

Discourses of Africa in the construction of British national identity:
an analysis through speeches by British prime ministers
(1990 – 2016)

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A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of:

Doctor of Philosophy

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September 2019*

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ABSTRACT:

Africa occupies a unique place in British consciousness. The rationale for Africa's centrality in post-Cold War British foreign policy has prompted much scholarly debate, revealing a tension between explanations emphasising Britain's desire to project power in the world and those focusing on Britain's attempt to project moral identity through concern for Africa.

Arguing that national identity is discursively constructed, this research explores the role of British prime ministers' discourses of Africa in the construction of British national identity. It examines continuities and discontinuities in British prime ministers' speeches that reference Africa, covering the premierships of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron (1990–2016). Through a 4-step mixed-methods approach, comprising quantitative tools, thematic content analysis, and critical discourse (Discourse-Historical Approach) analysis, this research identifies four content-oriented themes and 11 sub-themes in the speeches. Through these it identifies four discourses about Africa, signifying different visions about Britain's national identity and place in the world: 'paternalism', 'tutelage', 'partnership', and 'insecure former empire'. The central finding is that British prime ministers' discourses of Africa reveal two concurrent but contradictory British national identities. One represents an attempt to forge a new soft-power British national identity whilst the other signifies a reluctance to entirely renounce Britain's colonial identity.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

I would like to thank my supervisors Dr Danielle Beswick and Dr Jonathan Fisher, whose guidance, encouragement, and – above all – patience has been invaluable during this process. I am grateful to have had such excellent supervisors. I would also like to thank my family for their constant support, and instilling in me the values of hard work, humility, and courage. I hope they know how much I appreciate everything they do.

If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

– *Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727)*

The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool.

– *William Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act V, Scene I*

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Africa came to play a central role in Britain's history, foreign policy, self-image and public imagination during the nineteenth century – and more prominently so following the 1884 Berlin Conference and subsequent 'Scramble for Africa'. Over the course of colonisation, decolonisation, and more recent history, Africa has had a substantial impact on Britain – manifesting itself in a variety of ways, from arts and culture to shaping British identity and place in the world.

In 1960, at the end of his six-week tour of 'British Africa', Harold Macmillan delivered the landmark 'Wind of Change' speech to the Parliament of South Africa. In this speech, he stated: 'The wind of change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact' (Butler and Stockwell, 2013: 1). The process of decolonisation in Africa progressed rapidly under Macmillan, and by 1970 only Rhodesia and South West Africa remained under British control (Brown and Louis, 1999: 348).

Decades after Macmillan's speech and the rapid decolonisation of Africa, the continent continues to occupy a significant role in Britain's consciousness. In 2001, Tony Blair told the Labour Party conference 'the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become

deeper and angrier' (Gallagher, 2013: 11). Half a decade later, in a speech to News Corp., Blair stated: 'I know some of my fellow leaders think I am trifle obsessed with Africa. It's true. I am.'¹ In 2007, David Cameron travelled to Rwanda to take part in the Conservative Party's social action project, Project Umubano. During this trip, his parliamentary constituency was affected by severe flooding. Despite receiving criticism in the press and threats of a vote of no confidence in his leadership, Cameron chose to remain in Rwanda rather than return to the UK (Beswick, 2019). The rationale for Britain's continued engagement with Africa has been the subject of much discussion in UK-Africa literature. At its core, this literature reveals a division between explanations that emphasise Britain's desire to project power in the world and those that focus on Britain's attempt to derive a moral identity through concern for Africa.

This thesis examines how discourses of Africa have been used in the construction of British identity by British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period. The period of study covers four prime ministers: John Major (1990–1997), Tony Blair (1997–2007), Gordon Brown (2007–2010), David Cameron's coalition government (2010–2015), and the remainder of Cameron's premiership leading a Conservative majority government (2015–2016). This time period was selected for a number of reasons. During the Cold War, the strategy of containment by 'first world' powers against the communist expansion of the 'second world' provided the most convincing explanation for their interactions with the non-aligned 'third

¹ Tony Blair (30th July, 2006). News Corp., Pebble Beach, California, USA.

world' (Schmidt, 2013). After the end of the Cold War, however, this no longer explained external engagement with Africa. Therefore, beginning this period of focus at the end of the Cold War allows for the comparison of four consecutive prime ministers in this post-Cold War period, in which the context is similar enough to allow for meaningful comparison. It also allows for the comparison of two Conservative prime ministers and two Labour prime ministers. Furthermore, it provides an opportunity to compare Blair, who is the focus of a large body of UK-Africa literature, with two prime ministers who are often overlooked in this regard, Major and Brown, as well as with Cameron, who is the focus of a small but growing body of literature. In doing, it also provides an opportunity to assess claims in this literature about the continuities and discontinuities regarding the role of Africa in British foreign policy during these premierships.

The central research questions this thesis seeks to answer are:

1. Through their speeches, to what extent and in what ways have British prime ministers in the post-Cold War era invoked different discourses about Britain's relationship with Africa?
2. Are there noticeable patterns in the use of different discourses over this time (for example, by political administration, or by social/political/economic circumstance in Britain) that may explain the use of such discourses?
3. What does this tell us about the way discourses about Africa – and UK relations with Africa – are used by prime ministers in the construction of British national identity?

Building on a conception of national identity as discursively constructed, this research seeks to understand the role of discourses of Africa in the construction of British national identity. This is achieved through an analysis of British prime ministers' speeches collected from online archives, as well as from the Conservative and Labour Party archives. The whole corpus of speeches contains 273 speeches (see Appendix A), however only selected speeches are analysed.

Using a four-step mixed-methods approach, this thesis analyses speeches by British prime ministers across this time period in order to reveal the ways in which Africa is used to construct particular discourses of British national identity. Quantitative tools are used to ensure the breadth of information in the corpus of speeches is appreciated by deriving 'themes' (1) and 'sub-themes' (2) that capture the overt content of the speeches. Qualitative analysis is then used to understand the implicit content and discursive construction of British national identity. A thematic content analysis (3) and critical discourse analysis based on the Discourse-Historical Approach (4) are used for this.

This research makes a number of important contributions to knowledge. At its core, this thesis finds that British prime ministers discourses about Africa reveal two concurrent but contradictory British identities. One represents a Britain at ease with its post-Empire status, whilst the other signifies a Britain reluctant to entirely let go of its imperial identity. In response to the three research questions, this thesis finds that British prime ministers' references to Africa can be grouped into four content-oriented 'themes'. These are that

British prime ministers' references to Africa are about British history, security, morality, and economy. These are further divided into eleven 'sub-themes', which signify important nuances within these themes: 'commonality rooted in colonial history', 'the Commonwealth', 'sport'; 'Africa's underdevelopment as a security threat', 'peacekeeping', 'force projection'; 'moral posturing', 'Christian values', 'party political messaging'; 'Africa's economic prosperity as mutually beneficial', and 'Africa's economic prosperity as a (missed) opportunity for Britain'.

Through an analysis of these themes and sub-themes in prime ministers' speeches, four discourses about Britain's relationship with Africa emerge, which highlight different visions of British national identity. These are: 'paternalism', 'tutelage', 'partnership', and 'insecure former empire'. The themes, sub-themes, and discourses found in this thesis reveal two competing but coexisting notions of British national identity. On one hand, over the period of this research, 1990-2016, British prime ministers' conception of British national identity shifts from one of paternalism towards Africa to one of partnership. One way in which this can be seen is that references to Britain's colonial history in Africa and the Commonwealth diminish over time. This change in identity in relation to Africa can be explained by variety of factors – including prime ministers' party affiliation, their individual personalities, and broader changes over time – such as increasing African agency, and post-Cold War optimism about the triumph of liberal values and the turn to a rights-based approach. On the other hand, some discourses of Africa's place in British foreign policy have remained continuous throughout this period. This can be seen most prominently in relation to the discourse that

British assistance is required to maintain security in Africa, and that Africa is a moral cause for Britain.

This thesis makes several other significant contributions. It maps the literature on the rationale for Britain's post-Cold War involvement in Africa in Chapter 2, and then engages with, develops, and challenges key debates within this. It does so primarily by expanding the timeframe beyond those prime ministers that receive most attention in the literature, allowing claims of continuity or discontinuity to be assessed. For example, this research finds many similarities between the framing of Africa by Blair and Cameron; both frame Africa as an explicitly moral cause, and refer to it as an arena in which to project British hard power. In doing so, it develops the argument about the uniqueness of Blair's focus on Africa, such as that made by Gallagher (2013). Another such example is that this thesis supports the finding of Abrahamsen (2005) that Britain's engagement with Africa post-9/11 was evidence of the securitisation of Africa, however it makes an important contribution by presenting examples of the discourse that Africa presented a security threat years prior to 9/11.

In addition to contributing to UK-Africa literature, this research provides potential explanations for these findings and opportunities to build on this research. These explanations include factors personal to prime ministers, such as their party affiliation, as well as broader changes, such as increased African agency, and optimism about the capacity of politics to transform the world and the move towards a rights-based approach at the end of the Cold War.

Moreover, this research makes contributions through the data collected and the approach it uses. The data collected for this research is original and can be made available to other researchers interested in UK-Africa relations. The corpus contains 273 speeches, totalling 668,281 words. This dataset took a number of months to compile, and required searching through online archives and physical archives. The approach taken in this thesis represents a unique take on existing methods, and in doing so develops an innovative way of approaching national identity construction using large datasets such as this. It builds on the Discourse-Historical Approach by combining it with quantitative tools and thematic content analysis which can support a larger quantity of data, and which provides a framework that can be borrowed and built on in further research.

Having provided an overview of this thesis, the next chapter turns to focus on the literature pertinent to this research. This is divided into three areas. The first part of the literature review focuses on national identity and how it is constructed. The second looks at the role of political elites and political speeches, and in particular why studying British prime ministers' speeches can help understand British national identity. The third section of the literature review assesses competing explanations for Britain's continued engagement with Africa after the Cold War, as well as why Africa occupies a unique place in British consciousness and why it is useful for studying British national identity.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

In order to address the central research questions set out in Chapter 1, it is helpful to break them down into even smaller interlinking questions in this literature review. These questions help guide the structure of this literature review, and help situate it within debates in the literature. The first section of this literature review focuses on the nature of national identity, the second turns to political elites and their role in shaping and propagating national identity, and the third centres on why Africa is important in the construction of British national identity.

Firstly, drawing on the disciplines of political science and international relations, what is national identity? Where and how does national identity ‘exist’, and to what extent are there alternative – even competing – conceptions of national identity? How are these formed, shaped, and propagated, and which institutions and actors are central to this? This thesis builds on the idea that nations are imagined communities, and that national identity is constructed through discourse. There is no single national identity; identities are discursively constructed according to context. National identity can be discursively constructed through everyday actions and routines that reify the existence of a nation, such as through the use of a common language. This is known as ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995). However, national identity can also be constructed by political elites such as prime ministers and presidents

because their office offers them the platform to speak on behalf of the nation. This research is focused on this latter construction of national identity.

Secondly, with particular reference to the communication studies and political science literature, how are political elites involved in the formation and propagation of particular conceptions of national identity? What methods do they use, and why are political speeches of particular importance? The literature review finds that whilst there is a wealth of literature on the role of the US president in defining what it means to be American, there is currently limited research on the British context. Indeed, rhetoric and political speech-giving are so central to the US presidency that Tulis (1987) coined the phrase ‘the rhetorical presidency’. One method US presidents have used in their speeches to define national identity is to exclude certain groups by implying they do not possess the ‘proper’ American ideals (Beasley, 2004). Importantly, the literature review also finds that whilst the study of political speeches is frequently the starting point for the study of American national identity, there has been little systematic research into the place or function of political speeches across the study of British politics (Finlayson and Martin, 2008).

Finally, looking at the fields of international development, international relations and political science, what role has Africa played shaping ideas about Britain’s place in the world over time? To what extent have British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period considered the continent a priority and why? What is it about Africa that makes it particularly useful for studying the construction of Britain’s national identity? The third section of the literature review finds that Africa has occupied an important place in British

consciousness and national identity as far back as the nineteenth century. The literature on Africa's place in British foreign policy post-Cold War can broadly be split into two groups. One group emphasises the idea that Africa represents an arena in which Britain can project power in the world, whilst the other views Africa as a mirror in which Britain derives a moral identity for itself. These different views are set out in detail in section 2.3, and are perhaps most succinctly summarised by Reid (2014) and Harrison (2013) respectively. Reid (2014) argues that international engagement with Africa has been, and remains, fundamentally economic and military in nature. By contrast, Harrison (2013) contends that British campaigning around Africa has essentially been about the moral nature of Britishness.

2.1 The Construction of National Identity

In order to understand how discourses of Africa are used in the construction of Britain's identity by British prime ministers, it is important to firstly understand what national identity is and how it is formed. There is a debate in the literature as to whether the nation is modern, invented, and socially constructed – or whether it is primordial with ethnic, cultural, and historical linkages to the pre-national cultural unit. This then raises questions about where national identity exists, how it is propagated, and for what purpose – which will also be explored in this section. This research is based on the former idea; nations are imagined by those who believe themselves to be part of a community. It was the fall of sacred languages, which had previously represented privileged access to truth, alongside the invention of the printing press and increased literacy that allowed large numbers of people who did not know each other on a face-to-face basis to be able to consider themselves part of a single community (Anderson, 1983). This national identity is constructed and conveyed through discourse.

2.1.1 What is National Identity? Where and How Does it 'Exist'?

Building on the early work of the French historian Ernest Renan, the idea of the nation in the political science literature is largely discussed in terms of a distinction between two paradigms: *Willensnation* and *Kulturnation*. That is, the political nation by an act of will (*Willensnation*), and the nation defined by culture (*Kulturnation*), which is often linguistically defined and ethnically based (Wodak *et al.*, 2009: 18). These conceptions have been discussed using different terms in the discussions in English – but the underlying ideas are the same.

Instrumentalism views the nation as a vested interest in common pursuits, similar to *Willensnation*. Primordialism or perennialism, in contrast, conceptualises the nation as an instinct of individuals born into specific linguistic, racial or homeland communities such that the bond between the individual and the community is seen as so innate that it is primordial – and is therefore comparable to *Kulturnation* (Bačová, 1998).

Renan noted this distinction in his 1882 lecture *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, in which he claimed that there had hitherto been a confusion between nationhood and racial, linguistic, and religious groupings. Renan (1990: 14) dismisses the racial basis for a nation saying ‘to base one’s policy on an ethnographic analysis means to establish it on a chimera. The noblest countries – England, France and Italy – are the ones where the blood is most mixed’. Language, meanwhile, ‘invites us, but does not force us, to unite’, whilst ‘religion has become something individual; it concerns the conscience of each person’ (Renan, 1990: 16, 18). Instead, Renan contends that a nation is based on having a common past and a common will in the present. He elaborates:

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together [...] To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more - these are the essential conditions for being a people (Renan, 1990: 19).

One of Renan's main insights and contributions to understanding the construction of the nation is his appreciation of the role of collective memory. However, his argument is incomplete because it does not explain how such collective memory becomes linked to specific places and territories. Indeed, Bauböck (1991: 43) argues that such subjective definitions as *Willensnation* and *Kulturnation* are inadequate because they 'tautologically determine in advance what is to be explained – the formation of a national idea of community'.

Nevertheless, Anderson (1983: 15) makes the compelling case that a nation is an 'imagined political community' building on the concept of *Willensnation*. That is, a nation is a socially constructed community imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group. This is not to say that a national community is not real, but that any community so large that its members do not know each other on a face-to-face basis must be imagined to some degree. Nations are imagined as limited because even the largest of them has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nations (Anderson, 1983; Couture and Wojahn, 2016). This thesis builds on Anderson's concept of the nation as an imagined political community.

The evolution of the nation is important in understanding how they are constructed, and this will briefly be covered here drawing on Anderson's work – before moving onto criticisms and alternative understandings of how the nation has come into being. Anderson accepts that the modern nation is rooted in the religious communities and dynastic empires that were connected to one another by 'sacred languages' such as Latin and Arabic, as well as through texts passed down through centuries. In the 17th Century, kingdoms that had

hitherto been defined by religious ideals, started to collapse in Europe, and in their place, legitimacy was shifted into territories separated by laws.

Importantly, however, modern nations did not just appear from these religious communities and kingdoms; a paradigm shift in common people's understanding of the world was essential for them to comprehend the idea of a nation (Wodak *et al.*, 2009: 22). Anderson argues that two major factors led to this paradigm shift. The first was the fall of Latin as the 'sacred language', which had up until then represented privileged access to truth (Anderson, 1983). The second was the spread of the printing press and the increase in book printing in the 16th Century, which led to the increased importance of local languages after the small market for Latin books was saturated (Wodak *et al.*, 2009: 22). This also meant that the wide varieties of spoken dialects and languages were combined into a few written languages.

The written word and language acted as a catalyst for booming populations to consider themselves and relate to others in a fundamentally different way; these languages formed the basis of communicating between ordinary spoken languages and the sacredness of Latin (Anderson, 1983: 40). The supply and demand for new books printed in the smaller number of written languages created a hierarchy because some spoken dialects were more similar to the languages that were printed. Anderson argues that although this was inadvertent, it later became a model that could be drawn on and employed in nation-building. Anderson (1983: 122) therefore claims that written language created the concept of the nation. This thesis not only builds on Anderson's concept that nations are imagined political communities, it also pays specific attention to the importance of discourse in this.

It is useful, however, to briefly acknowledge competing conceptions of the nation and why these are less compelling. In contrast to Anderson's focus on the role of print-capitalism, its role unifying language and creating a cultural consciousness between speakers of the same language, Gellner (2006: 6-7) argues that cultural and voluntaristic definitions are inadequate. Gellner instead argues that 'population explosion, rapid urbanisation, labour migration, and also the economic and political penetration of previously more or less inwardturned communities' created new boundaries – meaning that nations are the result of late 18th Century industrialisation (Gellner, 2006: 41). In contrast to both Anderson and Gellner, Smith (1995) emphasises the importance of pre-existing territories. He argues that the modernist approach of Anderson and Gellner ignores 'the persistence of ethnic ties and cultural elements in many parts of the world, and their continuing significance for large numbers of people'. Smith therefore submits that a nation is 'a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members' (Smith, 1995: 56-57). Smith's argument is based on 'ethnies', which were broader cultural units in the premodern era. Therefore, Smith argues that whilst nations are modern, they are inextricably rooted in those pre-existing ethnies.

Yet these criticisms by Gellner and Smith do little to diminish Anderson's core argument. Gellner's definition does little to explain why, for example, two people from different backgrounds living on opposite coasts of the US believe themselves to be members of the same nation. Additionally, as previously noted, Anderson concedes that the nation has roots

in pre-existing religious communities and dynastic empires, but argues that these did not automatically form the basis of modern nations.

Using Anderson's definition of the nation as an 'imagined political community', a second key area to address is: where does national identity exist and how is it propagated? Wodak *et al.* (2009) argue that idea of the nation is constructed and conveyed in discourse, primarily in discourses about national culture. Echoing Anderson's argument about the imagined basis of the nation, Hall (1996) submits that nations are not just political institutions, they are also systems of cultural representations through which an imagined community is interpreted. Hall (1996: 612-613) argues:

people are not only legal citizens of a nation; they participate in the idea of the nation [...] A national culture is a *discourse* – a way of constructing meanings which influences and organises both our actions and our conception of ourselves. [...] National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about 'the nation' with which we can identify; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and imagines which are constructed of it.

This view is echoed by Calhoun (1997). He argues that the nation is a meaningful notion in everyday life because people talk about it; they make discursive claims for, about and in the name of the nation. 'Nations are constituted largely by [these] claims themselves, by the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective

identity, to mobilize [sic] people for collective projects, and to evaluate peoples and practices' (Calhoun, 1997: 5).

As well as building on the idea of the nation as an 'imagined community', this research builds on the notion that national identity is a discursive construct. Discourse analytical approaches to the study of nationalism centre on the ways in which understandings of the nation are constructed and conveyed through discursive acts (van Dijk, 1984; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). These discursive acts do not just describe social reality; they simultaneously construct that reality, willing into existence that which they name (Bourdieu, 1992: 223). Importantly for this thesis, as Wodak *et al.* (2009) argue, there is no such thing as *one* national identity. Rather, different identities are discursively constructed according to context – such as the audience and setting.

2.1.2 What Elements Comprise the Discursive Construction of National Identity?

So far, this thesis has explored how the nation can be seen as an 'imagined community', and that it is constructed through discourse. This section begins by exploring some of the elements identified in the national identity literature as being important in understanding how the nation is constructed. It then moves on to discuss discursive strategies, which encompass a range of devices such as metaphors, stereotypes, and allusions, and are more implicit in their role in constructing national identity. The section after (2.2) will expand on the role of political elites and how they use these to construct national identity – which is

vital in understanding how British prime ministers have referenced Africa in their speeches, and how this constructs British national identity.

There are competing ways of understanding the discursive construction of national identity. Some scholars emphasise the role of everyday discourses and bottom-up approaches to understanding the construction of national identity. That is, the nation may be constructed through explicit and active performances, rituals, and mass ceremonies in which the nation is actively produced and propagated in the public sphere (Uzelac, 2010). National holidays, for instance, involve mass ceremonies of nationalism being performed for the public, (re)producing national identity (McCrone and McPherson, 2009; Hayday, 2010). However, national identity is also constructed through the use and exchange of even the most simple, everyday semiosis (Wodak *et al.*, 2009). ‘Banal nationalism’ is achieved through simple routines and everyday actions that reify and reproduce the existence of the nation which can include, for example, using the national language (Billig, 1995).

Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008: 553) argue that the ‘the broad brush strokes favoured by macro-analytical approaches to the study of nationalism blur (and sometimes obscure) the finer grains of the nation that are embedded in the routine practices of everyday life’. They contend that it is not possible to properly appreciate the importance of the nation in everyday life by only studying its state-sponsored construction in a modern context or through elite manipulation. That is not to argue that everyday nationhood should be studied independently of these phenomena, but that nations are not just constructed from the top down; they are simultaneously the creation of ordinary people engaging in mundane

activities in their everyday lives (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 537). Although this thesis focuses on the top-down construction of national identity, it is important to understand the role of everyday semiosis and banal nationalism in constructing other identities from the bottom up.

Another principal way in which the nation has been legitimised throughout history by sharing a common language, as discussed previously with reference to Anderson (1983). Indeed, sharing a common, national language is often considered one of the hallmarks of a nation. Machin and van Leeuwen (2007) contend that many populations are convinced they belong to a unique national community largely because they read, listen to, and watch the same material – in particular, material from the national news media. Androutsopoulos (2007: 207-8) argues this trend was intensified with the emergence of the mass media: ‘the mass media contributed to the constitution of national languages and gave rise to the linguistic ideal of public discourse in the monolingual nation-state: a language as homogeneous as the nation it represents’. However, this argument is to some extent undermined by bilingual or multilingual countries such as India, Switzerland, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Canada. This aspect of national identity relevant to discussions about British national identity in relation to Africa when considering the widespread use of English in Africa, and references to members of the Commonwealth being united by a shared language.

Rhetoric about the role of history in the construction of national identity – the notion that a people’s shared past experience encourages cohesion – is also identified as being important

in the literature on nationhood. However, Deutsch (1966: 19) contends that ‘instead of being automatically united by a shared history, men at least under some conditions cannot share the historical events through which they live, unless they are already in some sense united’. That is, the notion that something is ‘common’ is predicated on an initial sense of cohesion and having been inculcated with certain ‘truths’. The assertion of an historical truth might be another’s ‘history’, full of falsehoods or fabrications to rationalise claims of cultural or national exceptionalism. ‘What ultimately matters is not *what is* but *what people believe is*’ (Connor, 1994: 37). Crucially, a consideration of history and its role in the construction of national identity is not an attempt to objectively understand which events have shaped a nation’s identity. Rather, it is about competing narratives, with actors attempting to dominate certain events and use them to aggrandise or individualise certain histories. This is particularly pertinent to later discussions about Britain and Africa, and the narration of Britain’s history in Africa during colonialism, where particular attention must be given to attempts to highlight or diminish particular histories.

Importantly for this thesis, a notable addition to the role of history in the construction of national identity is the role of ‘forgetting’. In his 1882 lecture, Renan argued that ‘forgetfulness, and [even] historical error, are essential in the creation of a nation’ (Renan, 1990: 11) meaning that nations are based as much on what people jointly forget as well as what they remember. He gives the example that ‘every French citizen has to have forgotten

the massacre of Saint Bartholomew'.² However, Anderson (1983) points out that there is a contradiction here; Renan argues French people must have forgotten the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre, yet does not explain what it is. In doing so, Renan assumes that his readers will remember the very massacre he says they have forgotten. Anderson notes that many French citizens of Renan's time knew of the massacre because it was taught in state-run schools, meaning the state itself preserved knowledge which needed to be forgotten for national identity (Poole, 2009). As such, Anderson contends that not only does nationality rely on the communal act of forgetting, but, paradoxically, that the very act of forgetting affirms the national site of memory. The act of forgetting is a matter of the national will – a ritualised performance of the will to forget (Gourgouris, 1996). In this paradoxical act, Anderson (1983: 202) argues there is 'the reassurance of fratricide' – that nations are fond of interpreting – and thus instituting – life-threatening encounters with an external enemy as foundational internal conflicts; fratricidal occasions that sanctify the topos of national origin and are thus ineradicable, which is precisely why they must always have already been 'forgotten' (Brownlie, 2013). This ties into later discussions in the literature review about British prime ministers discourses of Africa (see section 2.3).

The construction of identity through foreign policy and international relations has been explored by a number of authors, and is of particular importance to this thesis. Edward Said's *Orientalism*, for example, although about the Near and Middle East, is a useful

² The St. Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572 occurred during the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598), and was a targeted attack by French Catholics against Huguenots (French Reformed / Calvinist Protestants) which led to thousands of deaths (Knecht, 2002).

framework in understanding the early narratives of Africa that entered British consciousness and persist to some extent to this day. Said (1978: 300) proposed a binary whereby the West (Occident) created a romanticised identity of the East (Orient) to justify colonial and imperialist intentions. This Occident-Orient binary centres on the Western construction of the East instead of any truths about it. Said argues that the Western construction of the Orient is based on four 'dogmas'. First, the absolute dichotomy between the Occident, which is rational, advanced, and compassionate – in contrast to the Orient which is immature and inferior. Second, that generalisations about the Orient, particularly those based on literature depicting a stereotypical Oriental culture, are preferable to proof about the truth of modern Oriental cultures. Third, the Orient is perpetual, unchanging, homogeneous, and unable to define itself, and that therefore vague terminology for defining the Orient by the Occident is objective. Fourth, the Orient is an entity to be afraid of or to be mastered (Said, 1978).

This Occident-Orient binary is an elite construction, created and propagated by those who have the status and power to shape discourses. The phenomenon described by Said has also been called 'identification through differentiation'. Discourse analysts have examined how national discourses can be based around stereotypes which create a division between 'us' and 'them', and such discourses can be employed in order to justify discrimination or exclusion of outgroups (Gillespie, 2007).

Said's theory was developed by Mudimbe (1988) in his book *The Invention of Africa*. Both Said and Mudimbe address the phenomenon of 'the other' in Western consciousness and

Western empire – and that the Orient is viewed as exotic, intellectually retarded, emotionally sensual, governmentally despotic, culturally passive, and politically penetrable (Mazuri, 2005: 68). One notable difference between Said and Mudimbe, however, is that whilst Said insisted that the Orient does not exist and has never existed outside the consciousness and imagination of the West, Mudimbe believes that the invention of Africa is a prophecy in the process of self-fulfilment (Mazuri, 2014: 277). Mazuri (2005: 69) does, however, add the caveat that it is possible to accuse Said and Mudimbe of ‘reverse Otherness’; that is, of stereotyping the West in their stereotyping of the Orient.

Continuing with the focus on the construction of national identity through foreign policy and international relations, it is important to note that over the course of the twentieth century, dominated by the two World Wars, Europe (and Germany in particular) became central in shaping Britain’s identity. The construction of certain ideas about what it means to be European or German co-constructed what it meant to be British. This section briefly touches on some of the ways this was achieved, as these will provide useful context for the study of Britain’s national identity in relation to Africa. Wallace (1991: 70) argues ‘the myth of Anglo-Saxondom is as old as Shakespeare, matured through the experiences of the English Civil War and the struggles against the threat of Catholic absolutism, first from Spain and then from France: a free England defying an unfree continent’.

This view of the exceptional character and moral greatness of the Anglo-Saxon peoples continued through the First World War, and the Second World War further reinforced the idea that Britain and the US were the champions of freedom and democracy against a

totalitarian threat to the resistance in occupied countries (Wallace, 1991: 71). This history has continued to influence British national identity in the contemporary era. The language in prime ministerial speeches and parliamentary exchanges on Europe, for example, has been deeply ideological, conjuring up elements of the English national myth: Magna Carta, parliamentary sovereignty, the continuity of Britain's 700-year-old parliamentary traditions, its island status, 'the British people', 'the nation' (Wallace, 1991: 69). These are all elements that later came to play a role again around the vote of Britain's membership of the European Union in 2016, as discussed in the final part of this thesis. These discourses around freedom and sovereignty can help inform a study of British prime minister's speeches in relation to Africa in that they highlight a discourse of British exceptionalism.

In contrast to these approaches focused on the role of everyday nationhood, common language, history, and international relations, there are other ways in which the construction of national identity can be considered. According to Hall (1996: 613-615) the propagation of ideas about national identity can be broken down into five parts, which he calls 'discursive strategies'. Firstly, there is the narrative of the nation, which is prevalent at both a national level and in everyday life. Secondly, there is a notion of the foundation, continuity, and eternal character of the nation. Thirdly, the invention of tradition transforms historical defeats and embarrassments into something understandable by glossing over inconsistencies. Fourthly, the idea of the foundational legend regarding the origin of the nation. Fifthly, the fictional notion of pure, noble, primordial ancestors.

However, as Wodak *et al.* (2009: 24) point out, it is difficult to separate out national identity in this way, and that Hall's second, third, fourth and fifth discursive strategies could easily be interpreted as characteristics of the first. Kolakowski (1995) derives a similar, sometimes overlapping, approach to Hall's, and is therefore also problematic for the same reasons. Instead, Wodak *et al.* (2009) derive an approach that is based on the contents, discursive strategies, and the means and forms of realisation. Their discursive strategies are less prescriptive, so do not fall foul of the constraints of the approaches taken by Hall (1996) and Kolakowski (1995). A discussion of the approach is detailed in Chapter 3, as it forms the basis for the critical discourse analysis used in this research.

As this analysis of the literature demonstrates, national identity is best understood as being discursively constructed by people who imagine themselves to be part of a national collective. National identity is shaped by explicit and active performances, such as by state, political, and media actors, as well as through everyday social practices. However, as this thesis is solely focused on the capacity of political elites in constructing national identity, the next section of this research moves on to explore these political actors in more detail, and their role in constructing national identity.

2.2 The Role of Political Elites, Political Speeches, and the Audience

This section focuses on how political elites, such as British prime ministers, are able to narrate and propagate certain discourses – and in turn shape national identity. Before focusing on British prime ministers specifically, however, it is helpful to look at the literature on political elites and national identity more broadly. Much has been written about the US context and the role of the US presidency in shaping national identity, in what Tulis (1987) describes as the ‘rhetorical presidency’, in contrast to the lack of focus on the British prime minister. There are, of course, notable differences between the institutions of the British prime minister and the US president. In Britain the roles of the head of state and head of government are divided between the prime minister and the monarch, whilst in the US both roles are occupied by president. Nevertheless, the literature on the US context is still useful to review as it serves to highlight some broader points that are applicable to political elites such as prime ministers and presidents in general.

2.2.1 What Role Do Political Elites Play in the Construction of National Identity?

According to Mumford and Selck (2010: 295), language has increasingly come to be considered a useful indicator of a given political context – and that besides actors’ behaviour, their words reveal a lot about them. Finlayson and Martin (2008: 445) argue that systematic investigation of speech in British politics can shed light on political institutions, ideologies and strategies. They contend that a major political speech is ‘the proverbial grain of sand through which, if we are prepared to look closely and for a while, we may glimpse some of the turns taken by a political universe’.

Here we will start by looking specifically at the US context and the role of the US presidency, before moving on to other examples of political elites and their role in shaping national identity. Lowndes (2013: 469) contends that beyond the official powers and duties set out in the Constitution, the US presidency is an institution that is meant to embody the American people. Presidents serve as identificatory figures, representing what their supporters hold sacred about the nation. A similar argument is made by Beasley (2004), who studies the role of the president in shaping US national identity. As one of the most diverse countries in the world, the job of uniting such a range of places and people is difficult. Beasley (2004) argues that as the only national leader – the head of state and the head of government – it often falls to the president to attempt to define what is meant by the term ‘American’.

Beasley’s methodology involves studying presidential inaugural addresses and State of the Union addresses in order to identify how presidents have defined the term ‘American’. She argues that from the time of Grover Cleveland in 1885 to George W. Bush in 2002, there has been much continuity in the way presidents have constructed national identity in these addresses. This is accomplished by associating identity with civil religious themes, which has enabled presidents to sometimes exclude certain people – such as immigrants and women – from the national community and national identity because they do not possess the ‘proper’ American ideals (Beasley, 2004).

Continuing to draw on the US context, Stuckey and Hoffman (2006) expand on how the rhetoric of the US president helps frame national identity. Although apparently innocuous,

and appearing in both ceremonial and policy addresses, they find that ‘presidential language concerning national identity helps shape the context, and thus sets the terms for more substantive, issue-laden debates’ (Stuckey and Hoffman, 2006: 69). They study the capacity of presidents to define national identity by comparing the public rhetoric of William Taft and Richard Nixon. They find that both Republicans, although in office in very different socio-political contexts, display continuity in their strategies for defining national identity – which is centred around the fundamental importance of liberty and the belief that every citizen occupies a natural place in the hierarchy of society. In concurrence with the argument put forward by Beasley (2004), they conclude by suggesting that the president’s ability to shape national debate and identity is helped by the broad audience afforded to the president.

Meanwhile, van Noije and Hijmans (2005) provide an example of the role of the French president in shaping national identity. They conduct a discourse analysis of thirty-six New Year’s speeches delivered by five French presidents to understand how cultural identity was dealt with in the context of increased globalisation. In contrast to the continuity of US presidents in the studies by Beasley (2004) and Stuckey and Hoffman (2006), they find that the attention placed on various aspects of national identity fluctuates with each president, even if nationalist rhetoric appeared to be important for all of them. Additionally, they identify three broad framings, which they describe as ‘sense of belonging’, ‘the myth of French values’, and ‘the significant other’ (van Noije and Hijmans, 2005).

2.2.2 The Importance of Political Speeches

These examples from the US and France show that scholars who are interested in national identity often use political speeches to investigate political elites' capacity to narrate and define national identity. Speeches are also useful to study because political leaders are able to set the agenda on their own terms. In a study of American presidential speeches, Andrade and Young (1996: 592) argue that speeches 'provide the president with the best opportunity to influence the public because the president maintains complete control of the location, subject, and audience' – echoing the conclusions of Stuckey and Hoffman (2006) above. They add that 'there is reason to believe that measuring speech content directly taps into the more general concept of the president's agenda'. However, speeches cannot guarantee that subsequent behaviour or policy will reflect the content; they are indicators. Yet, as Mumford and Selck (2010) note, the fact that speeches may not reflect subsequent policy choices or behaviours does not present a methodological problem because the intent of this research is to study the discourse itself.

It is important to note that it cannot be assumed that the 'animator', the politician who delivers the speech, is also the person who actually wrote (Wodak *et al.*, 2009, citing Goffman, 1981). In fact, it is highly unlikely given the workload of politicians – especially holders of the highest offices.³ However, this is not important because the person who delivers the speech is always solely responsible for its content. In this way, politicians are the

³ There are some exceptions to this. For instance, Tony Blair spent a lot of time writing and re-writing speeches a number of his own speeches (see Campbell, 2011)

‘principals’ of their statements (Goffman, 1981). Additionally, it is the role of political speechwriters to develop a rhetoric that reinforces the myths that assist in creating a politician’s image; speechwriters only choose words that fit the politician’s image. Rhetoric can only communicate effectively when it complies with the myths of a unique political image that is ‘owned’ by the politicians (Chartris-Black, 2005). The role of speechwriters is therefore to support the marketing of a ‘brand’ that is created by the individual politician and so it is the politician who must be considered the author of his or her speeches (Chartris-Black, 2005). This means that whether the speech was written by a politician or not is largely irrelevant; what is crucial is that politicians own and are responsible for the words they say.

While their principal job would appear to be introducing (or opposing) a legislative agenda, politicians spend much of their time speaking.⁴ This can include press conferences, prime ministers questions, TV and radio interviews, official statements, announcements, and parliamentary debate. The extent of speech-giving would seem to make a good case for making their investigation central to political studies. Although political science research often uses such debates and speeches as a source, there is little systematic research into the place or the function of speeches as such within British political life (Finlayson and Martin, 2008). Despite their ubiquity in politics, Finlayson and Martin (2008) bemoan that there is

⁴ For example, Gordon Brown became prime minister on 27th June, 2007. By the end of that year he ‘had delivered 22 set-piece speeches, given 19 formal statements to the press, and participated in 20 press conferences. This amounts to 71 speech occasions not including media interviews, parliamentary speeches or statements, speeches made in his capacity as leader of the Labour Party and unrecorded speeches – such as those given to the PLP or within closed government meetings’ (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 445).

still not a systematic approach within political studies that seeks to relate the general phenomenon of the political speech to political activity and institutions more broadly. This is surprising when compared with the US context – which, as has been outlined, is well established and highly developed, particularly when it comes to what Tulis (1987) called the ‘rhetorical presidency’.

Further examples of the breadth of speech analysis in the US context include the Christian epic narratives in Martin Luther King’s *I’ve Been to the Mountaintop* (Keeley, 2008), and the choice of words in the 2008 Democratic and Republican Presidential Primary compared to famous political figures such as Martin Luther King, Reagan and JFK (Sacerdote and Zidar (2008). Finlayson and Martin (2008) note that in the UK the general nature and function of politicians’ speech activity remains obscure, and is worth exploring in more detail. This gap in the literature is one that this thesis seeks to contribute to through its focus solely on prime ministers’ speeches, and by comparing discourses of four consecutive prime ministers.

Having focused on other contexts, particularly the role of the US presidency, it is worth turning to the British context. Despite the relative lack of analysis of speeches, there are still some important examples that are illuminating. If we look at some of the most memorable and historic speeches in British politics given by members of the political elites, we can start see how these have become woven into narratives about British identity. Shadow Defence Secretary Enoch Powell’s infamous *Rivers of Blood* speech, for example, was delivered in 1968 – continues to shape discussions around immigration in the UK nearly half a century later. Perhaps the most famous line from Powell’s speech is ‘Like the Roman, I seem to see the

River Tiber foaming with much blood' (Hillman, 2008: 83). In his analysis of the speeches of leaders such as Hitler, Bismark, and Mao, Connor (1994) found a uniformity of expression in a number of these speeches – with particular emphasis on familial links such as ancestral, fraternal, sororal, maternal, paternal, and blood. Connor argues that these speeches were able to mobilise masses because of their appeals to primordial attachments, which are underestimated and indicate a lot about the essence and potentials of ethno-nationalism.

Winston Churchill delivered some of the most famous speeches in British history – including *'We Shall Fight on the Beaches'*, *'This was their finest hour'*, and *'Never was so much owed by so many to so few'*. These speeches have become in some ways synonymous with Britishness and the British bulldog spirit.⁵ Despite not being well received at the time, these speeches now provide an example of what Anderson (1983: 202) terms the 'reassurance of fratricide', as noted in the previous section of this chapter, in which the act of forgetting is a matter of the national will – a ritualised performance of the will to forget. Another speech by a British prime minister at a moment of crisis that touched the national psyche was Tony Blair's speech after the death of Princess Diana. Gallagher (2013) described Blair's 'People's Princess' moment as one of his most famous and statesman-like speeches, and linked this to the capacity of his government to embody Britain. An alternative – and perhaps more compelling – explanation is that it was about Blair as a person and an attempt to personally embody Britain's feeling at the time. It is important to consider here the argument made by

⁵ Churchill's speeches were not necessarily well received at the time. Some listeners thought he was drunk, and some found his speeches depressing (Toye, 2013). They have only in retrospect come to be seen as epitomising the British spirit.

Fairclough (2000: 96): ‘A rhetorical style is not an invariable way of using language; it is rather a mixture of different ways of using language, a distinctive repertoire. Tony Blair does not always speak in the same way, but he has a distinctive repertoire of ways of speaking which he moves between in a recognisable way’.

Yet these examples of speeches by Enoch Powell, Winston Churchill, and Tony Blair, and the limited analysis accompanying them, are the exceptions not the rule – which supports the argument by Finlayson and Martin (2008) that there is still limited systematic research into the role of speeches in British politics. This research seeks to help contribute to this by providing a detailed analysis of British prime ministers’ speeches in relation Africa and their role in the construction of British national identity. Having looked at the role of political elites’ speeches in shaping national identity (with specific reference to the British context), it is useful to understand whether and why the audience of these speeches matters, and how this shapes discourse.

2.2.3 Does Audience Matter?

In many societies, speaking and speech-giving is not a right of those in power but rather it is a duty. Clastres (1990: 153) gives the example of Native Americans to make this point:

Indian societies, do not recognise the chief’s right to speak because he is the chief, they require that the man destined to be chief prove his command over words. Speech is an imperative obligation for the chief. The tribe demands to hear him: a silent chief is no longer a chief. [...]

The whole political philosophy of primitive society can be glimpsed in the obligation of the chief to be a man of speech.

In modern democratic countries across the world, the legitimacy of office is still derived in part from the correct execution of institutionalised speech-moments similar to the example provided by Clastres. Such speech-rituals ‘assign roles to participants, test or demonstrate the competence or authority of political actors and may serve to affirm party, ideological or [most importantly for this research] national identifications’ (Finlayson, 2015: 96). Therefore, in analysing speeches over such a broad period, as this thesis does, it is important to have a range of speeches to draw on from each speaker.

In the US, such speech events are easy to identify (Campbell and Jamieson, 2008). The most prominent are the presidential inauguration address and the State of the Union address, but there are also many others – such as speeches made to a presidential nominating convention and even concession speeches. Such institutionalised speech-moments are perhaps more difficult to identify in the UK – but a number of such events do also structure the political calendar. The monarch, for example, delivers a Queen’s Speech⁶ at the official opening of Parliament, as well as the Queen’s Christmas Message.⁷ For the prime minister, this includes a wide range of addresses, such as prime ministers questions, their annual speech to party conference, the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, and acceptance and concession speeches. All of

⁶ the Queen’s speech is written by the government, and is also known as the ‘Speech from the Throne’

⁷ officially referred to as ‘Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech’

these events are opportunities to assess arguments and policies but also to test the general ability, skill, and character of the prime minister (Finlayson, 2015).

Yet for all these institutionalised speech-moments, Finlayson (2015) argues that the role of the audience is strangely absent in democratic theory. This assertion by Finlayson echoes one made by Myers (1999: 55) 16 years earlier: ‘political leadership typically entails the need to address composite, or heterogeneous, audiences, a situation to which rhetorical theorists have devoted little systematic attention’. Myers (1999: 68) notes that as politicians in democratic systems succeed, they have to deal with larger, more diverse, and more sophisticated constituencies. Myers’ own work on the role of the audience is worth exploring – not least because of his focus on Macmillan’s *Wind of Change* speech, which he cites as an important instance of the rhetoric of diplomacy. Myers (2000) argues that Macmillan’s argumentative and discursive techniques are not additions of finery designed for aesthetic purposes, but that they are essential to the persuasion of the people that comprise his heterogeneous audience. In this example, Myers identifies four distinct groups in Macmillan’s audience.

The first group consists of those who had backed Britain’s old policy of support for white domination in Africa, and thus opposed Macmillan’s core argument. This included the physically present audience: members of South Africa’s Nationalist Party, including the prime minister and cabinet, as well as the right wing of the British Conservative Party. The second group comprises those who had opposed Britain’s support for white domination, and so would likely be sympathetic to Macmillan’s message. This group included black

political leaders of the newly independent countries in Africa, such the ANC. The third group was the international audience – in particular, the US, who had been critical, if accepting, of Britain's imperial presence in Africa. The final distinct group in the audience as identified by Myers was the remainder the British Conservative Party – that is, the moderates – along with corresponding sections of British public opinion. This group had backed Macmillan shared his opinion of the need for change (Myers: 2000). Although Macmillan got support for the policy within the Conservative Party and more broadly from the British public, he did not succeed in keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth. Myers (2000) concludes by arguing that Macmillan's *Wind of Change* speech played a crucial role in shifting the Commonwealth's role to one where the fight between communism and capitalism would become as significant as the loyalty of Commonwealth countries to Britain and its institutions.

More recently, the internet and social media have heralded a radical transformation for political audiences. Virtually all political speeches by senior politicians such as the prime minister now address heterogeneous audiences. Platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, Snapchat and TikToc now offer journalists and ordinary citizens the opportunity to broadcast such events around the globe in real time. Previously, only major addresses would have been televised. This means that speeches delivered in international contexts are likely to be heard by domestic audiences too. Perhaps this transformation means that a consideration of the distinct audiences is of less relevance that it was previously.

This literature review has so far argued that national identity is discursively constructed. It has also highlighted some of the elements scholars of nationhood have identified as being important to the construction of national identity, such as language, history, and international relations. Additionally, it has shown how British political elites' speeches are central to this discursive construction, but little attention has so far been given to an analysis of British politics so far. This section also looked at how the audience can influence the discourses politicians use. In the next section, drawing on the disciplines of international development, international relations and political science, this thesis will explore why Africa is useful in understanding national identity construction by political elites, moving beyond Myers' analysis of Harold Macmillan's *Wind of Change* speech.

2.3 Why Focus on the Role of Africa in National Identity Construction?

There are competing arguments in the UK-Africa literature about the rationale for Britain's continued engagement with Africa after the Cold War. These include securitisation (Porteous, 2005; Abrahamsen, 2005); projecting ideas about the moral nature of Britain (Gallagher, 2013; Chandler, 2012; Harrison, 2013) and post-empire damage limitation (Mayall, 1986; Williams, 2004). In broad terms these different views can be grouped into two areas that have characterised Britain's relationship with Africa. The first is concerned with using Africa to project British morality. In contrast, the second discourse views Africa as an arena in which Britain can maintain or even expand its influence – even as its Empire crumbled. This manifests itself in a variety of ways, from allowing Britain to continue to play its old role of *Pax Britannica* (albeit on a smaller scale), to the trading opportunities offered by Britain's unique relationship with many of its former colonies in Africa.

During the Cold War (1947-1991), 'first world' countries adopted a policy of containment against the communist expansion of the 'second world'. Their doing so provided the most compelling explanation for their interactions with the non-aligned 'third world'⁸ (Ohaegbulam, 1992; Schmidt, 2013). In the post-Cold War era, however, this ceased to explain the rationale for external engagement with Africa. This section begins with some background and context to UK-Africa narratives, as these are crucial in understanding how these narratives emerged, before exploring the narratives in more detail.

⁸ a term that has subsequently become somewhat synonymous with Africa (see Odey, 2013)

2.3.1 Historical Context

Although Britain first established the Colonial Office as a government department in 1768, it was not until over a century later that Africa began to play a central role in the history, foreign policy, self-image and public imagination of the UK. This was particularly marked following the 1884 Berlin Conference and subsequent ‘Scramble for Africa’. In the 1870s, only 10% of Africa was under direct European control. By 1900 European nations had added almost 10 million square miles of Africa (one-fifth of the land area of the globe) to their overseas colonial possessions, accounting for 90% of the continent (Appiah and Gates, 2010). The British Empire alone ruled over 30% of Africa’s population (Adler and Pouwels, 2012), contributing to its position and identity as the global hegemonic power and *Pax Britannica*.

One of the earliest ways in which Africa entered the popular consciousness and discourses of people in Britain was through on the writings and tales of Christian missionaries and explorers during the Victorian period. Through these, Africa became woven into narratives about British identity and its role in the world. The ‘Scramble for Africa’ was itself justified under the guise of halting the slave trade (Pakenham, 1991). Christian missionaries in Africa campaigned against the slave trade, and in some cases speeded the involvement of European states in halting it. The celebrated Scottish missionary-explorer David Livingstone brought much publicity to the cause with his travel journals. Livingstone called for a crusade to defeat the slave trade controlled by Arabs in East Africa, saying that it was eating out the heart of the continent (Sundkler and Steed, 2000).

Britain had previously had some success in halting the slave trade around the shores of Africa, such as in Sierra Leone, The Gold Coast and Bight of Biafra (Manning, 1990). However, Arab traders from north of the Sahara and on the East Coast still traded, and many local chiefs were reluctant to give up the use of slaves. Reports of slaving trips and markets were brought back to Europe by explorers such as Livingstone, and abolitionists in Britain and Europe called for more to be done.

Paradoxically, abolitionism may have contained the seeds of empire. In *Capitalism and Slavery*, Williams (1994) contends that abolition was not purely altruistic but was as economically conditioned as Britain's later empire building in Africa. Although the idealism that motivated abolitionists such as William Wilberforce and Thomas Clarkson is undeniable (Hague, 2008; Clarkson, 2010), Williams argues that Britain could afford to legislate against the slave trade only after it had helped to provide the surplus capital necessary for industrial 'take-off'. Britain had lost much of its slave-owning territory as a result of the American Revolution, and as the leading industrial power in the world, Britain found in abolition a way to work against the interests of its rivals who were still heavily involved in colonial slavery and a plantation economy (Williams, 1994).

