimes been conflated within the research related to the Uncertainty-Threat Model.

Overall, the hypotheses derived from the Uncertainty-Threat Model have yet to be tested in an intergroup context such as immigrants. The finding of liberals showing less avoidance and conservatives showing more avoidance of uncertainty and more of a focus on threats could be increased when encountering intergroup situations. Research has shown that thinking about or encountering intergroup situations can increase uncertainty and perceived threat (Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Stephan et al., 2009). Thus, in intergroup situations of non-immigrants thinking about immigrants, being motivated by uncertainty avoidance and threat management should be predictive of responses to outgroups that are emphasized by the intergroup context (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017). There is, however, little research on threat and uncertainty together, and less on the relationship between political ideology, threat, uncertainty, and immigrants. Thus, we next examine these separate areas of research.

Some researchers argue that uncertainty can increase deliberation or compromise in negotiations and reduce confidence (MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). This position would then argue that increased uncertainty should also lead to less biased responding. Yet, increased uncertainty has been demonstrated to be related to increased intergroup bias in both minimal group paradigms and with real-world groups (Federico, Hunt, & Fisher, 2013; Grieve & Hogg, 1999) and to increased confidence in one's

attitudes and social identity, which can lead to more bias (Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Van Den Bos, Poortyliet, Mass, Miedema, & Van Den Ham, 2005). Thus, more reliance on avoiding uncertainty could be related to more bias.

Previous research, however, has also demonstrated that conservatives are more influenced by uncertainty in situations in which threats have been highlighted (Hass, 2016). In her research, she measured support for a compromise on the Affordable Care Act (i.e., Obamacare), and manipulated uncertainty and threat by asking participants to imagine either a home invasion scenario (threat) in which the culprit was either inside the house (certain) or trying to get in (uncertain). In the low threat control condition, participants imagined someone arriving at home during the day and ringing the doorbell; the person was either someone they knew (certain) or did not know (uncertain; Haas & Cunningham, 2014). This research observed that conservatives expressed less support for compromise with liberals, but only when uncertainty was paired with threat (Haas, 2016). This research would indicate that conditions that paired threat and uncertainty may increase bias for conservatives.

Regarding threat, it is clearer that attention to threat can often lead to a variety of biases at the intergroup level. In Riek and colleagues' meta-analysis (2006) using 95 samples, the intergroup threat was shown to have a large influence on the increased intergroup bias (average r = .43). Numerous other studies have also indicated that perceiving more threats are linked with increased intergroup bias (Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011; Pereira et al., 2010; Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004). In regard to political orientation, research has demonstrated that liberals show less acceptance of inequality (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost 2009; Jost et al., 2003), have more positive attitudes toward gays and lesbians, Muslim Americans, and Arabs (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Nisbet & Shanahan, 2004; Webster, Burns, Pickering, &

Saucier, 2014; Whitley & Lee, 2000), show less outgroup hostility (Kugler, Jost, &

Noorbaloochi, 2014), and have more positive feelings toward non-normative groups (Luguri,

Napier, & Dovidio, 2012). In addition, Jost and colleagues (2017), in their recent meta-analysis,

reviewed 174 tests of the hypothesized connection between feelings of insecurity and threat and

more conservatism or authoritarianism and found a moderately strong relationship between

conservatism predicting more subjective threat (weighted average, $r = .26$). Reviews have also

supported the hypothesis that conservatives are more likely and liberals less likely to have a

lower tolerance for uncertainty; the review notes that, over nine studies, there was a moderately

large association between conservatism and lower tolerance for uncertainty (weighted average

$r = - .33$; Jost, 2017). Thus, liberals are likely to show less bias toward low status or non-

normative outgroups such as immigrants, and responsiveness to threat is likely to increase this

intergroup bias, and potentially explain this relationship.

3.3   Research Overview.

We sought to explain the cultural divide between liberals and conservatives and sought to

extend the Uncertainty-Threat model to ingroup relations regarding immigrants. Given that

liberals tend to show less bias toward low status and non-normative groups, we hypothesized that

liberals would show less bias toward immigrants; here, we use the term bias to mean a response

tendency instead of an error. We next were also the first to test whether this relationship would be

significantly mediated by both uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat, and whether these

factors were equally influential; we also tested whether both would remain significant with social

dominance orientation (SDO) in the model, which is a variable that is strongly related to social

status (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). In follow-up studies, we extended perceived threat from

immigrants to include perceived threats from abstract (unspecified) outgroups and added a negative bias measure and an implicit measure of bias.

3.4   Study 4

3.5   Methodology

3.5.1   Hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1. Based upon previous research, we hypothesized that Political Ideology would be related to Bias toward immigrants in which more liberalism would be associated with less bias (Cunningham et al., 2004; Kugler et al., 2014; Luguri et al., 2012; Nisbet & Shanahan, 2004; Webster, et al., 2014; Whitley & Lee, 2000).

Hypothesis 2a and 2b. To test the first of two extremity hypotheses, we predicted that more liberalism would be linearly related to less Perceived Threat and less Uncertainty-Avoidance. In line with Jost and colleagues (2003; 2007; 2011), the quadratic relationship (i.e., more perceived threat and uncertainty-avoidance for those who were very liberal or very conservative) would be non-significant (i.e., unsupported extremity hypothesis). Given that liberals were predicted to be more positive and conservatives less positive toward immigrants, we also predicted that there would be linear relationship between Political Ideology and Bias in which more liberalism was related to less Bias, but that the quadratic term would be non-significant (i.e., a natural extension of the extremity hypothesis in which one's initial preference would be increased).

Hypothesis 3a, b, c, d, and e. Based upon past research (Burke et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017; Sibley & Duckitt, 2009), we predicted that Political Ideology would be associated with Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), System Threat, Death Avoidance, and Fear of Death, in which more liberalism was related to lower ratings on each of these measures. Finally, we predicted that liberalism would be related to higher rates of helping immigrants. This variable had been added to show the effects on a behavioral variable but given that it was a new measure and that it was not the primary outcome variable, we had placed it near the end of the study.

Hypotheses 4a and b. The main hypotheses for the current research related to the mediational predictions based upon the uncertainty-threat model by Jost and colleagues (2003; 2007; 2011). We predicted that both *chronic* variables of Perceived-Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance would mediate the relationship to Bias toward immigrants (4a). In order to provide an additional test for our mediational hypotheses, we wished to include another variable within the model that is known to be associated with bias and outgroup prejudice. A large amount of research has demonstrated that social dominance orientation (SDO) is associated with bias toward outgroups (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Durate, 2003; Kteily, Sidanius, & Levin, 2011). Those high in SDO endorse their beliefs in a competitive society and a preference for hierarchy within society and for their group to be at the top. This perception along with perceived threats can both be related to increased bias toward outgroups; thus, we wished to test that Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance would remain significant when SDO was added (Hypothesis 4b).

3.5.2 Participants.

Two hundred and six participants from the United States were recruited from the

recruitment platform Prolific.ac and they completed an online study for monetary compensation.

In this chapter we have used an online sample from US due to lack of availability of student

sample for a lab study, further we pilot tested the sample and found no difference in attitudes of

political orientation on implicit bias in British student samples and US samples. So only

participants, who indicated that their nationality was the US and they were residing in the US

within the Prolific.ac platform were recruited for this study; thus, the participants did not think of

themselves as immigrants. Participants were between 18 and 65 years old ($M = 31.00$, $SD =$

11.35) with 77.2% White, 25.7% Conservative, and 64.1% male participants. We recruited

roughly 200 participants in order to have .8 power for 2 predictors in the model with a nearly

medium effect size (d = .46), which is based upon effect sizes observed for the smallest factor in

previous research (Jost et al., 2007; Jost & Napier, 2011).

3.5.3 Design.

Political orientation was a measured predictor variable, while Perceived Threat and

Uncertainty-Avoidance were mediator variables, and Bias was the outcome variable. The two

mediators of Perceived Threat (Stephan et al., 1999) and Uncertainty-Avoidance (Jost et al.,

2007) were counterbalanced in order to methodologically control for order effects. The

continuous, Political Orientation measure was followed by Perceived Threat and then

Uncertainty-Avoidance in orders one (U-A: openness then ambiguity) and two (U-A: ambiguity

then openness), or they were followed by Uncertainty-Avoidance and then Perceived Threat in

orders three (U-A: openness then ambiguity) and four (U-A: ambiguity then openness).

Participants were randomly assigned one of these four, counterbalanced orders (Table1 for these four orders: see Appendix Y).

3.5.4 Materials

Filler Task 1: The first filler task was composed of four items from the Need for Cognition scale that were not related to political ideology ($\alpha = .75$, Need for Cognition 4 items scale to Political Ideology, $r = -.007$). Examples of the items included "I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them" and "I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for many hours" (see Appendix P). However, these items were answered on 1 to 5 response scale from Extremely Uncharacteristic to Extremely Characteristic, and after reverse scoring two items, higher scores indicated more need for cognition.

Perceived Threat from Immigrants: This scale (Stephan, Yabarra, & Bachman, 1999) consisted of fifteen items that measured threat levels based on seven symbolic threat and eight realistic threat items that were presented in a randomized order. The scale used a seven-point, vertical scale from (1) *Disagree Strongly* to (7) *Agree Strongly*. An example of the items included "The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding social relations are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans" (see Appendix S). Because the subscales share a common theme of threats to the ingroup (Stephen et al., 1999) and were highly correlated ($r = .75$, $p <$ .001, $\alpha = .94$), we used all fifteen items in the index of perceived threat, which has been used in previous research (Tipp et al., 2012; Tausch, Hewston, Kenworthy, Cairns & Christ, 2007; Schmidt & Muldoon 2015; Verkuyten, 2009). After reverse-scoring 8 items, scores were averaged and higher scores indicated more perceived threat ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 1.24$, $\alpha = .94$).

Uncertainty-Avoidance: We used Jost and colleagues' (2007) Uncertainty-Avoidance measure. This measure was the mean of items from the 10 item Openness to Experience subscale of the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008), "I am someone who is original, and comes up with new ideas," (see Appendix T1) and from the same 4 item Intolerance for Ambiguity measure used by Jost (Budner, 1962), "People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how complicated things really are" (see Appendix T2). Both scales were rated from (1) *Disagree strongly* to (7) *Agree strongly* and the items were randomized within scales; after reverse scoring two items, scores were averaged, and higher scores represented more uncertainty-avoidance ($M = 3.10$, $SD = 0.83$, $\alpha = .81$).

Filler Task 2: The second filler task was placed between the mediators and the outcome measure and was composed of four additional items from the Need for Cognition scale ($\alpha = .86$, 4 items Need for Cognition to Political Ideology, $r = .047$). Examples of the items included "I would prefer complex to simple problems," and "I only think as hard as I have to" (see Appendix P). After reverse scoring two items, scores were averaged, and higher scores indicated more need for cognition.

Bias scale: A five-item Feeling Thermometer (Alwin, 1992; Saguy et al., 2009) was used as the Bias outcome measure (see Appendix M). Participants rated their feelings toward immigrants on five opposite pairs of evaluative dimensions (*Warm-Cold, Negative-Positive, Friendly-Unfriendly, Suspicious-Trustworthy, Admiration-Disgust*) using a nine-point, vertical scale (e.g., the top, 1= _____ to = 9 _____). After reverse-scoring two items, higher scores indicated more negative reactions ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.55$, $\alpha = .95$). A separate measure that was not incorporated into the bias measure above was completed as a pilot test for future items for Study 5. Participants completed some pilot questions toward immigrants (*Approval, Acceptance,*

Liking, Disdain, Hatred; adapted from Stephan et al., 2002) by rating "… the degree to which you feel _____ toward immigrants" from (0) *No liking at all* (9) *Extreme liking*, depending upon the adjective rated.

Secondary Measures.

Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO): The Social Dominance Orientation measure included 16 items (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) such as "To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups." All items were completed on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from (1) *Very Negative* to (7) *Very Positive* (see Appendix U). Items were presented in a random order. After reverse scoring eight items, the items were averaged with higher scores reflecting higher social dominance ideology (M = 2.58, SD = 1.25, α = .95).

Death Avoidance scale: This scale consisted of 5 items that were rated on 7-point scales from (1) *Disagree Strongly* to (7) *Agree Strongly*. An example item includes "I avoid death thoughts at all costs" (see Appendix V1). Higher scores represented more death avoidance (M = 3.73, SD = 1.68, $α$ = .92; Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1994).

Fear of Death scale: This scale consisted of 7 items that were rated on 7-point scales from (1) *Disagree Strongly* to (7) *Agree Strongly*. An example item includes "I have an intense fear of death" (see Appendix V2). Higher scores represented more fear of death (M = 3.91, SD = 1.58, $α$ = .91; Wong et al., 1994).

System Threat item: Participants completed a single item on system threat that was used by Jost et al., (2007), "Our way of life is seriously threatened by the forces of terrorism in the

world." This item was rated on 7-point scale from (1) *Disagree Strongly* to (7) *Agree Strongly.* Higher scores represented more system threat.

Additional mathematical questions on three separate pages were presented in order to demonstrate that you are a real person, please complete some of these mathematics problems: 6 x 7 = _____; 8 + 5 = _____.

We also added following question in order to see the tendency how participants respond, "Would you be willing to help out immigrants, who are living in poverty, by providing your email address to be contacted about helping out? __No, __Yes". This additional question will also assess if participants respond as "No" this would mean either they did not wish to share their personal information to be associated with their responses, or they simply were not willing to help the immigrants.

In the US, left-wing ideas are often but not exclusively supported by the Democratic Party, and right-wing ideas are often but not exclusively supported by the Republican Party. We are interested in where you see yourself in the political spectrum from 1 = Very Right, to 5 = Neither, to 7 = Very Left (*M* = 4.60, *SD* = 1.81).

3.6 Procedure.

Participants completed informed consent and then some demographic variables including gender, ethnicity, age, English as a second language, residence status, and political ideology. Participants rated their personal political orientation on a nine-point, vertical scale from (1) *extremely conservative* to (9) *extremely liberal,* with a *moderate* as the mid-point (5) as was used in Jost et al., (2007). The political orientation item has often been included within demographics

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in previous research (Crawford, Kay, & Duke, 2015; Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Fitzgerald & Wickwire, 2012; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). The mean political orientation score was 5.65 ($SD = 2.17$).

Next, participants completed Filler Task 1, which included four filler questions from the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1984) that were uncorrelated with political ideology ($r = .007$), and that provided a small separation from the next task. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two orders of the mediators by being told to select the letter that appeared at the top of a list of letters (each list was randomly ordered for each participant; thus, participants were not self-selecting into an order. Whichever letter was chosen had been randomly ordered by the computer and participants did not know what each letter represented. Moreover, participants believed they were doing this to check that the system was recording their responses correctly). Participants then completed either the Perceived Threat scale first and then the Uncertainty-Avoidance scale, or they completed the opposite order. After completing these mediators, participants completed Filler Task 2 (4 filler items from the Need for Cognition scale) to provide separation between measures.

Participants next completed the five-item Feeling Thermometer (Alwin, 1992; Saguy et al., 2009) as the Bias outcome measure ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.55$, $\alpha = .95$). They then completed five additional bias items that were being pilot tested for a later study.