During this period, Africa also came to occupy an important place in the hearts and minds of the British public. Within a few months of its publication in 1857, David Livingstone's *Missionary Travels* sold 70,000 copies – and made him so rich and famous that he 'had to avoid situations where he might be mobbed by admirers' (Brantlinger, 1985: 176). Brantlinger argues that if Livingstone was a national hero towards the end of the 1850s, he

was a national saint by the time of his last African expedition in 1872. Even Charles Dickens, who usually hated evangelicals, made an exception of Livingstone – calling him one of those who ‘carry into desert places the water of life’ (Simpson, 1970: 15).

One event which has now entered the mythology of the era and epitomises the British ‘discovery’ of Africa was when Henry Morton Stanley embarked on a 700-mile expedition through the tropical forests to find Livingstone, and reportedly greeted him with the now famous line ‘Dr Livingstone, I presume?’ (Stanley, 1872: 412). Stanley turned his account of this expedition into the best-seller *How I Found Livingstone*. He later followed it with *In Darkest Africa* which sold 150,000, was frequently translated, and was ‘read more universally and with deeper interest than any other publication of [1890]’ (Chamberlain, 2013: 28).

Brantlinger contends that such accounts of African exploration exerted an incalculable influence on British culture and the course of modern history, and that it is difficult to find a clearer example of the Foucauldian concept of discourse as power (Brantlinger, 1990: 180). Importantly, the writings of these explorers were presented as nonfictional quest romances in which the heroic authors are portrayed as moving from adventure to adventure against a dark, infernal backdrop where there are no other characters of equal stature, only bewitched or demonic savages (Ross, 2002).

In their writings, Brantlinger argues, explorers broadly portrayed Africans as amusing or dangerous obstacles or as objects of curiosity, while missionaries portrayed Africans as weak, pitiable, inferior mortals who need to be shown the light. The focus of these stories is not

Africa or Africans but a David Livingstone or a Henry Morton Stanley – Victorian Saint George’s battling the armies of the night (Brantlinger, 1985). As such, it is noteworthy that their writings about Africa were more accurately about creating an identity for themselves.

Livingstone believed that the African was benighted and that the European was the bearer of the light of civilization and true religion. According to Livingstone, Africans were inured to bloodshed and murder, and cared for no god except being bewitched, and that without commerce, Christianity and civilisation the prospects for the ‘dark regions’ were not bright. Jeal (2013: 4) argues that Livingstone, ‘with his missionary aims and his almost messianic passion for exporting British values, seemed to his successors to have provided the moral basis for massive imperial expansion’.

From these early writings, we can see how the two distinct (but interlinked) narratives we have identified began to emerge. The first narrative is rooted in this idea that it was the role of European missionaries to bear of the light of civilisation (and Christianity) into the dark region of Africa. This is what Rudyard Kipling termed the ‘White Man’s Burden’. The second narrative can be traced to the early 19th Century with the idea that British support for abolitionism was not purely altruistic but a way to provide Britain with an economic advantage against its rivals, who were still heavily involved in colonial slavery and a plantation economy. With the collapse of the British Empire, some scholars such as Mayall (1986) contend that British involvement in Africa has been an attempt to maintain its influence in the world

In addition, Victorian missionary-explorers presented two conflicting portrayals of Africans – albeit both in need of ‘civilising’ by Europeans. On the one hand, Africans were portrayed as ‘helpless’ and ‘child-like’ – which helped the narrative of Britain as a moral guider; on the other they are seen as dangerous, savage and cannibalistic. This latter conception could be the basis for a sub-component of the second narrative – that Africa’s underdevelopment is a security threat to Britain and Europe. In the early 20th century, this was also reinforced through pseudoscience – setting the ‘rational’ Europe against ‘primitive’ Africa. In more recent decades, this debate has become re-ignited by the spread of Islam in Africa based on similar crude stereotypes (Keenan, 2009). Here this thesis explores each of these narratives in more detail with reference to the contemporary literature and debates, in order to better understand the post-Cold War context.

2.3.2 Using Africa to Present Britain as a Moral Authority

Since the mid-1980s, UK public perceptions of Africa have been shaped heavily by media coverage and celebrity philanthropy. The charity supergroup Band Aid was formed in 1984 to raise awareness and funds for the Ethiopian famine following Michael Buerk’s BBC broadcast of the ‘biblical famine’ (Eldridge, 1993). Although it was formed from a desire to help, Band Aid has been accused of propagating old colonial narratives of Africa as an undifferentiated, exotic, perennially static and helpless continent (Grant, 2015), as well as the notion of the ‘white saviour’ (Jeffreys and Allatson, 2015). In some ways, these can be seen as a continuity of the narratives set out by Livingstone and other missionaries a century earlier.

Grant (2015) argues that although this movement emanated from benevolent intentions, through the choice of the Band Aid song-lyrics, the images displayed, and the comments and decisions made regarding the concert events, the movement served to 'other' people from the Global South. Thus, Band Aid and Live Aid/8 contributed to, and compounded, problematic truths which suggest that the Global North is superior to the south. Such truths were also evident during the colonial period, and were promoted through exhibitions that advocated that people from the north were superior to colonial natives, and that colonialism was beneficial to the colonies, i.e., aiding the natives to improve themselves. Consequently, Band Aid, Live Aid/8 and colonial exhibitions all proclaimed to aid the people of the Global South while advocating problematic truths.

This same theme of generating moral authority through interactions with Africa is argued to continue under New Labour. In 1997, Tony Blair turned the Overseas Development Administration, a wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth office, into a new Department for International Development headed by a Cabinet minister. Its core aim was to fight global poverty, marking a turning point for Britain's aid programme which had hitherto focused on economic development (Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000). The aid budget itself was more than doubled, which was part of New Labour's effort to ensure, in the words of Robin Cook, that its foreign policy had an 'ethical dimension' (Williams, 2002). In many ways, Africa became a testing ground for this ethical foreign policy. In 2004, Blair established the Commission for Africa initiative, which served as the blueprint for the G8 Summit in 2005. In accordance with the Commission's recommendations, Blair and Gordon Brown put aid to Africa and debt cancellation at the centre of the agenda (Payne, 2006).

Gallagher (2009; 2013) puts forward the theory that this focus on Africa was about displaying the capacity of the ‘good’ British state. She contends that Britain’s relationship with Africa under New Labour represented something new, and that British state actors, in attempting to ‘do good’ in Africa, constructed the idea that they were involved in an idealised project. This was enabled through the sanitisation of historical engagement, and an apparent lack of British interests in Africa.

According to Gallagher (2013) this gave British policy in Africa a moral rather than political tone, and that narratives of Africa were more accurately the narrative Britain creates for itself, about its history, identity and role in the world. That is, when British politicians interact with or talk about Africa, they present their actions and words as beyond their own national self-interest, and that they are involved in a ‘noble cause’, transcending politics and economic interests. Gallagher’s work has not generated much discussion in the literature⁹, which is noteworthy because it means her central theses have not been revisited in a major way.

This argument is similar to one made by Harrison (2013), who argues that campaigning around Africa has mainly (although not exclusively) been a ‘conversation’ about the moral nature of Britishness. In this sense, Africa campaigns are ‘introverted’: developing imagery

⁹ *Britain and Africa under Blair* has been cited 18 times on Google Scholar. All of these references are only in passing, and none of them address the substantive points in Gallagher’s arguments. For example, Graham Harrison’s *The African Presence: Representations of Africa in the Construction of Britishness* (2013) only mentions it in a sentence on page 51. Chafer and Cumming (2013) mention the book in passing in a footnote on page 167.

and discourse about Africa addressed to Britons in which they tend to take centre-stage. This echoes the travel journals of the Victorian missionary-explorers such as Stanley and Livingstone who made themselves the protagonists of their writings about Africa. The notion that Britain is engaged in a 'moral crusade' in Africa derives from widespread and historically deep-rooted conception of the continent as needy and helpless.

British identity in this context is linked to taking up the cause of the ignored African poor in an attempt to prompt better governance from African leaders, who are usually described in either starkly 'good' or (more often) 'bad' terms (Gallagher, 2009). As such, Gallagher argues that discourses about Africa have contributed to the construction of British identity. Harrison argues the connection between Africa campaigning and British virtue is key here. Representations of Africa speak to a British national identity that is ordinal: quite simply that Britain does things about/to Africa (Harrison, 2013: 2).

According to Gallagher (2009: 2), the idea of Britain 'doing good' in Africa was established under New Labour. In a speech in Addis Ababa in 2004, Blair said:

In all the things that I deal with in politics, and the things that make people cynical and disengaged from the political process, when I come and see what is happening here [in Ethiopia] and see what could happen, I know that however difficult politics is, there is at least one noble cause worth fighting for (Gallagher, 2009: 2).

Gallagher (2013) goes on to argue that British engagement with Africa is aimed at projecting a British self-image and identity of competence and potency, which is more difficult to achieve in the complexity of domestic policies or other more difficult foreign policy contexts. This view of Africa as a blank arena in which Britain can project its own vision of its values and ideas is what makes Africa unique to study in relation to British national identity. Therefore, there is a compelling case to be made that Britain's policy and discourses about Africa reveal far more about a British desire to project a sense of moral authority than about the developmental needs of Africa.

Despite this, Gallagher herself concedes there were occasions on which British interests were put before African welfare. These include the sale of military traffic systems to Tanzania, implicit backing for Ethiopian incursions into Somalia, and failure act on condemnation of human rights abuses in the DRC, Sudan and Zimbabwe with military action (Gallagher, 2013: 145). Taylor and Williams (2004) also note the selectivity of Labour's criticism regarding fraudulent elections – such as focusing on Zimbabwe whilst ignoring those in Zambia and Madagascar. In the wake of the 'War on Terror', New Labour was also accused of ignoring the poor human rights record of Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi in favour renewing a military cooperation agreement that allowed British troops to use bases in Kenya. Gallagher concedes these tarnish the ideal of an ethical policy in Africa, but she argues that they are exceptions rather than a convincing argument that Britain's post-Cold War Africa policy can be explained through a more conventional framework (Gallagher, 2013: 145).

A number of scholars concur with Gallagher's assertion that New Labour's approach to Africa represented something new. Ero (2001), for example, argues the number of Africa-related initiatives that emerged when New Labour came to power suggest a different approach compared to the ad hoc methods of the past. Quoting *Prospect* magazine's Fred Halliday, she argues that Labour's 'long absence from office, and the desire to strike a new note in foreign and domestic policy, account for the way Labour has presented itself in the international arena'. She contends this was also from a desire to break from the Major administration and what Labour saw as Britain's increasing marginalisation within the international community.

Additionally, Mumford and Selck (2010) look at foreign policy speeches and conclude that New Labour under Blair adopted a more moral rhetoric than previous Conservative governments, and that this shift 'was not eminent until 2002' suggesting that it was a result of the attacks on September 11th 2001. However, they admit that 'one limitation of their study is its sole focus on Thatcher's rhetoric to indicate the Conservative foreign policy agenda. Ignoring John Major's time in government leaves a seven-year gap' (Mumford and Selck, 2010: 309). They justify this by asserting that Thatcher was the more important agenda setter for the Conservatives. This decision to ignore Major is evident more broadly in the UK-Africa literature; there is an emphasis on Blair and Cameron, in contrast to little analysis of Major and Brown because of their perceived insignificance. One of the main reasons for choosing these four consecutive prime ministers was to address this imbalance in the current literature and assess claims of continuity and discontinuity in UK-Africa narratives despite the lack of research from 1990-1997 and from 2007-2010.

Despite these arguments by Mumford and Selck (2010), Gallagher (2009; 2013), and Ero (2001), the ‘newness’ of the New Labour agenda is questionable. It has become popular to view 1997 and Blair’s landslide as a landmark moment and paradigm shift. Douglas Hurd, for example, quoted in Abrahamsen and Williams (2001) was annoyed by pretence that New Labour’s shift of two or three degrees was a shift of 180 in foreign policy thinking – and that somehow all their predecessors were ‘immoral rogues’. Abrahamsen and Williams (2001) argue that New Labour was instead successful at *branding* itself as ethical and caring, and that there was relatively little new about New Labour’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, they argue that most Western countries started adopting democracy and human rights into foreign policy rhetoric – so New Labour were not alone on this. Taylor (2010: 35) agrees that New Labour’s Africa policies largely continued on the same path as previous governments, preserving a ‘calculating eye to the national interest and Britain’s international reputation’ (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001: 249).

It is also noteworthy that seeking a more engaged role in the world on issues of poverty and development was not new to the UK under New Labour. The Department for International Development – for example - existed previously, and so its re-establishment in 1997 does not necessarily represent a ground-breaking change. Likewise, the 1997 White Paper was not the first UK White Paper on international development – the first was published over two decades before this (Hewitt and Killick, 1998). The 1997 Australian Aid review shows how New Labour was not unique in this regard either (Mullen, 1999). These detract from the argument that New Labour’s focus on ethical foreign policy represented something ‘new’. An analysis of political elites’ speeches before and after New Labour can help illuminate to

what extent the temporal dimension of UK-Africa relations was punctuated by discontinuities.

So far, this section has presented the argument that Africa's centrality in British foreign policy under New Labour represented a new moral cause for Britain more than it signified a commitment to the development needs of Africa (Gallagher, 2009; 2013; Harrison, 2013). It has also detailed nuances to this argument, such as that New Labour's focus on Africa was not new, but simply reflected a change in presentation of Britain's focus on Africa (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001). This section of the literature review moves on to provide more detailed explanations for how and why Africa specifically occupies such a unique place in British consciousness and foreign policy, and why it is useful to study to understand the construction of British national identity.

As discussed previously, one of Gallagher's central arguments is that Africa provides Britain with the opportunity to construct a self-image of competency because it transcends the complexity of domestic politics. Gallagher (2013: 1) goes on to argue that for realists, Africa represents a place of anarchy and free-flowing aggression, while for liberal-utopians, it is represents harmony and idealism. In both cases, Africa symbolises an arena where 'normal' politics can be transcended and where actors coalesce in doing abstract 'good', free of more contentious issues. As a blank space where 'goodness' can be practised, Africa is ideal.

In a 2004 BBC article, Taylor makes a similar argument, putting it succinctly: 'Africa is ripe for gesture politics because it's low cost financially and low cost politically. It makes good

headlines, shows you care and plugs into New Labour imagery. But if nothing is achieved, then no-one expected much and they can blame others' (Taylor, quoted in Geoghegan, 2004). Chandler (2003) concurs, saying that one important factor behind major western powers making foreign policy concerns central to defining their administrations is the difficulty of generating moral authority through domestic politics. He goes on to argue that foreign policy has become an important way for cohering governments and institutions, often appearing to be without any clear consensus-building political agenda of their own. Chandler claims that attempts to resolve questions of legitimacy through ethical policy led governments and institutions to focus on the previously peripheral concerns regarding human rights.

However, Williams (2002) notes that New Labour stopped using Cook's notion of an 'ethical dimension' to present its foreign policy to the public. He argues that while explicit ethical standards provide important benchmarks for activists and public intellectuals, they can also serve to highlight the failures of an administration at the expense of more positive developments. So discarding the language of an 'ethical dimension' may actually encourage a more sophisticated public debate that moves beyond the facile and misleading belief that foreign policies are either 'ethical' or 'unethical'.

Meanwhile, Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi (2005) present an alternative – and perhaps more compelling – explanation to Chandler about why governments engaged with the concerns of human rights advocacy groups. They note that New Labour's 1997 and 2001 White Papers do not mention rights, and that there had been a history of hostility to the

language of rights, so question why – in 2005 – there was less hostility (even enthusiasm) for a rights-based approach. They contend that with the end of the Cold War, there was a more comprehensive view of rights encompassing all rights (civil, political, economic, social and cultural), and from there it was not a big jump to concerns such as food security as rights. They also cite the impact of NGO activism, who spearheaded rights at the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995. Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi contend that rights can be seen as a means through which openly intrusive conditionalities that no longer fit the rhetoric of partnership could be brought in. That is, rights were a way of reframing participation. This challenges the idea that Africa was empty realm used by New Labour project for gesture politics, and suggests that claims of discontinuities in UK-Africa relations are perhaps exaggerated.

Thus, though compelling as a concept, deriving moral authority through international relationships (and particularly though an idealised Africa) has some limitations in that the argument largely considers the domestic perspective. The idea that Africa is a place that is distant from the messy, banal realities of domestic politics that can be used to construct fantasies, does not take into account Britain's international role. In this capacity, where narratives more open to criticism because they are not so distant, it is hard to sanitise historical engagement or simplify complex arguments for domestic consumption.

If political elites create different versions of Africa in different spheres, it is central in understanding how Africa is used to create narratives about Britain and its place in the world. For example, we may find one simplified, crude construction for a domestic audience

– sanitised of historical engagement. We might find that when political elites talk on the international stage, there is another more nuanced construction for audiences that are more familiar with the complexities of the continent and aware of British historical involvement in Africa. Of course, it is not possible to entirely separate out audiences; modern media has meant that speeches delivered in international contexts are likely to be heard by domestic audiences too.

However, the idea that this was simply a New Labour project is questionable, and is one of the points this thesis will seek to clarify by looking at longer-term trends in the post-Cold War period. In 2005, Cameron claimed that he was the ‘heir to Blair’ (Wintour, 2011). Soon after, he began adopting some of Blair’s mannerisms, phrases and ideas, including – perhaps – the concept of using Africa to shape the UK’s national identity with an emphasis on British morality. Cameron made two visits to Africa as leader of the opposition. Beswick (2019) argues that in doing so, Cameron sought to ‘demonstrate his credentials as a potential international statesman’ and ‘position engagement with Africa as part of Conservative Party modernisation’. It also represented his commitment to modernisation and to detoxify the image of the Conservatives as the ‘nasty party’ (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012: 133).

Throughout this section, we have explored the argument that Africa’s centrality in British politicians’ discourses and foreign policy under New Labour was essentially about projecting a moral identity of Britain instead of a commitment to the needs and priorities of Africa (Gallagher, 2009; 2013; Harrison, 2013). It has also highlighted arguments that call into question the newness of New Labour’s focus on Africa. These competing arguments will be

tested through the analysis of prime ministers' speeches. The next section of the literature review moves on to explore a competing argument; that Britain's involvement in Africa can be explained through a desire to project power and maintain influence in the world.

2.3.3 Using Africa to Display British Power and Influence

A contrasting argument is that Britain's post-Cold War engagement with Africa can be more compellingly explained through its desire to project power and influence in the world, manifesting itself in a variety of different ways – from allowing Britain to continue to play its old role of *Pax Britannica* (albeit on a smaller scale), to the trading opportunities offered by Britain's unique relationship with former in Africa. With the collapse of the British Empire, some authors in the literature contend that British involvement in Africa has been an attempt to maintain its influence in the world. In the two decades following the Second World War, Britain granted independence to most of its colonies. This process largely began under Attlee, but was resisted by his successors Churchill and Eden, and then greatly accelerated under Macmillan following his landmark *Wind of Change* speech (Hyam, 2007). Dean Acheson, who had been the US Secretary of State under President Truman, noted 'Great Britain [had] lost an empire and not found a role yet' (Acheson, 1963: 163).

Williams (2004) argues that that ever since Britain's retreat from colonialism in Africa, the primary concern of successive governments towards the continent has been aptly summarised by James Mayall (1986) as one of 'damage limitation'. Mayall argued that Britain's Africa policy revolved around the need to turn its imperial legacies 'from liabilities into assets [which required the creation of] a network of low key, but still special, relationships between Britain and her former colonies' (Mayall, 1986: 54). Williams (2004) contends that successive British governments have achieved this through three main mechanisms: the organisation and management of the international economy; bilateral relations – primarily economic in character; and the political organisation of international

society. However, Taylor (2010) claims that even under Conservative governments under Thatcher and Major, whose members have the most favourable attitude toward the colonial endeavour and retain romantic attachments to the Commonwealth, Africa was not a core priority. A discourse analysis of speeches delivered by British prime ministers in the post-Cold War era would help to shed light on whether this is indeed the case, and perhaps also the reason for this.

As part of this second argument, there is evidence to support the claim that Britain's relationship with Africa is rooted in concerns about security rather than development or British morality. For example, in contrast to the quote from Blair in the previous section about noble causes worth fighting for, in his 2001 conference speech, Blair stated:

The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and angrier (Gallagher, 2013: 11).

This metaphor draws on imagery used by the missionary-explorer David Livingstone in the mid-nineteenth century – that the Central African slave trade was ‘the open sore of the world’ (Provenzano, 2010). Porteous (2005) and Abrahamsen (2004; 2005) argue that Britain's relations with Africa post-9/11 were rooted in security rather than development.

This contradicts the idea that British involvement was of ‘disinterested good’ or even enlightened self-interest. Gallagher herself points out that Africa was not a key issue for Blair

during his first term. However, Africa was on the agenda by the end of 2001. She argues that for Blair, the war on terror and development in Africa were elements of the same programme. By contrast, Porteous (2005) contends that at the end of the Cold War, the West developed new approaches to Africa. Narrow strategic interests were put to the side, and fixed development goals were set, such as poverty reduction and debt relief. Talk of accountability and reform of international governance to reduce marginalisation of poor countries. Porteous argues that New Labour played an active role in steering this approach, but that the events of 9/11 intruded on this redefinition, and security and ideology crowded back; Africa with its large Muslim population was seen as region in need of attention in the War on Terror.

Abrahamsen (2004; 2005) concurs. She argues that New Labour's increasing attention to Africa is part of ongoing securitisation of the continent in the context of the War on Terror. That is, Africa moved from a category of development/humanitarianism to one of potential risk, threat and danger. Africa was more frequently drawn into 'security' debates where aspects of Africa's underdevelopment was regarded as representing a threat to the West, possibly facilitating terrorism. This presents a challenge to Gallagher's argument that Africa represents an area where British policies are motivated by selfless concern for Africa and remains unclouded by the complexity and ambiguity normally associated with more political relationships.

This concern about security has led to visible displays of hard power by Britain in Africa, most notably in Sierra Leone in 2000. British troops were deployed in Operation Palliser,

originally to evacuate foreign nationals. Before deployment, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone had been on the verge of collapse, however the operation exceeded its original mandate and took full military action to defeat rebels and restore order. The British were the catalyst for the ceasefire that ended the civil war. Tony Blair was regarded as a hero by many in Sierra Leone. Marr (2008: 551) argues that the success of ground attacks, real and threatened, over air strikes alone was influential on how Blair planned the Iraq War, and that the success of the first three wars Blair fought 'played to his sense of himself as a moral war leader'. Whilst this is intimately linked to the first narrative about projecting British morality in the world, it is also fundamentally about British influence and power – and Britain's ability to act as a global power policing the world. This narrative can also be seen in Blair's speech on Rwanda. He portrayed a new world order as one where the United Kingdom was always ready to defend human rights and democracy in Africa. 'If Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1993, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral duty to act there also.'

This view is echoed by Reid (2014), who looks at international engagement with Africa from the First World War and the height of colonial rule through to the present day. Reid argues that there have been significant changes in the relationship between Britain and Africa throughout this period – from colonialism to decolonisation, to the emergence of African nation states, the Cold War, through to current humanitarianism. However, Reid contends that despite this, there has also been much continuity in external policy and perception of Africa. In particular, Africa is valued for the economic opportunity it offers as a place of markets, materials and people, and is simultaneously seen as a military and political threat,

whose inherent volatility makes intervention both desirable and inevitable. Thus, Reid argues that whilst the context has changed significantly, engagement with Africa is still fundamentally economic and military in nature. Reid argues that British concern for Africa's development began comparatively recently, and that even this is rooted in the paternalistic altruism of the 19th century (as discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to abolitionists and missionaries).

Another way in which Britain has looked to maintain influence in Africa is through trade. Mawdsley (2015) argues that under the Cameron coalition government, the economic growth agenda returned to the centre of the Department for International Development's (DFID) mandate. An increased focus on the private sector could be seen as a reaction to an increasingly hostile domestic context regarding foreign aid and internationalism more broadly after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008. This increased emphasis on trade perhaps opens up a new more nuanced narrative about the role of Africa in the world, one more free from the paternalism often associated with aid and development. An interesting area for further exploration, therefore, would be to see if this is reflected and correlates with Conservative administrations (whose natural emphasis is on trade) compared to Labour administrations.

In recent decades, China's growing presence in Africa has introduced a new dynamic in Africa's relations with external actors. Motivated by the prospect of resources and new markets, China has begun challenging US and European dominance in Africa. African governments have responded eagerly to this new source of investment and aid, as well as to

China's readiness to overlook conditionalities that are usually placed on aid by countries such as Britain (Alden, 2006). The US and Europe claim that China's model of resource and infrastructure-focused assistance is undermining reforms by entrenching corrupt regimes (Kotsopoulos, 2014). It is for this reason that Britain may be seeking to reinforce its influence in the region – akin to a modern Marshall plan that seeks to bring African countries back into a sphere of British/European influence through trade.

2.4 Conclusion

This literature review has focused on three areas of literature that are central to this thesis. Firstly, it argues that nations can be thought of as ‘imagined political communities’. The concept of the nation is conveyed and communicated through discourse, and there is no single national identity – instead, there are competing national identities constructed according to context. Secondly, political leaders, such as British prime ministers, are able to propagate specific conceptions of national identity because of the wide audience afforded to them. Political speeches are of particular importance in doing this, and there is a lack of analysis regarding the role of speeches in British politics. Finally, the competing arguments for Britain’s post-Cold War engagement with Africa are best summed up as two strands exemplified by Reid (2014) and Harrison (2013). Reid argues that Africa has long been seen in terms of economic opportunity, and although immediate contexts have changed over time, international engagement with Africa remains essentially economic and military. By contrast, Harrison (2013) argues that British campaigning around Africa has mainly been a ‘conversation’ about the moral nature of Britishness.

Africa occupies a unique position in the consciousness that makes it useful for studying British national identity. On the one hand it may be seen as a place for gesture politics because ‘it’s low cost financially and low cost politically. It makes good headlines, shows you care’ (Taylor, quoted in Geoghegan, 2004). On the other, it is a continent that offers economic opportunities whilst also being a security threat whose instability makes intervention both desirable and inevitable.

This research makes contributions to the second and third of these areas of literature explored in this chapter – relating to the role and study of British political speeches and to the place of Africa in post-Cold War British consciousness and foreign policy. It does so by providing a systematic study of speeches as a means of exploring British national identity, and by assessing continuities and discontinuities in discourses in British prime ministers' speeches relating to Africa. This literature review has important implications for the research methodology and methods, which are explored in the next chapter. As it argues that national identity is socially constructed through discourse, it follows that a discourse analysis is an appropriate method to examine this. Additionally, this chapter has found that political speeches are often the starting point for studies of national identity, and these will form the basis of this research. The methods and methodology are detailed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

Methodology

Having critically reviewed the existing literature, this chapter focuses on methodology. It begins by looking at the research epistemology and ontology, and then addresses the research approach, strategy, and design – including data collection and analysis methods. It also covers research ethics, positionality, and limitations of this research, and concludes with the analytical framework used in this research. As this chapter deals with delineating an appropriate methodological approach for the research questions, it is appropriate to revisit the three research questions central to this thesis.

1. Through their speeches, to what extent and in what ways have British prime ministers in the post-Cold War era invoked different discourses about Britain's relationship with Africa?
2. Are there noticeable patterns in the use of different discourses over this time (for example, by political administration, or by social/political/economic circumstance in Britain) that may explain the use of such discourses?
3. What does this tell us about the way discourses about Africa and UK relations with Africa are used by prime ministers in the construction of British national identity?

3.1 Research Philosophy

In order to address these research questions, it is important to firstly understand the research philosophy. Marsh and Furlong (2010: 184) use the metaphor that research philosophy is ‘a skin not a sweater’ – meaning that it ‘cannot be put on and taken off whenever the researcher sees fit’. That is, even if the ontological and epistemological positions are unacknowledged, they still shape the assumptions of a researcher – including their approach to theory and the methods they use (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This is explored in this section through a brief discussion of ontology and epistemology.

Ontology concerns the nature of reality. More precisely, how far ‘reality’ is constructed by the researcher as being of an objective nature, or more as the product of individual cognition. Epistemology, meanwhile, concerns the nature of knowledge – that is, what can be known about the world? Broadly speaking, there are two main research paradigms that take different views on ontology and epistemology: positivism (also known as objectivism, foundationalism, or realism) and constructivism (also known as interpretivism, anti-foundationalism, or relativism). The former posits a ‘real’ world, ‘out there’, independent of our knowledge of it. The latter sees the world as socially constructed (Marsh and Smith, 2001: 529-530).

As detailed in Chapter 2, this thesis builds on the idea that nations are ‘imagined communities’ constructed through discourse. As such, it sits within this latter constructivist paradigm – it embraces a moderate constructivism as its epistemological starting point (Reisigl, 2017: 48). The constructivist paradigm grew out of the philosophy of Husserl’s

phenomenology, as well as other German philosophers' study of interpretive understanding called hermeneutics (Clegg and Slife, 2009: 26). Constructivism argues that structure and actor are mutually constituted. Although material constraints do exist, what is important from the constructivist perspective is 'how an action does or does not reproduce both the actor and the structure' (Hopf, 1998: 172).

Constructivists do not generally begin with a theory (as with postpositivists), instead, they 'generate or inductively develop a theory or pattern of meanings' throughout the research process (Creswell, 2003: 9). This means that a constructivist researcher is most likely to rely on qualitative data collection methods and analysis or a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods (mixed methods). Quantitative data may be utilised in a way that supports or expands upon qualitative data and effectively deepens the description. Thus, many researchers now view qualitative and quantitative methods as complementary (Creswell, 2003; Thomas, 2003; Hardt-Mautner, 1995). The discussion of qualitative and quantitative approaches and their relationship to each other will be expanded on in the next section.

3.2 Methodological Approach

This section focuses on the methodological approach and justifying which methods are most appropriate for answering the research questions. This section will look at these at a theoretical level. As briefly mentioned in the previous section, although constructivists tend to use qualitative research methods, there is a place for quantitative methods too. Indeed,

combining these approaches – in what is known as ‘mixed methods’ can provide the most useful insight for research such as this.

This section explains why combining qualitative tools with thematic analysis and critical discourse analysis is the best approach for understanding the discursive construction of British national identity through British prime minister’s speeches about Africa. However, it is important to understand the argument made by Fowler and Kress (1979: 197): ‘there is no analytic routine through which a text can be run, with a critical description issuing automatically at the end’. Fowler stresses that ‘[c]ritical interpretation requires historical knowledge and sensitivity, which can be possessed by human beings but not by machines’ (Fowler 1991: 68). This means that any tool, or method, which creates distance by lifting discourse out of context, to consider them in isolation is the ‘very antithesis’ to approaches within this field (Fowler and Kress, 1979: 198; Hardt-Mautner, 1995).

While this view, according to Hardt-Mautner (1995), continues to be valid and applicable to software programmes use in general, she makes the case for an approach which combines the quantitative methods of corpus linguistics with the qualitative methods of CDA, in order to make up for what ‘is usually lost in terms of breadth’ in qualitative research (Hardt-Mautner, 1995: 3). That is, although coding distances the researcher from the text, gathering quantitative information can help offer valuable insight into the data. Importantly, however, there must be a clear distinction between the quantitative and qualitative components of the research, with quantitative tools remaining separate from a textual analysis where the complete texts are examined in detail for the ‘full ideological significance’ of expressions.

Thus, whilst quantitative tools provide the means for a large scale overview, this is not sufficient in itself to count as a method of analysis. van Dijk suggests that a ‘deep qualitative analysis [on a smaller selection of data will] generally yield much more insight’ (MacMillan, 2005). Therefore, these approaches are not incompatible – but it must be understood that the quantitative element of this mixed-methods approach does not constitute analysis *per se*. Instead, the quantitative tools are used to understand the overt content and context of the speeches, which will help inform subsequent qualitative textual analysis.

3.2.1 Quantitative Tools

The literature that focuses on the analysis of political speeches shows that some researchers favour the use quantitative tools. One such example is provided by Charteris-Black (2005), who uses a quantitative method to track the frequency and usage of metaphors by various political figures in an attempt to understand what this reveals about their leadership styles. He compiled a corpus of speeches for each political figure he analysed, and then categorised these into themes, such as ‘personification’, ‘light and darkness’, ‘freedom and slavery’ – see Figure 3:1.

<i>Source domain</i>	<i>Churchill</i>	<i>Thatcher</i>	<i>Blair</i>	<i>King</i>	<i>Clinton</i>	<i>Bush (Father & son)</i>	<i>Total</i>
JOURNEYS	48	26	75	140	76	59	424
PERSONIFICATION	144	15	31	18	9	110	327
CREATION & CONSTRUCTION			35		82	35	152
DESTRUCTION			18		28	21	67
OTHER REIFICATION			28	20	8	30	86
CONFLICT		53	27	14	7		101
HEALTH & ILLNESS		24	10	20	6		60
ANIMALS	15	14	8			10	47
FIRE	13				10		23
RELIGION/MORALITY	13	10	6		18		47
LIGHT & DARKNESS	33		5	23		23	84
FREEDOM & SLAVERY	23		14	26			63
BUILDINGS	12						12
LIFE & DEATH		14	15		76	9	114
PLANTS		11					11
LANDSCAPE	5			26	7		38
BELL				23			23
CRIME & PUNISHMENT						24	24
FINANCE			13			29	42
WEATHER	5			18	6		29
SEA	9				5		14
STORY						22	22
OTHER	53	21	10	26	21	82	213
TOTAL	373	188	295	354	359	454	2,023

Figure 3:1. Overview of Metaphor Types by Source Domain (Charteris-Black, 2005)

Another example of how quantitative methods have been used is provided by van Noije and Hijmans (2005), whose research was discussed previously in Chapter 2. The authors first created an inventory of the defining themes of national identity and nationalism addressed by French presidents' speeches. They then took note of the wording and sentiment in which these themes were framed to produce Figure 3:2. It should be noted that the authors incorrectly use a line graph to plot a discreet dataset (their themes); such data is not continuous and therefore should be plotted using bar charts. This research learns from this mistake whilst also appreciating that the plotting of such themes can reveal about national identity. However, such purely corpus-based methods as used by Charteris-Black (2005) and van Noije and Hijmans (2005 study text in isolation, and therefore to draw conclusions directly from them would contradict the critical approach as set out earlier in this chapter.




Figure 3:2. Number of remarks by French president (van Noije and Hijmans; 2005)

Content analysis can also be conducted quantitatively, and can be used – for example – to track broad trends in narratives. This can be helpful for creating tools such as word clouds that help reveal these trends and themes that can be investigated further with qualitative methods. Burnham *et al.* (2004) note that quantitative content analysis was stimulated by the need to develop a more objective and systematic method for analysing the rapidly increasing volume of communication produced by governments, companies and other organisations such as newspapers and television companies. Berelson, one of the pioneers of content analysis research, defines quantitative content analysis as ‘a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ (Berelson, 1952: 18). As the content analysis is conducted under clearly specified conditions that make it systematic and objective, content analysis can be replicated by other researchers.

One problem with quantitative content analysis is described by Johnston (2006: 383). ‘Researchers, particularly (but not exclusively) novice qualitative researchers [find] themselves coding in a somewhat mechanistic manner, often for excessively long periods of time [...] The incessant desire to code every part of a document without taking the time to think and reflect upon the data can lead to an overly descriptive prosaic project’. This desire to code excessively is referred to in the literature as a ‘coding trap’.

A final example of the use of quantitative tools in textual analysis is provided by Mumford and Selck (2010). They use TEXTPACK, which codes words, word roots and word strings. The authors began by selecting a speech for each politician they were focusing on to signify their broad views on international relations. In order to achieve semantic validity, whereby

the dictionary must be 'sensitive to the linguistic contexts of the word' as well as ensuring the correct meanings, they applied a three-step process. First, they evaluated the speeches and chose words and phrases they felt denoted 'morality' or 'national interest'. Mumford and Selck say they achieved this by selecting words and phrases that clearly matched the concepts identified in the literature, such as 'moral', 'environment', and 'national interest'. Second, the sentences that were recognised to carry connotations of morality or national interest were filtered, and the nouns, adjectives and phrases carrying those meanings were selected. In doing so, the authors found that words such as 'international' and 'United Nations' were regularly used in value-laden ways.

Out of the three examples looked at in this section, the quantitative tools used in this research build on the examples by van Noije and Hijmans (2005) and Mumford and Selck (2010). It does so by recognising that searching the data for specific keywords from the literature review can help identify trends. It also appreciates that plotting this data in a similar manner to Figure 3.2 can help appreciate the significance of different trends in relation to each other. The quantitative tools used in this thesis are set out in Chapter 4.

3.2.2 Discourse Analysis

A recurrent theme in the literature on discourse analysis is that discourses reproduce the everyday assumptions of society, and that those common perceptions and understandings are encouraged and reinforced by those with access to the media, such as politicians, journalists and academics (Burnham *et al.*, 2004). As such, scholars have increasingly come to realise the importance of language and, in particular, political language.

There are five major approaches to analysing discourse according to Howarth (2000: 2-5). Firstly, positivists view discourses as ‘cognitive schemata’ which are defined as ‘the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’. Secondly, the realistic approach views discourse as a structured system in itself, and the purpose of analysing it is to describe how they contribute to the causation of events and social processes. Thirdly, the Marxist view of discourse analysis centres on the link of discourse to the contradictory process of economic production in capitalist structures. Fourthly, critical discourse analysis is similar to the Marxist approach but stresses a sociological rather than an economic structure within which to carry out discourse analysis. In this approach, human meaning and understandings are seen as crucial in explaining the social world. Fifthly, Howarth (2000) argues that post-structuralists and post-Marxists view social structures as inherently vague, partial and conditional.

This thesis builds on this fourth approach identified by Howarth, critical discourse analysis (CDA). Fairclough (2000) argues that CDA views language as one element of social practice, and aims to see how it is articulated along with other elements. CDA is particularly concerned with social change and how it relates to social relations of power and domination.

Wodak (2006: 65) argues that CDA:

is not concerned with evaluating what is 'right' or 'wrong'. CDA [...] should also justify theoretically why certain interpretations of discursive events seem more valid than others. One of the methodical ways for critical discourse analysts to minimize the risk of being biased is to follow the principle of triangulation. Thus one of the most salient distinguishing features of the DHA is its endeavour to work with different approaches, multimethodically and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information .

Fairclough (2000) views discourses to be performative, meaning-making attempts to make sense of the world through words and language. The study of discourse assumes that language, as a part of the culture from which it is drawn, is social practice. In this take on the connection between the ideational and the material, the structuring power of language fulfils a performative function because governments have to use language (written or spoken) to mobilise support, generate consensus around policy positions and legitimise actions taken at home and abroad (Fairclough 2000). Simpson and Hall (2012: 136) have argued that 'discourse analysis should reveal as much about the contexts as about the text' because it is closely attentive to the various audiences for linguistic performances as well as 'language use in a social context'.

Looking at other studies relating to the use of discourse in the construction of national identity, we find that other authors also favour Critical Discourse Analysis – such as Wodak *et al.* (2009) in their study of Austria¹⁰, and Broad and Daddow (2010), whose focus is on the UK Labour Party's discourse on the EU.

However, Potter and Wetherell (1987: 168) contend that the 'analysis of discourse is like riding a bicycle compared to conducting experiments or analysing survey data which resemble baking cakes from a recipe. There is no obvious parallel to well-controlled experimental design and test of statistical significance [...] it is not a case of stating first you do this and then you do that. The skills required are developed as one tries to make sense of transcripts and identify the organizational features of documents'. Despite this variety of conceptualisations of discourse and disagreements over how to perform discourse analysis, Broad and Daddow (2010) argue that one thing that unites scholars of foreign policy language is that they are interested in what Doty describes as how 'particular interpretive dispositions [...] create certain processes and exclude others' (Doty, quoted in Gaskarth 2006: 327). Gaskarth adds that discourses are productive in the sense that they do not neutrally reflect an objective reality 'out there' but actively construct it.

¹⁰ Wodak *et al.* (2009: 2) state that although their study focuses on Austria, it is by no means restricted to it. Many of its insights, especially its theoretical and methodological approach, which was specially developed for their investigation, are equally applicable to other countries.

3.2.3 Discourse-Historical Approach

This section begins by explaining the discourse analysis used in this thesis – the Discourse-Historical approach (DHA) – and its origins, before moving on to discuss its application in this thesis. This chapter concludes by integrating the methodology and analytical framework in Table 3.4 to help explain the structure of the rest of the thesis.

The DHA was pioneered and refined by Ruth Wodak (Wodak *et al.*, 1990; Wodak *et al.*, 1994; Wodak and van Dijk, 2000; Wodak and Chilton, 2005; Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Wodak *et al.*, 2009), and embraces a moderate constructivism as its epistemological starting point (Reisigl, 2017: 48). It was developed in the context of the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim, a former Secretary-General of the UN. As it emerged that Waldheim had kept secret his service as an intelligence officer in the Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II, the DHA was developed to study the semi-public discourses that emerged¹¹ – with a specific focus on anti-Semitism in its historical context and Austrian national identity (Wodak *et al.*, 1990; 1994). Notably, both of these pioneering DHA works used speeches from politicians as part of their empirical data. Since then, the DHA has been used in a variety of contexts – such as the analysis of overt and covert forms of racism in national parliaments (Wodak and van Dijk, 2000), the discursive construction of European identities in the speeches of German, British, and French politicians (Wodak and Weiss, 2005), and

¹¹ For example, in Austrian newspapers, the New York Times, daily news broadcasts and TV news, statements by politicians, TV discussions and news documentaries

discourses about refugees and asylum seekers in the British press from 1996-2006 (Delanty, Wodak and Jones, 2011).

Building on the research from 1990 and 1994, Wodak *et al.* (1999) examined the relationships between the discursive construction of national sameness and difference, and the ways in which this leads to the political and social exclusion of specific communities. They also offered a general theoretical and methodological framework that can be applied for the analysis of the discursive construction of national identities in various contexts and national states (Reisigl, 2017: 45).

When revising their 1999 research and framework a decade later, the three closely interwoven dimensions of analysis for the discursive construction of national identity remained the same (Wodak *et al.*, 2009: 30):

1. Content or topic
2. Discursive strategies
3. Means and forms of realisation

This can also be described as in Figure 3.3, below, where the content or topic is the macro structure, and the means and forms of realisation are described as the micro-linguistic features.




Figure 3:3. Three interrelated dimensions of analysis (adapted from Wodak et al., 2009)

For Wodak's study on Austrian national identity, the first dimension of analysis – the macro content – was revealed through a critical survey of the literature and pilot analyses of the data. In the second dimension of analysis, there are four discursive macro-strategies embedded in the discursive construction of national identity:

1. Constructive strategies – these encompass the linguistic acts which serve to build and establish a particular national identity, e.g. discursively establishing groups 'us' and 'them' or an image of oneself, or an identity. These are primarily linguistic procedures, which constitute a national 'we-group' through particular acts of reference. One such example given by Wodak is the use of 'we Austrians', which directly or indirectly appeals to solidarity.

2. Perpetuation and justificatory strategies – these attempt to maintain or reproduce already established groups, images or other discursive artefacts. Justifications strategies are frequently used when the status quo is under dispute, and needs to be justified in order to be preserved, and are frequently used to emphasise continuity. Justification strategies are used to defend and preserve a problematic narrative of ‘national history’, such as the colonisation of Africa.
3. Transformative strategies – these strategies attempt to transform the meaning of a relatively well-established aspect of national identity into another. Kovács and Wodak (2003) use the example of the redefining of Austrian neutrality which integrates modified geopolitical conditions, and where neutrality is not altogether lost.
4. Dismantling or destructive strategies – these serve to de-mythologise or demolish existing national identities or elements of them. For example, dismantling of Austria’s neutrality, which was dictated from outside (by allied occupants) and should therefore be renounced.

For each of these four macro-strategies, Wodak *et al.* (2009) identify five micro-strategies, which constitutes the third dimension of analysis. These are briefly outlined in Table 3.1:

Table 3:1. A selection of discursive strategies (as selected by Reisigl and Wodak, 2009)

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
nomination	discursive construction of social actors, objects/phenomena/ events and processes/ actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc. • tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches (pars pro toto, totum pro parte) • verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions, etc.
predication	discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events/ processes and actions (more or less positively or negatively)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) • explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns • collocations • explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) • allusions, evocations, and presuppositions/implicatures, etc.
argumentation	justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • topoi (formal or more content-related) • fallacies
perspectivization, framing or discourse representation	positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • deictics • direct, indirect or free indirect speech • quotation marks, discourse markers/ particles • metaphors • animating prosody, etc.
intensification, mitigation	modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • diminutives or augmentatives • (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctive, hesitations, vague expressions, etc. • hyperboles, litotes • indirect speech acts (e.g. question instead of assertion) • verbs of saying, feeling, thinking, etc.

However, for the purpose of this thesis, this three-tiered framework has been adapted into a four-step approach. The critical approach set out by Wodak *et al.* (2009) is too detailed for a large dataset such as this, so combining their focused Discourse-Historical Approach with quantitative tools and thematic content analysis provides a framework that can be borrowed and built on in further research.

The four-step approach of this thesis is as follows:

Level 1: identify the specific contents-oriented themes;

Level 2: identify sub-themes

Level 3: thematic content analysis

Level 4: critical discourse analysis

This is explained in more detail in the analytical framework at the end of this chapter in Table 3.4. The next section moves on to address the ethics, positionality, and the limitations of this research.

3.3 Ethics, Positionality, and Limitations

It is important to address points on ethics, positionality, and the limitations of this research. As this research is based on speeches gathered from physical and online archives, it does not raise any notable ethical problems. However, this does not mean that archival research is without ethical problems altogether. McKee and Porter (2012: 64) identify a number of questions that can help guide a consideration of ethics in this context of archival research. These begin by focusing on motives: What are my motives for conducting a particular research inquiry? Why do I want to study a particular person or persons, texts, and contexts? As mentioned previously, this research seeks to expand on existing literature and test arguments made in it. The current research focuses predominantly on Blair, and this is expanded in this research to include Major, Brown, and Cameron. In doing so, it also offers an opportunity to re-assess and challenge the arguments in the existing literature.

There are further questions that can be asked about the ethics of archival research in terms of positionality. McKee and Porter (2012: 65) suggest this can be framed as: How do my personal and professional experiences shape the questions I ask, the archives I research, the methods and methodologies I choose, and the conclusions I draw? The question of positionality is important to address since, as with research philosophy, it shapes a researcher's understanding of knowledge. Takacs (2002: 169) stresses the importance of acknowledging that 'one's knowledge claims are not universal truths – that one's positionality can bias one's epistemology'. All researchers conduct research with some degree of positionality, but acknowledging this helps other academics scrutinise the methods and

research in an attempt to maintain academic robustness and relative impartiality. As Cloke *et al.* (2000: 137) point out, ‘a strategy of positionality can be identified in which ‘telling where you are coming from’ can be employed tactically as a contextualisation of the interpretations which are to follow’.

The author is a longstanding member of the UK Labour Party, and has been on the executive committee of the Labour Campaign for International Development (LCID) since 2011. LCID is affiliated to the Labour Party, but exists separately from it. The organisation has been both supportive and critical of stances taken by the Party on matters relating to international development and foreign policy more broadly. Whilst undertaking this research, the author has held the position of Vice-Chair of Policy (2015 – 2018), and Chair (2018–). Through this organisation, the author previously interviewed the two Labour prime ministers focused on in this thesis, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, for a video about the Labour government’s record on internationalism. For this video, the author also conducted interviews with Glenys Kinnock¹², Douglas Alexander¹³, Hilary Benn¹⁴, Jim Murphy¹⁵ and Mary Creagh¹⁶.

¹² Minister of State for Africa and the United Nations, 2009-2010

¹³ Secretary of State for International Development, 2007-2010

¹⁴ Secretary of State for International Development, 2003-2007

¹⁵ Leader of the Scottish Labour Party, 2014-2015; Shadow Secretary of State for International Development, 2013-2014

¹⁶ Shadow Secretary of State for International Development, 2014-2015

It is important, therefore, that the research methods and the rationale behind the decisions made (such as the speech inclusion criteria) are explained clearly and transparently. This allows the research to be scrutinised and – if necessary – replicated by other researchers. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods also helps improve the transparency of this research and mitigate potential biases emerging from the author's positionality as the quantitative tools are easily replicable.

Other ethical questions offered by McKee and Porter (2012: 66-70) are less relevant to this research. As publicly delivered speeches delivered by prime ministers, questions about consent, how such materials ended up in archives, determining which materials are 'public' and 'private', and questions about the passage of time and the rights of the dead are not pertinent to this research. The ethical approval for this thesis has been submitted and approved by the University of Birmingham Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee. This was received and logged by the Research Support Group and has been assigned reference number ERN_17-0463. On the basis of the University Ethics Self-Assessment Form (SAF), no further ethical review is required.

It is also important to consider potential limitations to this research. These are listed in Table 3:2, along with ways these might be overcome.