To further test some relationships suggested by the Uncertainty-Threat Model, we included some secondary measures of death avoidance, fear of death, and system threat that had been used by Jost et al., 2007. Participants first completed a Death Avoidance scale (5 items, $\alpha = .92$, $M = 3.73$, $SD = 1.68$,) and Fear of Death scale ($M = 3.91$, $SD = 1.58$, $\alpha = .91$; Wong et al.,

1994) to test the proposed positive relationship to conservatism. Participants also completed a single item of system threat (Jost et al., 2007) and then the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale with sixteen items ($M = 2.58$, $SD = 1.25$, $\alpha = .95$, Pratto et al., 1994) to test the positive relationships between political ideology and system threat, and between political ideology and social dominance. Next, participants completed some simple mathematics, filler questions and then a secondary, behavioral measure of helping that was being pilot tested. They answered a yes/no question about whether they would be willing to help immigrants, who are living in poverty, by providing their email address in order to be contacted about helping out; no email addresses were actually collected. Finally, participants completed questions about a left-right political orientation item and then questions about the purpose and how positive their day was, and then were debriefed. The purpose and positive day questions were filler questions and added only to provide distractions after the main questions had been asked.

3.7   Results.

Prior to testing the main hypotheses, we coded the four orders of the mediators and conducted a regression with Order, Political Orientation, and the interaction in the model for each outcome measure. We observed non-significant Order × Political interactions for Attitudes toward Immigrants and for Attitude Bias 2 (pilot-tested items); for all analyses, we observed $p > 0.146$ and $R^2 < 0.011$. A Linear regression was conducted next to investigate the hypothesis that Political Orientation would be associated with Attitudes toward immigrants. Higher scores reflected a more liberal political ideology. As hypothesized, Political Orientation was significantly and negatively related to negative Attitudes, $R^2 = .27$, $\beta = -.52$, $t = -8.64$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = -.37$, 95%BCa CI [- .45, - .29], $p < .001$, which indicated that, within a

narrow confidence interval, higher liberalism was associated with less negative Attitudes (Hypothesis 1a); all Confidence Intervals (CI) used Bias Corrected intervals (BCa CI) as recommended by Hayes (2013) regardless of whether they were called "BCa CI" or "CI".

Political Orientation was also significantly and negatively related to the second Attitude measure being pilot tested, $R^2 = .27$, $\beta = - .51$, $t = - 8.57$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = - .42$, 95% BCa CI [- .51, - .32], $p < .001$. To test the extremity hypotheses, we centered Political Orientation and computed the quadratic term using the mean centered variable based upon recommendations for quadratic regressions (Cohen et al., 2003; van Prooijen et al., 2015). We added the Political Orientation variable in Step 1 and the Quadratic variable in Step 2 of the regression model with Uncertainty-Avoidance and we observed a Quadratic $R^2 < .001$, $\beta =$

- .01, $t = - .13$, $p = .894$ with bootstrapped $b < - .01$, 95% BCa CI [- .02, .02]. This same analysis was performed for Perceived Threat and found a Quadratic $R^2 < .001$, $\beta = - .03$, $t = - .48$, $p =$ .631, bootstrapped $b < - .01$, 95% BCa CI [- .03, .02]. Both non-significant effects suggested that participants at the extreme ends of political ideology did not endorse threat or uncertainty-avoidance significantly more (Hypotheses 2a), which replicates the non-significant, quadratic effects observed by Jost and colleagues (2003, 2007). We also performed these analyses for the relationship between Political Ideology and Attitudes toward immigrants. The Quadratic term was non-significant, $R^2 < .001$, $\beta = - .013$, $t = - .20$, $p = .839$ with bootstrapped $b < - .01$, 95% BCa CI [- .04, .03], suggesting that participants at either extreme end of the political spectrum were not responding with more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Hypothesis 2b).

Finally, a binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to test whether Political Orientation would be positively associated with the binary, behavioral-variable of Helping

Immigrants who are living in poverty. We observed that more liberalism was significantly related to more Helping of immigrants (Hypothesis 1a), $\beta = .28$, SE $= .08$, Wald $= 10.97$, p $= .001$, Odds Ratio $= 1.32$, 95% BCa CI [1.12, 1.55], Cox and Snell $R^2 = .06$.

Mediation.

We next tested the multiple-mediational hypothesis in which Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance were proposed to significantly mediate the Political Orientation to Bias relationship. We performed a simultaneous, multiple-mediation test using PROCESS analysis in SPSS with bias-corrected confidence intervals to 5000 samples as recommended by Hayes, (2013, v2, 13.1), for multiple mediators. As hypothesized, both Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance significantly mediated the Political Orientation to Bias relationship (see Figure 20; Hypothesis 4a). In evaluating the mediators, Threat was significantly larger with a comparison $b = -.29$, CI [- .38, - .21]. Finally, both Uncertainty-Avoidance ($b = -.02$, CI [- .05, - .01], *Completely Standardized Indirect Effect (CSIE) = -.03*) and Threat ($b = -.32$, CI [- .41, - .24], *CSIE = -.45*) remained significant indirect effects when SDO ($b = .01$, CI [- .04, .05], *CSIE = .01*) was added to the model (Hypothesis 4b). The mediational analyses for Behavioural Helping were also supportive of the model, but just only Threat variable (see Appendix Z, Study 4 - Figure b1).

Some researchers have suggested that differences on political ideology and threat are observed mainly on measures of threat related to physical threats such as mortality salience (Burke et al., 2013; Crawford, 2017). They suggest that for meaning threats, "threats to systems of meaning and value," liberals and conservatives should show a symmetry in their

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responsiveness to these meaning threats. We can test this hypothesis in relation to our research on immigrants because one subscale of the perceived threat scale is a measure of symbolic threat to beliefs and values (i.e., a meaning threat). For the Political Orientation to Bias relationship, both Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = - .03, CI [- .06, - .01], *CSIE)* = - .04) and Symbolic (meaning) Threat (b = - .26, CI [- .34, - .19], *CSIE* = - .36) were significant mediators (see Appendix Z, Figure S4).

Figure 20.

Figure 20: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

Both mediators were also significant when entered separate mediations (Uncertainty-Avoidance, b = - .03, CI [- .07, - .01], R^2 = .06, *CSIE* = - .05, and Threat, b = - .33, CI [- .42, -.26], R^2 = .27, *CSIE* = - .46). In addition, the Left-Right measure of Political Orientation

produced the same pattern of results and significances for all analyses, with the exception that

Death Avoidance was now significant, $R^2 = .02$, $p = .044$, $b = -.13$, CI [-.258, -.004]. For both

political variables, all patterns of results and significances remained the same for all analyses in a

sample of 181 participants after removing participants who failed to indicate that they were born

in the USA in the second set of demographics questions in Study 4. Even though all 206

participants indicated that their Nationality was US in the prolific.ac screening criteria, some had

failed to verify this in our demographic questions; we improved these questions in later studies.

In order to match previous research as closely as possible, we had followed Jost et al.'s,

2007, research in which they had combined Ambiguity-Avoidance with Closedness (i.e., reverse-

scored Openness factor from the Big-Five, personality index). In the current study, we observed a

significant correlation between Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness ($r = .443$) and a high

internal consistency for the combined measure of Uncertainty-Avoidance ($\alpha = .806$). In addition,

we also investigated whether a two-factor mediation model (i.e., Threat and Uncertainty-

Avoidance) would fit the data equally well as a three-factor mediation model (i.e., Threat,

Closedness, and Ambiguity-Avoidance) for the Explicit Bias results. Overall, both measures were

very similar to each other, but the two-factor model fit the data slightly better (RMSEA = .087,

TLI = .800, CFI = .814) than the three-factor model (RMSEA = .093, TLI = .769, CFI = .784)

and this two-factor model explained a good portion of the variance (i.e., 35.4% of the variance; χ^2

$= 410.28$, $p < .001$). These results indicate that either model could be a good fit for the current

data, though our combined, Uncertainty-Avoidance model was slightly better.

3.8 Discussion.

Political Orientation was significantly associated with Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance, but the quadratic effect, which tested the extremity hypothesis, was not significant; this pattern replicated the non-significant quadratic effects of Jost and colleagues (2003; 2007). In an extension of these predictions, the quadratic effect was also non-significant for the Political Orientation to Bias toward immigrants, which again shows a lack of support for the extremity hypothesis based upon the worldview validation perspective (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 2012). Moreover, we observed that both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat were significant mediators in a multiple-mediation model of Political Orientation to Bias, and Perceived Threat was a significantly more influential mediator; these mediations were replicated with the Symbolic (meaning) Threat subscale. Thus, the current research found support for the Uncertainty-Threat Model, and it is the first to extend this model to intergroup relations regarding immigrants and to the perceived threat scale.

3.9 Study 5

3.10 Methodology

3.10.1 Hypotheses.

Study 5 aimed to extend the measure of threat to general or abstract outgroups and to test whether uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat from abstract outgroups, as opposed to immigrants, mediated the relationship between political orientation and bias toward immigrants. We adapted a perceived threat to specific groups scale (Stephan et al., 2002) to be about abstract or general outgroups in much the same way that the social dominance orientation (SDO) measure

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is about hierarchy in relation to general groups. A second aim was to extend the measurement of bias to include only negative ratings. We hypothesized that political orientation would again be significantly and negatively correlated with bias and with the new, negative bias measure in addition to the Helping Immigrants variable. Second, we hypothesized that both uncertainty-avoidance and the perceived threat from abstract outgroups would mediate the negative relationship between political ideology and bias, and between political ideology and negative bias toward immigrants, and in a replication of Study 4, threat would be a more influential mediator. Finally, we anticipated replicating the non-significant quadratic effects between political ideology and the mediators and between political ideology and both measures of bias.

3.10.2 Participants.

A sample of three hundred and eight participants was recruited from the Prolific.ac participant pool. All participants indicated within the Prolific.ac platform that they were born in the US and currently resided in the US; thus, no participant was considered an immigrant. They were between 18 and 74 years old ($M = 31.53$, $SD = 12.12$) with 80.5% White, 22.1% Conservative, and 50.6% male participants. We recruited roughly 300 participants in order to have .85 power for 2 predictors and .82 with 3 predictors in the model with a small effect size

(d = .39) based upon Study 4 results estimated from the multiple-mediation model.

3.10.3 Design.

The order of the measures and mediators was the same as in Study 4 with a few changes. The deviations from Study 4 included the following: 1) the ambiguity items and openness items were randomized within a single, Uncertainty-Avoidance questionnaire instead of within separate

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questionnaires, 2) study 5 used only two orders because Uncertainty-Avoidance was now a single scale; thus, the Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance mediators were again counterbalanced to control for order effects, 3) the Perceived Threat measure was changed to be about general, abstract outgroups using an adaptation of Stephan et al.'s (2002) measure with 24 items (see Appendix W), and the single-item system threat question was included at the end of the perceived threat measure, 4) the death avoidance and threat from death scales were removed because of non-significant findings in Study 4, 5) a bias scale with only negative adjectives was added after the bias scale that had been used in Study 4 in order to tap only negativity (see Appendix X), and finally 6) seven filler items were added before the helping immigrants question. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two, counterbalanced orders of the mediators.

3.10.4 New Materials.

Perceived Threat from Abstract Outgroups: We used the 24-item Perceived Threat measure that we changed to be about general, abstract outgroups by adapting Stephan et al.'s (2002) threat from ethnic minority groups measure (see Appendix W). There were 12 symbolic threat items (e.g., "My group has very different values than outgroups.") and 12 realistic threat items (e.g., Too much money is spent on educational programs that benefit outgroups). The measure used a seven-point, vertical scale from (1) *Disagree Strongly* to (7) *Agree Strongly.* After reverse scoring a few items, we averaged the items and a higher score indicated more perceived threat from general/abstract outgroups ($\alpha = .96$).

Negative Bias scale: This scale included ratings of five negative feelings toward immigrants (*Disapproval, Resentment, Dislike, Disdain, Hatred*; adapted from Stephan et al., 2002). They

were asked to "Please indicate the degree to which you feel _____ toward immigrants" on a nine-point, vertical from (0) *No* _____ *to* (9) *Extreme* _____ (see Appendix X). Higher scores represented more negative bias toward immigrants *(M* = 2.49, *SD* = 1.99, *α* = .95).

Filler Task 3: A third filler task was placed between the attitude bias outcome measures and the final questions about mathematics, helping immigrants, and making errors within the study. It was composed of seven items from the Need for Cognition scale (*α* = .82; see Appendix P).

Following the rating of political orientation within the demographic questions, participants completed the same need for cognition Filler Task 1 from Study 4 (*α* = .75). They then were randomly assigned to complete either the Perceived Threat from Abstract Outgroups (24 items, *α* = .96, *r* = .87, *M* = 3.67, *SD* = 1.31) scale first and then the Uncertainty-Avoidance scale (*M* = 2.95, *SD* = .80, *α* = .81), or they completed the opposite order as was done in Study 4. After completing these mediators, participants completed the same need for cognition Filler Task 2 as from Study 4 (*α* = .81).

Participants next completed the first Bias scale, which was the same as in Study 4 and included participants rating their feelings toward immigrants on five opposite pairs of evaluative dimensions (*M* = 3.87, *SD* = 1.66, *α* = .94). They then completed the Negative Bias scale, which included rating five negative feelings toward immigrants (see Appendix X; *Disapproval, Resentment, Dislike, Disdain, Hatred, M* = 2.49, *SD* = 1.99, *α* = .95). Participants next completed the social dominance orientation (SDO) scale used in Study 4 (*M* = 2.36, *SD* = 1.18, *α* = .95). After completing Filler Task 3 (7 items from Need for Cognition scale; *α* = .82) and two mathematics items, participants completed the same yes/no helping-immigrants behavioral measure from Study 4, and then were debriefed.

3.11 Results.

We coded the two orders of the mediators and conducted a regression with Order, Political Orientation, and the interaction in the model for each outcome measure. We found nonsignificant Order x Political interactions for the Attitudes measure and the Negative Attitude measure; all interaction $p > 0.713$ and $R^2 < 0.001$. Two linear regressions were performed to test the expected negative relationships between Political Orientation and Attitudes toward Immigrants and between Political Orientation and Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants. As expected, Political Orientation was significantly and negatively related to more negative Attitudes (Hypothesis 1a), $R^2 = .29$, $\beta = - .54$, $t = - 11.09$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = - .43$, 95% BCa CI - .51, - .35], $p < .001$, and it also was significantly and negatively related to more negativity on the Negative Attitude measure (Hypothesis 1a), $R^2 = .19$, $\beta = - .43$, $t = - 8.38$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = - .41$, 95% BCa CI [- .52, - .31], $p < .001$; Because higher scores on Political Orientation were related to a more liberal ideology, the results indicated that higher liberalism was associated with less negative attitudes. Moreover, we created an Averaged Attitude score for Attitudes and Negative Attitudes and then standardized it; Political Orientation was significantly and negatively related to this standardized-Averaged Attitude score, $R^2 = .27$, $\beta = - .51$, $t = - 10.50$, $p < .001$.

For the extremity analysis, the quadratic term entered in Step 2 of the regression was non-significant for the relationships between Political Orientation and Uncertainty-Avoidance, $R^2 = .009$, $\beta = - .10$, $t = -1.72$, $p = .09$, bootstrapped $b = - .02$, 95% BCa CI [- .04, .01] and between Political Orientation and Threat from Unspecified Outgroups, $R^2 < .001$, $\beta = - .03$,

t = - .46, p = .643, bootstrapped b = - .01, 95%BCa CI [- .04, .03] (Hypothesis 2a). In separate

regressions, the Quadratic term was also non-significant for the Political Orientation to Attitudes

relationship, R^2 = .002, β = - .05, t = - .98, p = .327, bootstrapped b = - .02, 95%BCa CI [-.05,

.02] and also for the Negative Attitudes variable as predicted (Hypothesis 2b), R^2 < .001, β = .01,

t = .10, p = .923, bootstrapped b < .01, 95%BCa CI [- .05, .05].