Table 3:2. Potential limitations to research

Potential Limitation	How To Overcome
Limited availability / access to speeches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use physical archives such as the Conservative Party archive at the Bodleian Library and the Labour Party archive at The People's History Museum • Contact offices of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron directly asking for all speeches relating to Africa broadly so that these can be filtered to find ones that meet the inclusion criteria
Difficult to generalise findings because of small sample size and context specificity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Find ways to increase the sample size, such as by looking at speeches by other senior politicians who are also offered a broad audience and extensive media coverage, such as the chancellor
Influenced by researcher's perceptions, hence subjective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Be methodical and transparent in each stage of the research and clearly signal why decisions were made and how conclusions were reached
Selection bias	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use a transparent, robust selection criteria that is replicable by other researchers

3.4 Research Strategy and Design

Having outlined the methodology and methods this thesis will be using, this section will look at the practical application of this.

3.4.1 Speech Selection Criteria

As noted in the previous section, it is important to establish a transparent, robust speech selection criteria. This is achieved by building on how other scholars have approached this. One example of this is provided by Mumford and Selck (2010), who look for trends in Blair's foreign policy speeches. Their sample included 68 speeches for Blair, 36 for Robin Cook, and 311 for Thatcher. Their selection criteria for speeches is as follows (Mumford and Selck, 2010: 302):

- (a) the speech was held during the years in government; (b) the predominant part of the speech (i.e. more than half) was about foreign policy issues, defence, global issues or international and transnational organisations and corporations; (c) the speech qualified automatically if it was made within a foreign country; (d) the speech was not about the European Union (EU) or made to an EU governmental audience

Other studies are not so clear about their selection criteria. De Castella *et al.* (2009: 7) focus on rhetoric about fear and terrorism in the speeches of Australian Prime Minister John Howard. They found a total of 765 public speeches made by Howard for their period of study and selected 26 for 'their focus on terrorism related issues'. The authors do not specify

how exactly these 26 were chosen. They complement this initial sample with additional speeches selected from the Parliamentary Document Repository, ParlInfo, using the sole keyword 'terror'. Their final contained 27 speeches. Of these, they coded 13 in their entirety. The other 14 contained sections that did not relate to the theme of terrorism, and when these unrelated sections were greater than 500 words, they were omitted from coding and the total word count of coded material was reduced accordingly.

Drawing on these approaches, speeches were included in the sample if they met the following inclusion criteria.

1. The speech was delivered by a British prime minister in the timeframe of this study (1990 – 2016). Namely, the speech was delivered by John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, or David Cameron when they held the office of prime minister;
2. The speech mentioned 'Africa', or mentioned any one of the 54 African countries;
3. All speeches delivered in Africa were automatically included.
4. They were not made in the House of Commons. The speeches analysed are ones where the speaker has some control over the physical audience and arena. They are optional speeches in the way House of Commons speeches are not.

A complete list of speeches is provided in Appendix A, where they are listed chronologically, and have been labelled and numbered, and are referenced as such in the body of the thesis. Hyperlinks have been used where possible so that in the digital version these speeches can be checked.

An initial systematic search was conducted by searches on the website <<http://www.ukpol.co.uk>>, an online political speech archive with over 5,500 speeches on British politics – using ‘Africa’ as the sole keyword. This yielded a wide range of results, including speeches by backbench MPs. However, only speeches by relevant prime ministers were selected, in keeping with the definition and rationale highlighted above. This search found 4 speeches from Major, 5 from Blair, 7 from Brown, and 27 from Cameron. This was complemented by another systematic search of another online speech archive, <<http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/>>, again with the sole keyword as ‘Africa’ – but this time with the ability to search only the relevant time period, 1990–2016. Similar systematic searches were carried out on these two online archives using each of the 54 African countries as the keyword.

For the speeches of John Major, his website <<http://www.johnmajor.co.uk>> provides transcripts of virtually all his speeches throughout his political career. It also provides a section devoted to Africa. It is noteworthy that this section devoted to ‘Africa’ is one of only 10 categories identified by the curators of his website – alongside categories such as ‘Economy’, ‘Education’ and ‘Gulf War’ – perhaps indicating its importance.¹⁷ All speeches in this section were included in the sample, and the rest of Major’s website was systematically searched for further speeches in accordance with the inclusion criteria.

¹⁷ John Major’s website was updated in mid-2019 and this is no longer the case. However, it was important to note that for a long period this was the case.

Many of Blair and Brown's speeches were posted on the government website at the time they were delivered. However, after leaving office in 2010, the website was cleared. Many of these were subsequently archived at <http://www.collections.europarchive.org/>, and speeches from this site that met the inclusion criteria were incorporated into the sample. However, for the Blair administration, the archived speeches only cover 1997-2005, leaving a gap around 2006/2007.

Accessing David Cameron's speeches presented a different problem. In 2013, it was revealed that the Conservative Party had removed a decade of speeches from their website and the main internet library (Ramesh and Hern, 2013). It also blocked access to them via the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, a US-based library that periodically searches and stores the contents of webpages from specific 'crawls'. It should be noted that this may have impacted the sample of speeches from the Cameron administration that can be studied. The remainder of Cameron speeches were accessed through the [.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk) website, but it is unclear if the sample is incomplete.

In order to address this, these online systematic searches were complemented by visiting the Conservative Party and Labour Party archives. The Conservative Party's archive is housed at the Bodleian Libraries in Oxford, and the Labour Party's archive is at The People's History Museum in Manchester. The Conservative archives do not yet cover the Cameron administration. However, additional speeches were found from the Major administration, bringing the total Major sample to 48 speeches. The final Cameron sample contains 58 speeches.

Many of the speeches in the Labour archive were printouts of the government website before they were archived. These include the URLs in the header, and by noting these down and searching for them in the Wayback Machine, the speeches could be accessed and copied without having to use optical character recognition (OCR) technology. However for speeches without URLs on them, OCR technology was used. This brought the total Blair sample to 105, and the Brown sample to 62.

Given the problems highlighted, it is understood that this sample may not contain every speech delivered by a British prime minister mentioning Africa (or a country in Africa) from 1990-2016. Little and Wickham-Jones (2000: 278), for example, note that Blair delivered a speech in 1999 in Cape Town, but the transcript of this speech cannot be found. However, this section has shown that great efforts have been taken to ensure it is thorough and representative, both in terms of the time period covered, and in terms of the four prime ministers. Table 3.3 gives the number of speeches that met the inclusion criteria for each prime minister, the number of words in each corpus, and speeches per duration as prime minister.

Table 3:3. Speeches that met the inclusion criteria for each prime minister, the number of words in each corpus, and speeches per duration as prime minister.

Prime Minister	Speeches in sample	Weeks in office	Speeches per week	Size of corpus (words)
John Major	48	335	0.1433	114,311
Tony Blair	105	530	0.1981	228,572
Gordon Brown	62	150	0.4133	171,114
David Cameron	58	332	0.1747	154,284

Table 3.3. shows a relative consistency between Major, Blair and Cameron in terms of speeches referencing Africa per week. However, it raises a significant finding about Brown; even accounting for incomplete dataset of speeches, Gordon Brown is an outlier in that he talked about Africa roughly twice as much as the other three prime ministers. This requires further investigation. These speeches are plotted over time in Figure 3:4 to check whether they represent a good spread over the time period 1990-2016, and the figure shows there are no significant gaps.




Figure 3:4: Distribution of speeches by Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron referencing Africa in the full corpus of speeches

3.5 Analytical Framework

This analytical framework brings the theoretical focus of the methodology into perspective by showing how it will be used to analyse the data from the corpus of speeches. In doing so, it sets out a roadmap for the rest of the thesis. This is succinctly summarised in Table 3:4 at the end of this chapter.

In Chapter 4, quantitative tools are used to capture the overt content of the entire corpus of speeches. This is to help ensure that this breadth of information is not lost by focusing on only a few speeches. It also helps ensure that the results are more representative of the whole corpus of speeches rather than being based on a small sample of speeches. The corpus of speeches that meet the inclusion criteria (see 3.4.1) contains over 650,000 words.¹⁸ As such, it is impossible to conduct a critical discourse analysis of the entire corpus within the scope of this thesis. As noted previously, '[c]ritical interpretation requires historical knowledge and sensitivity, which can be possessed by human beings but not by machines' (Fowler 1991: 68). This means that any tool or method that creates distance by lifting discourse out of context to consider them in isolation is often considered the 'very antithesis' to approaches within this field (Fowler and Kress, 1979: 198; Hardt-Mautner, 1995).

Nevertheless, whilst quantitative methods and coding distances the researcher from the text, gathering such information can still provide useful insights and make up for what 'is usually

¹⁸ John Major's 48 speeches: 114,311 words. Blair's 105 speeches: 228,572 words. Brown's 62 speeches: 171,114 words. Cameron's 58 speeches: 154,284 words. Total word count: 668,281.

lost in terms of breadth' (Hardt-Mautner, 1995: 3). It is important to ensure there is a clear division between the quantitative and qualitative elements of the study, with software programmes used to measure instances, for example, remaining separate from a textual analysis that provides the 'full ideological significance' (Hardt-Mautner, 1995: 9). Therefore, these approaches are not incompatible – but it must be understood that Chapter 4 does not constitute analysis *per se*. These quantitative tools in Chapter 4 are used to derive content-oriented 'themes' that describe the main categories in terms of how British prime ministers talk about Africa.

Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, begin with a more detailed use of quantitative tools. In order to find the frequency of keywords in each theme that are in reference to Africa, a Python script has been written. This code processes the corpus of speeches to find every combination of keyword that is collocated against a reference of 'Africa' or an African country for each prime minister. Collocation helps to ensure that the sentences that contain these keywords are in reference to Africa but it does not guarantee it. It should also be noted that this approach can miss references if they are not collocated within a sentence. Nevertheless, this is a transparent and replicable tool that can help provide additional contextual information about the themes. The Python code uses the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK), which enables the rapid parsing, processing, and comparison of human language input. The Python code for this program is given in Appendix B and is extracted from a Jupyter notebook (hence the `#In[]` clauses). Although the code is universal for editors and IDEs, Jupyter was used for its flexibility. The script enables the comparison of two lists based on keywords – in this case the first comparison list is 'Africa' or any of a list of countries in Africa, and the

second list is selected keywords for a given theme. For a breakdown of how the code works, see Appendix B. This helps derive ‘sub-themes’ which are more nuanced content-oriented categorisations within each of the themes.

Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 continue with a thematic content analysis within each of these sub-themes. These thematic content analyses assess continuity and discontinuity of these sub-themes for each prime minister in order to identify trends. They also enable this research to respond to claims made in the existing literature about continuities and discontinuities, and provide partial explanations about the construction of national identity. This focus on content also serves to highlight speeches that will be explored in more detail using critical discourse analysis. Each of these chapters concludes with a critical discourse analysis of selected speeches in order to focus in on discursive methods in more detail

These findings are brought together in Chapter 9, which expands on the focus of discursive methods and identifies four discourses about how Africa is used in the construction of British national identity. Chapter 9 also looks at potential explanations for the themes, sub-themes and discourses found in this research. This is summarised in Table 3.4.

Table 3:4. Integrated Methodology and Analytical Framework

Stage 1: Initial quantitative analysis of entire corpus (Chapter 4)	<u>Aim:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(1) Check the spread of speeches in the corpus, (2) study the geographic location of speeches delivered, (3) map and graph the African countries mentioned in speeches, (4) plot word cloud of each prime minister’s corpus, (5) code speeches using NVivo. <u>Output:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Themes that capture broad categories in the speeches.										
Stage 2: Further quantitative analysis within each ‘thematic’ chapter	History (Chapter 5)			Security (Chapter 6)			Morality (Chapter 7)			Economy (Chapter 8)	
	<u>Aim:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Identify sub-themes within the four broad categories using Python program. <u>Output:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Sub-themes that capture more nuanced categories in the speeches.										
Stage 3: Thematic content analysis within each sub-theme	Common History	Commonwealth	Sports	Africa’s Underdevelopment a Security Threat	Peacekeeping	Force Projection	Moral Posturing	Christian Values	Party Political Messaging	Africa’s Economic Prosperity Mutually Beneficial	Africa’s Economic Prosperity a (Missed) Opportunity for Britain
	<u>Aim:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Thematic content analysis by sub-theme in order to understand why this category is notable in British prime ministers’ speeches about Africa and what this says about British national identity. <u>Output:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Narrow selection of speeches to find the speeches for Critical Discourse Analysis.										
Stage 4: Critical discourse analysis by theme	History (Chapter 5)			Security (Chapter 6)			Morality (Chapter 7)			Economy (Chapter 8)	
	Synthesis (Chapter 9)										
Stage 4: Critical discourse analysis by theme	<u>Aim:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">to understand the specific discursive strategies through which national identity is constructed <u>Output:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Discourses prominent in prime ministers’ speeches in reference to Africa (“Paternalism” discourse, “Tutelage” discourse, “Partnership” discourse, “Insecure former empire” discourse)										

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has covered the methodology and methods that will be used in this thesis. It shows that quantitative tools can be used in conjunction with discourse analysis, as long as quantitative tools remain separate the textual analysis. This chapter has drawn on other research that uses quantitative tools to understand the construction of national identity, and highlight how this research builds on these approaches. In addition, this chapter explains why critical discourse analysis is used in this research, as well as why specifically the Discourse-Historical Approach is used.

This chapter has also explored epistemology and ontology, the research approach, strategy, and design, data collection and analysis methods, as well as research ethics, positionality, and limitations of this research. This research embraces a moderate constructivist approach, and combines quantitative and qualitative methods. It sets out how the corpus of speeches used in this thesis has been compiled, and what information is contained in this dataset. Having highlighting potential ethical problems, positionality, and limitations, it is crucial that this research is conducted in a transparent manner. The next chapter uses quantitative tools to investigate the overt content of the speeches in a way that can be replicated by other researchers.

CHAPTER 4

Using Quantitative Tools to Understand the Data

This chapter uses quantitative tools to understand the overt content and context of the speeches, which will help inform subsequent analysis. This is achieved in five parts. Firstly, this chapter studies the distribution of speeches from 1990-2016 to understand if there are significant anomalies or outliers. Secondly, it turns to the geographical location of speeches delivered as this context helps explain the intent behind the speeches. Thirdly, it maps and graphs the African countries mentioned in speeches to get a sense of whether there are any clear distinctions between the four prime ministers. Fourthly, it plots each prime minister's corpus of speeches about Africa as word clouds, where word size is proportional to frequency of usage, in order to shed light on the broader content of these speeches. Finally, this chapter concludes by using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) to code the speeches. These approaches are combined with knowledge from the literature review to derive four overarching content-oriented 'themes' in the speeches. These are that Britain's post-Cold War relationship with Africa can be understood as being based on British 'history', 'security', 'morality', and 'economy'. The quantitative tools used in the first four sections of this chapter are easily replicable and therefore also help to improve the transparency of the process by which the four themes were chosen.

4.1 Distribution of Speeches

The graph showing the distribution of speeches that fit the inclusion criteria was first given in Chapter 3 (Figure 3:4). Previously, this was used simply to check whether there were any significant gaps in the data. However, this graph is also useful to study in itself – so it has been reproduced below (Figure 4:1).




Figure 4:1. Distribution of speeches by Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron referencing Africa in the full corpus of speeches

This graph indicates that there are some spikes in references to Africa – notably around 1994 and 2007/8. The 1994 spike reveals that three and then five separate speeches about Africa were delivered on consecutive days. This occurred on the 20th and 21st September 1994, and

was part of Major's visit to South Africa – the first by a British prime minister in 34 years. These speeches were also delivered in the context of Nelson Mandela's recent election as president of South Africa, and the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. The spike in 2007/8 is slightly different because it is over a longer timeframe, and covers seven instances in which multiple speeches referenced Africa in a single day. Part of this can be explained by Blair's visit to Sierra Leone and South Africa towards the end of his premiership in May 2007. This is noteworthy and will be explored in more detail as it indicates an attempt to use the platform offered by a tour of Africa to frame his time in office. However, there is no straightforward explanation for the continued spike in speeches at the beginning of Brown's time in office as they are diverse in terms of their audience – ranging from Google's Zeitgeist Conference to the Church of Scotland to the United Nations.

A further important point to take from this graph is how infrequently speeches referencing Africa were made by Blair between 1997 and 2001. This will need further examination because it lends weight to the argument that Africa was not a priority for Blair in his first term, and that this only started properly in his second term (Porteous, 2005: 289-90). This timeframe also appears to correlate with the finding by Mumford and Selck (2010: 309) that New Labour under Blair adopted a more moral rhetoric in foreign policy speeches than previous Conservative governments, but that this shift 'was not eminent until 2002' suggesting that it was a result of the attacks on September 11th 2001.

Another – and perhaps more helpful – way to look at the same data is to group the speeches by year, as shown in Figure 4:2. Doing so helps reveal trends not apparent in Figure 4:1. This

shows that in terms of quantity of speeches relating to Africa, the Major-Blair transition does not appear to be particularly significant. It also reinforces the extent to which Brown is an outlier in the number of speeches he gave that referenced Africa, first noted in Chapter 3 (Table 3.3).




Figure 4.2: Distribution of speeches by Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron referencing Africa in the full corpus of speeches, separated by year

4.2 Geographical Location of Speeches

The geographic location in which speeches are delivered is significant because prime ministers usually have significant control over location, meaning that this information may help illuminate intention. This section breaks down the location of speeches into three

‘spheres’: international, domestic, and those actually delivered in Africa. There are some difficulties in separating out geographic locations in this way. When a speech has been given at a specific summit, such as at an EU or G8 summit, they have been categorised as such – rather than the country in which the summit took place. For example, the EU Council meeting in Lisbon on 18th October 2007 (GB07p), is categorised as ‘EU’ rather than ‘Portugal’. Additionally, a small number of speech transcripts do not specify audience. For these speeches, the geographic location is inferred from the content of the speech.

This information is plotted as pie charts. By doing so, the following four charts represent geographic locations as a percentage of each prime minister’s corpus rather than frequency. This is to allow for more meaningful comparison than using raw numbers because otherwise the length of each prime minister’s time in office is in some form correlated to those figures. For the following four charts, black and grey is used to signify African audiences; red, orange and brown are used for other international audiences; and blue and green are used for domestic audiences.




Figure 4:3. John Major's speeches by audience – divided into 'International', 'Domestic', and 'Africa'




Figure 4:4. Tony Blair's speeches by audience – divided into 'International', 'Domestic', and 'Africa'




Figure 4:5. Gordon Brown's speeches by audience – divided into 'International', 'Domestic', and 'Africa'




Figure 4:6. David Cameron's speeches by audience – divided into 'International', 'Domestic', and 'Africa'

There are a number of noteworthy observations that can be drawn from these four charts that will help inform subsequent analysis chapters. Over a quarter of Major's speeches that reference Africa are delivered in Africa (15 out of 48), and the vast majority of these are in South Africa (10 out of 15). This suggests that Major's primary purpose in talking about Africa was specifically to focus on South Africa. By contrast, Blair spoke in seven African countries, and also referenced Africa in the most locations out of the four prime ministers. This could be interpreted in two somewhat contradictory – although not necessarily incompatible – ways. On the one hand this could be seen as a sign of a deeper engagement with the continent rather than just rhetoric on the part of Blair and the Labour government. On the other hand, it could be a way for Blair to project statesmanship (and potentially British power) on the world stage by focusing on Africa as the cause *du jour*. This research indicates there is an element of truth to both of these interpretations.

As shown in the previous section of this chapter (see Figure 4:2), when factoring for time in office, Brown spoke about Africa far more frequently than the other three prime ministers. However, only one of Brown's speeches is actually delivered in Africa. There are two factors that may help explain this: his short tenure in office, and that the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis and domestic politics dominated his schedule. Brown delivered a high percentage of speeches specifically to bilateral and multilateral audiences, such as domestic joint press conferences with other heads of state, and speeches made to the UN and EU.

Although Cameron's length of tenure in office was similar to that of Major, he only delivered two speeches in Africa. It is also important to note that a high number of

Cameron's speeches that reference Africa were delivered to business conferences and multinational corporations, which taken together represent 30% of all his domestic speeches referencing to Africa. This points towards the re-emergence and re-centring of economic growth and the private sector in development thinking under Cameron, as argued by Mawdsley (2015).

4.3 Countries Mentioned in Speeches

As well as the geographic location of speeches, the African countries British prime ministers mention in their speeches also help to reveal their intentions. These are plotted on a map of Africa (Figure 4:7) and as a graph of mentions of country as a percentage of each prime minister's corpus (Figure 4:8). Figure 4:8 suggests that while Major, Brown and Cameron talk frequently about specific countries (South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Libya respectively), Blair tends to talk about more countries in Africa, but less often (see also Figure 4:7). Major's references to South Africa represent a significant outlier by some of orders of magnitude, and complement the findings in Figure 4:3 about the prominence of South Africa in Major's speeches.

Importantly, Blair also talks about Africa as a continent far more often than the other three prime ministers. Although the previous section that showed Blair spoke in seven African countries, this frequent reference to Africa in such broad terms may be evidence that Blair's speeches about Africa were not detail-orientated, but instead prone to generalisations about the continent.




Figure 4:7. African countries that are mentioned in speeches by British prime ministers (1990-2016) ¹⁹

¹⁹ In creating this figure, references to ‘Congo basin’ have not been included as either DRC or the Republic of Congo, references to ‘Lake Chad’ have not been included as Chad, and references ‘Niger Delta’ have not been included in Niger. This is because these landforms span multiple countries and therefore it is not clear which country they should be categorised as, even if their name implies a particular country.




Figure 4:8. Mentions of 'Africa' and African countries in the speeches of British prime ministers (1990-2016) as a percentage of the total corpus of text for each speaker

4.4 Word Clouds of Content

Word clouds can provide useful visualisations to help understand large quantities of textual data. They provide an overview by distilling text down to those words that appear with highest frequency (Heimerl *et al.*, 2014). In this section, the entire corpus for each prime minister is entered into an online open-source word cloud generator.²⁰ This tool plots the 200 highest-frequency words in the corpus, where the size of the word is directly proportional to its frequency (n). The word cloud generator also provides options to plot these as proportional to $\log n$ and \sqrt{n} of word frequency as these can help emphasise words in different parts of the frequency spectrum. However, directly proportional was chosen because it is the most straightforward and intuitive way of understanding the data.

There are also drawbacks to word clouds. Harris (2011) notes that ‘word clouds support only the crudest sorts of textual analysis’, although he submits that ‘word clouds make sense when the point is to specifically analyze [sic] word usage’. As this section is not analysis in itself but instead a means to gain useful insights into the broader context of the overall corpus, this is an appropriate tool to use. The reoccurrence of words such as ‘Commonwealth’ or ‘G8’ would, for example, be important contextual information about the potential role of such institutions in British prime ministers’ discourse relating to Africa.

²⁰ The word cloud generator used for all word clouds in this research is available at: <<https://www.jasondavies.com/wordcloud/>>

The data contained in each corpus was refined before being entered into the word cloud generator in order to make better use of the word clouds. For example, references to ‘South Africa’ were combined into one word ‘SouthAfrica’ in order to distinguish these references as their own tag, rather than blur these specific references to more general references to ‘Africa’. This was also done for: ‘African Union’, ‘European Union’, ‘Great Britain’, ‘Security Council’, ‘United Kingdom’ and ‘United Nations’. The colours of the words in the word clouds do not carry meaning, but instead help to identify words from one-another.

The most striking feature across all of the word clouds is the prominence of references to ‘people’ – it is the most frequently used word in each corpus. This represents a continuity across the speeches of all four prime ministers, but does not reveal anything in itself. Looking more closely at the figures, for the two Conservative prime ministers, Major and Cameron, ‘Britain’ features more prominently in their word clouds than it does for the Labour prime ministers (Figure 4:9 and 4:12). By contrast, collective words such as ‘world’, ‘international’, and ‘global’ are more prominent in the speeches of Blair and Brown (Figure 4:10 and 4:11). This suggests a bilateral / multilateral split in thinking across party lines, and requires closer textual analysis.

There are other important trends that can be inferred from these word clouds. The Commonwealth, for example, only appears in Major’s word cloud (Figure 4:9). Additionally, although these speeches have been selected for their focus on Africa, the word ‘Africa’ only appears prominently in Blair’s word cloud (Figure 4:10). This is line with the finding from

Figure 4:8 that Blair spoke about Africa as a continent far more frequently than the other three prime ministers. The word clouds also reveal clusters of related or synonymous words that signify some reoccurring concepts – notably around ‘security’ and ‘economy’. The words ‘economy’, ‘economic’ and ‘security’ appear in all four word clouds, although not particularly prominently. However, when considered alongside related words, they appear to be indicative of broader trends. There are a number of words relating to security, such as ‘defence’ and ‘terrorism’, as well as those relating to the economy such as ‘trade’, ‘investment’, ‘market’, and ‘business’. This is taken into account in defining the content-orientated themes from the corpus of prime ministers’ speeches.



Figure 4:9. Word cloud of John Major’s corpus of speeches, where word size is directly proportional to frequency.



Figure 4:10. Word cloud of Tony Blair’s corpus of speeches, where word size is directly proportional to frequency.



Figure 4:11. Word cloud of Gordon Brown's corpus of speeches, where word size is directly proportional to frequency.



Figure 4:12. Word cloud of David Cameron’s corpus of speeches, where word size is directly proportional to frequency

4.5 Computer-Assisted Qualitative Discourse Analysis Software

The final stage of understanding the overt content of the entire corpus is achieved using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). A range of such software packages are available, including ATLAS.ti, Cassandre, MAXQDA, and NVivo. These software packages are broadly very similar (Gilbert, Jackson and di Gregorio, 2014). Evers *et al.* (2010) argue that there is no ‘best’ software; the decision to select a particular package over another is multifaceted. This project used NVivo 11 because it is intuitive and is designed to support such large datasets. Spencer, Ritchie and O'Connor (2003: 209) note that one of the advantages of NVivo is its efficiency in making links across large datasets, which would be difficult and time-consuming if done manually.

CAQDAS helps to organise textual information by coding sections of speeches and identifying ‘nodes’. A node is defined as ‘a collection of references about a specific theme, place, person or other area of interest’ (Bryman, 2012: 596). Before discussing the coding and nodes for the corpus of speeches, however, there are some issues around the coding that are important to note.

Firstly, coding is highly subjective and presents a number of problems. When a concept continues over a sentence or paragraph, it is subjective as to whether this should be coded once or many times. Whilst this was initially a problem, it was resolved by re-coding the data only once per sentence referencing Africa or a country in Africa. A second related but separate problem is about the content itself. Due to the interchangeable and often

synonymous usage of ‘Africa’ with wider international development issues, it is tempting to code in terms of development rather than Africa specifically. Africa is sometimes used as an example to talk about poverty or development, which then continues without reference to Africa – but it could well be implied that this part of the speech still relates to Africa. This was resolved by strictly coding parts of speeches that explicitly refer to Africa or countries in Africa. Thirdly, it should also be noted that these categorisations are not clear distinctions – there are overlaps and areas of uncertainty. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), for example, could arguably be categorised into security or morality, as it is often presented as a moral obligation to protect civilians in conflict zones. This was resolved by coding sections of speeches to the category with which they instinctively had the strongest affinity.

NVivo was used to code the 273 speeches in the sample and identify ‘nodes’. This included broad nodes such as ‘*Aid*’ and ‘*Immigration*’ to highly-specific sub-nodes, such as ‘*Role of Sports in helping youth in South Africa*’ and the mention of ‘*Africa or African country mentioned as the location of a conference or summit*’. These nodes helped summarise the content of the speeches – albeit in a more subjective way than the other tools used in this chapter. Through this coding, some reoccurring ideas emerge. Across all four prime ministers, nodes about trade and peacekeeping are important.

In deriving themes in the speeches of the four prime ministers, categorisations from related fields – such as aid and development more broadly – are helpful to consider. One example is the categorisation of countries’ rationale for foreign aid as ‘good neighbour’, ‘merchant’, ‘power broker’ and ‘activist’ roles, identified by Breuning (1995). Breuning, however, makes

the problematic assumption that ‘because of their common socialization [sic] as citizens of the same state, groups of decision makers representing one state have been inculcated with the same “truths”, myths, and lessons of history, and as a result share certain biases in their perception and framing of the state’s role in world politics’ (1995: 236). Despite this oversimplification, Breuning’s categorisations are helpful in that they serve to highlight some of the competing economic, political, and humanitarian motivations described more broadly in the literature.

Bringing together the findings from the quantitative tools in this chapter with knowledge from the literature review, this thesis categorises four distinct content-oriented themes that explain how British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period reference Africa in their speeches. These are that Britain’s post-Cold War relationship with Africa can be viewed as being based on British ‘history’, ‘security’, ‘morality’, and ‘economy’. The rationale for the four ‘themes’ identified in the speeches of the prime ministers are provided in Table 4:1. It is noteworthy that in considering foreign policy options for Britain the 1990s, Tugendhat and Wallace (1988) derive similar categorisations. Although their categorisations did not inform the four themes identified in this research, it is useful to look at the similarities in the broad themes they identify. These include: ‘historical legacy’, the ‘economic dimension’, the ‘security dimension’, and the ‘intangible elements of foreign policy’ – which includes the promotion of British values, not dissimilar to the ‘morality’ theme in this research.

Table 4:1 How Themes For Further Analysis Were Chosen

Theme	Research that helped identify this theme
History	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Literature Review: Williams (2005a; 2005b), Reid (2014) • NVivo Coding
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Literature Review: Abrahamsen (2005), Porteous (2005), Pugh <i>et al.</i> (2013), McConnon (2014) • Word clouds (Figure 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12) • NVivo Coding
Morality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Literature Review: Ero (2001), Williams (2002), Chandler (2003; 2012), Gallagher (2009; 2013), Taylor (2012), Harrison (2013) • Audiences of speeches (Figure 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6) • NVivo Coding
Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Literature Review: Williams (2004), Cargill (2013), Reid (2014) • Audiences of speeches (Figure 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6) • Word clouds (Figure 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12) • NVivo Coding

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has used a variety of quantitative tools to understand the breadth and context of information contained in the corpus of speeches. It has provided potential insights about distinctive characteristics of individual prime minister's speeches, as well as areas of potential alignment between prime ministers – such as a bilateral focus for Conservative prime ministers and a multilateral focus for Labour prime ministers. Taking the findings from this chapter and considering them alongside the literature review enables the categorisation of the content of the speeches into overarching 'themes'. The broad dichotomy from the literature review (Chapter 2) was the distinction between referring to Africa in a way that helps define a moral identity for the UK, and using Africa to build or project UK power or influence – whether economic or political.

Combining the findings from this chapter with the literature review, this research identifies four distinct, but interlinked, themes for understanding Britain's post-Cold War engagement with Africa. These are that British prime ministers present Britain's post-Cold War relationship with Africa as being based on British 'history', 'security', 'morality', and 'economy'. Each of these themes will be expanded on in the following chapters, integrating and scrutinising the relevant literature for each theme where applicable. The subsequent chapters will also break these themes down into sub-themes in order to understand subtleties and nuance within each of them.

CHAPTER 5

Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: Reimagining Britain's History in Africa

As detailed in Chapter 3, this thesis builds on the tripartite framework set out by Wodak *et al.* (2009) to create a four-part approach to understanding the discursive construction of national identity. The previous chapter laid out the first part of this: the main themes in British prime minister's discourses on the relationship between Britain and Africa (and by extension, Africa's place in the construction of British national identity) are 'history', 'security', 'morality', and 'economy'.

This chapter and the subsequent three chapters move on to focus in more detail on nuances within each of these themes to derive 'sub-themes'. These sub-themes constitute the second part of the four-part approach, and are found using additional quantitative tools. Concurrently, these four analysis chapters centre on a thematic content analysis and critical discourse analysis to study the discursive strategies used by British prime ministers – which comprise parts three and four of this framework. The commonalities and differences across the four thematic chapters will be brought together and assessed in Chapter 9, with particular attention to the linguistic means and realisation of discursive strategies. In doing so, this thesis will explain how British prime ministers' discourses of Africa construct British national identity.

This chapter focuses on the extent to which British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period have referred to Africa in their speeches in terms of the shared history between Africa and Britain. The argument that Britain's current relationship with Africa is based on its long historical link is not a new one – as detailed in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. Reid (2014: 144), for example, argues that there is 'a marked degree of continuity from the nineteenth century to the early twenty-first, in terms of both conceptualization [sic] of Africa and international engagement with it'. This continuity manifests itself in a variety of ways. For instance, the phrase used by Blair in his 2001 conference speech (TB01f)²¹ that 'the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world' draws on imagery used by the missionary-explorer David Livingstone in the mid-nineteenth century – that the Central African slave trade was 'the open sore of the world' (Jeal, 2013: 367).

As this chapter and the subsequent four analysis chapters show, however, the most valuable and noteworthy insights come not from just *whether* Africa is talked about in terms of history, morality, security, or economy – although this will indeed be discussed – but rather *how* this is done. What elements are highlighted? What elements are diminished? This selective narration by British prime ministers is central to understanding the construction of British national identity.

This chapter shows that common history is invoked primarily by Major, Blair and Cameron, but the extent and way in which this is achieved varies. This chapter focuses on three sub-

²¹ Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001), Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK.

themes that emerge from the analysis. Firstly, British prime ministers employ different discursive strategies to sanitise Britain's colonial history in Africa. The second sub-theme is a more specific focus on this around the Commonwealth as a *sui generis* institution that embodies particular values, cultures, and norms. As a unique organisation with no legal or political obligations and arguably irrelevant (Williams, 2005a), its place in these speeches is noteworthy because it suggests that the Commonwealth is not only a formal institution but also – and perhaps equally importantly – a rhetorical conception (or 'imagined community' as Anderson (1983) puts it). Britain's historical role in the Commonwealth gives it a status as *primus inter pares*, which is important in terms of Britain's national identity and role in the world. The third section is more specific still, highlighting the way in which sport (cricket in particular) offers Major a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa in an uncontroversial way that largely transcends politics, and enables him to suggest shared values and shared history that go beyond British self-interest. This chapter finds an increasing reluctance by British prime ministers from 1990-2016 to explicitly address Britain's colonial history with Africa, to the extent that Cameron frames it a part of history so long-gone that it is no longer relevant to modern British national identity.

The next section provides an analysis of the speeches, starting with a more detailed quantitative approach around the theme of 'history', before moving onto a thematic content analysis and then critical discourse analysis.

5.1 Quantitative Analysis

Quantitative tools have already been used check the robustness of the data collected (Chapter 3), identify any outliers or unusual trends in the data, and to help identify the four categories for analysis (Chapter 4). Here, quantitative tools are used again, but this time more specifically focusing on the history dimension to help highlight trends within this theme. This is achieved through a study of specific keywords. These keywords were selected based on the literature review and the author's own reading of the speeches during the data collection stage, as well as from the findings from the word clouds generated in Chapter 4.

For this History chapter, the keywords selected are: 'history', 'historical', 'common', 'Commonwealth', 'Empire', 'colonial', and 'colonialism'. 'Common' was selected for its usage in the literature in reference to common values, common language, or invoking a common heritage. This information is plotted in Table 5:1, where mentions of selected keywords are shown in terms of their raw numbers by prime minister. In Figure 5:1, these are plotted as percentages of each prime minister's corpus.

Table 5:1. Frequency of selected history-related keywords in the context of Africa by prime minister

	John Major	Tony Blair	Gordon Brown	David Cameron
Histor(y/ical)	21	17	4	7
Common	5	0	2	0
Commonwealth	53	19	10	1
Empire	1	1	0	0
Colonial(ism)	0	2	2	0




Figure 5:1. Frequency of selected keywords related to 'History' in the context of Africa (as a percentage of each prime minister's corpus)

As with the quantitative insights in Chapter 4, it is important to consider these findings separately from the textual analysis. Lifting discourse from its context cannot be considered analysis in itself because critical interpretation requires historical understanding and sensitivity, which can be possessed by human beings but not by machines (Fowler 1991: 68).

The most striking observation and clearest trend from Figure 5:1 is the apparent diminishing emphasis on the Commonwealth over the four prime ministers. This finding is noteworthy and needs exploring in more detail because it appears to contradict the claim by Martin and

Garnett (1997: 58) that the Commonwealth was ‘an institution relegated to the back burner’ for Major’s government. Of course, as this research does not include Thatcher, this could still be true when compared to previous administrations – but it is significant that Major marks the high point in references to the Commonwealth in relation to Africa out of the four prime ministers analysed. This is in contrast to the time of Churchill, when he considered the Commonwealth the most important of three ‘majestic circles’.²² Martin and Garnett (1997: 58) argue that the Commonwealth ‘slipped down the list of FCO priorities since Britain joined the European Economic Community. In a formal sense there may have been declining emphasis on the Commonwealth, but its usage in the context of speeches about Africa hints at perhaps a different role – one that is as much about the rhetoric of the Commonwealth as it is about its role as a formal institution.


Having captured a broad picture of references to specific history-related keywords, this section moves on to look in more detail at the context of these keywords. This is achieved by using the sentences extracted using the Python code as they show how history keywords are referenced in the context of Africa. However, if these sentences were plotted as they are – the results would inevitably show the keywords as appearing with the highest frequency. Therefore, deleting only the keywords from the extracted sentences and plotting the

²² ‘The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire, with all that that comprises. Then there is also the English-speaking world in which we, Canada, and the other British Dominions and the United States play so important a part. And finally there is United Europe. These three majestic circles are co-existent and if they are linked together there is no force or combination which could overthrow them or even challenge them.’ Winston Churchill (19th October, 1948), Conservative Party Meeting, Llandudno, Wales, UK (Deighton, 1995: 155).

remainder of the corpus helps to understand the context of these sentences. This information is plotted here for each prime minister as a word clouds, where word size is directly proportional to frequency of usage. As with the word clouds in Chapter 5, the colours of the words do not carry meaning, but instead help identify words from one-another.

Figure 5:2 reaffirms the centrality of South Africa in the speeches of Major. It also reveals an interesting finding; ‘cricket’ is frequently talked about in the context of Britain’s history with Africa. A deeper look at this reveals that it is significant enough to merit being a sub-theme in this chapter on its own. In contrast to the findings in Chapter 5 (see Figure 4:8), Zimbabwe is prominent in the speeches of Blair in this context (Figure 5:3). There is insufficient information in the word clouds generated for Brown and Cameron to draw meaningful conclusions from them. This can be seen in the prominence of relatively arbitrary words, such as ‘Lancaster’ and ‘1950s’, and indicates that the sample of sentences extracted by the Python code for these two prime ministers was small. Nevertheless, this has yielded potentially useful insights for further study.





5.2 Thematic Content Analysis

The findings from the additional quantitative tools in the previous section help reveal ways in which British prime ministers refer to history in the context of Africa. Taking these into consideration alongside the literature and knowledge of the speeches gained from reading them in the data collection stage, three sub-themes have been derived to guide the thematic content analysis. These centre on the role of colonial history, the role of the Commonwealth (see Figure 5:1), and the role of sports with particular reference to cricket (see Figure 5:2). This section explores the ways in which the four prime ministers talk about this history, with a focus on the elements they emphasise and diminish, as well as an assessment of continuities and discontinuities in this.

5.2.1 Commonality Rooted in Colonial History

This section begins by looking at the way in which Major, Blair and Cameron distance themselves from Britain's colonial history in their speeches. It then moves on to look at examples where British prime ministers refer to Africa as a common concern for Britain and other countries with colonial legacies in Africa, and contrasts this with examples where Africa is a common concern for all countries regardless of whether they have historical links to the continent. This indicates that portrayals of British engagement with Africa has developed from being rooted in colonial history to being rooted in mutual self-interest.

During Major's 1994 keynote speech to the South African National Assembly (JM94f)²³, he presents a positive picture of Britain's 'benign' history in Africa. He accomplishes this by presenting Britain as a reluctant coloniser with benevolent intentions.

We British were relative late-comers to Africa [...] Trade rather than colonisation was the reason for early British and European contacts with Africa. **Benign commerce turned however into the slave trade [...]** **The British Parliament outlawed this moral outrage in 1807 and the Dutch followed 7 years later.** [...] Christian missionaries **travelled courageously through Africa**, but in turn they **unwittingly** paved the way for the harsh incursions of rival empire builders.

This speech is analysed in more detail in the CDA section of this chapter, but this condensed extract helps understand the broad way in which the history between Britain and Africa is framed. It also allows for comparison with Blair and Cameron. In 2007, Blair gave a video speech marking the 200th anniversary of the British Parliament legislating to abolish the slave trade in the British Empire (TB07e)²⁴. Blair's speech shows the way in which responsibility for atrocities committed by Britain is accepted on the one hand, but dismissed on the other – and the way in which the tension between these two narratives are balanced. This speech will also be explored in detail in the CDA section of this chapter, but in this thematic content analysis it helps to understand the way in which Blair frames Britain's historical involvement. He focuses on the role of British abolitionists and Britain's role in ending the

²³ John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa.

²⁴ Tony Blair (25th March, 2007), video speech broadcast in Elmina Castle, Ghana.

slave trade, saying: ‘The people who fought against slavery came from all walks of life. They include former enslaved Africans like Olaudah Equiano, church leaders like Thomas Clarkson and statesmen like William Wilberforce’.

Another way in which Blair achieves this can be seen in a speech he gave in Addis Ababa (TB04h).²⁵ In this example, he simply ignores this difficult history using the false equivalency that ‘painful as it is for all of us’:

And yet as a result of history, as a result of a huge complexity of problems that have beset Africa over many decades, some of which we needn’t even go back into, **painful as it is for all of us**, as a result of these problems, these people with all this talent and ability can't make their lives work.

Cameron also attempts to distance himself from Britain’s colonial history – but he achieves this in a different way to Major and Blair. In his 2011 speech to the Pan-African University in Nigeria (DC11f)²⁶, he presents himself as a young new leader who is completely removed from the administrations that came before him. This reflects the way in which he had run for leader of the Conservative Party in 2005 and then as prime minister in 2010. He argues:

‘I passionately believe in liberal democracy... and I believe Africa can do it too. Let me be clear: this isn’t about imposing Western beliefs on Africa or neo-colonialism. **I’m from the**

²⁵ Tony Blair (7th October, 2004), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

²⁶ David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan-African University, Lagos, Nigeria.

generation free of this shadow. I wasn't even born when Harold MacMillan made his winds of change speech. And I'll be the first to say, we have our own work to do keeping democracy strong back at home. This is about what will work for Africa - and what we are seeing work'.

In doing so, Cameron attempts to frame Britain's historical role in Africa as part of history so far in the past that it is no longer relevant to modern British national identity. This represents a contrast from the methods used by Major and Blair, who acknowledged the link between this colonial past in Africa and Britain's modern identity.

A flaw of many discussions of Britain and Africa in the literature is that they tend to – explicitly or implicitly – work on the assumption that British politicians formulate their policy stance in isolation and have an agenda to 'use' Africa in a way that is advantageous specifically to Britain. One such instance is to project an image of British morality (Ero, 2001; Chandler, 2003; Gallagher, 2013; Harrison, 2013). However, a study of the speeches reveals a problem with this argument.

There are many examples of Africa being a focus across countries, with British prime ministers thanking other countries for their work on Africa – both countries with colonial histories in Africa, as well as countries that do not have colonial legacies. This indicates that there has been a desire by British prime ministers to reframe British engagement with Africa as being rooted in mutual self-interest, partnership and cooperation instead of colonial history. This is important because it suggests a different rationale for engagement with Africa

– one that extends beyond individual prime ministers or even Britain. For example – Major says that Britain and France have a joint obligation to Africa, and that this obligation is rooted in their historic ties to Africa (JM95d)²⁷:

Britain and France are both European countries a worldwide outlook. [...] We are Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council and participants in the Economic Summits. And **we both have obligations to parts of the world, like Africa, where we have long-standing and historic ties.** [...] **Both of us have long, historic and very strong interests in Africa.** We are launching today a joint initiative on conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa. We shall help African countries to develop their own capabilities and shall invite Western European Union partners to join us in sending advisory teams to Africa.

This could be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the legacy and impact of Britain's colonial history by shifting the blame onto other Western European countries who also engaged in the 'Scramble for Africa' in the late nineteenth century. However, the context of Major's speech – delivered as part of a joint press conference with President Chirac, and as such not explicitly about Africa in any way – points towards a more altruistic rationale; a joint approach to tackle problems in Africa based on a common outlook and with an acknowledgement of a joint history. This latter explanation is reinforced by Major later in the same speech²⁸:

²⁷ John Major (30th October, 1995), joint press conference with President Chirac, London, UK.

²⁸ John Major (30th October, 1995), joint press conference with President Chirac, London, UK.

[Britain and France] are the only two European nations that are nuclear powers, that have a worldwide interest, that sit on the United Nations Security Council, **that have long-standing historical interests in large parts of the world like Africa and it is upon that basis that we have a common outlook on many problems. And it was that common outlook, based on common background, common history and common interests, that led the President and I to conclude that there was ample scope for a global partnership.**²⁹

In contrast to Major's reference to colonial history as the rationale for a collective focus on Africa, subsequent prime ministers do not refer to it explicitly. In a joint press conference with German chancellor Angela Merkel, Brown (GB07c)³⁰ thanks Germany³¹ for the success of their presidency of the G8 and their focus on Africa: 'I would also like to congratulate you on the success of your G8 Presidency [...] it is in no small measure due to your leadership that the G8 have such a successful conclusion, both on climate change and on making progress on Africa.'

Two examples from Cameron show that Africa more recently has become a common focus even for countries that did not engage in empire building. In 2011, Cameron said that Africa

²⁹ The 'Further Research' section (see 10.3.2) presents ways in which research into France's historical role and legacy in Africa (Françafrique) can build on this thesis by adopting the framework but applying it to the speeches of French presidents.

³⁰ Gordon Brown (16th July, 2007), Berlin, Germany.

³¹ Although Germany was not initially involved in colonialism in Africa, its 1871 victory in the Franco-Prussian War led to imperial ambitions, and Germany gradually took over Kamerun, Togo, Tanganyika, and Ruanda-Urundi (Klinghoffer, 2006: 80).

has and should continue to be a common focus for Britain and Russia³², although with that focus being grounded in security. In a speech in Moscow (DC11i)³³, Cameron said:

We have shared interests in stability in the Middle East and North Africa too. I know we have not always agreed, Britain and Russia, about how to achieve that stability. Let me put my cards on the table: the view I have come to is that the stability of corrupt and violent repressive dictatorships [...] like Gaddafi's in Libya, is a false stability.

Similarly, in a speech in China (DC13k)³⁴, Cameron said: 'We're [Britain and China] also working together on global challenges, [...] **joint work on trade and investment to lift African countries out of poverty.** We both want an ambitious WTO deal in Bali this week, and we have agreed to share expertise and **strengthen peacekeeping missions in Africa.**'

The two competing explanations provided for this shift are not mutually exclusive. Prime ministers' desire to sanitise Britain's historical legacy in Africa is not incompatible with the concept that Africa has become a broader matter of mutual self-interest for countries across the world. However, this latter explanation also reveals an important factor about Britain's national identity; it indicates Britain no longer commands the hard and soft power to 'govern' in Africa as it did during the days of the British Empire, and could therefore be seen as a sign of British decline.

³² In 1889, Russia established the settlement of Sagallo in the Gulf of Tadjoura (present day Djibouti) but this lasted less than two months (Henze, 1991: 67).

³³ David Cameron (12th September, 2011), Moscow, Russia.

³⁴ David Cameron (2nd December, 2013), China.

This section has uncovered some of the strategies Major, Blair, and Cameron use to distance themselves from Britain's colonial history in Africa. It also reveals how concerns about Africa had initially been presented as a common cause for Britain and countries with colonial legacies there, and how this has developed to a broader concern rooted in common self-interest – such as trade and security (which are dealt with in more detail in subsequent chapters).

5.2.2 Britain And The Commonwealth: Primus Inter Pares

Having looked at the way in which British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period have referred to Africa in their speeches in terms of the broad shared history between Africa and Britain, this section focuses specifically on the use of the Commonwealth as a means of doing this. The evolution of the institution itself shows how this relationship between Britain and Africa has changed over time – first as an organisation that stipulated that membership required dominionhood (as laid out in the 1931 Statute of Westminster), and later as a free association of independent member nations (as laid out in the 1949 London Declaration) (Lloyd, 1997). Members of the Commonwealth have no legal or political obligations, but rather are apparently united by language, history, and culture. In 1970, Queen Elizabeth II said in her Christmas address that the Commonwealth was 'a special family – a family of nations' (The Royal Family, 1970). As such, its prominence in these speeches (particularly under Major) is noteworthy because it suggests that the Commonwealth is as much a discursive construct (or 'imagined community') as it is a formal institution.

McIntyre (2001: 3) argues that although the Commonwealth went through a ‘renaissance’ in the 1990s, it never captured the imagination of the UK government. Martin and Garnett (1997: 58), for example, contend that for Major’s government it remained ‘an institution relegated to the back burner’. In 1996, the Foreign Affairs Committee issued a report criticising the government for not paying more attention and devoting greater resources to the Commonwealth, arguing that the Commonwealth was an asset of significant potential for consolidating the UK’s interests beyond the Euro-Atlantic area (Williams, 2005a: 381).

In contrast to this apparent lack of focus on the Commonwealth, it appears to play a prominent part in the speeches of Major in relation to Africa. This can be seen in Figure 5:1, but a deep textual analysis is required to understand this information in context. This focus on the Commonwealth increasingly declines under Blair, Brown, and Cameron – although it re-emerges briefly towards the end of Cameron’s premiership in 2016, which coincides with the vote on Britain’s membership of the European Union.

Although the Commonwealth is referred to less frequently in Blair’s speeches, there is much continuity between Major and Blair in terms of how they use the Commonwealth to talk about the commonalities between the different member states. In Major’s 1991 speech in Harare, he talks about the common factors that unite the Commonwealth (JM91j)³⁵:

³⁵ John Major (21st October, 1991), Harare, Zimbabwe.

In the past from time to time the Commonwealth has often been divided. But the factors which unite it have always brought the members together again. And when we sit round the table it is quite remarkable to contemplate nearly fifty countries from every continent. **The superficial differences are clearly vast - size, wealth, colour, religion - but sitting down together we do all speak the same language both literally and metaphorically.** I can think of no other international meeting of this sort that needs no interpreter or any other meeting where as the Prime Minister of St Lucia remarked the other evening “It is not cricket”³⁶ and everybody knew precisely what he meant.

Blair echoes this sentiment about shared values and language in the Commonwealth at the beginning of his premiership (TB97b)³⁷, in an address to the Commonwealth Business Forum.

The Commonwealth should not be reluctant to take on an economic role and an economic profile. **We have a common language** in a global economy in the information age. **We have common values** that can shape the way we work. **We have many shared practices, similar legal and accounting systems.** And we can do more business with each other if we make more of these advantages.

The focus on English as a common language by both Major and Blair is important – especially as English is only one of hundreds of languages spoken in the Commonwealth,

³⁶ Although the latter part of this quote is not specifically about Africa, it helps introduce the next sub-theme in section 6.2.3.

³⁷ Tony Blair (22nd October, 1997), Commonwealth Business Forum.

and is not the primary language for many Commonwealth citizens. As discussed extensively in Chapter 2, language is central to national identity. The nation is a meaningful notion in everyday life because people talk about it; they make discursive claims for, about and in the name of the nation. One principal way in which the nation has been legitimised throughout history is by way of sharing a common language. Indeed, sharing a common language may be seen as one of the hallmarks of a nation.³⁸

In this way, the Commonwealth appears to act as a sort of imagined community in which historical circumstances have provided Britain and the British prime minister the platform to claim to speak on behalf of the whole institution and the people it represents. The similarities between Major and Blair go beyond stating that the Commonwealth shares certain values and institutions. Both, for example, explicitly reference the Commonwealth as an arena in which Britain's history of empire and colonialism can be transformed into a new identity. Major told the Conservative Party conference in 1994 (JM94m)³⁹:

a generation ago it was said that **Britain had lost an empire but not yet found a role**. It may or may not have been true then, but it surely isn't true today, because economically and militarily Britain remains in the top league - a member of the permanent five of the United Nations, a leading member of NATO, of the European Union, and of **a Commonwealth that covers one-third of all the people on earth**, a member of the Group of Seven of the worlds'

³⁸ There are, of course, notable exceptions to this – such as Canada (see Freake, Gentil and Sheyholislami (2011) for the construction of national identity in a bilingual context)

³⁹ John Major (14th October, 1994), Conservative Party Conference, Bournemouth, UK.

most powerful economies and one of only five significant nuclear powers in the world, and we have too as a priceless asset, perhaps the finest professional armed forces anywhere. That is Britain today, stripped of the masking-tape so often placed above it. So let's recognise what we are, look with confidence at the new world, and go out and put our own distinctive British mark on it.

Once again, Blair strongly echoes the essential argument put forward by Major – which helps explain the frustration expressed by Douglas Hurd that New Labour's shift of 2 or 3 degrees was presented as a shift of 180 in foreign policy thinking (quoted in Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001: 260). In his second term in office, Blair made a speech in India (TB02a)⁴⁰, in which he said:

For Britain, there is both challenge and opportunity. **The days of Empire are long gone.** [...] We are not a superpower, but **we can act as a pivotal partner**, acting with others to make sense of this global interdependence and make it **a force for good, for our own nation and the wider world.** In so doing, **I believe we have found a modern foreign policy role for Britain. In part this is by virtue of our history. Our past gives us huge, perhaps unparalleled connections with many different regions of the world.** We are strong allies of the US. We are part of the European Union. **Our ties with the Commonwealth [...] are visibly strengthening.** [...] It is generally accepted that our development assistance programmes, massively increased since 1997, give us an opening to help partner countries achieve their goals. **The initiative on Africa is one prime example.**

⁴⁰ Tony Blair (5th January 2002), Confederation of Indian Industry, Bangalore, India.

Major's speeches that refer to the Commonwealth do, however, have a unique aspect to them. He uses his position to advocate for democracy and human rights, and to push for 'sound economic and political management' in the Commonwealth. In the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall, this is about the virtues of capitalism over socialism. This usage of the Commonwealth in this way is an attempt to steer former British colonies without appearing paternalistic by suggesting that these are collective values that must be upheld by all members. We see this, for example, on Major's visit to Harare (JM91h)⁴¹:

This meeting must set the framework for the Commonwealth of the 1990s, we must build on our existing strengths, make the most of new possibilities. But the bedrock of **what we must do must be the general application of democracy and human rights**. It is on that basis that we can build good government and economic prosperity.

Major's use of 'we' in this speech is important to focus on because it is not meant literally. Major is not calling into question Britain's democracy or record on human rights, but it is less paternalistic than the more accurate 'you'. Volmert (1989: 123) argues: 'A speaker has at his/her disposal a whole range of (clever) options with which to present the interests and affairs of 'we-groups' in the public sphere. [...] a speaker can unite himself and his audience into a single 'community sharing a common destiny' by letting fall into oblivion

⁴¹ John Major (17th October, 1991), Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Harare, Zimbabwe.

all differences in origin, confession, class and lifestyle with a simple ‘we’. Major echoes this sentiment in later in this same trip in Zimbabwe (JM91j)⁴²:

All the members of the Commonwealth have pledged themselves to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental human rights as well as the sound economic and political management. In short, all those matters that collectively come together under the term of good government.

The Commonwealth largely disappears as a theme under Brown and Cameron’s coalition government (as seen in Figure 5:1), but begins to emerge towards the end of Cameron’s time in office – as leader of a majority Conservative government – and the vote on Britain’s membership of the EU. Cameron uses it to make the case for Britain’s engagement with the world. For example, in the final speech in the sample of speeches gathered, Cameron’s speech to EasyJet (DC16f)⁴³, he says:

We care about tackling climate change; we **care about trying to alleviate poverty in Africa**; we know we need to have the world’s trade lanes open for British business and enterprise. And I absolutely believe, if you want a big, bold, strong United Kingdom, then you want to be in organisations like a reformed European Union, rather than outside of them. Britain is part of the G7, we’re part of the G20, we’re part of NATO, which helps to keep our defences strong. **We are a very important part of the Commonwealth, which brings about a third of humanity together in one organisation.** And we’re members of the European Union. Being

⁴² John Major (21st October, 1991), press conference, Harare, Zimbabwe.

⁴³ David Cameron (24th May, 2016), EasyJet, Luton, UK.

in these organisations doesn't diminish our standing and our strength in the world, in my view.

It enhances it.

In contrast to Major's frequent and detailed references to the Commonwealth, Cameron only refers to the Commonwealth in passing alongside other institutions such as NATO and the EU. In doing so, he suggests that Britain's national identity is increasingly tied to its role as part of a complex network of institutions in which Britain is on equal terms with the other members.

This second sub-theme has shown that although the Commonwealth is an organisation with no legal or political obligations, it remains a powerful 'imagined community'. Despite asserting it is a free and equal association of independent states, the Commonwealth's history means that British prime ministers are more able to claim to speak 'on behalf' of the Commonwealth than any other figure (except the Queen). That is, Britain is *primus inter pares* in the Commonwealth. One way in which this can be seen is Major and Blair's emphasis on English as a common factor that unites the Commonwealth, despite the fact that it is not the primary language for many Commonwealth citizens. As such, this helps provide British prime ministers with the platform to discursively construct the Commonwealth in a way that suits Britain. For Major, this enables him to use it as a means to express 'proper' economic policies for former British colonies in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in a slightly less direct manner.

5.2.3 Sport

In Major's speeches that reference Africa, the role of sport – and in particular, cricket – emerges as an important theme. Indeed, he mentions cricket in nine out of the forty-eight speeches in the sample, representing almost a fifth. This finding is reinforced by its prominence in Figure 5:2. This finding is a new addition to the post-Cold War UK-Africa literature, and is noteworthy because the way in which he talked about Africa in turn reveals the way he viewed Britain's relationship with Africa. For Major, sport is a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa (sometimes the Commonwealth more broadly) in a way that transcends politics, and suggest shared values and shared history that go beyond self-interest. This is a unique phenomenon in the speeches of John Major, and is one that clearly distinguishes him from his three successors – and as such is a discontinuity in the framing of UK-Africa relations.

The role of sports and cricket in the British Empire has been the subject of much discussion in academic literature – however this has not been explicitly linked to the role it played in UK-Africa relations post-Cold War. At a broader level, Holt (1989: 212) contends that 'sports were thought to help create a climate of relations that would bind the Empire together'. Indeed, the Victorian cricket legend W. G. Grace wrote in his memoirs that 'the good fellowship born on the cricket-field has done more than is recognised to knit together the various sections of the British Empire and to advance the cause of civilisation' (Grace, 1899: 183-184).

Perkin (1989: 145) goes further, arguing that ‘in the case of Britain and its Empire [...], sport played a part in holding the Empire together and also, paradoxically, in emancipating the subject nations from tutelage. Thus it helped the Empire to decolonize [sic] on a friendlier basis than any other in the world’s history, and so contributed to the transformation of the British Empire into the Commonwealth of Nations’. A compelling reason for the power of such sports is provided by Mangan (1992: 2): ‘games, especially cricket, were elevated by the middle classes to the status of a moral discipline. [...] Eventually, cricket became the symbol *par excellence* of imperial solidarity and superiority epitomizing [sic] a set of consolidatory moral imperatives that both exemplified and explained imperial ambition and achievement. It became a political metaphor as much as an imperial game’.

The notion of sport as an historic ‘political metaphor’ between members of the Commonwealth helps to explain how it offered Major an opportunity to talk about lifting sanctions on South Africa and bringing it back into the international community. Indeed, Major himself says precisely this in a speech to the National Sporting Club at the Café Royal in London (JM91e)⁴⁴:

I was delighted this year to see South Africa readmitted by the International Olympics Committee and personally delighted to see South Africa come back into international cricket and I look forward to seeing them play at our great cricket grounds before too long. **The government may have done what it could to bring that about through quiet diplomacy,**

⁴⁴ John Major (19th September, 1991), National Sporting Club, Café Royal, London, UK.

but cricket itself did a good deal more [...] the field of sport played a very positive role indeed

This shows how the focus on sport and cricket provides Major with an opportunity to project a national identity that appears less self-interested and more focused on shared values. This can be seen again in Major's keynote address to the Parliament of South Africa in 1994 (JM94f)⁴⁵:

South Africa is one of the world's great sporting nations; our sportsmen and sportswomen have had memorable encounters over the years; they have had memorable encounters this year on the cricket and rugby fields and at the Commonwealth Games but **your sporting opportunities are not yet evenly distributed yet and we would like to help you** spread them to each and every part of your community.

Major not only used sport as a lens through which to reflect commonalities between Britain and Africa on an international level – he also used it to find common ground between himself and people from ethnic minority, such as Afro-Caribbean, backgrounds in Britain. His doing so represents an attempt to define Britishness and British national identity as a set of common values, beliefs, and pursuits – rather than an identity based on ethnic background (JM91f)⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa.

⁴⁶ John Major (25th September, 1991), Windsor Fellowship, London, UK.

I know from personal experience what a vital and rich contribution people from the ethnic minorities can make. [...] when I revisited Brixton to open a nursery at St Paul's Church, I had the opportunity of talking to the new youngsters who live in Brixton. **And just like my generation, what they wanted to talk about was cricket and football and the same sort of things that concerned me so many years ago.**

It is important to note that the link between sport and Africa is briefly mentioned in sports politics literature, such as Bale (2002); Grix and Carmichael (2012); Giampiccoli and Nauright (2019). Although these discussions are broadly tangential to the focus of this thesis, the literature specifically relating to Major is worth examining here. Bale (2002: xvii) notes that in 1995, Major supported a scheme to send 'sporting missionaries' to Africa. Major saw the continent as holding 'a vast reserve army of athletic talent that could be used as sports labor [sic] in the global sports economy' (Nauright and Amara, 2018: 2).

This view is rooted in history, according to Bale. He notes that in 1995, The Times reported on Major's idea and illustrated the story with a photograph of a young Tutsi man leaping over the heads of two European visitors. The photograph represented the 'treasure [that was] to be found in late twentieth-century Africa' and 'communicated an image of African athleticism' (Bale, 2002: xvii). The article in the Times that accompanied the photo implied 'the need for the more civilised Europe to rescue African athletes from their primitive conditions by giving them the gift of Western sports. In this way, they could be taken to a place where their skills could be appreciated and used' (Bale, 2002: xvii).

This sub-theme around the role of sport – and in particular, cricket – in Major’s speeches reveals a similarity to the previous sub-theme on the Commonwealth. For Major, sport is a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa in a way that transcends politics, and suggest shared values and shared history that go beyond self-interest. This is a unique phenomenon in the speeches of Major, and is one that clearly distinguishes him from his three successors. In a similar fashion, the Commonwealth is also a means of expressing shared values indirectly.

5.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

In the thematic content analysis, we found that there are three sub-themes that emerge in the way in which British prime minister's talk about Africa in relation to history. In this section, specific speeches will be analysed in greater detail using the Discourse-Historical Approach. The speeches selected for analysis in terms of history are given below in Table 5:2, along with details about the speeches. One speech each was selected for Major, Blair and Cameron. As we have seen in the thematic content analysis, Brown has been largely absent from this chapter because he does not use this framing to talk about Africa – and so a discourse analysis is not necessary. These speeches were selected based on coding that was carried out with NVivo (section 4.5), the quantitative analysis at the beginning of this chapter (section 5.1) and from the thematic content analysis in the previous section (section 5.2). These speeches were also chosen for their focus on the link between Africa and history in sufficient depth to discuss the discursive strategies used.

Table 5:2. History-related speeches selected for critical discourse analysis

Prime Minister	Date of Speech	Location
John Major	20/09/1994	South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa
Tony Blair	25/03/2007	Video speech in Elmina Castle, Ghana
David Cameron	19/07/2011	Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria

The first speech selected for Critical Discourse Analysis in relation to history is Major's 1994 address to the South African National Assembly in Cape Town. Figure 5.1 from the quantitative analysis chapter showed there was a 'spike' in references to Africa in 1994, in which three and then five separate speeches about Africa were delivered on consecutive days. These speeches were given on the 20th and 21st September 1994, and were part of Major's visit to South Africa – the first by a British prime minister in 34 years. Major's speech to the South African National Assembly was the keynote address of this tour. In his memoirs, Major (2000: 509) recalls:

I visited South Africa in September 1994, five months after the first fully democratic elections in the country's history, and addressed both Houses of Parliament. There was a limit to how much practical help Britain could give out of an overseas aid budget that is targeted at the very poorest nations, but I promised £100 million of assistance. Afterwards, at lunch - in the room in which, over thirty years earlier, Harold Macmillan had delivered his famous 'Wind of Change' speech - I saw something of the remarkable spirit that had taken the country into the new era. Former inmates of the notorious prison on Robben Island sat chatting with white MPs who had served in the previous National Party government.

In this speech, as discussed in the thematic content analysis, he portrays a positive picture of Britain's 'benign' history in Africa. He accomplishes this in two ways. Firstly, he presents Britain as a reluctant coloniser with benevolent intentions. The second way is to highlight

the joint service of Britain and South Africa in the World Wars against a common enemy and for a common cause (JM, 1994f)⁴⁷:

To make a new beginning we must first look the past in the eye. It is there in our hearts, **it is there in our joint history**, so let us be frank about what has united us and also about what has divided us. **We British were relative late-comers to Africa**, but in the 400 years since Sir Francis Drake's epic voyage of 1580 we have been **deeply involved** with this continent. **Trade rather than colonisation** was the reason for early British and European contacts with Africa. **Benign commerce turned however into the slave trade** and at the height of the 18th century into the **transportation of over 6 million Africans**. **The British Parliament outlawed this moral outrage in 1807 and the Dutch followed 7 years later**. As the 19th century progressed philanthropic explorers and Christian missionaries **travelled courageously through Africa**, but in turn they **unwittingly** paved the way for the harsh incursions of rival empire builders, and at the century's end right and wrong mingled on each side in the Boer wars and left a bitter legacy.

This extract shows how Major diminishes the negative elements of Britain's colonial legacy. Instead of focusing on the historical consequences of colonialism, which would be extremely challenging given his audience, Major instead centres this section of his speech on Britain's intentions. As this is more nebulous, it is easier to obfuscate and diminish Britain's role. Major employs a variety of 'justificatory' strategies – particularly 'trivialisation' strategies such as avoidance and euphemising. For example, Major refers

⁴⁷ John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa.

simply to being ‘deeply involved’ in Africa and the ‘transportation of over 6 million Africans’, rather than acknowledging conditions and horrors they suffered. These are examples of what Wodak *et al.* (2009) refer to as a ‘euphemistic verb obscuring agent’.

This can also be seen in his argument that the British were ‘late-comers to Africa’ – which he later reinforces through the use of ‘unwittingly’. This theme is continued with the assertion that Britain’s intentions were ‘trade rather than colonisation’ and ‘benign commerce’, and then by a claim to moral superiority by abolishing the slave trade before the Dutch. Major also asserts a claim to truth by his use of ‘let us be frank’, which is a linguistic strategy to lend weight to his assertions. There other examples of Major using a similar rhetorical technique. Later in this speech, he says: ‘Britain would like to work closely with South Africa to turn the tide at last in this Continent in which my nation has been so **deeply involved** for so many years’ – which is a way to hint at the lasting legacies of European colonialism without addressing it in name. Similarly, in his speech to the Western European Union Assembly (JM96a)⁴⁸, he simply says: ‘History, culture and trade bind Europe to virtually all parts of the globe: from the Mediterranean to the Far East, from Africa to Latin America’.

Focusing back on Major’s 1994 speech to the South African National Assembly, he jumps from this sanitised account of Britain’s colonial past and juxtaposes it with more recent history – when Britain and South Africa fought together in the World Wars.

⁴⁸ John Major (23rd March, 1996), Western European Union Assembly, London, UK.

And yet despite these recent wounds, former adversaries **from Britain and South Africa fought side by side in two World wars**, in Flanders, in East Africa, in North Africa, in Europe, on the ground and in the air. We in Britain owe those South Africans - from all the country's main communities - a great debt of gratitude. **They joined us in a common cause and they were ready to make, and did make, a common sacrifice.**

As noted in Chapter 2, an important aspect of the role of history in the construction of national identity is the role of 'forgetting'. Anderson (1983) argues that the very act of forgetting affirms the national site of memory. Or, as Gourgouris (1996) puts it, the act of forgetting is a matter of the national will – a ritualised performance of the will to forget. In this extract, we see Major use this framing to shape a British national identity that portrays South Africa as an equal partner.

Another important point in this extract to note is Major's use of 'from all the country's main communities'. This appears to be an attempt by Major to move beyond remarks made by Conservative politicians in the mid to late 1980s during Thatcher's premiership. In 1987, Thatcher (1987)⁴⁹ said in a press conference that 'a considerable number of the ANC leaders are communists', and concluded that 'when the ANC says that they will target British companies, this shows what a typical terrorist organization it is' (McSmith, 2013). In

⁴⁹ Margaret Thatcher (17th October, 1987), Vancouver Trade and Convention Centre, Commonwealth Summit, Vancouver, Canada.

addition, Teddy Taylor MP⁵⁰ declared that Mandela ‘should be shot’, whilst Terry Dicks MP⁵¹ asked: ‘How much longer will the Prime Minister allow herself to be kicked in the face by this black terrorist?’. As well as sanitising the distant history of colonialism, this shows Major’s attempt to distance himself from more recent history too.

The second speech to be studied in detail is Blair’s 2007 video speech on the 200th anniversary of the British Parliament legislating to abolish the slave trade in the British Empire (TB07e)⁵². The context and occasion of this speech make it difficult to dismiss Britain’s historical involvement in Africa; it was an event held specifically to acknowledge Britain’s role in the slave trade, and was broadcast in Elmina Castle – a major historical hub of trans-Atlantic slave trade, and a site of many atrocities and abuses. Despite this, it is used as an opportunity to simultaneously accept responsibility for Britain’s historical role in the slave trade but also to take credit for Britain’s historical role in abolishing it. The way in which the tension between these two narratives is balanced is revealing because it helps to understand the narration of British national identity.

It is important to briefly consider the specific context of this speech. Richards (2005: 617), who focuses on Ghana’s slave ‘castle-dungeons’, including Elmina Castle – the audience for this speech – notes:

⁵⁰ Sir Edward (Teddy) Taylor, Conservative MP for Glasgow Cathcart (1964 – 1979); Rochford and Southend East (1980 – 1997).

⁵¹ Terence (Terry) Dicks, Conservative MP for Hayes and Harlington (1983 – 1997).

⁵² Tony Blair (25th March, 2007), video speech played in Elmina Castle, Ghana.

Like theatre, memory is constructed through processes of selecting, repeating, forgetting – willfully as well as unconsciously – and re-assembling narratives. [...] No matter how much we strive for a full recuperation of a past event, our selection of facts, the emphases we devote, and the meanings we make are determined by our location in the present; we remember for some purpose, most often expressed as a need to learn how the past can instruct our present and future.

Blair begins the speech by acknowledging the scale of the atrocities committed and Britain's historical involvement in this, calling the transatlantic slave trade 'one of the most **shameful** enterprises in history'. This theme is present in the first quarter of the speech, and the adjectives used in this part of the speech help emphasise this. For example, he goes on to highlight the '**inhumane** abuse' suffered by people at Elmina Castle, but also 'in cities across the UK – in Liverpool, Hull, Bristol and London which played their role in this **deplorable** trade'. This theme reaches its peak with the sentence: 'It is an opportunity for the United Kingdom to express our deep sorrow and regret for our nation's role in this inhumanity and for the **unbearable suffering**, individually and collectively, the slave trade caused.'

This section segues into the next theme, which qualifies this acknowledgement of wrongdoing with a shift of focus to abolitionism, and with it Britain's claim to rightness. Blair offers one African and two British abolitionists in his example: 'the people who fought against slavery came from all walks of life. They include former enslaved Africans like Olaudah Equiano, church leaders like Thomas Clarkson and statesmen like William Wilberforce'. This is significant because it shows a shift in conceptualisation of national

identity from a colonising nation to one of an emancipator. The second theme continues and goes beyond famous abolitionists to suggest that the spirit of abolitionism was embodied in 'countless' people in Africa and Britain: 'But the campaign also involved countless men and women, black and white, now forgotten by history, from across Africa, including Ghana, from Britain and many other countries'.

Importantly, this second theme then offers an opportunity for Blair to focus on Britain's current aid and development commitments to Africa, as well as its role in tackling modern day slavery – which fills the latter half of the speech. This shows how a speech about the 200th anniversary of the end of the slave trade in the British Empire is used to talk about British government policy achievements.

Debt relief, for example, has enabled health care charges to be scrapped in Zambia. It has released the investment to build 2,500 primary schools in Tanzania so they can meet their target of universal primary education years ahead of schedule. There's been increased funding to tackle AIDS, already providing 1.6 million in poor countries with anti-retroviral drugs.

Britain is determined to continue to lead the drive to overcome all these challenges.

[...] The UK is committed as well to helping respond to the challenges facing the African and Caribbean diaspora.

The final speech selected for CDA in the context of history is Cameron's 2011 speech to the Pan-African University in Nigeria (DC, 2011f).⁵³ As seen in the thematic content analysis section, he uses this to present himself as a young new leader who is removed from the administrations that came before him.

'I passionately believe in liberal democracy... and I believe Africa can do it too. Let me be clear: this isn't about imposing Western beliefs on Africa or neo-colonialism. **I'm from the generation free of this shadow. I wasn't even born** when Harold MacMillan made his winds of change speech. And I'll be the first to say, we have our own work to do keeping democracy strong back at home. This is about what will work for Africa - and what we are seeing work'.

Unlike Major and Blair, however, Cameron rarely refers to Britain's historical legacy in Africa. Instead, looking at this speech in more detail, we can see other ways in which this focus of this speech is about making a break with recent history and looking to the future. This is aimed at three audiences simultaneously: the immediate audience in Nigeria, the public in the UK, and the Conservative Party. His focus on trade is an attempt to distance himself from the recent history of New Labour for all these audiences, whilst his commitment to aid represents a significant shift for the leader of a party that has traditionally been sceptical about the effectiveness of aid.

⁵³ David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan-African University, Lagos, Nigeria.

Today, Britain accounts for less than four percent of Africa's exports. That's almost three times less than China - and **one of the reasons I'm here** is to make sure we catch up. It's **why I've brought a plane full of business leaders**. And it's why **we want to do more** to extend loan guarantees and trade finance to British companies that are looking to do business in Africa. Because **we see Africa in a new way, a different way**. Yes, a place to invest our aid. But above all a place to trade.

Throughout the speech, Cameron shifts between 'I' and 'we'. As such, this makes it unclear which capacity he is speaking in. For example, in this extract, he begins by talking about his own purpose in coming to Africa in a personal capacity. However, the phrase 'we want to do more' and 'we see Africa in a new way, a different way' may imply his government or that he is speaking on behalf of Britain. This is complicated further by the section of the speech devoted to critiquing 'aid sceptics' who mostly come from his own party. Nevertheless, these all represent attempts break from recent history and to forge a new role for Britain.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on three sub-themes about the role of history in British prime ministers' speeches in relation to Africa. Firstly, Major, Blair, and Cameron use different discursive strategies to sanitise Britain's colonial history in Africa. Major uses euphemisms to downplay the role of Britain's colonial legacy in Africa, as does Blair - but to a lesser extent. Blair primarily uses transformational strategies to change the focus from Britain's role as a coloniser to emphasise its role in abolitionism. Cameron, meanwhile, attempts to move beyond this history altogether.

The second sub-theme is a more specific focus on this around the Commonwealth as a unique institution that symbolises certain values. The Commonwealth's place in these speeches is noteworthy because it suggests that the Commonwealth is more than a formal institution; it is also – perhaps equally importantly – a rhetorical conception. The Commonwealth's history means that British prime ministers are more able to claim to speak 'on behalf' of the Commonwealth than any other figure (except the Queen). This helps provide British prime ministers with the platform to shape the 'commonalities' in the Commonwealth – which can be used as a tool to condemn or express approval towards other Commonwealth countries in a subtle manner. This focus on the Commonwealth, prominent under Major, largely disappears under Blair, Brown, and Cameron – although it re-emerges briefly towards the end of Cameron's premiership in the second term, which coincides with the vote on Britain's membership of the European Union.

The third section is more specific still, highlighting the way in which sport (cricket in particular) offers Major a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa in an uncontroversial way that largely transcends politics, and enables him to suggest shared values and shared history that go beyond British self-interest.

CHAPTER 6

Security for Whom? Between Pax Britannica and Partnership with Africa

This chapter focuses on the extent to which Britain's post-Cold War engagement with Africa is presented by British prime ministers as being based on security, and how this shapes British national identity, as constructed by them. The idea that Britain's relationship with Africa is based primarily around concerns about British security rather than African development is explored in the literature (Abrahamsen, 2005; Porteous, 2005; McConnon, 2014; Pugh et al., 2013). This chapter will offer an opportunity to assess such – especially in relation to the changing place of Africa in British foreign policy pre and post-9/11. It begins with a continuation of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5, but with a specific focus on the security dimension. It then moves on to a thematic content analysis of the speeches and critical discourse analysis around this theme.

This chapter finds that Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron all link deprivation in Africa to the threat of extremism in the UK. In addition, this chapter shows considerable evidence for this link before 9/11 in contrast to the perceived sharp change after 9/11 in the literature. Furthermore, all four prime ministers show a lack of clarity about the extent to which British military forces should support peacekeeping in Africa compared to supporting the development of African peacekeeping forces. This suggests that there has not been a clear trend in terms of Britain's role in relation to peacekeeping in Africa; prime ministers are no clearer on this now than at the end of the Cold War. Finally, this chapter finds that whilst

there is a consistency amongst the four prime ministers about Britain's place in the world and its duty to intervene, this is most notable in the speeches of Blair and Cameron. This chapter is notable largely for its continuities, in contrast to the significant discontinuities found in the previous chapter on history.

6.1 Quantitative Analysis

For this security chapter, the keywords selected for input into the Python program are: 'security', 'conflict', 'extremism', 'extremist', 'stability', 'instability', 'peacekeeping', 'terror', 'terrorism', 'terrorist', 'threat', and 'war'. This information is plotted in Table 6:1, where mentions of selected keywords are shown in terms of their raw numbers by prime minister. In Figure 6:1, these are plotted as percentages of each prime minister's corpus.

Table 6:1. Frequency of selected security-related keywords in the context of Africa by prime minister

	John Major	Tony Blair	Gordon Brown	David Cameron
Security	11	31	25	31
Conflict	4	81	8	6
Extrem(ism/ist)	3	15	4	14
Instability	3	4	5	0
Peacekeeping	4	25	7	5
Stability	4	11	9	12
Terror(ism/ist)	2	35	10	17
Threat(s)	2	18	8	16
War	2	12	5	2






Figure 6:1. Frequency of selected keywords related to 'Security' in the context of Africa (as a percentage of each prime minister's corpus).

Figure 6:1 suggests that there is broadly much similarity between the four prime ministers in their speeches about Africa and security. There is an indication of potential similarity between Blair and Cameron, as seen in references to 'extremism', 'terrorism', and 'threat'. Whilst 'security' appears more frequently with each prime minister, this trend is not mirrored in any of the other keywords as might be expected if this was part of a wider trend. Blair's usage of 'conflict' is a significant outlier. These initial observations will be explored further through closer thematic and discourse analysis.

Having captured a broad picture of references to specific security-related keywords, this section moves on to look in more detail at the context of these keywords. This is achieved by using the sentences extracted using the Python code as they show how security is referenced in the context of Africa. Removing the keywords from the extracted sentences and plotting the remainder helps to understand the context of these sentences. This information is plotted here for each prime minister as a word cloud, where word size is directly proportional to frequency of usage.

Figure 6:2 shows that Major's discussions of Africa in the context of security are centred around South Africa, but also relate to economic issues – which explains the prominence of words such as 'economy' and 'investment'. In contrast, the other three prime ministers' word clouds show an emphasis on humanitarian words – for example 'poverty', 'peace', and 'democracy' in the word clouds of Blair, Brown and Cameron respectively. Figure 6:5 shows Cameron's attention to Somalia and Libya. It also shows the frequency with which Cameron talks specifically about Islam in this context, and apparently marks him out from the other three prime ministers.






Figure 6:4. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Gordon Brown's sentences containing specific security keywords, excluding those keywords




Figure 6:5. Word cloud showing frequency of words in David Cameron's sentences containing specific security keywords, excluding those keywords

6.2 Thematic Content Analysis

Bringing together the findings from the additional quantitative approach in the previous section with the literature and knowledge of the speeches gained during the data collection stage, three security related sub-themes can be identified. Firstly, we can find a sub-theme around Africa's underdevelopment as a breeding ground for terrorism and extremism – which poses a threat to Britain. This is broadly how security – as understood by UK policymakers – is discussed in the literature around Britain and Africa, as detailed in Chapter 2. Secondly, all four British prime ministers' rhetoric about peacekeeping in Africa is divided between a focus on African states acting as a stabilising force themselves, or – at other times – whether British assistance is required. Thirdly, there is a sub-theme around the display of British hard power in Africa. Whilst this is rooted in security, and is inextricably intertwined with the other sub-themes, the emphasis here is on Britain and projecting British power. This can be seen most clearly in the examples of Sierra Leone and Libya. These sub-themes will be explored here in more detail, with reference to the literature where relevant.

6.2.1 Africa's Underdevelopment as a Security Threat

The idea of Africa's underdevelopment as a breeding ground for terrorism and extremism – and the threat it poses to Britain – is explored in some detail in the literature. Abrahamsen (2005) argues that while Britain's actions in Africa were far less visibly militarised than US policies, New Labour's approach to Africa changed in subtle but important ways following 9/11. Abrahamsen cites the centrality of Africa in Blair's 2001 Labour Party Conference

speech (TB01f)⁵⁴ following 9/11 as indicative of these changes. Africa had few direct links to al-Qaeda, and it is therefore not clear why Blair would choose to devote so much attention to Africa. Abrahamsen concludes that Blair's attention to Africa was part of an on-going 'securitisation' of the continent. Through this securitisation, interactions with Africa shifted from a paradigm of 'development/humanitarianism' to a category of 'risk/fear/security'. That is, Africa was increasingly mentioned in the context of the 'war on terrorism' and the dangers Africa posed to Britain and the international community.

This argument is echoed by Porteous (2005). He contends that 9/11 intruded on the post-Cold War reassessment of the West's aims, interests and responsibilities in Africa. 'Security and ideology have crowded back to centre stage in western thinking, albeit in new forms. [...] The new focus on weak and failed states has led policy-makers to identify Africa, with its large Muslim populations, as one of several regions in need of attention in the emerging 'war on terror' (Porteous, 2005: 297). However, Porteous also argues that in the years following 9/11 and the Iraq War, Britain's policies on Africa did not shift significantly, and the rhetorical commitment to maintaining support for African development was reinforced, even amplified. Duffield (2001: 121) argues that this is because development has been reframed as 'a structural form of conflict prevention'.

Whilst not specifically focusing on Africa, McConnon (2014) makes a similar claim to Abrahamsen and Porteous – that since 9/11, Britain increasingly coordinated its foreign,

⁵⁴ Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001). Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK.

development, and security policies. The Department for International Development (DFID) brought Britain's national security into the core of its policy discourse through a gradual process by linking poverty and instability in the developing world to threats to UK's national security such as terrorism and religious extremism. DFID justified this shift through claims of common interest (DFID, 2009) between development for people in the global South and security for the UK by drawing on the concept of human security, where international development is offered as a solution to national security problems.

However, the speeches provide evidence of British prime ministers making the clear link between Africa's underdevelopment and extremism long before 9/11. In a 1994 speech to the Conservative Middle East Council (JM94b)⁵⁵, Major makes this very argument about Algeria, framing it in terms of economic deprivation.

We and our partners welcome the Algerian government's agreement with the IMF on a far reaching economic programme and we are supporting it financially. **Extremism thrives on economic deprivation.** Successful economic reform will do much to widen support for Algeria's government and her institutions.

Major expresses concerns about extremism and terrorism across North Africa more broadly in a joint press conference with Bill Clinton in 1995 (JM95c)⁵⁶. He says that he and Clinton

⁵⁵ John Major (28th July, 1994), Conservative Middle East Council, London, UK.

⁵⁶ John Major (4th April, 1995), joint press conference with President Clinton, Washington, D.C., USA.

spent time considering how they might address issues such as ‘combatting together some of the problems of instability, extremism and terrorism that we can begin to see in parts of North Africa’.

The argument that 9/11 marked a radical shift in rhetoric in relation to Britain’s interactions with Africa is further called into question by a look at Blair’s first term. Towards the beginning of his premiership, Blair gave a speech to the UN General Assembly (TB98b)⁵⁷ in which he says:

The fight against terrorism has also taken on a new urgency. **The past year’s global roll call of terror includes Luxor, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi,** Omagh and many others. Each one is a reminder that terrorism is a uniquely barbaric and cowardly crime. Each one is a reminder that terrorists are no resisters of borders.

It is significant that three of the four examples of terrorism Blair provided in 1998 were from Africa – Egypt, Tanzania, and Kenya respectively. Therefore, it would be more accurate to argue that the events of 9/11 served to strengthen a view expressed by British prime ministers numerous times in the years before the attack. According to Abrahamsen, the prominence of Africa in Blair’s 2001 Labour Party conference speech – less than a month after 9/11 – is evidence that Britain’s interactions with Africa had shifted from a ‘development /humanitarianism’ paradigm to one of ‘risk/fear/security’. In this speech,

⁵⁷ Tony Blair (21st September, 1998), UN General Assembly, New York, USA.

Blair used the phrase 'The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and angrier' (Gallagher, 2013: 11). Gallagher (2009) contests that this phrase rhetorically removes African states from the normal processes and dealings of international politics. Gallagher also argues this gives Britain a moral authority in its assertion that it can and has the ability and right to direct the policies of African states. The context of the quote allows us to better understand this interpretation. Blair (TB01f)⁵⁸ says that the partnership for Africa is a deal between the developing and developed world:

On our side: provide more aid, untied to trade; write off debt; help with good governance and infrastructure; training to the soldiers, with UN blessing, in conflict resolution; encouraging investment; and access to our markets so that we practise the free trade we are so fond of preaching. But it's a deal: on the African side: true democracy, no more excuses for dictatorship, abuses of human rights; no tolerance of bad governance, from the endemic corruption of some states, to the activities of Mr Mugabe's henchmen in Zimbabwe. [...] The will, with our help, to broker agreements for peace and provide troops to police them. **The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and angrier.**

⁵⁸ Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001), Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK.

This sub-theme becomes more frequent in Blair's post-9/11 speeches. A month later, at the Lord Mayor's Banquet (TB01h)⁵⁹, Blair links extremism in Africa to poverty: 'an extremist and perverted version of Islam which seeks to shoulder aside or overthrow moderate counsels [...] in Africa, grinding poverty, pandemic disease, a rash of failed states, where problems seldom leave their stain on one nation but spread to whole regions'. Other examples continuing on this same theme can be found throughout Blair's time as prime minister. In 2002 he told the TUC conference (TB02h)⁶⁰ that 'Africa, if left to decline, will become a breeding ground for extremism'. This is echoed at the end of his time as prime minister in 2007 (TB07n)⁶¹: '[f]ailed or struggling African states are breeding grounds for the very extremism that threatens us everywhere'.

This theme is continued by Brown, but he puts it in terms of a lack of education, and argues for education as a form of defence. This supports the argument made by McConnon (2014) that Britain's national security was brought into the core of its development policy discourse through linking instability in the developing world to extremism by drawing on the concept of human security where development is offered as a solution to national security problems (GB08e)⁶²:

⁵⁹ Tony Blair (12th November, 2001), Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK.

⁶⁰ Tony Blair (10th September, 2002), TUC Conference, Blackpool, UK.

⁶¹ Tony Blair (31st May, 2007), South Africa.

⁶² Gordon Brown (18th April, 2008), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, USA.

When I visited Abuja in Nigeria I found that side by side with a dilapidated school that we did not support enough was a madrassas where **Al Qaeda inspired extremists were enticing children into their school offering free high standard schooling** - so our offer of education for all is not just an education and economic policy for the developing world it is a defence and security policy for the developed world.

By also using this argument (DC11d)⁶³, Cameron shows that there has been continuity on this theme across the last four British prime ministers:

Now there are those who argue these North African countries are not the poorest in the world, and that we should concentrate on our own affairs. I reject this. Be in no doubt. **Get this wrong, fail to support these countries and we risk giving oxygen to the extremists who prey on the frustrations and aspirations of young people.** We would see more terrorism, more immigration, more instability coming from Europe's southern border. And that affects us right back at home.

There are other examples of this from Cameron, such as his 2013 speech to the Somali Conference in London (DC13f)⁶⁴, where he argues: 'helping young Somalis to escape grinding poverty is not just vital for the future of Somalia it's also the best antidote to the extremism that threatens us all'.

⁶³ David Cameron (27th May, 2011), G8 Summit, Deauville, France.

⁶⁴ David Cameron (7th May, 2013), Somali Conference, London, UK.

This shows that this theme did not arise only after 9/11, and it was an argument used and cultivated by all of the prime ministers – albeit in slightly different forms. After the terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015 that left 130 people dead, however, Cameron breaks from this argument that extremism thrives because terrorists take advantages of people living in poverty. Towards the end of his premiership, he makes the opposite case (DC15g)⁶⁵:

Some say [terrorism is] because of poverty and deprivation but that overlooks that many of these terrorists have had the full advantages of prosperous families or a Western education. [...] The root cause of this threat is the poisonous ideology of extremism itself. This ideology, this diseased view of the world, has become an epidemic – infecting minds from the mosques of Mogadishu⁶⁶ to the bedrooms of Birmingham.

Thus, we have seen that the argument linking deprivation and extremism is one that was made by Major, Blair, Brown and Cameron, and was a continuity throughout this period – until late 2015 Cameron turned the focus to Islamic extremism itself. This also helps explain the prominence of the word ‘Islamist’ in Cameron’s speeches, as seen in Figure 6:5. In terms of what this means for British national identity, by suggesting that Islamist ideology is inherently corrupting – regardless of poverty or deprivation, Cameron turns the focus away from Britain’s poverty alleviation efforts and instead increases the attention to the war on terror.

⁶⁵ David Cameron (16th November, 2015), Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, UK.

⁶⁶ Mogadishu is the capital city of Somalia.

However, Dowd and Raleigh (2013) argue politicians such as Cameron have fallen back on simplistic narratives in an attempt to explain the intensification of violent Islamist activity in Africa. The first of these is that violent Islamist groups in Africa form part of a single, monolithic, globalised Islamist threat. The second is that this threat is considered a danger for the West and Western interests primarily, and African stability only secondarily. The third is that ungoverned areas are assumed to provide a safe haven for extremism, and therefore Africa is seen as the new arena in which violent Islam will flourish. In particular, Dowd and Raleigh cite Cameron's declaration in Algeria that 'This is a global threat and it will require a global response' as evidence of this. Cameron went on to frame this as 'a generational struggle' against an extremist ideology, and the need to 'close down the ungoverned space in which [terrorists] thrive'. This research finds evidence to support this claim by Dowd and Raleigh (2013), such as Cameron's speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos (DC13c)⁶⁷, in which he argues:

I believe **we are in the midst of a long struggle against murderous terrorists and a poisonous ideology that supports them.** [...] al-Qaeda franchises have been growing for years in Yemen, in Somalia and across parts of North Africa, places that have suffered hideously through hostage taking, terrorism and crime [...] The French are right to act in Mali and I backed that action, not just with words, but with logistical support too. [...] We need to address that poisonous narrative that the terrorists feed on. **We need to close down the ungoverned space in which they thrive.**

⁶⁷ David Cameron (24th January, 2013), World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland.

6.2.2 Peacekeeping

A second sub-theme relating to security that can be identified in the speeches of the four prime ministers is around discussions of peacekeeping in Africa. For Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron, there is a tension in the speeches between a discourse of Africa as an arena that requires British assistance on the one hand, and on the other arguing that African countries or institutions are able to act as a stabilising force on their own. This division presents two competing visions of Britain's national identity and role in the world which lies at the heart of the central finding of this thesis.

In Cameron's speeches, he often makes the case that Britain's identity is tied to its role as a peacekeeper in the world, and he tends to use Africa as the primary example when talking about this. At the beginning of his premiership, in a speech to the British Armed Forces on HMS Ark Royal (DC10a)⁶⁸, Cameron argues that fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa is an important role of the Royal Navy – and that it is central to Britain's national interest and role in the world:

We have not asked the fundamental questions about the defence of our country, about **our role in the world**, since 1998. [...] It is time for us to think again about how to make our country safe, **how to project power in the world, how to look after our national interest**, and how to make sure we are secure for the future. That is what we should do. I know absolutely that **the Royal Navy will have a huge role to play in that future**. We are a

⁶⁸ David Cameron (24th June, 2010), HMS Ark Royal.

trading nation. We have got to keep our sea-lanes open. We want to stop drugs coming from our shores [sic], and that is the work that you do. **We have to deal with the appalling threat of piracy off the Horn of Africa; that is what you do.**

Five years later, having been re-elected as prime minister, Cameron repeats this argument at a speech at the UN (DC15c)⁶⁹, saying that Britain has a role to play in peacekeeping in Somalia and South Sudan:

Britain has for many, many years supported peacekeeping operations and taken part in peacekeeping operations. We think they are very important. We also think [...] **Britain has a particular role in training and logistics and expertise and standards and so we want to step up what we are doing.** Obviously we will want to see all the right force protection arrangements in place **but we should be playing a part in this. The outcome in Somalia**, if it's a good outcome, that's good for Britain. It means less terrorism, less migration, less piracy. **Ditto in South Sudan: if we can, as peacekeepers**, help to maintain order and peace and see stable development in that country then that is going to be, again, less poverty, less migration, less issues that affect us back at home.

In doing so, Cameron once again centres this on Britain's national interest. In other examples, such as Cameron's 2014 speech to the UN General Assembly (DC14d)⁷⁰, he takes a slightly less forceful approach. He begins by seemingly contradicting his previous stance:

⁶⁹ David Cameron (27th September, 2015), UN, New York, USA.

⁷⁰ David Cameron (25th September, 2014), UN General Assembly, New York, USA.

I don't believe this threat of Islamist extremism will best be solved by Western ground troops directly trying to pacify or reconstruct Middle Eastern or African countries'. However, he moves on to argue that Britain's military still has a large role to play: But pursuing an intelligent and comprehensive approach **should include a place for our military**. Our military can support the enormous humanitarian efforts that are necessary.

It is noteworthy that when Cameron was leading the campaign to remain in the European Union, he cited piracy in Africa as an issue that Britain inside the EU is uniquely positioned to tackle. In a speech delivered at O2's Headquarters (DC16a)⁷¹, he said:

I'm not sure that 6 maybe 10 years ago I thought that Europe was quite so important for Britain getting things done in the world. I thought obviously NATO matters, our partnership with America matters, but I see and I've seen this for 6 years that if we want to fix stuff, whether it is trying to stop people smugglers in the Mediterranean, whether it's **trying to stop pirates off the coast of Africa**, [...] **we gain by sitting round that table** with the French, with the Germans, with the Italians and getting things done.

In the month before the EU referendum, he made this same argument in a joint press conference with President Obama (DC16d)⁷², but focused solely on the issue of piracy in Africa: 'in east Africa, we have helped to turn around the prospects for Somalia, for instance,

⁷¹ David Cameron (23rd February, 2016), O2's Headquarters, Slough, UK.

⁷² David Cameron (22nd April, 2016), joint press conference with President Obama, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, UK.

thanks to an EU operation – led by Britain and supported by America – its waters are no longer a safe haven for pirates’.

This emphasis on external actors in helping Somalia contradicts the argument Cameron previously made at the Somali Conference in London (DC13f)⁷³. In this speech, he instead places far greater agency on Africa. He gives credit to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Somali people, and he stresses that Britain’s role was not in leading, but instead in providing support to Somalia.

the transformation in Somalia that we have seen has not happened because 50 countries sat round a table in a room in London last year and somehow decided Somalia’s future. **This change has happened because of the vision of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his team and because of the strength and courage of the Somali people** in beginning the long and difficult task of rebuilding their country from the bottom up. [...] **We know that Somalia’s future is shaped by Somalia and with Somalia it’s not something done to Somalia.** Today you are setting out the plans for your country. **Our task is clear: to back you and get behind your plans. And that is what we will do.**

The speeches of Blair, Brown, and Major reveal that are also torn about whether African countries can be their own peacekeepers, and what that means for Britain’s role in Africa. In Blair’s speeches, he switches back and forth between both sides of this argument. Speaking

⁷³ David Cameron (7th May, 2013), Somali Conference, London, UK.

in Ghana in 2002 (TB02b)⁷⁴, Blair praised the peacekeeping role of Ghana and other African countries:

Right across the African continent, countries are emerging from military rule and dictatorship. [...] The theme of my visit this week is partnership - **the necessity and the possibility of a greatly strengthened partnership between reforming African governments and the world's richer countries.** [...] Over the years, **Ghana has played a crucial role in UN peacekeeping, including in Sierra Leone, and you have been an important stabilising force in the region.**

In contrast, two years later in a speech in Addis Ababa (TB04h)⁷⁵, Blair presents a very different argument – that ‘Africa cannot stop conflict on its own’. The context between Britain and Africa had not changed significantly between this speech in Ethiopia and the previous speech in Ghana. The most notable change in British foreign policy was Blair’s decision to go to war in Iraq, and therefore this speech may represent an attempt to make the broader argument for intervention.

But **there will be times when Africa cannot stop conflict on its own.** Then the rest of the international community must stand ready to help. That is why **I also want Africa to be the top priority for the European Union’s new rapidly deployable battle groups and to get them operational as soon as possible** in 2005. [...] Even before 9/11 al Qaeda had bases in

⁷⁴ Tony Blair (2nd February, 2002), Ghana.

⁷⁵ Tony Blair (7th October, 2004), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Africa, they still do, hiding in places where they can go undisturbed by weak governments, where they plan their next attack which could be anywhere in the world, including right here in Africa as we have seen. **So it is for these reasons, that, because it is morally right and because ultimately it must be in our own interest, it is clear that this spotlight of attention of the whole of the international community should be focused on Africa.**

Speaking at Davos in 2005 (TB05a)⁷⁶, near the end of his second term in office, Blair reverts back to the focus of his Ghana speech by emphasising the role of African agency in peacekeeping. In this instance, Blair focuses on the role of the African Union instead of the European Union.

This **capability to intervene and keep the peace has to be built in Africa itself.** Today in the Sudan, AU peacekeeping forces do their best. **Without them, progress would be impossible.** But if there was the proper capability with sufficient numbers of forces, well equipped and trained, so much more could have been done. So much more must be done in future conflicts.

Blair continues this theme of supporting African institutions to prevent conflict in a speech at King's College London in 2006 (TB06o)⁷⁷:

⁷⁶ Tony Blair (26th January, 2005), Davos, Switzerland.

⁷⁷ Tony Blair (26th June, 2006), King's College London, UK.