Next, a binary logistic regression was conducted to test the binary, behavioral-variable of

Helping Immigrants who are living in poverty. We again observed that more liberalism was

significantly related to more Helping of immigrants (Hypothesis1a), β = .20, SE = .07, Wald =

9.16, p = .002, Odds Ratio = 1.22, 95%BCa CI [1.07, 1.40], Cox and Snell R^2 = .03.

Mediations

To examine the multiple-mediation hypothesis for Perceived Threat from Outgroups and

Uncertainty-Avoidance (r = 0.157), we conducted separate, multiple-mediation analyses for Bias

and for Negative Bias using PROCESS. As predicted, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived

Threat from Outgroups had significant indirect effects on the Political Orientation to Bias

relationship (see Figure 21; Hypothesis 4a), and Threat was larger, comparison *b* = -.07, CI [-.14,

-.01]. Both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Threat from Outgroups also had significant indirect

effects on the Political Orientation to Negative Bias relationship (see Figure 22; Hypothesis 4a),

and Threat was larger, comparison *b* = -.11, CI [-.19, -.04]. Once again, we tested these two

mediations with the Symbolic Threat subscale and replicated the same pattern of results as with

the full Perceived Threat scale (see Appendix Z, Figures S5 a & b). The mediational analyses for

Behavioural Helping were, however, not supportive of the hypothesis and also with the previous

research (see Appendix Z, Figures b2).

Uncertainty-Avoidance, *b* = -.03, CI [- .06, -.01], *CSIE* = -.04, and general Threat from

Outgroups, *b* = - .08, CI [- .15, - .03] *CSIE* = - .10 on Bias, and Uncertainty-Avoidance, *b* = - .03,

CI [- .07, - .01], *CSIE* = - .03, and general Threat from Outgroups, *b* = - .11, CI [- .19, - .06],

CSIE = - .11 on Negative Bias remained significant indirect effects when SDO was added to the

model for both Bias and Negative Bias respectively. We also observed that Uncertainty-

Avoidance, *b* = - .03, CI [- .05, - .01], *CSIE* = - .06, and general Threat, *b* = - .07, CI [- .11, - .05],

CSIE = - .16, were both significant indirect effects on the standardized Averaged Bias score.

Figure 21.

Figure 21: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Perceived
Threat from Outgroups and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias
corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

Figure 22.

Figure 22: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Negative Bias with Perceived Threat from Outgroups and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

Confirming the results of Study 4, both mediators were significant when entered into separate mediations for Bias (Uncertainty-Avoidance, $b = -.05$, CI [- .08 -.02], $R^2 = .08$, *CSIE* - .06, and Perceived Threat from Outgroups, $b = -.12$, CI [- .19, - .07], $R^2 = .17$, *CSIE* = - .15]). The separate mediations were also significant for Negative Bias with Uncertainty-Avoidance $b = -.05$, CI [- .10, - .02], $R^2 = .05$, *CSIE* = - .05, and Perceived Threat from Outgroups $b = -.15$, CI [- .24, - .10], $R^2 = .13$, *CSIE* = - .16.

The Left-Right measure of Political Orientation produced the same pattern of results and significances for all analyses with the exception that the quadratic effect on just the Bias measure was now significant; however, this effect was very, very small for the Bias measure, $R^2 = .01$, $\beta = -.21$, $t = -2.11$, $p = .036$. In addition, for both political variables, all patterns of results and significances remained the same for all analyses in a sample of 301 participants after removing participants who failed to indicate that they were born in the USA in the second set of demographic questions in Study 5. Even though all 308 participants indicated that they were born in the USA in the prolific.ac screening criteria, some had failed to verify this within the Study 5 demographic questions.

We once again tested the differences created by splitting the Uncertainty-Avoidance measure. We found a significant correlation between Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness ($r = .238$) and a high internal consistency for the combined measure of Uncertainty-Avoidance ($\alpha = .810$). Overall, the two-factor model with Uncertainty-Avoidance fit the data slightly better (RMSEA = .070, TLI = .831, CFI = .840) than the three-factor model with Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness separated (RMSEA = .072, TLI = .818, CFI = .827) for Explicit Bias. A similar pattern was observed for Negative Bias in which the two-factor model (RMSEA = .072, TLI = .827, CFI = .837) fit the data slightly better than the three-factor model with Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness separated (RMSEA = .075, TLI = .816, CFI = .825). Overall, the two-factor model with Uncertainty-Avoidance explained a good portion of the variance (i.e., 33.04% of the variance; $\chi^2 = 409.26$, $p < .001$). Once again, these results indicate that either model could be a good fit for the current data, but that the combined, Uncertainty-Avoidance model was slightly better.

3.12 Discussion.

In Study 5, we extended the measurement of bias to a negative bias measure and also extended the perceived threat measure to perceived threat from abstract outgroups, much like social dominance orientation is measured in relation to abstract groups. We replicated the political orientation to bias results and the multiple-mediation by uncertainty-avoidance and threat that had been observed in Study 4; in this case, threat was from abstract outgroups instead of threat from immigrants. We also demonstrated the same pattern of results for the Negative Bias measure and the Bias measure. In addition, both of these mediations were replicated with the Symbolic (meaning) Threat subscale. Overall, the observed results significantly extend the Uncertainty-Threat Model and its implications for examining intergroup relationships, especially for low status or disadvantaged groups such as immigrants, who have become a major focus of debates recently.

3.13 Study 6

3.14 Methodology

3.14.1 Hypotheses.

In Study 6, we replaced the behavioural dependent variable with a validated, implicit measure of attitudes, the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005); because of time constraints, we did not measure both variables. In addition, we returned to the use of the perceived threat from immigrants measure as a mediator in study 6 in order to test whether it would mediate the results to the negative bias measures used in the study 5 but not in study 4. We

also tested whether perceived threat would mediate the relationship to the validated, implicit measure.

3.14.2 Participants.

A sample of three hundred and thirty-one participants was recruited from the Prolific.ac participant pool to complete the online study with the anticipation that we would have to remove participants for non-completion and inattention. We followed the standard procedure for removing participants who failed to follow instructions and who responded on the implicit bias measure with one key response on ninety-eight percent or more of all test trials (Payne & Lundberg, 2014); we had a final sample of 312 participants. All participants indicated within the Prolific.ac platform that they were born in the US and currently resided in the US; thus, no participant was an immigrant. They were between 18 and 75 years old ($M = 31.71$, $SD = 12.39$) with 68.6 % White, 20.8 % Conservative, and 54.2 % male participants. We recruited roughly 300 participants in order to have .8 power for 2 predictors in the model with a small effect size

(d = .38) based upon previous online completion rates for our studies and based upon the results of Studies 4 and 5.

3.14.3 Design.

Study 6 used the same materials and procedures as Study 5 with the following changes: 1) In the current study, we returned to the use of the Perceived Threat from Immigrants scale (Stephan et al., 1999; see Appendix S) that we had used in Study 4; 2) In Study 6, we counterbalanced the order of Perceived Threat, Uncertainty-Avoidance, and Social Dominance Orientation. The bias-dependent variables were also counterbalanced so that explicit measures and implicit measures each occurred first for half of the participants in order to control for order

effects (see Appendix Y, Table 2 for the order of measures); 3) we dropped the measure of system threat and the behavioral helping measure and added the Affect Misattribution Procedure as the measure of Implicit Bias.

3.14.4 Materials.

Participants completed an online version of the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; see Appendix J) as an indirect measure of attitude bias toward immigrants (Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Payne et al., 2008; Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010; Payne & Lundberg, 2014). In the AMP instructions, participants were told that they would see Immigrant faces (shown Pakistani face as an example) and Non-Immigrant faces (shown a White face as an example) to complete the task. However, they were asked to judge the drawing as pleasant or unpleasant (see Appendix J). In the actual measure they saw a photograph of an Immigrant face (Pakistani/Indian face), a non-Immigrant face (White), or a grey square for an equal number of trials; the prime faces were matched for attractiveness. Each prime photo was replaced quickly with a Korean pictograph of a non-word, letter string (see Appendix J); we used non-words so that ability to read Korean did not affect the outcome of the task. We used the same timing as previous online AMP research (Payne et al., 2010) in which there were 72 trials where participants saw a Dot for 500ms (milliseconds) to identify the beginning of a trial and this Dot was followed by a prime (face or grey square) for 75ms, then followed by a pictograph for 225ms. A television-static pattern mask then appeared and remained on the screen until participants responded by pressing either the key labeled Pleasant or the key labeled Unpleasant. Participants were instructed to ignore the faces of immigrants and non-immigrants and to judge only whether the pictograph drawing appeared to be more or less pleasant than average; they did this by pressing the Pleasant or Unpleasant key; they

had four practice trials to familiarize themselves with the task prior to completing the 72 critical

trials. Thirty-six pictograph, non-words were presented twice within 2 blocks of 36 trials, and the

12 immigrant faces, 12 white faces, and 12 grey squares were presented twice each (i.e., once in

each block of 36 trials for a total of 72 trials). Each prime was randomly paired with pictographs

within each block of 36 trials. We used the standard scoring procedure from past research by

taking the percentage of pleasant responses after White faces and subtracting the percentage of

pleasant responses after Immigrant faces; thus, scores can range from 1 to -1 and higher scores

indicated more positive bias toward White faces in comparison to Immigrant faces (AMP; Payne

et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010).

3.15 Procedure.

After completing the demographic questions and the rating of political ideology within

the demographic section, participants completed the same Filler Task 1 (four items from the Need

for Cognition scale, $\alpha = .61$) from Studies 4 and 5. Next, participants were randomly assigned to

order by being asked to choose the letter that appeared at the top of a list of letters (each

randomly ordered for each participant and participants were unaware of the meaning of the

letters; see Appendix Y, Table 2 for orders). For Study 6, Perceived Threat, Uncertainty-

Avoidance, and SDO were counterbalanced to control for order effects. After these mediators,

participants completed the same Filler Task 2 ($\alpha = .74$) from Studies 4 and 5, and then completed

the dependent variables; the bias dependent variables (Bias, Negative Bias, and Implicit Bias)

were counterbalanced so that explicit measures and implicit measures each occurred first for half

of the participants in order to control for order effects. Bias toward immigrants, Perceived Threat

from Immigrants, and Uncertainty-Avoidance were measured with the same scales used in Study

4 and all three showed good reliability (Bias, $M = 3.60$, $SD = 1.40$, $\alpha = .91$; Threat, $M = 3.00$, $SD = 1.16$, $\alpha = .92$; Uncertainty-Avoidance, $M = 2.93$, $SD = 0.74$, $\alpha = .77$) with higher average scores equaling more bias or more perceived threat. Implicit Bias ($M = .00$, $SD = .25$) was measured with the standard AMP, and Negative Bias ($M = 2.34$, $SD = 1.68$, $\alpha = .95$) was again measured with the same scale used in Study 5 (see Appendix X). After completing Filler Task 3 ($\alpha = .64$) and two mathematics items, participants were thanked and debriefed.

3.16 Results.

We conducted three linear regressions to test the expected negative association between Political Orientation and Bias, Negative Bias, and Implicit Bias. Higher scores on Political Orientation were related to a more liberal ideology. As hypothesized, Political Orientation was significantly and negatively related to Bias (Hypothesis 1a), $R^2 = .23$, $\beta = -.48$, $t = -9.58$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = -.33$, 95% BCa CI [- .41, - .25], $p < .001$, significantly and negatively related to Negative Bias (Hypothesis 1b), $R^2 = .24$, $\beta = -.49$, $t = -9.99$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = -.40$, 95% BCa CI [- .50, - .30], $p < .001$, and it also was a significant, negative predictor of Implicit Bias (Hypothesis 1c), $R^2 = .12$, $\beta = -.35$, $t = -6.48$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = -.04$, 95% BCa CI [- .06, - .03], $p < .001$. We also standardized the three dependent variables and averaged them to create a standardized-Averaged Bias Score. Political Orientation was a significant, negative predictor of z-Averaged Bias, $R^2 = .32$, $\beta = -.57$, $t = -12.12$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = -.21$, 95% BCa CI [-.26, -.17], $p < .001$, and it was a larger effect (*Cohen's d* = 1.37) than each of the other three measures of bias. The effect size on the explicit measures was also larger than on the implicit measure, though both were substantial ($R^2 > .12$). This indicates that participants may be increasing their bias when they are asked to

evaluate it and consciously report it. It is also of note that the standardized-Averaged Bias measure that incorporated all three measures had a larger effect size ($R^2 = .32$) than the individual implicit and explicit measures; future research will need to confirm whether such a combined measure may produce better predictive ability.

For the extremity analysis, the Quadratic term that was entered in Step 2 of the regression was non-significant for Political Orientation to Uncertainty-Avoidance, $\beta = .04$, $t = .70$, $p = .485$, bootstrapped $b = .01$, 95% BCa CI [- .01, .03], and for Political to Threat (Hypothesis 2a),

$\beta = - .01$, $t = - .26$, $p = .794$, bootstrapped $b < .01$, 95% BCa CI [- .03, .03], which again replicated Jost and colleagues (2003; 2007). In addition, in separate regressions, the Quadratic term was non-significant for Bias (Hypothesis 2b), $R^2 = .002$, $\beta = - .04$, $t = - .78$, $p = .434$, bootstrapped $b = - .01$, 95% BCa CI [- .05, .03], for Implicit Bias (Hypothesis 2b), $R^2 < .001$,

$\beta < .001$, $t = .21$, $p = .834$, bootstrapped $b < .01$, 95% BCa CI [- .01, .01], and for z-Averaged Bias, $R^2 < .001$, $\beta < .001$, $t = .66$, $p = .509$, bootstrapped $b = .01$, 95% BCa CI [- .01, .03]. It was, however, significant for the Negative Bias variable (Hypothesis 2b), $R^2 = .01$, $\beta = .10$, $t = 2.03$,

$p = .043$, bootstrapped $b = .04$, 95% BCa CI [- .01, .08], but with a very small effect size

($R^2 = .01$). The SDO findings from Studies 4 and 5 were also replicated with similar results showing that higher liberalism was significantly related to less SDO, $R^2 = .31$, $\beta = - .56$,

$t = -11.74$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = - .29$, 95% BCa CI [- .35, - .23], $p < .001$. Once again, we tested these two mediations with the Symbolic Threat sub-scale and again found the same pattern of results as with the full Perceived Threat scale (see Appendix Z Figures S6 a, b & c).

Mediations.

To examine the multiple-mediation hypothesis for Perceived Threat from Immigrants and Uncertainty-Avoidance, we conducted separate, multiple-mediation analyses for the Political Orientation to Bias, to Negative Bias, to Implicit Bias, and to z-Averaged Bias. As hypothesized, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat had significant indirect effects on Bias (see Figure 23; Hypothesis 4a), and Threat was a larger mediator, comparison $b = -.30$, CI [- .38, - .23]. In a separate mediation, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat had significant indirect effects on Negative Bias (see Figure 24; Hypothesis 4a), and again Threat was a larger mediator, comparison $b = -.31$, CI [- .41, - .22]. For z-Averaged Bias, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat had significant indirect effects on z-Averaged Bias (see Figure 25). In contrast to expectations, Uncertainty-Avoidance was not a significant mediator when Threat was within the multiple-mediation model for Implicit Bias (see Figure 26), though Uncertainty-Avoidance was significant for standardized Averaged Bias.