I learnt about this from the time in the year 2000 in Sierra Leone where we sent - the UK - a relatively small force to Sierra Leone to help end the civil war. I have always since that time been sure that **if Africa had its own ability to respond rapidly** to the conflicts as they broke out, then many of **the long protracted conflicts we have seen on the continent could be avoided.**

These contrasting – sometimes conflicting – arguments about peacekeeping in Africa are brought together by Blair in a speech in Sierra Leone (TB07l)⁷⁸ near the end of his time in office, in which he argues that:

‘in relation to peacekeeping and conflict resolution, yes **it is Africa's responsibility to do it.** But we in the west and in the **wealthier countries have a responsibility to fund it,** to help train the forces, to help equip them, to help make sure that the logistics and the capability is there to make peacekeeping and conflict resolution work’.

The tension between these two arguments continues under Brown. On the one hand, Brown expresses his hopes for an African Union-UN peacekeeping force to protect the citizens of Darfur. At the same time, he acknowledges the role of Britain and the international community in playing an active role if the violence continues (GB07g)⁷⁹:

⁷⁸ Tony Blair (30th May, 2007), Sierra Leone.

⁷⁹ Gordon Brown (31st July, 2007), UN, New York, USA.

The situation in Darfur is the greatest humanitarian disaster the world faces today. Over 200,000 dead, 2 million displaced and 4 million on food aid. Following my meeting with President Bush, and I thank him for his leadership on Darfur, the UK and the French have now, with US support, agreed and tabled a UN Security Council resolution that will mandate the deployment of the world's largest peacekeeping operation to protect the citizens of Darfur. **And I hope this plan - for a 19,000 African Union-UN force - will be adopted later today.** Immediately we will work hard to deploy this force quickly. [...] But we must clear if any party blocks progress and the killings continue, I and others will redouble our efforts to impose further sanctions.

Brown's speech echoes a sentiment Major made over a decade before in his keynote address in Cape Town (JM94f)⁸⁰:

With our friends in Africa and with their agreement and with their participation, **Britain wants to develop new mechanisms to head off conflicts before they become unstoppable; before the bloodshed and the misery that we have seen become reality,** let us see if we can head them off. We have in mind, for example, **setting up regional peacekeeping cells.** We need more people trained to mediate, more people trained to act as peace-brokers. We would not need a cumbersome bureaucracy - not now or in any circumstances - **but a tight and properly resourced infrastructure that could best be established in Africa itself to deal with the problems that exist in Africa itself.**

⁸⁰ John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa.

Major revisits this speaking to the Army Staff College in Camberley (JM94p)⁸¹, saying

As a country which leans heavily on her worldwide interests and trade, it is right that Britain should play a full part in peacekeeping, peace-making and humanitarian relief. **In Africa, for example, we are ready to expand our role, by providing support and training to African peacekeepers.**

This sub-theme has shown how all four British prime ministers have been conflicted as to the level of involvement Britain should have in peacekeeping in Africa, to what extent institutions – such as the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union – should be involved. This brings to mind the quote by Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State under President Truman, that ‘Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role’ (Acheson, 1963: 163). It also suggests, however, that there has not been a clear trend in terms of Britain’s role in relation to peacekeeping in Africa; prime ministers are no clearer on this now than at the end of the Cold War.

⁸¹ John Major (24th November, 1994), Army Staff College, Camberley, UK.

6.2.3 Force Projection

A third security-related sub-theme can be identified in relation to the display of British hard power in Africa. Whilst this is intertwined with the two previous sub-themes in this chapter (Africa's underdevelopment as a security threat, and peacekeeping), the emphasis in this sub-theme is on projecting British hard power. This can be seen most clearly in the examples of Sierra Leone in 2000 and Libya in 2011, and is therefore most prevalent in the speeches by Blair and Cameron. However, there is a consistency amongst all four prime ministers speeches about Britain's place in the world and its duty to intervene. Rieff (2000) argues that: 'humanitarian intervention is important because it is central to the post-cold war west's moral conception of itself [...] And in this context what is important about humanitarian intervention is an idea, rather than a practice'.

In his Mansion House speech in 2000 (TB00c)⁸², Blair concedes that Britain is no longer a superpower. Instead, however, he uses the example of the intervention in Sierra Leone earlier that year to make the case that Britain's ability to engage and intervene are vital to its identity as a 'pivotal power':

On Sierra Leone there were those who said: what's it got to do with us? But I am sure Britain's and Europe's long-term interests in Africa are best served, if we intervene, not excessively, but to **do what we can to save African nations from barbarism and dictatorship and be proud of it**. And talking of pride, there can be no better advertisement for this country's

⁸² Tony Blair (13th November, 2000), Mansion House, UK.

values, spirit and professionalism than our Armed Forces. So we are right to engage. **Although not today a superpower, Britain is a pivotal power in international affairs.** We are the fourth largest economy; we have armed forces second to none in quality, global commercial and financial reach, a seat on the UN Security Council, a **world language**, an unparalleled network of European and global alliances.

This extract is revealing not only in how Blair constructs Britain, but also because of how he portrays Africa and the need to ‘save African nations from barbarism and dictatorship’. In language and imagery, this is not dissimilar to that of Victorian explorers over a century earlier, as discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 2), and serves to remove all agency from Africa and Africans. Blair first fully articulated this view of Britain’s identity and place in the world in his Chicago Speech (TB99a)⁸³, in what he called the ‘Doctrine of the International Community’.

The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts. [...] But the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle neighbouring countries, then they can properly be described as ‘threats to international peace and security’. When regimes are based on minority rule they lose legitimacy - look at South Africa.

⁸³ Tony Blair (24th April, 1999), Economic Club, Chicago, USA.

Blair's belief that it is Britain's duty to intervene remains a strong theme throughout his time in office. In his 2001 Party Conference Speech (TB01f)⁸⁴, just after 9/11, he attacks the failure of Major's government to intervene in Rwanda, saying Britain would have a 'moral duty to act' if it happened again:

And I tell you **if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1993**⁸⁵, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, **we would have a moral duty to act there also**. We were there in Sierra Leone when a murderous group of gangsters threatened its democratically elected Government and people. And we as a country should, and I as Prime Minister do, give thanks for the brilliance, dedication and sheer professionalism of the British Armed Forces.

Although numerous examples of this theme have been provided, two examples towards the end of Blair's premiership are vital to look at because of the way in which Blair specifically talks about Britain's role. Speaking on board HMS Albion (TB07a)⁸⁶, Blair explicitly rejects the idea that Britain should withdraw from its hard power role on the world stage because he argues that Britain's hard and soft power are driven by the same principles. Again, Africa is used as the example to make this case:

There is a case for Britain in the early 21st Century, with its imperial strength behind it, to slip quietly, even graciously into a different role. We become leaders in the fight

⁸⁴ Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001), Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK.

⁸⁵ It is noteworthy that the Rwandan genocide took place from April-July 1994 (Reyntjens, 1996), not 1993 as Blair says here.

⁸⁶ Tony Blair (12th January, 2007), HMS Albion, Plymouth, UK.

against climate change, against global poverty, for peace and reconciliation; **and leave the demonstration of “hard” power to others.** I do not share that case but there is quite a large part of our opinion that does. Of course, there will be those that baulk at the starkness of that choice. They will say yes in principle we should keep the “hard” power, but just not in this conflict or with that ally. But in reality, that’s not how the world is. **The reason I am against this case, is that for me “hard” and “soft” power are driven by the same principles.** The world is interdependent. That means we work in alliance with others. But it also means problems interconnect. **Poverty in Africa can’t be solved simply by the presence of aid. It needs the absence of conflict.** Failed states threaten us as well as their own people. Terrorism destroys progress. Terrorism can’t be defeated by military means alone. But it can’t be defeated without it.

On his tour of Africa at the end of his time in office, Blair takes the opportunity to double down on his commitment to interventionism. Blair’s speech in South Africa (TB07n)⁸⁷ is analysed in more detail in the critical discourse analysis section, but it is noteworthy that he says:

Above all, and most controversially, **Africa has been a prime example of a foreign policy that has been thoroughly interventionist. I believe in the power of political action to make the world better and the moral obligation to use it.** [...] I believe that now, today, our self-interest is in substantial part defined by the well-being of others; that the consequence

⁸⁷ Tony Blair (31st May, 2007), South Africa.

of globalisation is that our best chance of security and prosperity lies in advancing freedom, opportunity and justice for all.

This focus on displaying hard power is far less prevalent in Brown's speeches, and marks a significant discontinuity between Blair and Brown. Nevertheless, in his 2008 speech at the Google Zeitgeist conference (GB08g)⁸⁸, Brown also makes the case that Britain should have intervened in Rwanda. In doing so, he echoes the view expressed by Blair in his 2001 Party Conference speech. However, whereas Blair talked of it as a moral duty to intervene, Brown frames it as something that 'people' – i.e. citizens – would care enough about to be moved to act:

I think that people power will become an explosive force in history, perhaps the most potent power in the hands of the world for the future, and I think it will start changing not just domestic policy in individual countries, but change the way we run foreign policy. If, for example, **Rwanda was happening now, then I do not believe that the world would have been as silent** as it was because people would have known what was happening within the country and **people would have been moved to action.**

This difference between Blair and Brown's approaches to Rwanda precedes an argument made by Pugh *et al.* (2013). They argue that under Cameron and the Coalition government, intervention depended upon the critique of liberal discourses of intervention framed in

⁸⁸ Gordon Brown (19th May, 2008), Google Zeitgeist conference

terms of sovereignty and rights. Whereas in the Blair years there was a clearer assertion of global cosmopolitan purpose, the emphasis under Cameron was less controversially on building the capacity and resilience of people from the bottom up. That is, there was a move away from the intervention privileged in the 1990s and invasion of Iraq, toward emphasising empowerment, prevention and the agency of post-conflict and post-colonial subjects. They argue that the Coalition attempted to portray this as a ‘post-interventionist’ approach, such as in Libya. This argument by Brown shows a move away from the language used by Blair, and a move towards the type of ‘post-interventionist’ approach identified by Pugh *et al.*, although it precedes it by some years.

Daddow and Schnapper (2013) build on this ‘post-interventionist’ argument by Pugh *et al.* (2013), although they do not cite the research specifically. They concede that Cameron was a critic of Blair’s doctrine of the ‘international community’ which was used to justify intervention in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq. In particular, they note that Cameron had advocated caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. Once in government, however, Cameron committed Britain to military action in Libya within a year of coming into office. Daddow and Schnapper (2013) argue that this focus on pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that although operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, they came to be justified by similar arguments by Blair and Cameron. They conclude that ‘policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted [Blair and Cameron] to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years’ Daddow and Schnapper (2013: 330).

These arguments of continuity (Daddow and Schnapper, 2013) and change (Pugh *et al.*, 2013) – while seemingly contradictory – are not. Although Blair and Cameron came to justify intervention using similar arguments, Cameron was far more cautious about invoking the idea that the world could be remade around democratic (or indeed any other) ideologically charged principles. In doing so, Daddow and Schnapper (2013: 346) argue that Cameron proved himself to be adept at learning about the perils of too expansive an interventionist posture from Blair’s intervention in Iraq.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that this research finds that out of the four prime ministers, Cameron and Blair are most similar in terms of this focus on projecting power. This perhaps also reflects an attempt by both Blair and Cameron to assert themselves, dismiss allegations of their inexperience and naïvety, and present themselves as statesman-like. This explanation is explored in detail in Chapter 10, with reference to media coverage, and campaigning strategies used by Major against Blair in the run up to the 1997 election and by Brown against Cameron in the 2010 election. Like Blair, Cameron also refers to projecting British power in the world and looking after Britain’s national interest in a speech on board HMS Ark Royal in 2010 (DC10a)⁸⁹:

We have not asked the fundamental questions about the defence of our country, about our role in the world, since 1998. If you think of all the things that have happened since then – the actions that you have taken part in, in Sierra Leone, and Kosovo; the wars that we fought in

⁸⁹ David Cameron (24th June, 2010), HMS Ark Royal.

Iraq and Afghanistan – huge changes have taken place in our world: the attacks of 9/11; the attacks in our own country in July 2005. **It is time for us to think again about how to make our country safe, how to project power in the world, how to look after our national interest, and how to make sure we are secure for the future. That is what we should do.**

A few months later – still near the beginning of his premiership – Cameron continues with this sentiment about Britain’s role in the world at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet (DC10c)⁹⁰:

‘Our foreign policy is one of **hard-headed internationalism**. More commercial in **enabling Britain to earn its way in the world**, more strategic in its focus on meeting the new and emerging threats to our national security, and firmly committed to **upholding our values** and defending **Britain’s moral authority** even in the most difficult of circumstances.’

Evidence of Cameron’s understanding of the perils of too expansive an interventionist posture from Blair and the shift towards a ‘post-interventionist’ approach can be seen in Cameron’s speech to the London Conference on Libya (DC11a)⁹¹:

Today is about a new beginning for Libya – a future in which the people of Libya can determine their own destiny, free from violence and oppression. But the Libyan people cannot reach that future on their own. [...] First, we must reaffirm our commitment to UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and the broad alliance determined to implement it. [...]

⁹⁰ David Cameron (15th November, 2010), Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, UK

⁹¹ David Cameron (29th March, 2011), London Conference on Libya

Just twelve days ago, following an appeal by the Arab League, the United Nations passed an historic resolution to protect the people of Libya from the murderous brutality of Qadhafi's regime. At the meeting Nicholas Sarkozy hosted in Paris, **we made the right choice**: to draw a line in the desert sand, and to halt his murderous advance by force. Be in no doubt. **Our action saved the city of Benghazi. It averted a massacre. And it has given freedom a chance in Libya.**

In this section on Force Projection, we have seen a consistency between Blair and Cameron in their belief that Britain should be an active force in the world and has a duty to intervene. However, whereas in the Blair years there was a clearer assertion of global cosmopolitan purpose, the emphasis under Brown and then Cameron was more often framed in terms of building the capacity and resilience of people from the bottom up. In this section, Major has been the outlier. The view of 1997 as heralding a landmark moment in UK-Africa discourse and relations can be seen in the contrast between Major's failure to act in Rwanda, and Blair's action in Sierra Leone – and the continuation of this stance under Brown and Cameron. Blair felt Major had failed to understand Britain's role in the world, and led him to formulate a 'new' foreign policy centred on ethical concerns.

6.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

The thematic content analysis has shown that there are three sub-themes that emerge from the way in which British prime ministers talk about Africa in relation to security. In this section, specific speeches will be analysed in greater detail using the Discourse-Historical Approach. The speeches selected for analysis in terms of security are given below in Table 6:2, along with details about the speeches. One speech was selected for Blair, Brown and Cameron. As Major is largely absent from this chapter, a discourse analysis of his speeches is not necessary. The speeches were selected based on quantitative tools (such as frequency of key words and coding using NVivo), the extracts analysed in the thematic content analysis, and from reading speeches during the data collection stage.

Table 6:2. Security-related speeches selected for critical discourse analysis

Prime Minister	Date of Speech	Location
Tony Blair	30/05/2007	South Africa
Gordon Brown	25/09/2008	United Nations, New York
David Cameron	24/06/2010	HMS Ark Royal

One area that emerged from the content analysis that should be explored in more detail is how British prime ministers balance discourses of increased African agency on the one hand with maintaining British military involvement in Africa on the other. Blair's speech in South

Africa was made as part of a tour of Africa near the end of his time in office (TB07n)⁹². As noted in Chapter 5, Blair made a number of speeches during this short period in May 2007 (see Figure 4:1). In this speech, Blair admits that his foreign policy had been ‘thoroughly interventionist’. This approach had worked for him in the interventions in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, but damaged his reputation after the Iraq War. Having come into office with high approval ratings – reaching 65% approval in 1997 – by the end of his premiership this approval rating had reached minus 40 (The Economist, 2007). This tour of Africa may indicate an attempt to recapture some of the authority and respect he commanded earlier in his premiership, and show how admired he was in some other parts of the world. Blair begins this extract of his speech with a first person account of his views and values, showing that the focus is not on Africa *per se*, but rather on himself.

Africa is close to **my heart**. **I have** made friends right across this amazing and inspiring continent. Africa has been at the top of **my foreign policy** for the last ten 10 years. From the very beginning **I wanted** to forge a new partnership with African leaders and countries. Not based on rich and poor or donor and recipient but based on common values of justice, democracy and human rights; a partnership of trust and equality. Above all, and most controversially, Africa has been a prime example of a foreign policy that has been thoroughly interventionist. **I believe** in the power of political action to make the world better and the moral obligation to use it. **I do not believe** that in this time - the early 21st Century - international politics can be just about nations’ interests, narrowly and traditionally defined. **I**

⁹² Tony Blair (30th May 2007), South Africa

believe that now, today, our self-interest is in substantial part defined by the well-being of others;

At this point in the speech, mid-way through the sentence, Blair suddenly switches away from the first person to begin making broader arguments about Africa's security. It is important to notice that both the previous and subsequent sections of the speech refer consistently to 'Africa' as a homogeneous entity rather than to detail specific challenges faced by countries or regions. In this second part of this extract, whilst creating distance through the generic use of 'Africa', Blair starts using collective pronouns such as 'our' and 'we'. These are noteworthy because it helps explain who Blair is speaking to, and who he is speaking on behalf of. Blair's usage of 'African poverty deprives this continent' is, for example, contrasted in the second half of the sentence with its impact on 'us'. In doing so, Blair shows that his immediate audience – South Africa and Africa more broadly – is not included in these collective pronouns.

that the consequence of globalisation is that **our** best chance of security and prosperity lies in advancing freedom, opportunity and justice for all. It follows that where oppression, poverty and injustice exist, it is not only **our** duty but also in our self-interest to do what we can to bring about change for the better. Nowhere is that clearer than Africa. African conflict creates millions of refugees in search of a better life. African poverty deprives this continent - and millions of people - of the chance to succeed, and deprives **us** of successful and stable partners for economic growth and the benign exploitation of commodities and natural resources. Failed or struggling African states are breeding grounds for the very extremism that threatens **us** everywhere. [...] It is easy for people to mock the pretensions of an interventionist policy; and

intervention never fares as well as **we** would like. But consider the alternative and then make the choice. Suppose **we** did nothing. Actually **we** do not need to hypothesise.

In this third section of this extract, Blair reveals that these collective pronouns – ‘we’, ‘ours’ are in reference to Britain’s identity as part of ‘the wealthy nations’. In doing so, Blair projects a British national identity that tied to Britain’s economic prosperity, and its ability to intervene militarily. In this section, Blair also explicitly references the opportunity for ‘our values’ to take root – in an extreme form of ‘othering’. This suggests that Blair is arguing that Africa is not only separated in terms of economic prosperity but also in a more fundamental sense. This distance is reinforced by Blair’s argument that governments strayed from ‘a proper path’, and that Africa is a burden for wealthy nations who have to ‘stay with it for the long haul’.

We did do nothing or little as Rwanda slid into genocide; as HIV/AIDS grew; as Liberia and Sierra Leone descended into gangsterism; as governments in the 1980s and 1990s faltered or strayed from a proper path. The international action of the past few years hasn’t transformed Africa; but as I shall say later, it has undoubtedly made it better. For that to happen, the **wealthy nations** must hold to the path set out in the MDGs and the Gleneagles G8; and Africa must take its responsibilities seriously and develop in the way NEPAD and the G8 partnership provides. **We have to stay with it for the long haul; commit and re-commit; never let it be said we are not trying**, even if it cannot always be said we are succeeding. **We now have a broad political consensus for Africa in the UK.** Excellent. We need the same in the EU. We need each G8 to be bolder than the last. If we do this, and Africa responds as an equal partner, we will have set a strategic goal that in time we will achieve; and in a

continent in which the power of China is rising dramatically, we can work with China to serve the development of Africa in a way which benefits us all. **But if we give up, we will lose the chance in this continent - rich as it is - though its people are poor - for our values to take root.** It would be a calamitous misjudgement.

Blair concludes this part of his speech by focusing specifically on the intervention in Sierra Leone. Blair had delivered three speeches the previous day in Sierra Leone, and this may represent a broader strategy to highlight his foreign policy achievements in an attempt to re-frame his ‘thoroughly interventionist’ foreign policy while drawing focus away from Iraq. Yet in this extract, he does not do this explicitly – perhaps aware of the difficulties associated with claiming personal credit for the successful intervention. Instead refers to the role of the UK military alongside Africa and UN forces. In this way, he balances between British continued British involvement with Africa alongside increased African agency – although this is somewhat at odds with the previous three sections of this extract which had focused predominantly on the role of Britain and other wealthy nations in finding solutions to African problems.

So, to what ends should our intervention and support be fashioned? First, we must address more urgently the issue of conflict resolution and peace-keeping. I have come here today from Sierra Leone. When I last visited five years ago, Sierra Leone was a failed state. Emerging from a horrific conflict which saw 60,000 killed. 10,000 child soldiers. 1/4 million women and girls raped. Others brutally maimed, hands cut off. A war fuelled by the fight for diamonds and other commodities. We all felt despair at the wickedness that a small group of people could inflict on their compatriots. **But I also felt proud that Africa and the international**

community responded, with ECOWAS and UN troops, and ultimately the UK's own troops. We now must build on this window of opportunity and work with the elected government of Sierra Leone to help them build a better country for the people of Sierra Leone. Not easy. War destroyed the fabric of Sierra Leone. And state building is the hardest of challenges.

The second speech selected for critical discourse analysis in relation to security is Brown's speech to Lancaster House (GB08gg)⁹³. The event was organised by the Equality and Human Rights Commission to celebrate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the event and context might lend itself to a framing more focused on rights than other speeches, it does reflect Brown's approach to security in Africa more broadly, often framed in humanitarian language.

we are actually meeting in the place where in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the colonial movements and independence agreements were actually signed by negotiations in Kenya, Ghana and then Zimbabwe to create freedom from colonial oppression. And so this is a place which has seen many of the human rights that we value greatly being upheld by agreements for independence and majority governance in some parts of the world. When the declaration was written 60 years ago Britain was of course a very different place, but there are some things that do stand the test of time. The values of 1948 - that powerful post-war impulse for liberty, for justice, for fairness - continues not only to endure but to flourish to this day.

⁹³ Gordon Brown (10th December, 2008), Lancaster House, London.

As discussed in the thematic content analysis, Pugh *et al.* (2013) argue intervention under Blair was framed in terms of a global cosmopolitan purpose, whereas under Cameron this was less controversially about building the capacity and resilience of people from the bottom up. However, although they argue that Cameron and his government attempted to portray this as a ‘post-interventionist’ approach, this can also be seen earlier in Brown’s speeches. In this same way, although Daddow and Schnapper (2013: 346) argue that Cameron proved himself to be adept at learning about the perils of too expansive an interventionist posture from Blair’s intervention in Iraq, these lessons can also be seen in Brown’s speeches. Brown does not argue for specific British intervention – he argues for United Nations to act.

Perhaps the most poignant story that I have read in the last few years is a story of a young boy called David. He was a Ugandan, and he was caught up in the massacres in Rwanda. At the age of 10 he and his mother were killed by murderous people and if you go to the museum that commemorates the holocaust in Rwanda you see the photograph of David, and then you see the facts surrounding his existence: age, 10; his favourite pastime, playing football; his ambition, to be a doctor; and then his last words - and these were words I understand that he said to his mother - don't worry, **the United Nations are coming to save us. But they never did** - and that is why we must remember our responsibilities to everyone who faces persecution, difficulties and discrimination around the world.

In his book *Beyond the Crash*, Brown notes that ‘one of my oft-remarked-upon failings as a communicator is that I like to talk in numbers, what the British press branded my “tractor statistics tendency”’ (Brown, 2010: 4). In this speech, he avoids this by using the story of a young boy from Rwanda to make the case for UN intervention, a story he repeated a

number of times – see (GB08v)⁹⁴ and (GB08ff)⁹⁵. This personalises and humanises the tragedy, and highlights the cost of inaction.

This focus on the UN suggests a British national identity that is more attentive to international rules and less focused on projecting British exceptionalism, values, and power in the world. In the next extract from this speech, Brown's discursive strategy focuses on highlighting the urgency of the crisis. At the same time, he does not suggest British action.

In Zimbabwe we are witnessing a humanitarian emergency of **colossal** proportions, thousands now stricken with cholera. They need help urgently and our disagreement with Mugabe will not stand in our way. So we are increasing our humanitarian aid and calling on others to do the same, for we must stand together to meet our moral obligations to the people of Zimbabwe who have shown such forbearance and such fortitude, whilst saying firmly to the Mugabe regime that enough is enough. Now European countries came together on Monday of this week to expand our sanctions against Mugabe's **bloodstained** regime, freezing the assets and preventing the travel of their **henchmen**.

As Brown shifts from the example of Zimbabwe to Darfur, he also changes argumentation strategy from the highly personal anecdote of the young boy, David. For

⁹⁴ Gordon Brown (25th September, 2008), United Nations, New York, USA.

⁹⁵ Gordon Brown (17th November, 2008), Chain Reaction, Global Entrepreneurship Week, London.

Darfur, he focuses on numbers, using the ‘topos of the force of facts’ to make his point about the scale of the problem, and why it needs to be addressed so urgently.

In Darfur, **millions** of men, women and children continue to start each day with the fear of violence, abduction, rape or death. Already **200,000 people** have lost their lives, almost **3 million** people have been displaced, and almost **5 million** - that is **two-thirds** of the population - have been affected. So more than five years after the fighting began it is time for the world to come together once again to tell all sides in the conflict that it must end now.

Brown concludes by presenting Britain as part of a broader international community that upholds democracy and human rights, rather than being exceptional in this regard.

So today on this great anniversary I say to the women and girls of Kivu, to the stricken people of Zimbabwe, to the political prisoners of Burma, to the children of Darfur who have known nothing in their lives but war, and to all those who struggle throughout the world for human rights: the world will not abandon you. We must not, and we will not turn our backs and walk away. Now in a country like Britain with a strong tradition of democracy, it is all too easy to take our rights for granted, but we should never forget that the universal rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration and in our Human Rights Act are a shield and a safeguard for us all.

Cameron’s speech on HMS Ark Royal (DC10a)⁹⁶ is similar to Blair’s in that he also presents Britain a global power with the ability to intervene militarily and project power in the world.

⁹⁶ David Cameron (24th June, 2010), HMS Ark Royal

This is a contrast to the approach taken by Brown. The broader context of this speech is the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 by the Conservative / Liberal Democrat coalition government, which was the first major review since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. A new chapter was added to the Strategic Defence Review after 9/11, so it could be argued that defence had been reviewed again in 2001 (Cornish and Dorman, 2009: 250). As this speech is at the beginning of Cameron's time in office, he uses it to try and mark a fresh start and to distinguish himself from his predecessors. Cameron achieves this by using simple clauses in his sentences in an attempt to project assertiveness. These clauses have been highlighted in the extract below.

We have not asked the fundamental questions about the defence of our country, about our role in the world, since 1998. If you think of all the things that have happened since then – the actions that you have taken part in, in Sierra Leone, and Kosovo; the wars that we fought in Iraq and Afghanistan – huge changes have taken place in our world: the attacks of 9/11; the attacks in our own country in July 2005. **It is time** for us to think again about how **to make our country safe**, how **to project power in the world**, how **to look after our national interest**, and how **to make sure we are secure for the future**. **That is what we should do**. **I know absolutely** that the Royal Navy will have a huge role to play in that future. **We are a trading nation**. We have got **to keep our sea-lanes open**. We want **to stop drugs** coming from our shores, and **that is the work that you do**. We have **to deal with the appalling threat of piracy** off the Horn of Africa; **that is what you do**. We have to make sure we **keep vital sea-lanes open**, and the work in the Gulf; **that is what the Royal Navy is doing** today. I know that whatever the outcome of this review, whatever the changes we will have to

make, we should make them together and recognise that the Royal Navy is going to have a huge role to play in our future, in our defence, and in our security.

In doing so, Cameron is not asking what British identity is, he is stating it. Importantly, this identity is tied to Britain's role in Africa – such as its intervention in Sierra Leone and dealing with the piracy in the Horn of Africa. In contrast to Blair's speech in South Africa, he does not say 'I think' or 'I believe', he focuses on words that project confidence and authority. He says 'I know', 'we have to', 'it is time'.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has assessed the extent to which Britain's post-Cold War engagement with Africa is presented by British prime ministers as being based on security. Within the broad theme of security, there were three sub-themes that showed important differences in how Africa is constructed and the narratives used to construct narratives about British national identity.

Firstly, this chapter found that Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron link deprivation in Africa to the threat of extremism in the UK. This represents a continuity across all four prime ministers until the Paris attacks in 2015, when Cameron began framing extremism as something that is separate from poverty or deprivation. In contrast to the argument in the literature, this chapter finds that this framing began significantly before 9/11. However, it does appear more frequently after it. Secondly, all four prime ministers show they are

divided about whether British military forces should support peacekeeping in Africa, or whether African countries and institutions can do this. This continuity suggests that there has not been a clear trend in terms of how British prime ministers see Britain's role in relation to peacekeeping in Africa; they are no clearer on this now than at the end of the Cold War. Finally, this chapter finds that whilst there is a consistency amongst the four prime ministers about Britain's place in the world and its duty to intervene, however this is most notable in the speeches of Blair and Cameron. Whereas under Blair this was framed in terms of a clear global cosmopolitan purpose, under Brown and then Cameron, this was framed less controversially on capacity building.

Whilst the first thematic chapter, focusing on the role of history in British prime ministers' speeches that reference Africa, found evidence of significant changes from 1990-2016, this chapter exploring the role of security has found a number of continuities throughout this time period. The next chapter centring on morality finds further evidence for continuities in discourses about Africa from 1990-2016.

CHAPTER 7

Benevolent Britain? The Moral Basis of British Concern for Africa Beyond Blair

Having looked at security in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the extent to which Britain's post-Cold War engagement with Africa is presented by British prime ministers as being based on morality, and how this shapes British national identity. The moral underpinning of Britain's relationship with Africa has been explored in the literature in some detail (Ero, 2001; Williams, 2002; Chandler, 2003; Valley, 2009; Gallagher, 2013; Taylor, 2012; Harrison, 2013). Looking at the theme of morality more closely, a variety of sub-themes can be identified within this overarching concept that signify important differences in how Africa is constructed in the speeches of British prime ministers, and what this says in turn about British national identity. These sub-themes will be explored here in more detail, with reference to the relevant literature where applicable.

Firstly, an argument that has repeatedly been made in the contemporary UK-Africa literature is that British prime ministers' discussions around Africa have mainly (although not exclusively) been a 'conversation' about the moral nature of Britishness (Harrison, 2013). However, this argument is currently largely centred on New Labour, specifically under Blair's premiership (Gallagher, 2013). This chapter offers an opportunity to assess whether this framing of Africa is unique to Blair by expanding the time period of focus, as well as to explore in greater depth how this is achieved. This chapter finds that both Blair and Cameron emphasise the moral dimension overtly in their speeches.

Secondly, there are examples of all four prime ministers referencing Christianity in their speeches when they speak about the moral aspect of Britain's involvement in Africa. However, Brown also tends to draw on the moral teachings of a number of religions, rather than just Christianity. Although Steven (2011) contends that religion is generally an underappreciated motivating force in modern British politics, Harrison (2013: 542) argues that Africa's place in British global imaginings speaks to 'aspirations to see Britain as the 'home' of good, pragmatic, liberal and Christian citizens'.

Thirdly, there is a common thread through the speeches of the four prime ministers that Africa is a place they refer to in order to (explicitly or implicitly) assert that the values they champion – personally, for their party, and for Britain – transcend British party politics; that they are universal and apply as much to some of the poorest countries in the world as they do to Britain. In doing so, they seek to lend moral weight to their philosophy. Major and Cameron use narratives of Africa to promote the virtues of conservatism – that trade, investment and entrepreneurship are the best way out of poverty. Blair meanwhile speaks about Africa to give weight to his 'Third Way' philosophy whilst also using narratives about Africa to try and unite the Labour Party behind New Labour, and to attack the Conservatives.

The main finding from this chapter is that the rhetoric of Blair and Cameron is most similar out of the four prime ministers; both Blair and Cameron frame Africa as an overtly moral cause. This is noteworthy because they were from different parties, did not govern consecutively, and the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis separates their administrations.

One explanation for this similarity is that Blair and Cameron were elected prime minister after a long period in opposition⁹⁷, and were both elected to office at the young age of 43. The argument that both Blair and Cameron used Africa to present themselves as statesmen on the world stage to help combat the idea they were inexperienced is explored in detail in Chapter 9.

This chapter begins with a continuation of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5, but with a specific focus on the morality dimension. It then moves on to a thematic content analysis of the speeches and critical discourse analysis around this theme.

7.1 Quantitative Analysis

For this morality chapter, the keywords selected for input into the Python code are: ‘moral’, ‘morality’, Christian, Christianity, corruption, duty, rights, and values. This information is plotted in Table 7:1, where mentions of selected keywords are shown in terms of their raw numbers by prime minister. In Figure 7.1, these are plotted as percentages of each prime minister’s corpus.

⁹⁷ Labour had spent 18 years in opposition when Blair was elected, and the Conservatives had spent 13 years in opposition when Cameron was elected

Table 7:1. Frequency of selected morality-related keywords in the context of Africa by prime minister

	John Major	Tony Blair	Gordon Brown	David Cameron
Moral(ity)	1	14	2	1
Christian(ity)	2	1	0	1
Corruption	0	19	3	5
Duty	0	10	4	0
Rights	4	14	21	7
Values	8	14	4	1




Figure 7:1. Frequency of selected keywords related to 'Morality' in the context of Africa (as a percentage of each prime minister's corpus).

It is significant that Blair uses the words ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ in this context far more than the other prime ministers. This supports the argument put forward by Gallagher (2013) that Blair sought to project a new framing of Africa in terms of British morality. There appears to be a decrease in references to ‘values’, perhaps indicating that such language no longer befits an environment that is increasingly focused on the language of partnership. This is supported by the increase in references to ‘rights’ from Major to Brown – although it does not explain why this suddenly decreases under Cameron.

Having captured a broad picture of references to specific morality-related keywords, this section moves on to look in more detail at the context of these keywords using the sentences extracted using the Python code. This information is plotted here for each prime minister as a word clouds, where word size is directly proportional to frequency of usage.

Figure 7:2 and Figure 7:4 indicate that the dataset that generated these wordclouds were not large enough to plot a complete figure. Nevertheless, the usage of the Commonwealth in this context by Major and Blair is noteworthy, and requires a closer examination to understand whether this is significant. The prominence of ‘human’ by Major and Brown, and to a lesser extent, Blair, suggests that discourses of morality are perhaps linked to human rights (the word ‘rights’ has been removed as per the approach used to generate these figures).




Figure 7:2. Word cloud showing frequency of words in John Major's sentences containing specific morality keywords, excluding those keywords





Figure 7:3. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Tony Blair's sentences containing specific morality keywords, excluding those keywords



7.2 Content Analysis

Having conducted the quantitative analysis and having made some initial observations about references to morality in British prime minister's speeches about Africa, this section focuses on these in more detail through the content analysis. Within this overarching theme of morality, there are three sub-themes that signify important differences in how Africa is constructed. The first section focuses on the argument that British prime ministers' discussions around Africa have mainly (although not exclusively) been a 'conversation' about the moral nature of Britishness. Specifically, it looks at whether this became and remained a prominent theme under Blair alone, or whether it is part of a broader trend. The second section looks at the role of religion, and in particular Christianity, in British prime ministers' speeches about Africa. The third section of this chapter examines the extent to which this emphasis on morality is for the purpose of party political arguments, and in turn what the implications of this are for British national identity.

7.2.1 Moral Posturing

The notion that British prime ministers' speeches about Africa have largely been a conversation about the moral nature of Britishness is highlighted in this section. However, this section also reveals subtleties to the argument made in the literature that are important to note. There is a clear discontinuity between the way in which Major and Blair spoke about Britain's moral duty to Africa, supporting arguments made by Gallagher (2013). For Blair, Africa is overtly a moral cause – but for Major, this is not so. A further finding from this

chapter is that the rhetoric of Blair and Cameron is most similar out of the four prime ministers, as they both frame Africa as an explicitly moral cause.

The quantitative analysis indicates that Major did not talk about Africa in terms of morality *per se*. However, he did talk about Africa in terms of values and rights, and here we will focus on this more closely. By contrast, Blair and Cameron talk about Africa more frequently and explicitly in terms of morality, corruption and religion. This reinforces the argument made in the literature by Gallagher that Britain's relationship with Africa under New Labour represented something new, and that it was focused on the idea of the state's capacity to embody and represent good. British state actors, in attempting to 'do good' in Africa, enabled the formation of a conception of the British state as involved in a disinterested, idealised project. This was enabled through the sanitisation of historical engagement, and an apparent lack of British interests in Africa.

Gallagher claims that this gave British policy in Africa a moral rather than political tone, and that narratives of Africa are more accurately the narrative Britain creates for itself, about its history, identity, and role in the world (Gallagher, 2009: 449). The propensity of British politicians to treat Africa differently to the rest of the world stems from shared tendency to idealise Africa and Africans. That is, when British politicians interact with Africa, they assume that their actions rise above their own national self-interest – that they are engaged in a 'noble cause', transcending political and economic interests. Chandler (2003: 310) concurs. He contends that one important factor behind major western powers making foreign policy concerns central to their administrations is the difficulty of generating moral authority

through domestic policy initiatives. Foreign policy initiatives have become an important mechanism for cohering western governments and international institutions, often appearing to be bereft of any clear consensus-building political agenda of their own.

However, the literature around this focuses largely on Blair (Vallely, 2009; Gallagher, 2013). One of the aims of this thesis is to understand continuity and discontinuity over the period 1990-2016. In order to achieve this, it is important to examine these arguments for the other three prime ministers, as well as re-assessing Blair's premiership. This chapter finds that throughout Blair's premiership, he does indeed repeatedly and unequivocally makes the claim that Africa is a moral cause. For example, in a speech delivered to the EastWest Institute on receiving the Statesman of The Decade award six months into his third term (TB05l)⁹⁸, Blair says:

I believe passionately in Africa as a moral cause, but I also have to say to you that if I think of Africa, and I think of hundreds of millions of young people growing up in poverty, uncertain of their future, then **I think it is not merely a moral cause, but how foolish it would be if we in the wealthy part of the world allowed the obscenity of such poverty to continue.**

This framing of Africa as an explicitly moral cause is echoed using similar language throughout many of Blair's speeches to a variety of audiences. The context of the speeches

⁹⁸ Tony Blair (8th December, 2005), EastWest Institute Statesman of the Decade award, London, UK

in which Blair talks about Africa helps to explain Africa's role in identity construction. The focus on Africa as a moral cause in this speech suggests that this is central to the way in which Blair views his own time in office. It is also perhaps an attempt to build the legacy he would like to be remembered for – foregrounding some aspects whilst skipping over others, such as the Iraq War. Similarly, in Pebble Beach, California, towards the end of his time in office in 2006, Blair told News Corp. (TB06r)⁹⁹:

I know some of my fellow leaders think I am trifle obsessed with Africa. It's true. I am.

For reasons of moral purpose of course: how can we tolerate millions, literally millions, dying every year preventably from famine, conflict and disease?

Blair does not only use this framing when addressing western audiences. In Addis Ababa, for example, Blair again made this case (TB04h) using this same language:

And so there is **this immense and powerful moral cause** [...] In all the things that I deal with in politics, and the things that make people cynical and disengaged from the political process, when I come and see what is happening here [in Ethiopia] and see what could happen, **I know that however difficult politics is, there is at least one noble cause worth fighting for.**

⁹⁹ Tony Blair (30th July, 2006). News Corp., Pebble Beach, California.

The argument can first be seen in the aftermath of 9/11. He told the Labour Party Conference in 2001 (TB01f)¹⁰⁰ that ‘the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and angrier’. He used this conference speech to also set out the moral case for humanitarian intervention to his party: ‘And I tell you if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1993¹⁰¹, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a **moral duty** to act there also’.

The metaphor of Africa as a scar on the conscience of the world was repeated a number of times by Blair; he used it again a year later at the Nigerian Assembly (TB02c), the World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa (TB02g), and the G8 Summit in Canada (TB02f):

Before the last Election I said that **Africa would be a big priority for the government in our second term**. And I described **Africa as a scar on the conscience of the world**. And that is for a very simple reason. There are round about 200 million people in Africa who don't have either proper sanitation, access to clean water or proper health care. There are literally 20 million Africans that have died of AIDS in the past three years. Every 3 seconds a child in Africa will die, either of conflict, famine or disease. And yet we know that **it is not possible to change Africa unless Africa itself takes responsibility for leading that process of change**. So what we have agreed is a plan that is comprehensive, that deals with all the issues

¹⁰⁰ Tony Blair (2001) Labour Party Conference Speech, Brighton

¹⁰¹ See footnote 84

that need to be dealt with, but deals with them not on the basis of old fashioned aid...simply handing out money to people...but on the basis rather of a deal. **We are going to help Africa to help itself.** This isn't old fashioned aid. It is a genuine partnership for the renewal of Africa and I believe that today's document will send out a signal of hope.

Having confirmed that Blair explicitly frames Britain's interest in Africa in moral terms, and having seen from the quantitative analysis that Major rarely does this, it is important to look closely into Major's speeches to understand if this is perhaps achieved in different ways or if it is absent altogether. The usage of the language of rights and values by all four prime ministers – as highlighted in the quantitative analysis (Figure 7:1) – provides a starting point. When talking about rights and values, Major frequently uses the Commonwealth as an institution to talk about the common values between Britain and Africa. In doing so, there is the implicit notion that Britain's place at the centre of the Commonwealth provides it with the ability to speak on behalf of (and make claims about shared moral values on behalf of) other Commonwealth members in a way that they are not able to make because their voices are not given equal weight as Britain's. Or, to put it another way, Britain is *primus inter pares* in the Commonwealth. This argument has been explored in some detail in relation to history in 6.2.2, but its frequent usage by Major here points toward also a moral purpose.

For example, when Major welcomes Namibia to the Commonwealth in a speech to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Harare in 1991 (JM91h), he frames this moralistically in terms of 'certain values'.

And in welcoming Namibia to the Commonwealth we are doing more than simply **inviting her** to join a club. Namibia is joining an organisation which **stands for certain values** and which can use its collective strength to help its individual members and to wield influence in world affairs.

In his keynote address on his tour of South Africa in 1994, Major again made this point, this time (JM94f) about South Africa. He again frames it in terms of values:

South Africa's re-entry to the Commonwealth, **her coming home** to the Commonwealth where **she belongs** should do more than just heal a wound, it should provide a stimulus to the **Commonwealth family** of one-third of the world's nations. Madam Speaker, I am a dedicated believer in the Commonwealth, its values are our values, its values are your values.

These two extracts also demonstrate how references to familial relationships are important in Major's references to Africa and the Commonwealth, and are explored in more detail in the CDA section of this chapter.

This reinforces Gallagher's argument that Blair's framing of Africa represented something new. Blair certainly discussed Africa in more explicit moral terms. However, Blair is not alone in making this argument. Out of the four prime ministers, there is most similarity in the way in which Africa is moral cause for Blair *and* Cameron – a finding that has not yet been discussed in the literature. Whilst this is not apparent from the quantitative analysis (Figure 7:1), it can be seen through this content analysis. Making the moral case in similar

language to Blair, Cameron goes on to say that Britain's altruism shapes Britain's standing in the world and it defines Britain's identity. At the G8 Nutrition for Growth event in 2013 (DC13g) he said:

“Why does Britain always have to be out in front?” Let me tell you why. **It's because of the kind of people we are - and the kind of country we are. We are the kind of people who believe in doing what is right. We accept the moral case for keeping our promises to the world's poorest - even when we face challenges at home.** When people are dying, we don't believe in finding excuses. We believe in trying to do something about it. Look at Band Aid and Live8. Look at Red Nose Day. Look at the way the British public respond to appeals from the Disasters Emergency Committee. During the famine in East Africa, British people gave £79 million. This is British families looking at the images on their televisions and responding with their hearts. **It says something about this country. It says something about our standing in the world and our sense of duty in helping others. In short – it says something about the kind of people we are. And that makes me proud to be British.**

This speech is looked at in more detail in the Critical Discourse Analysis section of this chapter. It is important to see, however, that this is a theme throughout Cameron's speeches; there are further echoes of Blair's framing of Africa in Cameron's speeches, such as in DC12c delivered to the Family Planning Summit in 2012:

it is **morally right to honour our promises to the poorest in the world**. Every 6 minutes a woman who did not want to become pregnant will die in pregnancy or childbirth. Every 6 minutes. So how many minutes do we wait? I say we don't wait at all.

One final example can be seen in Cameron's speech to the European Council regarding Ebola. Cameron says in DC14f:

In facing Ebola we are facing one of the worst public health emergencies in a generation, and I have been absolutely determined that **Britain**, with other countries, **will lead the way in dealing with this**. Dealing with it because there is a massive crisis in West Africa, and **we should feel some moral obligation as a wealthy country to help**.

Thus, the idea that British prime ministers' references to Africa are centred on projecting the moral nature of Britishness can be backed up with the evidence presented here. However, this section also reveals subtleties to the argument made in the literature that are important to highlight. There is a clear distinction between the way in which Major and Blair spoke about Britain's moral duty to Africa. For Blair, and to a slightly lesser extent Cameron, Africa is overtly a moral cause – but for Major, this is not so. Major uses the Commonwealth to talk about shared values between Britain and Africa – but this is an indirect way of asserting moral authority. This sharp contrast could be attributed to Blair and Cameron coming to power after long periods in opposition, and wanting to assert themselves whilst also making a statement about their leadership over their party and Britain. The sharp contrast could also be a way to emphasise the break from their predecessor. For example, Major's

administration was plagued by scandals – particularly around the conduct of Conservative MPs.¹⁰² This explanation is explored in more detail in Chapter 9.

7.2.2 Christian Values

As discussed in the previous section, the narrative of Britain's relationship with Africa being based on morality has been covered in some detail in the literature. As this section shows, however, the religious or missionary aspect of it has been left underexplored. The literature that does examine this link between religion and British foreign policy tends to view it in a very historical sense. Robbins and Fisher (2010), for example, do focus on this – but their period of focus is 1815-1941. Elbourne (2002), meanwhile, investigates the role of Christianity in linking, constraining, and changing the lives of disparate peoples: African nomads, white settlers in Africa, the self-proclaimed members of the British 'religious world', and parliamentary and colonial officials, but the timeframe of her research is even earlier: 1799-1853.

Steven (2011) argues that scholars have broadly ignored the role of religion in modern British politics. He says 'this is primarily an institutionalist failing, with an over-emphasis on the decline of traditional church attendance, the absence of a confessional party and, linked to this, any significant social conflict related exclusively to religion' (Steven, 2011: ix).

¹⁰² At the 1993 Conservative Party Conference, John Major launched the 'Back to Basics' campaign, which was about returning to the moral and family values associated with the Conservative Party. Over the course of 1992-1997, however, almost a dozen Conservative politicians were caught having extra-marital affairs. This led to the label of 'Tory Sleaze', which stuck with the party.

However, Harrison (2013: 542) argues that Africa's place in British global imaginings speaks to 'aspirations to see Britain as the 'home' of good, pragmatic, liberal and Christian (or crypto-Christian) citizens who can campaign on behalf of Africans to ensure that the British state does the right thing and remains something of a *primus inter pares* in regards to how the west concerns itself with Africa'.

Religion is a notable aspect of British prime minister's speeches about Africa, as can be seen in Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6; all four Prime Ministers spoke to religious audiences about Africa. The religious aspect of Britain's engagement with Africa is used to present Britain as an actor whose motivations are grounded not in self-interest but in religious morality. Importantly, not all the prime ministers make this argument in terms of Christian morality. Throughout Gordon Brown's time in office, when talking about the moral underpinning of the concern for international poverty, he draws on many faiths – and secularism too – rather than just Christianity, despite famously drawing inspiration from his father who was a minister for the Church of Scotland (Taylor, 2005; Gay, 2007).

Major praises the way in which 'philanthropic explorers and Christian missionaries travelled courageously through Africa, but in turn they unwittingly paved the way for the harsh incursions of rival empire builders' (JM94f)¹⁰³. A decade later, Blair praises the role of

¹⁰³ John Major (20th September, 1994), to the South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa.

Christianity in the abolition of the slave trade, and stated that it was the role of faith leaders to continue the campaign against poverty (TB05b)¹⁰⁴:

The churches are among the most formidable campaigning organizations in history. I think of the campaign to abolish the slave trade, led by William Wilberforce with so many Christian organizations in support - culminating, after two decades of tireless persuasion in and beyond Parliament, in the abolition of the slave trade throughout the British empire in 1807. 2007 marks the two hundredth anniversary of that great reform. **The Government enthusiastically supports the work of the churches** not only to mark the bicentenary, but also **to explain the legacy and highlight the great campaigns against injustice and poverty in our world today**. 200 years ago slavery was the moral challenge. Today it is poverty, and faith leaders are in the forefront of the campaign to Make Poverty History.

In his speech to the Church of Scotland in 2008 (GB08h)¹⁰⁵, Brown echoes these arguments by bringing together the points made by Major and Blair. He says:

In the Church this work of building a good society has never been limited to the boundaries of the parish or the presbytery but has always **stretched out across the world** — from the **service and sacrifice of Scottish missionaries** we were brought up to remember - David Livingstone, Mary Slessor, Eric Liddell, Jane Haining - to more recently Kenneth

¹⁰⁴ Tony Blair (22nd March, 2005), Faithworks, London, UK.

¹⁰⁵ Gordon Brown (19th May, 2008), Church of Scotland General Assembly, UK.