Uncertainty-Avoidance, $b = -.02$, CI [- .04, - .01], $CSIE = -.03$, $b = -.02$, CI [- .039, - .003], $CSIE = -.02$, and $b = -.01$, CI [- .0153, - .0003], $CSIE = -.02$, and Threat, $b = -.28$, CI [- .36, - .21], $CSIE = -.41$, $b = -.26$, CI [- .36, - .18], $CSIE = -.32$, and $b = -.14$, CI [- .19, - .11], $CSIE = -.38$, remained significant indirect effects when SDO was added to the model for both Bias, Negative Bias, and z-Averaged Bias respectively (Hypothesis 4b). Neither Uncertainty-Avoidance $b = .001$, CI [- .002, .005], nor SDO $b = .004$, CI [- .006, .014] were significant indirect effects with Threat included within the multiple-mediation for Implicit Bias (Hypothesis 4b).

Figure 23.

Figure 23: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Perceived Threat from Immigrants and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

Figure 24.

Figure boxes and path labels:

Political orientation → Threat from Immigrants: *b* = -.36, *p* < .001

Threat from Immigrants → Negative Bias: *b* = .91, *p* < .001

Political orientation → Uncertainty-Avoidance: *b* = -.09, *p* < .001

Uncertainty-Avoidance → Negative Bias: *b* = .23, *p* < .001

Indirect, *b* = -.33, CI [-.43, -.24], *CSIE* = -.40

Direct, *b* = -.05, CI [-.14, -.03]

Indirect, *b* = -.02, CI [-.04, -.01], *CSIE* = -.03

Total, *b* = -.40, CI [-.48, -.32]

Figure 24: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Negative Bias with Perceived Threat from Immigrants and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

Figure 25.

Figure 25: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Implicit Bias with Perceived Threat from Immigrants and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

Figure 26.

Figure 26: Simultaneous, multiple mediation of Political Orientation to standardized Averaged Bias with Perceived Threat from Immigrants and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

Both mediators were significant when entered into separate mediations for Bias (Uncertainty-Avoidance, $b = -.03$, CI [- .06, - .02], $R^2 = .06$, *CSIE* = - .05, and Perceived Threat, $b = - .33$, CI [- .41, - .26], $R^2 = .23$, *CSIE* = - .48]), and separate mediations for Negative Bias (Uncertainty-Avoidance $b = - .03$, CI [- .07, - .01], $R^2 = .05$, *CSIE* = - .04, and Perceived Threat $b = - .33$, CI [- .44, - .25], $R^2 = .24$, *CSIE* = - .41). However, for Implicit Bias, Uncertainty-Avoidance was not significant, $b = .0008$, CI [- .0024, .0048], $R^2 = .003$, *CSIE* = .006, while

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Perceived Threat was significant $b = -.02$, CI [- .03, - .01], $R^2 = .09$, *CSIE* = - .13, when entered alone.

The Left-Right measure of Political Orientation produced the same pattern of results and significances for all analyses, except that the Uncertainty-Avoidance indirect effect was not significant within the multiple-mediation with threat on the standardized-Averaged Bias measure, and Uncertainty-Avoidance was also not significant in the multiple-mediation model with SDO and Threat on the standardized-Averaged Bias measure. After removing an additional four participants who failed to verify that they were born in the US within the Study 6 demographic questions (308 participants), all patterns and significances were the same for the Left-Right measure with the exception that Uncertainty-Avoidance was not significant in the multiple mediations with Threat and SDO on the standardized-Averaged Bias measure. Again, for the main political variable, all patterns of results and significances remained the same for all analyses in a sample of 308 participants.

Finally, as in Studies 4 and 5, we once again tested whether splitting the Uncertainty-Avoidance measure into Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness would change the results. We did not find support for this conclusion. As in Studies 4 and 5, a similar pattern was observed for Explicit Bias in which the two-factor model (RMSEA = .083, TLI = .778, CFI = .837) fit the data slightly better than the three-factor model with Ambiguity-Avoidance and Closedness separated (RMSEA = .075, TLI = .816, CFI = .825). Overall, the two-factor model with Uncertainty-Avoidance explained a good portion of the variance (i.e., 33.04% of the variance; $\chi^2 = 409.26$, *p* < .001).

3.17 Discussion.

This research supports the idea that the divide between liberals and conservatives by highlighting the importance that differences in threat management or risk avoidance play in explaining political differences. In three studies, we provided good evidence that the Uncertainty-Threat Model predicts relationships to political orientation, that it can be extended to an intergroup context, and that it predicts bias differences for liberals and conservatives within an immigration intergroup context. Moreover, both measured *personality* variables of uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat concerns mediated the relationship between liberalism (conservatism) and less (more) bias within an intergroup context related to immigrants; again, we use the term, bias, here to mean a response tendency instead of an error. In Study 4, measured uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threats from immigrants mediated the political orientation to bias relationship; they did so within both a multiple-mediation model and as separate mediators; within the multiple-mediation model that included uncertainty-avoidance, perceived threat was also demonstrated to be the most influential factor and that it was a very large effect on the relationship. Our research was the first to demonstrate such a mediation, and it also extended the mediation of threat management beyond the concepts of systemic threat from terrorism, belief in a dangerous world, and death anxiety (Jost et al., 2007). In Study 5, perceived threat was again extended from perceived threat from immigrants to perceived threat from abstract outgroups, and bias was extended to include a measure focusing on only negativity. Again, both uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat from abstract outgroups mediated the relationship between liberalism (conservatism) and less (more) bias, on both bias measures, and it was a moderately large effect. In Study 6, we replicated all findings with the exception of the mediational analysis

for the Implicit Bias measure. Interestingly, this indirect bias measure appears to be more tied to threat than we had previously believed because the threat was the only significant mediator of the relationship within either multiple-mediation model. However, an additional analysis on the averaged bias measure (of Bias, Negative Bias, and Implicit Bias) revealed that both uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat from immigrants significantly mediated the political orientation to averaged bias relationship; a combined analysis of Bias and Negative Bias from Study 5 also revealed the same significant mediation for uncertainty-avoidance and general threat.

We also analyzed the type of threat we used and examined some of the effects related to uncertainty-avoidance. A recent review has indicated that threat has been defined within the motivated social cognition perspective (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017) in a way that may miss differences (Crawford, 2017). This review suggests that *physical threat* (i.e., threats to existential reality such as mortality salience) and *meaning threats* (i.e., systems of meaning and values) have often been conflated. They argue that liberals and conservatives respond differently to physical threats, but that they usually respond in a similar manner to meaning threats. Within our current research, we did not use *physical threats*. Instead, we used *perceived threats to one's group*, which is similar to *meaning threats*. However, contrary to the review of *meaning threats*, we observed that liberals and conservatives responded differently to perceived threats to one's ingroup (i.e., combined *perceived realistic and symbolic threat*), and that *symbolic threat* (i.e. a meaning threat) entirely replicated the differential relationship to political ideology and the mediations to bias toward immigrants (both implicit and explicit bias). In addition, we used personality measures of uncertainty-avoidance that had been used previously (Jost et al., 2007; 2011). Over our three studies, we observed a weighted-average beta between Political Ideology

and Uncertainty-Avoidance of .25 (R^2 = .06); while this was a reasonably good effect size and was the reason we kept it throughout our three studies, the weighted-average beta observed by Jost and colleagues (2007) was better (.41). We have reviewed the recent research by Jost (2017; Jost, Sterling, et al., 2017) and have noted that Uncertainty-Avoidance may have a larger correlation with Political Ideology when more of the items of Need for Closure or Need for Structure are included within the measures of uncertainty-avoidance. Thus, future research may improve the measurement of Uncertainty-Avoidance by including Need for Cognitive Closure within this measure.

In our research, we mainly observed evidence supporting only the uncertainty-threat model (i.e., linear relationship between political ideology and threat and uncertainty-avoidance and between political ideology and bias), and we did not observe much support for the extremity hypothesis (i.e., a quadratic relationship; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; van Prooijen et al., 2015). The extremity hypothesis proposes that people at either the left or right extreme on the political spectrum should show more extreme reactions or biases than people at the middle of the distribution. Van Prooijen et al. (2015) showed that people on the extreme left and right showed more derogation of immigrants and more derogation of societal groups in general. They and Jost et al., (2007) used a quadratic regression to test this hypothesis. We did not replicate van Prooijen's effect in three studies with good sample sizes (206, 308, and 312 participants, .8 power to observe an R^2 of .025 to.04) and using a general population (i.e., not samples using undergraduate students); In Study 6, we also did not support the extremity hypothesis from the worldview perspective for the Bias measure, the standardized-Average Bias measure, and the Implicit measure. We, instead, observed a significant linear effect in which liberals showed less

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bias as hypothesized by the Uncertainty-Threat Model, but we did not observe the significant quadratic effect; participants at the extreme ends did not show more bias than moderates; however, we did observe a very slight extremity effect on the Negative Bias measure, but only in Study 6, and with only a very small effect size (R^2 of .01), which matches previous research (van Prooijen et al., 2015). In addition, van Prooijen et al. used an extremely large sample of 7,553 participants and observed very small changes in R^2 of .01 (derogation of immigrants) and .03 (derogation of societal groups); these small changes would require very large sample sizes to be observed reliably (779 participants for the .01 effect size with one predictor, or 957 with two); in addition, there is a question of the practical significance of the very smallest 1% effect observed in only one of our three dependent variables and only in our Study 6 in relation to the immigrants measure; would such a small effect be practically significant in applied settings? This is an empirical question for future studies to tackle.

The current research provides a good first test of the chronic personality hypotheses that can be derived from the Uncertainty-Threat Model. However, given that this research was an initial first test, it was correlational and limited to only demonstrating associations, though we did use methods to improve the correlational studies. For the mediational analysis, by measuring the mediators after political ideology, and bias after the mediators, it is known that the mediators did not influence participants' ratings of political ideology within the study (because the political ratings occurred first) and that bias did not influence participants' ratings of political ideology or the mediators within the study (Cohen et al., 2003; Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). However, rating political ideology could have had an influence of the later measures, though this a common

issue with political studies. Thus, future research could alter the order of these variables, or consider other ways to test the hypotheses generated by this model.

In addition to showing support for the Uncertainty-Threat Model, this research was the first to extend the model to perceived threat from outgroups, both to specific outgroups (i.e., immigrants) and to abstract outgroups much like social dominance orientation does with abstract groups, and to extend the multiple-mediation beyond systemic threat from terrorism, belief in a dangerous world, or death anxiety (Jost et al., 2007). In Study 4, we used a validated measure of the perceived threat from immigrants and found a significant mediation of the relationship between more liberalism and less bias toward immigrants (Stephan et al., 1999). In Study 5, we extended this research by testing the model with a measure of the perceived threat from abstract outgroups and observed a similar significant mediation. In Study 6, we returned to the perceived threat from immigrants measure and demonstrated its mediation of the political orientation to bias effect for an objective, indirect measure of bias. Moreover, in all three studies, perceived threat was a significantly more influential mediator than uncertainty-avoidance within the multiple-mediation model. This effect highlights the importance that perceived threat may play in differentiating liberals and conservatives and may provide a topic to bridge the divide on the immigration debates currently occurring worldwide.

3.18 General Discussion

Thus, a key difference between liberals and conservatives may be their responsiveness to perceived threats or risks (Jost et al., 2017) instead of differences in negativity bias as proposed by some theorists (Hibbing et al., 2014). Other researchers have begun to show that liberals and conservatives may differ in relation to threats (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Oxley, Smith,

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Alford, Hibbing, Miller, Scalora, & Hibbing, 2008; Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011). In other recent research, conservatism was positively related to self-restraint and social-order dimensions of the Moral Motives Model (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2007), both of which could be said to be related to differences in responsiveness to social threats. Discussing these differences in terms of people having different responsiveness to the threat, as opposed to wanting to be socially dominant or having a general negativity bias, allows for a constructive debate that may reduce the focus of casting either group in a negative light. Differences in responsiveness to threat can be adaptive in different circumstances and having a balance of both may be beneficial to society (Janoff-bulman & Carnes, 2016). If we are able to acknowledge the perceived threats, it allows for the discussion of the benefits of immigration to the overall economy, while also discussing the problems with immigration hurting the poor with whom immigrants occasionally compete for jobs. It allows us to focus on helping immigrants learn English to improve the shared focus on the ideals of the principles of democracy rather than on dividing us on cultural differences defined by blood ties and heritage. It allows for these groups to discuss issues related to threat in ways that may acknowledge and offer solutions to differences in threat and perhaps move the debate forward towards the promise of democracy instead of further dividing us.

4   CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION

The aim of our research was two-fold. First, we tested the role of intergroup ideologies in reducing outgroup bias and enhancing support for collective action at the same time along with political ideology as a predicting factor of bias. To achieve this aim Chapter 2 tested if Multiculturalism approach (MC), a Common Ingroup Identity approach (CIIM), and Commonality Without Highlighting subgroup identities approach (CWO) would be effective in improving the intergroup relations through bias reduction and generating support for collective action concurrently towards the British-Pakistani group; political ideology was also included as a factor. In Chapter 3, we pursued the consistent results of political ideology that we observed in Chapter 2 and examined the role of uncertainty avoidance and threat management as potential mediators of the signifiant political ideology and bias relationship. Our findings have contributed to the existing literature by closing the gaps in research on intergroup ideologies along with increasing our understanding of the influence of political ideology within the British context, yet it also has various socio-cognitive implications for the development of positive intergroup contact among ethnically diverse communities.

In the first part of our research, we have tested the role of MC, CIIM, and CWO in bias reduction and support for collective action towards the Pakistani-British outgroup with political ideology. Across three experiments, the Multicultural prompt demonstrated an inconsistent pattern. Multiculturalism (MC) produced significantly more (not less) outgroup attitude bias than did a commonality approach (CIIM) within Experiment 1, and while MC produced more bias than CIIM in Experiment 2, it was not significant within the full model or on its own In addition,

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within Experiment 2, MC did not produce significantly more bias than the neutral Control condition . While the Commonality (CIIM) condition did produce less bias than the Control condition, this effect was small and non-significant. Moreover, the results of Experiment 3 were contrary to Experiments 1 and 2. In this case, MC produced significantly less (not more) bias than the CIIM and the CWO (Commonality without highlighting) conditions. So, Experiment 2 did not support increased bias by MC that had been observed in Experiment 1 while Experiment 3 supported the opposite finding in which MC produced less bias in comparison to the CIIM condition. Thus, the overall pattern of results in relation to bias were inconsistent and mostly inconclusive.

The pattern for support for collective action was more consistent. Multiculturalism (MC) produced significantly less support and not more support for collective action than CIIM within Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and Experiment 3 though the effects were small to medium in all three experiments. However, MC was not significantly different from the Control condition in Experiment 2 or the Commonality without highlighting condition in Experiment 3; thus, the main finding is that multiculturalism produced significantly less support for collective action than did the commonality condition, but MC did not significantly decrease support in comparison to either the control in Experiment 2 or the Commonality without subgroup highlighting in Experiment 3.

In contrast, political ideology remained consistent in predicting willingness to support for collective action in all three experiments and significantly predicting bias in Experiments 1 and 2, though Experiment 3 was not significant with the non-significant interactions in the model but it was when just the simple effects were included. The consistency of the Political Ideology findings led to the second part of our research wherein we tested the mediating role of Threat-Management and Uncertainty-Avoidance based upon the Uncertainty-Threat Model (Jost et al.,

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2003, 2007 2017) to explain the relationship between political ideology and negative attitude bias against immigrants in Chapter 3. The model significantly explained the ideological differences observed in relation to attitudes towards immigrants and the mediation by uncertainty avoidance and threat management.

In the first section of our research, while considering the earlier empirical literature on the effectiveness of MC (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004) and CIIM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to overcome the outgroup bias, we tested these ideologies within the context of British White majority group to examine if these could reduce bias towards a non-normative ethnic minority group outside the US (for example Plaut et al., 2009; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2009; Wolsko et al., 2000; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014, worked with US samples). The Pakistani-British subgroup is one of the largest and fastest growing ethnic group of the UK, so we selected this minority group in this particular research context as a target group (ONS Census, 2012). We assumed that the majority population may experience exacerbated threat if people believe that minority groups want to maintain their culture (e.g., as implied within a multiculturalism approach). Recent research showed that respondents experienced more threat and supported multiculturalism less when they believed minority group members wanted to maintain their culture as opposed to wanting to adopt British culture (Tip et al., 2012; Tip et al., 2015).

This threat from diversity may be partially explained by intergroup threat theory (Stephan et al., 2009) and research on the ingroup projection model that has found that people may often perceive their ingroup (e.g., White majority) as prototypical of a larger superordinate group (e.g., British or United Kingdom; Waldzus et al., 2003; Wenzel et al., 2007). An outgroup such as a

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British minority group can be viewed negatively if it is included in the superordinate group (British), but is seen as having differences (cultural, religious, linguistic, etc) that may be viewed as violating the norms of the superordinate group (i.e., the norms of majority ingroup). Research on national identity within North America, and particularly in the USA, has shown that White Americans tend to see minority groups as extraneous to what it means to be an American and they see the American nationality as being comprised of attributes prototypical of their own racial group (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010; Yogeeswaran et al., 2012). There is little research on this topic within the UK (Tip et al., 2012; Tip et al., 2015); thus, we designed this research to fulfill the need to investigate the influence of diversity, multiculturalism, and these processes on intergroup relations and civic engagement within the UK.

We have examined these intergroup approaches across three experiments with White-British samples to evaluate whether a particular ideology reduces implicit bias and increases willingness to engage in support for collective action simultaneously, which has not been demonstrated within the literature. In Experiment 1, we observed that MC induced significantly more implicit bias in comparison to the CIIM condition. These results are contrary to much of the research that shows MC reduces bias (Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Hachfeld et al., 2015; Plaut et al., 2018; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Tadmor et al., 2012; Wolsko et al., 2000). However, this finding is in line with research showing that the UK views multiculturalism less positively than North America, where much of the MC research has taken place (Apfelbaum, Grunberg, Halevy & Kang, 2017; Apfelbaum, Stephan & Reagans, 2016; Apfelbaum, Sommers & Norton, 2008; Guimond et al., 2013; Morrison et al., 2010; Ryan et al., 2007; Wolsko et al., 2000), and with research showing that a commonality (CIIM) approach reduces prejudice, though may not improve support for collecitve action (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Houlette,

Gaertner, Johnson, Banker, Riek, & Dovidio, 2004; Klandermans, Sabucedo, & Rodriguez, 2004; Monteiro, Guerra, & Rebelo, 2009; Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, & Ward, 2001). The lower positivity to multiculturalism within the UK and Europe (Guimond et al., 2013) in conjunction with more perceived threat from those minority members viewed as wanted to keep their culture (Tip et al., 2015) or those being seen as more non-normative (Wenzel et al., 2007) may explain the increased bias. However, it does not explain the decreased support for collective action when compare to the commonality condition; we investigated this more thoroughly in Experiment 2. Further, we observed that conservatives showed more implicit bias than the liberals and also less support for CA. Inconsistent with our predictions, however, the political ideology did not show the significant effect on explicit bias. While this result was difficult to explain, we might assume the social desirability bias may have led to a reduced expression of any kind of biases because it was measured after the implicit measure and Race Relations Amendment Acts (UK) makes it illegal to discriminate (2000 & 2010). To further validate these findings and to test whether MC increased bias or CIIM decreased bias we conducted Experiment 2 with a neutral control condition.

In the second experiment, we hypothesized that the MC and CIIM conditions would replicate the findings from Experiment 1. In order to test the direction of the effect (i.e., MC decreasing or CIIM increasing bias) we included a neutral control condition that simply asked participants to think about the two groups (i.e., White-British and Pakistani-British). However, neither MC to Control nor the CIIM to Control comparisons significantly predicted the implicit bias, though MC showed more bias than the CIIM condition, it was not significantly higher. Such non-replication of the results with similar measures and samples are difficult to explain despite

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the established authenticity of the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) used to assess the indirect bias, and the previous research validation of the intergroup strategies and their effect on implicit bias. A potential explanation for this effect in the correct direction, but not being significant may be related to sample size. Within Experiment 1, we used a small sample (e.g., 54 participants or 27 per condition) based upon past research showing medium to large effect sizes. If the effect of MC or CIIM were, in fact, small to medium, then we may have had an anomalous result in Experiment 1 due to idiosyncracies of a small sample. Within Experiment 2, we used a much larger sample (e.g., roughly 50 per condition), which is in line with recent calls for improving the replicability of research findings within psychology. A potential second explanation could be that MC may produce the expectation that minorities will fit their group's stereotypes (Gutierrez & Unzueta, 2010) and white participants often oppose this approach in educational and organisational contexts (Thomas & Plaut, 2008; Verkuyten, 2009). Such resistance may be due to threat to one's identity (Yogeeswaran, Dasgupta, Adelman, Eccleston, & Parker, 2011; Yogeeswaran et al., 2012) because people often dislike minorities who want to continue to embrace their culture (Tip, et al., 2012) or because they believe that this approach excludes their own ethnic group (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011; Unzueta & Binning, 2010). A third experiment was thus warranted to determine whether the increased bias observed in the MC to CIIM comparison was a reliable effect.

In relation to the increased support for collective action findings in the CIIM condition, other research is also in conflict with our findings. In that research, investigators have found that elementary school students were less likely to notice and report instances of racial discrimination and prejudice after having been primed with a commonality-focused message compared to a

valuing-diversity message similar to the multicultural approach (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Sommers, & Ambady, 2010). In contrast and in order to make the MC and CIIM manipulations more comparable and controlled within our studies, we highlighted the White-British and Pakistani-British subgroups within both manipulations, which diverged from previous research that highlighted the identities only in the MC condition. This highlighting with the CIIM condition could have reduced participants missing the disadvantages of the minority subgroup and could have led to participants showing more and not less support for collective action for this group. So, we designed Experiment 3 to assess the commonality effect on the bias and support for collective action by dividing our intergroup prompt (CIIM) into a Commonality without highlighting the group identities prompt (see methods study 3, CWO).

As predicted, we observed in Experiment 3 that the Commonality focus, but with salient subgroups (CIIM) and novel approach of CWO both showed significantly more implicit bias with reference to the MC prompt, which was contrary to Experiments 1 and 2, but in line with research on multiculturalism from North America. While this Experiment was run several years after the first two experiments, the perception of a multicultural approach, however, had not improved between 2013 and 2016 (Mattei, & Broeks, 2018). In addition, anti-immigrant sentiment within the UK remains consistent. In contrast, CIIM produced more support for collective action in comparison to the MC condition, but the CWO (i.e., without highlighting) did not. This result lends support to the notion that our CIIM condition that included highlighting of subgroups may have been closer to a Dual-Identity approach and this may have been the reason for improved support for collective action. In a dual-identity approach, both the superordinate group (i.e., British) and the subgroup (Pakistani-British) identities are made salient simultaneously (in a

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manner similar to our Commonality condition in which we discuss commonalities first and then in a second stage highlight the two subgroups).

In this context, we can observe the role of our two-stage commonality model being similar to dual-identity model research; we, however, began our two-stage commonality research (Experiments 1 and 2) prior to the publication of Dovidio's dual-identity research related to collective action; thus, it was not integrated into the research for this Chapter. In their research, Dovidio, Saguy, Ufkes, Scheepers, Gaertner, Forgas, and Fiedler (2015) tested the dual-identity model to identify whether activating both identities increased support for collective action. In one study, they showed that a dual identity increased willingness to support collective action, but they did not measure the effect that it had on outgroup attitude bias. Overall, it might be safe to say that the dual-identity manipulation appears to be effective in generating support for CA among the majority groups, but the research has not shown that the dual-identity perspective increases support for collective action and also reduces bias at the same time. Our future research may need to explore the dual identity perspective more thoroughly, even though it had not initially done this because much of our research was conducted prior to the research showing that the dual-identity perspective improved support.

Once again, the Political Ideology results were much more consistent for both the collective action and implicit bias variables. Overall, conservatives showed higher and liberals showed lower levels of implicit attitude bias (signficant in Experiments 1 and 2, but not 3) and and conservatives showed decreased support for CA in comparison to liberals (significant in all three experiments). Thus, political ideology was a significant predictor of bias consistently. In addition, observing that Political Ideology was significantly correlated with Perceived Threat in

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Experiments 2 and 3 can be used to further explore the relationships to outgroup bias. We may wish to investigate whether minority groups or immigrants are being perceived as more of a threat as the demographics change from Britain being predominately white to being more diverse (i.e., ONS Census, 2012; 91.3% white in 2000 to 86% white in 2010). This effect may be exacerbated in times of economic turmoil such as those that Europe and Britain have faced recently (Park, Bryson, & Curtis, 2014; Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 1999).

4.1.1 Uncertainty-Threat Model, Political Ideology and Bias.

In the second line of our research in Chapter 3, we tried to explain the widening gap between liberals and conservatives in relation to their attitudes about the intergroup context of immigrants, so we tested a the Uncertainty-Threat Model (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017; Jost & Napier, 2012). We used three studies with outgroup attitudes toward immigrants as the outcome variables, and political ideology as the predictor to examine the influence of uncertainty avoidance and threat management as the mediators of the political ideology to bias relationship. We tested an American sample (i.e., recruited general public in an online sample to see the difference from student sample of White-British sample) and examined their attitudes towards immigrants (i.e., unspecified immigrants) and towards abstract outgroups (unspecified outgroups) in Chapter 3. In these studies, we used perceived threat (Symbolic and Realistic Threat; Stephan et al., 1999; 2009), which is similar to the "meaning" threat described by Crawfard, (2017). Further, the lack of research on threat and uncertainty together with their relationship to the political ideology and immigrants led us to explore these variables together.

4.1.2 Political ideology and Bias relation.

Initially, we tested the relationship of political ideology to attitude bias towards immigrants. Overall in three studies, we observed that less conservatism and more liberalism was related to less Bias, less Negative Bias, and less Implicit Bias. Our results of higher scores on liberalism related to less bias towards immigrants supported the previous research, (Graham et al., 2012; Hass, 2016; Hass & Cunningham, 2014; Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2017; Van Pooijen et al., 2015). Including our results of chapter 2 studies, more liberalism has consistently shown decreased outgroup bias (e.g., towards Pakistan-British & immigrants), which corresponds with research showing less support for group inequality (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost 2009; Jost et al., 2003) and more positive feelings towards non-normative groups (Luguri et al., 2012).

We next compared the Uncertainty-Threat hypothesis to the competitor Extremity hypothesis in relation to uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat. The Extremity Hypothesis predicted that there would be a quadratic relationship in which needs to reduce uncertainty and threat were related to endorsement of *any extreme ideology* (i.e., extremity hypothesis) regardless of one's beliefs and political ideology (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 2012; McGregor et al., 2001). Thus, high liberalism and high conservativism would be related to more Uncertainty-Avoidance and more Threat. A linear relationship, however, between Political Ideology and Uncertainty-Avoidance or Threat would support the Uncertainty-Threat Model and not the extremity hypothesis. Across all three studies, we found that the quadratic relationship was non-significant between Political Ideology and Uncertainty-Avoidance (Studies 4, 5, & 6) and Perceived Threat (Studies 4, 5, & 6) and only the linear effects were significant. In addition, if the extremity hypothesis from the worldview validation perspective was supported, then a chronic

tendency toward threat and uncertainty-avoidance should also be related to participants being more polarized in their view of immigrants as their chronic tendency to avoid threat/uncertainty was greater (i.e., very liberal participants would be more positive and very conservative participants would be more negative). Thus, the quadratic test was also applied to the Political to Bias relationships. Across the three studies, we observed that the quadratic effect was non-significant for Attitude Bias (Studies 4, 5, & 6), Negative Bias (Study 5), and for Implicit Bias (Study 6), but all the linear effects were significant. The main exception was a very small quadratic effect on explicit negative bias ($R^2 = .01$, $p = .043$) in Study 6. Thus, overall, there was much greater support for the Uncertainty-Threat Model.

4.1.3 Uncertainty-Avoidance and Threat-Management.

One of our main goals of Chapter 3 was to explain the large cultural divide between liberals and conservatives that has been identified in the literature and that was supported in Chapter 2 in relation to negative attitudes toward Pakistani-British people. Within Chapter 3, we were the first to test the ability of measured/dispositional uncertainty-avoidance and threat management to mediate the relationship to political ideology within an immigration context that is highly relevant to the current political debates within a diversifying world. With the need for immigration to supplement population growth, and some economic growth as a result, these immigration debates are likely to continue for decades to come. We used a multiple-mediation analysis to examine the Political Ideology to immigrant Bias relationship, and we found a consistent mediation of this relationship by Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat across all three studies (Studies 4, 5, & 6). Moreover, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat mediated the Political Ideology to Bias relationship (Studies 4, 5, & 6) and to Negative Bias

(Studies 5 & 6). The one exception was in Study 6 in which only Threat mediated the relationship to Implicit Bias, whereas Uncertainty-Avoidance was non-significant. In further examining this effect, we found that an analysis with the averaged bias measure (average of Bias, Negative Bias, and Implicit Bias) showed that both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Threat mediated the effect. So, it appears that Perceived Threat may be a more reliable effect in relationship to both explicit and implicit bias, which is an interesting future direction for the research. Within Study 5, we had also extended perceived threat to be about <u>abstract outgroups</u> (i.e., unspecified outgroups) as opposed to perceived threat form immigrants. We observed that both uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat from <u>abstract outgroups</u> mediated the relationship between liberalism (conservatism) and less (more) bias, on both bias measures, and it was a moderately large effect.