Mckenzie's and then Robert Craig's **struggles for multiracial justice in post-colonial Africa**. And as the Moderator's coming visits to Zambia, Nepal and Malawi will again show, **the Church can honourably claim a global vision that long predated the modern concept of globalisation** and perhaps even anticipated it too.

Completing the continuity of this theme throughout the 1990-2016 period – across all four prime ministers – Cameron references the role of the Bible in spurring people to champion equality and human rights, citing its role in the abolition of slavery. He says (DC11k¹⁰⁶):

I am proud to stand here and celebrate the achievements of the King James Bible. Not as some great Christian on a mission to convert the world. [...] The Judeo-Christian roots of the Bible also provide the foundations for protest and for the evolution of our freedom and democracy. [...] when every human being is of equal and infinite importance, created in the very image of God... we get the irrepressible foundation for equality and human rights... a foundation that has seen the Bible at the forefront of the emergence of democracy, **the abolition of slavery** [...] Just as our language and culture is steeped in the Bible, **so too is our politics**. [...] the Bible has been a spur to action for people of faith throughout history, and it remains so today. [...] And when it comes to the great humanitarian crises – **like the famine in Horn of Africa** – again you can count on faith-based organisations... like **Christian Aid, Tearfund, CAFOD, Jewish Care, Islamic Relief, and Muslim Aid**... to be at the forefront of the action to save lives.

¹⁰⁶ David Cameron (16th December, 2011), Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford, UK.

Although Gordon Brown's speech to the Church of Scotland focused on the role of the church, looking at his speeches more broadly reveals that throughout his time in office, when talking about the moral underpinning of the concern for Africa international poverty, he draws on many faiths – rather than just Christianity. This can be seen in speeches to audiences as varied as the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the Church of Scotland General Assembly, the New York interfaith conference, St Paul's Cathedral and the Lord Mayor's Banquet (GB08e¹⁰⁷, GB08h¹⁰⁸, GB08ee¹⁰⁹, GB09b¹¹⁰ and GB09e¹¹¹).

This is noteworthy because Brown is often referred to as a 'son of the manse'¹¹², and regularly spoke of having drawn inspiration from his father who was a minister for the Church of Scotland. It was one of his father's sermons that inspired Brown – at the age of 11 – and his brother John to found The Gazette, which proudly boasted that it was the only newspaper in Scotland sold in aid of African charities (Brown, 2017). One such example can be seen in Brown's speech to the Interfaith Conference in New York (GB08ee):

We cannot be one world when 30,000 children die unnecessarily every day from diseases we know how to cure and that we must together respond to this poverty emergency by redoubling

¹⁰⁷ Gordon Brown (18th April, 2008), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, USA.

¹⁰⁸ Gordon Brown (16th May, 2008), Church of Scotland General Assembly, Scotland, UK.

¹⁰⁹ Gordon Brown (13th November, 2008), New York interfaith conference, New York, USA.

¹¹⁰ Gordon Brown (31st March, 2009), St Paul's Cathedral, London, UK.

¹¹¹ Gordon Brown (16th November, 2009), Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK.

¹¹² A manse is a house provided for a minister of certain Christian Churches, especially the Scottish Presbyterian Church.

our efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals? **This is the power of faith: to force the greatest possible coalition for the common good.** [...] But today we know we are not, and never can be, moral strangers to each other. Because we find that through each of our heritages, our traditions and faiths, runs a single powerful moral sense

7.2.3 Party Political Messaging

A third reoccurring theme throughout the period 1990-2016 is that British prime ministers use Africa as an arena in which they attempt to factualise and universalise the virtues of their personal political philosophy as well as that of their party. The trend over this period is divided along party lines – by whether the Labour Party or the Conservative Party is in government.

Major and Cameron reference Africa to highlight the virtues of conservatism and capitalism – that trade, investment, and entrepreneurship are the best route out of poverty. This is their domestic philosophy too. For example, at a speech in Birmingham, Cameron says (DC12g): ‘We say help people become independent from welfare... our opponents call it: ‘cruel Tories, leaving people to fend for themselves.’ No: there is only one real route out of poverty and it is work’. This message is echoed in Major and Cameron’s speeches about Africa (JM95b; DC11e). Blair, meanwhile, references Africa to give a moral grounding to his ‘Third Way’ philosophy. Additionally, Blair also speaks about Africa to try and unite the Labour Party behind New Labour, and also to attack the Conservatives. A common theme through all of these is that Africa represents a place where prime ministers can assert that

their ideas transcend British party politics; they are universal and apply as much to some of the poorest countries in the world as they do to Britain.

In Major's speech to the Britain in the World Conference in 1995 (JM95b¹¹³), for example, he questions the efficacy of aid, and suggests that investment and entrepreneurship are more effective.

How do we play our proper part in tackling world poverty? Official development aid can point to some successes, for example in South Asia, but it is trade, investment, education and entrepreneurship which have fuelled the more spectacular development of South East Asia. **Hundreds of millions of people in sub-Saharan Africa have seen little improvement in their living standard despite huge flows of official aid over many years. How can we promote investment and entrepreneurship there?**

Cameron echoes this theme in many speeches, arguing that trade and investment are the key to lifting Africa and Africans out of poverty. In a joint press conference with President Zuma in 2011 (DC11e)¹¹⁴, he says, for example:

we must also though seize the opportunity of a booming Africa where trade and growth can lift millions out of poverty and where Britain too can benefit from seizing the

¹¹³ John Major (29th March, 1995), Britain in the World Conference, London, UK.

¹¹⁴ David Cameron (18th July, 2011), joint press conference with Jacob Zuma in Pretoria, South Africa.

chance to increase its trade and investment. That is why I brought a top-flight delegation of British businesses to Africa and I wanted to come, Mr President, to South Africa first because this is the gateway to that new economic future. Britain is already South Africa's biggest long-term foreign investor. Our trade is worth £9 billion a year and exports of British goods to South Africa in the first third of this year are up nearly 50% compared with the year before.

There is, however, a difference between Major and Cameron in respect to their views on aid. In contrast to Major, Cameron is more sympathetic to the argument that aid can help African economies. Cameron's appreciation of the role of aid can be explained by a number of factors, including his first-hand experience of the Conservative's social action project, Project Umubano, his desire to project a more moderate image of the Conservative Party, and that the Labour government from 1997-2010 'won' the battle of ideas regarding the value of the official development assistance spending. However, Cameron is clear that aid should be a catalyst for private enterprise and trade, and that aid should in time be stopped. In his speech to the Pan African University in Nigeria (DC11f)¹¹⁵, he says:

we can spend aid in a catalytic way to unleash the dynamism of African economies, kickstarting growth and development and **ultimately helping Africa move off aid altogether**. So getting aid right - that's the first thing we have to do. The second thing we must do **is together unleash economic growth through private enterprise and trade. This is what has lifted**

¹¹⁵ David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria.

hundreds of thousands out of poverty in Brazil, China and Indonesia... **and it can do the same here in Africa**

Throughout his time in office, Cameron promotes free trade with almost missionary zeal. In his speech to the Global Investment Conference in London (DC12d)¹¹⁶, he repeats this message:

I'll continue to champion a **free trade area in Africa, which could play such a vital role in lifting Africa further out of poverty**. And I will make trade a core priority when Britain hosts the G8 here in the United Kingdom next year.

Cameron reinforces this point in a speech in 2013 (DC13h)¹¹⁷, in which he says his emphasis on trade, tax and transparency is 'morally right'. He also uses this speech as an opportunity to attack increased regulation:

When trade is choked by barriers and bureaucracy – developing countries miss out on the chance to grow. These issues are not just important they are ever more urgent too. **Developing countries are finding new sources of natural wealth like offshore oil and gas in Ghana and Tanzania and the forces of globalisation are driving ever greater opportunities for growth and trade**. Just think what missing out on this growing income means for a country where thousands of children are dying every day because of malnutrition

¹¹⁶ David Cameron (26th July, 2012), Global Investment Conference, London, UK.

¹¹⁷ David Cameron (15th June, 2013), Lancaster House, UK.

or where sick parents have to choose between whether to buy medicine to save their own lives, or pay for food for their hungry children. [...] **And the extraordinary thing about this tax, transparency and trade agenda is that it's not just the right thing for us to do morally it's right for our economies too.** Because when some businesses don't pay their taxes, it corrodes public trust. When some companies don't play by the rules, that drives more regulation and makes it harder for other businesses to turn a profit. **And when Africa doesn't trade to its potential, we all lose the chance to benefit from trading with one of the fastest growing continents on the planet.**

The historical context of Major's premiership is important in understanding his emphasis on free trade. As Major's premiership began just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he also uses discussions about Africa – such as his 1991 speech in Zimbabwe (JM91h) – to warn against what he saw as the moral shortcomings of socialism and highly state-centred systems of government.

There is no wish to impose particular models. Different parts of the world have different traditions, different means of establishing a consensus, different institutions and different problems. Of course each society will strike its own balance between individual rights and the responsibilities of the state. **But recent history shows us that stifling individual rights leads to discontent and economic failure and ultimately collapse.**

This section has shown how both Conservative prime ministers use references to Africa to echo and highlight the moral virtues of capitalism and free trade. In a similar way, Blair links

Africa to the core principles of New Labour. In doing so, he attempts to universalise the truths of this philosophy, as seen in his speech to the French National Assembly (TB98a¹¹⁸):

What impresses me most is not the differences in the challenge this change poses for our countries. It is the similarities. [...] in Latin America, in Eastern Europe, in the Far East, **even in parts of Africa**. All of us struggle with these two questions: How do we equip ourselves for economic change? How do we impose some order in the face of social change? In other words how to provide security in a world of change. **Our guide has to be our values. And here let me explain what I mean when I talk of a Third Way or New Labour.** My conviction is that we have to be absolute in our adherence to our basic values, otherwise we have no compass to guide us through change.

It is noteworthy that Blair also references Africa to try and unite the Labour Party. The move towards the political centre under the New Labour brand risked creating divisions in the party. In his speech to the Labour Party conference in 1999 (TB99b)¹¹⁹, Blair references New Labour's policies around debt in Africa whilst invoking the Labour Party's founder, first leader, and first MP, Kier Hardie. This juxtaposition is used to argue that New Labour values are Labour values and British values. He argues:

Solidarity, social justice, the belief not that society comes before individual fulfilment but that it is only in a strong society of others that the individual will be fulfilled. That it is these bonds of

¹¹⁸ Tony Blair (24th March, 1998), French National Assembly, France.

¹¹⁹ Tony Blair (28th September, 1999), Labour Party Conference, Bournemouth, UK.

connection that make us not citizens of one nation but members of one human race. **And wouldn't Keir Hardie have been proud when under Britain's leadership, this week we cancelled the debt of those African nations deep in poverty so that their people too can realise their potential,** have the hopes and dreams for their children we want for ours?

Blair also references Africa at the Labour Party conference in 1998 in order to create a dividing line between Labour and the Conservatives. In doing so, Blair sought to calm those in the Labour Party who felt he had abandoned the Labour Party's principles in the pursuit of power. By referencing Africa, Blair tried to project an image of a Labour Party that could win power whilst also retaining a strong moral purpose. In his speech to the Labour Party conference in 1998 (TB98c)¹²⁰, he states:

And you tell me **what Tory government would have given the peoples of Africa and Asia a 25 per cent increase in aid and development.** Thousands of communities, tens of thousands of people, many starving and destitute, will live not die, have hope, not despair and may never know it was a new Labour government in Britain that had the courage to say: 'You are our brothers and sisters and we accept our duty to you as members of the same human race.' But more than that, we have done all this with the public behind us. Why? For a reason that should give every one of you confidence. **The centre-left may have lost the battle of ideas** in the 1980s, but we are winning now and **we have won a bigger battle today - the battle of values.**

¹²⁰ Tony Blair (29th September, 1998), Labour Party Conference, Blackpool, UK.

In this extract, Blair's reference to 'brothers and sisters' is used to argue that a shared humanity trumps national boundaries, and that Britain's national identity under a Labour government holds a greater moral value. Blair himself says as much in his speech in Pebble Beach, California (TB06s): 'If we are championing the cause of development in Africa, it is right in itself but it is also sending the message of moral purpose that reinforces our value system as credible in all other aspects of policy'.

In Brown's acceptance speech on becoming leader of the Labour Party (GB07a)¹²¹, he references Africa as one of the achievements that defines Blair's premiership (and by extension the legacy of New Labour).

"So let me begin by personally thanking Tony Blair – a man who for ten years has borne the burden of leadership of our country. All of us will remember his leadership – his leadership has made Britain stronger, more tolerant, more prosperous and fairer. **And let us never forget his towering presence in the international community, his work on Africa,** climate change, his work to win the Olympics for Britain, and the skills and determination he brought to securing peace in Northern Ireland. Tony Blair's achievements are unprecedented, historic and enduring. Tony – on behalf of the Labour party, thank you".

In this section, we have seen that a continuity across all four prime ministers is that Africa is a place British prime ministers refer to (explicitly or implicitly) in order to assert that the

¹²¹ Gordon Brown (24th June, 2007), Special Labour Party Conference, Manchester, UK.

values they champion – personally, for their party, and for Britain – transcend British party politics; that they are universal and apply as much to some of the poorest countries in the world as they do to Britain. Major and Cameron use narratives of Africa to promote the virtues of conservatism – that trade, investment and entrepreneurship are the best way out of poverty. Blair meanwhile speaks about Africa to give weight to his ‘Third Way’ philosophy whilst also using narratives about Africa to try and unite the Labour Party behind New Labour, and to attack the Conservatives.

7.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

The content analysis focused on the three sub-themes about in the way in which British prime ministers refer to morality in speeches relating to Africa. In this section, particular speeches will be analysed in greater detail using the Discourse-Historical Approach. The speeches selected for analysis in terms of the economy are given below in Table 7:2, along with details about the speeches. As with the previous thematic chapters, they were selected based on quantitative tools (such as frequency of key words and coding using NVivo), the extracts analysed in the thematic content analysis, and from reading speeches during the data collection stage.

Table 7:2. Morality-related speeches selected for critical discourse analysis

Prime Minister	Date of Speech	Location
John Major	20/09/1994	South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa
Tony Blair	07/10/2004	Ethiopia
Gordon Brown	19/05/2008	Church of Scotland General Assembly
David Cameron	8/06/2013	G8 Nutrition for Growth

John Major's speech, delivered to the South African National Assembly in 1994, is a useful example for exploring using DHA. Although this speech has been explored in the History chapter, there is an overlap between history and morality, and therefore it is explored in further detail in this section too. In this speech, Major criticises Apartheid in South Africa whilst also praising the transformation it has undergone and the elections it held that year. As shown in the Content Analysis section of this chapter, however, Major does not criticise South Africa directly, he again uses the Commonwealth as an institution to talk about the common values between Britain, South Africa, and other members. There is the implicit notion that Britain's place at the centre of the Commonwealth provides it with the ability to speak on behalf of (and make claims about shared moral values on behalf of) other Commonwealth members in a way that they are not able to make because their voices are not given equal weight as Britain's. The ways in which this are achieved will be explored here.

Instead of actively criticising South Africa about Apartheid, Major passively says that Apartheid struck at the very roots of the Commonwealth.

With so many Commonwealth members in Africa, the two are of course closely linked. Apartheid, even after South Africa's departure, struck at the very roots, the very foundations, of the modern multi-racial Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was unanimously against apartheid but deep divisions opened within it, at times they threatened the very existence of the organisation. The Commonwealth was more strongly committed to ending apartheid and very heavily preoccupied with it than any other body in the world. The emergence, therefore of the new South Africa is a particular cause for rejoicing across the Commonwealth. When Deputy President Mbeki presented your new flag to the Commonwealth Secretary-General in Westminster Abbey in July, the congregation burst into spontaneous applause; South African participation in the Commonwealth Games in Victoria was greeted with equal delight and so it was at Lords cricket ground at that memorable moment when South Africa took the field. South Africa's re-entry to the Commonwealth, **her coming home** to the Commonwealth **where she belongs** should do more than just heal a wound, it should provide a stimulus to the **Commonwealth family** of one-third of the world's nations.

The family metaphor that Major uses is intended to show unity and harmony within the Commonwealth. This also demonstrates how references to familial relationships are important in Major's references to Africa and the Commonwealth. Johnstone (2017) argues that since the days of Empire, members of the British Royal family and political elites have frequently employed familial metaphors and discourse to describe the relationship with British colonies. The metaphor of the Empire as a family blurs the distinction between the

domestic and the international arena. This links back to Blair's argument in the previous section that 'it was a new Labour government in Britain that had the courage to say: 'You are our brothers and sisters and we accept our duty to you as members of the same human race.'" This blurring of boundaries across the domestic and international arenas helps lend weight to Britain's moral standing and authority in the world.

Johnstone argues that this familial discourse continues in the form of the Commonwealth – which often referred to as 'a family of nations'. This practice can be seen here in not only in Major's use of 'her' in describing South Africa and Namibia, but also in the way in which he does this. South Africa is 'coming home' to the 'Commonwealth family' of nations where 'she belongs'. This may indicate a way for Britain to hold on to some semblance of power, and therefore reflects a Britain's national identity and place in the world that has seen decline since the British Empire.

In stark contrast, in Blair's speech in Ethiopia, he frequently refers to himself in the first person, and to the audience in the third. There are times where he does so in order to indicate the overlap, the common ground, but he does not attempt to close the gap entirely.

Today **I want to look ahead** to a year when Africa will be in the spotlight of international attention, and **I want to set out for you** how **I think** that international attention can be turned into international action to help Africa beat poverty, and then conflict.

There is no point where the 'I' and 'you' turns into an unequivocal 'we' and remains as such. He goes on to say that: 'In all the things that **I deal with in politics**, and the things that make people cynical and disengaged from the political process, when **I come and see** what is happening here [in Ethiopia] and see what could happen, **I know that** however difficult politics is, there is **at least one noble cause worth fighting for**.' This is unusual as many politicians prefer using the first-person plural personal pronoun 'we' to suggest a common goal. For Blair, this is not the case. As Blair consistently spoke in this way, it can be argued that his speeches were often about himself.

There is a division in this speech between the moralistic, highly personalised discursive strategy and the occasional shift towards more collective pronouns. For example, Blair says 'We also know that progress in Africa must be led by Africa'. However this is soon contrasted with Blair returning to the first person and taking credit for helping Sudan: 'I have just been to Sudan, where an appalling humanitarian disaster is happening, with thousands of people dying every month as a result of disease, malnutrition and violence. I set out the necessary action yesterday and look forward to it being implemented.'

In Gordon Brown's speech to the Church of Scotland General Assembly, we find a significant contrast to Blair. Brown begins by referring to himself in the first person as Blair does, but he weaves this into a broader moral discussion about poverty in Africa using 'we'. This 'we' refers not only to the immediate audience – the Church of Scotland – but more broadly as a way of asking what Britain should collectively be doing. For example, he says,

‘And while I would respectfully suggest that our country is fairer today than in the past, I accept with humility today that our country is not yet fair enough and **we** must do more.’

Cameron’s framing is similar to Brown’s. At the G8 Nutrition for Growth event in 2013 (DC13g) he focuses on Britain as a whole, using ‘we’:

“Why does Britain always have to be out in front?” Let me tell you why. **It’s because of the kind of people we are - and the kind of country we are. We are the kind of people who believe in doing what is right. We accept the moral case for keeping our promises to the world’s poorest - even when we face challenges at home.** When people are dying, we don’t believe in finding excuses. We believe in trying to do something about it. Look at Band Aid and Live8. Look at Red Nose Day. Look at the way the British public respond to appeals from the Disasters Emergency Committee. During the famine in East Africa, British people gave £79 million. This is British families looking at the images on their televisions and responding with their hearts. **It says something about this country. It says something about our standing in the world and our sense of duty in helping others. In short – it says something about the kind of people we are. And that makes me proud to be British.**

In David Cameron’s speech to the Family Planning Summit in London, he uses a combination of the discursive techniques used by Blair and Brown. He refers to himself in the first person frequently, but also uses ‘we’ to speak on behalf of Britain. He says: “There are those who will say we can’t afford to spend money on aid at a time like this. [...] I think it’s vital that we confront these arguments head on. Let me do so. First, it is morally right to

honour our promises to the poorest in the world. Every 6 minutes a woman who did not want to become pregnant will die in pregnancy or childbirth. Every 6 minutes. So how many minutes do we wait? I say we don't wait at all.'

These ways of talking about moral issues in relation to Africa suggest different ideas about Britain's national identity. For Major, Britain's identity is about its place at the centre of the Commonwealth and still not sure of its place in the world post-Empire. For Blair, talking in the first person means that he is the embodiment of the nation, or that he would like to take personal credit for progress in Africa. Brown's and Cameron's use of the first-person plural personal pronoun 'we' is supposed to appeal to a collective common goal.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the extent to which Britain's post-Cold War engagement with Africa is presented by British prime ministers as being based on morality, and how this shapes British national identity. It deals with three specific sub-themes about morality.

Firstly, this chapter has shown that the idea that British prime ministers' discussions around Africa have broadly been a 'conversation' about the moral nature of Britishness can be backed up with the evidence presented here. However, it also reveals subtleties to the argument made in the literature that are important to highlight. There is a clear distinction between the way in which Major and Blair spoke about Britain's moral duty to Africa. For Blair, Africa is overtly a moral cause – but for Major, this is not so. Secondly, the rhetoric of

Blair and Cameron is most similar out of the four prime ministers, as they both frame Africa as an explicitly moral cause. This is noteworthy because they were from different parties, did not govern consecutively, and the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis separates their administrations. Thirdly, all four prime ministers spoke to religious audiences about Africa. The religious aspect of Britain's engagement with Africa is used to present Britain as an actor whose motivations are grounded not in self-interest but in religious morality. Importantly, not all the prime ministers make this argument in terms of Christian morality. Throughout Gordon Brown's time in office, when talking about the moral underpinning of the concern for international poverty, he draws on many faiths – and secularism too.

A continuity across all four prime ministers that is not addressed in the literature is that Africa is a place British prime ministers refer to in order argue that the values they champion transcend British party politics, and have a moral backing by being applicable to the poorest of the poor in Africa.

CHAPTER 8

Africa's Economic Prosperity: A Rising Tide that Lifts All Boats Or The End of British Influence?

This chapter focuses on the extent to which British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period have – in their speeches relating to Africa – talked about Africa in terms of the economy. It then moves on to consider how this shapes British national identity. Narratives that emphasise the importance of the economy in the relationship between Britain and Africa can be traced back to the days of colonialism and empire – when British politicians saw Africa as both an economic opportunity and an economic problem for Britain (Havinden and Meredith, 1993). The process of decolonisation – beginning in the late 1950s – put an end to the narrative from British politicians that Africa was an economic problem for Britain. As this chapter details, however, the speeches of British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period show that narratives of Africa as both an economic opportunity and problem have begun to re-emerge – but in a new way.

In the speeches of British prime ministers, the rapid economic growth across Africa is – on the one hand – a cause to be promoted and celebrated, providing many African countries with the economic prosperity and freedom to be able to exercise greater agency over their own affairs. This idea can be summarised by the aphorism ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’, and is broadly the framing used by Blair and Brown. On the other hand, this economic independence and growth has led Africa to be increasingly free of its historical ties with

Britain, and has also paved the way for a variety of actors from around the world to compete with Britain (and other former colonial powers) for the natural resources and human resources in Africa – in what is frequently described as the ‘New Scramble for Africa’ (Ayers, 2013; Scholvin, 2016). This narrative is about Britain’s economic self-interest, and centres on the idea that the emergence of Africa as a potential problem or missed opportunity for Britain. This framing is present in the speeches of Major, Blair and Cameron – but is particularly marked in the speeches of Major and Cameron.

The central contradiction between these two narratives is that the former views African economic prosperity as inherently positive to Africa, Britain, and the world – whilst the latter is an admission of a loss of British influence, and a lost or dwindling economic opportunity for Britain. Also occasionally implicit in this second narrative is the idea that Britain deserves priority in access to Africa’s natural and human resources because of the historic relations and because of Britain’s aid and development programmes. Importantly, in this theme, the party political divide appears to play an important role. Both Labour prime ministers tend to emphasise the first narrative, whilst both Conservative prime ministers tend to emphasise the second.

The increasing focus on Africa as a source of economic opportunity for actors around the world has been the subject of much discussion in the contemporary Africa literature (Alden, 2007; Taylor, 2012; Alden *et al.*, 2018), including specific consideration of the role of economic factors in UK-Africa relations (Williams, 2004; Cargill, 2013; Reid, 2014). This chapter begins with a continuation of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5, but with a

specific focus on the economy dimension. It then moves on to a content analysis of the speeches and critical discourse analysis around this theme.

8.1 Quantitative Analysis

For this economy chapter, the keywords selected for input into the Python program are: economy, economic, China, export, invest, investment, and trade. This information is plotted in Table 8:1, where mentions of selected keywords are shown in terms of their raw numbers by prime minister. In Figure 8:1, these are plotted as percentages of each prime minister's corpus. These keywords were selected based on the literature review and the author's own reading of the speeches during the data collection stage.

Table 8:1. Frequency of selected economy-related keywords in the context of Africa by prime minister

	John Major	Tony Blair	Gordon Brown	David Cameron
Econom(y/ic)	29	51	34	18
China	4	16	10	16
Export	7	4	0	4
Invest(ment)	38	31	6	12
Trade	24	80	19	66






Figure 8:1. Frequency of selected keywords related to 'Economy' in the context of Africa (as a percentage of each prime minister's corpus).

Figure 8:1 indicates a decrease in references to the 'economy' and 'investment' in plain terms, and instead an increase in language about 'trade'. This indicates an increased reluctance by British prime ministers to speak prescriptively or paternalistically about African countries' economies. The move towards the language of trade appears to be more appropriate in an environment that is more focused on partnership and mutual benefit. However, it is noteworthy that Brown is an outlier in these trends. These initial observations need to be explored further in the thematic and discourse analysis sections of this chapter.

It is clear from Figure 8:2 that South Africa is central to how Major talks about Britain's economic relationship with Africa. In contrast, the other three prime ministers frequently reference Africa in a broader sense. There is a party political divide, with Blair and Brown focusing on development related words – such as 'world', 'education', 'poverty', and 'climate'. In contrast, business related words are more prominent in the speeches of Major and Cameron – such as 'growth', 'business', and 'jobs'.





8.2 Content Analysis

With the help of the quantitative tools, this section examines the content of the speeches more closely to better understand the initial observations. In particular, the similarity between Major and Cameron, in contrast to the similarity between Blair and Brown, are explored in more detail here. Before this, however, it is important to refer back to the literature on contemporary narratives of Africa in terms of the economy.

Williams (2004) contends that that ever since Britain's retreat from colonialism in Africa, the primary concern of successive governments towards the continent has been appropriately summarised by James Mayall (1986) as one of 'damage limitation'. Mayall argues that Britain's Africa policy revolved around the need to turn its imperial legacies 'from liabilities into assets [which required the creation of] a network of low key, but still special, relationships between Britain and her former colonies' (Mayall, 1986: 54). Williams contends that successive British governments have achieved this through three main mechanisms: the organisation and management of the international economy; bilateral relations – primarily economic in character; and the political organisation of international society.

This view is echoed by Reid (2014), who argues that international engagement with Africa continues to be, indeed will increasingly be, economic in essence. The idea that GDP growth is inherently 'good' prevails in the West's economic engagement with Africa, and the growth rates in most African countries far exceed that of Britain's – especially since the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis. Africa achieved average real annual GDP growth of 5.4% between 2000 and 2010, adding \$78 billion annually to GDP (in 2015 prices). The IMF forecasts that Africa

will be the second-fastest growing region in the world between 2016 and 2020 with annual growth of 4.3% (Leke and Barton, 2016). In contrast, over the period 2000 – 2017, the UK averaged just 2%. The best-performing African economies have achieved 6-8%, and regularly feature in the global top ten.¹²² This trend appears set to continue, with forecasts of spiralling oil and other resource revenues, and a rapid expansion in middle-class consumerism (Reid, 2014). The implication of this for British national identity is significant; it carries with it the notion that Britain is stagnating or declining as an economic power; Britain is seeking out economic partnerships with countries whose economic growth rates are far higher than Britain's, many of whom were former British colonies.¹²³

However, this content analysis finds a more mixed approach than the one suggested by either Williams (2004) or Reid (2014). It finds a contradiction in the narratives used by British prime ministers, and one that is broadly divided by party lines. The first narrative – broadly used by Blair and Brown – is that rapid economic growth across Africa is inherently positive, providing many African countries with the economic prosperity and freedom to be able to exercise greater agency over their own affairs. The second – most prominent in the

¹²² For example: Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Chad, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, and Zambia

¹²³ Nominal GDP is central to many Western countries' perception of themselves, their national identity, and the story they tell about their place in the world. Nominal GDP is just one of a number of metrics that can be used to measure a country's economic prosperity. As an indicator, it also tells a very specific story. Based on nominal GDP, the UK is the fifth largest economy. Based on other measures such as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), for example, it ranks ninth – behind Indonesia and Russia. The gap between the UK and large African economies such as Egypt and Nigeria is smaller when measured by PPP.

speeches of Major and Cameron – is that this economic independence and growth has led Africa to be increasingly free of its historical ties with Britain, and has also paved the way for a variety of actors from around the world to compete with Britain (and other former colonial powers) for the natural resources and human resources in Africa. These two narratives will be explored further here as separate sub-themes in 8.2.1. and 8.2.2.

8.2.1 Africa's Economic Prosperity as a Mutually Beneficial

The first sub-theme, most notable in the speeches of Blair and Brown, is that Africa's fast economic growth is beneficial to the world, and that this will provide Africa with greater freedoms. During Blair's first term, for example, in his 2000 Mansion House Speech (TB00c)¹²⁴, he suggests that a number of African countries are on the rise and that they could soon be significant powers in their own right. He juxtaposes old powers (Britain and Europe) and potential future powers (South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt), but importantly this is not framed as a zero-sum game – it is framed as prosperity all nations can attain.

A thumbnail sketch of international politics shows us that there is the USA - the only superpower. There are the older European powers, including Britain. There is China, with its great history, culture, vast population and, now economic dynamism. [...] **There may be others who because of size, population and position join them - Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Indonesia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.**

¹²⁴ Tony Blair (13th November, 2000), Mansion House Speech, London, UK

There are echoes of this in Blair's second and third terms. In speeches delivered in his second term in Addis Ababa and in his third term in South Africa, Blair speaks warmly of Chinese involvement in Africa as a driver of economic prosperity. This contrasts with Cameron's presentation of Chinese trade with Africa as trade that Britain is missing out on – as explored in the next sub-theme (see 8.2.2). In the Addis Ababa speech (TB04h)¹²⁵, Blair argues:

we should not wait for the WTO to increase the opportunities for Africa to trade, we can increase those opportunities now. For example once Lesotho was allowed to import cotton from China to turn it into clothing, which is then sold to America, business boomed, it increased from less than \$100 million to over \$300 million in three years.

Likewise, in the speech delivered in South Africa at the end of his time in office (TB07n)¹²⁶, Blair acknowledges the increasing presence of China in Africa, but talks about working with China, the EU and the G8 to support development in Africa. This implies that Africa should be a concern for all countries, not just former colonial powers.

We now have a broad political consensus for Africa in the UK. Excellent. We need the same in the EU. We need each G8 to be bolder than the last. If we do this, and Africa responds as an equal partner, we will have set a strategic goal that in time we will achieve; and in a continent in which the power of China is rising dramatically, **we can work with China to serve the**

¹²⁵ Tony Blair (7th October, 2004), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

¹²⁶ Tony Blair (31st May, 2007), South Africa

development of Africa in a way which benefits us all. But if we give up, we will lose the chance in this continent - rich as it is - though its people are poor - for our values to take root. It would be a calamitous misjudgement.

This 'global' approach to Africa is a continuity throughout Blair's time as prime minister. Although delivered in a very different context – to the Lord Mayor's Banquet during his first term TB01h¹²⁷ – Blair makes a similar argument:

I hope [...] that a plan for Africa will be agreed at the G7/8 Summit in Canada. [...] But at this time of economic uncertainty it is essential we agree on the agenda for a new trade round. **Success means increased trade flows** and rising living standards around the world. Failure would mean a retreat into protectionism and isolationism. All parties should show the necessary flexibility to achieve this.

Brown is unique amongst the four prime ministers in that he rarely frames Africa as an economic issue – it is more often framed in terms of poverty or international development. Nevertheless, there are instances in which he takes the same multilateral approach as Blair. In 2007 (GB07l)¹²⁸, he frames economic reconstruction for Zimbabwe (a former British colony) as a problem for South Africa and the African Union, rather than for Britain:

¹²⁷ Tony Blair (12th November, 2001), Lord Mayor's Banquet, London

¹²⁸ Gordon Brown (20th September, 2007), unspecified domestic audience

for the day that democracy returns in Zimbabwe, **we want to work with South Africa** which is trying very hard under President Mbeki to resolve this situation, and with the rest of the African countries to design a programme of economic reconstruction for Zimbabwe. And **we want to play our part with the African Union** and with others in making it possible for people to restore and to build some prosperity in the future in a free country with a democracy.

8.2.2 Africa's Economic Prosperity as a (Missed) Opportunity for Britain

In contrast to the previous sub-theme, the second sub-theme is based on the same underlying facts about the strong economic growth across many countries in Africa – but it reaches a different conclusion. It argues that this economic prosperity and independence leads Africa to be increasingly free of its historical links with Britain, and has also led to actors from around the world to compete with Britain for the natural resources and human resources in Africa – in what is described as the ‘New Scramble for Africa’ (Ayers, 2013; Scholvin, 2016). This sub-theme is particularly notable in the speeches of Major and Cameron.

This narrative is about Britain's economic self-interest – which is subtly (but importantly) different to the previous sub-theme – because it views the emergence of Africa as a missed economic opportunity for Britain. The emphasis in this narrative is bilateral – between Britain and Africa, which is in contrast to some of the multilateral approaches explored in the previous sub-theme. The key difference between these two narratives is that the former views African economic prosperity as unquestionably positive to Africa, Britain, and the world – whilst this framing is more focused on a loss of British influence in Africa.

Speaking in South Africa (JM94f)¹²⁹, Major claims South Africa's economic success is rooted in the institutions left behind by Britain's colonial legacy. Using 'we' to mean Britain and 'you' to mean South Africa, Major argues that having helped bring about this economic success, Britain should get to reap the rewards of this.

The new South Africa's second great asset is to have inherited by far the most modern and effective economy and social infrastructure in all of Africa. We British want to work with you as you develop those efforts. Like you, we want all of South Africa's people to enjoy the fruits of success. And I say this not as a pious sentiment but because **we British have a direct interest, a very great stake, in your future.**

It is important to point out, however, that Major's remarks are often limited to South Africa, rather than about Africa more broadly. An extract from this same speech makes this distinction particularly clear, where Major highlights a specific lack of commitment to the rest of Africa. He says:

And Britain has a very substantial economic interest in South Africa. British investment in South Africa has an estimated market value of between 40 - 50 billion Rand, **this is greater than our investment in the whole of the rest of Africa combined, it shows the depth of Britain's national commitment to South Africa.** For Britain, South Africa is already an export market of the same scale as India, close to the markets of Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia and

¹²⁹ John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa

Singapore. But this is not one-way, but two-way trade. The United Kingdom is South Africa's second largest supplier, we are also your second largest export market.

In David Cameron's speeches, he frequently makes the case that Britain has not been reaping the economic benefits of its relationship with Africa. Cameron also expresses the belief that Britain's aid budget is something that should give Britain priority in trade with Africa. Speaking to the International Festival of Business in Liverpool in DC14b¹³⁰, he argues that:

I think this is a major opportunity for Britain and one we haven't always taken up in the past. I led a trade mission to Africa, to Nigeria and South Africa. And I want to do more of that because I think if you look at the – you know which economies are growing the fastest, you will see that some of the fastest growing are in Africa. And I think for too long politicians, particularly, have thought of Africa as a destination for aid and a source of global difficulties and problems rather than an immense market opportunity. [...] Let's use the advantages that we have. **We do have and have kept large aid programmes, particularly to sub Saharan Africa, that should give us a good relationship with these countries from which we can build better business and investment links;** I think that makes a difference.

This speech extract is important because it is a criticism of the New Labour approach to Africa – although Cameron does not criticise his predecessors directly. This reference to politicians thinking of Africa as 'a destination for aid and a source of global difficulties and

¹³⁰ David Cameron (11th June, 2014), 11th International Festival of Business, Liverpool, UK

problems rather than an immense market opportunity’ represents an important difference in the approaches to Africa between these administrations – despite their similarities in other aspects.

In his speech to the Pan African University in Nigeria (DC11f)¹³¹, Cameron talks of trade with Africa as a zero-sum game; Chinese trade with Africa is trade that Britain is missing out on:

Today, **Britain accounts for less than four percent of Africa’s exports**. That’s almost **three times less than China** - and one of the reasons I’m here is to **make sure we catch up**. It’s why **I’ve brought a plane full of business leaders**. And it’s why we want to do more to extend loan guarantees and trade finance **to British companies that are looking to do business in Africa. Because we see Africa in a new way, a different way.**

Although this sub-theme is largely linked to the Conservative Party, it is not unique to it. Cameron’s focus on the economy in his speech about Africa, unapologetic in its focus on British economic self-interest, provides a contrast to Blair’s language of partnership. Nevertheless, Blair’s speech to the Nigerian Assembly (TB02c)¹³² strikes very much the same tone.

¹³¹ David Cameron (19th July, 2011), at the Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria

¹³² Tony Blair (7th February, 2002), Nigerian Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria

Britain has long enjoyed a special bond with Nigeria. It is not just a question of history. British companies are major investors. Trade is growing. [...] Nigeria is a nation, which vibrates with energy. It personifies the richness and sense of possibility that is Africa. [...] **Africa should not be seen as a victim but as a partner. Africa demands a new partnership not out of desperation but out of promise for the future. This is about what we do together, as equals, with mutual respect and shared determination. If Africa gains, we gain.** The world will be safer and more just. Let us not forget: **Africa is a market of 750 million people on Europe's doorstep.** [...]. **Britain also has a special responsibility to Africa.** [...] My purpose today and in the coming three days is to develop support for **a new partnership between Africa and the developed world.** I stress the word 'partnership.' This is not just about aid. It is not only about what we give. **You need our support. But we need you to succeed.**

The final line of this speech extract also presents a problem that has not yet been encountered in this thesis. Blair's line "You need our support. But we need you to succeed" can be read in two different ways giving two slightly different meanings. This could be better interpreted through an audio recording of this speech, however this could not be found. One reading places the emphasis on Nigerian success, the other places the emphasis on Britain's relationship with Nigeria.

John Major's speech to the CBI/RIIA/COSAT Investment Conference in South Africa (JM96d)¹³³ is similar in tone to Blair's. A common factor between these two speeches is that they were both delivered in Africa, and so this focus on mutual economic benefit is perhaps to be expected – as opposed to Cameron's, which was delivered in Liverpool to the International Festival of Business.

Trade between us has leapt. British exports rose 25 per cent in 1994 and a further 30 per cent in 1995. South Africa has a substantial investment in Britain. And **Britain is the biggest foreign investor in South Africa**. I am very keen that **British business should continue to lead the way**. It is important they do so, because investment from overseas will be one of the keys to South Africa's future prosperity. Investment flows will dwarf any government-to-government assistance. [...] A British company is by far South Africa's largest foreign employer. Nine of the top twenty foreign employers in South Africa, are British. Today, South Africa is an important political and economic force. [...] Economically, she has the potential not only to attain the growth rate she needs, but also to lead the way to greater growth throughout Southern Africa.

This narrative of economic benefit to Britain in speeches delivered in Africa can also be seen in Cameron's speech in South Africa (DC11e)¹³⁴, representing a continuity between Major, Blair and Cameron.

¹³³ John Major (10th July, 1996), CBI/RIIA/COSAT Investment Conference, South Africa.

¹³⁴ David Cameron (18th July, 2011), Pretoria, South Africa.

I think it is important for the Prime Minister to get out there with British business at a time when we need investment and growth and jobs back at home to see our exports expand, to **open up new markets, to seek new contracts and new deals**. That is what I have done in India, what I have done in China and now I am here in Africa. I think it is a good thing to do and I am going to press ahead with that. I think it is a worthwhile thing and Britain should not be put off that. [...] I think it is right for Britain to be engaged with South Africa and to be engaged with Africa as a whole. There is **a huge opportunity for trade, for growth, for jobs – including jobs at home in the UK** – and I think it is right for the British Prime Minister to be out there with British businesses trying to drum up export support and growth that will be good for both our countries.

Later on this same trip – in a speech to the Pan African University in Nigeria (DC11f)¹³⁵, Cameron makes the same point.

‘today I’ve come here to Lagos because there’s another story unfolding on this continent – something that many in the West are only just waking up to. Tell me this: which part of the world has seen its number of democracies increase nearly eight-fold in just two decades? Eastern Europe? No, it’s Africa. Which continent has six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world? Asia? No, it’s Africa. Which country is predicted by some to have the highest average GDP growth in the world over the next 40 years? You might think Brazil, Russia, India or China. No. Think Africa. Think Nigeria. The point I want to make today, is this: This can be Africa’s moment. **Africa is transforming in a way no-one thought possible 20 years ago...**

¹³⁵ David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria.

and suddenly a whole new future seems within reach. [...] And we need change in Britain too, because, frankly, we're just not doing enough to pursue the possibilities of trading with you. Right now, **Britain is in danger of missing out on one of the greatest economic opportunities on the planet. And we cannot let that happen.**

There is the implicit (and sometimes explicit) notion that Britain is stagnating or declining as an economic power; Britain is seeking out economic partnerships with countries whose economic growth rates are far higher than Britain's (and are projected to remain much higher), many of whom were former British colonies. Two short extracts of these speeches about Africa succinctly capture this view: Blair's 'We need you' (TB02c)¹³⁶, and Cameron's 'Britain is in danger of missing out' (DC11f)¹³⁷.

8.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

The content analysis focused on two sub-themes about in the way in which British prime ministers refer to the economy in speeches relating to Africa. In this section, specific speeches will be analysed in greater detail using the Discourse-Historical Approach. The speeches selected for analysis in terms of the economy are given below in Table 8:2, along with details about the speeches. As with the previous thematic chapters, they were selected based on quantitative tools (such as frequency of key words and coding using NVivo), the

¹³⁶ Tony Blair (7th February, 2002), Nigerian Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria

¹³⁷ David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria

extracts analysed in the thematic content analysis, and from reading speeches during the data collection stage.

Table 8.2: Economy-related speeches selected for critical discourse analysis

Prime Minister	Date of Speech	Location
John Major	20/09/1994	South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa
Tony Blair	07/02/2002	Nigeria
Gordon Brown	23/09/2009	United Nations General Assembly
David Cameron	19/07/2011	Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria

The first speech selected for Critical Discourse Analysis in relation to economy is Major's 1994 address to the South African National Assembly in Cape Town. This speech has already been studied in the History Chapter (Chapter 6), but there is more that can be said about this in relation to the economy.

Throughout this speech, Major frequently talks about a new 'beginning' for South Africa. This constructive discursive strategy enables Major to arbitrarily define South Africa in a way that is beneficial for him; a new beginning draws a line under Britain's historical legacy and South Africa's more recent history of Apartheid, despite being referenced in other parts of the speech. The references to a new beginning are complemented by Major's use of justification and relativisation strategies.

For instance, Major merely refers to Britain being ‘deeply involved’ in South Africa rather than go into detail about the nature of that involvement. This is an example of what Wodak *et al.* (2009) refer to as a ‘euphemistic verb obscuring agent’ – a way to trivialise and downplay the seriousness of that involvement. Major goes on to argue that South Africa has inherited ‘the most modern and effective economy and social infrastructure in all of Africa’. Despite these references to history – which are vital in explaining South Africa’s current place in the world – Major nevertheless feels he has the authority to define a new era.

But this is not one-way, but two-way trade. The United Kingdom is South Africa's second largest supplier, we are also your second largest export market. This is a formidable relationship, but I hope it **represents no more than a beginning**. The global economy today is marked by the growth and dynamism of its newcomers. South Africa has great human and national resources. The potential is there, the need is there, your people are impatient for results. Yet no government on earth, however benevolent, can develop an economy with strokes of the pen. Prudent management, alertness to the challenges of the market, the acquisition and retention of international business confidence, that global economy offering hope and progress remains one of competition and a drive for success. You have achieved an historic launch towards it and you will need to hold to that momentum over the years ahead. [...] South Africans are trading, improving roads and air links and developing communications into the heart of Africa and some of our British companies are proud to be partnering you in that remarkable and necessary work but welcome though it is, **this is just the beginning**. In aid, in trade and in diplomacy, Britain would like to work closely with South Africa to turn the tide at last in this Continent in which my nation has been so deeply involved for so many years.

Furthermore, Major switches between a variety of ‘voices’, which help to show how he views Britain’s relationship with South Africa, and can be used to explore how he views Britain’s national identity. Major switches between speaking on behalf of Britain (‘we British’), to speaking on behalf of the people of South Africa (‘your people are impatient for results’), to making broader claims about the ‘truth’ (‘no government on earth, however benevolent, can develop an economy with strokes of the pen’). Such pronouncements about South Africa’s domestic policy show a more involved approach than is suggested by Major’s ‘we want to work with you’.

The second speech studied in closer detail is Blair’s 2002 address to the Nigerian Assembly in Abuja (TB02c). In this speech, Blair speaks about the economy in terms of mutual self-interest. In contrast to Blair’s often highly-personalised style of speaking, here he uses short clauses to give weight to these assertions, as they are presented as facts. For example, ‘if Africa gains, we gain’. Blair also mixes facts in amongst these assertions, which helps lend weight to his overall argument – such as ‘Africa is a market of 750 million people’.

If Africa gains, we gain. The world will be safer and more just. Let us not forget: Africa is a market of 750 million people on Europe’s doorstep. And the events of September 11 and their aftermath illustrate dramatically that the security of each of us depends on the prosperity of us all. In today’s interdependent world, there can be no secure future for any of us unless we manage globalisation with greater justice. **Britain also has a special responsibility to Africa. The British people as a whole care deeply about it.** Many were active for years in the struggle against the evil of apartheid in South Africa. British people donate £200 million every

year to charities dedicated to development and disaster relief, and tens of thousands demonstrated for the Jubilee 2000 debt relief campaign. And Nigeria has a special role in any partnership for African development. It is a continental powerhouse - the giant of Africa, with 120 million people, one sixth of all Africans. My purpose today and in the coming three days is to develop support for a new partnership between Africa and the developed world. I stress the word 'partnership.' **This is not just about aid. It is not only about what we give. You need our support. But we need you to succeed.**

In contrast to Major, Blair's discourse about Africa's economy is not framed solely in terms of self-interest. Later in this speech, Blair focuses on the role of aid and growth in encouraging education and decreasing poverty.

Better governance is key in fostering higher and more inclusive economic growth. More than 20 African countries achieved growth rates of 4 per cent last year. Uganda is among the 10 fastest growing economies in the world. Countries which have strengthened their public expenditure management include Mali, Senegal, Mozambique, Malawi, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania. But if Africa is to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015, it needs annual economic growth of more than 7 per cent. And Africa's current average annual growth rate is less than half that. Aid is one important component of helping Africa to grow. But it is time to view aid in a different context. [...] **But this money should not be seen as a handout to the poor. It is, rather, an investment in our collective future.** It should be specifically directed to the areas we know can make a difference, like education for all, including girls.

The third speech selected for Critical Discourse Analysis in relation to economy is Brown's 2009 speech to the UN General Assembly (GB09d). Although the content analysis section showed similarities between Blair and Brown in the way they talk about the economy in relation to Africa, a closer look reveals that Brown's approach is unique. This can partially be attributed to the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis, and Brown's view of globalisation. Brown presents Britain as a global leader and standard-bearer for economic cooperation and aid funding.

We need strong economic co-ordination now as we navigate the uncertainties of recovery. [...] And we must strengthen our targeting of tax havens with, from next March, real sanctions against those jurisdictions which fail to meet global standards. **But the voice of Africa will have to be heard and heeded to bring recovery in areas devastated by the events of the past year and to assure that we do not put the millennium development goals beyond reach as a result of a wider failure of global responsibility.** In London, the G20 agreed measures to result in \$50 billion for poor countries to help them weather the crisis. Because of London, the IMF can lend \$8 billion instead of \$2 billion over this year and next. **This is already helping Kenya and Tanzania to increase government spending in response to the crisis. For amid all the challenges we face, we must remember a promise we made 10 years ago.** And this is the fifth and final imperative: to achieve a vision for 2015 we are now in danger of betraying. On present trends it will take not five years as we pledged and not even 50 years, but more than 100 years to deliver on some of the Millennium Development Goals.

The fourth speech selected for critical discourse analysis in relation to economy is Cameron's 2011 speech in Lagos, Nigeria (DC11f). He begins with the use of a number of rhetorical questions in order to make the point that Africa is misunderstood, which have been emphasised in the extract below. This is partially aimed at distinguishing himself from his New Labour predecessors, and their focus on aid spending in Africa through DFID.

But today I've come here to Lagos because there's another story unfolding on this continent... something that many in the West are only just waking up to. Tell me this: **which part of the world has seen its number of democracies increase nearly eight-fold in just two decades?** Eastern Europe? *No, it's Africa.* **Which continent has six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world?** Asia? *No, it's Africa.* **Which country is predicted by some to have the highest average GDP growth in the world over the next 40 years?** You might think Brazil, Russia, India or China. *No. Think Africa. Think Nigeria.* The point I want to make today, is this: This can be Africa's moment. Africa is transforming in a way no-one thought possible 20 years ago... and suddenly a whole new future seems within reach.