In view of the replicated effects of political orientation and threat, we have observed a clear distinction in the attitudes of liberals and conservatives in relation to the attitude bias and support for collective action toward the Pakistani-British minority group and in relation to attitude bias (Chapter 2) and perceived threat as a mediator regarding immigrants in general (Chapter 3). Alternatively, the expression of more bias by conservatives and perception of more threat from the outgroup is in line with the previous research (Graham et al., 2009; Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2008; Jost, et al., 2017). Jost and colleagues (2003) conducted a meta-analysis and found several psychological variables that predicted political conservatism were driven by the perceived threat such as death anxiety, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity, openness to experience, uncertainty tolerance, and fear of threat and loss. There are other dividing factors such as differences in endorsement of moral foundations and social dominance orientation (SDO) (Graham et al., 2011; Ho et al., 2011). However, we believed that an essential difference on these divides, especially in the intergroup context of immigrants, revolves around uncertainty-

avoidance and threat avoidance. To examine this idea, we initiated the second line of our research

on the foundations of the Uncertainty-Threat model (Jost & Napier, 2012; Jost et al., 2017; Jost et

al., 2007). In this model, the scholars provided some evidence that liberals and conservatives

differ in their attention to and management of threats and in the avoidance of uncertainty. They

further show that more uncertainty avoidance and more attention to threats was associated with

less liberalism and more conservatism (Jost et al., 2007). In our research, we extended the

measurement of threat management to include perceived symbolic and realistic threat (Stephan et

al., 2009) because it has been a fundamental motive of intergroup relations, and also being

unexplored in connection with the intergroup context within Uncertatinty-Threat Model. Overall,

the hypotheses derived from the Uncertainty-Threat Model have yet to be tested in an intergroup

context such as immigrants.

Our findings of significant mediation of the political to bias relationship by uncertainty-

avoidance and threat further support the works of earlier scholars who claim that divide is a result

of underlying differing psychological mechanisms (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2009).

However, other researchers (Brandt et al., 2014; Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013) have

argued that previously if the liberals appeared positive and show affirmative action towards

outgroups such as minorities, gay and lesbian people, and the poor to name a few because those

groups oppose ideological values of conservatives. Such a fundamental difference in the

worldview of the liberals and conservatives, and how these both impact the intergroup relations is

still under debate and we have tried to test these further. Although, in recent studies, researchers

have started finding that both liberals and conservatives do not differ in intolerance towards some

ideologically different and threatening groups (Brandt et al., 2014), many of these groups

opposed by conservatives tend to be low status groups and those opposed by liberals tend to be

high status groups (e.g., military, business people, Christian fundamentalists, wealthy people, etc). So, it might be that the *ideological conflict* perspective is in line with Jost and colleagues in regard to a main difference being avoiding uncertainty by keeping the status of groups unchanged and conservatives being okay with inequality in society and managing threats to that higher status (Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017).

Across three studies in Chapter 3, we provided sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of the Uncertainty-Threat model to predict differences between liberals and conservatives in regard to immigrants, and this finding supports our research in Chapter 2 that used a specific minority group (Pakistani-British) as the outgroup. Overall, both uncertainty-avoidance and threat-management were significant mediators of Political Ideology to bias. The Uncertainty-Threat model also provided evidence that higher levels of threat from both immigrants (Studies 4 and 6) and abstract outgroups (Study 5) mediated the effects, which provides additional support for the generality of the threat management effect.

In addition, our research appears as the first to find threat management as the strongest mediator of the political and bias relationship. Our model also extended to the research by demonstrating the effects on negative bias and also on implicit bias using Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), both within the lab and with a larger, more general sample online. In the first section of the current thesis, we used the AMP in the lab with a White-British sample within the UK and found a consistent replication of significant effect of AMP on the bias and political orientation. We observed the same replicated effect of AMP in our Uncertainty-Threat Model of mediation in section two of this research that was conducted within the USA in the online studies.

Putting together the findings of the current research, we can say that the direction of the attitudes of majority groups towards minority groups is significantly divided on the political

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ideology, which is mediated by the types of threat such as perceived threat and uncertainty-avoidance. This division highlights the explaining factors underneath the attitudes and the cultural gap that majority groups perceive about minorities within intergroup context, and that liberalism has reliably shown less bias toward and more immigrant-oriented helping attitudes. These findings shift the debate of the dividing factors on one hand and confirm the role of the political ideology of the majority group to predict outgroup bias in an ethnically diverse country on the other hand. Across both lines of our research, we have collected data from both an American general public sample and from White-British students and, yet we observed similar patterns of data regarding threat perceptions and political ideology, and a linear relationship between ideology and bias. We replicated the Jost and colleagues (2003, 2011) model of Uncertainty-Threat and found enough evidence to extend the model within intergroup context.

Before this work, we did not find such comprehensive testing of political ideology and uncertainty-threat mediation in intergroup context with the inclusion of multiple variables and more specifically within intergroup ideology (i.e., MC, CIIM, and CWO), bias and support for collective action all in one research project. We operationalised these variables by using measures that were reliable and frequently used in the previous literature. Our intergroup ideologies may not have steadily shown expected simultaneous bias reduction, yet they still encourage us to test these further in intergroup context in relation to support for collective action (CIIM with highlighting) and to use a more recent alternative dual-identity approach in future studies.

4.1.4 Limitations and Future Directions.

In order to discuss the limitations of the current research, we can map out several aspects of the two chapters to be improved for the future research.

The CIIM prompt we have manipulated deviates from previous research (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000) which was used frequently in research in the US ethnic diversity context. We took initiative to manipulate this as a commonality prompt within British ethnic diversity context due to the commonality focused features of the prompt. This aspect of the commonality might not have appealed the White-British sample who are less likely to perceive any outgroup as similar as themselves (i.e., British-Pakistani), hence we observed mixed results on implicit bias and support for Collective Action with comparison to MC, but overall we observed less bias and more support for CA within commonality prompt which needs further testing with Dual-Identity Model. The inconsistency observed in the commonality prompt conditions in all three experiments potentially suggests the development of similar prompts that exclusively cover the demographics of British ethnic diversity context, along with inclusion of a sample beyond academic students to observe differences in attitudes of both sample groups.

Another potential limitation is that we could have counterbalanced the measures of bias and support for CA as we did counterbalance of Uncertainty and Threat scales in chapter 3. So, in the future research this could be considered as an important methodological improvement to incorporate within experiments.

We have used LDT as a separator and a delay measure between the intergroup prompt and AMP, which might have potentially contributed to wear off the effect of the prompt and could be replaced by a comparatively short filler scale in the future research.

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Although the second line of research was replication and correlational and limited to only demonstrating associations for the Uncertainty-Threat Model and its relationships to attitudes toward immigrants, though we did use methods to improve the correlational studies. For the mediational analyses, by measuring the mediators after political ideology, and attitudes after the mediators, it is known that the mediators did not influence participants' ratings of political ideology within the study because the political ratings occurred first, and that attitudes did not influence participants' ratings of the mediators or political ideology (Cohen et al., 2003; Kenny et al., 1998). However, rating political ideology could have had an influence on the later measures, though this a common issue with political studies. Thus, future research could alter the order of these variables to fully demonstrate that those orders did not influence ratings. Moreover, future research could experimentally test the hypotheses generated by this model in order to examine the Uncertainty-Threat Model's proposal that temporarily activating uncertainty and threat may induce a conservative shift in addition to the effects observed with chronic, dispositional measures. This is a question that the current research is not able to answer.

Another limitation is the nature of the perceived threat that we measured. According to ITT, perceived realistic threats can be about both competition for resources (e.g., taking jobs; using social services) and about physical safety (e.g., being physically hurt). The standard measures used for measuring perceived threat based upon ITT have not measured threats to physical safety at the concrete or conceptual level, but according to the theory, there is room for incorporating such items (Stephan et al., 1999, 2002). If those physical safety items were to be included, we may see differences between the realistic and perceived threat subscales, which is often not observed on the usual measures (Rios et al., 2018). Thus, more research on the nature of

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this measure will need to be conducted to test how well it taps meaning threats as opposed to physical threats, and whether physical threats can be measured more broadly and less concretely.

4.1.5   Conclusion and Implications.

In Chapter 2, we proposed that thinking about and interacting with outgroup members or about diversity can induce questions of trust and whether an outgroup is threatening (Stephen et al., 2010; Wenzel et al., 2007). With a population that is still largely ethnically similar, an increase in the minority population may be perceived as a problem, especially in times of economic turmoil such as those that Britain has faced recently. (Park et al., 2014; Stephan et al., 2009). While researchers have advocated for several different strategies (MC, CIIM etc.), to the best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to reconcile whether decreasing prejudice is mutually exclusive to increasing support for collective action and working towards resolving actual disadvantages. Our research tested these methods and observed that a commonality condition with highlighting subgroups (similar to the Common Ingroup Identity Model with highlighting) produced more positive intergroup attitudes and more support for collective action than did the multiculturalism perspective. However, these results were not consistent in relation to attitude bias towards immigrants, but the commonality with highlighting condition were consistently better in relation to support for collective action. Thus, further testing of this approach is warranted, and, further comparison with a dual-identity approach is warranted given the recent positive results of the dual-identity perspective in relation to support for collective action and improved attitudes within different studies.

To conclude our discussion, we may argue that people with liberal and conservative ideologies differ in the ways they respond to perceived threats and risks (Jost et al., 2017) other

than just having a general negativity bias (Hibbing et al., 2014) or becoming socially dominant. Recently, the Moral Motives Model (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2007) observed a positive relationship between conservatism and two aspects of the model i.e., self-restraint and social-order which held contrasting responses to the social threats. However, dialogues on such differences help to shift the productive debate towards reducing the negative perception of any group (e.g., ethnic minorities/immigrants etc.). Although, these differences maybe contextual, hence, a balanced approach could benefit a diverse society (Janoff-bulman & Carnes, 2016). Further, acknowledgment of the perceived threat opens the venues of discussions regarding the immigration benefits to the economy along with the perception of immigrants as competitors in the labour job market. These discussions further lead to convincing people to not just accentuate the cultural and hereditary group divisions but help immigrants to improve their English language skills to equip them to develop their democratic values. Finally, this debate may also require finding viable autonomous solutions to the contrasting threat perceptions triggering social divisions among various groups.

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6   <u>APPENDICES</u>

<u>Appendix A:</u>

<u>Ideology General Instructions</u>

Note: Adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004)

We are interested in people's impressions of various ethnic groups in the United Kingdom. In the following study, we will ask you various questions regarding your perceptions of two different ethnic groups. More specifically, we will ask you about "**PAKISTANI-BRITISH**" people in the United Kingdom and also about "**WHITE-BRITISH**" people in the United Kingdom. You will be asked to make these judgments using the same set of attributes for both "**PAKISTANI-BRITISH**" and "**WHITE-BRITISH**" groups. Some of these questions may seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about how various groups in the United Kingdom are viewed.

Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on this questionnaire that would link the responses to you.

You may work through the various tasks at your own pace. If you have questions at any point, please ask the experimenter for help.

Please re-read these instructions one more time.

Thank you for your participation.

MC Prompt

Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004)

We are interested in people's impressions of various issues pertaining to ethnicity in the United Kingdom. In the following questionnaire, we will ask you a variety of questions regarding your perceptions of ethnic issues and ethnic groups. Some of these questions may seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about how these issues that affect our society are viewed.

Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a number one concern for the United Kingdom. We are in the unique position of having many different cultural groups living within our borders. This could potentially be a great asset. Different cultural groups bring different perspectives to life, providing a richness in food, dress, music, art, styles of interaction, and problem solving strategies. Each ethnic group within the United Kingdom can contribute in its own unique way. Recognising this diversity would help build a sense of harmony and complementarity among the various ethnic groups. Each group has its own talents, as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we validate the identity of each group and we recognise its existence and its importance to the social fabric. We can allow each group to utilise its assets, to be aware of its own particular problems or difficulties, and overall to live up to its potential. **Thus, social scientists argue that understanding both the similarities and differences among ethnic groups is an essential component of long-term social harmony in the United Kingdom**.

The questionnaires are designed to tap people's views of a variety of social groups.

Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to the questions on the following pages. All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely

confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on the questionnaire that would link the responses to you.

Please reread these instructions one time.

Thank you for your participation.

MC choose response items

Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004)

1. Work together better.

2. Understand each other.

3. Less fighting.

4. Learn new cultures.

5. By interacting with people from different ethnic backgrounds, such as Pakistani-British and White-British, we are more able to understand stereotypes associated with other countries.

6. Exposed to new goods, clothing, music, traditions, etc.

7. Minorities don't feel that they are unimportant.

8. Helps with international negotiations.

9. Make society less boring.

10. Educate people in the UK of other ethnic groups.

11. Might help cut down on crime.

12. Increase awareness of how certain groups are treated.

13. Multiculturalism brings to light different viewpoints and methods of dealing with issues. One situation might be explained or dealt with in two separate ways by two different groups, such as Pakistani-British or White-British groups. This enhances our pool of ideas.

14. Multiculturalism gives way to diverse activities that one would not experience otherwise.

15. Multiculturalism helps groups with communication. Differing viewpoints can be hard to grasp and explaining these logically can be beneficial to all groups.

16. It refines people's sense of what being human is all about.

17. Provides diversity in social climate for future generations.

18. Encourages bilingual communities.

19. Enables the settling of future immigrants.

Control Condition Prompt

Note: Adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004). Ideology general instructions were used as a control prompt instead of an actual prompt.

We are interested in people's impressions of various ethnic groups in the United Kingdom. In the following study, we will ask you various questions regarding your perceptions of two different ethnic groups. More specifically, we will ask you about "**PAKISTANI-BRITISH**" people in the United Kingdom and also about "**WHITE-BRITISH**" people in the United Kingdom. You will be asked to make these judgments using the same set of attributes for both "**PAKISTAN I-BRITISH**" and "**WHITE-BRITISH**" groups. Some of these questions may seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about how various groups in the United Kingdom are viewed.

Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on this questionnaire that would link the responses to you.

You may work through the various tasks at your own pace. If you have questions at any point, please ask the experimenter for help.

Please re-read these instructions one more time.

Thank you for your participation.

CIIM Prompt

Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004)

We are interested in people's impressions of various issues pertaining to ethnicity in the United Kingdom. In the following questionnaire, we will ask you a variety of questions regarding your perceptions of ethnic issues and ethnic groups. Some of these questions may seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about how these issues that affect our society are viewed.

Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a number one concern for the United Kingdom. At the present time, we are experiencing a great deal of conflict among various ethnic groups. Social scientists note that it is extremely important to heed the principle that all men and women are created equal. That is, in order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember that we are all first and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United Kingdom. In order to make the U.K. as strong and successful as possible, we must think of ourselves not as a collection of independent factions, but instead as parts of a larger whole. We must look beyond skin colour and understand the person within, to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger group, "British". Currently, we are spending a great many resources on conflict between ethnic groups. If we can recognise our "sameness" we will be able to rechannel those resources to work on other difficult and important problems within our society such as poverty, caring for the elderly, and medical research. **Thus social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture, to appreciate that at our core, we really are all the same**.

The questionnaires are designed to tap people's views of a variety of social groups.

Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to the questions on the following pages. All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on the questionnaire that would link the responses to you.

Please reread these instructions one time.

Thank you for your participation.

CIIM Choose Response items

Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004)

1. More productive in business when people work well together.

2. A sense of pride when people are in one group.

3. Diminishes a barrier between races that blocks good communication.

4. Would solve many of the social problems and injustices that hurt us today.

5. There would be fewer hate crimes.

6. Less time and money used towards legal cases due to racial issues.

7. When at war everyone would fight for everyone equally. For example, a White person would defend a <u>Pakistani</u> person as much as another <u>White</u> person.

8. Would not need to spend as much government money on groups that help enforce a unified UK.

9. We might become a more prosperous country with everyone working together.

10. More cooperation with other countries if they see that we are one not different races.

11. Less violence.

12. Free flow of ideas between races resulting in faster technological advances.

13. No more racial tensions would result in a happier and more productive society.

14. We would be stronger as a nation if U.K. citizens, such as <u>Pakistani-British</u> and <u>White-British</u> got along instead of turning things into racial issues.

15. Not having to focus on ethnic issues frees up resources to focus on other issues.

16. Equal access to work/other positions or facilities --wouldn't have to produce extra facilities for separate but equal type policies.

17. People would be nicer to one another.

18. There would be less fighting between races.

19. Simplify politics.

CWO Prompt

Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004). CIIM prompt used as CWO prompt.

We are interested in people's impressions of various issues pertaining to ethnicity in the United Kingdom. In the following questionnaire, we will ask you a variety of questions regarding your perceptions of ethnic issues and ethnic groups. Some of these questions may seem sensitive but please understand that our only purpose is to learn more about how these issues that affect our society are viewed.

Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a number one concern for the United Kingdom. At the present time, we are experiencing a great deal of conflict among various ethnic groups. Social scientists note that it is extremely important to heed the principle that all men and women are created equal. That is, in order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember that we are all first and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United Kingdom. In order to make the U.K. as strong and successful as possible, we must think of ourselves not as a collection of independent factions, but instead as parts of a larger whole. We must look beyond skin colour and understand the person within, to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger group, "British". Currently, we are spending a great many resources on conflict between ethnic groups. If we can recognise our "sameness" we will be able to rechannel those resources to work on other difficult and important problems within our society such as poverty, caring for the elderly, and medical research. **Thus social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture, to appreciate that at our core, we really are all the same**.

The questionnaires are designed to tap people's views of a variety of social groups.

Obviously there are no right or wrong answers to the questions on the following pages. All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely confidential and anonymous. There is no identifying information on the questionnaire that would link the responses to you.

Please reread these instructions one time.

Thank you for your participation.

CWO Choose response items

Note: adapted from Richeson & Nussbaum (2004). CIIM choose responses used, however, these were manipulated by deleting the highlighting (i.e., underlining) of the subgroup categories from the responses to transform these for CWO conditions.

1. More productive in business when people work well together.

2. A sense of pride when people are in one group.

3. Diminishes a barrier between races that blocks good communication.

4. Would solve many of the social problems and injustices that hurt us today.

5. There would be fewer hate crimes.

6. Less time and money used towards legal cases due to racial issues.

7. When at war everyone would fight for everyone equally. For example, one person would defend another person.

8. Would not need to spend as much government money on groups that help enforce a unified UK.

9. We might become a more prosperous country with everyone working together.

10. More cooperation with other countries if they see that we are one not different races.

11. Less violence.

12. Free flow of ideas between races resulting in faster technological advances.

13. No more racial tensions would result in a happier and more productive society.

14. We would be stronger as a nation if U.K. citizens got along instead of turning things into racial issues.

15. Not having to focus on ethnic issues frees up resources to focus on other issues.

16. Equal access to work/other positions or facilities --wouldn't have to produce extra facilities for separate but equal type policies.

17. People would be nicer to one another.

18. There would be less fighting between races.

19. Simplify politics.

Word ratings are from Warriner et al., (2013), norms of valence, arousal, and dominance

LDT Negative	LDT Positive	Negative Stereotype	Positive Stereotype	Non-Words	Words
~Vomit	~Desirable	~Radical	~Loyal	~Shrutnd	~Table
~Poison	~Wonderful	~Threat	~Brave	~Zolc	
~Disturbing	~Smile	~Criminal	~Sincere	~Throughmbs	~Compass
~Horrible	~Romance	~Cruel	~Cultured	~Treeved	
~Rubbish	~Pleasant	~Intolerant	~Friendly	~Phloalled	~Finger
~Disgust	~Holiday	~Aggressive	~Hardworking	~Ghweeffth	
~Cockroach	~Caress	~Stupid	~Religious	~Blorthed	~Calender
				~Puxt	
				~Wroarp	
				~Quootched	
				~Weff	
				~Spraughmbth	
				~Sckwincsed	
				~Ghoagnth	
				~Fribbs	
				~Steaves	
				~Twarked	
				~Rhird	
				~Creukks	
				~Drulned	

Answer Keys

F = No	K = Yes

Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP)

Instructions and Primes:

As a reminder:

U = unpleasant   P = pleasant

This task will take only a few minutes.   When you're ready,
please place your fingers on the response keys, and press the
space bar to begin.

U = Unpleasant   P = Pleasant

Examples of Chinese Pictographs used in AMP in Experiments 1, 2 & 3 (chapter2)

池 介 助

Examples of Korean Pictographs used in AMP in experiment 3 (chapter 2) and study 6 (chapter3)

뷀 붓 캔

Examples of Pakistani-British / immigrant faces used in AMP in experiments 1-3 (chapter 2) & in study 6 (chapter3)

Examples of White-British faces used in AMP in experiments 1-3 (chapter 2) and in study 6 (chapter3)

Appendix K:

Support for Collective Action scale

Note: adapted from Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, and Pratto, (2009).

Instructions:

The following questions concern various levels of support people might have for policies related to Pakistani-British people and life within the UK. We want to be clear that we are NOT evaluating you or your individual responses. We have not collected information about your identity and your responses are linked only to a random number, so all your responses are completely anonymous and confidential. If we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you respond to each of the questions openly and honestly.

Please rate the question on the scale indicated below:

1. Not at all
2. Somewhat
3. Moderately
4. Very Much
5. Completely

1. I see a need to support a change that will improve the position of Pakistani-British people within the UK in comparison to White-British people.
2. I support legislation through which Pakistani-British people will be guaranteed equal work opportunities as White-British people in the UK
3. I wish that White-British and Pakistani-British people would be more equal in terms of resources

(Filler Items)

Subjective Happiness Scale

Instructions:

For each of the following statements or questions, please indicate the number from the scale that you think is most appropriate in describing you. (Carefully take note of the labels, or anchors, for the 1 to 7 scales, as they differ for each of the four items.)

In general, I consider myself:

1. Not a very happy person
2. none
3. none
4. none
5. none
6. none
7. A very happy person

Compared with most of my peers, I consider myself:

1. Less happy
2. none
3. none
4. none
5. none
6. none
7. More happy

Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting the most out of everything. To what extent does this characterization describe you?

1. Not at all
2. none
3. none
4. none
5. none
6. none
7. A great deal

Some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not depressed, they never seem as happy as they might be. To what extent does this characterization describe you?

1. A great deal
2. none
3. none
4. none
5. none
6. none
7. Not at all

Explicit Bias Measure

Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions.

1. Extremely Warm
2. Very Warm
3. Moderately Warm
4. Somewhat Warm
5. Neither
6. Somewhat Cold
7. Moderately Cold
8. Very Cold
9. Extremely Cold

Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions.

1. Extremely Negative
2. Very Negative
3. Moderately Negative
4. Somewhat Negative
5. Neither
6. Somewhat Positive
7. Moderately Positive
8. Very Positive
9. Extremely Positive

Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions.

1. Extremely Friendly
2. Very Friendly
3. Moderately Friendly
4. Somewhat Friendly
5. Neither
6. Somewhat Unfriendly
7. Moderately Unfriendly
8. Very Unfriendly
9. Extremely Unfriendly

Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions.

1. Extremely Suspicious
2. Very Suspicious

3. Moderately Suspicious
4. Somewhat Suspicious
5. Neither
6. Somewhat Trusting
7. Moderately Trusting
8. Very Trusting
9. Extremely Trusting

Please rate your feelings toward Pakistani-British people on the following evaluative dimensions.

1. Extreme Admiration
2. High Admiration
3. Moderate Admiration
4. Some Admiration
5. Neither
6. Some Disgust
7. Moderate Disgust
8. High Disgust
9. Extreme Disgust

Demographics

Demographic instruction:

We have a few more questions to ask about you, please enter the following information:

Click on "continue" to get to the next screen.

Age: Please type in your age. (please use a number, e.g., 19)

Fill-in-the-Blank -----------------

Gender: Please indicate your gender by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box.

1. F
2. M

Race: Please indicate your race (or ethnicity) by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box.

You will have a chance to specify or expand up it more on the next question. (used in experiments 1-3)

1. Southeast Asian
2. White
3. African
4. African American
5. Middle Eastern or North African
6. Indian or Indian Subcontinent
7. Latino or Hispanic

Race 2: if you would not include yourself as a member of one of the ethnic groups listed in 1 through 6, or if you would like to further specify your previous answer. Please indicate your race or ethnicity by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box.

1. Southeast Asian
2. White
3. African
4. African American
5. Middle Eastern or North African
6. Indian or Indian Subcontinent
7. Latino or Hispanic
8. Other

Race 3: If you selected other, please specify your race or ethnicity:

Fill-in-the-Blank   -------------

Please indicate your ethnicity by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box. You will have a chance to specify it more on the next question. (Used in studies 4-6)

1. Southeast Asian
2. White
3. African American
4. Afro-Caribbean
5. Middle Eastern or North African
6. Indian
7. Native American
8. Pacific Islander
9. Latino or Hispanic

Please select "other" if you would not include yourself as a member of one of the ethnic groups listed in 1 through 8, or if you would like to further specify your previous answer. Please indicate your race or ethnicity by using the mouse to click on the appropriate box.

1 Southeast Asian

2 White

3 African

4 Afro-Caribbean

5 Middle Eastern or North African

6 Pakistani

7 Indian

8 Native American

9 Pacific Islander

10 Latino or Hispanic

11 other

Race 3: If you selected other, please specify your race or ethnicity:

Fill-in-the-Blank   -------------

Political Ideology Item

Note: Participants received the following measure of political ideology;

Please rate your, personal political orientation:

1. Extremely Conservative
2. Very Conservative
3. Moderately Conservative
4. Somewhat Conservative
5. Centre/moderate
6. Somewhat Liberal
7. Moderately Liberal
8. Very Liberal
9. Extremely Liberal

Need for Cognition scale (Filler Task)

(Cacioppo & Petty, 1984).

Please rate the following statements on the scale provided:

1. extremely unlike me

2. somewhat unlike me

3. uncertain

4. somewhat like me

5. extremely like me

1. I prefer complex to simple problems.

2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.

3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.

4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my abilities.

5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth about something.

6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long hours.

7. I only think as hard as I have to.

8. I prefer to think about small daily projects rather than long-term ones.

9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.

10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.

11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.

12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.

13. I prefer my life to be filled with problems that I must solve.

14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.

15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.

16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental effort.

17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works.

18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.

Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Filler Task)

Instructions:

Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience. Using the 1-6 scale, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have each experience. Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather than what you think your experience should be. Please treat each item separately from every other item. Click continue now.

1. Almost Always

2. Very Frequently

3. Somewhat Frequently

4. Somewhat Infrequently

5. Very Infrequently

6. Almost Never

1. I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until sometime later.

2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or thinking of something else.

3. I find it difficult to stay focused on what's happening in the present.

4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I'm going without paying attention to what I experience along the way.

5. I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they really grab my attention.

6. I forget a person's name almost as soon as I've been told it for the first time.

7. It seems I am "running on automatic," without much awareness of what I'm doing.

8. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.

9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I'm doing right now to get there.

10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I'm doing.

11. I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else at the same time.

Perceived Threat Measure

Note: adapted from Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman (1999)

Instructions:

Please take a moment now to complete the following questions.

Obviously, there are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely confidential.

1. Disagree Strongly
2. Disagree Moderately
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Agree Moderately
7. Agree Strongly

Symbolic 1: Pakistani-British immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of UK society as soon as possible after they arrive.

Symbolic 2: Immigration from Pakistan is undermining UK culture.

symbolic 3: The values and beliefs of Pakistani-British immigrants regarding work are basically quite similar to those of most British people.

symbolic 4: The values and beliefs of Pakistani-British immigrants regarding moral and religious issues are NOT compatible with the beliefs and values of most British people.

symbolic 5: The values and beliefs of Pakistani-British immigrants regarding family issues and socialising children are basically quite similar to those of most British people.

symbolic 6: The values and beliefs of Pakistani-British immigrants regarding social relations are NOT compatible with the beliefs and values of most British people.

symbolic 7: Pakistani-British immigrants should NOT have to accept British ways.

real1: Pakistani-British immigrants get more from this country than they contribute.

real 2: The children of Pakistani-British immigrants should have the same right to attend schools in the United Kingdom as British people do.

real 3: Pakistani-British immigration has increased the tax burden on British people.

real 4: Pakistani-British immigrants are NOT displacing British workers from their jobs.

real 5: Pakistani-British immigrants should be eligible for the same health-care benefits received by British people.

real 6: Social services have become less available to British people because of Pakistani-British immigration.

real 7: The quality of social services available to British people has remained the same, despite Pakistani-British immigration.

real 8: Pakistani-British immigrants are as entitled to subsidised housing or subsidised utilities (water, electricity, drainage) as poor British people are.

Perceived Threat from Immigrants

Response Scale

1. Disagree Strongly

2. Disagree Moderately

3. Disagree Somewhat

4. Neither Agree nor Disagree

5. Agree Somewhat

6. Agree Moderately

7. Agree Strongly

1. Immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of American society as soon as possible after they arrive.

2. Immigration is undermining American culture.

3. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding work are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.

4. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding moral and religious issues are NOT compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.

5. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding family issues and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.

6. The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding social relations are NOT compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.

7. Immigrants should NOT have to accept American ways.

8. Immigrants get more from this country than they contribute.

9. The children of immigrants should have the same right to attend schools in the United States as Americans do.

10. Immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans.

11. Immigrants are NOT displacing American workers from their jobs.

12. Immigrants should be eligible for the same health-care benefits received by Americans.

13. Social services have become less available to Americans because of immigration.

14. The quality of social services available to Americans has remained the same, despite immigration.

15. Immigrants are as entitled to subsidised housing or subsidised utilities (water, electricity, drainage) as poor Americans are.

Uncertainty-Threat Measure

1). Oppenness to experience Scale items

Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree that you are someone who *likes to spend time with others*? Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which **you agree or disagree with that statement.**

1 – strong disagreement

2 – moderate disagreement

3 – slight disagreement

4 –

5 – slight agreement

6 – moderate agreement

7 – strong agreement

I am someone who

1. _____ Is talkative
2. _____ Tends to find fault with others
3. _____ Does a thorough job
4. _____ Is depressed, blue
5. _____ Is original, comes up with new ideas
6. _____ Is reserved
7. _____ Is helpful and unselfish with others
8. _____ Can be somewhat careless
9. _____ Is relaxed, handles stress well.
10.   _____ Is curious about many different things
11._____ Is full of energy
12._____ Starts quarrels with others
13._____ Is a reliable worker
14._____ Can be tense

15._____ Is ingenious, a deep thinker
16._____ Generates a lot of enthusiasm
17._____ Has a forgiving nature
18._____ Tends to be disorganized
19._____ Worries a lot
20._____ Has an active imagination
21._____ Tends to be quiet
22._____ Is generally trusting
23._____ Tends to be lazy
24.   _____ Is emotionally stable, not easily upset
25._____ Is inventive
26._____ Has an assertive personality
27._____ Can be cold and aloof
28._____ Perseveres until the task is finished
29._____ Can be moody
30._____ Values artistic, aesthetic experiences
31._____ Is sometimes shy, inhibited
32._____ Is considerate and kind to almost everyone
33._____ Does things efficiently
34._____ Remains calm in tense situations
35._____ Prefers work that is routine
36._____ Is outgoing, sociable
37._____ Is sometimes rude to others
38._____ Makes plans and follows through with them
39._____ Gets nervous easily
40._____ Likes to reflect, play with ideas
41._____ Has few artistic interests
42._____ Likes to cooperate with others
43._____ Is easily distracted
44._____ Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature

2). <u>Ambiguity Intolerance scale</u> (Budner's (1962)

On positively worded items, strong agreement was scored 7, moderate agreement, 6, slight agreement, 5, slight disagreement, 3, moderate disagreement, 2, and strong disagreement, 1 Scoring of negative. Items was in the reverse direction. All omissions were scored 4.