The urgency is stressed throughout this speech. Cameron frequently emphasises words that stress immediacy – 'today', 'suddenly', 'only just', as well as later 'seize' and 'grab', as if these opportunities will disappear if not taken now. This suggests that now that people are realising Africa's potential for growth, there will be a race to help shape and benefit from this growth.

I have seen the passion and enterprise of Nigerians changing my country for the better. But what I have seen in London I have seen a hundred-fold here today. From Eko Atlantic and

Balogun Street Market to the biggest port in the most populous country in Africa... you are transforming your city. And your fellow Africans are doing the same all over the continent. Today there are **unprecedented opportunities** to trade and grow, raise living standards and lift billions from poverty. So I urge you: **seize these opportunities, grab them**, shape them.

Having encouraged people in Africa to make the most of these opportunities, Cameron then turns to state that Britain has a self-interest in this prosperity.

Today, Britain accounts for less than four percent of Africa's exports. That's almost three times less than China - and **one of the reasons I'm here** is to make sure we catch up. It's **why I've brought a plane full of business leaders**. And it's why **we want to do more** to extend loan guarantees and trade finance to British companies that are looking to do business in Africa. Because **we see Africa in a new way, a different way**. Yes, a place to invest our aid. But above all a place to trade.

Throughout the speech, Cameron shifts between 'I' and 'we'. As such, this makes it unclear which capacity he is speaking in. For example, in this extract, he begins by talking about his own purpose in coming to Africa in a personal capacity. However, the phrase 'we want to do more' and 'we see Africa in a new way, a different way' may imply his government or that he is speaking on behalf of Britain. This is complicated further by the section of the speech devoted to critiquing 'aid sceptics' who mostly come from his own party. Nevertheless, these all represent attempts break from recent history and to forge a new role for Britain.

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the extent to which Britain's post-Cold War engagement with Africa is presented by British prime ministers as being based on economic factors, and how this shapes British national identity. It finds a more mixed approach than the one suggested by either Williams (2004) or Reid (2014). It finds a contradiction in the discourses used by British prime ministers, and one that is largely divided by party lines.

The first narrative – broadly used by Blair and Brown – is that rapid economic growth across Africa provides many African countries with the economic prosperity and freedom to be able to exercise greater agency over their own affairs. This narrative is also multilateral in focus. The second narrative by contrast is primarily bilateral in focus. Most prominent in the speeches of Major and Cameron, it contends that economic independence and growth has led Africa to be increasingly free of its historical links with Britain. This economic growth has also paved the way for a variety of actors from around the world to compete with Britain for the natural resources and human resources in Africa. This narrative is primarily about Britain's economic self-interest, and views the emergence of Africa as a missed opportunity for Britain.

The key distinction between these two narratives is that the former views African economic prosperity as inherently positive to Africa, Britain, and the world – whilst the latter is an admission of a loss of British influence and a lost or dwindling economic opportunity for Britain. As seen in this chapter, the second narrative also encompasses the idea that Britain deserves priority in access to Africa's natural and human resources because of the historic

relations and because of Britain's aid and development programmes. Importantly, this is the first theme in which the party political divide appears to play an important role. Both Labour prime ministers tend to emphasise the first narrative, whilst both Conservative prime ministers tend to emphasise the second.

CHAPTER 9

The Role of Africa in the Construction of British National Identity

This chapter identifies cross-cutting themes across the last four chapters, expands on them, and links them back to national identity. It also returns to debates in the literature – as identified in Chapter 2 – and situate this research within them. The previous four chapters have found links between different prime ministers for different themes. It is useful at this point to understand how these linkages connect the four prime ministers.

Firstly, there are similarities across all four prime ministers. In relation to security and Africa, the argument that deprivation in Africa leads to extremism is a continuity across all four prime ministers (at least, up until the penultimate year of Cameron's premiership). Additionally, all four prime ministers are divided about the extent to which African countries or institutions can be peacekeepers in Africa, or whether Britain needs to have an active military presence in Africa. Nevertheless, there is a consistency amongst the prime ministers' comments about Britain's place in the world and its duty to intervene. It also suggests that there has not been a clear trend in terms of Britain's role in relation to peacekeeping in Africa; prime ministers are no clearer on this now than at the end of the Cold War. Another common thread across the four prime ministers is that they all refer to Africa in order to assert that the values they champion – personally, for their party, and for Britain – transcend British party politics; that they are universal and apply as much to some of the poorest countries in the world as they do to Britain.

Secondly, there are notable examples where party politics plays an important role in the discourses prime ministers use. At times, Blair speaks about Africa to lend weight to his 'Third Way' philosophy whilst also using narratives about Africa to try and unite the Labour Party behind New Labour, and to attack the Conservatives. In contrast, Major and Cameron use narratives of Africa to promote the virtues of conservatism – that trade, investment and entrepreneurship are the best way out of poverty. For Major, this is also linked to the end of the Cold War and wanting to steer countries towards sound economic policies. On one hand, for Blair and Brown, the rapid economic growth across Africa is a cause to be promoted and celebrated, providing many African countries with the economic prosperity and freedom to be able to exercise greater agency over their own affairs. On the other hand, for Major and Cameron, even if this is celebrated, there is a worry that economic independence and growth has led Africa to be increasingly free of its historical ties with Britain, and has also paved the way for a variety of actors from around the world to compete with Britain (and other former colonial powers) for the natural resources and human resources in Africa. References to Africa in relation to the Commonwealth is a strategy used by Major, although it reappears towards the end of Cameron's time in office with the Brexit vote, suggesting that this is linked to party identity too.

Thirdly, there are strong parallels between Blair and Cameron. Their emphasis on hard power sets them apart from Major and Brown. However, whereas in the Blair years there was a clearer assertion of global cosmopolitan purpose, the emphasis under Cameron is less controversially on building the capacity and resilience of people from the bottom up. Both Blair and Cameron frame Africa as an explicitly moral cause. This is noteworthy because

they were from different parties, did not govern consecutively, and the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis separates their administrations. One explanation for this similarity is that Blair and Cameron were elected prime minister after a long period in opposition, and were both elected to office at the age of 43 – and perhaps used Africa to present themselves as statesmen on the world stage to help combat the idea they were inexperienced. This is explored in more detail in section 9.5.2 of this chapter.

Fourthly, there are similarities between Major, Blair, and Cameron, with Brown being an outlier. These three prime ministers speak about Britain's colonial history in Africa, but employ different discursive strategies to sanitise Britain's colonial history in Africa. Additionally, when referencing Africa in moral terms, Major, Blair, and Cameron, can be found to use overtly Christian messages, while Brown draws on a wider group of faiths.

Finally, Major is unique in the way in which emphasised the role of sport (cricket in particular), as it offered him a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa in an uncontroversial way that largely transcends politics, and enables him to suggest shared values and shared history that go beyond British self-interest.

At the same time, the previous chapters reveal important discontinuities in language about Britain and Africa by British prime ministers between 1990 and 2016. The analysis conducted in the previous chapters – together with the findings in this chapter – indicates that there is an overarching trend from the language of paternalism to partnership over this timeframe. However, it would be incorrect to frame it solely in such simple terms; there is a

plethora of examples that complicate such a straightforward assessment – such as discontinuities by time, party, and prime minister. There is evidence to argue for a discontinuity for every prime minister, which highlights a problem – discontinuities can be self-fulfilling and so can be found wherever one looks for them. As discussed in Chapter 10, this appears to be a shortcoming in some of the literature that focuses solely on Cameron in contrast to Blair (Pugh *et al.*, 2013; Daddow and Schnapper, 2013). It is certainly correct that there is a discontinuity between Blair and Cameron, however they are incorrect in their assertion that this discontinuity begins with Cameron. That is to say, discontinuities should not be overstated – and therefore the shift in language from paternalism to partnership should also be qualified.

Such findings add complexity to the contemporary UK-Africa literature, and constitute an important contribution to knowledge on both sides of the debate about continuity versus discontinuity over this period. For instance, on the one hand, this research lends weight to the argument made by Taylor (2012) that New Labour's Africa policies largely continued on the same path as previous governments, preserving a 'calculating eye to the national interest and Britain's international reputation'. On the other, it reaffirms the argument that Blair's election in 1997 marked a new turn in the conceptualisation of Africa – in which the continent represents a 'noble cause', transcending politics and economic interests (Gallagher, 2013). These two findings, whilst apparently mutually exclusive, are found in the speeches simultaneously as shown in this chapter. This helps to underline how rhetoric is far more nuanced than is generally appreciated in the literature on the UK and Africa.

These findings from the previous chapters begin to illuminate how British national identity is constructed in these speeches. Two overarching trends emerge. One is a general shift from the language of paternalism to partnership – which shows how prime ministers’ discourses of British national identity show a coming to terms with Britain’s post-empire, post-superpower status. The other signifies continuity across this period – which shows that in some ways British prime ministers’ discourses about Britain’s relationship with Africa have not changed that much over this time period. This chapter builds on the findings from the previous chapters by focusing specifically on discursive strategies. In doing so, it expands on the explanation of how British national identity is constructed through speeches about Africa, and also offers an explanation as to why different identities of Africa exist in the speeches.

In this chapter, four discourses are identified, building on the analysis conducted in the thematic chapters. It is important to note that these are separate from the themes of the previous four chapters, and do not directly correlate with them. The four themes – history, economy, morality, and security – are content oriented. By contrast, the four discourses are purpose orientated. Each discourse is distinguished by the combination of discursive strategies employed by the prime ministers, and the relative prominence of each of these. Before moving on to explain these four discourses, however, it is important to revisit the discursive strategies briefly – which were detailed in the Analytical Framework (Chapter 4). (Wodak *et al.*, 2009) outline four macro-strategies. These are: constructive strategies, perpetuation strategies, transformative strategies, and dismantling strategies.

Constructive strategies are the linguistic acts that build and establish a particular national identity. One such example is Major's repeated use of 'we British', which discursively establishes 'us' and 'them' groups. This highlights his perception of the unequal power dynamic between Britain and South Africa, as opposed to invoking a shared purpose. This can be contrasted with other constructive strategies, such as simply referring to African countries in name – a strategy common in the speeches of Major, Brown and Cameron – or referring to Africa as a whole continent, a hallmark of Blair's speeches. Studying these constructive strategies gives the analysis a depth beyond the explicit content of the speeches and into the subtle and implicit construction of national identity.

Perpetuation strategies attempt to maintain or reproduce already established groups. They are frequently used when the status quo is under dispute and needs to be justified in order to be preserved. Justification and legitimisation strategies are specific types of perpetuation strategies and are employed to defend and preserve a problematic narrative of 'national history'. This can be seen, for example, when Major acknowledges Britain's colonial history and its legacy in Africa but seeks to justify it by pointing out that other European countries also engaged in empire building in Africa (JM94f).¹³⁸

Transformative strategies attempt to transform the meaning of a relatively well-established aspect of national identity into another. An example of such a strategy is the way in which Blair acknowledges Britain's role in the slave trade and its horrific impact on Africa, but

¹³⁸ John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa.

changes the frame of the debate to focus on Britain's role in abolishing it (TB07e)¹³⁹. Dismantling strategies serve to de-mythologise or demolish existing national identities or elements of them. For example, Cameron's speeches that made reference to Africa often sought to dismantle the notion that Africa's success depended on British aid (DC14b)¹⁴⁰.

Having revisited the strategies, the four discourses are outlined here, as well as which prime ministers they are most common under, how each is distinguished by the type of discursive strategies used, and the level of prominence given to each.

The first discourse, 'paternalism' is primarily seen in the speeches of Major, but there are examples of it in speeches by Blair and Cameron too. In this discourse, British prime ministers present the biggest power gap between Britain and Africa – which presents a neo-colonial dynamic. It is distinct in two ways. Firstly, by the use of nomination strategies that discursively separate Britain and Africa into 'us' and 'them' groups. Secondly, through use of perpetuation strategies that diminish the legacy of colonialism, and justify Africa as an arena to project British hard-power.

The second discourse, 'tutelage', is predominantly found in the speeches of Blair. Importantly, although Blair's language was ostensibly focused on partnership, his insistence on Africa as a special case aligns him more with this 'tutelage' discourse. Blair's tendency to

¹³⁹ Tony Blair (25th March, 2007), Video recording played in Elmina Castle, Ghana, on the 200th anniversary of the British Parliament legislating to abolish the slave trade in the British Empire

¹⁴⁰ David Cameron (11th June, 2014), 11th International Festival of Business, Liverpool, UK

talk about Africa as a monolithic entity with intractable problems shows little focus on details – and his personal devotion echoes the missionary zeal of Victorian explorers. As such, this is perhaps more about himself than it is about Africa. This narrative uses a number of discursive strategies, such as nomination, justification and transformation strategies.

The third discourse, referred to here as ‘partnership’, is one in which British prime ministers speak about countries in Africa like they would any other – that is, Africa is not treated as a special case. This discourse does not ignore the poverty in Africa, but rather the solutions to these problems are not paternalistic as in the first two discourses. This discourse is present in speeches of all four prime ministers, however it is most associated with the speeches of Brown. It is distinguished by the nomination and transformation strategies used. Instead of the nomination strategies of ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups of the first paternalism discourse, this one more often uses collective pronouns such as ‘we’ to indicate that Africa and Britain are united in their aims. This discourse suggests that Britain has moved out of the shadow of being the former British Empire, and is comfortable with its new identity as an internationalist soft-power superpower.

The fourth discourse is similar to the ‘partnership’ discourse in that it is also based on a belief that Africa is on the brink of great transformations. However, it reaches a different conclusion about what this means for Britain and British national identity. Labelled ‘insecure former empire’, this discourse views the rapid economic growth of many African countries as a missed opportunity for a sluggish British economy. This presents a national identity of Britain as a country on the decline and still insecure with its place in the world without the

empire. As Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State under President Truman, noted: ‘Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role’ (Acheson, 1963: 163). Although Acheson made this remark over half a century ago, this appears to still carry some weight, especially in light of a small but noteworthy resurgence in references to the Commonwealth in the lead up to the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union. Prominent in the speeches of Cameron, this discourse also appears to be a reaction to the New Labour consensus that British national identity is tied to its aid budget in Africa and as a global soft power leader. This may seem contradictory given that Cameron ring-fencing of ODA spending at a time of significant domestic austerity, and his personal commitment to aid spending. However, the transformation and dismantling strategies of this discourse represent a tension between Conservatism – primarily in the Conservative Party, but also in the media and public – and attempts to change perceptions of the Conservative Party.

These four discursive strategies are summarised in Table 11.1 below. Having laid out this overview of the four discursive strategies, it is important to note that this is a broad outline. As this chapter details, there are a plethora of examples that show greater complexity than these four discourses – such as areas of overlap between prime ministers and discourses.

	“Paternalism” discourse	“Tutelage” discourse	“Partnership” discourse	“insecure former empire” discourse
Discursive strategies most prevalent in this discourse	Nomination / Perpetuation	Nomination / Transformation	Nomination	Transformation / Dismantling
Level of paternalism	High	Medium	Low	Low

Table 11.1. The four discourses identified from the analysis in the thematic chapters

The next sections will expand on this in more detail, with particular emphasis on the discursive strategies used in selected British prime ministers’ speeches.

9.1 Paternalism Discourse

The defining characteristic of the ‘paternalism’ discourse is that it presents Britain as still having great power over Africa – resulting in a neo-colonial dynamic. This discourse is most prominent in speeches made by Major, however there is a certain continuity in this discourse as it can also be found in some speeches by Blair, Brown and Cameron – albeit to a lesser degree. There are two main discursive strategies that define this discourse. The first is the use of nomination strategies that discursively separate Britain and Africa into ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups. The second is through uses of perpetuation strategies that diminish the legacy of colonialism, and justify Africa as an arena to project British hard-power.

This discourse is epitomised in Major's 1994 address to the Conservative Party Conference (JM94m)¹⁴¹, in which he said: 'time after time it has been British initiatives that have led the way in achieving this, to use our age-old links with Africa to help prepare that troubled continent for a better future'. This extract is useful because it highlights a number of discursive strategies that are central to this discourse – including the two main strategies of nomination and perpetuation. Firstly, the use of the nomination strategies of 'Britain' and 'Africa' shows the distance between these two subjects, as it implies there are no commonalities. Secondly, the homogenisation of the continent 'Africa', as highlighted by Brown and Harman (2013) is also important to this. Thirdly, the use of 'time after time' is emblematic of the way in which discourse views Africa's problems as intractable. Fourthly, the use of 'age-old' links is a way of sanitising Britain's historical role on the continent without having to address atrocities committed. Finally, the view that it is British initiatives that have helped change Africa's fate shows the lack of agency afforded to Africa.

Nomination strategies can be used to serve different purposes. As in the extract from Major's speech, in this discourse, they are used to separate out Africa and Britain into 'them' and 'us' categories – as seen the speeches of Major, Blair, and Cameron. For example: '**We British** were relative late-comers to Africa' (JM94f)¹⁴², '**we British** have a direct interest, a very great stake, in your future' (JM94f)¹⁴³, '**do what we can** to save African nations from

¹⁴¹ John Major (14th October, 1994), Conservative Party Conference, Bournemouth, UK

¹⁴² John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa.

¹⁴³ John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa.

barbarism and dictatorship and be proud of it' (TB00c)¹⁴⁴, 'look after **our national interest**' (DC10a)¹⁴⁵. This strategy constructs Britain and Africa as unequal actors with little shared interest, and of a British national identity still rooted in its colonial history. It is important to note that this strategy is used in both domestic and international contexts.

Alongside this nomination strategy, perpetuation strategies are also common in the construction of this 'paternalism' discourse. As explored in the History chapter (Chapter 6), Major, Blair and Cameron all diminish the impact of colonialism by shifting the responsibility for crimes committed away from Britain and using selective accounts of Britain's history in Africa. At the core of this discursive strategy is a claim to 'truth'. In John Major's speech to the South African National Assembly (JM94f)¹⁴⁶, for example, he argues that the British were 'late-comers to Africa'. He justifies Britain's 'benign' history in Africa by presenting Britain as a reluctant coloniser with benevolent intentions. This continues with the assertion that Britain's intentions were 'trade rather than colonisation' and 'benign commerce', and then transforms into a claim to moral superiority by noting that Britain abolished the slave trade before the Dutch.

This is similar to the discursive strategy employed by Blair in his 2007 video speech marking the 200th anniversary of the British Parliament legislating to abolish the slave trade in the British Empire (TB07e). Blair's speech is slightly different to Major's because British

¹⁴⁴ Tony Blair (13th November, 2000), Mansion House, London, UK.

¹⁴⁵ David Cameron (24th June, 2010), HMS Ark Royal.

¹⁴⁶ John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa.

responsibility for atrocities is accepted at first. However, the transformation to focus on Britain's moral superiority is achieved in the same way. After calling the transatlantic slave trade 'one of the most shameful enterprises in history', Blair qualifies this acknowledgement of wrongdoing with a shift of focus to abolitionism, and with it Britain's claim to rightness. As mentioned in the History chapter, Blair offers one African, and two British abolitionists in his example: 'the people who fought against slavery came from all walks of life. They include former enslaved Africans like Olaudah Equiano, church leaders like Thomas Clarkson and statesmen like William Wilberforce'. This is significant because it shows a transformation in conceptualisation of national identity from Britain's role as a colonising nation to one of an emancipator, just as Major did.

Another way in which this perpetuation strategy can be seen is in the metaphors used by Blair. As noted by Reisigl and Wodak (2009) metaphors are important discursive strategies used in the construction of national identity. Blair (TB01f)¹⁴⁷ told the Labour Party Conference in 2001 that 'the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and angrier.' He repeated this metaphor whilst addressing the Nigerian Assembly in Abuja (TB02c)¹⁴⁸, at the G8 Summit in Canada (TB02f)¹⁴⁹, and again to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa (TB02g)¹⁵⁰. This violent metaphor removes all

¹⁴⁷ Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001), Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK.

¹⁴⁸ Tony Blair (7th February, 2002), Nigerian Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria.

¹⁴⁹ Tony Blair (28th June, 2002), G8 Summit, Canada.

¹⁵⁰ Tony Blair (28th September, 2002), World Summit on Sustainable Development, South Africa.

agency from Africa, presents Africa as an intractable problem, and also depicts Africa as incapable of solving its problems. It also removes historical context from the problems, and draws on imagery used by the missionary-explorer David Livingstone in the mid-nineteenth century – that the Central African slave trade was ‘the open sore of the world’ (Provenzano, 2010).

The ‘paternalism’ discourse constructs a British national identity that is similar to the dynamic under colonialism – that Africa is incapable of solving its own problems and requires British assistance. As detailed, it is most prominent in speeches made by Major, but can also be found in some speeches by Blair and Cameron. It is important to note, however, that Major’s interest in Africa is primarily around South Africa. In contrast, the next discourse of ‘tutelage’ refers to Africa in very general terms.

The specific focus on *prime ministers’* discourse and its role in the construction of national identity in this thesis can lead to a contradiction of the literature. For example, Dowden (2007) would contend that Brown belongs to this discourse as well. He argues that when Brown visited Mozambique in 2006 as chancellor, he said ‘that Britain had nothing to apologize for in its colonial record in Africa. What he probably meant was that he was proud of the British missionaries and teachers and doctors who had given their lives to building schools and clinics and churches in Africa. But many Africans saw it as a shocking endorsement of British imperialism’. As this research has focused exclusively on *prime ministers’* words, this speech was not part of the sample studied.

9.2 ‘Tutelage’ Discourse

In contrast to the first discourse, the ‘tutelage’ discourse is slightly less paternalistic. Nevertheless, it retains the idea that Britain is central to solving Africa’s problems. The ‘tutelage’ discourse is primarily found in the speeches of Blair – although it can also be seen in speeches by Major. Although Blair championed the language of partnership in Africa, his frequent and highly general references to Africa demonstrate this is part of a separate discourse. Blair showed a propensity to speak about Africa as a continent rather than focusing on countries – and his sweeping references to the ‘state of Africa’ with its ‘grinding poverty, pandemic disease, a rash of failed states’ (TB01h)¹⁵¹ are unrepresentative of the whole of Africa. This tendency to portray Africa as having intractable problems shows little focus on details, such as Blair’s incorrect assertion to the Labour Party conference that the Rwandan genocide occurred in 1993 (TB01f)¹⁵². As such, this discourse is perhaps more about Blair himself than it is about Africa – and his personal devotion echoes the missionary zeal of Victorian explorers. This discourse uses a range of strategies, including nomination and transformation strategies, as seen in the sub-themes of the Commonwealth, Sport, moral posturing and party political messaging.

The ‘paternalism’ discourse emphasised difference through the nomination strategy of ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups. By contrast, this discourse focuses primarily on nomination strategies

¹⁵¹ Tony Blair (12th November, 2001). Lord Mayor’s Banquet, UK

¹⁵² Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001). Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK

centring on the first person pronoun ‘I’. For example, in Blair’s 2005 speech at the launch of the Commission for Africa report¹⁵³, he said:

I fear my own conscience on Africa. **I** fear the judgement of future generations, where history properly calculates the gravity of the suffering. **I** fear them asking: but how could wealthy people, so aware of such suffering, so capable of acting, simply turn away to busy themselves with other things? [...] **I** feel that judgement of the future alongside the now. It gives **me** urgency. It fills **me** with determination.

This is also apparent in other speeches. For example, in his 2005 speech to the East-West Institute (TB05k)¹⁵⁴, ‘**I believe** passionately in Africa as a moral cause, but **I** also have to say to you that **if I think** of Africa [...] **I think** of hundreds of millions of young people growing up in poverty’. Similarly, in his speech to News Corp. in 2006 (TB06s)¹⁵⁵, he said: ‘**I know** some of my fellow leaders think **I am** trifle obsessed with Africa. It’s true. **I am.**’

In this way, Blair’s speeches about Africa are often about himself. According to Abrahamsen (2005: 55), Blair was ‘almost messianic’ in his mission to help Africa. Abrahamsen is not the only one to make this comparison. Blair’s former friend Robert Harris accused him of having ‘a messiah complex’ (Bowie, 2014). This may help to explain why Blair’s speeches about Africa focus on it as a monolithic continent. As noted in the initial quantitative

¹⁵³ Tony Blair (11th March, 2005), launch of the Commission for Africa report, British Museum, London.

¹⁵⁴ Tony Blair (8th December, 2005). East-West Institute, Guildhall, London.

¹⁵⁵ Tony Blair (30th July, 2006). News Corp., Pebble Beach, California.

analysis (Chapter 4, Figure 4.8), this is a unique aspect of Blair's speeches that distinguishes him from the other prime ministers. Thus, whilst there are other areas of continuity, this is one important way in which Blair did represent a substantially new approach to the discourse on Britain and Africa. This nomination strategy is echoed by Cameron in the final discourse, however it serves a different purpose, as detailed in 10.4.

Having looked at the nomination strategy used in this discourse, this section will now look at the transformation strategies used by Major and Blair. The Commonwealth and the role of sport act in similar ways in this discourse; they are both transformation strategies that seek to maintain British influence in Africa. In a speech in Harare, for example, Major talks about the common factors that unite the Commonwealth. 'The superficial differences are clearly vast - size, wealth, colour, religion - but sitting down together we do all speak the same language both literally and metaphorically' (JM91j).¹⁵⁶ Blair echoes this sentiment about shared values and language in the Commonwealth at the beginning of his premiership (TB97b)¹⁵⁷, in an address to the Commonwealth Business Forum.

The Commonwealth [has] **a common language** in a global economy in the information age. **We have common values** that can shape the way we work. **We have many shared practices, similar legal and accounting systems.** And we can do more business with each other if we make more of these advantages.

¹⁵⁶ John Major (21st October, 1991), Harare, Zimbabwe.

¹⁵⁷ Tony Blair (22nd October, 1997), Commonwealth Business Forum.

Importantly, both Major and Blair explicitly reference the Commonwealth as an arena in which Britain's history of empire and colonialism can be transformed into a new identity. Major's discussions of the Commonwealth, however, do have a unique aspect to them. He uses his position to advocate for democracy and human rights, and to push for 'sound economic and political management' in the Commonwealth. In the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall, this is about the virtues of capitalism over socialism. This usage of the Commonwealth in this way is an attempt to steer former British colonies without appearing paternal by suggesting that these are collective values that must be upheld by all members.

John Major uses the role of sport as a transformation strategy in a similar way. For Major, sport is a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa (or the Commonwealth more broadly) in a way that transcends politics, and suggest shared values and shared history that go beyond self-interest.

9.3 'Partnership' Discourse

The 'partnership' discourse is distinguished primarily by the nomination and transformation strategies used. Instead of the nomination strategies of 'us' and 'them' groups of the first discourse or the first person pronoun 'I' of the second, this discourse more often uses collective pronouns such as 'we' to indicate that Africa and Britain are united in their aims, or by referring to countries in name. In doing so, British prime ministers speak about countries in Africa like they would any other. This discourse does not ignore the poverty in Africa, but rather the solutions to these problems are not paternalistic as in the first two discourses. This discourse is present in speeches of all four prime ministers. Brown most often uses this discourse, and rarely uses the others. This consistency marks him out from the other three prime ministers, who use combinations of at least three of the discourses. Within this discourse, there is an acknowledgement that some African countries will grow very quickly over the coming decades, and this is presented as positive and to be celebrated. This discourse suggests that Britain has moved out of the shadow of being the former British Empire, and is comfortable with its new identity as an internationalist soft-power superpower. There is evidence for this discourse in speeches by all four prime ministers.

One important way in which this discourse is may be distinguished is in the nomination strategies used by British prime ministers. In contrast to the distance of 'you' and 'us' groups of the first discourse, and the personalised 'I' of the second, this discourse of partnership focuses more often on countries in Africa by name. This hints at a changing relationship between Britain and Africa, and one that has moved on from the legacy of colonialism. A

normalising of relations to the sort of relationship Britain has with any country. It also shows more attention to country-specific issues rather than broad generalisations.

Significantly, Major and Cameron use this discourse because it ties in with their focus on bilateral trade, which they place more emphasis on as Conservative prime ministers than Blair or Brown. For example, Major's primary interest in Africa was South Africa – and working to ensure sanctions on South Africa were lifted. 'South Africa is a potential giant in the African Continent not only economically but politically and diplomatically over years and I think its example will spread elsewhere.' (JM94l)¹⁵⁸. Major made two visits to South Africa during his time as prime minister. Returning in 1996, he said: 'No British Prime Minister had visited South Africa for 34 years. When I addressed the National Assembly, I spoke of a **fellowship** for the future between Britain and South Africa. Since then, we have been putting that **fellowship** into practice in practical ways' (JM96d)¹⁵⁹. Similarly, much of Cameron's interest in Africa focused on bilateral trade, and the nomination strategies used reflect this spirit of partnership. For instance: 'Our trade is worth £9 billion a year and exports of British goods to South Africa in the first third of this year are up nearly 50% compared with the year before' (DC11e)¹⁶⁰. There are examples of such nomination strategies in the context of trade from Blair and Brown. Blair, for example, says: 'On trade, I know that Ghana has a particular interest in securing improved trading opportunities. Developed countries retain significant barriers to trade, particularly in agriculture.' However,

¹⁵⁸ John Major (22nd September, 1994). Pretoria, South Africa.

¹⁵⁹ John Major (10th July, 1996). CBI / RIIA / COSAT Investment Conference, South Africa.

¹⁶⁰ David Cameron (18th July, 2011). Pretoria, South Africa.

this has to be looked at in the context of all of their speeches to understand that these are exceptions to the rule.

For Brown, this nomination strategy is the norm – but it is rarely in relation to trade. One such instance is a speech in Downing Street in 2008: ‘And when you ask about the cooperation between our two countries, we are ready to support the Nigerian government, both in restoring peace in the Niger Delta, and also in taking all the measures necessary to deal with lawlessness in the area. But we will work to the ideas that the President has about what can be done’. This is a significant contrast to the language and nomination strategies in the first and second discourses; Brown rarely speaks in the first person or creates a dichotomy between Africa and Britain through the use of ‘us’ and ‘you’.

9.4 'Insecure Former Empire' Discourse

The fourth discourse is similar to the previous 'partnership' discourse in that it is also centred on a belief that Africa is on the threshold of great economic and social transformation. The 'insecure former empire' discourse, however, views the rapid growth of many African countries as a missed opportunity for a slow British economy. This presents a national identity of Britain as a country on the decline and still insecure with its place in the world without the empire. This discourse is marked out by its use of transformation and dismantling strategies. Prominent in the speeches of Cameron, this discourse appears to be a response to the Blair-Brown concept that British national identity is tied to its aid budget. This may seem contradictory given that Cameron protected – indeed, increased – ODA spending at a time of significant domestic austerity. However, the transformation and dismantling strategies of this discourse represent a tension between Conservatism – primarily in the Conservative Party, but also in the media and public – and attempts to change perceptions of the Conservative Party.

There are two main points that stand out. The first is that it returns to the nomination strategies that create a perceived power gap – such as 'we' and 'you' – that were common in the 'paternalism' discourse. However, the dynamics are reversed. Instead of Britain doing things for or to Africa, it is about what Africa can do for Britain. The second point that emerges from this discourse is that Cameron uses it to bring the focus to himself, echoing the example of Blair in the 'tutelage' discourse. This is significant because it echoes Blair's rhetoric but has not been detailed in the existing literature.

Cameron uses this discourse to focus attention on himself as someone to right the ‘wrong’ of New Labour’s aid paradigm. It creates a dividing line between himself and the previous Labour government, and enables him to present himself as the solution – as shown through his frequent use of ‘I’.

I think this is a major opportunity for Britain and one we haven’t always taken up in the past. **I led a trade mission to Africa**, to Nigeria and South Africa. And **I want to do more** of that because **I think** if you look at the – you know which economies are growing the fastest, you will see that some of the fastest growing are in Africa. And **I think for too long politicians, particularly, have thought of Africa as a destination for aid and a source of global difficulties** and problems rather than an immense market opportunity. [...]We do have and have kept large aid programmes, particularly to sub Saharan Africa, that should give us a good relationship with these countries from which we can build better business and investment links; **I think that makes a difference.** (DC14b)¹⁶¹

Cameron’s use of ‘we’ in the following extract is also significant because he uses it to signify that Britain has a new leader who is a Conservative, with the implication being that Africa had hitherto been a source of untapped economic potential by his New Labour predecessors. This also presents a national identity tied the idea of Britain as entrepreneurial and capitalist country.

¹⁶¹ David Cameron (11th June, 2014), 11th International Festival of Business, Liverpool, UK

‘today I’ve come here to Lagos because there’s another story unfolding on this continent – something that many in the West are only just waking up to. [...] Africa is transforming in a way no-one thought possible 20 years ago... and suddenly a whole new future seems within reach. [...] It’s why I’ve brought a plane full of business leaders. And it’s **why we want to do more** to extend loan guarantees and trade finance to British companies that are looking to do business in Africa. Because **we see Africa in a new way**, a different way (DC11f).

Cameron’s discursive strategy can be seen more clearly by contrasting it with the way in which Blair speaks about the same issue. Blair does not use the ‘insecure former empire’ discourse, but instead uses the ‘tutelage’ discourse. In Blair’s speech to the Nigerian Assembly (TB02c), for example, although the content is comparable to Cameron’s, his framing is very different. Blair’s use of ‘we’ is not tied to his role as a Labour prime minister, or even his role as prime minister at all, he uses ‘we’ to speak on behalf of Britain.

Britain has long enjoyed a special bond with Nigeria. It is not just a question of history. British companies are major investors. Trade is growing. [...] Nigeria is a nation, which vibrates with energy. It personifies the richness and sense of possibility that is Africa. [...] Africa should not be seen as a victim but as a partner. Africa demands a new partnership not out of desperation but out of promise for the future. **This is about what we do together, as equals, with mutual respect and shared determination. If Africa gains, we gain.** The world will be safer and more just.

John Major's speech to the CBI/RIIA/COSAT Investment Conference in South Africa (JM96d)¹⁶² is similar in tone to Blair's – which show that Cameron's discursive strategy is unique in this respect; Major rarely refers to himself.

Trade between us has leapt. British exports rose 25 per cent in 1994 and a further 30 per cent in 1995. South Africa has a substantial investment in Britain. And Britain is the biggest foreign investor in South Africa. I am very keen that British business should continue to lead the way. It is important they do so, because investment from overseas will be one of the keys to South Africa's future prosperity. Investment flows will dwarf any government-to-government assistance. [...] A British company is by far South Africa's largest foreign employer. Nine of the top twenty foreign employers in South Africa, are British.

Cameron's reaction to the aid focused New Labour was on the one hand to accept the new status quo of retaining aid spending, whilst simultaneously using his conservative instincts to push for trade over aid rhetoric. In this way, Cameron aligned himself whilst also distancing himself from New Labour.

¹⁶² John Major (10th July, 1996), CBI/RIIA/COSAT Investment Conference, South Africa.

9.5 Contextualising the Findings

Although not the specific focus or aim of this research, this section seeks to understand the reasons for the trends in themes and discourses identified over the last five chapters. In order to do this, this section will move beyond prime ministers' speeches to contextualise the findings using secondary sources. It is important to note, however, that it is difficult to identify causality. Instead, therefore, this section highlights correlations and seeks to explain trends on that basis.

9.5.1 From Paternalism to Partnership

Despite the continuities and discontinuities found in this thesis, of the main findings is that the language used by British prime ministers in referring to Africa moves from a framing that is largely paternalistic to one that is more about partnership. This reflects a broader paradigm shift that occurred around the end of the Cold War – namely, the rise of optimism about the ability of politics and institutions to improve the world, and an increase in African agency.

The beginning of the post-Cold War shift can be seen in US President George H. W. Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on September 11th 1990. In this speech, Bush spoke of his vision of a 'new world order', and argued that the crisis in the Persian Gulf and the end of the Cold War offered the nations of the world:

‘a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. [...] Out of these troubled times [...] a new world order - can emerge [...] An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony. [...] A world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.’ (Bush, 1990: 20).

This optimism was based in particular on the assumption that globalisation would knit together the nations of the world into ‘a global community espousing common values and shared interests, backed by a rising tide of prosperity [that would] eliminate the need for zero-sum perspectives in world affairs’ (Reveron, Gvosdev and Owens, 2015: 244). It was this optimism also led Fukuyama to assert that the world had reached the ‘end of history’ with the triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism, and signalled the arrival of a post-ideological world (Fukuyama, 1989).

Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi (2005: 13) argue that the end of the Cold War: ‘made possible a more comprehensive view of rights as encompassing all rights: civil, political, economic, social and cultural. From this point, it is not a long jump to framing “development” concerns such as food security and population as issues of rights. There is less contestation over their status as rights claims, unlike the sterile and polarised debates that characterised the Cold War era.’

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the role of increased African agency in bringing about this shift to partnership. Brown and Harman (2013: 1) argue, ‘the study of Africa’s international relations has for a long time been dominated by a concern to explain how the continent has been governed, shaped and marginalised by external actors’. In a period that has seen strong, sustained economic growth across the continent and assertive diplomacy from African actors, this approach looks ever more anachronistic. African interventions on the global stages of the UN, WTO, and World Bank have been highly visible and demonstrate growing assertiveness (Brown and Harman, 2013). Additionally, the legitimacy and representativeness of post-Second World War structures and institutions have been called into question. After all, African countries represent just over a quarter of the UN membership, yet have no permanent seat on the UN Security Council. However, Zondi (2013: 19) argues that Africa relies on ‘coordinated and common negotiating positions [to] re-centre itself in the multilateral system’.

Cargill (2013: 76) argues that Cameron’s intervention in Libya shows that in some ways, little has changed with regards to Africa’s agency; ‘African agency remains limited. UK agency remains extensive’. Yet this intervention is an outlier in recent UK-Africa relations. ‘While the UK Government might deny it, issues of human rights and governance cannot be quite so forcefully raised as they once were, when purely developmental and humanitarian interests predominated’. This represents a ‘challenge to the UK’s historical self-defined moral mission in Africa’ (Cargill, 2013: 77).

9.5.2 The Blair-Cameron Link

There are strong parallels between Blair and Cameron in how they reference Africa in their speeches. Indeed, out of the four prime ministers studied in this research, there is most similarity between Blair and Cameron. Their emphasis on Africa as a sphere to project hard power sets them apart from Major and Brown, as does their framing of Africa as an overtly moral cause. In addition, their passion for Africa is presented as a highly personal commitment. This parallel is particularly noteworthy because they are from different parties, did not govern consecutively, and the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis separates their administrations. There are two obvious characteristics to their premierships that might explain the commonalities of their focus on Africa: their youth on entering office, and both entered government after a long period in opposition. These two explanations will be expanded on here.

Blair was 43 years old when he entered Number 10 in 1997, making him the youngest prime minister since the Earl of Liverpool in 1812 (Seldon, 2007). Just over a decade later, Cameron was also elected at 43 years of age – but he was a few months younger than Blair on taking office, thus making him the youngest prime minister in the last two centuries (Hart and Carr, 2013). Their youth and perceived inexperience as challengers to incumbent prime ministers were part of attacks used against them.

Philip Gould, a key Labour strategist and senior adviser to Tony Blair, wrote a memo in which he explained that Blair's weakness was that he could be perceived as 'too soft and not

tough enough' and 'inexperienced' (Gould, 1999: 211). Moreover, an article in the New York Times notes, Blair's 'youth and relative inexperience have also caused him problems. Detractors on both sides of the political aisle portray him as out of his depth, and have hung on him the derisive nickname of Bambi' (Stevenson, 1994).

In a similar manner, Brown used his 2008 conference speech to make the remark 'I am all in favour of apprenticeships, but let me tell you this is no time for a novice' (BBC News, 2008). This made the headlines in a number of newspapers and was seen to be an attack at both Cameron, and Brown's potential leadership challenger David Miliband. Various leaked communications also reveal how Cameron was viewed by people he met around the time of the 2010 election and – although Cameron would not have heard these criticisms directly – he would have been aware of his perceived inexperience and how necessary it was for him to reassure those who found him to be so. The release of Hillary Clinton's emails to the state department, for example, show her aide (and former White House aide to Bill Clinton) Sidney Blumenthal thought Cameron was 'aristocratic, unsure, inexperienced, oblique and largely uncommitted' (Fenton, 2015). Meanwhile, a discussion between Mervyn King and the US ambassador revealed by WikiLeaks showed that King found both Cameron and Osborne to be inexperienced (Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 70).

In this context, Blair and Cameron's focus on foreign policy – and in particular, Africa – could be explained as a way to generate moral authority and project statesmanship on the world stage. Chandler (2003: 310) argues that foreign policy initiatives have become an important mechanism for cohering western governments and international institutions, often

appearing to be bereft of any clear consensus-building political agenda of their own. There are two aspects of Blair and Cameron's speeches in relation to Africa that lend weight to this argument: their emphasis on projecting power and their highly personalised style of talking about Africa. Theakston (2012: 207) argues, 'Cameron and Blair fit the model of the more emotionally literate leader that modern politics seems to require'. Langer (2010: 65), meanwhile, contends there are 'interesting similarities regarding which aspects of the personal sphere of [Blair and Cameron] were emphasized [sic]'.

The second factor that unites Blair and Cameron is that both became prime minister after their parties had spent a long period in opposition. The Labour Party had spent 18 years in opposition when Blair entered Downing Street, while the Conservative Party had spent 13 years out of office when Cameron formed the Coalition government. In their time as leader of the opposition, both Blair and Cameron made a concerted effort to change, reposition, and rebrand their parties. Blair changed Clause 4 of the Labour Party's constitution which had previously represented the party's commitment to common ownership, rebranded the party as 'New Labour', and adopted a 'Third Way' ideology. Cameron abandoned the Conservative Party's logo of 30 years, a torch of freedom, in favour of an oak tree in order to promote an image of modern, softer, and more environmentally-friendly party (Dommett, 2015). This was reinforced by Cameron's visit to the Arctic to witness the effects of climate change, a commitment to lead the 'greenest government ever', and his softening of the party's stance on crime – as exemplified by his 'hug a hoodie' speech.

Importantly, both Blair and Cameron also used foreign policy to emphasise change. Daddow and Schnapper (2013) argue that ‘policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted [Blair and Cameron] to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years’. Little (2000: 251) argues that ‘there has been an active and persistent attempt to identify ‘clear blue water’ between New Labour’s approach to foreign policy and the measures adopted by both Conservative and Labour administrations of the past’.

Notably, less than a fortnight after New Labour’s 1997 landslide victory, the foreign secretary, Robin Cook, launched a mission statement for the FCO in which he stated Britain’s foreign policy must have an ‘ethical dimension’ (Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000). In 1997, Blair separated DFID from the FCO, establishing it as an independent department headed by a Cabinet Minister (Morrissey, 2005). As noted in the Security Chapter (Chapter 7) and Morality Chapter (Chapter 8), Blair also contrasts his approach in Sierra Leone with the failure of Major’s government to intervene in Rwanda. He told the Labour Party Conference in 2001 (TB01f): ‘And I tell you if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1993, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral duty to act there also’.

Cameron also made changes in foreign policy to underline his commitment to modernisation and to detoxify the image of the Conservatives as the ‘nasty party’ (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012: 133). He signalled a commitment to international development through maintaining official development assistance target and DFID as a separate government department.

Cameron made two visits to Africa as leader of the opposition – to Darfur and South Africa in August 2006 and Rwanda in July 2007. Beswick (2019) argues that in doing so, Cameron sought to ‘demonstrate his credentials as a potential international statesman’ and ‘position engagement with Africa as part of Conservative Party modernisation’. The Observer newspaper suggested that this represented an ‘audacious bid to seize the issue of African aid and development from Gordon Brown’ (Temko, 2006). Cameron further signalled a changed Conservative Party by meeting with Nelson Mandela on his visit to South Africa, and calling Mandela ‘one of the greatest men alive’ in an article in The Observer (Cameron, 2006). This marks a sharp contrast to views expressed by Margaret Thatcher and other Conservative MPs in the 1980s.

Cameron’s rebranding and repositioning of the Conservative Party was also demonstrated on his visit to Rwanda in 2007. As noted by Beswick (2019), Cameron’s trip to partake in the Conservative’s social action project in Rwanda, Project Umubano, coincided with severe flooding in his parliamentary constituency. Despite receiving criticism in the press and rumours of a vote of no confidence in his leadership from members of the 1922 committee, Cameron chose to continue with his trip to Rwanda. The study of Cameron’s party modernisation from 2005-2015 by Dommett (2015) would benefit from including such considerations of the role of foreign policy and Africa. Although Dommett cites Cameron’s reference to Africa in a foreword to a statement of Conservative Party aims and values, this is more by accident than design – and she does not pick up on this reference or delve into it any further, choosing instead she focuses on the other aspects of the foreword.

In contrast, for Blair, this argument about party modernisation does not seem to stand up to the same level of scrutiny. As the analysis in this thesis has shown, Blair's focus on Africa, whilst present in his first term – most notably the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 – started properly in his second term (Porteous, 2005: 289-90). The ethical dimension to Blair's foreign policy rhetoric did not fully occur until after 9/11 (Mumford and Selck, 2010). Potential explanations for Blair's unique focus on Africa are therefore explored in further detail in the next section.

9.5.3 Explaining Blair's Focus on Africa

As discussed in the literature review, there are conflicting accounts about why and when Africa came to play a central role in Blair's foreign policy. The explanations highlighted in this research include the personal (Taylor, 2012; Vallely, 2009), somewhat more calculated explanations about projecting a moral identity for Britain (Gallagher, 2013), and security concern post 9/11 (Abrahamsen, 2005). However, one aspect that hasn't been explored is the involvement of external actors such as President Mbeki and Bob Geldof (Vallely, 2009). As the first three of these have been explored already in some detail, this section will reflect predominantly on those explanations that have not yet been covered.

According to Taylor (2012: 450), Blair was the most media-obsessed leader Britain has had in modern times, and he projected himself as a 'personal savior [sic]' of Africa. Similarly, Abrahamsen (2005: 55) argues that Blair was 'almost messianic' in his mission to help Africa. However, Vallely (2009) argues that Blair's focus on Africa did not stem from narrow

political self-interest because it sometimes it ran counter to usual political considerations. Blair knew that his continued lobbying of other G8 leaders on Africa was irritating them; Vallely (2009: 199) states:

At one point the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder – in a desperate attempt to find some common ground with George Bush, with whom relations were still icy after Germany’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq – said privately to Bush: “Blair is being a real pain in the arse about this Africa stuff, isn’t he?” To which Bush replied: “Yeah, I wish he’d give it a rest.”

Near the conclusion of Blair’s time in office, in a speech in South Africa (TB07p)¹⁶³ Blair credits President Mbeki for his focus on Africa, a point which has not been picked up in the literature on this area.

I remember conversations I had with you very early on in your Presidency and my Premiership when you emphasised to me that in the end the solutions to Africa’s problems come from within Africa, it is the duty and obligation of those of us outside of Africa to give support and help but in the end Africa wants to take responsibility for its own destiny and future. And you made a great impression on me in the sense of trying to get away from a relationship between Africa and the outside world that was about donor and recipient, and to one of partnership and equality, where there were obligations on the African side as well as on the side of the developed world and where we move together recognising those mutual obligations are interchangeable [...] **So in a sense that very**

¹⁶³ Tony Blair (31st May, 2007), South Africa.

formative analysis that you gave me was what led to us trying to develop a different way of approaching these problems and that culminated in the Gleneagles G8.

Meanwhile, Vallely (2009) argues that Bob Geldof had a significant role in placing Africa high on Blair's foreign policy agenda. Vallely claims that Geldof travelled to Ethiopia in 2003 and found that the famine was on a level similar to the 1984-1985 famine which had led to the Live Aid concert. Vallely (2009: 194) says that Geldof phoned Blair, who was attending the G8 summit in France, and said:

“It's happening again [...] Twenty years after Live Aid and things are no better. In some ways they're getting worse [...] None of it is working. And there are all these new forces of the globalized economy at play which nobody properly understands. Africa is fucked.”

Vallely goes on to say that Blair asked Geldof to meet him, and that this was significant in raising the profile of Africa on Blair's agenda.

9.5.4 Why is Brown an Outlier?

When accounting for length of time in office, the corpus of speeches indicates that Brown delivered twice as many speeches that referenced Africa compared to Major, Blair, and Cameron – as shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 4:2. Throughout this thesis, Brown has emerged in an outlier in other ways. Whereas Major, Blair, and Cameron refer to Britain's colonial history in Africa (albeit in different ways), Brown does not do this. Additionally, when making the moral argument for engagement with Africa – historical or recent – Major,

Blair, and Cameron, can be found to use overtly Christian messages, while Brown draws on a wider group of faiths. The analysis of Brown in the literature tends to focus on his time as chancellor (Taylor, 2005; Dowden, 2007). As such, it represents a continuation of literature that focuses on Blair's premiership to the exclusion of other prime ministers. Prime Minister Brown is largely unaddressed in the UK-Africa literature due to his being preceded and succeeded by more consequential prime ministers and because of his short tenure. As such, the findings on Brown represent an important new contribution to knowledge.

Explanations in the literature focus on Brown's faith and upbringing. According to Brown's biographer, 'helping the Third World had been a special interest for Brown since childhood' (Bower, 2004: 206), while Wheeler (2007) simply states that 'Africa was [...] an early concern'. Brown often cites his father, who was Presbyterian Church of Scotland minister, as inspiration. Dowden (2007) argues that Brown inherited his father's ideals; strictly moral, puritanical and serious, careful with money and caring for others. It was one of his father's sermons that inspired Brown – at the age of 13¹⁶⁴ – and his brother John to found *The Gazette*, which proudly boasted that it was the only newspaper in Scotland sold in aid of African refugees (Allport, 2009: 24). This explanation of Brown's interest in Africa being long-standing is further underlined by the fact that when he was a student at the University of Edinburgh, he was elected rector and exposed the university's investments in Apartheid South Africa, and ended them (Dowden, 2007).

¹⁶⁴ This is given in some sources as 11 (Pierce and Alleyne, 2007) and in others as 13 (Allport, 2009: 24).

David Livingstone had also been a Scottish Presbyterian minister. As noted in the Literature Review (Chapter 2), Livingstone's *Missionary Travels* sold 70,000 copies within a few months of its publication in 1857 (Brantlinger, 1985). Livingstone had called for missionaries to bring Christianity to 'the Dark Continent', and the Church of Scotland had responded enthusiastically, sending thousands of young idealistic Christians to Africa for more than a century to bring their religion and education to Africans. Dowden (2007) argues that their feedback through the Church increased Scotland's sense of international mission, particularly for Africa.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

This conclusion summarises the findings of this thesis and highlights its original contributions to knowledge. It then situates these findings within the literature explored in Chapter 2 and referenced throughout. It finishes by offering two ways this research can be expanded on in further research.

10.1 Findings And Original Contributions To Knowledge

This thesis has answered the three central research questions set out in Chapter 1. It finds that British prime ministers' references to Africa can be categorised into four 'themes'; that their references to Africa are about British 'history', 'security', 'morality', and 'economy'. Each of these can be further categorised into 'sub-themes' that signify important nuances within each theme. By analysing the themes and sub-themes in prime ministers' speeches, this thesis finds four discourses about Britain's relationship with Africa, which highlight different conceptions of British national identity. These are: 'paternalism', 'tutelage', 'partnership', and 'insecure former empire'. When viewed together, these themes, sub-themes and discourses reveal two competing but coexisting notions of British national identity. The main finding of this thesis is that British prime ministers' discourses of Africa reveal an attempt to forge a new soft-power British national identity, and – simultaneously – a reluctance to entirely renounce Britain's colonial identity.

The first shows that British prime ministers' conception of British national identity changes from one of paternalism towards Africa to one of partnership. The second shows that some discourses of Africa's place in British foreign policy used by British prime ministers have remained continuous throughout this period, and are also rooted discourses about Africa from the 19th Century. As noted in the literature review, there is no such thing as one national identity. Instead, different identities are discursively constructed in relation to context, such as the audience and zeitgeist. However, the two prominent identities found in this research are notable because they exist concurrently whilst being contradictory. The findings of this thesis can also be considered a response of sorts to Dean Acheson's remark that 'Great Britain has lost an empire and not found a role yet' (Acheson, 1963: 163). In their discourses about Africa, British prime ministers from 1990-2016 construct two prominent identities for Britain; one comfortable with its post-Empire status, and the other reluctant to let go of its imperial legacy.

Furthermore, this thesis makes a number of original contributions, which can be broken down into six areas. Firstly, the corpus of speeches collected for this research is new and can be made available to other researchers. Secondly, the approach taken in this thesis represents a unique take on existing methods. Thirdly, this thesis studies the overt content of the speeches to derive 'themes' and 'sub-themes' that represent important substantive topics British prime ministers reference in relation to Africa. Fourthly, this research explores the implicit content of the speeches to understand the ways in which national identity is constructed – such as through selective 'we-groups', forms of othering, and metaphors. Fifthly, it provides potential explanations for these findings. Sixthly, it details how these

original contributions speak to debates in the existing literature on UK – Africa relations. These contributions are expanded on in more detail here.

First, this research has provided a new dataset that can be utilised for further research. The corpus contains 273 speeches, totalling 668,281 words. The corpus of speeches took many months to compile, and required searching and sorting through online archives and physical archives. The online archives used to collect this data are: the Political Speech Archive (www.ukpol.co.uk), the British Political Speech archive (www.britishpoliticalspeech.org), John Major's website (www.johnmajor.co.uk), the European Archive (www.collections.europarchive.org), the British government website (www.gov.uk), and the Wayback Machine Internet Archive (www.archive.org). It would be challenging and time-consuming to re-collect this data, especially as the domain address of the European Archive has expired and speeches from this archive must now be accessed via the Wayback Machine Internet Archive using the specific URL for each speech. These online sources were complemented by visits to the Conservative and Labour Party archives at the Bodleian Libraries in Oxford and The People's History Museum in Manchester respectively. Speeches from the physical archives were digitised using optical character recognition (OCR) technology. This dataset is provided in Appendix A, and can also be made available online as Open Access (OA) content, which can benefit other researchers interested in UK-Africa relations.

Second, this thesis has made a contribution in terms of its approach. As highlighted in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, speeches are understudied in the British context, especially in relation to what Tulis (1987) terms 'the Rhetorical Presidency'. The focus solely on prime

ministers' speeches instead of policy or actions represents a novel approach to the field of UK-Africa research. As Finlayson and Martin (2008: 60) argue, a political speech is a 'proverbial grain of sand through which, if we are prepared to look closely and for a while, we may glimpse some of the turns taken by a political universe'. Additionally, this research builds on a number of existing approaches to develop an innovative way of approaching national identity construction. The critical approach set out by Wodak *et al.* (2009) is too focused for a large dataset such as this, so combining their detailed Discourse-Historical Approach with quantitative tools and thematic content analysis provides a framework that can be borrowed and built on in further research. Fairclough (2000: 96) explains that a 'rhetorical style is not an invariable way of using language; it is rather a mixture of different ways of using language, a distinctive repertoire. Tony Blair does not always speak in the same way, but he has a distinctive repertoire of ways of speaking which he moves between in a recognisable way'. It is difficult to capture the range of repertoires and themes of such a broad dataset using only critical discourse analysis. Therefore, this additional thematic content analysis stage is crucial in gaining this understanding, and also helps to develop arguments in the literature on this subject. The Python code written for this thesis to help understand the context of keywords within each theme (provided in Appendix B) is a useful tool for researchers wanting to analyse large text corpora regardless of the field of study, and represents another contribution of this research.

Third, this research studies the overt content of the speeches and argues that the 'themes' for understanding the rationale for Britain's post-Cold War engagement with Africa are: 'history', 'security', 'morality', and 'economy'. This finding corroborates assumptions made in

the literature, such as Tugendhat and Wallace (1988) – whose work predates the period of this study but who sought to forecast Britain’s foreign policy options in the 1990s. In addition, this research finds eleven ‘sub-themes’ that signify important nuances within these themes: ‘commonality rooted in colonial history’, ‘the Commonwealth’, ‘sport’, ‘Africa’s underdevelopment as a security threat’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘force projection’, ‘moral posturing’, ‘Christian values’, ‘party political messaging’, ‘Africa’s economic prosperity as mutually beneficial’, and ‘Africa’s economic prosperity as a (missed) opportunity for Britain’.

Fourth, this thesis focuses on the implicit content of the speeches, centring on discursive strategies – such as who is included and excluded when prime ministers use ‘we-groups’, as well as the types of metaphors they use in relation to Africa. In doing so, this research identifies four ‘discourses’ that show different conceptions of British national identity. These are: ‘paternalism’, ‘tutelage’, ‘partnership’, and ‘insecure former empire’. While there has been a shift in discourse from ‘paternalism’ to ‘partnership’ over this period of study, there is also a concurrent discourse that has remained constant throughout this period and signals British reluctance to renounce its imperial identity entirely.

Fifth, this research provides potential explanations for the continuities and discontinuities found in the themes and discourses, and provides avenues for building on this research. This research argues that the discontinuities in prime ministers’ discourses in relation to Africa can be explained by a variety of factors including prime ministers’ party affiliation, their personalities, and broader changes that took place around the period focused on in this thesis. For example, differences in British prime ministers’ references to Africa in relation to

Britain's economy correlate to the party affiliation of the prime minister. Whereas the two Labour prime ministers refer to Africa's increasing economic prosperity and freedom as a source of increased African agency which is mutually beneficial for Britain, Africa, and the world, the two Conservative prime ministers tend to refer to Africa's rapidly growing economy as a zero-sum economic opportunity for Britain. In other areas, prime ministers' individual personalities help explain their discourses about Africa and, in turn, the construction of British national identity. For instance, Major focused on sports to suggest common values between Britain and Africa in an uncontroversial way that transcends politics. This thesis also argues that the young age at which Blair and Cameron entered office, their perceived inexperience by the media and their opposition, and that both entered office after their parties had spent a long period in opposition helps to explain the similarities in their discourses around projecting hard power in Africa. There are other changes that occurred around the period of focus in this thesis that may explain the broad shift in discourse from paternalism to partnership, such as increased African agency and post-Cold War optimism about the triumph of liberal values. Yet for all these explanations centred on the discontinuities in prime ministers' discourses about Africa, this thesis has also shown that there is considerable continuity throughout this period – particularly in relation to British prime ministers' discourses about security in Africa and the notion of Africa as a moral cause. The explanation for this continuity is that British prime ministers value the power projection and economic opportunities that come from this national identity.

Sixth, this thesis maps the literature regarding the rationale for post-Cold War UK-Africa engagement, and it makes a number of important contributions to the debates in the current

literature. The contribution of this research to debates in the literature is detailed in the next section.

10.2 Situating This Research In The Existing Literature

This thesis has engaged with, developed, and challenged key debates in the existing literature throughout. The most notable contributions it makes are presented in this section. It primarily builds on the existing literature by focusing on prime ministers who were ignored in the literature because of their apparent insignificance – often Major and Brown – or because the literature around Cameron’s premiership is still growing.

This research finds that in contrast to the argument made by Martin and Garnett (1997: 58) that, under Major, the Commonwealth was ‘an institution relegated to the back burner’, this thesis finds that the Commonwealth is a powerful imagined community in his speeches. Its role in these speeches is to project a British national identity of *primus inter pares* – that is, first among equals. This under-appreciation of the role of Commonwealth stems from a consideration of the institution in strictly policy terms, rather than its role in less overt ways. The Commonwealth occupies an important role in Major’s narration of British national identity in relation to Africa in terms of history and morality. Therefore, it is also inaccurate for Williams (2005a) to argue that it ‘remained’ an institution of little importance under New Labour. This research argues that there has been an increasing decline in emphasis on the Commonwealth from Major to Cameron. However, this should be qualified by the

acknowledgement that in the lead up to the vote on Britain's membership of the European Union, there was a slight resurgence in references to the Commonwealth under Cameron.

Further, this thesis makes a number of important contributions in relation to UK-Africa narratives framed in terms of security. This thesis supports the finding by Abrahamsen (2005) that Britain's engagement with Africa moved towards a category of 'risk/threat' post-9/11. However, the thematic content analysis in Chapter 7 provided evidence of this securitisation of Africa before 9/11, and even in the speeches of Major. While this does not contradict the argument made by Abrahamsen, as she cites Blair's 2001 Labour Party conference speech as evidence of the 'ongoing' securitisation of the continent, the confirmation in this dataset of Africa being presented as a security threat in speeches years prior to 9/11 is an important contribution to discussions of the securitisation of UK Africa relations.

In a similar manner, this research concurs with findings around peacekeeping by Pugh *et al.* (2013) and Daddow and Schnapper (2013), but disagrees with their assertions about when these changes took place. Both argue that Cameron learnt from Blair's intervention in Iraq, and used a less ideological, less controversial 'post-interventionist' approach. This research has found evidence of this rhetoric in the speeches of Brown which therefore pre-dates their arguments. Their unquestioning focus on Cameron's premiership as an indication of change in policy whilst ignoring Brown's premiership is short-sighted. Pugh *et al.* make no reference to Brown in their article, whilst Daddow and Schnapper only reference him twice in passing.

In the morality chapter, this thesis finds a wealth of evidence to support the argument by Gallagher (2013) that under Blair, Britain's relationship with Africa represented a new approach focused on the state's capacity to embody and represent good. That is, attempting to 'do good' in Africa enabled the formation of a conception of the British state as involved in a disinterested, idealised project. However, this research also builds on this by finding that Cameron echoed many of Blair's arguments in this respect, in contrast to Major and Brown – for whom Africa is not an explicit moral cause.

As well as expanding the timeframe of the research on UK-Africa relations, this research also responds to broader debates in the literature. In this respect, it is important to consider the competing arguments of Reid (2014) and Harrison (2013). Reid argues that Africa has long been seen in terms of economic opportunity, and although immediate contexts have changed over time, international engagement with Africa remains essentially economic and military. By contrast, Harrison (2013) argues that British campaigning around Africa has mainly (although not exclusively) been a 'conversation' about the moral nature of Britishness. This thesis finds that while Reid's argument is somewhat applicable to Cameron and Major, and Harrison's argument captures some of Blair's focus on Africa, neither of these explanations adequately capture the nuances found in this thesis. Both of these arguments must be combined in order to appreciate British prime ministers' references to Africa over the period 1990-2016, and their implications for British national identity.

This research has also added to smaller debates in the literature, such as to the literature on the role of sports in UK-Africa relations under Major. It does not support or contradict the

argument by Nauright and Amara (2018: 2) that Major saw Africa as holding ‘a vast reserve army of athletic talent that could be used as sports labor [sic] in the global sports economy’. However, it does add to this literature by showing in some detail in section 6.2.3 that sports played an important role in allowing Major to talk about the relationship between Britain and Africa and suggest a sense of shared history and values.

This chapter has detailed ways in which this research has made original contributions to knowledge and progressed debates in the existing literature. In doing so, it shows why this research matters. However, there is also one further point to emphasise on why this research is important: this thesis has made notable findings by focusing on continuities and discontinuities over a significant period. In the existing literature, however, the tendency to focus on prime ministers deemed to be more consequential has led to gaps in understanding. In this field of research it has led to an over-emphasis on Blair, and an underappreciation of Major and Brown’s administrations. The next section explores two ways this research can be expanded on.

10.3 Further Research

There are a number of ways the research in this thesis can be expanded upon. This section sets out two ways this can be achieved. The first changes the timeframe to focus specifically on the role of Africa in the construction of British national identity in the post-Brexit context; the political landscape is too volatile for this to be feasible currently. The second applies the framework used here to the French context. In particular, by looking at how

French presidents talk about France's relationship with its former African colonies (Françafrique) and the discursive construction of French national identity.

10.3.1 The Post-Brexit Context

On 23rd June 2016, Britain voted to withdraw from the European Union, a process commonly referred to as Brexit (a portmanteau of 'British' and 'exit'). Brexit has profound implications for Britain's place in the world, including Britain's relationship with Africa. As detailed in Chapter 3, one of the reasons for the time period chosen for this study (1990-2016) is that the context during this time remained similar enough to allow for meaningful comparison across these four prime ministers in the post-Cold War period.

The Brexit vote, however, has been described as the biggest political change for Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Penny and O'Donnell, 2016). This context is so different that it requires investigating in itself – and as such is an area that should be explored in further research. The high level of uncertainty and fluctuation in British politics at the time of the publication of this thesis means it is currently difficult to make clear arguments about the post-Brexit vote context.

In August 2018, Theresa May made a brief tour of Africa in the middle of Brexit negotiations. Although much media attention focused on May dancing with school children in Cape Town and scouts in Nairobi, the speeches she gave are noteworthy and should be studied in more detail. During her three day visit, she travelled to South Africa, Nigeria and

Kenya – all Commonwealth countries – and was accompanied by a 29-member trade delegation (Sabbagh, 2018). May was clear that her intention was to ‘deepen and strengthen [Britain’s] global partnerships’ (Madowo, 2018) as it prepared to leave the EU. However, she also touched on other themes highlighted in this thesis. Her agenda included security issues as she spoke of the threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the role of British forces based in Kenya helping fight al-Shabab in Somalia.

This visit was the subject of much discussion in the press, and further academic research could situate it in the broader context of post-Cold War UK-Africa literature. The Telegraph hailed May’s visit as an ‘important signal of renewed British political and economic interest in Africa. It was long overdue: a British prime minister has not visited Africa since 2013, and there has been a comparative decline in the UK’s visibility in many parts of the continent over the last decade, just as many other states, including France, Turkey, China and Japan, have been upgrading their Africa engagement’ (Vines, 2018). Other news organisations were more sceptical about May’s visit; Quartz Africa used the comic headline: ‘New phone, who dis? The United Kingdom is looking for new post-Brexit friends in Africa’ (Kazeem, 2018).

On 24th July 2019, Boris Johnson became British prime minister. He has not yet delivered a speech in relation to Africa, but his past record indicates that his view of the relationship between Britain and Africa may display marked discontinuities from previous prime ministers. Responding to Blair’s quote that ‘Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world’, Johnson wrote in his Spectator column that Africa ‘may be a blot, but it is not a blot upon our conscience. The problem is not that we were once in charge, but that we are not in charge any more’ (Johnson, 2002). As foreign secretary, Johnson told the Financial Times

that his post-Brexit vision includes “unparalleled” ties with the Commonwealth’ – and that, in Africa, Britain is doing more than just sending aid. ‘We’re opening about 10 new embassies there. We’re opening embassies in, well, the Pacific, in the Caribbean. The flag is going up around the world rather than coming down’ (Payne, 2019). Arguments linking Brexit to nostalgia for the British Empire or ‘British Empire 2.0’ should, in particular, be explored in more detail in further research as they currently enjoy prominence in journalistic literature (Tharoor, 2017; Saunders, 2019) but are not yet properly scrutinised in academic literature (see Sykes, 2018: 152).

10.3.2 Françafrique and French National Identity

Africa also occupies a significant place in French consciousness and national identity. France’s relationship with its former African colonies is known as ‘Françafrique’. As noted in Chapter 5, Major said that Britain and France have a joint obligation to Africa, and that this obligation is rooted in their historic ties to Africa (JM95d).¹⁶⁵ These historical ties manifest themselves in a variety of ways. Yates (2018) points out that France has a history of military intervention and peacekeeping operations in Africa – including recent operations such as Mali (Operation Serval), the Sahel (Operation Barkhane), and the Central African Republic (Operation Sangaris). France also has a large African diaspora community who make substantial contributions to French arts, culture and sports; many of France’s best football players are from African diaspora communities and propelled them to victory in the FIFA

¹⁶⁵ John Major (30th October, 1995), joint press conference with President Chirac, London, UK.

World Cup in 1998 and 2018. This context would make for interesting research in how ‘Frenchness’ is defined by French presidents, and would make for a good extension to this research by applying the same framework to a study of speeches by French presidents with a focus on French national identity.

Emmanuel Macron was elected at the age of 39, becoming the youngest ever president of France. In a speech at Ouagadougou University in Burkina Faso, he uses a similar framing to Cameron to distance himself from France’s colonial history by focusing on his youth. He stated: **‘I am from a generation that doesn’t come to tell Africans what to do.** I am from a generation for whom Nelson Mandela’s victory is one of the best political memories. I will not stand by those who say the African continent is one of crises and misery. I will be alongside those who believe that Africa is neither a lost continent or one that needs to be saved’ (O’Connor, 2017). Six years earlier, in a speech to the Pan-African University in Nigeria (DC11f)¹⁶⁶, Cameron had set out a similar argument in very similar language: ‘I passionately believe in liberal democracy... and I believe Africa can do it too. Let me be clear: this isn’t about imposing Western beliefs on Africa or neo-colonialism. **I’m from the generation free of this shadow.** I wasn’t even born when Harold MacMillan made his winds of change speech.’

François Mitterrand, French minister of the interior (and later France’s longest ever serving president) wrote in 1957: ‘sans l’Afrique il n’y aura pas d’histoire de la France au XXI^e siècle’

¹⁶⁶ David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan-African University, Lagos, Nigeria.

(Le Monde, 2017) – meaning ‘without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st century’. Yet French presidents have not always chosen their words in relation to Africa so carefully. In Nicolas Sarkozy’s infamous 2007 Dakar speech, which was supposed to emphasise partnership and African renaissance, he caused outrage by saying that the African man had failed to ‘enter into history’ (Cumming, 2013). A decade later, Emmanuel Macron also received heavy criticism for his assertion that ‘civilisational’ problems and women having ‘seven or eight children’ were hampering development in African nations (Dearden, 2017).

In 2012, François Hollande claimed on visiting Senegal that ‘the time of La Françafrique is over’ (France 24, 2017). Yet such a claim is perhaps more rhetoric than reality. Haski (2013) argues that Hollande strengthened France’s ties with Africa, recognising that ‘Africa – and not only the French-speaking countries – is France’s hinterland, an integral part of its past, but also of its future. With new generations rising and high global growth rates in many countries, Africa offers new opportunities for a European nation with diminishing global clout’.

These two competing visions of France’s relationship with Africa and its implications for French national identity has parallels with the central finding of this thesis about British national identity. British prime ministers’ discourses of Africa in the post-Cold War period reveal an attempt to shape a new British national identity around partnership with Africa instead of paternalism. Yet, at the same time, continuities in prime ministers’ discourses

throughout this period signal an unwillingness to entirely reject Britain's old imperial identity and the power projection and economic opportunities that offers Britain.

APPENDIX A

List of Speeches

This appendix contains a list of all the speeches that met the inclusion criteria (see Chapter 3). Most were gathered from online archives, but some are from the Conservative and Labour Party archives. They are listed chronologically and have been labelled and numbered, and are referenced using the prime ministers initials and year of speech in the body of the thesis. Hyperlinks have been used where possible so that in the digital version these speeches can be checked. All hyperlinks were correct at the time of data collection.

No.	Speech ref	Speaker (+ URL or archive)	Date	Location
1	JM90a	John Major [Archive]	29/11/1990	Altrincham and Sale Conservative Association Dinner, Cresta Court Hotel, Manchester, UK
2	JM90b	John Major [URL]	15/12/1990	European Council meeting, Rome, Italy
3	JM91a	John Major [URL]	01/02/1991	London, UK
4	JM91b	John Major [URL]	11/02/1991	Federal Chancellor's office, Bonn, Germany
5	JM91c	John Major [Archive]	15/04/1991	EBRD, London, UK
6	JM91d	John Major [URL]	08/07/1991	Sunday Times Environmental Conference, London, UK
7	JM91e	John Major [URL]	19/09/1991	National Sporting Club at the

				Café Royal, London, UK
8	JM91f	John Major [URL]	25/09/1991	Windsor Fellowship, London, UK
9	JM91g	John Major [URL]	11/10/1991	Blackpool, UK
10	JM91h	John Major [URL]	17/10/1991	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Harare, Zimbabwe
11	JM91i	John Major [URL]	18/10/1991	Harare, Zimbabwe
12	JM91j	John Major [URL]	21/10/1991	Harare, Zimbabwe
13	JM92a	John Major [Archive]	24/03/1992	Conservative Central Office, London, UK
14	JM92b	John Major [URL]	16/10/1992	Birmingham, UK
15	JM92c	John Major [URL]	24/10/1992	Cairo, Egypt
16	JM93a	John Major [URL]	24/03/1993	Global Technology Partnership Venture Conference, Birmingham, UK
17	JM93b	John Major [URL]	16/06/1993	London, UK
18	JM93c	John Major [URL]	20/09/1993	Nikkeiren Economic Organisation, Tokyo, Japan
19	JM94a	John Major [URL]	03/06/1994	World Environment Day, QEII Conference Centre, London, UK
20	JM94b	John Major [URL]	28/07/1994	Conservative Middle East Council, London, UK
21	JM94c	John Major [URL]	07/09/1994	Leiden University, the Netherlands
22	JM94d	John Major [URL]	20/09/1994	Cape Town, South Africa
23	JM94e	John Major [URL]	20/09/1994	Cape Town, South Africa

24	JM94f	John Major [URL]	20/09/1994	South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa
25	JM94g	John Major [URL]	21/09/1994	Alexandra Township Cricket Ground, South Africa
26	JM94h	John Major [URL]	21/09/1994	Alexandra Township Cricket Ground, South Africa
27	JM94i	John Major [URL]	21/09/1994	Ivory Park Primary School, Tembisa, South Africa
28	JM94j	John Major [URL]	21/09/1994	Johannesburg, South Africa
29	JM94k	John Major [URL]	21/09/1994	Johannesburg, South Africa
30	JM94l	John Major [URL]	22/09/1994	Pretoria, South Africa
31	JM94m	John Major [URL]	14/10/1994	Bournemouth, UK
32	JM94n	John Major [URL]	26/10/1994	Institute of Education, London, UK
33	JM94o	John Major [URL]	18/11/1994	Chartres, France
34	JM94p	John Major [URL]	24/11/1994	Army Staff College, Camberley, UK
35	JM95a	John Major [URL]	24/01/1995	British Retail Consortium, London, UK
36	JM95b	John Major [URL]	29/03/1995	Britain in the World Conference, London, UK
37	JM95c	John Major [URL]	04/04/1995	Washington D.C, USA
38	JM95d	John Major [URL]	30/10/1995	London, UK
39	JM95e	John Major [URL]	09/11/1995	Auckland, Australia
40	JM95f	John Major [URL]	12/11/1995	Auckland, Australia
41	JM96a	John Major [URL]	23/03/1996	Western European Union Assembly, London

42	JM96b	John Major [URL]	20/04/1996	Moscow, Russia
43	JM96c	John Major [URL]	29/02/1996	Standard Chartered Bank, Bangkok, Thailand
44	JM96d	John Major [URL]	10/07/1996	CBI/RIIA/ COSAT Investment Conference, South Africa
45	JM96e	John Major [URL]	08/11/1996	Bordeaux, France
46	JM97a	John Major [URL]	09/01/1997	Calcutta, India
47	JM97b	John Major [URL]	09/01/1997	Calcutta, India
48	JM97c	John Major [URL]	12/02/1997	London, UK
1	TB97a	Tony Blair [URL / URL / URL]	23/06/1997	UN General Assembly on the Environment and Sustainable Development, New York, USA
2	TB97b	Tony Blair [URL]	22/10/1997	Commonwealth Business Forum, London, UK
3	TB98a	Tony Blair [URL]	24/03/1998	French National Assembly, France
4	TB98b	Tony Blair [Archive]	21/09/1998	UN General Assembly, New York
5	TB98c	Tony Blair [URL]	29/09/1998	Blackpool, UK
6	TB99a	Tony Blair [URL]	24/04/1999	Economic Club, Chicago, USA
7	TB99b	Tony Blair [URL]	28/09/1999	Bournemouth, UK
8	TB00a	Tony Blair [Archive]	18/01/2000	WEF, Davos, Switzerland
9	TB00b	Tony Blair [URL]	02/03/2000	Active Community Convention and Awards, London, UK
10	TB00c	Tony Blair [URL]	13/11/2000	Mansion House Speech,

				London, UK
11	TB01a	Tony Blair [URL]	23/02/2001	Canadian Parliament, Canada
12	TB01b	Tony Blair [URL]	06/03/2001	London, UK
13	TB01c	Tony Blair [URL]	15/03/2001	AMEC Yard, Wallsend, UK
14	TB01d	Tony Blair [URL]	29/03/2001	Westminster Central Hall, London, UK
15	TB01e	Tony Blair [Archive]	14/06/2001	London
16	TB01f	Tony Blair [URL]	02/10/2001	Brighton, UK
17	TB01g	Tony Blair [Archive]	11/10/2001	Egypt
18	TB01h	Tony Blair [URL]	12/11/2001	Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK
19	TB01i	Tony Blair [URL]	30/12/2001	Unspecified domestic
20	TB02a	Tony Blair [URL]	05/01/2002	Bangalore, India
21	TB02b	Tony Blair [URL]	02/02/2002	Ghana
22	TB02c	Tony Blair [URL]	07/02/2002 [?]	Nigerian Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria
23	TB02d	Tony Blair [URL]	12/03/2002	LSE, London, UK
24	TB02e	Tony Blair [URL]	07/04/2002	George Bush Senior Presidential Library, USA
25	TB02f	Tony Blair [URL]	28/06/2002	G8 summit, Canada
26	TB02g	Tony Blair [URL]	02/09/2002	World Summit on Sustainable Development, South Africa
27	TB02h	Tony Blair [URL]	10/09/2002	TUC Conference, Blackpool, UK
28	TB02i	Tony Blair [URL]	11/11/2002	Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK

29	TB03a	Tony Blair [URL]	01/01/2003	Unspecified domestic
30	TB03b	Tony Blair [URL]	07/01/2003	Foreign Office Conference, London, UK
31	TB03c	Tony Blair [URL]	24/02/2003	London, UK
32	TB03d	Tony Blair [URL]	23/03/2003	Speech broadcasted to British troops
33	TB03e	Tony Blair [URL]	07/05/2003	10 Downing Street, UK
34	TB03f	Tony Blair [URL]	30/05/2003	Warsaw, Poland
35	TB03g	Tony Blair [URL]	02/06/2003	G8 summit, Évian-les-Bains, France
36	TB03h	Tony Blair [URL]	17/07/2003	White House, Washington D.C., USA
37	TB03i	Tony Blair [URL]	18/07/2003	US Congress, Washington D.C., USA
38	TB03j	Tony Blair [URL]	10/11/2003	Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK
39	TB03k	Tony Blair [URL]	24/11/2003	Anglo-French Summit, London, UK
40	TB03l	Tony Blair [URL]	06/12/2003	Nigeria
41	TB03m	Tony Blair [URL]	16/12/2003	Unspecified domestic
42	TB03n	Tony Blair [URL]	05/01/2004	10 Downing Street, UK
43	TB04a	Tony Blair [URL]	05/03/2004	Sedgefield, UK
44	TB04b	Tony Blair [URL]	25/03/2004	Tripoli, Libya
45	TB04c	Tony Blair [URL]	26/04/2004	10 Downing Street, UK
46	TB04d	Tony Blair [URL]	27/04/2004	CBI, London, UK
47	TB04e	Tony Blair [URL]	27/04/2004	Launch of Climate Group, London, UK

48	TB04f	Tony Blair [URL]	14/08/2004	London, UK
49	TB04g	Tony Blair [URL]	07/10/2004	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
50	TB04h	Tony Blair [URL]	07/10/2004	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
51	TB04i	Tony Blair [URL]	19/10/2004	Downing Street, London, UK
52	TB04j	Tony Blair [URL]	03/11/2004	Downing Street, London, UK
53	TB04k	Tony Blair [URL]	15/11/2004	Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK
54	TB05a	Tony Blair [URL]	26/01/2005	Davos, Switzerland
55	TB05b	Tony Blair [URL]	11/03/2005	British Museum, London, UK
56	TB05c	Tony Blair [URL]	22/03/2005	London, UK
57	TB05d	Tony Blair [URL]	06/05/2005	10 Downing Street, UK
58	TB05e	Tony Blair [URL]	23/06/2005	EU Parliament
59	TB05f	Tony Blair [URL]	14/09/2005	UN Security Council on terrorism, New York
60	TB05g	Tony Blair [URL]	15/09/2005	UN World Summit, New York
61	TB05h	Tony Blair [URL]	16/09/2005	UN World Summit, New York
62	TB05i	Tony Blair [URL]	26/10/2005	EU Parliament, Strasbourg, France
63	TB05j	Tony Blair [URL]	14/11/2005	Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK
64	TB05k	Tony Blair [URL]	25/11/2005	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Malta
65	TB05l	Tony Blair [URL]	08/12/2005	EastWest Institute, Statesman of the Decade award to Tony Blair, London, UK
66	TB05m	Tony Blair [URL]	31/12/2005	Unspecified domestic

67	TB06a	Tony Blair [URL]	11/02/2006	South Africa
68	TB06b	Tony Blair [URL]	12/02/2006	South Africa
69	TB06c	Tony Blair [URL]	12/02/2006	South Africa
70	TB06d	Tony Blair [URL]	14/02/2006	Kliptown, South Africa
71	TB06e	Tony Blair [URL]	14/02/2006	Kliptown, South Africa
72	TB06f	Tony Blair [URL]	17/02/2006	Berlin, Germany
73	TB06g	Tony Blair [URL]	27/03/2006	Parliament of Australia
74	TB06h	Tony Blair [URL]	03/04/2006	Ruach Ministries Christian Centre, Brixton, UK
75	TB06i	Tony Blair [URL]	04/04/2006	Online (MSN webchat)
76	TB06j	Tony Blair [URL]	25/04/2006	Unspecified domestic
77	TB06k	Tony Blair [URL]	16/05/2006	CBI annual dinner, London, UK
78	TB06l	Tony Blair [URL]	23/05/2006	10 Downing Street, UK
79	TB06m	Tony Blair [URL]	24/05/2006	10 Downing Street, UK
80	TB06n	Tony Blair [URL]	26/05/2006	Georgetown University, USA
81	TB06o	Tony Blair [URL]	26/06/2006	King's College London, UK
82	TB06p	Tony Blair [URL]	04/07/2006	Unspecified domestic
83	TB06q	Tony Blair [URL]	11/07/2006	10 Downing Street, UK
84	TB06r	Tony Blair [URL]	17/07/2006	G8 Summit, St Petersburg, Russia
85	TB06s	Tony Blair [URL]	30/07/2006	Pebble Beach, California, USA
86	TB06t	Tony Blair [URL]	01/08/2006	Los Angeles World Affairs Council, USA
87	TB07a	Tony Blair [URL]	12/01/2007	HMS Albion, Plymouth, UK

88	TB07b	Tony Blair [URL]	27/01/2007	WEF, Davos, Switzerland
89	TB07c	Tony Blair [URL]	06/03/2007	Tate Modern, London, UK
90	TB07d	Tony Blair [URL]	14/03/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
91	TB07e	Tony Blair [URL]	25/03/2007	Video speech broadcast in Elmina Castle, Ghana
92	TB07f	Tony Blair [URL]	25/03/2007	Berlin, Germany
93	TB07g	Tony Blair [URL]	18/04/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
94	TB07h	Tony Blair [URL]	24/04/2007	Berlin, Germany
95	TB07i	Tony Blair [URL]	27/04/2007	Unspecified domestic
96	TB07j	Tony Blair [URL]	10/05/2007	Trimdon Labour Club, Sedgfield, UK
97	TB07k	Tony Blair [URL]	24/05/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
98	TB07l	Tony Blair [URL]	30/05/2007	Freetown, Sierra Leone
99	TB07m	Tony Blair [URL]	30/05/2007	Sierra Leone
100	TB07n	Tony Blair [URL]	30/05/2007	South Africa
101	TB07o	Tony Blair [URL]	31/05/2007	South Africa
102	TB07p	Tony Blair [URL]	31/05/2007	South Africa
103	TB07q	Tony Blair [URL]	01/06/2007	South Africa
104	TB07r	Tony Blair [URL]	07/06/2007	G8 Summit, Germany
105	TB07s	Tony Blair [URL]	08/06/2007	G8 Summit, Germany
1	GB07a	Gordon Brown [URL]	24/06/2007	Manchester, UK
2	GB07b	Gordon Brown [URL]	12/07/2007	London, UK
3	GB07c	Gordon Brown [URL]	16/07/2007	Berlin, Germany

4	GB07d	Gordon Brown [URL]	20/07/2007	Paris, France
5	GB07e	Gordon Brown [URL]	23/07/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
6	GB07f	Gordon Brown [URL]	30/07/2007	Camp David, USA
7	GB07g	Gordon Brown [URL]	31/07/2007	United Nations
8	GB07h	Gordon Brown [URL]	23/08/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
9	GB07i	Gordon Brown [URL]	28/08/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
10	GB07j	Gordon Brown [URL]	29/08/2007	Parliament Square, London, UK
11	GB07k	Gordon Brown [URL]	06/09/2007	International Health Partnership, London, UK
12	GB07l	Gordon Brown [URL]	20/09/2007	Unspecified domestic (to journalists)
13	GB07m	Gordon Brown [URL]	09/10/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
14	GB07n	Gordon Brown [URL]	11/10/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
15	GB07o	Gordon Brown [URL]	16/10/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
16	GB07p	Gordon Brown [URL]	18/10/2007	EU Council, Lisbon, Portugal
17	GB07q	Gordon Brown [URL]	19/10/2007	EU Council, Lisbon, Portugal
18	GB07r	Gordon Brown [URL]	12/11/2007	Lord Mayor's Banquet Speech, London, UK
19	GB07s	Gordon Brown [URL / URL]	23/11/2007	St Peter's Primary School, Nsambya Uganda
20	GB07t	Gordon Brown [URL]	27/11/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
21	GB07u	Gordon Brown [URL]	30/11/2007	10 Downing Street, UK
22	GB07v	Gordon Brown [URL]	30/11/2007	Unspecified domestic
23	GB08a	Gordon Brown [URL]	21/01/2008	Delhi, India

24	GB08b	Gordon Brown [URL]	20/02/2008	Camden, London, UK
25	GB08c	Gordon Brown [URL]	10/03/2008	Unspecified domestic
26	GB08d	Gordon Brown [URL]	16/04/2008	UN Security Council
27	GB08e	Gordon Brown [URL]	18/04/2008	JFK Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, USA
28	GB08f	Gordon Brown [URL]	06/05/2008	Canary Wharf, London, UK
29	GB08g	Gordon Brown [URL]	19/05/2008	Google Zeitgeist Conference, Hertfordshire, UK
30	GB08h	Gordon Brown [URL]	19/05/2008	Church of Scotland General Assembly, Scotland, UK
31	GB08i	Gordon Brown [URL]	10/06/2008	10 Downing Street, UK
32	GB08j	Gordon Brown [URL]	12/06/2008	Unspecified domestic (to journalists)
33	GB08k	Gordon Brown [URL]	13/06/2008	10 Downing Street, UK
34	GB08l	Gordon Brown [URL]	16/06/2008	10 Downing Street, UK
35	GB08m	Gordon Brown [URL]	17/06/2008	Lancaster House, UK
36	GB08n	Gordon Brown [URL]	24/06/2008	EU Council, Brussels, Belgium
37	GB08o	Gordon Brown [URL]	09/07/2008	Japan
38	GB08p	Gordon Brown [URL]	14/07/2008	Union for the Mediterranean Summit, Paris, France
39	GB08q	Gordon Brown [URL]	15/07/2008	Unspecified domestic (to journalists)
40	GB08r	Gordon Brown [URL]	18/07/2008	10 Downing Street, UK
41	GB08s	Gordon Brown [URL]	21/07/2008	Knesset, Jerusalem, Israel
42	GB08t	Gordon Brown [URL]	24/07/2008	Lambeth Palace, UK
43	GB08u	Gordon Brown	25/09/2008	New York, USA

		[Archive]		
44	GB08v	Gordon Brown [URL]	25/09/2008	UN, New York, USA
45	GB08w	Gordon Brown [URL]	26/09/2008	New York, USA
46	GB08x	Gordon Brown [Archive]	26/09/2008	Education Fund, New York, USA
47	GB08y	Gordon Brown [Archive]	26/09/2008	New York, USA
48	GB08z	Gordon Brown [Archive]	26/09/2008	New York, USA
49	GB08aa	Gordon Brown [URL]	14/10/2008	10 Downing Street, UK
50	GB08bb	Gordon Brown [Archive]	27/10/2008	Renaissance Foundation, London, UK
51	GB08cc	Gordon Brown [URL]	06/11/2008	London, UK
52	GB08dd	Gordon Brown [URL]	10/11/2008	Lord Mayor's Banquet speech, London, UK
53	GB08ee	Gordon Brown [URL]	13/11/2008	Interfaith Conference, New York, USA
54	GB08ff	Gordon Brown [Archive]	17/11/2008	London, UK
55	GB08gg	Gordon Brown [Archive]	10/12/2008	Lancaster House, London, UK
56	GB09a	Gordon Brown [URL]	09/02/2009	Lancaster House, London, UK
57	GB09b	Gordon Brown [URL]	31/03/2009	St Paul's Cathedral, London, UK
58	GB09c	Gordon Brown [URL]	10/05/2009	Bournemouth, UK
59	GB09d	Gordon Brown [URL]	23/09/2009	UN General Assembly, New York, USA
60	GB09e	Gordon Brown [URL]	16/11/2009	Lord Mayor's Banquet,

				London, UK
61	GB10a	Gordon Brown [URL]	19/02/2010	London, UK
62	GB10b	Gordon Brown [URL]	11/05/2010	Labour HQ, London, UK
1	DC10a	David Cameron [URL]	24/06/2010	HMS Ark Royal
2	DC10b	David Cameron [URL]	13/08/2010	Sandhurst, UK
3	DC10c	David Cameron [URL]	15/11/2010	Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK
4	DC11a	David Cameron [URL]	29/03/2011	London, UK
5	DC11b	David Cameron [URL]	13/04/2011	Paris, France
6	DC11c	David Cameron [URL]	14/04/2011	Romsey, Hampshire, UK
7	DC11d	David Cameron [URL]	27/05/2011	G8 Summit, Deauville, France
8	DC11e	David Cameron [URL]	18/07/2011	Pretoria, South Africa
9	DC11f	David Cameron [URL]	19/07/2011	Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria
10	DC11g	David Cameron [URL]	25/07/2011	10 Downing Street, UK
11	DC11h	David Cameron [URL]	22/08/2011	10 Downing Street, UK
12	DC11i	David Cameron [URL]	12/09/2011	Moscow, Russia
13	DC11j	David Cameron [URL]	22/09/2011	UN General Assembly
14	DC11k	David Cameron [URL]	16/12/2011	Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford, UK
15	DC12a	David Cameron [URL]	26/01/2012	Davos, Switzerland
16	DC12b	David Cameron [URL + URL pt2]	13/04/2012	University of Nottingham, Malaysia
17	DC12c	David Cameron [URL]	11/07/2012	Family Planning Summit,

				London, UK
18	DC12d	David Cameron [URL]	26/07/2012	Global Investment Conference, London, UK
19	DC12e	David Cameron [URL]	01/08/2012	Global Health Policy Summit
20	DC12f	David Cameron [URL]	12/08/2012	Hunger Summit, 10 Downing Street, London, UK
21	DC12g	David Cameron [URL]	10/10/2012	ICC, Birmingham, UK
22	DC12h	David Cameron [URL]	05/11/2012	Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, UAE
23	DC12i	David Cameron [URL]	12/11/2012	Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK
24	DC12j	David Cameron [URL]	19/11/2012	CBI, London
25	DC13a	David Cameron [URL]	17/01/2013	Unspecified domestic
26	DC13b	David Cameron [URL]	20/01/2013	Unspecified domestic
27	DC13c	David Cameron [URL]	24/01/2013	World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland
28	DC13d	David Cameron [URL]	15/03/2013	EU Council, Brussels, Belgium
29	DC13e	David Cameron [URL]	04/04/2013	Thales UK, Govan, Scotland
30	DC13f	David Cameron [URL]	07/05/2013	Somali Conference, London, UK
31	DC13g	David Cameron [URL]	08/06/2013	G8 Nutrition for Growth, London, UK
32	DC13h	David Cameron [URL]	15/06/2013	G8 Open for Growth, Lancaster House, UK
33	DC13i	David Cameron [URL]	06/09/2013	G20 Summit, Russia
34	DC13j	David Cameron [URL]	02/10/2013	Manchester, UK
35	DC13k	David Cameron [URL]	02/12/2013	China

36	DC13l	David Cameron [URL]	05/12/2013	Unspecified domestic
37	DC14a	David Cameron [URL]	25/04/2014	Unspecified domestic
38	DC14b	David Cameron [URL]	09/06/2014	International festival for business
39	DC14c	David Cameron [URL]	10/07/2014	10 Downing Street, UK
40	DC14d	David Cameron [URL]	25/09/2014	UN General Assembly
41	DC14e	David Cameron [URL]	09/10/2014	10 Downing Street, UK
42	DC14f	David Cameron [URL]	24/10/2014	European Council, Brussels, Belgium
43	DC14g	David Cameron [URL]	13/11/2014	Australia
44	DC14h	David Cameron [URL]	28/11/2014	JCB, Staffordshire, UK
45	DC15a	David Cameron [URL]	21/05/2015	10 Downing Street, UK
46	DC15b	David Cameron [URL]	19/06/2015	GLOBSEC, Bratislava
47	DC15c	David Cameron [URL] URL	27/09/2015	Unspecified international
48	DC15d	David Cameron [URL]	08/10/2015	Manchester, UK
49	DC15e	David Cameron [URL]	10/11/2015	Chatham House, London, UK
50	DC15f	David Cameron [URL]	11/11/2015	HMS Bulwark, Malta
51	DC15g	David Cameron [URL]	16/11/2015	Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, UK
52	DC15h	David Cameron [URL]	09/12/2015	Bucharest, Romania
53	DC16a	David Cameron [URL]	23/02/2016	O2's Headquarters, Slough, UK
54	DC16b	David Cameron [URL]	03/03/2016	Amiens, France
55	DC16c	David Cameron [URL]	18/03/2016	Brussels, Belgium

56	DC16d	David Cameron [URL]	22/04/2016	Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, UK
57	DC16e	David Cameron [URL]	09/05/2016	British Museum, London, UK
58	DC16f	David Cameron [URL]	24/05/2016	easyJet, Luton, UK

APPENDIX B

Python Code to Extract Sentences

This appendix contains the Python code written and used to extract sentences, as described in Chapter 4. The code was run on Jupyter Notebook (Version 5.7.4), Python (Version 3.6), NLTK (Version 3.4.4).

The real-world use of this code is:

1. Determine which prime ministers' speech corpus to analyse;
2. Edit lines 16-19 to reflect the chosen prime minister (commenting out those not needed in this run);
3. Determine the list of keywords to select (history, security, morality or economy), checking the python list in lines 28-31;
4. Select the correct keyword list in line 40;
5. Modify the name of the output file to reflect the above choices in line 67;
6. Run the code;
7. Analyse the output text file

```

1. # coding: utf-8
2. # In[1]:
3. from nltk import sent_tokenize, word_tokenize
4.
5. # In[2]:
6. Cameron = open("speeches/David Cameron Speech Corpus.txt", "r", encoding="utf8")
7. Brown = open("speeches/Gordon Brown Speech Corpus.txt", "r", encoding="utf8")
8. Blair = open("speeches/Tony Blair Speech Corpus.txt", "r", encoding="utf8")
9. Major = open("speeches/John Major Speech Corpus.txt", "r", encoding="utf8")
10.
11. # In[3]:
12. print(Cameron.read())
13.
14. # In[4]:
15. # select the speech to use, via # comment
16. #speech = Cameron.read()
17. #speech = Brown.read()
18. #speech = Blair.read()
19. speech = Major.read()
20.
21. # In[8]:
22. # keyword list 1
23. africa = ['Africa', 'African', 'Algeria', 'Angola', 'Benin', 'Botswana', 'Burkina Faso',
    'Burundi', 'Cabo Verde', 'Cameroon', 'Central African Republic', 'Chad', 'Comoros', 'Congo', 'Democratic Republic of the Congo', 'DRC', 'Republic of the Congo', 'Cote d'Ivoire', 'Djibouti', 'Egypt', 'Equatorial Guinea', 'Eritrea', 'Eswatini', 'Swaziland', 'Ethiopia', 'Gabon', 'Gambia', 'Ghana', 'Guinea', 'Guinea-Bissau', 'Kenya', 'Lesotho', 'Liberia', 'Libya', 'Madagascar', 'Malawi', 'Mali', 'Mauritania', 'Mauritius', 'Morocco', 'Mozambique', 'Namibia', 'Niger', 'Nigeria', 'Rwanda', 'Sao Tome and Principe', 'Senegal', 'Seychelles', 'Sierra Leone', 'Somalia', 'South Africa', 'South Sudan', 'Sudan', 'Tanzania', 'Togo', 'Tunisia', 'Uganda', 'Zambia', 'Zimbabwe']
24.
25.
26. # In[9]:
27. #keywords to compare
28. keywords1 = ['history', 'historical', 'common values', 'common language', 'Common wealth', 'Empire', 'colonial', 'colonialism']
29. keywords2 = ['security', 'conflict', 'extremism', 'extremist', 'stability', 'instability', 'peacekeeping', 'terror', 'terrorism', 'terrorist', 'threat', 'war']
30. keywords3 = ['economy', 'economic', 'trade', 'investment', 'export', 'China']
31. keywords4 = ['moral', 'morality', 'corruption', 'duty', 'values', 'rights', 'Christian', 'Christianity']
32.
33. # In[14]:
34. sentences = sent_tokenize(speech.lower())
35.
36. # In[15]:
37. #sentence_number = 0
38. selected_sentences=[] # initialize a list to contain selected sentences
39. for index, sentence in enumerate(sentences):
40.     for keyword in keywords3: # select keyword lists 1-4 as necessary
41.         if keyword.lower() in word_tokenize(sentence):
42.             for word in africa:
43.                 if word.lower() in word_tokenize(sentence): # search same sentence
44.                     #sentence_number+=1
45.                     #print(sentence_number, sentence)

```

```

46.         selected_sentences.append(sentence)
47.         if word.lower() in word_tokenize(sentences[index-
1]): # search preceding sentence
48.             #sentence_number+=1
49.             #print(sentence_number, sentence)
50.             selected_sentences.append(sentence)
51.         if word.lower() in word_tokenize(sentences[index+1]): # search su
ceeding sentence
52.             #sentence_number+=1
53.             #print(sentence_number, sentence)
54.             selected_sentences.append(sentence)
55.
56. # In[16]:
57. print(selected_sentences)
58.
59. # In[17]:
60. # select unique sentences from list
61. print(set(selected_sentences))
62.
63. # In[19]:
64. # write selected sentences to a .txt file
65. # modify manually based on the above
66.
67. with open('extracted_sentences_major', 'w') as file:
68.     for item in set(selected_sentences):
69.         file.write("%s\n" % item)

```

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