Coded to be the Ambiguity Intolerant score (i.e., Higher Uncertainty Avoidance)

Ambig1
An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much.
1 – strong disagreement
2 – moderate disagreement
3 – slight disagreement
4 –
5 – slight agreement
6 – moderate agreement
7 – strong agreement

Ambig13r
People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how complicated things really are.

1 – strong disagreement
2 – moderate disagreement
3 – slight disagreement
4 –
5 – slight agreement
6 – moderate agreement
7 – strong agreement

ambigN3
I have always felt there is a clear difference between right and wrong.
1 – strong disagreement
2 – moderate disagreement
3 – slight disagreement
4 –
5 – slight agreement
6 – moderate agreement
7 – strong agreement

ambigN4r

There is not necessarily a right way and a wrong way to do everything.

1 – strong disagreement
2 – moderate disagreement
3 – slight disagreement
4 –
5 – slight agreement
6 – moderate agreement
7 – strong agreement

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale

16-item Group Based Social Dominance Orientation Measure from Pratto et al., (1994)

Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling towards?
Beside each object or statement select an item from '1' to '7' which represents the degree of your
positive or negative feeling.

 RESPONSE SCALE

 1 Very Negative

 2 Negative

 3 Slightly Negative

 4 Neither Positive nor Negative

 5 Slightly Positive

 6 Positive

 7 Very Positive

 1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.

 2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.

 3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.

 4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

 5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.

 6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

 7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.

 8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

9. It would be good if groups could be equal.

10. Group equality should be our ideal.

11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.

12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

13. Increased social equality.

14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.

15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.

16. No one group should dominate in society.

1). Death Avoidance Scale (Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1994).

Instructions:

This questionnaire contains a number of statements related to different attitudes toward death. Read each statement carefully, and then decide the extent to which you agree or disagree. For example, an item might read: "Death is a friend." Indicate how well you agree or disagree by clicking the circle next to the option. If you are undecided, click undecided. However, try to use the undecided category sparingly.

Note that the scales run from BOTH strongly agree to strongly disagree AND from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

It is important that you work through the statements and answer each one. Many of the statements will seem alike, but all are necessary to show slight differences in attitudes.

(click next to begin)

Please remember that the scales run from BOTH strongly agree to strongly disagree AND from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

Whenever the thought of death enters my mind, I try to push it away.

1. Disagree Strongly
2. Disagree Moderately
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Agree Moderately
7. Agree Strongly

I avoid death thoughts at all costs.

1. Agree Strongly
2. Agree Moderately
3. Agree Somewhat
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree

5. Disagree Somewhat
6. Disagree Moderately
7. Disagree Strongly

I avoid thinking about death altogether.

1. Disagree Strongly
2. Disagree Moderately
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Agree Moderately
7. Agree Strongly

I always try NOT to think about death.

1. Agree Strongly
2. Agree Moderately
3. Agree Somewhat
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree
5. Disagree Somewhat
6. Disagree Moderately
7. Disagree Strongly

I try to have nothing to do with the subject of death.

1. Disagree Strongly
2. Disagree Moderately
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Agree Moderately
7. Agree Strongly

2). **Fear of Death scale** (Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1994).

The fact that death will mean the end of everything as I know it frightens me.

1. Agree Strongly
2. Agree Moderately
3. Agree Somewhat
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree
5. Disagree Somewhat
6. Disagree Moderately
7. Disagree Strongly

Death is no doubt a grim experience.

1. Disagree Strongly
2. Disagree Moderately

3.   Disagree Somewhat
4.   Neither Agree nor Disagree
5.   Agree Somewhat
6.   Agree Moderately
7.   Agree Strongly

The prospects of my own death arouses anxiety in me.

1.   Agree Strongly
2.   Agree Moderately
3.   Agree Somewhat
4.   Neither Agree nor Disagree
5.   Disagree Somewhat
6.   Disagree Moderately
7.   Disagree Strongly

I have an intense fear of death.

1.   Disagree Strongly
2.   Disagree Moderately
3.   Disagree Somewhat
4.   Neither Agree nor Disagree
5.   Agree Somewhat
6.   Agree Moderately
7.   Agree Strongly

I am disturbed by the finality of death.

1.   Agree Strongly
2.   Agree Moderately
3.   Agree Somewhat
4.   Neither Agree nor Disagree
5.   Disagree Somewhat
6.   Disagree Moderately
7.   Disagree Strongly

The uncertainty of not knowing what happens after death worries me.

1.   Disagree Strongly
2.   Disagree Moderately
3.   Disagree Somewhat
4.   Neither Agree nor Disagree
5.   Agree Somewhat
6.   Agree Moderately
7.   Agree Strongly

The subject of life after death troubles me greatly.

1.   Agree Strongly
2.   Agree Moderately
3.   Agree Somewhat
4.   Neither Agree nor Disagree

5. Disagree Somewhat
6. Disagree Moderately
7. Disagree Strongly

Our way of life is seriously threatened by the forces of terrorism in the world.

1. Disagree Strongly
2. Disagree Moderately
3. Disagree Somewhat
4. Neither Agree nor Disagree
5. Agree Somewhat
6. Agree Moderately
7. Agree Strongly

Perceived Threat from Outgroups

(adapted from Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra, Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson, McNatt, & Renfro, 2002).

Instructions: Please take a moment now to complete the following questions.

This is a study of attitudes toward outgroups. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to understand the views toward people not from your ingroup. We are asking questions about some sensitive issues. We recognize that sometimes it is not easy to be completely frank and honest, but your answers will help us better understand attitudes toward these important issues.

Obviously, there are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. All that matters is your own opinion on these issues. Your responses are completely confidential. There is no identifying information on this questionnaire that would link the responses to you.

In this section of the study, we will ask you to think about "OUTGROUPS." For the purposes of this study, an Outgroup is any group or groups of which you DO NOT class yourself as being a member of, or belonging to, and that you do not identify with.

(click next to begin)

1. Outgroups hold too many positions of power and responsibility in this country.
   o Disagree Strongly
   o Disagree Moderately
   o Disagree Somewhat
   o Neither Agree nor Disagree
   o Agree Somewhat
   o Agree Moderately
   o Agree Strongly

2. Outgroups dominate American politics more than they should.
3. When outgroups are in positions of authority, they discriminate against my group when making hiring decisions.
4. Too much money is spent on educational programs that benefit outgroups.
5. Outgroups have more economic power than they deserve in this country.

6. Outgroups receive too much of the money spent on healthcare and childcare.

7. Too <u>little</u> money per student is spent on education for outgroups.

8. The tax system favors outgroups.

9. Many companies hire less qualified members of outgroups over more qualified members of my group.

10. Outgroups have more political power than they deserve in this country.

11. Public service agencies favor outgroups over my group.

12. The legal system is more strict on outgroups than on my group.

13. My group has very different values than outgroups.

14. Outgroups have no right to think they have better values than my group.

15. Outgroups want their rights to be put ahead of the rights of my group.

16. Outgroups don't understand the way my group views the world.

17. Outgroups do not value the rights granted by the Constitution (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) as much as my group does.

18. Outgroups and my group have different family values.

19. Outgroups don't value the traditions of their group as much as my group does.

20. Outgroups regard themselves as morally superior to my group.

21. The values of outgroups regarding work are different from those of my group.

22. Most members of outgroups will never understand what members of my group are like.

23. Outgroups should not try to impose their values on my group.

24. My group does not get as much respect from outgroups as they deserve.

Negative Bias Measure

Note: Measure adapted based on Stephan et al. (2002) and coded on a 1-10 scale.

Please indicate the degree to which you feel disapproval toward immigrants.

0 No disapproval at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Extreme disapproval

Please indicate the degree to which you feel resentment toward immigrants.

0 No resentment at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Extreme resentment

Please indicate the degree to which you feel dislike toward immigrants.

0 No dislike at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Extreme dislike

Please indicate the degree to which you feel disdain toward immigrants.

0 No disdain at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Extreme disdain

Please indicate the degree to which you feel hatred toward immigrants.

0 No hatred at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Extreme hatred

Supplemental Material (Chapter 3)

Table 1: Study 4. Counterbalancing the order of measures.

Order	Main Measures						
	Mediators			Filler Task 2		Secondary measures	
1	Threat	UA: Openness1st	UA: Ambiguity2nd	Ncog2nd4	Bias	Death Avoid, Fear of Death, System Threat	SDO
2	Threat	UA: Ambiguity1st	UA: Openness2nd	Ncog2nd4	Bias	Death Avoid, Fear of Death, System Threat	SDO
3	UA: Openness1st	UA: Ambiguity2nd	Threat	Ncog2nd4	Bias	Death Avoid, Fear of Death, System Threat	SDO
4	UA: Ambiguity1st	UA: Openness2nd	Threat	Ncog2nd4	Bias	Death Avoid, Fear of Death, System Threat	SDO

Table 2: Study 6. Counterbalancing the order of measures; 12 orders.

Order	Measures						
1	Threat	U-A	SDO	N. Cog4	Explicit Bias & Neg	N. Cog	Implicit Bias
2	Threat	SDO	U-A	N. Cog4	Explicit Bias & Neg	N. Cog	Implicit Bias
3	U-A	Threat	SDO	N. Cog4	Explicit Bias & Neg	N. Cog	Implicit Bias
4	U-A	SDO	Threat	N. Cog4	Explicit Bias & Neg	N. Cog	Implicit Bias
5	SDO	Threat	U-A	N. Cog4	Explicit Bias & Neg	N. Cog	Implicit Bias
6	SDO	U-A	Threat	N. Cog4	Explicit Bias & Neg	N. Cog	Implicit Bias
7	Threat	U-A	SDO	N. Cog4	Implicit Bias	N. Cog	Explicit Bias & Neg
8	Threat	SDO	U-A	N. Cog4	Implicit Bias	N. Cog	Explicit Bias & Neg
9	U-A	Threat	SDO	N. Cog4	Implicit Bias	N. Cog	Explicit Bias & Neg
10	U-A	SDO	Threat	N. Cog4	Implicit Bias	N. Cog	Explicit Bias & Neg
11	SDO	Threat	U-A	N. Cog4	Implicit Bias	N. Cog	Explicit Bias & Neg
12	SDO	U-A	Threat	N. Cog4	Implicit Bias	N. Cog	Explicit Bias & Neg

## Appendix Z:

Analyses of Secondary Measures:

Study 4:

Higher liberalism was significantly related to less System Threat (Hypothesis 3b), $R^2 = .09$, $\beta = -.31$, $t = -4.58$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = -.25$, 95%BCa CI [-.36, -.15], $p < .001$. However, we did not replicate Jost et al.'s (2007) findings of Political Orientation predicting Death Avoidance (Hypothesis 3c), $R^2 = .01$, $\beta = -.11$, $t = -1.60$ $p = .111$, with bootstrapped $b = -.09$, 95%BCa CI [-.19, .02], $p = .101$, or Fear of Death (Hypothesis 3d), $R^2 < .01$, $\beta = .05$, $t = 0.76$, $p = .448$, with bootstrapped $b = .04$, 95%BCa CI [-.06, .14], $p = .444$.

Study 5:

Higher liberalism was significantly related to less System Threat (Hypothesis 3b), $R^2 = .19$, $\beta = -.43$, $t = -8.42$, $p < .001$, with bootstrapped $b = -.42$, 95%BCa CI [-.50, -.33], $p < .001$.

Mediations with perceived Symbolic Threat:

Study 4:

For the Political Orientation to Bias relationship, both Uncertainty-Avoidance ($b = -.03$, CI [-.06, -.01], *CSIE* = -.04) and <u>Symbolic (meaning) Threat</u> ($b = -.26$, CI [-.34, -.19], *CSIE* = -.36) were significant mediators (Figure S4).

Figure S4

Indirect, $b = -.03$, CI [-.06, -.01], *CSIE* = -.04

Figure S4. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Symbolic Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

For the Political Orientation to Bias relationship, both Uncertainty-Avoidance ($b = -.05$, CI [-.08, -.02], *CSIE* = -.06) and <u>Generalized Symbolic (meaning) Threat</u> ($b = -.11$, CI [-.17, -.06], *CSIE* = -.13) were significant mediators (Figure S2a). For the Political Orientation to <u>Negative Bias</u> relationship, both Uncertainty-Avoidance ($b = -.05$, CI [-.09, -.02], *CSIE* = -.05) and <u>Generalized Symbolic (meaning)</u> <u>Threat</u> ($b = -.14$, CI [-.21, -.09], *CSIE* = -.15) were significant mediators (Figure S5b).

Figure S5a

Figure within diagram:

- Generalized Symbolic Threat
- Political
- Bias
- Uncertainty-Avoidance

$b = -.28, p < .001$
$b = .39, p < .001$
Indirect, $b = -.11$, CI [-.17, -.06], *CSIE* = -.13
$b = -.11, p < .001$
$b = .44, p < .001$
Indirect, $b = -.05$, CI [-.08, -.02], *CSIE* = -.06

Figure S5a. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Generalized Symbolic Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap.

Figure S5b

Figure S5b. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Negative Bias with Generalized Symbolic Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap.

Study 6:

For the Political Orientation to Bias relationship, both Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = -.02, CI [-.04, -.01], *CSIE* = -.03) and Symbolic (meaning) Threat (b = -.25, CI [-.32, -.19], *CSIE* = -.37) were significant mediators (Figure S6a). For the Political Orientation to Negative Bias relationship, both Uncertainty-Avoidance (b = -.02, CI [-.04, -.01], *CSIE* = -.03) and Symbolic (meaning) Threat (b = -.25, CI [-.34, -.18], *CSIE* = -.31) were significant mediators (Figure S6b). Finally, for the Political Orientation to Implicit Bias relationship, Uncertainty-Avoidance was non-significant (b = .001, CI [-.002, .006], *CSIE* = .01) while Symbolic (meaning) Threat (b = -.01, CI [-.02, -.01], *CSIE* = -.10) was significant (Figure S6c).

Figure S6a

Figure S6a. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Bias with Symbolic Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

Figure S6b

Figure S6b. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Negative Bias with Symbolic Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap.

Figure S6c

Figure S6c. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Implicit Bias with Symbolic Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap.

Mediations with Behavioural Helping variable:

Study 4:

For the Political Orientation to Behavioural Helping relationship, Uncertainty-Avoidance was non-significant ($b = .004$, CI [-.025, .041]) while Threat ($b = .19$, CI [.06, .32]) was a significant mediator (Figure b1).

Figure b1

Figure b1. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Behavioural Helping with Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.

For the Political Orientation to Behavioural Helping relationship, neither Uncertainty-Avoidance ($b =$ .01, CI [-.03, .05]) nor Threat from Outgroups ($b = $ -.03, CI [-.09, .04]) were significant mediators (Figure b2).

Figure b2

Figure b2. Multiple mediation of Political Orientation to Behavioural Helping with Threat from Outgroups and Uncertainty-Avoidance as mediators.